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FORMULATING URBAN TRANSPORT STRATEGY: LEARNING

FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF MUMBAI

Ramakrishna Nallathigaϕ

Abstract

Urban transport is increasingly becoming important in a country like India,

wherein urbanization levels are steadily increasing and the growth of urban areas is to

some extent being determined by the prevalence of good city transport. It is therefore

necessary for the cities to formulate urban transport strategies so that they can continue to

provide support to the rising levels of population. Here, we undertake a review of the

experience of such strategy by Mumbai city, one of the oldest and largest cities in India.

We undertake the scenario analysis and review the past studies first and then examine the

strategic options and their use in terms of both current practice and critical shortcomings

so that the learnings for other cities can be spelt out. From the review, it can laid down

that perhaps the best approach to city transport involves (a) using demand and traffic

management (b) integration of all major modes of transportation (c) establishing

appropriate institutional mechanisms (d) formulating policies that give priority to public

transport and ensure its improvement (e) strengthening transport infrastructure.

Key Words: urban transport strategy, demand management, transport infrastructure

and public transport ϕ Knowledge Manager (Infrastructure & Environment), Centre for Good Governance, Dr MCR HRD IOA Campus, Road No. 25, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad 500 033, e-mail: [email protected]

Ramakrishna Nallathiga

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FORMULATING URBAN TRANSPORT STRATEGY: LEARNING

FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF MUMBAI

1. Introduction

Urban transport is increasingly becoming important in a country like India, when

the country is transforming from a predominantly rural to urban society with about 30 per

cent of its total population is now urban according to Census 2001. Although, there has

been a somewhat slow pace of urbanization at less than 3 per cent in the last decade when

compared to a steady growth rate of more than 3 per cent in the previous 3 decades, in

absolute terms the urban population continued to grow and accompanying such

urbanization is the rapid expansion of population in metropolitan cities (3i Network 2006).

According to Census 2001, the metropolitan population share in the total urban population

has reached a level of 39 per cent, bringing concerns about the challenges being faced and

necessitating better management of metropolitan cities in the critical areas of

infrastructure. Mumbai is one such important metropolitan city of the country with a long

history of development and transport.

Urban transport is an important component of urban infrastructure and the

development of which is vital to the growth of Indian economy (World Bank 2002). As

the growth of city is also critically dependent upon infrastructure, it is imperative that the

cities come out with strategies for improving the urban transport. However, full scale of

transport planning in metropolitan cities has been a very recent phenomenon and the

experiences of transport strategies have not been adequately presented in literature.


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Mumbai is a large metropolitan city with concentration of trade and business, therefore it

is also known as the commercial capital of the country. With a rapidly growing population

in the city and surrounding urban agglomerations, the transportation systems have to cater

to the transport needs within the city and between agglomerations and the city. Here,

Mumbai presents some good experiences of coping with demand in spite of some

shortcomings. This paper attempts to provide a review of the experience of Mumbai in

terms of the strategies it adopted over years which could act as some interesting cases

worth examining. It then identifies a broad framework for the strategic management of

urban transport in Mumbai.

2. The Scenario of Urban Transport in Mumbai

Mumbai, like other cities has three major modes of transport – rail based mass

transport, bus based mass transport and road transport. The geometry of Mumbai in the

form of peninsula has been influencing the laying down of its transport infrastructure

running North – South in two major transport corridors (rail and road) that were developed

by the British during colonial era (see figure 1), which still continue to be the major

connecting lines. The rail based transport is an important mode of transport that carries

about 6.2 million passengers every day and the buses of BEST carry about 4.6 million

passengers and together account for 88 per cent of the total passengers, a ratio which many

cities would love to attain, given the lag in developing the infrastructure in a planned way.

Not surprisingly, Mumbai’s share of 860 private vehicles per 1000 people is very low as

compared to many other smaller metro cities like Bangalore (1130), Hyderabad (887) and

Chennai (975). However, such high dependence on public transport is not devoid of

problems; it is reflected in over-crowded sub-urban trains that carry near about 4,000-


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5,000 people per train when compared to their design capacity of 1,800 to 2,200 persons.

Such crushing loads are a major problem that caused the sustained efforts to bring about

the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP-II) discussed later.

In terms of road transport, Bombay experiences a very high congestion particularly

on the connecting roads of the city through which the buses normally ply. The average

vehicle speeds are low at about less than 10 km per hour in the peak hours of traffic. Yet,

the difficult conditions in train travel force several individuals to choose personal modes

of transport and the road corridors connecting North-South have to some extent given

some encouragement to it, which has been criticised by W. S. Atkins Report (1994) that

“Bombay has become the worst example of restraint through congestion.” The city has,

indeed, been slowly strangling itself because of the unrestrained use of personalized

modes of transport, particularly in the suburbs, thanks to over-crowding of public transport

and its inability to respond to the challenges of ever-increasing traffic.

