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Impor t risk analysis of
fox entry pathwaysinto Tasmania
2008Depar tment of Pr imar y Industr ies and Water
March
Import Risk Analysis of Fox Entry Pathways into Tasmania
Prepared by Dr Darren Phillips
Chair,
Biosecurity Technical Group Fox Working Group
DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES AND WATER
March 2008
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ii IRA of Fox Entry Pathways into Tasmania _ Version 2.0, BPB, DPIW, 19/3/2008
DOCUMENT ACCEPTANCE and RELEASE NOTICE
This Report is the Final Draft, Version 2.0, of the Fox Entry Pathways Import Risk Analysis (IRA), first issued to selected stakeholders on 29th June 2007.
This Report is a managed document. The draft IRA, its subsequent revision(s) and final re-issue are controlled and issued by the Biosecurity Policy Branch (BPB), Biosecurity and Product Integrity (BPI) Division, Department of Primary Industries and Water (DPIW). For identification of amendments, each page contains a release number and a page number. Changes will only be issued as a complete replacement document. Recipients should remove superseded versions from circulation. Recipients are responsible for accurate citation when referring to this Report. This document is authorised for release once all signatures have been obtained. PREPARED: DATE: 19/3/2008 (for acceptance) (Andrew Bishop, Project Manager and Manager, BPB) ACCEPTED: DATE: 19/3/2008 (for unrestricted release) (Alex Schaap, Project Sponsor and General Manager, BPI) 1. BUILD STATUS:
Version Date Author Reason Sections 1.0 29/6/2007 D Phillips, Biosecurity Policy
Branch (BPB) Initial Draft Release All
1.0 17/10/2007 D Phillips, BPB Compilation of a ‘Comments Register’, detailing amendments to the first draft of the Fox Entry Pathways IRA
All
1.1 17/10/2007 D Phillips, BPB Amended Draft incorporating BTG Fox Working Group comments
All
2.0 19/3/2008 D Phillips, BPB Final Draft for Approval All 2. DISTRIBUTION:
Copy No Document Type
Version Issue Date Issued To
Controlled IRA Report 1.0 29/6/2007 BTG Fox Working Group; Alex Schaap, General Manager, BPI
Controlled IRA Comments Register
1.0 17/10/2007 BTG Fox Working Group; Alex Schaap, General Manager, BPI; Fox Eradication Program Management Committee
Controlled IRA Report 1.1 17/10/2007 BTG Fox Working Group; Alex Schaap, General Manager, BPI; Fox Eradication Program Management Committee
Uncontrolled IRA Report 2.0 -Final
19/3/2008 Alex Schaap, Project Sponsor (For unrestricted public distribution, and recommendation to the Biosecurity Technical Group)
Confidential Controlled Copy Not for Distribution Confidential Controlled Copy Not for Distribution
Pathway Import Risk Analysis Overview of Risk Reduction Management Measures that could be taken against Fox Entry Pathways into Tasmania March 2008
Depar tment o f Pr imary Industr ies and Water
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2 IRA of Fox Entry Pathways into Tasmania _ Version 2.0, BPB, DPIW, 19/3/2008
Import Ris k Ana ly s is o f Fox Entry Pa thways into Tasmania
Acknowledgments The Biosecurity Technical Group (BTG) Fox Working Group kindly acknowledges assistance and input into this review process from a wide range of both Departmental personnel, including Rod Andrewartha, Paul Nas, Rick Eisenkoeck, Mark Mackay, Nigel Burgess and Shane Walsh, and external clients such as Graham Griffith, National Manager Cargo Handling Equipment, TOLL Shipping, and Brooke Kettle, TasPorts.
The BTG Fox Working Group membership (DPIW): Biosecurity Policy Branch (BPB), BPI: Darren Phillips, Biosecurity Policy Analyst (Chair) Andrew Bishop, Manager, Biosecurity Policy Quarantine Services Branch (QSB), BPI: Colin Sherman, Manager, Program Planning Sabatino Cesile, Quarantine Operational Support
& Melbourne dock plans Allan Duncan, Senior Quarantine Officer, North
West operations Jeremy Cooper, Quarantine Officer, Southern
operations Fox Eradication Program (FEP), RMC: Alan Johnston, Manager, FEP Chris Parker, Operations Manager Craig Bester, Senior Coordinator Wildlife Management Branch, RMC: Nick Mooney, Wildlife Biologist Cover Photography (from left to right): Quarantine officer – courtesy of Lyn Broos; fox - courtesy of Invasive Animals CRC; cars off ferry - Lyn Broos.
Disclaimer The information provided in this document is provided in good faith. The Crown, its officers, employees and agents do not accept liability however arising, including liability for negligence, for any loss resulting from the use of or reliance upon the information in this Report and/or reliance on its availability at any time.
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IRA of Fox Entry Pathways into Tasmania _ Version 2.0, BPB, DPIW, 19/3/2008 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................5
2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................21
2.1 OVERVIEW AND CONDUCT OF PATHWAY IMPORT RISK ANALYSIS ...............................21 2.2 IRA STAGE 1 – INITIATION OF THIS PATHWAY IMPORT RISK ANALYSIS.......................23
3 PURPOSE..........................................................................................................................26
4 SCOPE...............................................................................................................................27
5 METHOD..........................................................................................................................28
5.1 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................28 5.2 IRA STAGE 2 - PEST RISK ASSESSMENT .......................................................................28
5.2.1 Pest categorisation.................................................................................................29 5.2.2 Determination of likelihood of entry......................................................................30 5.2.3 Determination of likelihood of establishment. .......................................................32 5.2.4 Determination of likelihood of spread. ..................................................................32 5.2.5 Assessment of consequences. .................................................................................32 5.2.6 Estimation of unrestricted risk...............................................................................34
5.3 IRA STAGE 3 - PEST RISK MANAGEMENT ....................................................................35 5.4 VERTEBRATE PESTS COMMITTEE (VPC) THREAT CATEGORY ......................................35
6 RESULTS ..........................................................................................................................38
6.1 SHIPPING PATTERNS AND VOLUME ...............................................................................38 6.1.1 Shipping Patterns for Tasmanian ports .................................................................39 6.1.2 Shipping Containerisation Patterns for Tasmanian ports .....................................43 6.1.3 Resident Fox Populations at mainland Australian Ports ......................................44
6.2 AIRCRAFT USAGE PATTERNS ........................................................................................45 6.3 QUARANTINE BARRIER INSPECTION REGIMES...............................................................47
6.3.1 Containerisation Inspection Regimes ....................................................................47 6.3.2 Quarantine Detector Dog (QDD) Inspection Practices ........................................48
6.4 LEGISLATION & REGULATORY CONTROLS....................................................................49 6.4.1 Animal Health Act 1995.........................................................................................49 6.4.2 Nature Conservation Act 2002...............................................................................50 6.4.3 Vermin Control Act 2000 & 2002..........................................................................50
6.5 PEST RISK ASSESSMENT................................................................................................51 6.5.1 Pest Categorisation................................................................................................51 6.5.2 Likelihood of Entry ................................................................................................55 6.5.3 Likelihood of Establishment...................................................................................57 6.5.4 Likelihood of Spread..............................................................................................58 6.5.5 Likelihood of Consequence ....................................................................................59 6.5.6 Unrestricted Risk Estimate ....................................................................................61
7 RISK MANAGEMENT MITIGATION MEASURES & RECOMMENDATIONS.62
