formulating a plausible relativism

F O R M U L A T I N G A P L A U S I B L E R E L A T I V I S M

STEVE EDWARDS

Ralativism and realism are standardly regarded as mutually exlusive theses, akin to the purported exclusivity of subjectivism and objectivism. Yet, it can be shown that relativism requires that realism be true - or so it will be argued here. The first tasks that need to be undertaken are to make clear what relativism is and to identify the requirements of a plausible relativism. These tasks are now to be turned to.

Philosophers have spoken variously of at least nine varieties of relativism each of which must include some claim about truth, if only derivatively; such a claim about truth is required to transform an observation of diversity into a proposal of relativism. The nine varieties are the following; (i) moral relativism, (ii) conceptual relativism, (iii) relativism of truth, (iv) perceptual relativism, (v) relativism of reason (HoUis and Lukes 1982 pp. 5-11). To these five we might add (vi) linguistic relativism (cf. Rosch 1977), (vii) ontological relativism (Quine 1969), (viii) species relativism (cf. Munevar 1988) and (ix) cultural relativism. (The latter thesis can be conflated with conceptual relativism for the purposes of this paper - and is done by Hollis and Lukes (op. cit. p. 6).)

So two proposals have tacitly been made in relation to this list: first, that diversity is not sufficient for relativism, and second,that relativism of truth is both necessary and sufficient for relativisn't in general. 1 Given agreement on the two proposals, the nine varieties identified can be partitioned into two categories comprising strong and weak versions of relativism. 2 Roughly speaking, strong versions purport to allow room for mutual understanding and weak versions exclude mutual understanding in a sense to be made clear shortly.

Within the category of strong relativism, one can conceive of two ways in which a relativist thesis might be developed: first, by relativising truth to intertranslatable conceptual schemes; and second,

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by relativising truth to individual believers. In weak relativism, truth is relativised wholesale to incommensurable schemes. It will now be argued that strong relativism is the least plausible of the two categories of relativism distinguished. 3

First, it might not be allowed that knowledge and belief can be conflated in the way that strong relativism seems to require. It would appear to be a necessary feature of at least one class of beliefs that they fall short of knowledge. Smith might believe he was born in the UK only to discover later that this was not the case. The suggestion that Smith knew he was born in the UK though this later turned out to be false seems to involve a misuse of the word "know" (cf. Winch 1976 pp. 322-323) and seems to imply a misuse of the word "belief' (cf. Price 1934-5 p. 47). Knowing, it may be said, involves a greater degree of cognitive security than believing.

Second, the plausibility of the suggestion that the same statement, p, can have different truth conditions at the same time might also be considered problematic. The characteristic feature of strong relativism is that the truth value of the same statement is allegedly relativised - either to individuals at times or to communities at times. But consider how this could be possible. In translation of the speech of members of another linguistic community sentences of that language would, it seems, be paired with sentences of the home language which had the same truth conditions. Two sentences would not be paired if they had incompatible truth conditions. And the latter procedure is that required by the strong relativist. (Cf. Davidson 'Radical interpretation' in Davidson 1984; also Newton-Smith 1982, and 1981 p.35.)

The same argument may be recruited in opposition to the "individuals" version of strong relativism. For example, Smith interprets Jones' behaviour as an uttering of a sentence. Ordinarily Smith takes it to be the case that the sentence uttered by Jones is true if and only if (iff) that sentence is true. So consider that Jones utters p "Brown is six feet tall". For Smith, this is true is Brown is six feet tall and is otherwise false.

The strong relativist who relativises truth to individuals seems forced to allow that the truth conditions ascribed to Jones' utterance by Smith differ from those ascribed to it by Jones. Further, the truth conditions ascribed to p by Smith and by Jones must be incompatible. Otherwise no relativist consequences follow. The truth conditions of p thus appear, now, to be as follows: (i) p is true iff Brown is six feet tall; (ii) p is true iff it is not the case that Brown is six feet tall; (iii) p

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is false iff Brown is six feet tall; and (iv) p is false iff it is not the case that Brown is six feet tall. For Smith (and the rest of us) the truth conditions of p are captured in (i) and (iv); for Jones the t ruth conditions of p are captured in (ii) and (iii). But this shows that p can not properly be said to have any Iruth conditions since it seems to be a consequence of strong relativism that there are no discernible constraints on truth. That is to say, the predicate "...is true (false)" can be applied arbitrarily to any declarative sentence whatsoever.

