fragile promise of the fuel swap plan, survival, fitzpatrick

8/2/2019 Fragile Promise of the Fuel Swap Plan, Survival, Fitzpatrick

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Iran: The Fragile Promise of the

Fuel-Swap Plan

Mark Fitzpatrick

Mark Fitzpatrickis Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation at the IISS.

Survival | vol 52 no 3 | JuneJuly 2010 | pp 6794 DOI 10 1080/00396338 2010 494878

When Iranian and US senior ocials met in Geneva on 1 October 2009 for

the rst substantive bilateral discussion between the two sides in many

years, it sparked a global surge of optimism that creative diplomacy might

yet nd a way out of the escalating crisis over Irans nuclear programme.

As further detailed in Vienna three weeks later, Tehran agreed in principle

to a US proposal to exchange the bulk of Irans stockpile of low-enriched

uranium (LEU) for replacement fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).

The LEU would have rst been sent to Russia for further enrichment to

19.75%, and then to France for fabrication into fuel assemblies. From thestart, the deal was tangential to the main issues at stake, and it oered only

temporary respite from the growing threat posed by Irans ssile-material

production programmes. Over the course of the winter, as Iran withdrew

its initial agreement and brought its nuclear programme closer to the line

of weapons production, the condence-building advantages originally fore-

seen for the deal have been replaced by still more mutual suspicion. Yet, as

this journal goes to press, the world is once more enticed by the promise

of a fuel-swap deal, this time one negotiated by the presidents of Brazil,

Turkey and Iran on 17 May, but with crucial details left vague. This new

version of the fuel-swap plan is less aractive on non-proliferation grounds,

but on balance will be a plus if Iran is willing to export LEU and if it agrees

to stop enriching to 20%. Exporting the LEU is key to a longer-term solu-

tion that accepts enrichment only under terms that reduce the potential


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Iran: The Fragile Promise of the Fuel-Swap Plan | 69

United States, and was not disposed to approve a TRR fuel sale either, even

though it had no legal prohibitions against doing so.

Irans request to the IAEA for assistance in obtaining TRR fuel thus

smacked of a gambit. Anticipating that the request would be refused,Iran likely asked in order to claim an excuse for producing 20% enriched

uranium on its own, as indeed it went on to do.5 Irans claimed justication

for this action is belied by its lack of any means of turning the LEU into

TRR fuel. Seing up such a production line at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant

at Esfahan would not be beyond Irans technical capabilities,6 but any fuel

production would take a few years, particularly if, in keeping with standard

safety practices, the fuel were tested for an extended period of time. There

is also the legal maer of the intellectual property rights to

parts of the production process, which Iran does not have.

Any production would thus occur well after Iran claims

the TRR will run out of fuel. Mohammad Ghannadi, vice

president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

(AEOI), acknowledged the time problem in December

2009: We could enrich the fuel ourselves, he said, but

there would be technical problems. Also, wed never makeit on time to help our patients.7 In February 2010, AEOI

head Ali Akbar Salehi urged those who doubted that Iran could make the

fuel to wait a few months,8 but Tehran has not provided any information to

the IAEA to demonstrate that such a capability was being put in place.9

In a display of creative diplomacy, Washington called Irans blu by

devising the swap proposal that was discussed in Geneva. Under the pro-

posal, fuel assemblies for use in making medical radioisotopes would be

provided, if Iran rst supplied the necessary LEU. The plan was for Iran to

export to Russia 1,200kg of the 1,600kg that it was assumed to have produced

as of 1 October 2009.10 The 1,200kg, when further enriched and processed,

can provide three reactor loads of TRR fuel. Coincidentally (or perhaps not),

1,200kg of 3.5% LEU is approximately the amount needed to produce enough

weapons-grade HEU for a single bomb.

In addition to its signicance as a condence-building measure, the plan

as originally agreed oered important benets to both sides. By reducing

Irans request

to the IAEA

smacked o a

gambit


4/29

70 | Mark Fitzpatrick

Irans stockpile below the level necessary to produce a nuclear weapon

indeed, Iran would have retained only as much LEU as it possessed in August

2008 it would have provided diplomatic breathing space for negotiations

on a longer-term solution. More importantly, it would establish the principlethat Iranian uranium could be enriched outside of Iran, seing an important

precedent. Any long-term solution to the nuclear issue surely will have to

accept some degree of enrichment in Iran, the proliferation danger of which

can be reduced if the product is exported elsewhere for fuel fabrication, so

that Iran does not have enough on hand to pose a nuclear threat.11

The deal was also a way for the United States to put the onus on Iran.

If the deal failed, Washington, having taken the extra step toward a diplo-

matic solution, presumably would have an easier time enlisting support for

coercive measures. But if the plan was a trap for Iran in this regard, it has

been slow to spring. American ocials, it seems, sincerely saw the swap as

a way to begin to build trust. Anticipating that it would be the rst tangi-

ble success of Obamas nine-month engagement policy, they hoped that a

breakthrough here could lead to constructive dialogue on a range of other

issues. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei reected this optimism

when, at the end of negotiations in Vienna on 21 October 2009, he said, Ivery much hope that people see the big picture, see that this agreement

could open the way for a complete normalization of relations between Iran

and the international community.12

For Iran, in addition to keeping the research reactor operating, the plan

was a way to show that its LEU really was being used for the civil nuclear

purposes it proclaimed, even if what came back to Iran was not actually

its own poor-quality uranium but cleaner uranium substituted by Russia

or France along the way. The deal thus oered Iran a way to legitimise its

enrichment programme, a goal Tehran had long sought and a reason why

France, the United Kingdom and, above all, Israel were sceptical about the

deal. They saw the fuel-swap plan as marginal to the central issue of Irans

continued enrichment, and were unenthusiastic about the amendments

that would have been required to Security Council resolutions forbidding

Iranian export of LEU. Given Washingtons keenness for the deal, however,

the allies went along with it.


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The US plan also oered Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a

way to escape predicaments he faced on both the domestic- and foreign-

policy fronts. At home, Ahmadinejads authority was being challenged, and

the very make-up of the regime was under pressure. Street demonstrationsthat had initially focused on charges of fraud in the 12 June 2009 election had

metastasised into dissatisfaction with the government and the rule of the

supreme leader, exposing deep ssures among the political elite. Abroad,

Iran was under new pressure over the exposure in September of another

hitherto-undisclosed enrichment facility. IAEA rules require notication of

any new nuclear facilities as soon as a decision is taken to build one. 13 Iran

waited to tell the agency about its new Fardow fuel-enrichment plant near

Qom until it realised that the secrecy of the site had been compromised. Even

then, the notice that Iran provided on 21 September was incomplete and

unpublicised, thus giving free eld to President Obama to reveal the plant

to maximum publicity four days later at the G20 summit, with Presidents

Dmitry Medvedev and Nicolas Sarkozy at his side. The Russians were not

amused that they had to hear about the Fardow plant from the Americans.

