framing innovation policy for transformative change ...€¦ · framing innovation policy for...

FRAMING INNOVATION POLICY

FOR TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE: INNOVATION

POLICY 3.0Johan Schot, W. Edward Steinmueller

Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU)University of SussexDRAFT – Version 218 October 2016

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FramingInnovationPolicyforTransformativeChange:

InnovationPolicy3.0

JohanSchot

W.EdwardSteinmueller

SciencePolicyResearchUnit(SPRU)

UniversityofSussex

DRAFT,Version2

Updated:18October2016

Acknowledgements:

WehavebenefittedfromdiscussionswithparticipantsinSPRUcollaborationsinColombiasponsoredbyColciencias,withparticipantsintheSPRU-AfricaEngagementweekandwithcollaboratorsinaMarieCurieproposalforadvancedgraduatetrainingintheareaoftransformationalinnovation.Inaddition,wewouldliketothankRobinMansell,BenMartin,JordiMolas-Gallart,MatiasRamirez,IsmaelRafols,AdrianSmithandBlancheTingforcommentsonearlierdrafts.

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ContentsIntroduction...........................................................................................................................................3

Framing1:InnovationforGrowth.........................................................................................................4

Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention...................................................................................5

Framing1:InnovationModelandActors..........................................................................................6

Framing1:PolicyPractices.................................................................................................................7

Framing1:AlternativeorCounterFramings.....................................................................................8

Framing2–NationalSystemsofInnovation..........................................................................................9

Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention.................................................................................10

Framing2:InnovationModelandActors........................................................................................11

Framing2:PolicyPractices...............................................................................................................13

Framing2:AlternativeorCounterFramings...................................................................................14

Summary..........................................................................................................................................14

Framing3:TransformativeChange......................................................................................................15

Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention.................................................................................17

Framing3:InnovationModelandActors........................................................................................18

Framing3:PolicyPractices...............................................................................................................19

Framing3:AlternativeorCounterFramings...................................................................................20

Conclusion............................................................................................................................................20

References............................................................................................................................................22

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Introduction

Publicpolicies,includingthosedirectedatscienceandtechnology,arisefromunderstandingsofpastexperiencewithactions,reflectionsoncontemporarychallengesandperceptionsoffuturepotentialsforaction.Thepast,presentandfutureareinterpretivelyconnectedbypolicyscholarsandpractitionersaswellasmanyothersasaguidetoanalysisandaction.Theseinterpretiveconnectionsproduceforcefulframings–interpretationsofexperience,orderingofpresentcircumstancesandimaginationsoffuturepotentialitieswhichprovidethefoundationsforpolicyanalysisandactionandhaveapowerfulinfluenceontheimaginationofpotentialsandopportunities(Goffman,1974;BenfordandSnow,2000;Taylor,2003).Framingsevolveovertimeandtheychangeastheybecomeperceivedasinadequatetocurrentcircumstances.Becausetheyinfluencepeoples’imaginations,theyalsoextendbeyondthepublicpolicyspheretoinfluencethemobilisationandactivitiesofnon-governmentalorganisationsaswellastheprivateenterprisesectorandevenfamiliesandindividuals.Inthecontemporaryworld,despiteimportantimprovementsinlifeexpectancyandmaterialwelfareincountries,persistentproblemsofeconomiccrisesandrisinginequalitycoincidewithagrowingrealisationthatcurrentmodelsformeetingourbasicneeds–whetherinfood,energy,mobility,materials,waterorresourcesmoregenerally–areunsustainable.TheavailableframingsofscienceandtechnologypolicythatevolvedquiterecentlyinhistoricaltermssinceWorldIIremainrelevant.However,theydonotprovideperspectivesonhowtomanagetheconsequencesofthesocio-technicalsystemofmoderneconomicgrowthtowhichtheycontributedandofwhichtheyareapart.Moderneconomicgrowthisgeneratedbyasocio-technicalsystemscomplexbaseduponindustrialmassproductionandindividualizedmassconsumptionwhichextensivelyemploysfossilfuels,isresourceandenergyintensiveandproducesamassiveamountofwaste.Ourviewisthatthreeframingsrelatedtoscienceandtechnologypolicycanbedelineated,twoofwhichareavailableandaresystematicallyemployedinpolicydiscourseandaction.Eachoftheseframingsinvolvesamodelofinnovationwhichdefinestherolesofactorsanddescribesactionsthatmaybetakentoaddressgoalsthatarealsopartoftheframingsweexamine.Thethirdframingremainsunder-developedalthoughithasexistedinthebackgroundofpolicydiscussionsformanyyears.Thefirstframingfocusesoninnovationforgrowth,tappingthepotentialofscienceandtechnologyforprosperityandextensionofasocio-technicalsystembaseduponmassproductionandconsumption.Itaroseasthesocio-technicalsystemscomplexofmoderneconomicgrowthemerged–twocentralfeaturesofwhichKuznets(1973)identifiedasscience-basedindustryandsustainedimprovementinfactorproductivity.1Intermsofscience,technologyandinnovationpolicy,however,thisframingremainedtacitorunarticulateduntilaftertheSecondWorldWarwhenitwasextendedtocreateanewvisionfortheroleoftheStateinthewritingsofVannevarBush(1945)andothers.Thesecondframing–nationalsystemsofinnovation-emergedduringthe1980stoaddresssomeoftheconsequencesforindividualnationstatesoftheexperiencewithmoderneconomicgrowth–theintensificationofinternationalcompetition,globalization,theprospectsofbeingleftbehind,andthepromiseofcatchingup.Similartothefirstframing,someofthefeaturesofthesecondframingwerepresentinanunarticulatedforminearlieryearswithgreaterinfluenceonthepracticethanontherationaleortheoryofscience,technologyandinnovationpolicy.Thispaperarticulatesbothrationalesmoreclearlyandputsthemintohistoricalcontext. 1Kuznets(1973)identifiedsixcharacteristicsdefiningmoderneconomicgrowth.Theotherfourwererapidpopulationgrowth,structuraltransformation(primarilyurbanisationandtheshiftfromagriculturetomanufacturingandthentoservices),changesinideology(e.g.secularisation),theincreasedglobalreachofdevelopedcountries(partofwhatisnowreferredtoasglobalisation),andthepersistenceofunderdevelopment(atthetimeofKuznetsarticle,thepersistenceofnon-moderngrowthexperienceamongthreequartersoftheworld’spopulation).

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Athirdframing–transformativechange-isinthemakinganditsoutlineshavebecomeclearerinrecentyears.ThehistoricalbackgroundiscapturedmostrecentlyintheUNSustainableDevelopmentGoalspublishedin2015.Theseincludeendingpovertyandreducinginequalityinallitsformseverywhere,andpromotinginclusiveandsustainableconsumptionandproductionsystems,fullandproductiveemploymentanddecentworkforall,andmanymore.2Thisthirdframinginvolvesaquestioningofhowtousescienceandtechnologypolicyformeetingsocialneedsandaddressestheissuesofsustainableandinclusivesocietiesatamorefundamentallevelthanpreviousframingsortheirassociatedideologiesandpractices.Theemergenceofanewframingdoesnotnecessarilyreplaceexistingframings.However,framingscompetewithoneanotherfortheimaginationofpolicymakersand,ultimately,citizens.Thelegitimacyofrationalesandargumentsforparticularpoliciesandtheactionsthatfollowfromthemisinfluencedbytheprevalenceandunderstandingoftheframings.Ouraiminthispaperistoexaminethehistoricaldevelopmentofallthreeframings,illustratinghoweacharisesasaresponsetochangingsocialandeconomiccircumstances.Ultimately,wecontendthatresearch,experimentation,andreflectiononthethirdframingshouldbeapriorityinanyconsiderationofinnovationpolicy.Thispaperisabouttheframingofscience,technologyandinnovationpolicyatahighlevelofabstraction.Wethinkitisimportanttoarticulateandassesstheseframingssincetheyhavepervasiveimpactsonpractice,yetneverfullyshapewhatishappeningontheground;actualpracticemightreflectmixturesofalltheseframes.

Framing1:InnovationforGrowth

ConcernsaboutthefutureoftheindustriallydevelopedeconomiesmanifestedthemselvesfollowingWorldWarII.Thepotentialforthere-emergenceofunemployment,inflation,andeconomicinstabilitywasfearedandtherolesofthestateinmobilisingandconductingthewareffortlegitimisedstateinterventionthatpreviouslyhadbeenviewedsceptically,particularlyintheBritishandAmericancontext.Substantialvariationacrosscountriesinthestate’ssupportforresearchanddevelopment(R&D)priortothewarexisted,butwithafewexceptions,suchasagriculturalresearchintheUSandEurope,theseeffortswereadirectconsequenceofthestate’sroleinparticularactivitiessuchasdefence,telecommunications,medicalresearch,geologicalsurveys,andcivilengineeringworks.3Followingthewar,andbecauseoftheensuingColdWar,therewasenthusiasmforanexpandedstateroleinconductingscientificresearchwhichwasexpectedtobringindustrialbenefits.Therewasalsopublicenthusiasmandoptimismthatsciencewouldbringbenefitsnotwithstandingtheroleofscienceincreatingnuclearweapons.

AbroadconsensusemergedthatthestatecouldandshouldplayanactiveroleinfinancingscientificresearchonthepremisethatnewscientificdiscoverieswouldtickledowntopracticethroughappliedR&Dbytheprivatesector.Itwasalsorecognisedthatsciencewasmakingsubstantialcontributionstothemodernisationofindustry–replacingcraftpracticesandtraditionswithacontinuationandintensificationofscientificmanagementasarticulatedinTaylorismandFordism.Typically,duringthe1950s,scienceandinventionwereviewedasdistinctactivities.Asdistinctactivities,therewerealsoabasisforadivisionoflabourbetweenthestateandprivateenterprise.Insocialhistories,bothscienceandinventionwerediscussedintermsofthe‘heroic’orPrometheanoriginatorwithfamiliardebatesabouttherelativeinfluenceofindividualsandgroups.4

Attentiontotheissuesofappliedresearchandtechnologicaldevelopmentandtheirtreatmentasaninvestmentbyfirmssuggestedshortcomingsinthefocusoninventionwhichemphasiseddiscoveryanddiscoverers.Fortheseinvestmentstoberecouped,commercialisationofinventionwasrequired.Commercialisationwouldonlyhappenifaninventionweretobepurchasedbyasignificantnumberofcustomers.Ineffect,theframingdescribingtheoriginsandnatureofinventioninheritedfromthepastwasundergoingchange.Initially,thisinvolvedafocusonR&Dasaninvestmentandledtoquestionsaboutthe

2http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/3SeeTindemans(2009)andMoweryandRosenberg(1989)4Forexample,contrastBernal(1939)withthelargenumberofencomiumsforinventorssuchasFordandEdison.