3. Review of Past Studies of Transport Strategy

Mumbai has a somewhat rich experience of the studies made to provide some strategic

directions and interventions to improve the state of urban transport. Some of the major

studies undertaken include:

⇒ The Wilbur Smith Plan (1962)

⇒ Regional Plan (1973)

⇒ Comprehensive Road Development Plan (1983)

⇒ Bombay Urban Transport Project (1984)

⇒ Traffic System Management Plan (1983)


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⇒ Comprehensive Transport Plan (1994)

We will briefly review the various studies and recommendations and reach to the point of

what is currently lacking in the current transportation system and propose the strategic

framework for better management of the city transport.

The Wilbur Smith Associates study to prepare road transport plan in 1962 was the first

transport plan for Greater Mumbai. It emphasized on laying down elaborate network of

freeways mainly for the private road transport, which was contended by the Government.

Yet, the freeway proposals find merit in today’s transport scenario of congested arterial

roads. Instead, the Traffic Management Cell of Govt of Maharashtra undertook a

complementary study of Mass Transportation augmentation possibilities that included

proposals for (1) augmenting the carrying capacity of the existing rail based transport

system (2) providing additional links to the surface system (3) provision of new rapid

transit system in the form of metro or monorail. These recommendations did find some

light with the ‘optimisation’ efforts of sub-urban railway network and

expansion/improvement of some of the major railway stations but the underground metro

proposal remained in the plan document.

The Regional Plan of 1973 prepared by the Bombay Regional Metropolitan Development

Authority (BMRDA) too a regional perspective of existing transport and laid down

proposals for inter-regional, intra-regional and intra-city transport projects. These were

primarily aimed at providing the connectivity between various points and laying down

new linkages that could lead to the development of new regional corridors e.g., rail linkage

from Kalyan/Diva to Vasai. Many of the connecting roads were developed but the rail

corridor was not developed to the fullest extent that would facilitate the growth.


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The Central Road Research Institute has prepared a comprehensive road transport plan in

1983 that provided a hierarchial network of roads in the form of (a) Eastern and Western

freeways (b) Mumbai mainland links in the form of Nava Sheva link and Thane Creek

bridge (d) Expressways and (d) Major Arterials. However, except some expressways lad

down in the western and eastern parts, many of the recommendations – particularly the

arterial ways in the city – did not find any light for the want of building-up of adequate

traffic demand in the course of time.

The World Bank has studied the potential for improving the public transport in Mumbai

and came up with a proposal to lend financial and technical assistance to improve it in

1978. This led to the formulation of Bombay Urban Transport Project (no, MUTP-I)

implemented during 1978-84. The project supported investments in improving the road

system, augmenting the bus fleet (700 buses including 235 double deckers), developing 3

bus depots and a workshop. It also made provision for building 11 bus shelters and

termini and lent support to traffic circulation improvement through 5 fly-overs, 2

pedestrian bridges and 3 tunnels. Modernisation and improvement works for signal

system at 77 junctions were also carried out and the municipal staff was given training.

Another expert committee headed Sri K G Paranjpe in 1983 has also looked the high

priority projects to be undertaken to improve the traffic scenario. It proposed short term

measures of improving the arterial linking roads and constructing link roads, foot-over-

bridges and level crossings at some important locations. It also proposed the immediate

measures in the form of traffic management schemes at some of the vital junctions and


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road improvements along some of the major roads, but not much had been done on ground

in terms of implementing these except some improvements at key junctions and roads.

The WS Atkins study of comprehensive transport study in 1994 was the last study of the

series, which was carried upon the advice of the World Bank. The study has first looked

at the structure of transport and forecasted the growth of population and vehicles based on

the observed growth rates of last three decades and arrived at the passenger trips under

various modes of transport. It observed that the share of public transport could fall from

the current 88 per cent in 1993 to 85 per cent in 2011 and the private and intermediate

transport could rise from 7 and 5 per cent to 9 and 6 six percent during the same period. It

suggested several measures and which still provide the direction to transport management

even after 12 years. The study sought an improvement in the road network – both to the

existing road network of highways and arterial roads and to the connecting links between

eastern and western parts of the city. It also recommended the use of inland waterways of

Mumbai and to improve the suburban rail services so as to enhance their transport

capacity. The proposals did not find their until the Mumbai Urban Transport Project

(MUPT-II) came into picture once again with the help of the World Bank.

4. Strategic Framework for Transport Management in Mumbai

The review of the past studies above provided the insights of the transport

strategies suggested by various studies in the past and the elements adopted. However,

many of these studies lacked a holistic perspective of the problem and did not give a

thinking to the strategic areas wherein they have to make most of the recommendations.