Under the circumstances, Ahmadinejad had good reason to see the deal on

oer at Geneva as a way to reassert his domestic leadership and pre-emptsanctions pressure fanned by the Fardow exposure.

In devising the Geneva plan, Washington rst consulted with Moscow.

Their agreement on the proposal was the rst tangible product of the much-

touted re-set in USRussia relations. Russia does not produce the type of

fuel required by the TRR, however, and Argentina refused to be involved.

Although peeved at being left out of the initial USRussia discussions,

France was then prevailed upon to allow Cerca to produce the fuel, each

load of which would take about a year to manufacture (this niche product

is reactor-specic and is not kept on the shelf). But Frances reluctant agree-

ment came with a strict condition: Iran would have to export the 1,200kg in

one batch and do so by the end of 2009. Otherwise, Irans continued accu-

mulation of LEU would obviate the purpose of signicantly depleting its

stockpile. At the time the swap oer was made, the amount proposed for

export would have comprised 75% of Irans stockpile. By the end of January

2010, 1,200kg was less than 60% of the stockpile (which by then had grown


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to 2,065kg). At the 117kg per month production rate achieved in winter

2009/10, Iran would be able to replenish the 1,200kg in just over 10 months.

By the time that Brazilian President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva and Turkish

Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan brokered a revived deal in mid-May,1,200kg represented less than half of Irans stockpile.

Geneva meeting

When they met in Geneva on 1 October, US Under Secretary of State William

Burns and Iran Supreme National Security Council Secretary Saeed Jalili

discussed the US proposal. The Geneva talks had been billed as a meeting

between Jalili and EU foreign-policy chief Javier Solana, accompanied by rep-

resentatives of the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China,

France and Germany). But after the opening round of canned presentations,

the talks evolved into a series of smaller meetings, punctuated by long inter-

missions while Solana telephoned ElBaradei and Jalili called home to Tehran.

In his side meeting with Burns, Jalili agreed that the US proposal could be the

basis for a deal, the details of which should be negotiated by a lower-level

working group. All the parties, including Iran, then agreed to the statement

Solana read at the end of the session, including the following line:

In consultations with the IAEA and on the margins of todays meeting,

it was agreed in principle that low enriched uranium produced in Iran

would be transported to third countries for further enrichment and

fabrication into fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor, which

produces isotopes for medical applications.14

However, when ocials from the IAEA, France, Russia, the United States

and Iran met in Vienna on 19 October to hash out the details, Irans ambas-

sador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, quickly backed away from the

outlines of the Geneva deal. He insisted that any exchange of LEU for TRR

fuel would have to be simultaneous, and that the LEU would be parcelled

out in stages. This would have meant that Iran would not part with any of its

LEU for the years time it would take to produce a fuel load, by which time

its stockpile would presumably have grown by another weapons worth of


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LEU. As a condence-building measure, such a deal held no appeal to any

of Irans negotiating partners. As US ambassador to the IAEA Glyn Davies

later put it, Iran wants the international community to use some other coun-

trys uranium for TRR fuel while Iran keeps its own uranium for a possibleweapons option. How does that increase condence?15

After three days of hard negotiations, the parties agreed to a formulation

that ElBaradei then put forward in his name. Although few details were

publicised, the deal was largely the same as the original plan agreed to in

Geneva, under which Iran commied to exporting the bulk of its enriched-

uranium stockpile to Russia for further enrichment and then processing into

fuel rods. Left unspecied was when the fuel assemblies would be sent to

Iran. In a separate side deal with Iran, Washington reportedly agreed to

supply safety equipment for the Tehran reactor, contingent on agreement

over the LEU export deal.16 The United States, Russia and France immedi-

ately accepted ElBaradeis proposal, while Iran said it was considering it in

a favourable light, but needed time to provide a response.17

Iranian counter-oers

Following the Vienna meeting, the tentative deal ran into immediate troublein Tehran, where it was rejected by Ahmadinejads rivals across the politi-

cal spectrum. Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, who as Irans previous nuclear

negotiator had repeatedly been vetoed by hardliners when he sought small

elements of tactical exibility, found revenge by castigating the Geneva

plan as a Western deception. His opposition was apparently enough to

tilt the naturally suspicious Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,

against the deal. Reformist presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi

similarly opposed it, as did conservative presidential candidate Mohsen

Rezai, secretary of the Expediency Council, who said that Iran should retain

1,100kg of its stockpile.18 This was suspiciously close to the amount nec-

essary to produce a nuclear weapon, though he expressed his proposal

in terms of maintaining negotiation leverage. Conservative parliamentar-

ian Hesmatollah Falahatpisheh said any export of Iranian LEU should be

conditioned on ending the economic sanctions on Iran, particularly those

aecting its ability to import raw uranium.19


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While avoiding a formal answer to ElBaradei, Iran over the next few

months oered several permutations of its counter-proposal for a series of

simultaneous exchanges of LEU for TRR fuel. The rst public exposition

came from Foreign Minister Manuchehr Moaki during a Q&A session andsubsequent press conference at the IISS Manama Dialogue on 12 December

2009. A simultaneous swap of Iranian LEU for fuel should start with 400kg,

he said, and be carried out on Kish Island, a free-trade zone near the Straits

of Hormuz. Two additional tranches would be traded over several years.20

To explain why Iran had retreated from the outlines agreed in Geneva and

elaborated upon in Vienna, Moaki blamed the Western press for focusing

on the purpose of the deal: We said we are in agreement on the princi-

ples of the proposal, but suddenly the Western media announced that 1,200

kilograms of uranium would be leaving Iran to delay the construction of a

nuclear bomb.21 Iran knew all along, of course, that Washingtons purpose

was to make it impossible for Iran to be able to produce a nuclear weapon in

the short term. The real reason for walking away from the contours agreed

in Vienna was domestic politics. Amadinejads rivals had condemned him

for being willing to give up the LEU and for linking it with the issue of TRR

fuel.Moaki did not then say whether Iran would ever allow the LEU to leave

Iranian soil, and it took several months for this important detail to be clari-

ed. In March 2010 Iran said it was willing to put 1,200kg of LEU under

IAEA seal on Kish Island, and to allow it to be exported upon receipt of the

equivalent amount of TRR fuel.22 Tehrans oer to put the uranium under

seal at Kish was presumably intended as a guarantee against further enrich-

ment, which Iran would soon go on to do regardless. However, as long as

the LEU remained on Iranian territory, whether under IAEA seal or not,

it would be susceptible to seizure and diversion to weapons use. In 2003,

North Korea did just that with the plutonium-bearing spent fuel that was

under IAEA seal there, and Iran itself forced the IAEA to break seals on

nuclear equipment when it decided to undo the 2003 and 2004 suspension

agreements with the E3/EU.