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rateofadoption(orpathofdiffusion)ofnewproducts.Tocapturetheseprocessesandtodistinguishinventionfromthemorecomplexprocessesofappliedresearch,developmentandcommercialisation,thewordinnovationbegantobeemployed.5Thesimplestdefinitionofinnovationiscommercialisedinvention.6

Inthelate1950sthepopularimaginationfavouringtheeconomicbenefitsofscienceprovokedare-examinationoftheroleofscientificandtechnologicalknowledgefrombothempiricalandtheoreticalperspectives.Empirically,therelationbetweenthefactorsofproductionandthegrowthofeconomicoutputwasre-examinedbyAbramovitz(1956),Solow(1957)andothers.AbramovitzandSolowdemonstratedthatthecontributionoflabourandcapitalgrowthfellfarshortofexplaininggrowthineconomicoutput,leavingalargeresidualwhichSolowattributedtotechnologicalchangeandwhichAbramovitzreferredtoas“somesortofmeasureofourignoranceaboutthecausesofgrowthintheUnitedStates”,(p.11).Intermsofscienceandtechnologypolicy,thisworkseemedtoconfirmthebenefitsthatsciencewasprovidingtotheeconomy.Thefindingswerereinforcedbytheappearanceofnovelartefactssuchasmassmarkettelevisions,passengerjetairlines,and,moredarkly,intercontinentalballisticmissiles.Thesignificanceoftheresidualprovokedanincreaseinsocialscientistandpolicymakerinterestintheprocessesoftechnologicalchange.Italsoledtoare-examinationoftherationaleforpublicinterventionintheresearchenterprise.

Rationale/Justificationforpolicyintervention

Theexplicitrecognitionthatinvestmentwasrequiredforinnovation,combinedwiththeempiricalinsightthatinnovationortechnologicalchangewasthesinglelargestfactorineconomicgrowth,presentedatheoreticalquestionforeconomists.ItwasinthiscontextthatNelson(1959)andArrow(1962)askedthequestion–Aretheincentivesofmarketactorsadequatetoproducethesociallydesiredlevelofscientificknowledge?Theirnegativeanswerreflectedthenatureofscientificknowledge(thechallengesof‘appropriating’orowningit)andthelogicofthemarket(afirmexpendingcoststhatwillequallybenefitrivalsisnotmakingarationaleconomicdecisionsincetherivalscanfreerideandobtainacostadvantagefromnotmakingtheresearchexpenditure).7Thus,economictheoryprovidedarobustrationaleforthepublicsupportofonlyacomponentofinnovation(discoveryorinvention).Ineconomicslanguage,discoveryandinventionweresaidtohavethefeaturesofapublicgood,akintoroadsorsewersanditwasreasonablywell-acceptedthatpublicgoodssufferfrom‘marketfailure’–theinadequacyofmarketincentivestoproducethematthedesiredlevelorquality.8

Thequestionofwhetherasimilarmarketfailuremightapplytothelatterstagesoftheinnovationprocess–appliedresearchandcommercialisation–wasnotaddressedbecauseitwasassumedthattheseintheselaterstages,theknowledgewouldbeappropriable–appropriationofbenefitscouldbeprotectedbytradesecrecy,intellectualproperty,orsimplybymaintainingacompetitiveleadpreventingrivalsfromquicklyimitatingsuccessfulinnovations.9

5Foreconomists,whoweredevelopingthetheoryofproductiontoreflectthecontributionsoftechnology,thebroadertermstechnicalortechnologicalchangewereemployedinparallelsinceitalloweddiscussionofbothinnovationsrepresentingnewproductsandimprovementsinprocessesforproducingproducts.Later,thetermsprocessandproductinnovationsbegantobeusedastypesoftechnologicalchange.6ThiswasaparticularconcernofChrisFreemanduetohisinterestinthesocialfunctionsofscience(Bernal,1939)andtheneedtodistinguishbetweeninventionandcommercialisationofinvention.WhileFreemanwasnotthefirsttomakethisdistinction,hewasinfluentialingettingthisestablishedduetothesuccessofFreeman(1974).7Bothoftheseassumptionswerelaterquestioned.Mostdramatically,thepublicgoodnatureofsciencewasquestionedbyCollins(1974)andlaterbyCallon(1994).Rosenberg(1990)observedthatfirmsdidinvestin‘non-appropriable’sciencewiththeirownmoney,perhapsbecausethiswasanecessaryconditionforemployingscientistsorintegratingtheirscientistswithinscientificcommunitiesandnetworks.8Substantialdebatescontinuedinpoliticaleconomyconcerningwhichgoodswerenecessarilypublicgoodswiththoseoflibertarianorneoliberalviewscontestingvirtuallyeverycandidate,includingscience,seee.g.Kealey(1998)9Exceptionstothisruleincludeddefencewhereplanningmostoftendominatedmarketcompetition,medicalresearchwhichwasseenasinherentlypublic,andagriculturewhereaconsiderableshareofadvancewasthoughttostemfrommorewidespreadadoptionofbestpractice.

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Policymakerscontributedanadditionalfeaturetothefirstframingbysponsoringmissionorientedresearch,acontinuationand,insomecases,anextensionofthepreviousroleofgovernmentresearchfundingforgovernmentactivities.Technologiesweredevelopedtowagewar–atomicweapons,radar,jetaircraft,ballisticmissiles,andcomputerswerefurtherdevelopedfor‘defence’andadaptedtocivilianapplication.Themostimprobableoftheseadaptations,thecivilianuseofballisticmissiles,wastransformedintoaspaceprogrammeandaspaceraceparallelingthePost-Wararmsraceinnuclearweapons.PolicymakerdefinitionandpursuitofmissionswasmotivatedbynationalprestigeandideologicalcompetitionbetweenthestatesocialismofthethenSovietUnionandChinaandthecapitalismoftheWest,ratherthanbyeconomicreturnsonpublicinvestment.Scientistsalsobenefittedfromtheirperceivedcontributiontowarefforts.ThephysicistRobertWilsonrespondedtoaquestionfromaUSSenatorconcerningthedefence(mission)valueoftheproposednewacceleratoratFermilab,atthetime,thelargesthighenergyphysicsresearchinstallationintheworld-”Inthatsense,thisnewknowledgehasalltodowithhonourandcountrybutithasnothingtododirectlywithdefendingourcountryexcepttohelpmakeitworthdefending”(Wilson,1969).

Economistsandpolicymakerswerenottheonlycontributorstothefirstframingofscienceandtechnologypolicy.Awarenessofthepotentiallynegativeconsequencesofscientificdevelopmentwas,inthe1950s,limitedtoafewareassuchastherisksofnuclearwarandradiationexemplifiedbythe‘DoomsdayClock’regularlyupdatedonthecoveroftheBulletinofAtomicScientists.However,thepublicationof,forexample,SilentSpring(Carson,1962),andtheLimitstoGrowthreportbytheClubofRome(Meadows,Meadows,Randersetal.,1972)openedamuchwideragendaofsocialconcernaboutthepotentiallynegativeconsequencesofthenewproductsofscience.Duringthe1960s,considerableanxietyaboutandprotestagainstthepossibleconsequencesofscienceforpublichealthandsafetyand,ultimately,environmentalquality,emerged.Policymakersrespondedtothesedevelopments,oftenreluctantly,bydevelopingnewregulatoryagenciesormakingimportantchangesinthoseagenciesthathadbeenestablishedinanearlierera.Forexample,theUSFoodandDrugAdministration(FDA),whichhadbeenestablishedin1906tolicensepharmaceuticalproductsandsetstandardsforfoodstandards,begantoregulatetheeffectivenessandsafetyofpharmaceuticalsaftertheworldwidethalidomidedisaster.10

Framing1:InnovationModelandActors

ThemodelofinnovationunderlyingFraming1isthecommercialisationofscientificdiscoverywitheachoftheprocessesfollowingdiscoverydrivenbytheeconomiclogicofinvestmentandfinancialreturninthepotentialmarketfortheinnovation.Thisframingreflectsamodernistconfidenceintheinevitabilityofprogressandaneconomicrationaleforthesocialwelfarebenefitsofchoiceacrossarangeofcompetitivelymassproduced(andhencerelativelyinexpensive)goods.Itisexpectedthatthisscience-ledprocesswillcontributesubstantiallytolongtermeconomicgrowthandprovidenumerousbusinessopportunities.Somewhatreluctantly,thisframingallowsformistakeswhicharethemselvesattributedtoshortcomingsinscientificknowledgethatcanberemediedwithfurtherresearch.Ingeneral,regulationofthesepotentialmistakes–theiranticipationandcorrection–isoutsidethemainmodelofinnovation.Regulationis,forthemostpart,appliedaftertheresearchprocessiscompletedandatthepointwhenproblemsareexperiencedintheadoptionanduseoftheinnovation.Toidentifytheseproblems,governmentsusetechnologyassessmentexercisesandcreatespecificagencieswhichinformParliaments(Vig.andPaschen,2000).Yetthesetechnologyassessmentactivitiesarenotseenasacorepartofascience,technologyandinnovationpolicy,butasausefuladd-onatbest.Anexampleofex-postproblemsolvingisCFC(chlorofluorocarbons)whereaninnovationthatimprovedthequalityofrefrigeration11eventuallywererecognisedasahazardtotheozonelayerandproductionwasproscribedbyinternationaltreaty(MontrealProtocolonSubstances

10ThiswasdonewithKefauverHarrisAmendmentorDrugEfficacyAmendment,a1962amendmenttotheFederalFood,Drug,andCosmeticAct.11CFCsalsoreplacedtherefrigerantssulfurdioxideandmethylformatethatwould,inthecaseofleakage,bedirectlyhazardoustohumanhealth.

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thatDepletetheOzoneLayer,1987).12Concernsaboutthebroaderimplicationsfortheenvironmentorhumanhealthandwelfareofthepathofscientificadvancewereviewedsomewhatfatalisticallyasthecostofprogress.Theyweremostlymarginaliseduntilthelate1970sand80swhenincidentssuchasozonedepletionresultingfromCFCsandtheThreeMileIsland(1979)andChernobyl(1986)nuclearaccidentsoccurred.

Theactorsinthisinnovationmodelhaveacleardivisionoflabourandresponsibility.Scientistsareexpectedtopursuetheadvanceofscientificunderstandingwithonlyincidentalattentiontothepotentialcommercialvalueoftheirdiscoveries13,topublishtheirworkfullydisclosingthemethodsandfindings14,andtoassumethatthosetakinguptheirdiscoverieswillusetheminasociallyresponsiblemanner.Thepublicsectorisexpectedtofundscientificresearchgenerouslyandtoregulatesciencetoassureitsopennessandtoencourageself-regulationofscientificmisconduct(e.g.falsifyingresultsormakingunjustifiedclaims)bythescientificcommunity.Thepublicsectorisalsoexpectedtoofferameansforidentifyingproblemsarisingfromtheapplicationofscienceandtoreferthesetoexpertsinthescientificcommunityforevaluationandsolutions.Theroleoftheprivatesectoristotransformscientificdiscoveriesintoinnovationswhichwillsupportsustainedlongtermeconomicgrowth.Inthe1960s,itwasassumedthatthecompetencetodothiswouldexistprimarilyinlargeincumbentcorporationswhowouldbeabletobuildtheindustrialresearchcapacitiestoperformtheappliedresearchanddevelopmenteffortsnecessarytocommercialisescientificdiscovery.Towardstheendsoftheperioditbecameclearthatanewgroupofactors,newtechnologybasedfirms(NTBFs)hademergedandwiththemanincreasinginterestinthenatureofentrepreneurshipandentrepreneursthatSchumpeterhadwrittenaboutearlierinthecentury.

Framing1:PolicyPractices

Thefirstframingencouragedanexpansiveviewofthebenefitsofresearchbut,nonetheless,policypractitionershadtonegotiatethepoliticalprocessthroughwhichresearchfundsareallocated.ThepolicymakerdefinitionofmissionsandmissionledresearchprogrammesdiscussedaboveweremostapparentintheUSwhereseverallargegovernmentalDepartments(defense,energy,andhealth15)havecontinuedtosponsorbasicandappliedresearchandinFrancewhereatomicenergyandmedicalresearchepitomisedadirigisteapproachtoscientificadvance.Thepoliticaladvantageofmission-ledresearchisthatthefundingofbasicscientificresearchcanbejustifiedintermsofitscontributiontospecificobjectivesratherthanrelyingsolelyonthesomewhatvaguerpromisethatscienceultimately(inthelongrun)bringsprestigeorculturalbenefits.