8 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................65
9 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................67
10 APPENDICES.................................................................................................................72
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10.1 APPENDIX 1. POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ........................................... 72 10.2 APPENDIX 2. 2001-2003 FOX-FREE ACTION PLAN RECOMMENDED ‘PREVENTATIVE’ STRATEGIC ACTIONS (NATURE CONSERVATION BRANCH 2001) ........................................... 74 10.3 APPENDIX 3. PORT FOX RISK PROFILES .................................................................. 75 10.4 APPENDIX 4. INSPECTION OF INTERSTATE (DOMESTIC) CONTAINERS................... 112 10.5 APPENDIX 5. LEGISLATIVE BACKING FOR FOX REGULATION IN TASMANIA ......... 115
10.5.1 Animal Health Act 1995 (No. 85 of 1995)......................................................... 115 10.5.2 Nature Conservation Act (No. 63 of 2002)........................................................ 116
10.6 APPENDIX 6. PEST DATA SHEETS.......................................................................... 119
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
FIGURE 1. FOX RISK ENTRY PATHWAYS OF CONCERN................................................................ 7 TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF FOX ‘LIKELIHOOD OF ENTRY’ PATHWAYS............................................ 9 TABLE 2. KEYNOTE SUMMARY OF RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURES PROPOSED FOR FURTHER
CONSIDERATION AGAINST FOX RISK ENTRY PATHWAYS ................................................. 11 TABLE 3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURES PROPOSED FOR FURTHER
CONSIDERATION AGAINST FOX RISK ENTRY PATHWAYS ................................................. 14 FIGURE 2 FOX DISTRIBUTION IN AUSTRALIA ......................................................................... 22 TABLE 4. MAJOR FOX RELATED EVENTS IMPACTING ON TASMANIA OVER THE PAST DECADE 24 TABLE 5. LIKELIHOOD OF ENTRY – COMPONENT STAGES FOR RISK ESTIMATION .................... 30 TABLE 6 NOMENCLATURE FOR QUALITATIVE LIKELIHOOD .................................................... 31 TABLE 7. MAGNITUDE OF LOCAL, REGIONAL AND STATE CONSEQUENCES................................ 33 TABLE 8. RISK ESTIMATION MATRIX ......................................................................................... 34 FIGURE 3. TASMANIA AND ITS MAJOR PORT LOCATIONS (AS SOURCED DIRECTLY FROM
TASPORTS WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.TASPORTS.COM.AU/ABOUT/PORT_LOCATIONS.HTML). 39 TABLE 9. SUMMARY OF KEY SHIPPING PATTERNS FOR TASMANIA........................................... 40 FIGURE 4. SHIP VISITS TASMANIA’S FOUR MAJOR PORTS (AS SOURCED FROM TASPORTS
WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.TASPORTS.COM.AU/)..................................................................... 41 FIGURE 5. GOOGLE IMAGE SHOWING AERODROME LINKAGES BETWEEN MELBOURNE, KING
ISLAND (MARKED ‘B’) AND SMITHTON AERODROME........................................................ 46
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1 Executive Summary Quarantine measures for protecting and maintaining Tasmania’s high standard of biosecurity must be periodically checked to ensure they remain fit-for-purpose. As part of this on-going process, the DPIW is reviewing risk measures that currently apply to matters of particularly serious quarantine concern to the State, such as that posed by the potential introduction of the exotic vermin, the European red fox, Vulpes vulpes. Each quarantine risk review undertaken is informed by contemporary Import Risk Analysis (IRA) method which provides a scientifically credible, transparent foundation for policy decisions about quarantine measures. Foxes in Tasmania Authorities have gathered sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt over the past decade to categorically confirm the presence of low numbers of red foxes in the State (Fox Eradication Program 2005). Popular belief suggests the presence of these foxes has most likely arisen from the wilful, illegal introduction of sets of fox cubs by one or more people in the late 1990’s, and is a situation exacerbated by the coincidental decline of the Tasmanian Devil population across much of the State due to the spread of a fatal facial tumour disease. Tasmanian Devil’s are believed to have provided an important predatory and/or competitive buffer against the establishment of foxes in the past. As the fox is far from being fully established in Tasmania, every effort is being made by the Government to specifically target and eradicate the small number of vermin known to be present in selected areas of the State. The Quarantine Challenge The challenge exists to successfully eradicate one of the world’s most adaptable, elusive and wily invasive pests as quickly as possible, before these resident fox populations have the chance to breed up in number. Known as a ‘super predator’ and one of the world’s worst top 100 invasive species, if the fox does establish it will devastate the last remaining ecological sanctuary of ground-dwelling marsupials of significant diversity, scale and number left in Australia (Department of Primary Industries and Water 2004; Global Invasive Species Database 2007; Kinnear 2003). The significance of this point and the extremely high value and status that Tasmania’s unique environmental heritage enjoys in the world cannot be understated. The reason being that red foxes are now recognised as the most widely distributed carnivore in the world (Global Invasive Species Database 2007), and Tasmania is uniquely poised to still successfully protect its biodiversity and agriculture and retain its fox-free status. Foxes will have a major impact on Tasmanian agriculture (predation of livestock calves and lambs), horticulture (foxes are omnivorous, and soft fruits form a significant part of their diet when in season), tourism potential (through severe species loss of the island’s biodiversity), and, human and animal health (e.g. hydatids being a case in point). Hand-in-hand with any such eradication effort is a need to seek to prevent any further re-introduction of foxes into the State by accidental or wilful (illegal) means. The concern is the eradication effort and benefit, no matter how successful, will be severely diminished, if not lost altogether, if the supply tap for re-introduction cannot be turned off to any significant degree (Saunders et al. 2006, p. 51). Tasmania, as Australia’s only island State, faces the same full spectrum of challenges to successfully manage its quarantine barrier, as does its much larger mainland counterpart. The principal difference is scale. Though relatively small in size, Tasmania is faced with the very challenging situation of having to manage a length of coastline as long as that of Victoria and
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New South Wales combined, yet with a fraction of these States populations and revenue base. Colloquially known as the ‘City of Kew’ syndrome, a perspective worth noting is that Tasmania’s population base is not much greater than that of Melbourne’s City of Kew. Quarantine Entry Risk Pathways This pathway IRA demonstrates that the multiple range of risk entry pathways requiring management extend across: • all manner of aircraft activity, • recreational sailing and yachting, • commercial sailing (pleasure cruises, and public conveyance) and • commercial shipping (container, bulk cargo, petro-chemical and industrial). Such entry pathways extend into multiple destinations whether it be: • commercial ports, • small harbours or general coastline, • major and regional airports, • manned and unmanned aerodromes, and • private airstrips in their dozens, if not hundreds. Two broad streams of risk entry pathway exist (see Figure 1): 1. Accidental Entry, and 2. Wilful/Illegal Entry. The key landfall points extend not only to one land mass, such as the Tasmanian mainland, but to numerous islands as well, such as King, Flinders, Cape Barren, and Bruny island’s, etc. Each transport link between Tasmania and mainland Australia and the World represents a potential quarantine risk entry pathway for foreign goods, pests and materials of one form or another. The potential risk entry pathways pertaining to foxes are summarised in Figure 1. The problem with the European red fox as a quarantine pest of concern is that the issues it raises, and the risks it presents, cuts across ALL areas of quarantine function. The review recognises:
• If many of the fox risk entry pathway concerns can be addressed to some or all degree, it is believed significant additional benefits will most certainly simultaneously flow to a much broader spectrum of quarantine risk materials and issues.