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Therefore, like other Indian metro cities, Mumbai’s transport strategy has some

shortcomings, which primarily relate to the following areas (Nallathiga 2003a):

⇒ the focus on supply side interventions and improvements and little or no

attempts on the demand side

⇒ the lack of financing mechanisms to undertake improvements to road/rail

infrastructure and mass transportation projects

⇒ the lack of connectivity and circulation of traffic due to the lack of

development of circular and east-west linking roads,

⇒ the lack of proper integration of the various modes of transport, particularly the

planning of inter-modal transfer points, and that of transport and land use,

⇒ the institutional inadequacies in the form of multiple agencies dealing with the

same problem with little or no coordination.

We will now elaborate these areas further in terms of what is lacking and what should

have been the focus and cite a few examples.

The current perspective of dealing with urban transport from pure supply side

interventions, hitherto taken by transportation planners, has to change as it is a

management problem, rather than an engineering problem. Many large cities have

successfully undertaken the measures on both demand and supply sides to contain the

transport problems. Singapore, for example, has shown an exemplary way to deal with

urban transport through demand management measures (Nallathiga 2003b) (see Box

1). Therefore, some kind of curbs on the use of private modes of transport using some

form of restraint is required. It is here that there are several economic instruments

available for constraining the demand. Some of these include (Bombay First 2000):

⇒ vehicle parking charges


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⇒ road use charges

⇒ area licenses

⇒ auctioning of vehicle licenses

⇒ vehicle quota scheme

⇒ cordon pricing Scheme

⇒ vehicle license Fees

⇒ wheel tax in a revised form

⇒ payroll tax

⇒ congestion pricing

⇒ fuel or energy pricing (surcharge).

Box 1: TRANSPORT DEMAND MANAGEMENT IN SINGAPORE

Transport demand management is an essential approach taken by Singapore in dealing

with city transport. Road pricing is an important component of Singapore’s overall

transportation strategy started in Singapore in June 1975. While road capacity continues to

be increased judiciously to meet rising travel demand, the strategy also calls for greater

reliance on public transport usage and demand management. One aspect of demand

management is the restraint of vehicle ownership, either through the imposition of high

upfront ownership costs or restriction on the actual growth of the car population. The

former type includes the custom duties and vehicle registration fees, which amounted to

almost one-and-a-half times that of the car’s open market value, while the latter is

managed through a Vehicle Quota System. The other aspect of demand management is the

restraint of vehicle usage through the levy a charge on motorists based on the quantity,


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place or time of the use of their vehicles. Generally, the more one uses his car the more

one has to pay. The road pricing schemes, petrol tax, diesel duty, and parking charges are

measures in this category. One of the goals set out in the demand management strategy of

Singapore is to move away from relying predominantly on vehicle ownership costs, to one

of a better balance between it and usage costs. The resulting system would be a fairer and

more equitable one. Singapore's experiences with road pricing over the past years have

moved from the manual scheme to the current electronic one.

Manual Road Pricing

There were two manual road pricing schemes used in Singapore, namely the Area

Licensing Scheme (ALS) and the Road Pricing Scheme (RPS). The ALS was in place for

23 years before being replaced by an electronic version called the Electronic Road Pricing

System (ERP), while the RPS was implemented progressively on expressways from 1995

(and also subsequently replaced by the ERP in 1998). Basically, both schemes were based

on the need for paper licenses to be purchased prior to their passage through control points

set up on the roads. The ALS was first formulated and designed in 1973 under the

direction of a high level inter-ministerial committee, set up to recommend measures to

improve the transport situation then. This was followed with a 1-year public dialogue on

the details of the scheme and some modifications were made based on the feedback. The

scheme was projected as part of an overall package of measures and this, in some way,

helped it gained support from the public. The other measures also implemented at around

the same time included the raising of customs duties and imposition of a new tax

(Additional Registration Fee or ARF) on new motor vehicles in 1972, and the imposition

of a parking surcharge in 1975.

Area Licensing Scheme


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The ALS covered the more congested parts of the Central Business District (CBD),

designated as the Restricted Zone (RZ). To gain access into the RZ during the restriction

periods, non-exempt vehicles needed to purchase and display an ALS area licence. These

licences could be bought on a monthly basis or a daily basis, and are priced at 20 times the

daily rate. The monthly licences can be bought at post offices, while the daily ones can be

purchased at roadside sales booths located at the approach roads to the RZ, petrol stations,

post offices and convenience stores. For obvious traffic management reasons, these

licences were not sold at the control points of the RZ. The licences came in various shapes

for various classes of vehicles and were colour coded that varied from one month to

another, partly to deter fraud and for easy identification during restricted hours. They

observed whether vehicles displayed the valid licences on their windscreens, or on the

handle-bars in the case of motorcycles and scooters.

