Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University Phase 4

Working Paper SeriesStudies on Multicultural Societies No.35

Framing the American-led World Order: President Obama’s Pivot to Asia Policy and the Belief of American Exceptionalism

Chin-Kuei Tsui

Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University

Framing the American-led World Order: President Obama’s Pivot to Asia Policy and

the Belief of American Exceptionalism

Chin-Kuei Tsui

Working Paper SeriesStudies on Multicultural Societies No.35

2018

978-4-904945-67-4

67 Tsukamoto-cho, Fukakusa, Fushimi-ku, Kyoto, Japan

2018

Framing the American-led World Order:

President Obama’s Pivot to Asia Policy and

the Belief of American Exceptionalism

Chin-Kuei Tsui*

ABSTRACT

Since the Pivot to Asia policy was introduced by the Obama administration in 2011, there has been a growing body of literature discussing the shift in U.S. foreign and security policies, particularly the transformation of U.S. military strategy and the promotion of the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP). In contrast to the existing literature, which focuses mainly on the military and diplomatic dimensions of the policy shift, this article provides a critical and discursive analysis of President Obama’s new Asia policy and discusses the cultural roots of U.S. foreign policy. Specifi c concepts, such as American exceptionalism, and the national myths of Manifest Destiny and the “western frontier” are examined and illustrated. I argue that the central theme of Obama’s Pivot to Asia is the idea of American exceptionalism, which emphasizes America’s distinctive and unique role in balancing power relationships and shaping the political order in Asia. By portraying China as a major competitor, in terms of its economic growth and military capacity, America’s new policy aims to prevent China from challenging the U.S. for superiority in Asia and to maintain and preserve a pro-America world order.

KEYWORDS

President Obama; Pivot to Asia; Rebalance; Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP); American Exceptionalism

Introduction

In January 2009, Barack Obama took offi ce and became the 44th president of the U.S. As a president who promised to “change” his predecessor’s foreign policy, which was characterized by unilateralism and the assertion of America’s military superiority over its competitors, Obama’s foreign policy emphasized multilateralism and international cooperation on issues of global concern, such as counterterrorism, climate change, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Dueck 2015; Kaufman 2016). Obama also vowed to restore America’s image abroad and re-establish U.S. foreign relations with its allies based on a foundation of mutual interest, trust, and respect (Traub 2015). To distinguish his presidency from his predecessor’s, Obama and his administration reoriented U.S. foreign and security policies toward a new trajectory. While acknowledging that the U.S. was still at war with terrorist groups, the Obama administration relocated the war on terror from Iraq—the major foreign-policy focus of the Bush administration—to Afghanistan

* Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan, R.O.C.

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and Pakistan, claiming that these nations, not Iraq, were the “true epicenter of violent extremism” (Obama 2009b). The Obama administration also redeployed America’s combat forces and reduced America’s military involvement in the Middle East (McCrisken 2011). This foreign-policy shift from the critical region signaled a “pivot” in U.S. foreign policy. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011) noted in a Foreign Policy article, “As the war in Iraq winds down, and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the U.S. stands at a pivot point.” Clinton also argued that over the next decade, foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacifi c region would be the preoccupation of the U.S. administration (ibid.).

This strategic turn in U.S. foreign and security policies has become known as the American Pivot (or Rebalance) to Asia. Although Obama is not the fi rst “Pacifi c President” in U.S. history, he did demonstrate particular interest in the Asia-Pacifi c region during his administration (Green 2016, 519). In addition, it has been argued that Obama’s childhood in Indonesia and Hawaii helped shape his unique perspectives on the region (ibid.). In fact, in addition to the president, other key administration fi gures—namely, Jeffery Bader, Kurt Campbell, James Steinberg, Michael Green, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, among others—contributed to the Pivot to Asia policy (ibid., also see Slaughter et al. 2008).11 During Obama’s terms in offi ce, Asia became the highest priority for U.S. foreign and security policies. The Obama administration also translated the policy from rhetoric to real policy practices. For example, in November 2011, Obama participated vigorously in the East Asia Summit (EAS). Notably, he was the fi rst American president to attend the conference. Other initiatives and political achievements included the signing of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the dispatching of senior offi cials to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