• The fact that wilful (illegal) introduction of live adult foxes and/or cubs is an extremely difficult quarantine risk matter to manage and detect, when constrained by defined resource availability limits.
• Such resources have to be stretched across multiple arms of quarantine risk management, whether it be pre-entry, entry (border control) or post-entry (post border) control.
In the limited time available to this review (several weeks), this pathway IRA has strongly profiled the risks presented by shipping entry pathways into the State. However, considerable attention has also been given to the question of potential wilful, human-assisted introduction pathways.
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Risk Assessment The following conclusions can be drawn from this risk assessment review process:
1. Analysis indicates that any variation in risk likelihood’s is largely confined to the initial phase of ‘Likelihood of Entry’, on a pathway specific basis.
2. If a fox gains entry onto the Tasmanian mainland or islands, the likelihood of the animals ability to then distribute, establish and be of significant consequence (if a breeding population of at least one pair were able to establish) will remain consistently high (as in ‘extreme’) risk, irrespective of its point of entry due to this pests high level of adaptability, survivability, agility, dispersive capacity, dietary versatility, food consumption levels, etc.
3. Broadly speaking, though at least two definite fox entry pathways are known to exist of an accidental nature, the greatest quarantine risk is believed to rest with wilful/illegal means of introduction of the pest. The two ‘accidental entry’ pathways of greatest concern are that associated with transfer of empty containers (EC’s) and/or unassisted entry onto a Roll-on, Roll-off (Ro/Ro) vessel when docked and loading.
4. The pathways are numbered (qualitatively weighted) in order of potential risk from highest (1) to lowest (6) in Table 1.
5. Fox Risk Port Profiles were undertaken for Tasmania’s four major ports; Burnie, Devonport, Bell Bay and Hobart. It is firmly established, on current shipping forms and volume patterns, that Burnie and Devonport represent the highest shipping risk entry pathways for the State. However, this could change if Bell Bay were to also become a Ro/Ro facility in the future.
6. The wilful introduction of one or more fox cubs, as opposed to adult foxes, it is believed will stand a greater chance of remaining undetected by quarantine and successfully establishing the pest in the field, if hand rearing the animals to maturity, in secrecy prior to release.
7. The risk, and chances of evading detection are further heightened, if wilful introduction of the pest takes place via the use of either:
• a light aircraft to a remote or private landing strip,
• a private yacht to a secondary or minor harbour, or
• a fully packed container which is either not inspected or only tailgate inspected during winter months.
8. Winter months of April through to September represent a higher risk factor for survival and entry of foxes than do the Summer/’daylight savings’ months. The risk relationship is believed to be predominantly governed by prevailing daytime temperatures and improved ability by an adult fox to withstand the deleterious effects of dehydration during winter months. In summer, a fox trapped in a container for 24-72 hours is most likely to asphyxiate or fatally dehydrate due to experiencing extended very high temperatures in a confined space.
9. The unrestricted risk estimate associated with European red foxes gaining entry to and establishing in Tasmania (less the question of likelihood of entry), without quarantine intervention, is estimated to be (Likelihood of Establishment and Spread = (L)ES):
= (L)ES x magnitude of consequences = high x extreme = extreme risk
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IRA of Fox Entry Pathways into Tasmania _ Version 2.0, BPB, DPIW, 19/3/2008 9
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF FOX ‘LIKELIHOOD OF ENTRY’ PATHWAYS
FORM OF ENTRY
PATHWAY MODE OF ENTRY Likelihood of Entry
(Accidental or Wilful/Illegal)
TYPE CLASS Risk weighted from highest to lowest
Wilful/Illegal Aircraft, light Private (private airstrips or unmanned aerodromes)
1A
Wilful/Illegal Yachting/boating Private yachts 1B
Wilful/Illegal Aircraft, light Chartered 1C
Wilful/Illegal Commercial Shipping Unmonitored Ro/Ro containers*
1D
Wilful/Illegal Commercial Shipping Private vehicles/ vans
2A
Wilful/Illegal Commercial Shipping Trucked containers
2B
Wilful/Illegal Yachting/boating Fishing boats 2C
Wilful/Illegal Aircraft, light Commercial 2C
Accidental Commercial Shipping, unassisted entry
Roll-on, Roll-off (Ro/Ro) (via ships loading platform)
3A
Accidental Commercial Shipping, assisted entry
Empty Containers (ECs)
3B
Wilful/Illegal Aircraft, jet Commercial 4A
Wilful/Illegal Aircraft, jet Chartered or private
4B
Accidental Commercial Shipping, unassisted entry
Load-on, Load-off (Lo/Lo) (via ships gantry)
5
Accidental Commercial Shipping, assisted entry
Ship hand’s pet 6
* This risk entry pathway applies to a specific shipping operation which currently is not being subject to quarantine barrier control freight inspection. If proven to be the case, the situation needs urgent rectification.
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10 IRA of Fox Entry Pathways into Tasmania _ Version 2.0, BPB, DPIW, 19/3/2008
Risk Management Mitigation Measures A range of risk management mitigation measures are offered as discussion points to seek to stimulate further inter-agency review on how best to address the quarantine risks of identified concern (Tables 2 & 3). The risk mitigation measures are grouped on the basis of pre-entry (pre-clearance at source), entry (border control) and post-entry (domestic) quarantine practice. The measures are focused thematically, along two main lines of thinking:
1. Maximising the opportunity for ‘pre-clearance’ activities at source, off-shore, where-ever possible; and
2. Continually seeking to enhance strategic decision making of deployment of on-ground operational resources to the best effect possible, particularly at the point of barrier control.