Irans negotiating partners held to the principles of the Geneva/Vienna

deal, but were not inexible about the details. Russian Deputy Foreign


9/29


Minister Sergei Ryabkov visited Tehran in early November to sound out

possibilities, but came away empty-handed and irritated at Irans suggestion

that Russia could not be trusted to uphold its part of the Geneva bargain.

From a non-proliferation perspective, it did not much maer where IransLEU went, so long as it left Iranian territory. It could be placed in escrow

in any mutually acceptable third country. Turkey oered its territory, as

did Japan and Brazil. To satisfy Iranian complaints that past broken agree-

ments had left the country sceptical about TRR fuel being provided unless

the exchange were simultaneous, the IAEA agreed to take formal custody

of the LEU, the other parties agreed to a legally binding

supply agreement, and the United States oered substan-

tial political assurances.23

Irans rejection of these guarantees is illustrative of a

fallacy in the arguments that are sometimes advanced in

favour of Western concessions in exchange for Iranian limi-

tations on its nuclear programme. ElBaradei has argued,

for example, that if the West had only conceded a right

to enrichment back in 2003, Irans centrifuge programme

could have been capped at the R&D stage. This may be true,but the case for the counterfactual is not strong. Likewise,

several Western scholars and former diplomats have argued

that Iran should have been oered a deal to establish a multinational enrich-

ment consortium in exchange for transparency and conditions on output.

The fundamental problem with all such proposals is the unlikelihood that

Iran would accept limitations that would impede a break-out capability.24

Of course, the only way to know for sure is to test the proposition. The

fuel-swap plan oered such a test, and Irans response strengthens scepti-

cism about its intentions. As the Europeans found in their negotiations with

Iran beginning in 2003, and as Russia found in its 2005 oer to establish a

joint consortium to enrich uranium on Russian soil, Irans typical paern

is neither to accept nor reject proposed restrictions, but rather to shunt

them aside through non-responsive counter-proposals. Those who look for

reasons to give Iran the benet of the doubt will always nd them, but it is

naive to read Irans reply up until mid-May as anything but a rejection of

Irans typical

pattern

is neither

to accept

nor reject

restrictions


10/29


the fundamental purpose of the proposal. Absent clarity about the details

struck on 17 May and about Irans willingness to accept any production

and stockpile limitations or to fully cooperate with the IAEA, it is unclear

whether this is a break from the previous negotiation style.On 2 January 2010, Iran gave the other parties a month to respond to

its counter-proposal, after which it warned that it would produce 20%

enriched uranium on its own. Irans insistence on simultaneity was briey

dropped when Ahmadinejad in a 2 February television interview said there

could be a 45 month delay between LEU export and receipt of the fuel.

That the hardline president should be the only public gure in Tehran to

support the Geneva deal may seem counter-intuitive, but Ahmadinejad

had political reasons, as mentioned above. His political rivals, by the same

token, were loath to see him capture the prize of taming the Great Satan.

Moreover, because the fuel could not be produced in the 45 month period

Ahmadinejad suggested, his January statement may have been an artfully

constructed show of exibility that he knew would be unpersuasive to the

West but sucient to give China further reason to oppose UN sanctions. In

any case, his concession was immediately met by another hail of domestic

opposition and was not repeated by him or any other Iranian leader. In fact,in reporting the remarks, the headline on his own website said Gradual

Exchange of Fuel is Not Possible, and the ocial transcript of his interview

omied the reference to a 45 month delay.25

Back in May 2009, Obama had seemed to set a deadline of the end of the

calendar year for Iran to respond positively to his oer of engagement. After

a White House meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,

and in response to Netanyahus call for a three-month deadline, Obama said

that he intended to gauge and do a reassessment by the end of the year

on whether the diplomatic approach was producing results.26 Throughout

the year, Obama was patient, sending two largely unrequited leers in the

spring to Ayatollah Khamenei, and realising that Iran would not be able

to make any bold diplomatic moves until after the June presidential elec-

tions. The political turmoil that engulfed Iran after the election gave Obama

further reason for patience, and the years end came and went without the

White House declaring game over.


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By mid-December it should have been clear to Washington that Irans

leaders were not willing to part with the bulk of their LEU. Europeans, who

by now had had six frustrating years of trying to negotiate with Iran, pri-

vately pronounced the deal dead. But this was not at all clear to China, whichthroughout the winter continued to claim that it was too early for further

sanctions because there was still room for diplomacy. Iran fed Chinas posi-

tion by engaging various interlocutors as potential intermediaries. Needing

Beijings support, or at least acquiescence, for a new UN sanctions resolu-

tion, Washington kept the door ocially open for as long as it could.

Iran raises the stakes

Iran exacerbated the situation on 9 February when it began enrichment

to 20% at a newly installed 164-machine cascade at the above-ground,

pilot fuel-enrichment plant (PFEP) at Natanz. It might be argued that by

beginning 20% enrichment, Tehran was seeking to force acceptance of its

counter-proposal for a simultaneous exchange. But there were more impor-

tant political motivations for the move. Ahmadinejads announcement on

11 February of successful 20% enrichment served as the rallying cry for his

speech to the nation on the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution.In their rush to enable Ahmadinejad to announce the achievement on the

anniversary, the operators at Natanz began to feed low-enriched UF6

into

the cascade before IAEA inspectors arrived, contrary to Tehrans promise to

the agency. The operators also violated Article 45 of Irans safeguards agree-

ment with the IAEA, which calls for notice of major changes suciently in

advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted.27 When notied on

8 February that the higher-level enrichment would commence, the IAEA

asked Iran to wait until inspectors could adjust their monitoring procedures

and obtain further details about the enrichment plan. Irans decision to begin

the higher-level enrichment without waiting for the IAEA to adjust proce-

dures triggered an unusually prompt secretariat report to agency members,

expressing concern about the lack of advance notice about the move.

A week later, newly installed IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano

issued the hardest-hiing secretariat report on Iran to date. It detailed the

areas of Iranian lack of cooperation with the IAEA, which should have been


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grounds for a further IAEA board nding of safeguards non-compliance.

The report also summarised the outstanding issues concerning possible

military dimensions to Irans nuclear programme, saying:

The information available to the Agency in connection with these

outstanding issues is broadly consistent and credible in terms of the

technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and

the people and organizations involved. Altogether, this raises concerns

about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities

related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.28

Never before had a secretariat report raised the prospect of current activi-

ties relating to nuclear-warhead development.