To exert the Pivot policy and emphasize America’s indispensable role in the Asia-Pacific region, Obama said, “The U.S. is a Pacifi c power” and “there’s no region in the world that we consider more vital than the Asia-Pacifi c region” (Obama 2011b). Like Obama, Clinton said, “[T]he U.S. had to do more to help shape the future of Asia … The trajectory of the global economy and our own prosperity … all hinged to a large degree on what happened in the Asia-Pacific” (Clinton 2014, 41–2). Clinton also listed reasons and objectives for the U.S. Pivot to Asia, including strengthening bilateral security alliances, deepening America’s working relationships with emerging powers, engaging with regional multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-based military presence, and advancing democracy and human rights (Clinton 2011). The Obama administration’s foreign-policy initiatives illustrate that framing new trade, and commercial rules and norms for the Asia-Pacifi c countries, such as the establishment of the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP), and enhancing America’s foreign relations with countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region—both economically and militarily—were the major concerns of Obama and his political aides. The administration viewed issues associated with the economy and security as inter-connected and, thus, they should not be discussed separately. As Kurt Campbell (2016, 268)—one of the key architects of Obama’s Asia strategy—indicated, deeper economic ties will strengthen security ties. Moreover, a foundation of shared economic interests would contribute to wealth, prosperity, and stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region. In short, America’s Pivot to Asia policy aimed to preserve and extend U.S. power in this particular region. It sought to shape a pro-American international order in accordance with U.S. national interests as identifi ed by political elites.

1 Jeffery Bader served as a special assistant to the President of the United States for national security affairs at the National Security Council (NSC); Kurt Campbell served as the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacifi c Affairs of the Department of State; James Steinberg was appointed as Deputy Secretary of State; Michael Green served as a special assistant to the President and as Senior Director for Asia on the NSC staff; and Anne-Marie Slaughter served as Director of Policy Planning for the U.S. Department of State.

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Framing the American-led world order in the Asia-Pacific

Setting Roles and Norms: Promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

As mentioned previously, Obama’s Pivot policy made Asia the focal point of the U.S. administration. The policy per se also demonstrated America’s efforts to reshape Asia’s order in the context of China’s rise. Critics argue that Obama’s Pivot to Asia should not be understood as a particular policy aimed at containing China. However, it cannot be denied that China’s rise and its increasing leverage in the Asia-Pacifi c region indeed concerned U.S. policymaking elites, and ultimately affected the formulation of Obama’s Pivot policy—particularly the way that the U.S. engages with China and strategic concerns regarding China’s role in the Obama administration’s economic actions in the region.

While discussing Obama’s foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacifi c region, the promotion of the TPP—a region-wide economic agreement among 12 Asia-Pacific nations—was viewed as a high priority and a cornerstone of the Pivot to Asia (Campbell 2016, 268). Initially, the TPP was an expansion of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP), which was signed by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore in 2005. However, it expanded to 12 members by the end of 2013 with the addition of Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Mexico, Peru, and the U.S. Through the efforts of partner states, major negotiations on the TPP were completed in 2015 (ibid., 266). These 12 states would become members of the TPP, an open-platform agreement that allows any country to join—including China, America’s largest competitor in the Asia-Pacifi c region—if the state can meet the standards set by member countries.

In the official lexicon, the Asia-Pacific region is viewed as “an extraordinary engine for growth” (Obama 2011b). Offi cials (Campbell 2016; Green 2016) also emphasized that America’s future development is closely associated with the region’s growth. While commenting on the U.S. economy and global economic stabilization, Obama (2011b) argued that “APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) accounts for 55 percent of global GDP and is growing faster than the global average, signifi cantly faster. It represents 2.7 billion consumers and purchases 58 percent of U.S. exports.” Clinton (2011) also argued that America’s “economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American fi rms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia.” Thus, building closer ties with the Asia-Pacifi c states by promoting and institutionalizing the TPP agreement would contribute to global and U.S. trade, as well as economic growth. Importantly, the TPP could provide a platform for partner states to fully discuss signifi cant issues, such as conventional tariffs and quotas, cross-border Internet communications, customs cooperation, intellectual property, rules of origin, labor standards, sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT), and environmental standards, among others (Offi ce of the U.S. Trade Representative 2011). With the completion of negotiations between states, the values and norms shared by the TPP countries were expected to shape the rules of global trade and commerce. Furthermore, an agreement endorsed by most Asia-Pacifi c countries should attract, and eventually integrate, China into this new economic architecture. In fact, the Chinese government publicly declared its interest in the TPP (Campbell 2016, 268). In 2013, President Xi Jinping even prioritized the TPP issue when he met with Obama (ibid).