This is based on the premise of utilising as much intelligence gathering and profiling of quarantine intercept data and ground-truthed inspectorial personal knowledge as feasibly possible, in order to maximise the opportunity and potential, to capture not just the wilful/illegal means of entry for foxes but other quarantine contraband as a whole. Such techniques are often employed to great positive effect at the international barrier to maximise the chance of quarantine interception of high/highest risk materials. Tasmania being an island State, may further benefit from continuing to build on already considerable quarantine effort in this critical area of function.
Risk mitigation measures are also offered to strategically address the needs of seasonal relationship factors that require periods of more elevated quarantine alert. One such period is April – May each year, when young foxes are known to disperse from their original territory of birth. It is interesting to note that the only two documented incidents of foxes seen to disembark onto Tasmanian soil, from either an actual shipping container or a Ro/Ro ship, have occurred on separate occasions at the start and end of May respectively, though the incidents were years apart. The question of the need for further Port Security risk measures was also addressed by ensuring a team of 4 people from the Biosecurity Technical Group’s (BTG) Fox Working Group, carried out site visits to each of Tasmania’s four main ports. Fox Risk Port Profiles were prepared for each port, as illustrated in Appendixes 3.2 – 3.5, along with an additional profile for Port of Melbourne (Appendix 3.1) on information supplied by Sabatino Cesile, Quarantine Tasmania. It was proven beyond doubt that any attempt to secure the perimeter of each and every port to a standard that was fox proof to satisfactorily contain an escapee animal off a ship was nigh impossible. The cost would be enormous and far outweigh its concomitant risk. The BTG Fox Working Group concludes that the costs are prohibitive and any improvement in fencing and gating arrangements would prove ineffective. If tightening of existing Port Security measures are taken by the ports authority, TasPorts, that it do so for good reason other than concern about containment of foxes.
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o Ta
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itiat
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•
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oth
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all
maj
or S
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s en
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g Ta
sman
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Ports
on
a re
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r bas
is, t
he q
uest
ion
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e co
st-
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fit o
f in
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edic
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tra
p fo
r use
on
each
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ves
sel s
ailin
g in
to T
asm
ania
. The
re
is a
fai
r lik
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ood
that
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mai
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by t
he p
athw
ay a
nd m
ay t
here
fore
be
an
impr
actic
al ri
sk o
ptio
n in
real
ity.
Stat
ion
Pier
& th
e Sp
irit’
s of T
asm
ania
I &
II
• Es
tabl
ish
a pr
e-cl
eara
nce
pres
ence
and
int
ellig
ence
gat
herin
g ex
erci
se fo
r hig
h ris
k tra
velle
rs a
nd v
ehic
ular
traf
fic w
aitin
g to
bo
ard
the
Spiri
t’s, p
re-s
ailin
g to
Dev
onpo
rt.
Qua
rant
ine
Tasm
ania
(QTa
s) o
pera
tions
•
Stre
ngth
en
cove
rt in
telli
genc
e ga
ther
ing
capa
city
an
d qu
aran
tine
inte
rcep
tion
data
pr
ofili
ng
in
orde
r to
re
fine
targ
etin
g of
ope
ratio
nal o
n-gr
ound
reso
urce
s.
• R
e-di
rect
som
e lim
ited
reso
urce
s to
add
ress
ing
light
airc
raft
activ
ity a
t K
ing
and
Flin
ders
Isl
ands
, an
d on
-goi
ng ‘
spot
’ ch
ecks
of
unm
anne
d ae
rodr
omes
, pa
rticu
larly
in
north
-wes
t Ta
sman
ia, w
hene
ver p
ossi
ble.
•
Con
duct
int
er-a
genc
y di
scus
sion
for
um o
n ho
w b
est
to t
ackl
e hi
gh ri
sk p
rivat
e ai
rcra
ft an
d ya
chtin
g ris
k en
try p
athw
ays.
ENTR
Y
Seas
onal
N
one
at th
is ti
me.
N
one
at th
is ti
me.
Unc
ontro
lled
Copy
12
IRA
of F
ox E
ntry
Pat
hway
s int
o Ta
sman
ia _
Ver
sion
2.0,
BPB
, DPI
W, 1
9/3/
2008
QU
AR
AN
TIN
E
BAR
RIE
R
PHA
SE
TIM
E
PER
IOD
AC
CID
ENTA
L EN
TR
Y P
ATH
WA
YS
(nam
ely
‘Shi
ppin
g’)
WIL
FUL/
ILLE
GA
L EN
TRY
PA
THW
AY
S
O
n-go
ing
• Fo
rmal
isat
ion
of a
Fox
Incu
rsio
n Em
erge
ncy
Res
pons
e Pl
an
(FIE
RP)
as
a co
-sig
ned
inte
rage
ncy
agre
emen
t w
ith c
lear
ly
defin
ed r
oles
and
eng
agem
ent
proc
esse
s be
twee
n th
e FE
P,
QT,
Pol
ice
and
Emer
genc
y Se
rvic
es,
DPI
W,
Ship
ping
&
Avi
atio
n ag
enci
es.
Irre
spec
tive
of t
he b
read
th o
f ag
ency
re
pres
enta
tion
on a
ny s
uch
Plan
, it
is i
mpe
rativ
e th
at t
he
who
le q
uest
ion
of a
cle
arly
def
ined
incu
rsio
n re
spon
se p
lan
be re
visi
ted.
•
Cro
ss –
chec
k EC
s to
som
e de
gree
on
land
fall
in T
asm
ania
n po
rts.
• N
o fu
rther
act
ion
is re
com
men
ded
be ta
ken
on tr
ying
to ‘f
ox-
proo
f’ th
e pe
rimet
er’s
of a
ny o
f Tas
man
ia’s
four
maj
or p
orts
.
• Fo
rmal
isat
ion
of a
Fox
Inc
ursi
on E
mer
genc
y R
espo
nse
Plan
(F
IER
P)
with
a
stro
ng
Com
plia
nce/
Crim
inal
Pr
osec
utio
n co
mpo
nent
to it
. •
Mai
ntai
n fu
ll sh
ip i
nspe
ctio
ns o
n ar
rival
at
all
four
maj
or
Tasm
ania
n Po
rts.
• A
pply
a n
ew Q
Tas
frei
ght i
nspe
ctio
n sc
hem
e to
fre
ight
bei
ng
impo
rted
into
the
Stat
e vi
a B
ridpo
rt fr
om V
icto
ria a
nd F
linde
rs
Isla
nd a
s a m
atte
r of v
ery
high
prio
rity
and
urge
ncy.
•
Rev
iew
th
e pe
rfor
man
ce
of
exis
ting
dete
ctor
/sniff
er
dogs
ca
paci
ty to
det
ect f
ox sc
ents
and
mat
eria
ls u
nder
pre
ssur
e.
• R
evie
w
the
pote
ntia
l ne
ed
for
addi
tiona
l sp
ecia
lised
do
g de
tect
ion
team
s, sk
illed
in fo
x sc
ent d
etec
tion.