Thus strong relativism cannot be regarded as a theory concerning the nature of truth since the predicate "...is true (false)" can be applied arbitrarily to any declarative sentence. Further, it may even be added that strong relativism is inconsistent with relativism. This follows if it is accepted both that relativism of truth is necessary for relativism in general and that acceptance of strong relativism is incompatible with acceptance of any theory concerning the nature of truth.

So it can be said, at least, that strong relativism is open to severe objection. Does weak relativism prove more hardy? It will be claimed that it does.

The weak relativist, it may be recalled, makes no claims for the relativisation of truth values of specific inter-scheme knowledge claims. For him, truth is relativised wholesale to incommensurable conceptual schemes - inter-scheme translation is ruled out.

Such a relativism has at least two advantages over strong relativism. First, it is not necessary to conflate knowledge and belief. The weak relativist can allow that the belief that p is true is not sufficient for the truth of p, nor for it to be the case that p is known. Such slack between belief, truth and knowledge is possible since some, less knowledgeable, believers within the scheme may believe a sentence to be true even though it is false relative to the scheme.

In weak relativism it becomes possible to identify constraints on truth which did not seem possible in strong relativism. Primarily, in weak relativism it is not the case that believing that p is true is sufficient either for the truth of p or for it to be known that p.

Second, weak relativism is impervious to the claim that meaning and truth conditions are inextricable. No claims are made to relativise the truth values of specific claims to individuals or to inter-translatable linguistic communities.

It seems to be the case, then, that weak relativism has distinct advantages over strong relativism. The weak relativist can maintain that he is proposing a theory concerning the nature of truth which is

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consistent with relativism. The weak relativist can also suggest at least one constraint on such a theory: believing that p is true is not sufficient for knowing that p or for it to be true that p.

Weak relativism can be seen to require at least the possibility of foreign schemes. Without that possibility truth is not legitimately describable as being relative to schemes. So it may plausibly be proposed that weak relativism requires the success of the following conjunction: (a) that sense can be made of the notion of a conceptual scheme, and (b) that there may be more than one such scheme. 4

Let it be granted that the possibility of scheme pluralism proves genuine. So now weak relativism is given the conjunction stated. But what are the metaphysical implications of weak relativism? and, are any of these implications incompatible with it?

It was suggested earlier that relativism may require the truth of realism. Having made clear what form a plausible relativism should take (i.e. it should take the form of weak relativism) it is time now to make clear the relationship between weak relativism and realism (henceforth I will use the term "metaphysical realism" instead of just plain "realism").

It can be suggested that metaphysical realism has two aspects, ontological and epistemic (cf. Devitt 1983 pp. 75-76). The ontological aspect involves the claim that there is a way the world is independently of man's capacity to cognise that way; further, there is a way the world is which is independent of the capacity of any finite being to cognise that way. So the ontological aspect of metaphysical realism involves commitment to the existence of a world which can not, in principle, be cognised as it is independently of the forms of cognition employed by the members of any finitely existing species or form of life.

The epistemic aspect of metaphysical realism just says that there are truths concerning the way the world is independently of forms of cognition. These truths have verification transcendent truth conditions (for finitely existing beings). The epistemic aspect of metaphysical realism will not receive further comment; it seems uncontroversial to assert that it is incompatible with any form of relativism. So further references to metaphysical realism should be taken as references to the ontological aspect only, unless it is stated otherwise.

It may appear paradoxical to claim that the truth of metaphysical realism is required for the truth of relativism. Yet this seems to be the case. For example, Swoyer (1982 p. 97) stresses the relationship between relativism and the notion of a "framework-independent

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'world'". KOrner (1984 p. 215) draws attention to a distinction between "a transcendent reality which is mind-independent...and the world as it appears 'through a categorial framework'". The suggestion in b o t h cases is that such a framework-independent world is experienced by inhabitants of the plurality of frameworks. Inhabitants of one particular framework (call them users of the framework) perceive and make judgements about a reality seen through a framework. But the world as it is independently of any form of cognition is inaccessible; it cannot be seen as it is independently of the forms of cognition; it can be cognised only as it appears through those forms.