Similarly,althoughtheunderlyingmarketfailuremodelonlyjustifiespublicinvestmentforscientificandtechnologicalknowledgethatisapublicgood,theframingthatresearchisthesourceoflongtermeconomicgrowthledpolicymakerstorespondfavourablytothesupportofalltypesofresearch.ThisleadtothecreationofmanypolicyinstrumentsaimedatstimulatingR&Dincludingfavourabletaxtreatmentanddirectsubsidiesemployedhorizontallytospecificindustriestoencouragecompetition.Inaddition,nationshaveattemptedtocreatefavourablebusinessclimatesforbusinessinvestmentonthepremisethatashareofthisinvestmentwouldflowtoinnovationactivities.TherecognitionofthesignificanceofNTBFsinfostering 12TheMontrealProtocolisanexampleofincompleteregulationsinceitdidnotprovidemeasuresforsequesteringanddestroyingexistingstocksofCFCs.SoonelineofinvestigationinFraming1isregulatoryeffectivenessfromwhichideasaboutthe‘precautionaryprinciple’follow.13AninterestingrevisionofthispartofthemodelwassuggestedbyStokes(1997)whosuggesteditmightbepossibletodistinguishbetweenlinesofscientificresearchwhichmightbe‘use-inspired’(e.g.Pasteur’sinvestigationsintothemechanismsoffermentation)fromthosethatare‘pure’(e.g.Bohr’sinvestigationofenergystatesinatoms)14SeeDasguptaandDavid(1994)foraninterpretationofscientificdisclosureasanalternativesystemtoappropriabilityforgeneratingsocialwelfare.15TheunusualstructureoftheUSgovernment(comparedtocentralisedparliamentarydemocracies)severstheusualrelationshipbetweenhighereducationandsciencepolicy.IntheUS,themajorityofuniversitiesareestablishedandfinancedbyindividualstatesoftheunion.TheverysubstantialincreaseinFederalfundingforresearchgreatlybenefittedseveralofthese(e.g.UniversityofCaliforniaandtheuniversitiesestablishedbytheMorrillActof1862,whichprovidedaone-offgrantofsubstantiallandfromtheFederalgovernment)aswellasseveralleadingprivateuniversities(MIT,Stanford,Harvard,ChicagoandColumbia).SeeGeiger(1993)

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innovationledtotheideathattaxationoncapitalgainsfromtheelevationofequityvaluesshouldalsoreceivefavourabletaxtreatmenttoencouragefurtherinvestmentinthesefirms.ComparisonofthelevelsofR&DinvestmentbetweencountriesbecameanimportantindicatorguidinggovernmentpolicywhichlaterbecameanexplicitpolicyintheEuropeanUnionwiththeaspirationofachievinga3%ofGDPaverageresearchintensityacrosstheEU(EuropeanCommission,2010).

Yetwhilegovernmentsarepositiveaboutpublicfunding,almostnocountrycanaffordtodoeverythinginscienceandtechnology.Choicesarenecessary.Thisledtothedevelopmentofmechanismsformakingchoicesbetweencompetingalternatives.Aprominentmechanismwhichdevelopedduringthe1980sand90swastechnologyforesight(MartinandIrvine,1989).Theseactivitiesmadeitpossibletobringsocietalconsiderationsintotheselectionprocess,butinpracticesupplyfactors(perceivedtechnologicalopportunities)oftendominated.ForesightoffersaprocessapproachtotheselectionofprioritieswhichthenallowsgovernmentstoleavetheresponsibilityforselectiontothecompaniesinvolvedwhichfitstherationaleofaFraming1approach.Toensurethatthedivisionoflabourbetweenscientificresearchasapublicgoodandtheprivateappropriabilityofappliedresearch,developmentandcommercialisation,policyactionstostrengthenandextendintellectualpropertyprotectionwereundertaken.TheUShasbeenparticularlyaggressiveinthisareawiththeestablishmentoftheCourtofAppealsfortheFederalCircuit(1982)withaprincipalremittoreviewpatentlitigation,extensionstothepatentlifeforpharmaceuticalproducts(1984),andtakingaleadingroleintheTradeRelatedAspectofIntellectualProperty(TRIPS)agreementincorporatedinthe1994UruguayRoundoftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT).Providingtheinputsforscienceandinnovationthrougheducationisanotherroleofgovernment.EducationforresearchcareerswasacommonpolicyaimthroughoutthefirstframingperiodandhascontinuedmorerecentlywithanemphasisonSTEM(science,technology,engineeringandmathematics)subjectsandacorrespondingre-alignmentofeducationfundinginseveralcountries(e.g.theUK)toreflectthispriority.Learningfrompolicypracticewasparticularlyimportantbetween1960and1990.Thepetroleumcrisisofthe1970shighlightedtherelianceofvirtuallyallcountries’dependenceontheimportofpetroleumtooperatethemassproductionanddistributiontechnologiesthatarosefromthefirstframing.ItgaverisetoanewmissionorientedpolicyintheUSandothercountriesseekingtoreduceenergydependenceandthiscontributedtotheearlydevelopmentofrenewabletechnologies.

Framing1:AlternativeorCounterFramings

Thefirstframing’sdepictionoflargescalescientificenterprisejoinedwithlargeenterpriseorcomplexeco-systemsofNTBFswasverydominantintheUSandEurope,butitposedamajorchallengeforlessdevelopedcountrieswhichlackedtheresourcestoconstructthesocio-technicalsystemthatwasrequired.Sagasti(1980)arguedthatthiswasproducingtwocivilisations,onethatgeneratestheknowledgeandderivesprincipalbenefitsfromitandtheother(i.e.thedevelopingworld)seeminglypassivelyreceivingapartofthisknowledgeandtherebyadiminishedcapacityforsovereigntyandself-determination.Inaddition,thetechnologiesdevelopedbythis‘firstcivilisation’werethemselvesseenasdisadvantageous(Stewart,2008).Thesecounter-framingofthebeneficialnatureofscientificprogressandinnovationinthedevelopedcountrycontextledtoresponsesbyscholarsandpolicymakersinthelessdevelopedcountries.FollowingtheearlierworkofRaulPrebisch(1950)andHansSinger(1950),adoctrineofimportsubstitutionledanumberofcountries,particularlyinLatinAmerica,towithdrawfromthegeneraltrendtowardmoreliberalinternationaltradetariffsinordertobuildinfantindustries.ThesametypesofpolicieswereemployedinEastAsia,perhapswithagreaterdegreeoftargetingofspecificindustriesandwithaclearintenttobuildexportcapacityratherthanimportsubstitution.Althoughlargelyabandonedbythe1990s,manyconcludedthatthesepolicieshadpositiveeffectsintheEastAsiancontextandsomearguedthatthesepolicieshadpositiveimpactsintheLatinAmericancontext,e.g.Colistete(2010).16DevelopmentsrelatedtoSchumacher(1974)andStewart’s(1973)argumentcallingforanappropriatetechnologymovementattemptedto

16Inbothareas,internationalpressureswereimportantreasonsfortheabandonmentofthepolicies.

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harnessresearchprocessestoproducetechnologiesthatwouldbemoresuitableinthedevelopingcountrycontext.17Forthemostpart,innovationscomingoutofthismovementwereveryrudimentary(e.g.betterovensforusinglocalfuels)andgenerallyfellshortoftheexpectationthattheywouldprovidesignificantadditionstotheincomeofdevelopingcountrypeople.Nonetheless,ideasfromthissocialmovementre-appearinwritingsaboutfrugalinnovation(Radjou,PrabhuandAhuja,2012),innovationfromthebottomofthepyramid(LondonandHart,2004),andinclusiveinnovation(Chataway,HanlinandKaplinksy,2014).

Framing2–NationalSystemsofInnovation

TheemergenceofFraming2wasaresponsetotheperceivedincompletenessofthefirstframingandtothesomeoftheconsequencesofpursuingthismodel.Thepost-WorldWarIIgrowthexperiencethatcontinuedwithrelativelyminorinterruptionsuntiltheoilshocksofthe1970sandtheseriousrecessionof1981(oftenreferredtoinEuropeasaneconomiccrisis)intensifiedcompetitionbetweencountriesandhighlighteddifferencesinnationalindustryinnovativeandproductiveperformance.Italsobecamemoreapparentduringthe1980sthattheconvergencebetweenhigherandlowerincomecountrieswasoccurringatamuchslowerratethancouldbeexplainedusingthefirstframe’spremisethatscientificandtechnologicalknowledgewasaglobalpublicgood–inprinciple,availabletoeveryoneintheworld.Anexplanationofthisstateofaffairs,consistentwiththefirstframing,wasthattherichercountrieswereholdingbackscientificortechnologicalknowledge,therebyexcludingothercountriesfromutilisingthisknowledgetoengageinacatching-upprocess.18ThisideawascontestedbySoete(1985)whoobservedthattheindustrialstructureoftechnologybasedcompaniesoftencontainedsmallerormediumsizedfirmsthatwereableandwillingtoselltechnologies(e.g.licensepatents,selladvancedcapitalgoods,orbeacquiredatpriceslowerthantheimplicitcostsofreproducingtheirtechnologies).

TheseconundrumsintheapplicationofFraming1ledscholarstore-examinethelinearmodelofinnovationthatunderlaythisframing.Fourimportantmodificationswereindicated.First,ratherthanaglobalpublicgood,itwasrecognisedthatscientificandtechnologicalknowledgeoftencontainedimportanttacitelements.Theknowledgedidnotfreelytravelovergeographicalandculturaldistances,butinsteadwassticky(VonHippel,1994).Second,theabilitytoabsorbknowledgefromtheworldwidenetworkofresearchandresearchersdependsonabsorptivecapabilities(CohenandLevinthal,1989)whichrequirepriorexperienceinrelatedresearchandapplication.Third,‘absorptivecapacities’wereoneofarangeofsocialcapabilitiesthatstemmednotonlyfromthelevelofeducationbutalsoitsqualitiesandthesocialcapabilityofentrepreneurship.19Fourth,thecharacteroftechnologicalchangewasrecognisedasbeingcumulativeandpath-dependent(David,1975;Arthur,1983).Abalanceexistedbetweenmajordisruptiveinnovationsthatalterthetrajectoriesofsearchandimprovement,andcumulativeinnovationsthatreinforceandstrengthenexistingmethods,ofteninwaysthatraiseimportantbarrierstonewtechnologiesthatmightbemore,ormorerapidly,disruptivethanwithoutthesecumulativeimprovements.Thesemodificationswereseenascomplementarytothegrowingempiricalrecognitionthatinnovationisofteninitiatedbyusers(vonHippel,1988)orthroughfeedbacksamongappliedresearch,developmentandcommercialisationactivitiesinwhatKlineandRosenbergtermedachainlinkmodelofinnovation(KlineandRosenberg,1986).