•
Req
uest
the
Stat
e’s
Chi
ef V
eter
inar
y O
ffic
er (
CV
O)
re-is
sue
a di
rect
ive
re-o
utlin
ing
the
Stat
e’s
regu
lato
ry r
equi
rem
ents
on
foxe
s and
fox
mat
eria
ls to
rele
vant
aut
horit
ies a
nd st
aff.
• Tr
ain
the
last
2-3
yea
rs i
ntak
e of
Qua
rant
ine
Tasm
ania
fie
ld
insp
ectio
n pe
rson
nel i
n a
Fox
Det
ectio
n Tr
aini
ng p
rogr
am.
• C
onsi
der
intro
duci
ng
a fo
x an
d ve
rtebr
ate
pest
s tra
inin
g/fa
mili
aris
atio
n pa
ckag
e as
a p
erm
anen
t fix
ture
into
any
ne
w Q
uara
ntin
e Ta
sman
ia o
ffic
ers i
nduc
tion
train
ing.
POST
EN
TRY
Se
ason
al
• Se
ason
al a
lerts
to th
e pu
blic
abo
ut th
e ne
ed f
or v
igila
nce
and
aler
tnes
s in
ide
ntify
ing
and
repo
rting
sus
pici
ous
fox-
like
activ
ity.
• Im
prov
ed f
ox r
oad
sign
age
to b
e de
velo
ped
by th
e FE
P, w
ith
enha
nced
let
terin
g/nu
mbe
ring
for
the
call-
out
num
ber,
‘Fox
O
ut’.
• C
omm
unity
out
reac
h ca
mpa
ign
to e
ncou
rage
pub
lic m
onito
ring
and
repo
rting
of
susp
icio
us a
ctiv
ities
at
rem
ote
air
strip
s an
d ha
rbou
rs. P
artic
ular
ly ta
rget
tour
ists
trav
ellin
g ar
ound
the
Stat
e.
• C
ontin
ue t
o en
hanc
e th
e de
velo
pmen
t of
ong
oing
com
mun
ity
awar
enes
s pro
gram
s dire
cted
at:
• ra
isin
g pu
blic
aw
aren
ess
abou
t th
e ke
y da
nger
s fo
xes
repr
esen
t to
Tasm
ania
, •
redu
cing
pu
blic
or
pe
er
ridic
ule
of
citiz
ens
repo
rting
po
tent
ial i
ncid
ents
or m
atte
rs o
f con
cern
.
U
ncon
trolle
d Co
py
IRA
of F
ox E
ntry
Pat
hway
s int
o Ta
sman
ia _
Ver
sion
2.0,
BPB
, DPI
W, 1
9/3/
2008
13
QU
AR
AN
TIN
E
BAR
RIE
R
PHA
SE
TIM
E
PER
IOD
AC
CID
ENTA
L EN
TR
Y P
ATH
WA
YS
(nam
ely
‘Shi
ppin
g’)
WIL
FUL/
ILLE
GA
L EN
TRY
PA
THW
AY
S
O
n-go
ing
• A
ctiv
atio
n of
a F
ox I
ncur
sion
Em
erge
ncy
Res
pons
e Pl
an
(FIE
RP)
to a
pos
t-ent
ry q
uara
ntin
e in
curs
ion
inci
dent
. •
Act
ivat
ion
of th
e FI
ERP
to a
pos
t-ent
ry in
cide
nt.
NB
: Ris
k m
easu
res w
hich
hav
e be
en su
cces
sful
ly u
nder
take
n to
dat
e ar
e hi
ghlig
hted
by
shad
ing
of th
e te
xt.
Unc
ontro
lled
Copy
14
IRA
of F
ox E
ntry
Pat
hway
s int
o Ta
sman
ia _
Ver
sion
2.0,
BPB
, DPI
W, 1
9/3/
2008
TA
BLE
3. D
ETA
ILED
SU
MM
AR
Y O
F R
ISK
MA
NA
GEM
ENT
MEA
SUR
ES P
RO
POSE
D F
OR
FU
RTH
ER C
ON
SID
ERA
TIO
N A
GA
INST
FO
X R
ISK
EN
TRY
PA
THW
AY
S
QU
AR
AN
TIN
E
BAR
RIE
R
PHA
SE
TIM
E
PER
IOD
AC
CID
ENTA
L EN
TR
Y P
ATH
WA
YS
(nam
ely
‘Shi
ppin
g’)
WIL
FUL/
ILLE
GA
L EN
TRY
PA
THW
AY
S
PRE-
ENTR
Y
Seas
onal
•
Neg
otia
te w
ith P
ort o
f Mel
bour
ne A
utho
rity
to u
nder
take
an
annu
al t
rapp
ing
prog
ram
for
fox
es t
arge
ted
at t
he t
wo
perio
ds o
f th
e ye
ar w
hen
foxe
s re
side
nt in
the
Port
area
are
m
ost
activ
e; A
pril
–May
(w
hen
youn
g ar
e di
sper
sing
) an
d Ju
ly-A
ugus
t (w
hen
vixe
ns
are
‘in-s
easo
n’,
mat
ing
and
prep
arin
g de
ns).
This
su
gges
ted
initi
ativ
e w
as
very
su
cces
sful
ly u
nder
take
n on
two
sepa
rate
occ
asio
ns in
199
9,
and
agai
n in
200
1, b
ut u
nfor
tuna
tely
not
rep
eate
d on
an
annu
al b
asis
sinc
e th
en.
• C
onsi
der
seek
ing
the
intro
duct
ion
of s
imila
r fo
x tra
ppin
g pr
ogra
ms
at a
ny o
ther
por
t-of-
call,
suc
h as
Syd
ney
and
Ade
laid
e, i
f fo
x po
pula
tions
are
eve
r fo
und
to b
e re
side
nt
near
doc
k lo
adin
g ar
eas
for
com
mer
cial
shi
ppin
g de
stin
ed
for T
asm
ania
n po
rts
Non
e at
this
tim
e.
O
n-go
ing
• To
com
plet
ely
elim
inat
e th
e ve
ry s
mal
l ris
k pr
esen
ted
by
was
hed-
dow
n, a
ir dr
ied
empt
y co
ntai
ners
(EC
s) a
rriv
ing
in
Tasm
ania
n po
rts (
for
carr
ying
eith
er a
tra
pped
fox
, pe
st o
f an
y fo
rm,
and/
or i
llega
l co
ntra
band
) –
esta
blis
h a
pre-
clea
ranc
e Q
ualit
y A
ssur
ance
In
spec
tion
&
Cle
aran
ce
Sche
me
at p
ort
of o
rigin
for
sea
ling
empt
y co
ntai
ners
to
a st
anda
rd
that
sa
tisfie
s Q
uara
ntin
e Ta
sman
ia’s
(Q
T)
requ
irem
ents
. Th
e sc
hem
e w
ould
rel
y up
on a
n ‘o
ffic
ially
au
thor
ised
’ pe
rson
to
insp
ect,
lock
and
sea
l th
e co
ntai
ner
with
a d
esig
nate
d, c
olou
r co
ded
seal
(Se
e un
der
‘Ent
ry
Phas
e’
for
follo
w-u
p se
cond
ary
insp
ectio
n an
d cr
oss-
verif
icat
ion
on th
is m
atte
r).