During Obama’s terms, the promotion of TPP was articulated in U.S. foreign-policy discourse, and the central theme of Obama’s TPP policy was to prevent a regional Asia-Pacifi c order dominated by China. Under the leadership of Xi, China has projected a Chinese foreign policy that emphasizes “assertiveness” (Friedberg 2014). With this increase in China’s power and influence, many correctly predicted that the

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Chinese government would use coercive measures—such as economic sanctions, financial leverage, and coercive diplomacy—to address disputes with its allies and counterparts (Mastro 2015; Chang Liao 2016). For example, while tackling territorial issues associated with the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes, China fl exed its muscles by declaring an air defense identifi cation zone (ADIZ) to reclaim land, and establish artifi cial islands in a critical area. In terms of the regional economic order, which concerns the U.S. elites, the Chinese government has constructed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It also strongly supports the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which might weaken the American-led TPP in the Asia-Pacifi c region (Wesley 2015; Chan 2017). In 2014, President Xi also declared his desire for an “Asia for Asians” at an international conference, while criticizing the U.S. security buildup in the Asia-Pacifi c region (Jakobson 2016). These serious foreign-policy measures conducted by the Chinese government have indeed raised concerns among U.S. political elites that in the long term, China may pursue a form of hegemony in Asia, thereby diminishing America’s regional role. Thus, to preserve and extend America’s power in the Asia-Pacifi c region, the U.S. had to act and shape a pro-American order in accordance with its interests. As Obama argued, “When more than 95 percent of America’s [our] potential customers live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global economy. We should write those rules, opening new markets to American products while setting high standards for protecting workers and preserving our environment” (quoted in Campbell 2016, 267). In his 2015 State of the Union address, Obama asserted the necessity of TPP and Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), arguing that without them China would write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region. As Obama is quoted as saying above, it should be the U.S., rather than China, who leads and drafts the rules for global trade and commerce.

America’s Strategic Shift: U.S. Hegemony and Balance of Power in Asia

In addition to creating an economic architecture, rebalancing the power relationships in the Asia-Pacific region is one of the focal points of Obama’s Pivot policy. During the Cold War era, America’s Asia policy mainly focused on slowing the expansion of communism and the severe threats from the Soviet Union and North Korea. However, in recent decades, the security context in Asia has shifted dramatically. Although the regime in North Korea remains a pressing threat to the U.S. and its Asian allies, China, rather than Russia, has been prioritized as the chief concern of Washington elites. Issues related to China’s rise—or the so-called “Thucydides trap,” usually understood in the context of a competition between a rising power, China, and an established power, the U.S.—have been widely discussed (Zoellick 2013; Brzeninski 2014). Furthermore, China’s rapid military development, marked by its capabilities of power projection and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), has been noted and fi ercely debated in both U.S. academic and political circles (Silove 2016). Critics argued that with the reduction of America’s military presence in the Middle East, a balance-of-power policy in the Asia-Pacific region aimed at dealing with the China threat was urgent and compulsory. For example, Campbell (2016, 151), the key fi gure in Obama’s Pivot policy, argued: “America’s strategy in Asia calls for a balance of power, but the region’s power distribution is moving in the direction of a dominant China that easily surpassed and outshines its neighbors economically and militarily.” Given that China’s military and economic capabilities have grown exponentially in the past few decades, the U.S. should prevent China from exerting regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacifi c. To achieve this goal, the Obama administration reformulated U.S. foreign and security policies, diversifying its focus and military posture in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean by enhancing security ties with U.S. allies and partners in this region.

The U.S. has strengthened and maintained its leading role in the Asia-Pacific region for several