Although Amanos reference to current activities was not directed

at Irans provocative decision to enrich to 20%, the military implications

of the enrichment programme are more clear than ever. As long as Iran

has no fuel-fabrication capability, there is no civilian-use justication for

enriching to 20%. Moreover, doing so puts Iran on the cusp of producing

weapons-usable HEU. The move exacerbated concern that Irans intentionis to move closer to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. By starting

with 20% product of this quantity, Iran would be able to further enrich to

weapons grade in a short period of time. Although 20% seems a long way

from the 90% level of enrichment that is considered weapons grade, the vast

majority of the eort required to enrich natural uranium to weapons grade

has already been expended by the 20% level. In fact, 72% of the eort to

produce weapons-grade uranium is accomplished by the time the product

is enriched to 3.5%. By the time the uranium is enriched to 20%, nine-tenths

of the eort to reach weapons grade has been expended.29 Having sought

to justify enriching to 20% for the sake of TRR fuel, Iran could try to justify

going to 63% as a means of producing the targets required for the produc-

tion of medical radioisotopes at the reactor; in fact, Iran has already claimed

it may need to do so.30 It could even speciously claim a need to produce

90% HEU for the most eective functioning of these targets.31 Production

of enriched uranium at any of these higher levels would complicate IAEA


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detection of clandestine HEU production, because Iran could claim that any

environmental samples showing signs of higher enrichment were due to

contamination by the activity connected with claimed TRR fuel or target

production.The deal that Lula and Erdogan struck with Ahmadinejad on 17 May was

silent about Iran enriching to higher levels. Separately, Iran said it would

continue to enrich to 20%. France, Russia and the United States could be

expected to insist that this stop as a condition for accepting the new deal.

They could hardly agree to legitimise enrichment in Iran without a limit on

the level.

Nuclear timelines

Although Israel contends that Iran could have a bomb by 2011, 32 most

Western governments today avoid citing specic timelines for how long it

could take Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. In his latest annual threat

assessment in February 2010, US Director of National Intelligence Dennis

Blair said only that Iran is technically capable of producing enough HEU

for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so. 33 One reason for

reticence is that a capability to produce merely one nuclear weapon does notmean much in terms of nuclear deterrence, nor would doing so make any

strategic sense. It would not be worthwhile for Iran to take the momentous

step of breaking out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thereby provoke

a military response unless it was sure it could quickly produce several

weapons worth of HEU.

Another reason for Western governments to avoid talking about weapon

timelines is that the presumptive date by which Iran could conceivably build

a nuclear weapon is uncomfortably close. If Iran did not care about the inter-

national reaction, the approximately 2,000kg of 3.5% LEU in its stockpile as

of February 2010 theoretically could be further enriched to 90% in a few

weeks. For this purpose, only one of the 164-machine cascades would need

to be recongured; the others could be used in their current state to produce

high enrichment levels in stages, with only some loss of eciency.34 It will

be less dicult for Iran to produce uranium at higher levels of enrichment

now that it has the experience of enriching to 20%. Designing a weapon and


14/29


producing and assembling the various parts could take a couple of years,

but this could be shortened to as few as six months if Iran has already com-

pleted weapons-design work during the past several years or acquired a

working weapons design of the sort that the A.Q. Khan network sold toLibya and copied in digital format.

Weapons-design work

Prudent security planners in the West have to assume that since Khan sold

a weapons design to Libya, he also would have been willing to sell one

to Iran, although no evidence has emerged of Iran having obtained such a

design. What has emerged recently is new evidence of Iranian design work

on nuclear-weapons components occurring after 2003. While all Western

intelligence agencies agree that work had been carried out until this year,

opinion is divided about any progress in subsequent years. The timeline for

Iranian weapons production depends in large part on how advanced such

weapons-design work is.

Debate continues over the infamous conclusion reached in the US National

Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of November 2007 that Iran had halted explicit

work on nuclear weapons in late 2003 and that work remained halted atleast until mid-2007. The British, French, German and Israeli governments

all dier with that conclusion. The British, for example, believe that the 2003

halt order was removed in late 2004 or early 2005,35 and Germanys foreign-

intelligence service testied in a court case that there were strong indications

that Iran had a nuclear-weapons programme in 2007.36

Evidence made public in December 2009 oered circumstantial support

for the assessment of European intelligence agencies. An Iranian document

provided to the Times by ocials of one unnamed government and con-

rmed by an Asian intelligence source suggests that Iran has embarked

on a four-year plan to test a neutron initiator, the device that triggers the

explosion in a nuclear bomb. The document, said to have been wrien in

2007, describes the use of uranium deuteride, which Pakistan has used as

an initiator for its bomb and which has no civil application.37 Unidentied

US ocials familiar with the document said that its authenticity had not

been conrmed, but that it was part of a paern of evidence suggesting that


15/29


Iran is laying the groundwork to build a nuclear weapon. An IAEA ocial

who saw the document said he could not yet make a determination of its

authenticity or date, nor whether it had remained simply as a blueprint or

if actual experiments described in it had been performed.38

British physicistNorman Dombey commented that the small scale, leisurely pace and aca-

demic context of the uranium-deuteride eort described in the document

made it sound more like a university research project than a top priority

national programme.39

As of mid-April 2010, the US intelligence community had not changed its

conclusion that weapons-development work was suspended at least until

mid-2007. There are indications, however, that the next NIE will come to a

new conclusion that is closer in line with the assessment of other Western

capitals. An unnamed US ocial was quoted in mid-January as saying, basi-

cally, were talking about [nuclear weapons] research (resuming) not about

the Iranians barrelling full steam ahead on a bomb program.40 A Newsweek

blog quoted unnamed sources who predicted the new assessment would

be Talmudic in its parsing.41 US analysts reportedly now believe that Iran

may have resumed work on how to design and construct a bomb but not on

development of procedures to actually build a weapon.42

Such a distinctionis meaningful: it is the dierence between two and three dimensions. This

time, however, the details of the new NIE may not be made public.43

A third reason why Western governments opt not to discuss weapons

timelines is that while most calculations are based on the known enrichment

capability and stockpile at Natanz, the more likely Iranian NPT break-out

scenario would involve production at clandestine facilities, the capabili-

ties of which by denition cannot be quantied. Clandestine break-out or

sneak-out is the more likely scenario because break-out at Natanz would

quickly become known to inspectors, and therefore the world. Whether or

not world powers would react quickly to destroy the stockpile and pro-

duction facilities through military means, prudent Iranian strategists would

have to assume that any move to break out of the NPT in so obvious a

fashion would invite an aack.

Luckily, the prospect for clandestine break-out diminished with the

September 2009 revelation of the Fardow enrichment facility. Because of its


16/29


small size the IAEA veried that it is being built to contain only about 3,000

centrifuges Western ocials are certain that it was intended for weapons

purposes. Some 50,000 rst-generation centrifuges are needed to produce

the annual fuel load for a 1,000MW power reactor, but just 3,000 such cen-trifuges are sucient to produce a weapons worth of HEU each year. Once

it was outed, Fardow lost most of its value for weapons production, since

any aempt to use it for weapons purposes would be detected by the IAEA.