Operating Hours

The ALS started in 1975 with the restricted hours of 7.30am - 9.30am daily, except on

Sundays and public holidays. The restriction period was then extended to cover the

evening peak hours of 4.30pm to 7.00pm on weekdays. In 1994, more fundamental

changes were made keep restriction hours to cover the inter-peak period of 10.15am -

4.30pm on weekdays and the post-peak period of 10.15am - 3.00pm on Saturdays. When

the ALS started in 1975, taxis, public transport buses, goods vehicles, motorcycles, and

passenger cars carrying three or more passengers (excluding the driver) were exempted

from the scheme. Carpooling was allowed under the scheme to optimise vehicle usage and

to counter the charge that the scheme favoured only the rich. Special car-pool pick-up

points were set up to regulate the queuing up by passengers and cars, mostly next to bus-

stops and at fringe car parks. But, the exemption on taxis and car-pools were abolished.

Road pricing charges


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The licence fees had been revised upwards over the years to cater for inflation and to

check the gradual upward creep in the number of restricted vehicles entering the RZ.

Starting at $3 per day for a licence for cars in 1975, this had crept up to $5 per day in

1980. By 1994, there were two levels of fees for licences – the one that permits usage

throughout the day, and the one that were applicable for use during the inter-peak period

only. The ALS fees for use during the inter-peak period were pegged at two-thirds of those

that were applicable for the whole day. For cars, the daily licence fees were $3 and $2

respectively. Hence, there were two categories of licences, known as “whole-day licences”

and "part-day licences".

Initial Impact

The initial drop in traffic entering the RZ was 44%, but it crept up to a 31 % drop by 1988.

This was despite the growth by a third in employment in the city and by 77% in vehicle

population during the same period. The drop in traffic was caused by the decanting of

motorists whose destinations were not the city itself but had merely been using the city

roads as a bypass, as well as by those who changed their journey start time to avoid paying

the ALS fees. There was little evidence to suggest that motorists had transferred to public

transport in significant quantities. Based on feedback from road users prior to the ALS

implementation in 1975, a park-and- ride scheme was also implemented to cushion the

impact on motorists. Thirteen fringe car parks were established around the periphery of the

RZ where motorists could park their cars for a low fixed fee and took a shuttle bus into the

RZ at a flat fare. The shuttle services were later modified to also serve nearby areas due to

poor usage of the fringe car parks.

Road Pricing Scheme

The other manual road pricing scheme in Singapore was known as the Road Pricing

Scheme (RPS). This was designed for use on expressways and was first implemented on 1


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June 95. Meant as a pilot scheme to introduce the idea of road pricing at other congested

points outside the RZ, the RPS required motorists who passed through the two gantries, to

display a different category of licences, although ALS licences valid for the day or month

were also acceptable. Starting with two control points operating for 2 hours during the

morning peak period, this was subsequently extended to three other locations before its

replacement with the electronic version.

Limitations of Manual Road Pricing

Being manual schemes, both the ALS and RPS had certain limitations. They were labour

intensive. The enforcement job was tiring. Human enforcement by visual means was prone

to error leading occasionally to wrongful summonses being issued. Under the manual

system, a licence offered a vehicle unlimited number of entries to the RZ or passage

through the ALS/RPS control points. Although it was not legally transferable between

vehicles, it was tempting for such action to have taken place. With the shortcomings of the

manual road pricing schemes, the search for a more efficient technology began in earnest

in the early 1990s. Technology for an electronic road pricing system was emerging at that

time, and after several years of discussions and prototype testing with potential suppliers, a

contract for the installation of a Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC)

electronic road pricing system was awarded in 1995.

Electronic Road Pricing

The ERP system has three major group of components. The first centred around the IU

and the stored-value smart-card. While the IU were produced specifically for the ERP

system, the smart-cards were marketed by a consortium of local banks for multiple uses.

Different IUs were produced for different classes of vehicles, with each type distinguished

by different colours. The second group of components comprises those installed at the on-

site ERP gantries. These include the antennae, the vehicle detectors and the enforcement


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camera system. All these are linked to a controller at each of the site. Data collected is

transmitted back to the Control Centre continuously through leased telephone lines. The

third group of components is at the Control Centre, and includes various servers,

monitoring systems as well as a master-clock to ensure that the timing at all the ERP

gantries are synchronised. All the financial transactions are processed here, before being

sent to the banks for settlement. In addition, violation images are processed at the Control

Centre, and letters are printed and sent out from here to all the offenders.