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decades. By enhancing its security ties with regional allies, such as providing military assistance and conducting military diplomacy, the U.S. has preserved and extended its power and leverage in this region. However, in recent decades, America’s military superiority has been challenged by China’s growing military might, especially its A2/AD capability. China’s intention to boost its A2/AD capability had been clearly articulated in the 2008 Near Sea Doctrine, which asserts that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aims to deny any U.S. military infl uence in the East China and South China Seas (Green 2016, 529). China also sought to improve its ability to project power over Guam and the co-called “Second Island Chain” (ibid.). To rebalance and reshape the regional order, the Obama administration modifi ed U.S. military strategy in Asia, which traditionally concentrated on Northeast Asia, and stressed the geographical signifi cance of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Officials argued that to ensure America’s presence in these regions, the U.S. should maintain fi rm relationships with its key allies there. While speaking at an APEC summit in Honolulu, Obama (2011) said, “In Australia, we’re going to be focusing a lot on the security alliance between our two countries, but that obviously has broader implications for U.S. presence in the Pacific.” After Obama’s statement, Australia agreed to host 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, which is located in northern Australia. The Australian government also invited the U.S. to use Australia as the southern anchor of an American Indo-Pacifi c strategy (Campbell 2016, 217; Chan 2017, 3). In addition, with U.S. assistance, Australia-India relations have improved. Consequently, a “trilateral relation” between the U.S., Australia, and India was forged. Given that Australia and India are “two of the cornerstone countries of the Indo-Pacifi c” (quoted in Campbell 2016, 218), a stable and fi rm security alliance was indispensable.

In addition to Australia, other key allies contributed to the fulfi llment of America’s Pivot policy. In April 2014, the U.S. and the Philippines signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allowed the U.S. to rotate its stationed troops through eight different military bases and build necessary facilities for military purposes (Campbell 2016, 224). Both the U.S. and the Philippines have common interests on issues of international concern, such as counterterrorism and the South China Sea disputes. Owing to concerns about geopolitics and geo-economics, China and the Philippines both claimed their sovereignty rights in the South China Sea. Although the U.S. maintained its neutral status, offi cially it supported the Filipino government’s efforts to solve territorial disputes with China through the framework of international law (ibid., 225).

Also, it is worth noting that America’s security ties with Singapore and Thailand were articulated prominently in Obama’s Pivot policy. In 2015, a Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed by the U.S. and Singapore (Campbell 2016, 221). After the Philippines pushed U.S. naval and air forces out of its territory in 1991, Singapore gave the U.S. rotational access to facilities within its territory. In addition, because of its geographic location, Singapore is traditionally home to U.S. naval forces and is crucial to U.S.-led military operations in the region (ibid.). Regarding Thailand, America’s oldest treaty partner in Asia, the nation traditionally has played an infl uential role in regional affairs and has been active in ASEAN-led efforts (ibid., 230). Considering that Thailand’s junta government has built a closer relationship with China because of recent arms sales in 2015, the U.S.-Thailand relationship was highlighted in Obama’s Pivot policy (ibid., 228), notably its support for America’s presence in Southeast Asia and its claim of freedom of navigation, particularly in the South China Sea. Likewise, through the U.S. military’s Cobra Gold exercises—the region’s largest military drills, involving twenty-eight countries––the U.S. has further bolstered its military presence in Southeast Asia (ibid., 230).

The U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances were crucial elements of Obama’s Pivot policy as

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well. As the key contributors to a U.S. forward-deployed strategy, both Japan and South Korea have endured challenges from China and North Korea. Thus, the aims of America’s beefed-up security efforts in the region were to secure commitments from its traditional allies in Northeast Asia. America’s military presence in Japan and Korea dates back to the 1940s and 1950s. Recently, Japan modifi ed its constitution and signed defense guidelines with the U.S. to allow Japanese forces to participate in regional and international affairs, including collective defense and select foreign missions, as well as to provide necessary support to the U.S. in regional conflicts, including hostilities in the South and East China Seas. The U.S., in return, helped Japan modernize its Self-Defense Force (Campbell 2016, 207–12). As for Korea, America’s aim for the Korean peninsula has shifted from preventing the expansion of communism to preventing a nuclear-armed North Korea. To deter this threat, the U.S. maintains a deployment of 23,000 troops in South Korea. Recently, with assistance from the U.S., South Korea has been armed with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) to defend against North Korean ballistic missiles (ibid., 213–14). In addition, America’s most advanced strategic weapons were sold and deployed to the Korean peninsula, including F-35 aircraft and Aegis-equipped warships, as well as Patriot missile batteries (ibid.).