Stat
ion
Pier
& th
e Sp
irit’
s of T
asm
ania
I &
II
• C
onsi
der e
stab
lishi
ng a
pre
-cle
aran
ce p
rese
nce
and
inte
llige
nce
gath
erin
g ex
erci
se o
n hi
gh r
isk
trave
llers
and
veh
icul
ar tr
affic
w
aitin
g to
boa
rd th
e Sp
irit’s
, pre
-sai
ling
to D
evon
port.
For
war
d th
e ‘ta
rget
ed’
pote
ntia
l ris
k us
er i
nfor
mat
ion,
par
ticul
arly
car
re
gist
ratio
ns,
to
pre-
notif
y fo
r fu
rther
cl
ose
quar
antin
e in
spec
tion
on a
rriv
al a
t D
evon
port,
and
enh
ance
d us
e of
‘re
d lin
e’ ta
rget
ed in
spec
tions
. Q
uara
ntin
e Ta
sman
ia o
pera
tions
•
Bui
ld u
p co
vert
inte
llige
nce
gath
erin
g ca
paci
ty a
nd q
uara
ntin
e in
terc
eptio
n da
ta p
rofil
ing
in o
rder
to
refin
e ta
rget
ing
of
oper
atio
nal
on-g
roun
d re
sour
ces.
Enha
nced
pr
e-cl
eara
nce
U
ncon
trolle
d Co
py
IRA
of F
ox E
ntry
Pat
hway
s int
o Ta
sman
ia _
Ver
sion
2.0,
BPB
, DPI
W, 1
9/3/
2008
15
QU
AR
AN
TIN
E
BAR
RIE
R
PHA
SE
TIM
E
PER
IOD
AC
CID
ENTA
L EN
TR
Y P
ATH
WA
YS
(nam
ely
‘Shi
ppin
g’)
WIL
FUL/
ILLE
GA
L EN
TRY
PA
THW
AY
S
• Er
ect
high
ly v
isib
le s
igna
ge w
arni
ng o
f th
e da
nger
s fo
xes
pres
ent
to T
asm
ania
at
port
of o
rigin
. Ple
ase
note
thi
s ta
sk
has
been
ve
ry
succ
essf
ully
co
mpl
eted
by
Q
uara
ntin
e Ta
sman
ia a
t th
e 3
key
dock
ing
faci
litie
s fo
r sh
ippi
ng t
o Ta
sman
ia
orig
inat
ing
from
the
Po
rt of
M
elbo
urne
(s
ee
App
endi
x 4.
1 –
Fox
Ris
k Po
rt Pr
ofile
– P
ort o
f M
elbo
urne
fo
r evi
denc
e).
• C
ontin
ue e
duca
ting
dock
wor
kers
of
the
risks
fox
es a
nd
quar
antin
e pe
sts
pres
ent t
o Ta
sman
ia a
nd s
uppl
y th
em w
ith
on-g
oing
qua
rant
ine
info
rmat
ion
mat
eria
l. Th
is a
ctio
n ha
s be
en s
ucce
ssfu
lly a
chie
ved
on o
ccas
ions
in
rece
nt y
ears
by
QTa
s vi
a “T
ool B
ox”
pres
enta
tions
to w
orke
rs.
• C
onsi
der
disc
ussi
ng w
ith a
ll th
e m
ajor
shi
ppin
g lin
es i
nto
Tasm
ania
(TO
LL S
hipp
ing,
AN
L, T
T-Li
ne,
Chas
Kel
ly
Tran
spor
t G
roup
, M
atth
ew F
linde
rs ?
), th
e qu
estio
n of
in
stal
ling
and
man
agin
g on
e st
anda
rdis
ed,
spec
ialis
ed f
ox
trap
per
ship
. At
each
and
eve
ry s
ailin
g in
to T
asm
ania
, the
tra
p w
ould
nee
d to
be
fres
hly
baite
d at
the
sta
rt of
the
vo
yage
, and
then
mon
itore
d at
joun
ey’s
end
, in
Tasm
ania
by
an
auth
oris
ed
pers
on
to
an
agre
ed/fo
rmal
ised
tra
ppin
g m
anag
emen
t pr
otoc
ol,
join
tly a
gree
d up
on b
y Q
uara
ntin
e Ta
sman
ia, F
ox E
radi
catio
n Pr
ogra
m &
Shi
ppin
g Li
nes.
activ
ities
at
Port
of M
elbo
urne
and
oth
er p
orts
-of-
orig
in f
or
ship
ping
, m
ay h
elp
free
up
a lit
tle m
ore
reso
urce
s to
be
dire
cted
at
addr
essi
ng t
he q
uara
ntin
e ris
k ne
eds
of K
ing
and
Flin
ders
Isl
ands
, an
d m
onito
ring
of u
nman
ned
aero
drom
es.
Cur
rent
ly K
ing
Isla
nd a
nd li
ght a
ircra
ft tra
ffic
rem
ains
a h
igh
risk
entry
rout
e fo
r qua
rant
ine
cont
raba
nd.
• C
ondu
ct
an
in-h
ouse
w
orks
hop/
disc
ussi
on
foru
m
with
in
volv
emen
t fr
om r
elev
ant
sist
er a
genc
ies
like
Bio
secu
rity
Polic
y B
ranc
h an
d Fo
x Er
adic
atio
n Pr
ogra
m
to
furth
er
stra
tegi
cally
ana
lyse
targ
etin
g of
its
reso
urce
s to
see
k to
redu
ce
dow
n th
e qu
aran
tine
risks
ass
ocia
ted
with
lig
ht a
ircra
ft an
d ya
chtin
g pa
thw
ays.
ENTR
Y
Seas
onal
N
one
at th
is ti
me.
N
one
at th
is ti
me.