Implementation of ERP

The ERP system is designed to be simple to use. Indeed, all that it required of the user is to

insert the smart-card into the IU, whereby a diagnostic check is automatically done to

ensure that both the IU and the smart-card are in working condition. Should there be a

problem with either the IU or the smart-card, the user will be alerted so that remedial

action can be taken. The IU is also designed to have a low balance indicator, whereby the

user will be alerted should the cash balance in the smart-card falls below a pre-defined

amount. When the vehicle passes through the ERP gantry, the appropriate ERP charge is

deducted from the smart-card. There is a short beep, signifying a successful transaction,

and the remaining cash balance in the smart-card is displayed momentarily. Should there

be insufficient cash in the smart-card or should there be no smart-card in the IU, the

enforcement cameras in the gantry will take a picture of the rear of the vehicle. Similarly,

should the vehicle has no IU installed in it, the enforcement cameras will also take a

picture of the offending vehicle. The picture is sent back to the control centre, where the

vehicles’ registration numbers are automatically read using an OCR technique. The

owners of the vehicles are then issued with letters to ask for payments. For cases of

insufficient cash balance or no smart-card in the IU, an administrative charge of S$10 plus

the outstanding ERP charge is imposed. If this payment is not made within the prescribed


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28-day period, a summons will follow. This carries a penalty of S$70. For cases where

vehicles pass through the ERP gantry with no IU, summonses are issued immediately. The

penalty is also $70. Failure to pay the penalty can result in the offender being called up to

appear in the Courts.

Impact of ERP

Traffic volume into the CBD had reduced by about 10-15% during the ERP operation

hours, as compared to the ALS scheme. This was in spite of the road pricing charge being

lower at between S$0.50 to S$2.50; the charge for the ALS was S$3.00 for peak periods

and S$2.00 for the inter-peak period. The major difference is that the ERP charge is

applicable for each passing, while the ALS charge allowed multiple entries for that day.

Hence, the ERP had influenced particularly the behaviour of those who made multiple

trips into the CBD – and this was estimated to be about 23% of trips that entered the CBD

during the ALS days. Many of these multiple trip-makers cut down their number of trips,

e.g. office workers no longer use their cars to attend mid-day meetings or lunches – more

relied on the public transport system instead.

Advantage of ERP over MRP

The ERP system allowed more frequent changes to be made to the road pricing charges, so

that it can better optimise road usage. A research effort with a local university established

speed-flow curves for 2 different types of roads – those in the CBD and expressways. The

intent of ERP is to optimise road usage, i.e. flows should be near the maximum possible.

When speed goes above the upper threshold, too few vehicles are deemed to be using the

roads and hence, the road space available is not being optimally used. Hence, the road

pricing charge can be reduced to allow more vehicles to use the roads. Conversely, if the

speed falls below the lower threshold, too many vehicles are on the roads and this is a


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signal that the road pricing charge can be increased. Other considerations do come in when

deciding on the final road pricing charge, e.g. the effect of traffic diverting to other roads.

Conclusion

Road pricing in Singapore has been effective in managing congestion on roads in the CBD

since its inception in 1975, and in recent years on expressways and other major roads

outside the CBD. Technology had helped to make the expansion of the original road

pricing scheme possible; and the authorities are still keeping tab on new developments in

road pricing technology to further enhance the present ERP system

Source: Keong (2002)

Although several studies have suggested some or other kind of ‘tactical’ improvements

to city roads and traffic management, these might yield little effect and they are not

able to make any ground for the want of finances to undertake the same. Given the

paucity of funds for such micro-interventions, large funding support can only come

from external agencies in the case of projects with wider impacts, such as those that

undertake upgrading and augmenting of two existing forms of mass transportation.

This is exactly what has been chosen as right strategy by the World Bank in its funding

of the MUTP – II (Some more details are provided in Table 1). Here, it may be worth

examining the features of the MUTP – II which is provided in the Box 2.

Box 2: MUMBAI URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROJECT (MUTP)

BACKGROUND

The Bombay Urban Transportation Project (BUTP) was conceived to bring about

improvements in public transport system way back in late seventies. It was implemented


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during 1977-84 by the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA,

then known as BMRDA) with an active funding support of the World Bank. The BUTP

had several project components which essentially aimed at traffic and demand

management through major improvements in road and railway infrastructure. The project

had an outlay of Rs 6,433 crores, of which Rs 4,250 crores were invested by the World

Bank, while the remaining by Indian Railways.

Evidently, the contribution of BUTP was found to be inadequate - thanks to ever

expanding transportation needs of the city. For example, the suburban trains with nine car

rakes carry nearly 5,000 passengers during peak hours against the actual capacity of 2,600,

resulting in a crammed condition. Also, an increase in private vehicle ownership has led

to road congestion and chaotic traffic. In fact, road congestion has lowered bus speeds to

10-12 km per hour; the actual operating speeds are even lower in some cases. These

conditions necessitated conceptualization of MUTP as a follow-up of the BUTP. The

“Comprehensive Transport Strategy (CTS)”, prepared by W S Atkins for MMRDA in

1994, formed a good background to MUTP. It examined three major transportation

strategies and came to the conclusion that public transport with demand management is a

better strategy. Indeed, the World Bank had welcomed MUTP way back in 1985.