The perceptions and judgements of the users of a particular framework are commensurable. The sensory experience of such user (i.e. of a particular framework) is the product of conceptual heritage, neurophysiology and the framework-independent world. Roughly, neurophysiology and conceptual heritage comprise the form of cognition, the world as it is in itself provides the content. 5 Inhabitants of different frameworks make judgements the reference of which is a similar product (i.e. of conceptual heritage...etc.). And, as earlier stipulated, no genuine inter-framework communication is possible for the weak relativist.

The distinction between the world seen through a framework and a world which is wholly independent of them - is not cognitively accessible to users of frameworks - can be taken to suggest a distinction between appearance and reality which can be drawn at two levels. First, it is feasible to refer to an appearance/reality distinction within frameworks. Second, following KOrner, it seems plausible to suggest a distinction between the world as it is independently of all frameworks - reality - and the world as it appears through various frameworks - appearance.

The relationship between the two terms "appearance" and "reality" is a conceptual relationship bound up with the presupposition that there is a metaphysical correlate of the distinction. One way to express such a metaphysical correlate would be by appeal to essential and nonessential properties such that entities havae some properties essentially and others nonessentially. 6 Theorists who object to the positing of such essential properties still draw an appearance/reality distinction (e.g. Russell 1950 p. 116). So the point being made here is unaffected by anti-essentialist ontological preferences.

The suggested conceptual and metaphysical relationship can be characterised as a one-way dependence relation such that if an entity A

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can be said to have appearance F it is always legitimate to ask how A really is.

An attempt to characterise relations of conceptual dependence has been made by K6mer. He suggests that "[An] attribute, say, X, [can be said to have] strict priority of application over another attribute, say, Y, if and only if Y is not applicable (has no instances) unless - as a matter of fact or logic - X is applicable and if the converse relation does not hold" (K6rner 1984 pp. 18-19). K0rner's characterisation of dependence may be just what is needed to characterise the suggested relation which holds between appearance and reality.

Let it be agreed that "reality" may be regarded as an attribute truly predicable of entities and that this attribute corresponds to attribute X in K~mer's characterisation. Let it be agreed further that "appearance" is similarly an attribute which can truly be predicated of entities and that this attribute corresponds to attribute Y in K~rner's characterisation. Now it can be said that "reality" has strict priority of application over "appearance" since if there are no entities with the attribute "reality" there can be no entities with the attribute "appearance". And it seems reasonable to claim that the converse relation fails to hold: if an entity has the attribute "appearance" truly predicable of it it cannot fall also to have to attribute "reality" truly predicable of it.

It has been claimed here that relativism requires the possibility of scheme pluralism. And it has been suggested that there is a metaphysical consequence of commitment to scheme pluralism. This consequence is the view that the plurality of schemes afford a perspective on a scheme-independent world. The conceptual relation between the terms "appearance" and "reality" is such that if an entity can have the attribute "appearance" truly predicated of it, it must also be such that it can have the attribute "reality" truly predicated of it. So if it is the case that an appearance/reality distinction can indeed be drawn between the world as it appears through a scheme and the world as it is independently of any scheme, then weak relativism must imply commitment to the existence of a scheme-independent world. Such a world is independent in the sense that, in principle, it is not perceptually accessible to any user of any framework. If metaphysical realism includes the claim that there is a way the world is independently of, say, human capacity to cognise that way, then weak relativism appears to be consistent with metaphysical realism. Further, these considerations seem to indicate that weak relativists ought to be committed to the truth of metaphysical realism. So despite the

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apparent paradox, a pluasible relativism should seek to align itself with metaphyscal realism. In short, weak relativsim requires that there be a scheme-independent entity.

Consider now the relationship between weak relativism and anti- realism. Anti-realism may attract the attention of the weak relativist since, at least as it is expressed by Luntley, truths seem to be related to decision procedures which are themselves employed in a particular "area of discourse" (Luntley op.cit, p. 50). The weak relativist might seek to assimilate the notion of an area of discourse to the notion of a conceptual scheme. Decision procedures for the resolution of disputes concerning truth values of knowledge claims may be described as being internal to the scheme. Provided the schemes are incoinmensurable, and that there are a plurality of them, weak relativism is achieved.