O
n-go
ing
• Fo
rmal
isat
ion
of a
Fox
Incu
rsio
n Em
erge
ncy
Res
pons
e Pl
an
(FIE
RP)
as
a co
-sig
ned
inte
rage
ncy
agre
emen
t w
ith c
lear
ly
defin
ed r
oles
and
eng
agem
ent
proc
esse
s be
twee
n th
e FE
P,
QT,
Pol
ice
and
Emer
genc
y Se
rvic
es,
DPI
W,
Ship
ping
&
Avi
atio
n ag
enci
es w
here
app
licab
le,
and
any
othe
r ke
y
• Fo
rmal
isat
ion
of a
Fox
Inc
ursi
on E
mer
genc
y R
espo
nse
Plan
(F
IER
P) a
s a
co-s
igne
d in
tera
genc
y ag
reem
ent
with
cle
arly
de
fined
role
s an
d en
gage
men
t pro
cess
es b
etw
een
the
FEP,
and
re
leva
nt
agen
cies
w
here
ap
plic
able
, an
d an
y ot
her
key
stak
ehol
ders
th
at
may
ho
ld
an
imm
edia
te
and
legi
timat
e
Unc
ontro
lled
Copy
16
IRA
of F
ox E
ntry
Pat
hway
s int
o Ta
sman
ia _
Ver
sion
2.0,
BPB
, DPI
W, 1
9/3/
2008
QU
AR
AN
TIN
E
BAR
RIE
R
PHA
SE
TIM
E
PER
IOD
AC
CID
ENTA
L EN
TR
Y P
ATH
WA
YS
(nam
ely
‘Shi
ppin
g’)
WIL
FUL/
ILLE
GA
L EN
TRY
PA
THW
AY
S
stak
ehol
ders
tha
t m
ay h
old
an i
mm
edia
te a
nd l
egiti
mat
e in
tere
st in
the
mat
ter.
• EC
s ar
e cr
oss-
chec
ked,
to
so
me
satis
fact
ory
perc
enta
ge
num
ber
of o
vera
ll nu
mbe
r tra
ded,
as
set
by Q
T, i
.e.
100%
vi
sual
ext
erna
l in
spec
tion
to v
erify
sea
ls h
ave
not
been
ta
mpe
red
and
no o
ther
qua
rant
inab
le c
onta
min
ants
aris
en
post
se
al
in-tr
ansi
t fr
om
port
of
orig
in.
Re-
insp
ect
‘x’
perc
enta
ge o
f ran
dom
ly s
elec
ted
cont
aine
rs a
s a
furth
er b
ack
up te
st, t
o ve
rify
insp
ectio
n st
anda
rds a
re u
p to
scra
tch.
•
No
furth
er a
ctio
n be
take
n at
any
of
Tasm
ania
’s f
our
maj
or
ports
to se
ek to
‘fox
-pro
of’ t
he p
erim
eter
’s o
f the
se p
orts
and
th
ey
mai
n ac
cess
/gat
ing
poin
ts.
The
cost
s w
ould
be
pr
ohib
itive
and
wou
ld m
ost
likel
y st
ill p
rove
ine
ffec
tual
in
cont
aini
ng a
n es
cape
e fo
x co
min
g of
f a
ship
or
ship
ping
co
ntai
ner.
If p
ort s
ecur
ity is
tigh
tene
d, th
at it
be
done
so
for
othe
r re
ason
s an
d ob
ject
ives
, ot
her
than
fo
xes.
The
prob
abili
ties
of t
hese
inc
ursi
on e
vent
s oc
curr
ing
are
very
lo
w.
inte
rest
in
the
mat
ter.
The
key
diffe
renc
e fo
r th
e FI
ERP
in
resp
ect
to
dete
ctin
g an
d re
spon
ding
to
a
Wilf
ul/Il
lega
l in
trodu
ctio
n, m
ay p
rove
to b
e th
e ac
tivat
ion
with
in th
e Pl
an o
f its
Com
plia
nce/
Crim
inal
Pro
secu
tion
com
pone
nt.
The
plan
ne
eds
to e
nsur
e th
at e
xter
nal a
genc
y pe
rson
nel s
uch
as P
olic
e O
ffice
rs, i
f firs
t con
tact
ed b
y th
e pu
blic
and
firs
t on
the
scen
e,
clea
rly u
nder
stand
to n
ot r
emov
e or
mov
e th
e ca
rcas
s of
a fo
x (if
dea
d) so
that
fore
nsic
s mat
eria
ls ar
e no
t los
t fro
m th
e sc
ene.
Th
e FI
ERP
need
s to
hav
e an
inv
estig
ativ
e re
spon
se t
eam
on
call
to re
spon
d to
such
inci
dent
s, to
seek
to e
nsur
e th
at th
e be
st
leve
l of
for
esen
ic e
vide
nce
avai
labl
e at
the
inc
iden
t sc
ene
is
capt
ured
. •
Mai
ntai
n fu
ll sh
ip
quar
antin
e in
spec
tions
on
ar
rival
an
d do
ckin
g at
the
four
maj
or p
orts
, as
curr
ently
pra
ctis
ed, p
rior t
o lo
wer
ing
of t
he c
argo
Ro/
Ro
door
s an
d co
mm
ence
men
t of
un
load
ing.
•
App
ly n
ew Q
Tas
oper
atio
ns s
hipp
ing
frei
ght i
nspe
ctio
n re
gim
e to
car
go b
eing
bro
ught
thr
ough
Brid
port
from
eith
er P
ort
Wel
shpo
ol,
Vic
toria
or
Flin
ders
Isl
and
as a
mat
ter
of h
igh
prio
rity,
to
ensu
re t
he o
pera
tor
com
plie
s w
ith S
tate
lic
ensi
ng
oper
atio
nal r
equi
rem
ents
. •
Rev
iew
th
e pe
rfor
man
ce
of
exis
ting
dete
ctor
/sniff
er
dogs
ca
paci
ty
to
dete
ct
fox
scen
ts
and
mat
eria
ls
(of
hidd
en
mat
eria
ls)
unde
r pr
essu
re i
n tru
e ‘f
ield
bas
ed’
insp
ectio
ns,
whe
n di
stra
cted
by
othe
r stro
ng, c
ompe
ting
scen
ts su
ch a
s fru
it,
vege
tabl
es a
nd sp
ices
. •
Rev
iew
th
e po
tent
ial
need
fo
r ad
ditio
nal
spec
ialis
ed
dog
dete
ctio
n te
ams,
if ot
her
illeg
al c
ontra
band
is
bein
g ta
rget
ed,
and
the
pote
ntia
l to
mul
ti-sk
ill th
ose
dogs
for
det
ectio
n of
fox
sc
ents
as w
ell.
• A
sk t
he S
tate
’s C
hief
Vet
erin
ary
Off
icer
(C
VO
) to
iss
ue a
U
ncon
trolle
d Co
py
IRA
of F
ox E
ntry
Pat
hway
s int
o Ta
sman
ia _
Ver
sion
2.0,
BPB
, DPI
W, 1
9/3/
2008
17
QU
AR
AN
TIN
E
BAR
RIE
R
PHA
SE
TIM
E
PER
IOD
AC
CID
ENTA
L EN
TR
Y P
ATH
WA
YS
(nam
ely
‘Shi
ppin
g’)
WIL
FUL/
ILLE
GA
L EN
TRY
PA
THW
AY
S
dire
ctiv
e to
all
rele
vant
age
ncie
s an
d pe
rson
nel
re-c
larif
ying
th
e le
gisl
ativ
e po
sitio
n on
fox
es a
nd f
ox m
ater
ials
to
ensu
re
unifo
rm c
larit
y of
und
erst
andi
ng a
bout
wha
t is
acc
epta
ble
or
not r
e th
e ex
istin
g ba
n on
fox
and
fox
part
impo
rtatio
ns.
