Fragile and conflict-affected states: the role of non-violent social movements

By Sadaf Lakhani for FSI 2012

What are fragile states?

States where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its

people, including the poor.

Criteria for assessing ‘fragility’

Lack of authority, capacity and legitimacy of the state

• Risk of conflict or violence• Accountability of government institutions, • Capacity to manage public resources and deliver services, • Territorial control, • Levels of poverty, and ability to protect the poorest• Lack of effective political processes to influence the state to meet social

expectations. • Other characteristics include weak institutions and governance systems.

• Problems with defining fragility and with applying the label

Why does fragility matter for development actors?

• Fragility: countries classified as fragile are home to over one-quarter of the world’s population.

• At least half of these states are affected by armed conflicts of varying intensity.

• Fragile and conflict-affected states are the furthest from reaching the Millennium Development Goals (reverse of poverty trends).

Why is violent conflict important for international actors?

Symptomatic of severe government failures but also of ruptures within society.

Recent history of violent conflict makes countries up to 44% more likely to fall back into violent conflict.

Failure of international actors- multilateral bodies, country allies, development actors.

Needs and challenges in Post-conflict States

• Lack of acceptance of peace-process/victory• Proliferation of small arms• Lack of presence of state in some areas• Rapid political transitions• Need to rebuild infrastructure,• Restoration or building of state architecture• Need to provide livelihoods, restore economy

Post-conflict needs and challenges

• Continuation of violence and insecurities after end of ‘formal’ peace.

• Post-conflict nationbuilding and statebuilding

• Post conflict recovery and development

Continuation of violence and insecurities after end of ‘formal’ peace.

• Lack of authority of the state in all parts of the country• Presence of armed non-state actors • Criminal gangs, terror groups and other forms of

violence• Militarized communities• Demobilized former -combatant support for effective, peaceful reintegration of former

combatants support for communities to limit or resist the actions

of armed actors

Post-conflict nation and statebuilding

• Need to address root-causes of violent conflict• Political reorganization of the state• Redistribution of resources /or productive

assets such as land• Support the convergence of societal goals and

social cohesionAddressing grievances and tensions between

‘ethnic’ groupsSafe return and integration of IDPs

Post conflict recovery and development

• Delivering services to people• Restructuring war economies• Inclusive growth and development• Social accountability

Ensuring responsive service delivery Combatting corruption, ensuring social accountability Guiding or even challenging development Leveraging and further opening ’spaces for participation’ Supporting traditionally marginalized groups

Demanding social accountability: Ghana water privatization

• Link between water and health • 70% of Ghanaians living on <$1/day• 30% did not have access to safe drinking water• Government shift to cost-recovery rather than

Right to Water• 95% increase in fees for water• Concerns over the process and content of

tender and contract

Ghana Coalition Against Water Privatization

• Formed in year 2000, headed by ISODEC, a community-based organization working on health issues

• Broad coalition-women’s groups, trade unions, churches, public health workers, students, environmental groups, disabled organizations.

• Multi-pronged strategy-’academic’/technical, rights-based, politicization, popularization. Involved legislature and decentralized government.

• Internationalization: Links to international actors (US, UK), and to other related actors in S.A. to build allies and support

• Learning from Cochabamba

Ghana CAP Outcomes?

• 2004, WB provided $103 million grant for urban water project, along with other donors

• Management contract awarded to AquaVitens -Rand in 2005, for 5 year period

• Severe problems effecting delivery of services, contract reconsidered in 2008

• Non-renewal of contract in 2010

Supporting communities to resist or limit the actions or armed non-state actors

Mindanao, Philippines

*Zones of peace in midst of conflict*Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighting for 30 years*Government responds with militarization*Local communities felt conflict fatigue

Peace zones, Mindanao, cont

• Initiated by Church-based organizations with support of the Coalition for Peace

• Failed negotiations with armed parties • Declaration of ceasefire by communities of Naga city, endorsed

by other key leaders such as school superintendent• Other peace-promotion public activities (banners, headbands,

signs at village perimeters, defying armed actors to reclaim their villages)

• Pushed for permanent zones of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN)

• Combination of methods- church backed position papers, monitoring via new media, peoples’ marches and protests

Coalition for peace outcomes?

• Government take-over of ZOPFANS, even arming local groups, communities sought to distinguish themselves from these, creating second wave of Zones for Peace

• Secure peace in their villages- war has by-passed or had a lesser effect on many zones for peace

• Reducing the tensions between communities that contribute to the armed conflict

• Encourage development by securing local area, NGO activities and return of government services.

• Exert pressure on all parties to find a political solution to the problem.

What is the role of strategic non-violent methods in fragile and conflict-affected states?

Raising consciousness, reframing problems, discriminations, and inequalities in society before they turn into acute grievances

Mobilizing interest and resources to intervene in social conflicts and the power structures of society before citizens see violence as a viable means of achieving their goals

Responding to and creating political opportunities on different scales to promote their interests and social change

Developing alternatives to current political, economic, and cultural

practices.

Opportunities and constraints for support from international actors

Opportunities heavy focus of attention and resources on fragile and conflict effected states break from ‘business as usual’ emphasis on social accountability aid dependency of host governments Facilitating connections between groups globally (south-south learning)

Constraints• Little awareness of possibilities of application of non-violent conflict methods• Discourse • Implementation issues- who to work with, how to select• Reluctance of civic movements to accept assistance• Aid can distort incentives, impact legitimacy• Collusion of international actors in state and society failures