Overall, the security aspect of Obama’s Pivot policy acknowledges the changing nature of the international order. Although terrorism (or violent extremism) and the Middle East remain as security concerns among Washington’s political elites, China and the Asia-Pacific have taken center stage. The significance of this specific region has been explicitly articulated in U.S. foreign-policy discourse. In November 2011, while giving a speech to the Australian Parliament, Obama (2011c) said, “For the U.S., this refl ects a broader shift. After a decade in which we fought two wars … the U.S. is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacifi c region.” In January 2012, he also said, “Our nation is at a moment of transition … as we end today’s wars, we will focus on a broader range of challenges (and) opportunities, including the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacifi c” (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the

21st Century Defense 2012). In line with Obama’s statement, the U.S. Pentagon said the U.S. military would “of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacifi c region” (quoted in ibid., 2). In June 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta declared that the U.S. Navy would shift from a 55:45 Pacific/Atlantic division of ships to 60:40 in the future (Panetta 2012). The Defense Department subsequently announced that 60 percent of the U.S. Air Force would be repositioned to the Asia-Pacifi c region (Campbell 2016, 15). Clearly, for the Obama administration, the purpose of the Pivot policy is to respond to China’s rise and reshape the regional order in the Asia-Pacifi c—both militarily and economically. With the aid of its allies and partners, America’s military superiority provides robust support to protect and pursue these new national interests.

American exceptionalism and the construction of “Pivot to Asia” discourse

It can be argued that the foundations of the Pivot to Asia fi t the narrative of “American exceptionalism.” Although American exceptionalism is an old idea that can be traced to the 17th century, when the first Puritan immigrants from Europe established settlements in North America, it continues to be employed by elites to frame, rationalize, and justify proposed policies (Walt 2011, Noll 2012, McCoy 2012, Tomes 2014). American exceptionalism per se also illustrates how Americans view themselves and their country, and how the U.S. defi nes its role in international affairs. Campbell (2016, 135) indicated that the Pivot is a specifi c “policy formulated and implemented to preserve and extend American power” in an effort to strengthen Asia by tinkering with its complex arrangements of institutions, norms, and values that have facilitated

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cooperation and undergirded Asia’s peace and prosperity (ibid.). Tackling this fast-growing region of the world, with the prospect of declining U.S. global leadership, Obama said, “We’ve got to make sure we’re writing the trade rules” (quoted in Campbell 2016, 193). He also said,

American leadership is still welcome. It’s welcomed in this region … and the reason it’s welcomed, I think, is because we have shown that we are willing to not just look after our own interests, but try to set up a set of rules and norms in the international arena that everybody can follow and everybody can prosper from. And people appreciated that. (Obama 2011b)

In other words, the future of the Asia-Pacifi c region should be shaped and regulated toward a trajectory that the U.S. can accept, with no hegemony dominating the order in this region.

The justification for America’s global leadership, and its perceived international obligation to transform the world toward an American model, can be traced to Puritan John Winthrop’s famous 1630 address, “A Model of Christian Charity,” in which the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony proclaimed, “For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us” (quoted in Vlahos 2012, 67). Along those lines, Thomas Paine, an English-American political activist, declared in Common Sense, a pamphlet he wrote in 1776, that “we have it in our power to begin the world over again” and that the “birthday of a new world is at hand” (ibid.). Paine’s words, in fact, illustrate a specifi c social and political context, i.e., the American Revolution period, differentiating America from the Old World.

However, in addition to Winthrop and Paine, Alexis de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat, contributed to the discursive construction of an “exceptional nation” and “a land of wonders” (quoted in McCrisken 2003, 89). In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville observes: “The position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one” (quoted in ibid., 1). He continues: “Not until I went into the churches of America … did I understand the greatness and the genius of America. … America is good. And if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great” (quoted in de Nobrega 2014, 177). Indeed, Tocqueville’s endorsement of the uniqueness of America’s liberal democracy and political culture helped mold the idea of American exceptionalism, and Tocqueville’s work is still perceived as the most important source text for studies on American exceptionalism (Tomes 2014, 36).

The formation of American exceptionalism not only tells us who Americans are, but also illustrates where Americans came from. Importantly, it shows that the God-blessed nation should and would eventually transform the world. Since the exceptional country was established in 1776, its unique worldview has been articulated and deeply embedded in U.S. foreign and security policy discourse. Notably, although the idea of U.S. exceptionalism has different meanings during different periods of U.S. history, the essence of American exceptionalism is fi xed and remains the same—that the U.S. is a unique and great country in human history, guided and protected by the Almighty. This philosophy is embodied on the Great Seal of the U.S.: “Annuit

coeptis,” or “He (God) has favoured our undertakings,” and “Novus ordo seclorum,” or “A new order of the ages.” For over two centuries, Americans fi rmly believed that their country was not an ordinary nation. Instead, it is a nation with a unique obligation, an “undertaking” that will bless all the nations of the world (Hughes 2003, 100–1).