Luntley claims that "anti-realism is characterised by restraining truth to knowable truth" (Luntley 1988 p. 50; also Dummett 1978 e.g. p. 155). ("Knowable" here means something like "does not have truth conditions which are verification transcendent".) Leaving aside differences of opinion between various commentators as to the precise nature of anti-realism, the characteristic feature identified by Luntley seems to be accepted as such by other commentators. 7 To add a little more detail, let Luntley's remark be taken to concern human knowledge. So it can now be presented as the claim that anti-realism seeks to restrain truth to humanly knowable truth (cf. Williamson 1987 p. 50). 8

But the appeal of anti-realism to the relativist turns out to be spurious. As noted, the anti-realist locates truth with humanly knowable truth. And, hence, for the anti-realist, truth is epistemically constrained. These two elements of anti-realism can be seen to conflict with relativism.

First, if truth is restricted to humanly knowable truth and if the truths of some schemes are inaccessible in principle to users of alien schemes, then there are classes of claims the truth values of which are inaccessible to users of other schemes. This suggests a situation which conflicts with the chamcterisation of anti-realism offered here.

It has been sugested that the anti-realist restricts truth to truth knowable by humans. This might be taken as the claim that p can be known to be true if, and only if, it is possible that any human can know p to true. So the scope of "knowable by humans" means any human. I f this is the import of the anti-realist thesis, then it seems that cultural relativism (as a variety of weak relativism) and anti-

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realism are incompatible. The incompatibility derives from its being the case that the cultural relativist requires at least one class of truths which can be known only to users of a particular scheme. That requirement is incompatible with anti-realism since anti-realism restricts truth but restricts it to the species homo sapiens rather than to users of incommensurable schemes; the cultural relativist does so restrict truth.

It might be added that anti-realism is thus incompatible with species relativism also. The latter thesis preserves the idea of a class of truths which are inaccessible to members of other species. The anti- realist is not willing to countenance the possibility of such a class since they allegedly have verification transcendent truth conditions.

The second source of incompatibility between relativism and anti- realism derives from the relationship between relativism and metaphysical realism. Recall that, as expressed above, metaphysical realism has two aspects, ontological and epistemic. The ontological aspect states that there is a way the world is independently of the capacity of any finitely existing member of any species or form of life to cognise that way. It was argued above that a plausible relativism may be required, at least, to be consistent with this aspect of metaphysical realism.

The second aspect of metaphysical realism, the epistemic aspect, involves the claim that truth should not be constrained to knowable truth (human or otherwise). But, as noted above, it is an essential part of anti-realism that truth should be so constrained. So anti-realism is incompatible with the acceptance of this aspect of metaphysical realism. So too, however, is relativism.

Thus there is argreement between the anti-realist and the relativist that the epistemic aspect of metaphysical realism is false, But, as will now be seen, whilst the relativist thesis needs to be consistent with the ontological aspect of metaphysical realism, anti-realism proves inconsistent with that aspect.

Devitt (1983 p. 74, p. 80) draws attention to passages in Dummett which suggest that ontology is epistemically constrained in addition to truth (Dummett 1978 p. xl, p. xxxi, pp. 146-147). Claims to the same effect are to be found in Luntley also (e.g. 1988 PP. 82-83). Crudely, the suggestion is that, for the anti-realist, reality is coextensive with experienceable reality. Since a framework-independent realm is nonexperienceable in principle, it can not be a genuine part of reality. References to such a realm are, at most, metaphorical.

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There is clearly more to the anti-realist argument than is stated here, but no further indication of its nature will be provided (see Devitt op. cit.; Dummett op. cit.; Luntley o19. cit.; McGinn 1980). The crucial point for our purposes is that acceptance of anti-realism is inconsistent with acceptance of the ontological aspect of metaphysical realism. Since weak relativism requires consistency with the ontological aspect of metaphysical realism, anti-realism and weak relativism are incompatible.

Thus the weak relativist cannot plausibly seek to align his thesis with anti-realism since there are two sources of incompatibility between the two theses. First, the weak relativist seeks to preserve a class of sentences the truth values of which are verification transcendent for non-users of the scheme. Second, the weak relativist requires consistency with the ontological aspect of metaphysical realism, but anti-realism proves inconsistent with that aspect.