Thesemodificationsoftheunderlyingmodelofinnovationsuggestedthatimportantinternationaldifferencesmightexistinthecapacitytoinnovateandfocussedattentionontheprocessesoflearningandtherelationbetweendifferentorganisationsinasociety.Freeman(1988)andLundvall(1992)employedthetermnationalsystemsofinnovation.Thenationalsystemsofinnovationapproachdirectedattentiontothe

17SeealsoKaplinsky(2011).18Gerschenkron(1962)hadhighlightedtheadvantagesofeconomicbackwardnessforrapideconomicgrowthbynotingthepotentialforlargeincrementstoproductivityandoutputbyadoptingtechniqueswellknowninwealthiereconomies.Duringthe1960sand1970stherehadbeenconsiderableoptimismconcerningtheprospectsfor‘technologytransfer’asakeycomponentofdevelopmentstrategy.19Thepromotionofentrepreneurshipisoftenastandinforpro-businessandanti-governmentpoliticalsentiments(i.e.thefavouringofprivateratherthanpubliccollectiveaction).However,italsoreflectssocialnormsregardingtakinginitiativeanddepartingfromexistingpracticesofteninvolvingthebuildingofnewbusinesses.

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variousconfigurationsoforganisationsconcernedwiththegenerationandutilisationofscientificandtechnologicalknowledge.Centraltothisideawasthatsomeconfigurationsmightbemuchmoreeffectivethanothers.Thus,thesemightcontributesubstantiallytotheexplanationofwhyveryunevenratesofproductiveandinnovativeperformancewereobservablethroughouttheworld.Inparticular,Freeman(1988)suggestedthatJapanhadmadeimportantorganisationalinnovationsinthegenerationandutilisationoftechnologicalknowledgewhichexplaineditsabilitytocatchupandovertakecompaniesinadvancedmanufacturingsectorssuchasautomobilesandtelevisions.

IntheversionofnationalsystemsofinnovationofferedbyFreeman(1987,1988),thesesystemshadanationalcharacter,reflectingdifferencesininstitutionsandpolicies.InLundvall(1985,1988),thecentralityofcapabilitiesforlearningwasadditionallyemphasisedasanationalcharacteristicthatappliedtocountry-basedorganisations.Thejustificationforageographic-politicalboundingofthesesystemswastwofold:institutionsandpoliciesarelargelyestablishedatanationallevelandknowledgedoesnottraveleasilyoutsidethesocio-culturalmilieuinwhichitiscreated.Furtherdifferentiationofsystemsofinnovationthinkinginvolvedanemphasisonthe‘stickiness’ofknowledgesuggestingregionalsystemsofinnovationor,alternatively,cognitivealignmentcreatedbycommonparticipationinanindustryanditstechnologicalproblemsregardlessofnationality,leadingtosectoralsystemsofinnovation.20


Thesocio-historicalcontextofthesystemsofinnovationliteratureisimportant.ItaroseinanattempttoexplaintheinsurgenceofEastAsianeconomies,firstJapan,thenthefour‘tigers’(Taiwan,Korea,Singapore,andHongKong)and,mostrecently,China.Onewayofthinkingaboutthishistoricalcontextistofocusonthefurtherdevelopmentoftheinternationalisationoftradeandfinancethatwasoccurringinthelattertwodecadesofthe20thcentury–thebeginningsofprocesseswhicharenowcollectivelyreferredtoasglobalisation.21

Fromaneoliberaleconomicperspective,globalisationisseenasthespreadofaninternationalsystemofliberaltradeandinvestmentcreatingthebasisforinternationalcompetitionand,hence,efficiencyinproductionanddistribution.22However,thereareimportantqualificationstothepositiveinterpretationsofthisperspective–theprocessesofglobalisationsimultaneouslyhaveallowedmillionsofpeopletoimprovetheirmaterialwellbeingandimpoverishedmillionsofothers.Whilemanyofthelessdevelopedeconomieshavemademajorstridesintotalnationalincome,thedistributionofthisincomewithincountrieshas,inmanycasesworsened,andthegapbetweentheincomeoftherichernationsandthepoorestnationshaswidened(Keeley,2015;vanZanden,Baten,d’Ercoleetal.,2014).FromtheperspectivesharedbyFraming1and2,growthofoutputandemploymentisofcentralimportanceinthefutureeconomicwelfareofcountriesandtheircitizens.Fallingbehindingrowthraisesthespectreofdeclineandadownwardspiralinwhichacountrybecomeslessabletocompeteininternationalmarketsand,becauseofincreasingimports,tomaintaindomesticmarketsintradedgoods.Acentralrationaleforgovernmentinterventionisthemaintenanceofcompetitiveness–agoaloftenstatedinmercantilisttermsasbecomingevermorecompetitiveinordertostimulatecontinuousgrowththroughexportswhilepreservingadominantshareindomesticproductionfordomesticconsumption.23Inmanycountries,thedisplacementsstemmingfromglobalisationhaveproducedapoliticalcompetitivenessagendatheeconomiclogicofwhichis,atbest,questionable(Krugman,1994).

20ThevarietiesofsystemsideasisexaminedinEdquist(1997).21Amongthemanydevelopmentsaccompanyingglobalisationistheincreaseintheinternationalmovementofgoods.Ameasureoftheintensificationofglobalisationisthegrowthofcontainerisedshippingoverthelast20yearswhichhasgrownfrom40millionto180millionTEU(twentyfootequivalentunit)(UNCTAD,2015:19)22TheliberalperspectiveisexemplifiedbyFriedman(2005)23Ofcourse,thisraisesthesameproblemswitheconomicsustainabilitythatSmith(1960[1776])observedwithregardtoearliermercantilistpracticesandthatledthenandinthefollowing150yearstoperiodicepisodesoftariffincreasesandbreakdownsininternationaltrade.

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Thenationalinnovationsystemapproachiscomplementarytoacompetitivenessagenda,basedupontradeadvantageratherthannationalprestigeormilitarypower.Advocatesofthisagenda(whichremainsinfluentialtoday)arguethatinnovationbroadlyrequiresgovernmentinterventioneithertopreserveortoexpandthecompetitiveadvantageofdomesticfirms.TherationaleofthecompetitivenessagendaretainsaFraming1perspectivetotheextentthatinterventionsarelimitedtopre-competitiveresearch,i.e.thecreationofknowledgeupstreamofproductdesign.Thislimitationislargelyduetoconcernsaboutstatesupportorquasi-mercantilistpolicieswhichwereproscribedtocreatealevelplayingfieldininternationaltradecompetition.Anumberofscholarshavearguedfor(Graham,1994)andagainst(CohenandNoll,1991)thisextensionofstateactors.IntheEntrepreneurialState,Mazzucato(2013)focussesontheneedforaFramework2systemsapproachthatfocussesontherolehighlevelrisk-taking(beinganinvestoroffirstresort)thatdifferentpublicorganisationshaveplayedinregionsthathavesucceededinachieving‘smart’innovation-ledgrowth.Inlookingforward,shearguesthatrewardsfromsuccessesinthisprocessshouldbesharedasequitablyastheriskstaken.AkeycontributionofMazzucatoistodrawattentiontotheshortcomingsoftheinnovationsystemsfocusontheinteractionbetweenthemultipleactorswithoutquestioningthenatureoftheactorsthemselves.Inparticular,theproblematicwaythatthepublicsectorhasbeentheorisedhasledtoinnovationpolicieswhichsetafirstpriorityonthegenerationofnewknowledgeandassumethattheprocessesofcommercialisationanddiffusionwillbesuccessfullyaddressedbycommercialincentives.Thiscallsattentiontothepossibilityofsystemicfailureiffinancialisationhasledtotheabsenceofpatientfinanceandtoexclusionofthepublicbenefitandhencegreaterinequalitybecausetheleadrisktakingroleofthepublicsectorhasbeenignored.Ineffect,thisprocesssocialisesrisksinordertoprivatiserewards.

Intermsofthegovernanceofpolicyinterventions,Framing2suggeststhedesirabilityofalliancesandcoordinationamongtheactorswithintheinnovationsystemtoavoidsystemfailure–thelackofcooperationandcoordination.Avarietyofothersystemfailuresispossibleincludingcapturebyvestedinterestsofgovernmentpoliciesaimedatfacilitatingresearchandinnovationandthecreationofcartelsunderthebannerofimprovedresearchcooperationandcoordination.Inthisframing,theseshouldberelegatedtothe,oftenseparate,regulatoryministriesoragenciesofnationalgovernmentswhich,duetothecompetitivenessagendaoftenhavebeenunwillingtoactagainstdomesticconcentrationsofeconomicpowerduetofearsoflossofcompetitivenessinrelationtootherlargemultinationalcompanies.24


Despiteitsinclusionofawiderangeofactorswhoareseenashavingagencytoimproveinnovationsystems,Framing2sustainsthegovernmentandproducer-centricperspectiveofFraming1.AlthoughusersarespecificallyidentifiedasapossiblesourceofinnovationinthemodelofinnovationunderlyingFraming2,anduser-producerrelationsareseenaskey,theagencyofuserstoaffectthedirectionornatureofinnovationgenerallyhasnotbeenconsideredasamatterforpolicy,andusersarenotmobilisedorperceivedasinnovativeactors.

TheunderlyingmodelofinnovationinFraming2,however,wasfundamentallyrevisedwithimportantimplicationsforpolicypractice.Itmovedawayfromalinearunderstandingofinnovationtowardsamoreinteractivemodelasisexemplifiedbythechain-linkedmodel.AkeyrelevantworkdistinguishedaMode1andMode2structureofknowledgeproductionsimilartoourtwoframings(Gibbons,Limoges,Nowotnyetal.,1994).ThisworkdistinguishedfivefeaturesofMode2knowledgeproduction:1)knowledgeisincreasinglyproducedinthecontextofapplication,252)transdisciplinarity,themergingor‘inter-penetration’

24Forexample,in1999,theUSrepealedtheGlassSteagallAct(1933)whichhadregulatedconcentrationofbanksduetotheexistenceoflargeforeignbanks.SomehavearguedthatthiscontributedtothesubsequentproblemsindealingwiththeUS-initiatedbankingcrisisandglobalrecessionof2008althoughthisremainscontroversial.25AccordingtoGibbons,Limoges,Nowotnyetal.(1994)knowledgeproductionwasbecomingmore‘sociallydistributed’andhad‘transcendedthemarket’(p.4)althoughtheirworkcontinuestofocusondistinctionsbetweenuniversityandindustryproducersofknowledgewithonlyanobliquereference(p.37)tovonHippel(1976,1988)that‘thepresenceofpotentialbuyersandusersdirectlyinthecontextsofdevelopmentinfluencethedirectionthatinnovativelinesof

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ofdisciplinaryframeworkstoproducenewcommonframeworksforresearchinthecontextofapplication(p.29),3)heterogeneityandorganisationaldiversity,reflectingtheincreasingdiversityofactorsinvolvedinknowledgeproduction,4)socialaccountabilityandreflexivity,involvingawiderrangeofexpertsintheresearchprocesstoaccommodateethicalandenvironmentalconcerns26,and5)qualitycontrol,theobservationthattraditionaldisciplinarypeerreviewofwhatconstitutesgoodsciencebecomesmorecomplexasknowledgeisproducedinthecontextofapplicationratherthanwithinestablisheddisciplinesandtheirself-referentialnorms.Gibbons,Limoges,Nowotnyetal.(1994)suggestedtheneedforinstitutionalreformwithparticularattentiontotherelationshipsbetweendirectgovernmentresearchefforts(e.g.inpublicresearchlaboratories),industrialresearchanduniversityresearchtostimulatethecreationofnetworkstofacilitatecoordinationandcooperation.ThisfocusoninstitutionallinksandinteractionsresonatesverywellwithFraming2,thenationalsystemofinnovationapproach.