In American history, the narrative of American exceptionalism was employed by many U.S. administrations to frame and structure their foreign and security policies. By referring to the U.S. as a

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“shining city upon the hill,” President Reagan eloquently justifi ed the U.S.-led global campaigns against the so-called “evil empire”: the Soviet Union. Like Reagan, Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush adopted the same theme to construct their political discourses. In presidential rhetoric, the U.S. is defi ned and depicted as an “indispensable nation,” “a great country,” “a great land,” and the “leader of the free world” (Tsui 2016). Like Obama’s predecessors, the idea of American exceptionalism is rooted in his Pivot policy—the most signifi cant and infl uential political achievement of Obama’s administration. As the key fi gures of the U.S. administration asserted, the U.S.-built economic architecture, noted by the promotion of the TPP, not only would benefi t America itself, but also other Asia-Pacifi c countries. Undoubtedly, as an “indispensable nation” and a “Pacifi c power,” the U.S. must lead and transform the region to a model that the U.S. wants. American leadership, as Obama (2011b) and Clinton (2011) asserted, is welcome in the region.

Related to the idea of American exceptionalism, America’s intention to reshape regional order and spread its values in the Asia-Pacifi c region is closely associated with a set of national myths, namely the myth of the “western frontier,” and the myth of Manifest Destiny. Both the frontier and Manifest Destiny myths can be traced to the period of westward expansion. In his 1893 address, titled “The Signifi cance of the Frontier in American History,” Frederick Jackson Turner argued that the idea of the American frontier and the pioneer spirit had shaped Americans and their character (Slotkin 1998, 3). He said the closing of the old frontier by the end of the 19th century and the lack of a new one had precipitated the contemporary crisis in American development (ibid.; also see Tomes 2014). Like the frontier ideal, the concept of Manifest Destiny is closely associated with America’s 19th century westward expansion, particularly the annexation of Texas and acquisition of the Oregon territory. In the July-August 1845 issue of the Democratic Review, edited by John L. O’Sullivan, an anonymous author asserts, “Our manifest destiny [is] to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions” (quoted in Hughes 2004, 106; also see Pratt 1927). Later, O’Sullivan asserts in another article published by the New York Morning News in December 1845 that “to state the truth at once in its naked simplicity … our claim to Oregon … is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federative self-government entrusted to us” (quoted in Hughes 2004, 106). Embracing the ideas of Manifest Destiny and the western frontier, the U.S. in the 19th century expanded its territory through a series of military conquests, including the Mexican War (1845–48) and the Spanish-American War (1898). Tomes (2014, 35) argued that the frontier experience is widely utilized by U.S. elites to understand the tendency toward outward expansion that U.S. presidential administrations have placed at the center of national security interests, often to justify their foreign policy.

The national ideals of frontier and Manifest Destiny can be utilized to further illuminate U.S. engagement with China, and, more broadly, U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. America’s engagement with the Asia-Pacifi c, particularly China, dates back to the 18th century. In 1784, the Empress of China ship left New York bound for the lands of the Far East on a mission to commence trade with China (Campbell 2016, 95). After a 15-month voyage, the ship eventually returned with various commercial goods, and the success of the business trip, subsequently, encouraged other American merchants to trade with China. Thereafter, the so-called “Old China Trade” route was initiated (ibid., 95). However, in the mid-19th century, with the development of sea power and its increasing role in international affairs, the U.S. tended to extend its political leverage in the Asia-Pacifi c region. It also sought to build closer commercial ties with China (ibid., 98). Nevertheless, in contrast with other European nations’ colonial activity, such as British colonialism in Asia, America’s 19th century policy toward Asia asserted the importance of trade and commerce, without

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any imperial ambitions in the region (ibid., 105–7). In 1844, the U.S. signed the Treaty of Wanghua, which cemented America’s trade interests in China and recognized China’s sovereignty (ibid., 97). In 1899, through the efforts of Secretary of State John Hay, the U.S. successfully convinced other powers to accept the so-called “Open Door Notes,” in which America’s global interests in free trade and equal access are stressed. Presently, the Open Door Notes, which articulated many trade and commercial rules, are still perceived by many as a rudimentary precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (ibid., 99). In short, these policy practices conducted by U.S. administrations in the 19th century aimed at promoting specific rules and values, and extending America’s power to the continents beyond North America. They illustrate a specifi c world view of the U.S., one that was shaped and formulated by the common history and experiences shared by the American public, i.e., the concept of American exceptionalism, and the ideals of the frontier and Manifest Destiny.