STRUCTURE OF MUTP

The main project components are (see ANNEXURE for further details of projects):

Rail Transport Component

- Capacity optimization and enhancement;

- Setting up new corridors along the existing corridors; and


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- Purchase of rolling stock

Road Transport Component

- Traffic management e.g., area traffic control, bus priority and rail station area transport

integration;

- Infrastructure e.g., roads and ROBs; and

- Equipment e.g., fleet replacement

Resettlement and Rehabilitation

- Land acquisition

- Construction and/or purchase of transit and permanent dwelling units; and

- Resettlement & Rehabilitation (R&R) assistance

The total cost of the project has been estimated at about Rs 4546 crores. It comprises of

the following components underneath.

Component Cost (Rs in crores) % share of Total Cost

Railways 3031 67

Roadways 827 18

Resettlement & Rehabilitation 466 10

Incremental Operating costs & Taxes 181 4

Miscellaneous (PPF, Front end Fee) 40 1

The World Bank support to this project is Rs 2591 crores (57% of total cost) and the

remaining amount through counterpart funds (43% of total cost). Indian Railways and

Government of Maharashtra will share counterpart funds for railways and R & R. Also,

MCGM, BEST and MSRDC will provide their own counterpart funds for roadways.


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FEATURES OF MUTP

The MUTP has several components which improve the existing rail and roadway

transport systems significantly.

It has an important component of resettlement and rehabilitation of about 19,000

project affected households (or 77,000 persons).

Land acquisition may not turn out to be a major problem since the need for private

land acquisition is very limited; a major part of it is planned to be procured through the

transfer of development rights (TDR).

No requirement of any major environmental clearance due to the fact that project

alignment does not violate any major environmental laws, excepting few works that

fall under the coastal regulation zone (CRZ).

Some significant environmental benefits are expected from the proposed

environmental management plans.

Public health and other benefits arising from avoiding of congestion and associated

gaseous emissions are also substantial.

Most importantly, the execution of the project will enhance the capacity of public

transport significantly. This is roughly estimated to be anywhere between 25 and 30 per

cent. This provides a breathing time for Mumbai’s complex and acute transport problem.

Once again, the need will be felt to formulate an alternative strategy.

Source: Author (2003)


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One of the major shortcomings of transport management practice over the last few

decades has been the inadequate attention paid to the connectivity and circulation of

traffic. The city managers have always been bogged down to improving the old roads

running North – South whose results have been little effective due to narrow roads,

little room for expansion and increasing congestion. By focusing the efforts on such

‘micro’ or ‘tactical’ improvements, the planners and managers have missed the

opportunity to overcome them through ‘strategic’ options. Eastern and western

freeways have long been suggested as the relieving roads for the traffic but are yet to

find a place on the city map. The Atkins Study emphasized on the east-west linkages

in the form of Jogeswari-Vikhroli link road and Santacruz-Chembur link road – which

are now undertaken within MUTP-II. However, some other strategic linkages are yet

to take place and these include: Vasai-Diva rail link, Bandra-Kurla sub-urban rail link,

Andheri-Kurla metro link, and Mumbai Trans-harbour link between Nava Sheva and

Sewri. All of them provide strategic connectivity and provide room for a better

circulation of traffic within the city as well as the region (Dalvi 2003).

Mega cities like Mumbai cannot have dependency on one mode of traffic, rather

multimodal transport is quite common in several cities. However, it is the integration

of these modes and the logistics that matters most (Balakrishnan 2003). With the

suburban trains running on major rail corridors, the bus services can play the role of

providing short distance services as well as feeder vehicles that reach to the major

railway stations. Similarly, intermediate public transport can act primarily as feeder

and disperse vehicles providing such services. Both these mechanisms are already

there and serve to a good extent, but their efficiency is curtailed by poor design and

layout of the inter-modal transfer points and therefore they are often sources of traffic


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jams. A correction is required through designing of efficient station complexes with

multiple floors for providing transfer and also through creating a good ambience as

well as amenities especially at the points where inter-city/ inter-state services are

accessed. To some extent this has been covered under the Station Area Traffic

Improvement Schemes at some of the major railway stations under the MUTP. Also,

besides the improvements at inter-modal transfer points, modal options have to be

increased. While underground metro is a good option, it has been ruled out for the

huge capital costs of the project and its unlikely recovery of even maintenance costs.

However, an over ground metro connection between Andheri and Ghatkopar has been

discussed for quite some time and it might soon find the light1. Another alternative

mode is the Passenger Water Transport between Mumbai and Navi Mumbai, which

provides much of the ease of passenger goods traffic flow between Mumbai and its

satellite city Navi Mumbai. The western free way can also come sea route from

Bandra to Nariman Point and the eastern free way can start from here to Sewri and

extend upto Chembur, thereby providing crucial circular route that can allow fast

movement of traffic between various points. Moreover, besides using the transport

modes effectively, the transport planning has to be integrated with land use planning.