ArelatedlineofresearchandpolicyadvocacywithinFraming2hasbeenpresentedusingthetermTripleHelix(EtzkowitzandLeydesdorff,1997;Etzkowitz,1998,2008)–thelabelreferstotheincreasinglyinter-twinednatureofgovernment,industry,anduniversityresearchefforts.SimilartoGibbons,Limoges,Nowotnyetal.(1994),scholarsparticipatingintriple-helixstudieshavesoughttomapandanalysethenewformsofcooperationemergingbetweeninstitutions,toconsiderprocessesofgovernancethataligntheinterestsofthesedifferentinstitutionsandtoprovideguidancetoeachtypeofinstitutionastohowtheymightenactreformsthatwouldmakenationalsystemsofinnovationfunctionmoreeffectively.Animportantelementoftriple-helixresearchhasbeenthepremisethatuniversitiesshouldbecomemoreentrepreneurial,fosteringnewcompanyformationthroughspin-offsandlicensingtechnologyproducedthroughuniversityresearch.

Thedifficultiesintransferringknowledgebetweenlocationsprovokedare-examinationofgeographicallocalisationeffects(Gertler,2001).Initialstudieshighlightedtheexistenceofindustrialclusters(CastellsandHall,1994)suggestingpoliciesaimingtoconcentrateactivitiesofaparticulartype,e.g.theMalaysianmultimediacorridor(Bunnell,2002).However,laterstudiesfoundthatgovernanceissueswereofcriticalimportanceanddifficulttoreproduce(Cooke,2001)andthatproximityinseveraldifferentsenseshadthepotentialfordetrimentalaswellaspositiveeffects(Boschma,2005).

Aparallellineofinvestigationfocussedontheeffectsofcognitiveproximityandalignmentandparticularlyonthesignificanceofthecumulativenatureoftechnologicalchange.Fromthisperspective,knowledgeisacquiredthroughsituatedlearningratherthanfromthetransmissionandreceiptofinformation.Aninfluentialcontributioninthisareasuggestedthatorganisationalandsocietalarrangementsforimprovinglearningthroughexperienceandinteractionarecentralingeneratingandutilisingknowledge(Lundvall,1985,1988,1992).IntheKoreancontext,LinSuKimalsomademajorcontributionsindicatinghowlearningcouldbeusedeffectivelyinacatchingupcontext(Kim,1999).

Intermsofactorsandinnovation,Framing2reflectsperceivedchangesintheprocessesbywhichapplicableknowledgeisgeneratedandexchanged.RatherthanbeingalinearflowfromsciencetoappliedR&Dtocommercialisation,knowledgeisgeneratedthroughinteractionamongthe(morediverse)actorsinnational,sectoralandregionalinformationsystems.Theseinteractionsinvolveaprocessofinteractivelearningandthebuildingofcapabilitiestoabsorbandadaptknowledge,ofteninfluencedbyphysicalandcognitiveproximity.Fortheseprocessestobeeffective,alignmentoftheseactors’objectivesandcapacitiesforinteractionisnecessary.Withinthismodel,considerableattentionispaidtoexemplarssuchasSiliconValley(Kenney,2000)orRoute128(Saxenian,1996)intheUSortheCambridgeshireareaofEngland(GarnseyandHeffernan,2005).Thereis,however,littleconsensusastohowthismodelmightbeinfluencedbypolicy.

researchwilltake.’Infact,vonHippeldocumentsinthesetwoworksthatitwasuserswhoweredirectlyresponsibleformanymajorinnovationsinthescientificinstrumentandotherfields.26ThisforeshadowsourdiscussionoftheseissuesinFraming3.ThediscussionofthisinGibbons,Limoges,Nowotnyetal.,(1994)(pp.7-8andinbriefreferencethroughoutthework)suggeststhatmechanismsofaccountabilityandinstitutionsforreflexivitywerealreadyinplace.However,almostnoevidenceisofferedforthisconclusion

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ThelackofacademicconsensusregardingtherelativeeffectivenessofdifferenttypesofinterventionsbasedonaFraming2perspectivehasledtoconsiderablevarietyinactualpolicypractices.Centralgovernmentshaveundertakensubstantialeffortstobuildtechnopoles(e.g.SophiaAntipolisinFrance(Longhi,1999))andsciencehubs(e.g.TsukubusciencecityinJapan(Tatsuno,1986).Regionalauthoritieshaveattemptedtore-vitaliseareasbymakinginvestmentsinnewtechnologybasedfirms,e.g.ResearchTriangleinNorthCarolina,US(LinkandScott,2003).Theseeffortshavehadmixedsuccessandthetimehorizonforsuccessfulnationalorregionaldevelopmentappearstobeverylongrelativetothetenureofpoliticaldecisionmakerswhoinitiatesuchplans.

Policiesthataimtoimprovethecoordinationandalignmentamongdifferentactorsininnovationsystemshavebeenundertakeninmanycountries.Theseofteninvolvefundingconditionality,e.g.researchfundingontheconditionofparticipationwithotherorganisationsinanetwork.Suchconditionalfundinghasbeenappliedtouniversity,corporate,andpublicresearchlaboratoryfunding.Exemptionsfromcompetitionpolicyguidelineslimitingmeetingsandcollaborationsamongfirmsinspecificindustrieshavealsobeenenactedinordertoencourageresearchnetworkformation.Foresighthasalsobeenusedandadvocatedasatoolforbettercommunication,moreeffectivecoordination,developmentofconsensusandgenerationofcommitment(MartinandJohnston,1999).

OneofthedistinguishingfeaturesofFraming2isthegreaterroleascribedtoagencyascomparedtoFraming1and,accompanying,thisisagreaterinterestinentrepreneurship.ThenatureoftheentrepreneurwasacentralissueinthewritingsofSchumpeter(Schumpeter,1947,1949).However,itwasnotuntilthe1980sthataspecificfocusonpoliciescultivatingentrepreneurshipinvolvingtheformationandgrowthofnewfirms,particularlythoseinvolvingtheuseofnewtechnologiesstartedtobeacentralconcernofpolicy.Promotionofnewtechnologybasedfirms(NTBFs)27sitsuneasilywithneoliberalviewsoftheefficacyofmarketsandwhichsuggestsfirmsizeisirrelevanttothedegreeornatureofinnovativeness(KulickeandKrupp,1987).However,whenissuesofagencyareconsideredexplicitly,thefocusanddriveofsuchfirms,alongwiththepersonalitiesoftheirentrepreneurialfounders,suggestsareasonforspecialconsiderationofthesetypesoffirmsingovernmentpromotionpolicies.Suchpoliciesalsoreflectthegrowingconcernforemploymentandtheassociatedobservationthatsmallandmediumsizedfirms(SMEs)comprisethemajorityofemploymentinmosteconomies.Althoughinmanycontexts,thisismoreofaproblemthananadvantage(SMEsgenerallydonothavetheresourcesormarketpresencetoengageinR&Dorthelargescalepromotionofnewtechnologiesandoftenhavelowerlevelsofproductivitythantheirlargerrivals),theidentifyingfeatureofNTBFsistheirpioneeringofnewtechnologies,someofwhichproducerapidgrowthinemploymentandoutput.NTBFsalsocontributetothelargernationalsystemofinnovationbycreatingagreaterdegreeofdiversificationandspecialisation,enablinglargerfirmstoselectfromapopulationoffirmswithmanymorenewideasthanmightbeproducedsolelythroughinternalR&Dprocesses.

Framing2alsosuggestsarenewedpolicyfocusontheissuesoftechnologicaldiffusionortakeup.Thesystemsapproachemphasisestheconnectionbetweensupplyanddemandwhichistakentobemediatedbynon-marketaswellasmarketprocesses.Manymoderntechnologiesinvolvecoordinationbetweenfirmsinsectorssuchasaerospace,electronics,COPS(complexproductsandsystems,suchasflightsimulators)andzeronetcarbonemissionbuildingsinvolvingnotonlysubstantialscientificandtechnologicalknowledge;butknowledgethatisdistributedacrossawiderangeofspecialisedfirms.Inorderforthesesectorstodevelopandflourishtherelationshipwiththeircustomersneedtobesufficientlystabletosupportinvestmentwhilethenetworksoffirmscomprisingthesesectorsneedtobeadequatelycoordinated.Issuesofdemandandcoordinationwereoftenaddressedhistoricallythroughgovernmentprocurement.Whilegovernmentprocurementremainsimportant,privatesectordemandfortheproductsandservicesofthesesectorshasincreaseddramatically(inpartduetotheprivatisationofpreviousgovernmententerprisesintelecommunicationsandtransport).Privatisationnotonlyintroducesmarkets,italsorestructuresthenon-marketrelationswithinthesesectors.Governmentshaveachoicewhethertheserestructuringsare

27Asadescriptivecategory,NTBFsalreadyexistedinreviewsofindustrialperformance.

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conductedinalaissezfairefashionorinvolvearoleforgovernmentregulation,promotion,andinterventions.28

GovernmentpolicypracticesintheFraming2involveeducationandtrainingoftheworkforcewiththeaimofsupportingtheabsorptivecapacitiesoffirmsandotherorganisations.Absorptivecapacityisoneofseveraltypesofnon-marketcapabilitiesthatbecomevisiblewhentheanalysisofknowledgegenerationanddistributionisdeepenedbeyondthelinearmodelembodiedinFraming1.29Indevelopingeconomies,theappropriatedirectionofeducationalandskillstrainingpoliciesofteninvolvestheachievementofparticularinstrumentalskillsinscienceandtechnologyandanengagementwithpost-colonialortraditionalheritagesthearedifficulttoreconcilewithaspirationsfordevelopmentandidentityinacontemporaryworld(Freire,1970).Intheindustrialisedeconomies,thereisacontinuingtensionbetweenlaissezfaireeducationpoliciesandskillsandlabourforcedevelopmentpoliciesthatprovidegreaterresourcesforparticulartypesofeducation(e.g.USpoliciesundertheNationalDefenseEducationAct(1958)orvariousreformsoftheUKeducationsystemaimedatproductivityandskillsattainment(MachinandVignoles,2015)).


Thenationalsystemsofinnovationandrelated(sectoralandregional)frameworksarestructuredaroundknowledgesharingandcollaborationamongorganisationsemployingprofessionalresearchers.Aconsequenceofthisisthatthebroadersocietaldiscussionoftechnologicaloptionsanddirectionsisnotintegratedintotheoperationofnetworks,evenwhenthesenetworksareestablishedastheresultofgovernmentintervention.Ineffect,thenationalsystemofinnovationframingcontinuesthetechnocraticpoliticsoftheinnovationforgrowthframing(Framing1).Bothframings,ascommonlyemployedinpolicydiscussion,shareanimplicitunderstandingthatthereisasinglebestpathforscientificandtechnologicaldevelopment.Thispathmightbeinflectedbyethicalorenvironmentalconstraints,butthereisnotamultiplicityofpathsorcriteriabywhichtoevaluationscientificandtechnologicaldevelopments.Thealternativeorcounterframing,anelementofFraming3,isthereforeonethatexplicitlyintroducesparticipatoryanddemocraticprocessesthatareempoweredtoidentifyalternativesandtoinfluenceortakedecisionsregardingthesealternatives.