In light of Fardows exposure, Irans leaders must be worried that any other

clandestine enrichment facilities might also be discovered. Buoyed by the

Fardow outing, a senior White House ocial said at the beginning of the

year, for now, the Iranians dont have a credible breakout option, and we

dont think they will have one for at least 18 months, maybe two or three

years.44

Irans technical woes

Another favourable development for the West has been the high breakage

rate of Iranian centrifuges. This too aects the nuclear-weapons timeline

assessment. Although Iran continues to install centrifuges at Natanz, and

over the winter increased the rate of production of LEU, the number of cen-trifuges actually enriching uranium dropped by 23% between 31 May 2009

and 29 January 2010. The drop may be partly due to a shift of aention to

enrichment activity at Fardow,45 and possibly to clandestine facilities else-

where. Inspectors noted in March that new equipment was no longer being

delivered to safeguarded sites.46

The technical diculties at Natanz should not be minimised, however.

The rst-generation centrifuge model that Iran relies on is notoriously

trouble-prone, and those that Iran built and installed are failing at a faster

than normal rate even for that design. One reason for this is that Iran did

not follow prudent engineering prescriptions for lengthy testing before

installing numerous cascades. Another is the low quality of the plants com-

ponents, which Iran had to produce on its own. Iran does not have access to

legitimate global markets and is hard-pressed to nd black-market suppliers

who have not been put out of business or co-opted by Western intelligence

agencies. Meanwhile, some of the parts Iran has been able to acquire illicitly


17/29


have apparently been tampered with through Western covert operations

in order to induce problems down the line.47 Export controls have clearly

worked to limit Irans enrichment capabilities, but it is hard to judge how

much dual-use material useful to the enrichment programme is still geingthrough to Iran. Over time, Iran will be able to improve on its centrifuge

performance, and probably move to later-generation centrifuges that have

been under development for the past two years. According to Salehi, the

advanced models will start full-scale operation by March 2011.48

Enter the Green Movement

If Iran were led by internationally oriented democrats, the nations dual-

purpose nuclear technologies would be of lesser concern. This is not because

nuclear weapons are necessarily safer in democratic hands, but because

such leaders presumably would be more willing to accept limitations on

the countrys nuclear programme that would lessen the chances of nuclear

materials being used for weapons purposes. Given the youthfulness, educa-

tional aainment and openness to the world of the Iranian public, it would

seem inevitable that the clericalmilitary clique that rules Iran will one

day be replaced by a government with an internationalist mindset. For thepast several years, such a political change seemed much further o than

the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. In June 2009, however, the

prospects for political change appeared to grow substantially.

The surprising strength of the protests that erupted after the tainted 12

June presidential election and that continued for months thereafter gave

rise to the best hope in years for a long-term solution to the nuclear crisis.49

Brutal repression meted out by the regime in the form of beatings, show

trials and executions were evidence of growing defensiveness. Fissures

among members of the ruling elite came into stark relief. Ahmadinejad and

Khamenei appeared to lose their legitimacy and the Islamic Republic itself

was said by some analysts to be nearing its end. Most Western observers

realised that the prospect of a Green Revolution was still a long shot, but the

odds that Tehrans current rulers would give up their quest for a nuclear-

weapons capability were judged to be far longer. Thus, being on the Green

Movement had both logical and emotional appeal.


18/29


The Green Movement represents the greatest hope for a long-term

solution to the nuclear problem not because reformists would give up

the nuclear quest; this has become too embedded in the Iranian psyche.

Opposition to the Geneva deal among reformists such as defeated presiden-tial candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi stemmed from political opportunism,

but also reected nationalist support for the nuclear programme. Still, a

democratic, outwardly oriented government that adopted the goals of the

Green Movement would likely be more willing to negotiate on the pace and

content of the programme, as was the case with the previous negotiating

team under reformist President Mohammad Khatami.

Hopes that the Green Movement will prevail must not be allowed to

distort analysis of what is actually happening in Iran, however. There is

legitimate debate about claims of massive fraud in the 12

June election. 50 Eighty percent of Iranians polled in August

and September 2009 considered Ahmadinejad to be the

legitimate president of Iran, and most expressed con-

dence in the election process and the declared results.51

Predictions that the 11 February 2010 anniversary of the

Islamic Revolution would see more large-scale protestsproved to be well o the mark. It would be a mistake to

pin hopes, and policy prescriptions, on reformists coming

to power. Khamenei has lost his legitimacy in the eyes of

part of the population, but there is still lile likelihood

that he and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps will

lose control. Together they wield almost every lever of power in the country

and show no sign of the kind of political hesitancy that contributed to the

downfall of the Shah.

Westerners should also be humble about their ability to positively inu-

ence political developments in Iran. True, the outside world has a moral

duty to inveigh against regime brutality and suppression of human rights in

Iran. Obamas more forthright pronouncements on this score, as in his Nobel

Peace Prize acceptance speech,52 deservedly won international applause.

The support he gave to reformists in Iran was more subtle, however. By dis-

sipating the image of America as an evil enemy against which the Iranian

Westerners

should be

humble about

their ability

to infuence

developments


19/29


people must collectively rally, Obamas outreach strategy helped to foster

conditions that allowed the Green Movement to ourish.

Going beyond this to actively side with domestic opponents of the regime

would be a bad bet. Western non-governmental organisations should beallowed to provide technology that would help reformists overcome the

regimes success in cuing Internet and mobile-phone service. But Western-

supplied material support for the protest movement would more likely

harm than help it. Mousavi and other leaders would condemn the support

for fear of making stick the regimes accusations that reformers are Yankee

stooges, and the result could well be a split in the cohesion and eective-

ness of the movement. Commenting on the hubris of outsiders who think

they know how to foster change in Iran, Represenative Gary Ackerman,

Chairman of the US House Subcommiee on the Middle East and South

Asia, sagely wrote in early February:

Even if there was not a painful history of American intervention in Iranian

aairs, and even if the Iranian regime was not desperate to smear its

domestic opponents as American lackeys and spies, we should, at the

very least, have some humility about the ability of our government to

competently shape highly politicized and dynamic events in other nations.

I would submit as proof the previous decade.53

Amidst uncertainly about prospects for the Green Movement and the

best way to support it, policymakers would be well advised to follow the

Hippocratic Oath, and be cautious about actions that could harm the chances

of democratic change in Iran.