• Tr
ain
the
last
2-3
yea
rs i
ntak
e of
Qua
rant
ine
Tasm
ania
fie
ld
insp
ectio
n pe
rson
nel
in a
Fox
Det
ectio
n Tr
aini
ng p
rogr
am
supp
orte
d by
the
FEP
and
Wild
life
Con
serv
atio
n fo
x pe
rson
nel.
• In
trodu
ce a
fox
and
ver
tebr
ate
pest
s tra
inin
g/fa
mili
aris
atio
n pa
ckag
e in
to a
ny n
ew Q
uara
ntin
e Ta
sman
ia o
ffic
ers
indu
ctio
n tra
inin
g, a
s a
perm
anen
t tra
inin
g fix
ture
to e
nsur
e th
ey h
ave
a cl
ear
unde
rsta
ndin
g of
any
inc
iden
t co
ntro
l pr
oced
ures
tha
t m
ay n
eed
to b
e pu
t in
plac
e w
ith r
egar
d to
fox
and
ver
tebr
ate
pest
incu
rsio
n m
atte
rs.
POST
EN
TRY
Se
ason
al
• Se
ason
al a
lerts
to th
e pu
blic
abo
ut th
e ne
ed f
or v
igila
nce
and
aler
tnes
s in
ide
ntify
ing
and
repo
rting
sus
pici
ous
fox-
like
activ
ity, a
t kn
own
perio
ds o
f hi
gh a
ctiv
ity f
or f
oxes
; ie
. lat
e A
utum
n an
d ea
rly S
prin
g; p
artic
ular
ly f
or k
now
n ‘h
ot s
pot’
regi
ons o
f the
Sta
te
• Im
prov
ed r
oad
sign
age
to b
e de
velo
ped
by t
he F
EP.
One
su
gges
tion
is t
hat
with
cur
rent
sig
nage
the
Fox
fre
e-ca
ll nu
mbe
r is
too
smal
l to
see
or re
mem
ber c
lear
ly w
hen
pass
ing
the
sign
at s
peed
, esp
ecia
lly a
t nig
ht.
• C
ontin
ue to
enh
ance
the
deve
lopm
ent o
f on
goin
g co
mm
unity
aw
aren
ess p
rogr
ams d
irect
ed a
t: •
rais
ing
publ
ic a
war
enes
s ab
out
the
key
dang
ers
foxe
s re
pres
ent t
o Ta
sman
ia,
• re
duci
ng p
ublic
or
peer
rid
icul
e of
citi
zens
rep
ortin
g po
tent
ial
inci
dent
s or
mat
ters
of
conc
ern.
Num
erou
s ca
ses
have
bee
n re
porte
d of
pub
lic c
itize
ns n
ot c
omin
g fo
rwar
d w
ith in
form
atio
n fo
r fea
r of p
ublic
ridi
cule
.
• C
omm
unity
out
reac
h ca
mpa
ign
to e
ncou
rage
the
wid
er p
ublic
to
mon
itor
and
repo
rt su
spic
ious
act
iviti
es a
t rem
ote
air
strip
s an
d ha
rbou
rs. T
ouris
ts v
isiti
ng re
mot
e ar
eas
coul
d, a
nd m
ay b
e m
ore
‘ope
n’, t
o pl
ayin
g a
pivo
tal r
ole
in th
is re
gard
if m
ade
awar
e of
th
e se
rious
ness
of
th
e is
sue
and
enco
urag
ing
them
to
im
med
iate
ly r
epor
t the
ir ob
serv
atio
ns to
aut
horit
ies.
Tim
e is
of
the
esse
nce
with
su
ch
mat
ters
. Pa
st
inci
dent
s of
re
porte
d si
ghtin
gs a
nd e
ven
disc
over
ies
of fo
x ca
rcas
s on
the
road
side
by
visi
ting
cycl
ing
tour
ists
hav
e on
ly c
ome
abou
t ‘af
ter
the
even
t’ on
thei
r ret
urn
hom
e in
ters
tate
or o
vers
eas.
Onl
y to
dis
cove
r tha
t w
hat t
hey
had
in f
act w
itnes
sed
was
a v
ery
impo
rtant
mat
ter
of
conc
ern
to F
EP &
Sta
te Q
uara
ntin
e an
d/or
Pol
ice.
•
Con
tinue
to
enha
nce
the
deve
lopm
ent
of o
ngoi
ng c
omm
unity
aw
aren
ess p
rogr
ams d
irect
ed a
t: •
rais
ing
publ
ic a
war
enes
s ab
out
the
key
dang
ers
foxe
s re
pres
ent t
o Ta
sman
ia,
• re
duci
ng
publ
ic
or
peer
rid
icul
e of
ci
tizen
s re
porti
ng
Unc
ontro
lled
Copy
18
IRA
of F
ox E
ntry
Pat
hway
s int
o Ta
sman
ia _
Ver
sion
2.0,
BPB
, DPI
W, 1
9/3/
2008
QU
AR
AN
TIN
E
BAR
RIE
R
PHA
SE
TIM
E
PER
IOD
AC
CID
ENTA
L EN
TR
Y P
ATH
WA
YS
(nam
ely
‘Shi
ppin
g’)
WIL
FUL/
ILLE
GA
L EN
TRY
PA
THW
AY
S
pote
ntia
l inc
iden
ts o
r mat
ters
of c
once
rn
O
n-go
ing
• A
ctiv
atio
n of
a F
ox I
ncur
sion
Em
erge
ncy
Res
pons
e Pl
an
(FIE
RP)
to a
pos
t-ent
ry q
uara
ntin
e in
curs
ion
inci
dent
suc
h as
a
repo
rt of
a s
hot f
ox o
r cu
b, a
ccid
enta
l roa
d ki
ll, d
isco
vere
d ca
rcas
s by
the
gene
ral p
ublic
, hig
h qu
ality
fox
sigh
tings
, etc
..
• A
ctiv
atio
n of
the
FIE
RP
wou
ld s
till
appl
y, p
ost-e
ntry
, w
hen
resp
ondi
ng t
o in
telli
genc
e ga
ther
ed,
or a
pub
lic r
epor
t of
, th
e pr
esen
ce o
f on
e or
mor
e fo
xes
havi
ng b
een
brou
ght
into
the
St
ate
illeg
ally
, and
bei
ng h
arbo
ured
and
/or
rele
ased
by
priv
ate
citiz
ens
NB
: Risk
mea
sure
s whi
ch h
ave
been
succ
essf
ully
und
erta
ken
to d
ate
are
high
light
ed b
y sh
adin
g of
the
text
.
CONTACT DETAILS
Biosecurity Policy Branch
Phone: 03 6421 7630
Fax: 03 6424 5142
Email: [email protected]