Thisalternativeframingsuggeststheneedtoopenupprocessofchoicetomarginalisedactorstoprovidethemavoiceandinfluenceoverwhatpathsarefollowedinresearchanditsfunding.ThisissuehasbeentakenupmorerecentlybyDutrénitandSutz(2014),Lundvall,Joseph,Chaminadeetal.(2009)andotherswhodrawonanationalsystemofinnovationapproach,butaskwhythisapproachgiveslittleattentiontotheproblemsofdevelopingcountries.Theircentralconcernisthatthenationalsystemofinnovationapproachisleadingtosocialexclusion,andtheystress,theneedforparticipatoryapproachessoastodemocratiseknowledgeproduction(DutrénitandSutz,2014).ThecallformoreandwiderparticipationisalsopresentincriticismsanddebatesinEuropeandtheUS.IthasledtosuggestionsforpolicypracticesuchasConstructiveTechnologyAssessment,InteractiveTechnologyAssessmentandParticipatoryTechnologyDesigntohelpintheidentificationofoptionsandconsequencestoexistingtrajectoriesofdevelopmentandchange(Rip,T..J.MisaandSchot,1995)

Summary

Asnotedearlier,framesarepersistent.Thefirstframingofscienceandtechnologypolicy,basedonthepremisesthatscienceisthebasisforlongtermeconomicgrowth,andthatinnovationlargelyinvolvesthecommercialisationofscientificdiscovery,ispresentincontemporarydiscussions.Manyofthepolicy

28Apurelaissezfaireapproachisraresincegovernmentstypicallyremaininvolvedinissuessuchasstandardisationandregulationaswellasbeingmajorcustomersintherestructuredsectors.29Capabilitiesfornetworkingincludingsupplierandvaluechainmanagement,marketdevelopmentandknowledgemanagementareotherexamplesofsuchnon-marketcapabilities.Althoughsomepartsofthesecapabilitiescanbeacquiredthroughmarkettransactions,thechoicesinvolvedinthesetransactionsthemselvesrequirecapabilitieswithinthefirmororganisation.

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practicesdevelopedwithinthisframingoftheissuesarestillpracticedalthoughsomehavebeensubjecttomodificationascompetingframingsofeconomicpolicysuchasneoliberalismhavesoughttolimitstateaidandtofavourmarketovercollectiveactioningovernmentpoliciesmoregenerally,includinginnovationpolicy.Representativesofthescientificcommunitycommonlyarguethattheindependenceofmembersofthiscommunitytopursuecuriositydrivenresearchisaprimevalueandisresponsibleforprofoundlyimportantinnovations,aperspectivethatisconsistentwiththefirstframing.AmongthoseNTBFsestablishedinthemiddleofthe1970sand1980sthathavesurvived,somehavegrownintomajormultinationalcorporationsalthoughmanyofthesearelocatedintheinformationandcommunicationtechnology(ICT)sector.WhiletheICTsectorhascontributedconsiderablytoeconomicgrowthitdoesnot,itself,employpeopleinproportiontoitsturnover.30

Scientificdiscoveriesclearlyremainimportantinopeningnewopportunitiesforeconomicgrowthalthoughcontemporaryunderstandingoftheresearchprocesssuggeststhat,inadditiontotheheroicentrepreneur,manyresearcheffortsinvolvelargeteamsandinter-organisationalcoordination,featuresthatarelargelyoutsidethefirstframingwhichisnotmuchconcernedwiththeorganisationalstructureofresearchprocesses.ImportantexceptionstothisincludeLangrish,Gibbons,Evansetal.,(1972)andSPRU’sProjectSappho(CurnowandMoring,1968).ThesereflectionsonpolicypracticestemmingfromthefirstframinghaveledtoquestionsaboutthefocusonR&D.Itwasarguedthatitisimportanttolookathowtheresultsofresearcheffortsareusedandabsorbedintheeconomy.Thesecondframingemergedaimedatboostingtheabsorptivecapacitybyentrepreneursandthroughinstitutionallinkages.

Overtimeithasbecomeclearthattheprocessesoftechnologicalchangeareuneveninbothtimeandspace.Clustersofinnovationsthatrestructureparticularsectorshavebeencharacterisedasdisruptiveormajorinnovationsbecauseoftheireffectsonincumbentfirmsandjobs.Althoughthegeneraloptimismsuggestedbythefirstandsecondframingsregardingthesocialwelfareimpactsofthesechangesprevailedthroughoutthe20thcentury,theextentofincomeinequalityinhighincomecountrieshasincreased.Anumberofmiddleincomecountriesappeartobetrappedintorelianceonnaturalresourcebasedgrowthandtrade,andalthoughtheBRICgroup(Brazil,Russia,IndiaandChina)isapartialexception,manylowerincomecountrieshavemadelittleprogressincatchingup.Allofthesedevelopmentssuggestthatthefirstandsecondframingsareunsatisfactoryforavarietyofactorsandareparticularlyfocussedonarelativelylimitedperiodofhistoricaldevelopment(thelatterhalfofthe20thcentury).Duringthis,periodparticularcountriesemergedasleadersinscience-basedgrowth,eventhoughwithinthesecountriesincomedisparitiesoftenremainedlarge.Inaddition,theclimatechangeeffectsofgreenhousegasemissions,theenvironmentaleffectsofthevolumeofhouseholdandindustrialwaste,andotherexternalitiesproducedbythepatternofgrowthenvisagedinthefirstframinghavesuggestedthattheregulatorymodelboltedontothebasicinnovationmodelisunabletoaddresstheseexternalities.Itisnotonlytherateoftechnologicalchange,butitsdirectionwhichisenergyandmaterialintensive,andnotinclusiveenough.Thesefeaturesarenoteasilyencompassedinthefirstandsecondframings.

Framing3:TransformativeChange

Overthelastdecades,scienceandtechnologyhavecometobeframedasstrategicresourcesforindustryandgovernment.Investinginthemwouldboosteconomicgrowth,evengreeneconomicgrowth,andhelptoreduceinequality.Thebenefitsofthisgrowtharetobere-investedinscienceandtechnology.Whetherthesepositivebenefitshappendependsonstateinterventionsincegovernmentshavetoensurethatcleantechnologiesreceiveahighpriorityandfairerincomedistributionmeasuresneedtobetaken.StimulatingR&Dandbuildingnationalsystemsofinnovationmightbeameansofgainingcompetitiveadvantageintheshorttermandinthelongrunifgovernmentscontinuetoinvestintherightdirection.However,thisisonlysowhenweassumenation-states,despiteglobalisation,havethepowertodirectscienceandtechnology, 30TheICTsectorclearlystimulatesbothjobcreationanddestructioninothersectors.Forexample,directdialtelephoneshavelargelyeliminatedthejobofbeingatelephoneoperatorwhilethisandrelatedtechnologieshaveledtothecreationof‘callcentres’whichemployverysubstantialnumbersof‘operators.’

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areinthepositiontoorganizethedistributionfunctioninanadequateway,andarenotcapturedand/orcorruptedbyotherinterests.Thepotentialerosionofthepowerofnation-states,however,isnotthemainchallenge.Amorefundamentalchallengeisthenatureoftheinnovationprocessitself.

Science,technologyandinnovationpoliciesareoftenbasedontheassumptionthatinnovationisaforceforcreatingabetterworld.31Theideaisthatdevelopingnewtechnologieswillleadtopositiveoutcomesandthatremainingexternalitiescanbemanagedthroughregulation.Itisrecognizedthattechnologydevelopmentmightleadtosomebadoutcomesintheshortterm,suchasunemploymentinsectorsexperiencingrapidtechnicalchange,butinthelongtermeveryonewillbenefitsincenewhighqualityjobswillbegenerated.ItwasforthisreasonthatSchumpeterregardedtechnicalchangeasaprocessofcreativedestruction.AsSoete(2013),however,remindsus,innovationmayalsoleadtodestructivecreation,benefitingthefewattheexpenseofthemany,leadingtolowqualityjobs,andcreatingmoreproblemsthanitsolves.Manytechnologiesaredeeplyimplicatedinasetofpersistentenvironmentalproblems.Theycontributetothecurrentresource-intensive,wastefulandfossilfuelbasedparadigmofmassproductionandmassconsumption(Meadows,RandersandMeadows,2004;Bardi,2011;Steffenandetal,2015).

Thedoublesocialandenvironmentalchallengeforscience,technologyandinnovationpolicyisnowbeingrecognizedbymanygovernmentsandotheractors.ThroughinitiativessuchasHorizon2020,theEUexpectsinnovationtoaddressanumberofwell-chosensocietalchallengesandithasalsoembracedthenotionofResponsibleResearchandInnovation(RRI).32The2015LundDeclarationexplicitlyprioritisestraininganewgenerationofresearcherswhowillhavetheskillstoaddressgrandsocietalchallengesunderpinnedbyanexcellentresearchbase.33AlsothenewlysigneduniversalParisclimatechangeagreementhassettheambitiousgoaltoreachzeronetcarbonemissionsinthesecondhalfofthecentury,andtheUnitedNations(2015)hasformulated17SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),callingforgreenerproduction,increasedsocialjustice,afairerdistributionofwelfare,sustainableconsumptionpatternsandnewwaysofproducingeconomicgrowth.

Notwithstandingthisshiftinemphasis,manyscience,technologyandinnovationpoliciesarestillbasedonthe20thcenturysupply-driveninnovationmodelwhichtakescompetitionbetweennationsandsupportforR&Dandnationalsystemsofinnovation(Framings1and2)asthemainentrypointsforpolicymaking.Thinkingcreativelyabouthowinnovationcoulddirectlyaddressenvironmentalchallengesaswellastheadditionalissueofsocialchallengesisrarelypresent.Evenifpoliciesstarttobeaimedataddressingthesechallenges,asmanygovernmentsarepresentlydoing,itisunclearhowtoimplementsuchpolicies(seeKuhlmannandRip,2014).

Itisclearthatdeliveringontheeconomic,environmentalandsocialchallenges,thethreepillarsofsustainabledevelopment,willneedafundamentalchangeinthesocio-technicalsystemsforfood,energy,material,mobility,healthcare,andcommunicationprovision.Innovationpolicyfortransformativechangeneedsthereforetofocusmuchlessonproducts,processes,firms,andR&D,butontheachievementofsystemswidetransformations,sinceoptimizationofexistingsystemswillnotbeasufficientanswer(OECD,2015).TherequiredsystemswidetransformationmightbecalledaSecondDeepTransition(Schot,2016;SchotandKanger,2016).Thetransitionisdeepbecauseitinvolveschangingasetofdeeplyembeddeddirectionssharedamongseveralsocio-technicalsystems.Thesedirectionshaveledtohighlevelsofwealthandwelfareinanumberofcountries,butalsohaveleftmanypeopleinthedevelopingworldbehindandcurrentlyarecontributingtowardsincreasedinequalitywithintherichandhighlyinnovativecountriesaswell.Theyalsoleadtoincreasingresourceintensity,carbonlock-in,andsevereecologicaldegradation.ThesedirectionswerecreatedduringtheFirstDeepTransitiontoindustrialmodernity.ThemagnitudeofsocialandtechnicalchangesrequiredforaSecondDeepTransitionimpliesenteringanewphaseinthehistoryofindustrialization,industrialcapitalismandperhapsevenmodernityifthisthirdframingistotakehold..

31Exceptionsincludemilitarysecuritywheretheoperativegoalisbetterstatedasavoidingworsestatesoftheworld.32EuropeanCommission,KI-31-12-921-EN-C33https://www.ukro.ac.uk/authoring/researcher/Documents/151215_lund_declaration.pdf

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Theactionsneededforsystemwidetransformationcanbetranslatedintonewpublicmissions,yetthiswillnotbesufficient.Thisisbecausepublicinvestmentonitsownwillnotbringaboutthenecessarysystemtransformation(KuhlmannandRip,2014;Foray,MoweryandNelson,2012).Missionorientedpoliciesmayevenbecounter-productiveifthemissionsarenotformulatedinanopen-endedwaythatencouragescreativityanddiversity.Systemstransformationrequiresabroadchangeprocesswhichgivesthedevelopmentofthesesystemsnewdirectionsaimedataddressingsocialandenvironmentalchallenges.Inthisframing,itisimportanttoconsiderhowtocombinetechnologypushanddemandpullinstrumentsandtoconsiderpolicymixesratherthansinglepolicyinstrumentssoastoachievepolicycoordinationacrossgovernment(KivimaaandKern,2016;RoggeandReichardt,2016).