In the 20th century, the U.S. ambitiously acted to shape and dominate the Asia-Pacific region, partly due to America’s incomparable sea power and partly because of its growing commercial interests in the region. To protect America’s trade and commercial interests, and to ensure the principle of freedom of navigation, various security operations were initiated and executed during this period. With America’s increasing role in the Asia-Pacifi c, President Theodore Roosevelt said in 1900, “I wish to see the U.S. the dominant power on the shores of the Pacifi c Ocean” (quoted in Campbell 2016, 107). In contrast with the 19th century, when the U.S. had no forward-deployed presence in Asia, in the 20th century, U.S. naval establishments in Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines—most of them built after the 1898 Spanish-American War—provided the Roosevelt administration with robust support to shape the regional order toward an America-friendly trajectory. Other political achievements include the completion of the “Washington Treaty System” in the 1920s, which aimed to slow down the budding naval arms race in the Pacifi c, and to ensure America’s military superiority over its competitor there––the Imperial Japanese Navy. Other achievements include various security alliances led by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacifi c, particularly those with allies Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Additionally, since the 1950s, the U.S. has maintained and enhanced a closer relationship with Taiwan. Although the U.S. broke off offi cial relations with Taiwan in 1979, Congress alternatively passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to demonstrate U.S. support of Taiwan’s democracy (ibid., 255). In the past few decades, the U.S. also played an influential role in Taiwan-China relations, helping Taiwan defend against China’s military threats.

Essentially, bolstering U.S. security ties with regional allies and partners, such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma, and New Zealand, is crucial to America’s Asia policy. It has been followed by each U.S. administration in the past few decades and clearly was articulated in Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy. U.S. policymaking elites fi rmly believe that a stable regional order directed by the U.S. is good for the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies. Thus, as a powerful “Pacific country” with a unique role provided by Providence, transforming and leading the world to an American model is America’s inevitable obligation.

American exceptionalism and Obama’s decline-management strategy

During the Obama presidencies, the U.S. administration faced a severe political situation, both internally and externally. The Obama administration had to wrestle with the worst financial crisis since the 1930s and its side effects due to America’s economic recession—that is, the erosion of America’s power and global infl uence. It also continued to fi ght a war against violent extremism in the Greater Middle East. Although

9

the U.S. joint counterterrorism missions truly concerned Washington’s decision-makers, terrorism was not perceived as the preoccupation of the Obama administration. In a recent interview conducted by The Atlantic, Obama pointed out that the “Pivot to Asia” has always been a paramount priority of his national security team (Goldberg 2016, 82); he also firmly expressed his belief that America’s economic future must lie in Asia (ibid.). However, in addition to the specifi c concern about China’s rise, the Pivot to Asia could be better comprehended as a bold agenda aimed at remaking the world and reshaping America’s role both at home and abroad (Chollet 2016, 52).

After the 2008 fi nancial crisis and subsequent Great Recession, issues related to America’s global leadership and status were constantly discussed by U.S. policymaking elites and academic pundits. Critics (Ikenberry 2008; Mearsheimer 2010; Walt 2011; Layne 2012; Kupchan 2012; Brands and Feaver, 2016) argued that American power is waning, and stressed that the U.S. global leadership is challenged by several rising countries, such as, Brazil, Russia, India, and China. These specific countries, according to the key fi gures of the Obama administration, had already ascended and were established powers; they also demonstrated their political leverage in the international arena in terms of the capability of their agenda setting (Mann 2012, 72). To engage with these countries and preserve America’s global leadership, in the fi rst term of his presidency, Obama and his political aides, the so-called “Obamians” (Mann 2012), drafted, implemented, and practiced a series of policies, including the Af-Pak Strategy and the Pivot to Asia. In contrast to former presidents—namely, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush—who fi rmly believed that the U.S. was and would remain an “indispensable nation” or the world’s dominant power, Obama held a “distinctly more modest and downbeat outlook on America’s role in the world” (quoted in ibid., 71); he also thought that in the post-fi nancial crisis world, the U.S. was struggling to maintain its supervisory role over various competitors. As Ben Rhodes, Obama’s political advisor, claimed, “What we’re trying to do, frankly, is to preserve our leadership” and “We’re not trying to preside over America’s decline. What we’re trying to do is to get America another fi fty years as leader” (quoted in ibid., 72).