Zoning of manufacturing and services production in the suburbs and the hinterland of

Navi Mumbai would also bring in some rapid changes to the current traffic flow and

bring about some relief. However, the connectivities mentioned above have to be in

place for this to work out.

An important area of concern is the institutional mechanisms and their adequacy. The

city transport function is fragmented between various tiers of government – local, state

1 It is argued by few others that a technology like sky bus can prove to be cost-effective in this context but it was not taken for the want of tested technology that is operational elsewhere (Badami and Koppikar 2004)


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and central – and the para-statal agencies leaving little scope for a concerted effort to

improve the city transport. This shortcoming came to the light in the implementation

of MUTP itself. As the project involved making use of existing institutions listed

below, the Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation (MRVC) was established as a 50:50 joint

venture of Indian Railways and Government of Maharashtra, which is a significant

initiative in right direction. Therefore, such coordination mechanisms need to be

dovetailed for city transport. One of the mechanisms proposed is the creation of

‘Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority (UMTA)’ for undertaking the whole range

of functions and overcoming the fragmentation menace.

Organization Functions

MMRDA-PMU Overall coordination and monitoring of the project;

Implementation of R &R activities for rail and road transport

MRVC Implementation of rail projects

MCGM Construction of ROBs, traffic management, environmental

monitoring

MSRDC Roadway construction

BEST Procurement of environment and passenger friendly buses

MCGB for Traffic

Police

Area Traffic Control System

Moreover, the organizational capacities need to improved through induction of right

people with required skill set and operational knowledge. It has been recommended by

W.S. Atkins study that a reorganization of Traffic Department within the Municipal


23

Corporation was required. This includes departments of Highway Planning, Traffic

Planning, Parking Control, Traffic Signals and Traffic Data and Survey. It is proposed

that each department should have well qualified Engineers, Planners and Economists.

This is already being included in the World Bank aided MUTP as the formation of a

Traffic Management Unit (TMU) within the BMC. The formation of the TMU to a

large extent can do away with the problems so far associated with the plethora of

organizations handling the city’s transport.

5. Summary and Outlook

It may be noted that the Mumbai city not only has a strong history of evolution but also an

experience of continuous study of the city growth and traffic and transport issues.

However, the review clearly laid down that not all of these studies were very

comprehensive and therefore sometimes focused on some narrow ‘tactical’ improvements,

which did not lead to any major improvements. It is also found that the best approach to

resolving the transportation problems of Mumbai lies in demand and traffic Management

before engineering, and essential integration of all transportation modes. Moreover,

institutional mechanisms have to be strengthened and priority to improve public transport

and transport infrastructure has to be laid down.

Here, we can also discuss the findings of another non-official study by Bombay First

(2000) that synthesized the findings of previous studies. It found that given the

complexity of city’s transport problem, the key solution lies in the demand management of

private transport accompanied by an augmentation of public transport and the

development of alternative modes of transport. It has also partially addressed the


24

financing mechanism and outlined the broad organizational structure for implementation.

The key summary points of the report are as follows (Nallathiga 2003a):

First, emphasis on discouraging the use of private vehicles through either policy

restraint or fiscal restraint and encouraging the use of mass transportation,

especially during peak hours. Illustratively, the proposed restraints include: (i)

streamlining road-based mass transportation, (ii) imposing curbs on entry to and

parking in CBD (Island City), (iii) restrictions on traffic maneuverings and truck

operations, (iv) removing hindrances to traffic movement, and (v) traffic

engineering measures.

Second, several improvement measures are proposed under road and rail based

transport to enhance the potential of existing North-South transportation corridor

and provide East-West linkages.

Third, since the inter-modal transfer points are critical points causing congestion, it

identified the need for their designing such that the delays are reduced to the

minimum, and passenger transfers take place efficiently, as far as possible within

the terminal area itself. This implies the need for integration of all mass

transportation modes and intermediate public transport modes such as shared taxis

and contract carriages.

Fourth, it identified that introducing a third form of mass transportation - Passenger

Water Transport (PWT) - will ease the pressure on land based transport. Mumbai

is blessed with an abundance of this natural resource that can provide cheap and

environment-friendly transport, and it is time the city exploited this to its

advantage.


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Fifth, the need for integration of all these mass transportation modes so that they

function as an Integrated Metropolitan Transport System, complementing and

supporting each other, rather than running in competition. This integration can be

provided by the road based bus services, which can provide the short-haul feeder

services from the terminals of rail and water to the final destinations in the CBD

and residential areas, thereby also providing the East-West connectivity.