MorerecentworkbyMazzucato(2015;2016)haslookedatthebroaderimplicationsformissionorientedinvestments,innotjustfixingmarketorsystemfailures,butinactivelyshapingandcreatingmarkets.Herworkhasfocussedonthepossibleuseofmission-orientedthinkingtoconsiderbigproblemsaroundsocietalchallenges,fromclimatechangetoageing(MazzucatoandPerez,2015;MazzucatoandJacobs,2016;).BuildingonherworkontheEntrepreneurialState(2013),shefocusesontheorganisationaldimensionsthatarerequiredforpublicorganisationstosteerdirections,evaluatedynamicchangewhichisverydifficulttocaptureintraditionalcost-benefitanalysis,andwelcometrialanderrorinanopenendedandevolutionaryprocessofinnovativechange.Inordertodoso,newformsofpartnershipsarerequiredbetweenpublic,privateandthirdsectoractorsthatcreatemore‘symbiotic’partnerships,onesthatcantacklechallengestogether,andsharerewardsaswellasrisks.Howtogetcivilsocietyengagedinthisprocess,bothindeliberatingandsettingthe‘direction’andintakingpartofthepartnershipsisakeychallengeforthisagenda.

Providingnewdirectionsforsocio-technicalsystemschangeinvolvesprocessesofopeningupawiderangeofchoicesbeforeeventuallyclosingdowntheoptionstobepursued.Transformativeinnovationpolicymustinvolveadaptability,reversibility,learning,andanticipatingagreaterdiversityofoptionswithoutturningtooeasilyandquicklyto“for”or“against”argumentsregardingspecificoptions.Thisapproachtopolicyshouldenableexperimentationwithoptionsbeyondthenarrowboundariessetbyincumbents.Itshouldbebasedonscientificadvicefromabroadrangeofperspectivesanditshouldnurtureopportunitiesforstakeholderstochallengedominantviews.Sinceinnovationpolicynecessarilyinvolvestensionsanddisagreementsandfacesdifficulttrade-offsamongtheinterestsofdifferentgroups,thegovernanceoftransformativeinnovationneedstoinvolvepolicyprocessesthatprovideameansofnegotiatingthesedifficultieswithoutlosingsightofdemocraticidealsforsocialtransformation(Stirling,2008,2009)


WhileinFraming1and2itisassumedthat,withtheexceptionofnegativeexternalities,theprocessofinnovationiscompatiblewithsocialwelfareandprogress,Framing3raisesquestionsabouttheshortcomingsofscience,technologyandinnovationinaddressingissuesofsustainabilityandpovertyorinequitableincomedistribution.TheseshortcomingsmaybeseenaslargeexternalitiesthataresubjecttoregulationasinFramings1and2.However,Framing3encouragesadeepersetofquestionstobeaskedconcerningthecompatibilityofcurrentsocio-technicalsystemsofprovisionwithsocietalgoalsand,ultimately,aboutthegovernanceofinnovationprocesses.

Thisrationaleforthistypeofinnovationpolicywhichiscentredonsocio-technicalsystemchangedrawsuponScienceandTechnologyStudies(STS)insightsintothecontingentnatureoftechnologies.Somescholarsobservethattechnologiesareconstructedbypowerfulactorsintheirworldviewand/orinterests(Winner,1977;Noble,1984;Mirowski,2002),andthatalternativeinnovationsofferinggreaterpotentialforsocialinclusionormoreequitablepatternsofincomedistributionoftenlacksponsorshiporagency.STSscholars,inparticular,aregenerallyscepticalthatscienceandtechnologyinvestmentsareconsistentwithsocialandenvironmentalvaluesandoftheabilitytoachievethesevaluesthroughmarketregulationorpricecontrols.Forthesescholars,aswellasmanyothers,achievingthesealternativesrequiresascienceandtechnologypoliticsthatopensupspaceforsocietallearning,publicdebate,deliberationandnegotiation(Rip,T..J.MisaandSchot,1995;Schot,2003).Anearlyexpressionofthisrationalenotesthatoursocio-technicalsystemisfundamentallytoxictothenaturalenvironmentandhumanprospects(Mumford,1934;1964)and

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thatthisislargelyduetotheconcentrationofpowerinactorswhoarethemselvesdisconnectedfromthenaturalworldandordinarysocialrelations.Thismeansthatafundamentaltransformativechangeisrequired,onethatinvolvesthedemocratisingofcontroloverinnovationproductionanddiffusionandthecreationofnegotiationspacesormarketnichesforalternativetechnologiestobecomeestablished,captureimaginationsandwinconstituenciesamongactorsthatwouldotherwisebeexcluded.

Thecentralfocusofthethirdframingistheachievementoffundamentalsystemicchangeintheinterestsofsocial,economicandenvironmentalsustainability.Thereisarangeoftypesofpoliciesthatcancontributetothissystematicchange.Theemergingfieldofsocio-technicaltransitionresearchbuildinguponevolutionaryeconomicsandSTSfocusesonhowtoachievetransformativechange(Grinetal.,2010;Markard,RavenandTruffer,2012).Inthisfielditisarguedthatsubstantialprogressmaybemadebyprotectingandenlargingthespacesinwhichsocialandtechnologicalexperimentationisconductedenablingtheemergenceofalternativeswhich,inturn,garnerconstituenciesandadvocatesfortheirbroaderimplementationand,ultimately,forsystemchange.Itmayalsobenecessarytodevisemeansofdirectlydisruptingincumbentsystemsduetotheirmonopolisationofresourcesanddominationofvisionsofwhatispossibleanddesirable,andtheiractiveresistancetosystemchange(Geels,2014).


Framing3aimstochangesystemsthataresocio-technicalconfigurations.Severalelements,includingskills,infrastructures,industrystructures,products,regulationsandpolicies,userpreferences,andculturalfactorsareunderstoodtoco-evolvetogetherinasocio-technicalsystem.Thecomponentsofthesystemstendtoalignedandreinforceeachother,makingthemdifficulttochange.SystemInnovationreferstoradicalchangeinalltheelementsoftheconfiguration,andtotheprocessofdevelopingthenewconfigurationandembeddingitinthebroadereconomyandsociety(foranoverviewseeRipandKemp,1998;Grinetal.,2010).Systeminnovationalsoinvolvessocialinnovation,sincethefocusisnotonlyonthetechnologicalcomponents,butonallthecomponentsincludinguserpreferences,policiesandtheperceptionofthevalueandculturebyactorswithinthesystem.Systeminnovation,inthiscontext,involvesnewtechnologies,butitalsomightinvolvethere-useandremakingofoldtechnologiesaswellaslow-techoptions.Systeminnovationinvolvesmultipleactors,includinginnovativecivilsocietyactors,whoplayacrucialroleinco-constructionofnewsystems(OudshoornandPinch,2003;Schot,2016).SysteminnovationpracticeshavebeenpursuedthroughoutthehistoryofFraming1and2policies,butmanyoftheactorsandsystemcomponentshavealwaysbeenbeyondthescopeoftheinnovationmodel(primarilycentredoneconomicjustifications)underlyingtheseframings(Steinmueller,2010).

IntheinnovationmodelunderlyingFraming3,thereisnosinglebestpathwaytosustainability,incomeequityandothersociallydesirablegoalsawaitingdiscovery.Instead,theprocessofsysteminnovation(embodyingtechnologicalchangeanddiffusionortakeup)involvesactorsinnegotiatingalternativepathways,eachwiththepotentialforsettingatrajectoryforsystemchange(Stirling,2009).Inthisframingthemodelofinnovationmustbeexperimentalbecause,attheoutset,nopathwayisknowntobefitforpurposeinmeetingsocialgoalsorfeasibleinlargescaleapplication(SchotandGeels,2008).Itisonlythroughtheaccumulationofexperiencebyvarietyofactorswithdifferingmotivationsandprioritiesthatapathwaywhichisfitforpurposecanbeidentified.Theaimofexperimentationissystemicchangeinformedbyscepticismthatmarginalchangesinexistingsystemsislikelytobeeffectiveinmeetingsocialgoals.

ItisimportanttostressthatFraming3isnotprincipallyamodelofscienceandtechnologyregulation.Instead,itfocusesoninnovationasasearchprocess,guidedbysocialandenvironmentalobjectives,informedbyexperienceandthelearningthataccompaniesthatexperience,andawillingnesstorevisitexistingarrangementstode-routinizeexistingthemsoastoaddresssocietalchallenges.AclaimunderlyingFraming3isthattheinnovationprocessislikelytobeeffectiveinachievingthesegoalsifitisinclusive,experimentalandaimedatchangingthedirectionofsocio-technicalsystems.ThisdepartsfromthefocusofFraming1onR&Dinvestment,andtheenlargementofflowsofusefulknowledgeinwhichinteractionsbetweengovernmentandthescientificcommunityarecentral,withsomeadditionalattentiontoissuesofdiffusion.ItalsodepartsfromtheFraming2systemfocuswhichisdirectedatboostingtheabsorptiveand

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learningcapacityofthesystemofinnovationbybuildingnetworksofknowledgeamongproduceranduserorganisations,stimulatingthealignmentandcoordinationoftheseorganisationsinanefforttoproducetechnologicalchange,andfacilitatingentrepreneurship,butintheserviceofthegoalsofgrowth,employmentandinternationalcompetitiveness.

BothFramings1and2viewsocialandenvironmentalgoalsasbeingachievedthrougheconomicgrowthandthepossibilityofre-distributionofsurplusesgeneratedbyproductivityimprovementsandbyacapacityfortechnocraticelitestoregulateexternalitiesintheserviceofsocialandenvironmentalgoals.BycontrastFraming3involvesdeliberatingandexploringthesesocialandenvironmentalgoalsandunderlyingvaluesandembeddingtheminprocessesofsystemicchange.Deliberationprocessesgiverisetocommoncommitmentstoasearchforeffectivesolutionstosocialandenvironmentalchallengesandtorecognitionthatthesesolutionsnecessitateexperimentationandlearningaboutunderlyingassumptionsandvalues.Framing3givesrecognitiontothefactthatassumptionsandvaluesareco-producedintheseprocesses,theyareemergentincharacterandarefurthershapedandconsolidatedintheprocessofsystemchange.


Becauseoftheimportanceofsearch,experimentationandlearning,policypracticesinFraming3involvefindingmeanstofacilitateandempowerthoseengagedintheseprocesses.Technologicalchangehasalwaysinvolvedaprocessofsearch.However,inthisframingitisessentialtoreflectonsocialandenvironmentalneedsandthesearchprocesshastobeguidedbyimprovementsinanticipationofcollateraleffectsandconsequences.DevelopingprocessesthroughwhichanticipationmightbefeasibleisapriorityforbringingFraming3intopractice.SomeguidanceontheprocessesthatfacilitateanticipationisavailableinthepracticesdevelopedinconnectionwithForesightactivitiesandthoseoftechnologyassessmentgroups.Thefocusoftheireffortsisoftendirectedatlargescalecommercialapplicationaimedatcatchingthenextwaveoftechnologicalopportunitywhichmayopennewpossibilities,asintechnologyassessmentofnanotechnologyorbiotechnology.InFraming3,theaimofanticipationistoidentifyareasforexperimentationand,indoingso,toexaminetheconsequencesthatmayfollowintermsofenergyandmaterialsuse,thejobslikelytobecreated,andtheeffectsontheenvironmentoftheintroductionofnewphysicalartefactsorinformationprocessesthatmaybeproduced.Anticipatorydeliberationaimsnotatproducingblueprints,butatgeneratingmultiplepossibilitiesanddiversepathways.Itaimstosustainaprocessofcollectivesearchandlearningratherthanashorttermassessmentbasedonnarrowcriteriaandyes/notypedecisionmaking.