The sanctions debate

The imposition of additional sanctions on Iran should be judged in the same

light as possible assistance for the Green Movement. The Obama admin-

istration has sought to shape sanctions that would aect the regime, but

not impose widespread hardships on the people. The Iranian Revolutionary

Guard Corps is a prime target, because of its dual role in domestic oppres-

sion and Irans nuclear and missile programmes. Directing sanctions against


20/29


the corps that do not harm the public is easier said than done, however,

given its involvement in so many aspects of the Iranian economy. But to

the extent that sanctioning the corps frees up market shares for the private

sector, this will be to the overall public benet.Given the failure of previous sanctions to change the regimes nuclear

policies, it is fair to ask why additional sanctions would be any more likely

to achieve success. The standard answer from ocials in London, Paris and

Washington is that so far, sanctions have not been suciently painful. But

sanctions that might really cripple the economy, such as a ban on dealing

with Irans central bank, or an eective ban on rened-petroleum exports

to Iran (as hard as that would be to achieve), would severely penalise the

population. Claims that this would spark an internal revolt against the gov-

ernment represent wishful thinking unfounded on historical analogy or

comprehension of the Iranian context and psyche.

The ecacy of sanctions should not be judged solely on whether they

bring about the desired behaviour change. None of the countries pursu-

ing sanctions against Iran believe that these measures alone will suce to

change Irans posture. They hope, rather, that economic losses will give

Irans leadership reason to negotiate in earnest. If real negotiations ensue, asappeared to be the case with the October talks in Geneva and Vienna, incen-

tives, including acknowledging an Iranian right to enrichment, could then

be tabled to give Iran a positive reason for accepting limitations. Meanwhile,

sanctions can create negotiation leverage, to be relaxed as incentives or

tightened as disincentives.

Sanctions serve several other purposes as well. Firstly, they demon-

strate that there are real costs to intransigence. A failure to impose biting

sanctions would give Irans hardline leaders justication for their uncom-

promising position. Ahmadinejad already crows that his deance has

been more successful than the exibility employed by his predecessor.

Secondly, as mentioned above, sanctions in the form of export controls can

be an eective means of limiting Irans strategic programmes and deter-

ring support from third parties. Such controls cannot stop the programmes

altogether, but they can limit their eectiveness and create opportunities

for covert industrial sabotage. Less directly, nancial pressure can be a


21/29


way of limiting the revenues Iran can devote to its nuclear and missile

programmes.54

Thirdly, sanctions serve as a warning to other states that might consider fol-

lowing Irans path. This deterrence measure is one of several policy tools beingemployed to prevent a proliferation cascade in the Middle East. Enforcement

action upholds the credibility of Security Council mandates, and gives the

United States, as the worlds lone superpower, continued reason to seek mul-

tilateral, negotiated solutions. Sanctions can also contribute to political change

in Iran. US National Security Advisor General James Jones expressed this pro-

vocatively when he said during an interview on Fox News in mid-February

that a combination of [internal and external problems] could well trigger a

regime change.55 Finally, and most importantly in the current context, sanc-

tions are beer than the alternative. An unnamed senior US ocial told the

New York Times in February that sanctions are about driving [Iran] back to

negotiations, because the real goal here is to avoid war.56

Avoiding the worst-case scenario

A military aack on Irans nuclear facilities is a bad option for many reasons.

Nothing is more likely to rally the populace around the regime and kill pros-pects of democratic change for another generation. Another war in the Middle

East could have catastrophic consequences for regional stability, human

suering, Western cohesion and moral authority, and the global economy

through its impact on oil prices. An asymmetrical response from Iran and its

sympathisers would probably not be limited to the region, but take the form

of a global jihad against American interests. Even if Washington played no

role in a military strike against Irans nuclear facilities, the Muslim street

would assume otherwise. Weighed against these negative consequences,

the gain to be had in seing back Irans nuclear programme would be tem-

porary. Iran would seek to reconstitute the programme, but now with the

collective determination of an aroused and angered people. It would have

an excuse for moving full steam ahead on weaponisation, and within a short

time might get there.

Nevertheless, Israel is likely to carry out a military strike if it judges that

Irans nuclear programme presents an existential threat. The deeply held


22/29


view in Israel is that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable and must be pre-

vented by any means necessary. Knowing the risks of military action, Israeli

leaders are intent on promoting all diplomatic and economic options. But

if diplomatic eorts fail, Iranian policymakers should have no doubt aboutIsraels determination to take maers into its own hands. Israel may calcu-

late that it would be worthwhile to carry out even a limited strike, hiing

the stockpiles and facilities at Natanz, Esfahan and Arak in order to block

the key bolenecks in Irans nuclear programme.

At some point, the United States and its European allies may also have

to consider military action. As this author has argued before, Iran can be

deterred from crossing the line from latent capability to weapons produc-

tion as long as its leaders know that such a step would invite debilitating

use of force against the regime.57 By denition, such a deterrence strategy

must be credible to work.

Iranian policymakers must take into account two kinds of tripwires that

could trigger an aack. One is any action by Iran that signalled an inten-

tion to cross the line between capability and weapons production. Obvious

signs would be if Iran were to withdraw from the NPT, expel inspectors,

declare a weapons intention, or test a weapon. Irans leaders are unlikely totake such obvious steps, but they might be tempted to gear up to cross the

line by resuming weapons development in ways that would be observable

only through intelligence collection. Judgements about the strength of the

intelligence would be an important factor in deciding whether to initiate a

pre-emptive military aack.

The second tripwire involves the degree to which progress in Irans

nuclear programme puts it too close to quickly being able to cross the line

to weapons production. The accumulation of a stockpile of LEU and Irans

production of 20% enriched uranium is important in this regard. The more

LEU and the higher its concentration, the less time it would take Iran to

further enrich a weapons worth of HEU. As argued above, Irans ability to

produce just one weapon should not itself be a tripwire. But Irans adver-

saries cannot allow the LEU stockpile to grow too large, to the point where

Tehran could calculate that a NPT break-out was worthwhile. Just how large

the stockpile could grow before Irans adversaries would feel compelled to


23/29


1 Some analysts doubt that the reactor

fuel will run out in the immediate

future. See Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan

Oelrich, The Twenty Percent Solution

Breaking the Iranian Stalemate,

Federation of The American Scientists

Issue Brief, 16 April 2010, hp://www.

fas.org/programs/ssp/_docs/Twenty_

Percent_Solution_FINAL-1.pdf.

2 IAEA, Implementation of the NPTSafeguards Agreement in the Islamic

Republic of Iran: Report by the Director

General, GOV/2003/75, 10 November

2003, paras 2628, hp://www.iaea.org/

Publications/Documents/Board/2003/

gov2003-75.pdf.3 19.75% is just below the 20% level that

arbitrarily distinguishes LEU from

HEU. In theory, a bomb could be

made using 20% HEU, but it would

be impractically large, weighing

at least 400 kg. Weapons designers

prefer to use HEU enriched to over

90%, which is considered weapons

grade.4 Ahmadinejad: Iran Ready to Buy N.