To conclude. This paper sought to clarify the nature of the relationship between relativism, metaphysical realism and anti-realism. The most coherent version of relativism, weak relativism, was seen to require the truth of the ontological component of metaphysical realism and to be incompatible with anti-realism. It may well be the case that weak relativism is compatible with metaphysical realism but surely the claim that there is a way the world is independently of, say, human capacity to cognise or characterise that way is not a claim one usually associates with relativists. Indeed, it is surely the case that weak relativism trades on the nonrelative truth of a claim with the overall import of the following: It is true that there is a scheme-independent entity which, in principle, cannot be pexceived as it is in itself but only as it appears through the forms of cognition employed by users of schemes. In the light of these considerations the possibility of formulating a plausible relativism appears to be remote.

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER MANCHESTER

M13 9PL, UK

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NOTES

1 Commentators differ on this issue. Swoyer (1982 p.84) suggests that relativism of truth may not be a necessary component of relativist theses in general, Gellner (1982 p.183) suggests otherwise. For a detailed argument in support of the view that relativism of truth is necessary for relativist theses in general see Edwards 1990 ch.1 passim.

2 This distinction is borrowed from Swoyer (1982). 3 Objections to strong relativism are to be found throughout the

relativism literature, e.g. Swoyer op.cti, pp.95-96; Hollis and Lukes 1972 p.9; Newton-Smith 1982 passim; Winch 1976 pp.322-323; Williams 1972 pp.34-38; Trigg 1973 e.g. pp.3-5; Lee 1985 ch.1).

4 Davidson, famously, has denied the possibility of coherence to the notion of a conceptual scheme ('On the very idea of a conceptual scheme', in Davidson 1984). Thus if his claims are true, weak relativism is false. On the other hand, Kfrner (1970, 1984) has proposed that sense can be made of the related notion of a categoriat framework. And, in the texts just cited, he has proposed that sense can be made of the idea of a plurality of such frameworks, So in relation to the schema for weak relativism proposed above, Davidson denies (a) and, therefore, also denies (b); K6rner allows both (a) and (b). I have argued elsewhere that Davidson may be wrong to deny (a) though he may be right to deny (b), and that K6rner is right to grant (a) and wrong to grant (b) (in Edwards 1990). But I do not propose to rehearse those arguments here. Instead, consider it to be the case that, contra Davidson, sense can be made of the notion of a conceptual scheme.

5 Davidson (1984) objects to the idea of an exclusive distinction between scheme and content. But it can be argued that there is a case for holding some kind of difference in degree between scheme and content, see e.g. Kraut 1986.

6 Loux (1978 ch.6) draws attention to two theories of substance, the bare substratum theory and the bundle theory; the former theory is associated with Aristotle, the latter with, for example, Russell (e.g. 1950 p.97). Loux points out that there are difficulties for both theories. All that is required for the argument here is that within both of the theories cited by Loux there is room for an appearance/reality distinction; and this is certainly the case.

7 Cf. Williamson 1987 p.52; Devitt 1983 pp.74-75; McGinn 1980 p.19; these three commentators and Luntley himself each acknowledge that their respective interpretations of anti-realism are derived from Dummett's work (e.g. Dummett 1978).

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Schematically, the bare outline of the anti-realist thesis may be represented as follows: for all p, p is true iff, for all h, it is possible that the relation hKp can be satisfied (where (...knows that...) is a two-place predicate satisfied by named humans and named declarative sentences; the first predicate-p/ace is reserved for humans, the second for declarative sentences). There are difficulties with such a schema. For example, given that humans generally live for 70 or 80 years at most, and that this is a contingent truth, the schema seems to allow the possibility of Smith knowing the truth of knowledge claims such as "It rained on Dec.4th. 21 AD" adn "It will rain on Dec.4th. 3001 AD". So problems centre on the type of possibility appealed to - be this logical possibility or a type of possibility constrained by physical theory. Such problems will not be pursued here.

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Munevar G., 1988, 'Evolution and the naked truth', in Cultural Relativism and Philosophy, (ed) Daseal M., Brill: Leyden.

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