Anticipationisbynaturespeculative.Whileitcanprovidebroadoutlinesofpossibilitiesitcannotforeseethedetailsthatcometolightonlythroughexperimentationandlearning.Thus,whileessential,anticipationmustbejoinedwithexperimentationwithinarangeofpossibilitiessuggestedbyanticipationexercises.Isitbettertorecyclethantorepairandupgrade?Whatagriculturalpracticeswillproveviableasalternativestocurrentrelianceoffossilfuelsforenergy,fertilisers,transportandprocessing?Whatpracticeswillbemosteffectiveinachievingcarbonneutralbuildingsandinfrastructures?ThesequestionscanonlybeansweredthroughexperimentationatascalewellbeyondthatoftheR&Dlaboratory.Itcallsforsocietalexperimentation.Itisonlythroughactualpracticethatexperienceanddeeplearningaregeneratedandthattheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofaparticularinnovationpathwaycanbeidentifiedandremediedbyrevisionorbychoosingadifferentdevelopmentpathway.Deeplearningoccurscollectivelyandenableschangesincognitiveframesandassumptionsandisakintosecond-orderlearning(SchotandGeels,2008).Societalexperimentationmustincludegrassrootsinnovationwithcommunitiesandcivilsociety(SmithandSeyfang,2013).Framing3envisagesthatitgrowsandnurturesnewpathwaysand,intheprocess,challengesincumbentfirmsandgovernmentagenciesthatarealignedwiththem(regimeactors)inpreservingtheexistingtrajectory.Itentailspoliticalstrugglesaroundthenewgoalofsustainabilityanditrequiresincumbentfirmstogothroughprocessofstrategicreorientation(GeelsandPenna,2015).Theroleofintermediaryactorsinadvocatingcompetitiveniches,newvisionsandpoliciesiscrucial(Kivimaa,2014),asistheconstructionofnetworksembracingbothnicheanddominantregimeactors(Diaz,Darnhofer,Darrotetal.,2013)

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Theneedforanticipation,experimentation,learning,andtheformationofbridgingnetworksandalliancessuggestsnewinstitutionalarrangementsandgovernancestructuresthatcutacrossgovernments,markets,andcivilsociety.Italsosuggestsinvolvingpublicandprivatefinanceandnewwaystoshareandappropriatethegainsinknowledgefromtheseactivities.Inadditiontothesenewinstitutionalarrangements,waystobetterconnectexistinginstitutionstoachievecoordinationandtorecordandlearnfromprocessesofanticipationandlearningareneeded.Thiswillrequirenewsetsofskillsforbridgingthesocialsciencesandthescience,technologyengineeringandmathematic(STEM)fieldswhichhaverecentlybeenapriorityinmanycountriesseekingtorespondtotheimperativesofinternationalcompetitionandeconomicgrowththroughproductivityincrease.Whenthegoalssetforofsocio-technicalsystemsreflectarangeofsocialandenvironmentalneedsandmoreinclusiveideasaboutsocialwelfare,bridgingbetweenwhatispossibleandwhatisdesirablewillrequireindividualswithcapabilitiesforbridgingsocialandscientificandtechnologicaldomains.Thisimpliesare-orientationofeducationpolicyand,ultimately,apedagogythatisconsistentwiththedesiredtransitiontomoresustainableoutcomes.


AprimaryalternativeorcounterframingtoFraming3isthatitispossibletoaddressthesocialandenvironmentalchallengesthroughtheimplementationofcapital-intensivesolutions(e.g.centralizedenergyproductionwithbigwindandsolarfarms,theexpandeduseofnuclearenergyandfurtherdevelopmentofaglobalvaluechainofwasteproducts;geo-engineering)andtechnologiesthataimtomitigateex-posttheimpactsofcarbon-intensivedevelopment(e.g.carboncaptureandstorage).Inthisalternative,actorsfocusontheeconomicgrowthagenda,whiledistributionalconsequences(socialandecologicalcosts)areofsecondaryimportance.Alongthispaththereisthedangerthatitsocial,political,andecologicalleadtoeconomicstagnation,increasesinsocialequality,warforresources,increasesintheoccurrenceofnaturaldisastersandmoreforcedmigration.Forthiscounterframingtoachieveitsaims,powerfulforceswouldneedtobeinplacetopreventandmitigatedisastersandconflicts,compensateforsocialexcesses,andunderwritethelegitimacyofthesysteminordertoavoidpotentiallycatastrophicoutcomes.Giventhehighecologicalandsocialcoststhatwouldneedtobeabsorbed,thisframingimpliesconstructinganewrelationshipbetweenthestate,themarket,andcivilsociety,andmostlikely,newformsofpro-activeandentrepreneurialstateactiononnationalandaswellascitylevels,strongrelationshipsbetweenthestateandbusiness,andnewtechnocraticsupranationalstructuresensuringglobalcoordination.Theseseemunlikelyinviewofthedifficulttoachievesuchchangesinresponsetorecentsocialandeconomicchallenges.

Conclusion

Rethinkinginnovationpolicyistimely.Manyresearchcouncils,governmentsandinternationalorganizationsworldwidewantinnovationtoaddresssocietalorgrandchallenges.ThegrowingimpactofResponsibleResearchandInnovation(RRI)isasignthatthesechallengesarebeingtakenseriously.Yethowtodesign,implementandgovernchallenge-ledinnovationpoliciesisfarfromclear.Mostinnovationpoliciesarebasedonthe20thcenturysupply-driveninnovationmodelwhichtakescompetitionbetweennationsandsupportforR&Dasthemainentrypointforpolicymakingwithoutthinkingcreativelyaboutthebroadersuiteofinnovationpoliciesthatcouldbeputinplace.Inthepost-WorldWarIIperiod,twomaininnovationpolicyframingshavedeveloped.

Thefirstframingportrayedinnovationpolicyasprovidingincentivesforthemarkettoproducesociallyandeconomicallydesiredlevelsofscienceknowledge(R&D).Thisismainlyimplementedbysubsidiesandmeasurestoenhancetheappropriabilityofinnovationthroughintellectualpropertyprotection.Foresightwasdevelopedtoidentifyareasinneedofsupportandvariousformsoftechnologyassessmenthavebeen

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establishedtoexaminenegativeexternalitiesandtoprotectsocietywhentheimpactsbecomeaproblem.Regulationisthenanoptionthatcanbeputinplace.Thisframingidentifiesthemostimportantelementofinnovationasthediscoveryprocess(invention)andthelinearmodelinwhichtechnologyisregardedastheapplicationofscientificknowledgeisprivileged.Thelinearmodelprivilegesdiscoveryoverapplicationpartlybecausetherewardsofapplicationareassumedtobecapturedthroughanadequatelyfunctioningmarketsystem.Onlyinthecaseofmarketfailure,isgovernmentactionrequired.

Thesecondframingaimstomakebetteruseofknowledgeproduction,supportcommercialisationandbridgethegapbetweendiscoveryandapplication.Thisframingmakescentralvariousformsoflearning,includinglearningbyusing,producingandinteracting,linkagesbetweenvariousactors,absorptivecapacityandfirmcapabilityformation,andentrepreneurship.Therationaleforpolicyinterventionissystemfailure:theinabilitytomakethemostoutofwhatisavailableduetomissingormalfunctioninglinksintheinnovationsystem.Innovationpolicyfocuses,forexample,ontechnologytransfer,buildingtechnologyplatformsandtechnologyclusterstostimulateinteraction,andhumancapitalformation.Inthismodelforesight,technologyassessmentandregulationareadd-onstothecoreactivityofpromotinginnovationontheassumptionthatanyinnovationistobeencouragedsinceinnovationisseenasthemotorforproducingeconomicgrowthandcompetiveness.

Athirdframeforinnovationpolicy,transformativechange,takesasitsstartingpointthatthenegativeimpactsorexternalitiesofinnovationcanbegreaterthanthepositivecontributions.Thisframefocusesonmobilisingtheinnovationprocesstoaddressawiderangeofsocietalchallengesincludinginequality,unemploymentandclimatechange.Itemphasizespoliciesfordirectingsocio-technicalsystemsinsociallydesirabledirectionsandembeddingprocessesofchangeinsociety.Itentailstheexplorationofsocio-technicalsystemchangeinvolvingastructuraltransformationingovernancearrangementsamongthestate,themarket,civilsocietyandscience,togetherwithexperimentationandsocietallearning,responsibleresearchandinnovation,andaconstructiveroleforforesightaimedatearlyshapingoftheinnovationprocessesandonacontinuingbasis.Innovationpolicyfortransformativechangeaimsto:

• Broadentheconceptofinnovationbeyonditstraditionalfocusoninventiontoincludeinnovationandtheimpactsarisingfromembeddinginnovationinsociety-thinkingfarbeyondsupportforR&Dandtheprioritisationofspecificresearchavenues.Innovationpolicyshouldsupportconstant‘tinkering’andthere-makingofsocio-technicalsystemsaswellasthedevelopmentofnewservicesandorganisationalmodelstomeetsocialandeconomicchallenges.Policyformationandimplementationnecessarilyinvolveawiderangeofactorsfromfirmsandotherknowledgeproducinginstitutionstousers,NGOsandgovernments.

• Providedirectiontoinnovation.InFraming3innovationpolicyisnotaboutsettingpriorities,butaboutimprovingtheprocessofopeninguptoawiderangeofchoicesandgivinggreaterattentiontotherationaleforclosingdownoptions.Innovationpolicyshouldallowfordeeplearning,challengestodominantviews,andnurturingagreaterdiversityofoptions.Itshouldenableexperimentationwithoptionsbeyondthoseemergingwithinthenarrowboundariessetbyincumbentinstitutions–publicandprivate.Itshoulddrawuponscientificadvicefromabroadrangeofperspectiveswhichnecessarilyinvolvesconflictandpoliticalstrugglessinceitinvolvestheassessmentoftrade-offsamongtheoptionsfavouredbydifferentgroups.Itinvolvesensuringthatgovernancearrangementsaremadecompatiblewiththeseaims.

Onelastnote--Framings1and2emergedandweredevelopedmainlyintheUSandEurope,andhavebeencriticisedfromadevelopmentperspective.Bothframesassumethatdevelopingcountriesneedtocatch-upandthatscience,technologyandinnovationpolicyisatoolforthisprocess.Frame3doesnotassumethatinnovationsandsocio-technicalsystemchangewillnecessarilycomefromtheGlobalNorthorthatothercountriesneedtoplaycatch-upwiththoseinnovations.Onthecontrary,theassumptionisthatboththeGlobalNorthandGlobalSouthmustbeinapositiontocontributetotransformativechangeandthatmutuallearningcanbebeneficial.Inthisframing,itisclearthatdiversepathwaysarepossibleandthatlocalgenerationandadaptationwithinacomplexprocessofsystemtransformationshouldbeembraced.

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