Fuel from US, Fars News Agency, 7

October 2009, hp://english.farsnews.

com/newstext.php?nn=8807151645.

5 Iran commonly refers to the enrich-

ment level as 20%, which is the

rounded-up gure (from 19.75%) used

throughout much of the rest of this

article.6 President Ahmadinejad announced

on 9 April 2009 that Iranian scien-

tists had mastered the fabrication of

fuel pellets from natural uranium.

These pellets apparently would beused for the Heavy Water Research

Reactor being built at Arak. Several

other fuel-fabrication lines are

under construction or are planned.

See IAEA, Implementation of the

NPT Safeguards Agreement and

Relevant Provisions of Security

Council Resolutions 1737 (2006),

1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835

(2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,

GOV/2010/10, 18 February 2010, para.

25, hp://www.iaea.org/Publications/

Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-10.

pdf.7 Thomas Erdbrink and William

Branigan, In Iran, Nuclear Issue is

Also a Medical One, Washington

Post, 20 December 2009, hp://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

take action to destroy it is unclear, but Israels threshold is undoubtedly

lower than that of the United States.

This uncertainty underscores why the West was intent to see the bulk of

Irans stockpile removed as soon as possible. The West does not want Iranto have the capability to produce a nuclear weapon. Irans determination

not to part with the bulk of its LEU strongly suggests the opposite intention.

Apparently, Iran sees the LEU as a security hedge. A misjudgement about

how large the hedge will be allowed to grow could well trigger the very

aack that the nuclear programme may have been intended to forestall.

Notes


24/29


article/2009/12/19/AR2009121902171.

html.8 Zarf chand mah ayandeh sae

soukht misazim [We Will Build Fuel

Pellets in the Next Few Months],Fars News Agency, 12 February 2010,

hp://www.farsnews.net/newstext.

php?nn=8811230089.9 As of the IAEAs latest report in

February 2010, no equipment had

been installed in any safeguarded

plant for production of the fuel,

nor had Iran informed the IAEA

of any such plans. At the Uranium

Conversion Plant, Iran had started

seing up several production lines for

conversion of UF6

to U-308 and ura-

nium metal. Iran may be preparing to

produce U-308 fuel for the TRR, but

this would take 24 years.10 According to the IAEA report of 28

August 2009, as of 2 August, Iran had

produced 1,430kg of LEU. The rate

of production was about 80kg permonth, so presumably by 1 October

the stockpile would have been about

1,590kg. On 30 October 2009, the

IAEA veried that 1,653kg had been

produced. See IAEA, Implementation

of the NPT Safeguards Agreement

and Relevant Provisions of Security


1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835

(2008) in the Islamic Republic of

Iran, GOV/2009/55, 28 August

2009, footnote 3, hp://www.iaea.

org/Publications/Documents/

Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf;

IAEA, Implementation of the

NPT Safeguards Agreement and

Relevant Provisions of Security


1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835

(2008) in the Islamic Republic of

Iran, GOV/2009/74, 16 November

2009, footnote 3 hp://www.iaea.org/

Publications/Documents/Board/2009/

gov2009-74.pdf.11 A suggestion along these lines

was made in 2008 by Bruce Riedel

and Gary Samore (who would

soon become a special assistant to

President Obama on the National

Security Council sta). See Managing

Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle

East, in Restoring The Balance: A

Middle East Strategy For The Next

President, (Washington DC: Brookings

Institution Press, 2008), p. 107.12 Borzou Daragahi, U.S., Iran Move

Closer to Nuclear Deal, Los Angeles

Times, 22 October 2009, hp://articles.

latimes.com/2009/oct/22/world/fg-us-

iran22.13 Iran claims that because in 2007 it

rescinded its 2003 acceptance of this

rule (specied in Code 3.1 of its safe-guards subsidiary arrangements), it

only need abide by an older rule that

requires notication of a new facility

only six months before nuclear mate-

rial is introduced. Because there is no

provision for unilateral rescission of

IAEA rules, however, ElBaradei pro-

claimed Iran to be on the wrong side

of the law.Furthermore, Iran appears

to have begun work on the Fardow

plant before 2007. See Mark Heinrich,

Iran Broke Law by not Declaring

Atom Site: ElBaradei, Reuters, 30

September 2010, hp://www.reuters.

com/article/idUSTRE58T2S120090930.14 Remarks by EUHR Solana Following

Meeting with Iranian Supreme

National Security Council Secretary

Jalili, 1 October 2009, hp://www.


25/29


europa-eu-un.org/articles/fr/

article_9050_fr.htm.15 E. Ostapenko, US Envoy to IAEA:

Irans Idea to Establish Self-suciency

for Nuclear Development is Built onMirage, Trend News, 12 March 2010,

hp://en.trend.az/news/politics/for-

eign/1652783.html.16 Julian Borger, Hopes Rise of End

to Impasse as Iran Gets Two Days

to Back Nuclear Deal, Guardian, 12

October 2009, hp://www.guardian.

co.uk/world/2009/oct/21/iran-nuclear-

deal.17 IAEA Statement on Proposal to

Supply Nuclear Fuel to Iranian

Research Reactor, IAEA Press

Release, 23 October 2009, hp://

www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/

PressReleases/2009/prn200912.html.18 Gareth Porter, USIran Talks:

The Road to Diplomatic Failure,

CommonDreams.org, 12 December

2009, hp://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/12/12-4.

19 Ibid.20 See First Plenary Session Question

& Answer Session, The IISS

Manama Dialogue, Bahrain, 12

December 2009, hp://www.iiss.org/

conferences/the-iiss-regional-security-

summit/manama-dialogue-2009/

plenary-sessions-and-speeches-2009/

rst-plenary-session/rst-plenary-

session-question-answer-session/.21 Robert F. Worth, Iran Avows

Willingness to Swap Some Uranium,

New York Times, 13 December 2009,

hp://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/

world/middleeast/13iran.html.22 Jay Deshmukh, Iran Ready for

Nuclear Fuel Exchange Inside

Country, AFP, 17 March 2010, hp://

www.google.com/hostednews/

afp/article/ALeqM5jMz9EJHqT3Y

xqBfFxd9ibM0vTK-A.23 Leer from French Ambassador

Florence Mangin, RussianAmbassador Alexander Zmeyevskiy

and American Ambassador Glyn T.