Last, it proposed upgradation of N. M. Joshi Marg/ Senapati Bapat Marg to an

arterial road for developing an additional transport corridor. This will provide the

following travel corridors in the North-South direction: (i) 4 corridors of road

transport, (ii) 5 corridors of rail transport, (iii) 2 corridors of water transport, and

(iv) one Trans-Harbour PWT route.

These are essential lines of improvement of transport that run in line with the framework

laid down earlier. However, the core of transport management lies in the development of

a strategy that lays down the priorities, direction, organization, finances and institutional

arrangements. These elements of transport strategy were already discussed earlier and they

hold the key for future development of the city and its transport scenario. Moreover, much

depends on the MUTP project, which is expected to change the face of mass public

transport. MMRDA also proposed to undertake the Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project

(MUIP) to de-congest some of the major road corridors in the city and suburbs, which will

then become another important intervention. The emergence of metro, water transport,

free ways, trans-harbour link and east-west linkages should all hold a promise for better

transport and so do the changes in the course of land use and economic growth.


26

References:

3i Network (2006), India Infrastructure Report 2006, Oxford University Press, New Delhi

Badami, S. and Koppikar, S. (2004): ‘Commuting in Mumbai 2008, Room for Optimism’,

Economic and Political Weekly of India April 3-8: 1458-1460

Balakrishnan, B. C. (2003), ‘Urban Transportation in Mumbai: The Need for an Integrated

Hierarchy of Mass Transportation Systems’, The CITY, Volume II, No. 1, pp 23-28.

Bombay First (2000): ‘Comprehensive Transport Strategy for Mumbai’, A Synthesis

Report of the Study Commissioned by Bombay First, Mumbai

Dalvi, M Q (2003), ‘Some Reflections on Transport Problems in Mumbai’, The CITY,

Volume II, No. 1, pp 7-17.

Keong, Chin K. (2002), ‘Road Pricing: Singapore’s Experience’, Paper prepared for

IMPRINT EUROPE Network third seminar on “Implementing Reform on Transport

Pricing: Constraints and Solutions: learning from best practice” held at Brussels, 23rd -

24th October 2002

MMRDA (1978): Regional Development Plan for the Mumbai Metropolitan Region,

Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority, Mumbai

Nallathiga, R. (2003a), ‘Comprehensive Transport Strategy for Mumbai – A Summary of

Recommendations’, The CITY, Volume II, No. 1, pp 34-36.

Nallathiga, R. (2003b), ‘Best Practices in Transport Planning and Management – Case

Study of Singapore’, The CITY, Volume II, No. 1, pp 47-48

Nallathiga, R. (2006), ‘Envisioning a Comprehensive Transport Strategy for Mumbai’,

Indian Journal of Transport Management Volume 30, No. 2:, pp 153-177


27

The World Bank (2002), India’s Transport Sector: Challenges Ahead, The World Bank,

Washington DC.

W S Atkin’s Study (1994), “Comprehensive Transport Plan for Bombay Metropolitan

Region”, Project Report prepared by W S Atkins International

Wilbur Smith Study (1962), “Planning of Road system for Mumbai Metropolitan Region”,

Project report prepared by Wilbur Smith Associates International

Figure 1: Mumbai and its transport network


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Table 1: Salient Features of MUTP Project


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Project Components Main Physical Works

Rail Transport

Improve capacity and performance of

the suburban railway system

Procurement of new rolling stock

Upgrading of existing rolling stock

Increasing track capacity

Improving signaling, electrical and

telecommunication systems

Institutional strengthening for a better

management

Optimization of suburban railway

services

Quadrupling of lines between Borivali

and Virar

Provision of 5th and 6th line between

Kurla and Thane

Provision of 5th line between Mahim-

Santacruz and Borivali

Conversion of DC to AC


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Road Transport

Strengthen the capacity of the MCGM

for traffic management, policy and

regulation

Support specific investments in traffic

signals and management, east-west

connecting roads and rail grade

separations

Improving the service delivery of BEST

Improving systems for developing

transport strategies and policies

Jogeshwari-Vikhroli Link Road,

including two flyovers not included in

MUTP

Santacruz-Chembur Link Road

RoBs at Jogeshwari South, Jogeshwari

North and Vikhroli

Pedestrian sub-ways, footpaths and other

pedestrian facilities

Station Area Traffic Improvement

Schemes (SATIS)

Bus procurement

Resettlement and Rehabilitation

Construction of about 19,000 dwelling

units to resettle project affected persons,

including 6,000 transit houses

Land acquisition for civil works

Reconstruction of some of the basic

civic amenities

Compensation payment for economic

losses

Financing of the consultancies for

baseline surveys

Preparation of resettlement

implementation plans

NGO support for implementation

Training of staff/NGOs

Source: Prepared by Author based on the information provided by MMRDA (2002)

formulating urban transport strategy: learning...

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