Davies to IAEA Director-General

Yukiya Amano, 12 February 2010,

available at hp://www.politico.com/

static/PPM138_100216_document.

html.24 Mark Fipatrick, The Iranian Nuclear

Crisis: Avoiding Worst-case Outcomes,

Adelphi Paper 398 (London: IISS,

2008), p. 61.25 As reported by Kaveh L Afrasiabi,

Iran Launches New Phase in Nuclear

Crisis,Asia Times, 5 February 2010,

hp://www.atimes.com/atimes/

Middle_East/LB05Ak01.html.26 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Tells

Netanyahu He Has an Iran Timetable,

New York Times, 18 May 2009, hp://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/world/

middleeast/19prexy.html.27 IAEA, The Text of the Agreement

Between Iran and the Agency for

the Application of Safeguards in

Connection with the Treaty on

the Non-proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, INFCIRC/214, 13

December 1974, hp://www.iaea.org/

Publications/Documents/Infcircs/

Others/infcirc214.pdf.28 IAEA, GOV/2010/10, para 41.29 The author is indebted to Houston

Wood on this point. Note that the

exact percentage can vary depending

on the level of waste.30 Middle East Media Research Institute,

Iranian Supreme National Security

Council Advisor: Circumstances May


26/29


Arise Under Which Iran Will Require

Uranium Enriched to 63%, MEMRI

Special Dispatch No. 2605, 19 October

2009, hp://www.memri.org/report/

en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3717.htm.31 David Albright and Jacqueline

Shire, Irans Enrichment for the

Tehran Research Reactor: Update,

ISIS, 9 February 2010, hp://isis-

online.org/isis-reports/detail/

irans-enrichment-for-the-tehran-

research-reactor-update/8.32 Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak

was quoted by a senior Israeli ocial

as telling a parliamentary commiee

in late December, I believe that by

early 2010 Iran will hold threshold

technology (for building a bomb).

That means that if it wanted, it could

develop nuclear weapons within

a year from obtaining threshold

technology. See Iran Nuclear Plant

Immune to Conventional Strike,

AFP, 28 December 2009, hp://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/

ALeqM5i6iQ_yRItbEyQi1bDoon-

lY0F0S4A.33 Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat

Assessment of the US Intelligence

Community for the Senate Select

Commiee on Intelligence, 2

February 2010, p. 13, hp://intelli-

gence.senate.gov/100202/blair.pdf.34 The author is indebted to Houston

Wood on this point.35 James Bli and Daniel Dombey, US

at Odds With its Allies over Irans

Nuclear Programme, Financial Times,

30 September 2009.36 David Albright and Christina

Walrond, The Trials of the German

Iranian Trader Mohsen Vanaki: The

German Federal Intelligence Service

Assesses that Iran Likely Has a

Nuclear Weapons Program, Institute

for Science and International Security,

15 December 2009, hp://isis-online.

org/isis-reports/detail/the-trials-of-the-german-iranian-trader-mohsen-

vanaki-the-german-federal-in/8.37 Catherine Philp, Secret Document

Exposes Irans Nuclear Trigger,

Times, 14 December 2009, hp://

www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/

world/middle_east/article6955351.

ece. Philp told the present author that

the Asian intelligence source who

provided the conrmation was not

Israeli.38 Robert Burns and Pamela Hess, US

Sees Iran Edging Closer to Nuclear

Arms Knowhow, Associated Press,16

December 2009.39 Norman Dombey, This is No

Smoking Gun, Nor Iranian Bomb,

Guardian, 22 December 2009,

hp://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/22/no-iran-

nuclear-bomb-trigger.40 Adam Entous, U.S. Spy Agencies

see Iran Pushing Atom Bomb

Research, Reuters, 19 January 2010,

hp://www.reuters.com/article/

idUSTRE60I5W420100119.41 Mark Hosenball, Coming Around

On Iran, Newsweek, 15 January 2010,

hp://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/

declassied/archive/2010/01/15/com-

ing-around-on-iran.aspx.42 Ibid.43 Josh Rogin, Coming Soon:

A New Iran NIE?, The Cable

(blog), Foreign Policy, 26 February

2010, hp://thecable.foreign-

policy.com/posts/2010/02/26/

coming_soon_a_new_iran_nie.


27/29


44 David E. Sanger and William J.

Broad, U.S. Sees an Opportunity

to Press Iran on Nuclear Fuel, New

York Times, 3 January 2010, hp://

www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/world/middleeast/03iran.html.

45 The shift of focus to Fardow

was suggested by a senior IAEA

ocial. See Mark Heinrich and

Steve Holland, IAEA Fears

Iran Working Now on Nuclear

Warhead, Reuters, 18 February 2010,

hp://www.reuters.com/article/

idUSTRE61H4EH20100219.46 David E. Sanger and William J.

Broad, Agencies Suspect Iran is

Planning Atomic Sites, New York

Times, 27 March 2010, hp://www.

nytimes.com/2010/03/28/world/

middleeast/28nuke.html.47 Sanger and Broad, U.S. Sees an

Opportunity to Press Iran on Nuclear

Fuel.

48 Parisa Hafezi, Iran Expects Full-scale Advanced Enrichment in 2011,

Reuters, 18 December 2009, hp://

in.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=I

NIndia-44837220091218.49 Richard H. Haass, Enough is

Enough, Newsweek, 22 January 2010,

hp://www.newsweek.com/id/231991;

Robert Kagan, How Obama Can

Reverse Irans Dangerous Course,

Washington Post, 27 January 2010,

hp://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/

AR2010012602122.html.50 See, for example, Eric A. Brill, Did

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Steal the

2009 Iran Election?, unpublished

manuscript, 31 March 2010, available

at hp://iran2009presidentialelection.

blogspot.com/.51 Iranian Public on Current Issues,

WorldPublicOpinion.org, September

2009, hp://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep09/IranUS_Sep09_rpt.

pdf.52 See Nobel Lecture by Barack H.

Obama, Oslo, 10 December 2009,

hp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/

peace/laureates/2009/obama-

lecture_en.html.53 Gary Ackerman, America and the

Iranian Political Reform Movement:

First, Do No Harm, circulated

statement, 3 February 2010, hp://for-

eignaairs.house.gov/111/

ackerman020310.pdf.54 David Ignatius, A Sober Approach to

Sanctioning Iran, Washington Post, 7

March 2010, hp://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2010/03/05/AR2010030502970.

html.55 Flynt Levere and Hillary Levere,

Is the Obama Administration Moving

Closer to Endorsing Regime Change

in Iran?, The Race for Iran (blog),

14 February 2010, hp://www.

raceforiran.com/is-the-obama-

administration-moving-closer-to-

endorsing-regime-change-in-iran.56 David E. Sanger, Obama Takes

Several Gambles in Bid to Defuse

Nuclear Stando with Iran, New

York Times, 11 February 2010, hp://

www.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/world/

middleeast/11assess.html.57 Fipatrick, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis:

Avoiding Worst-case Outcomes, pp.

815.


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