The “decline-management” strategy, according to Michael Clarke and Anthony Ricketts (2017, 491), was developed and formed by the Obama administration in three signifi cant events—i.e., the Libyan intervention, the humanitarian crisis in Syria, and the rise of China. Moreover, the principles adopted by the U.S. administration were later understood as the so-called “Obama Doctrine” characterized by the concepts of “leading from behind” and “burden sharing” (Indyk, Lieberthal, and O’Hanlon 2013; Dueck 2015; Goldberg 2016). Specifi cally, while managing the crisis caused by Qaddafi ’s regime in Libya, Obama emphasized the necessity of “collective actions” and asserted America’s “supporting role” (rather than the “leading role”) in the missions authorized by the NATO. Obama (2011a) argued that “Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for others to set up as well; to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs.” With regard to the humanitarian crisis in Syria and campaigns against the Islamic State (IS), the concepts of “leading from behind” and “burden sharing” were furthered and adopted by U.S. policy practitioners. Consequently, the Syrian opposition groups were trained and armed by the U.S. and fought side by side with their regional allies. The U.S. responses to crises in Libya and Syria illustrate that the notion of “nation-building at home” had been translated from rhetoric to real-world policy practices. With that specifi c idea, Obama (2009b) had previously claimed in a speech given at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point that “the Country I am most interested in nation-building is my own.”

In terms of issues associated with China’s rise, the principle of “multilateralism” was embedded in

10

the U.S. Pivot to Asia. As the present research (Campbell 2016; Green 2016) has illustrated, the U.S. not only enhanced its security ties with traditional allies and partners in the Asia-Pacifi c but also increased its engagement with many signifi cant institutions, such as the ASEAN and the EAS. Offi cials believed that the U.S. presence in such a critical region would ultimately contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacifi c region. Importantly, the future development of Asia, as Obama and his political advisors frequently mentioned in their speeches, was directly tied to the health of the U.S. economy, which was argued and perceived to be the foundation of American power.

Nevertheless, Obama’s “decline-management” strategy (or the Obama Doctrine) provoked a lot of criticism in both academia and the U.S. political arena (Dueck 2015; Kaufman 2016). Many argued that the essentials of the Obama Doctrine, which call for America’s self-restraint—that is, the acknowledgment of America’s limited power and role in world affairs—actually contradict the notion of American exceptionalism that the U.S. is an “indispensable nation,” which has a special, God-given mission to lead and transform the world according to an American model. Obama’s political dissidents, such as Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich, also fiercely criticized the U.S. president’s views on American exceptionalism because Obama (2009a) once claimed in France: “I believe American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism, and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” The doubts about America’s superiority, in fact, reveal a broader consensus widely shared by many American elites that “to deny American exceptionalism is in essence to deny the heart and soul of this nation” (quoted in Neumann and Coe 2011, 37). However, as this research has argued and demonstrated, the Pivot to Asia—the preoccupation and most significant political achievement of Obama’s administration—was indeed established on the fi rm belief of American exceptionalism. Obama and his political aides still sought to pursue a world order dominated by the U.S.; the Obamians just framed and led the world in different ways (Chollet 2016).

Conclusion

An examination of America’s Pivot to Asia illustrates that Obama’s Asia-Pacific policy is actually established on the idea of American exceptionalism. Given that the U.S. is a “unique” and “exceptional” nation blessed by the Almighty, it has the responsibility to transform the world with values that Americans fi rmly believe in, such as truth, justice, goodness, and democratic self-government (Hughes 2004). America’s leadership and obligation to frame and direct the order in the Asia-Pacifi c is indeed explicitly articulated in the Pivot policy. While insisting on the importance of the TPP and the necessity of rebalancing Asia’s power structure, U.S. policymaking elites actually represented and enhanced the idea of American exceptionalism. The Pivot also demonstrates how U.S. elites translated the “exceptional” idea into real practice through U.S. foreign policy in accordance with America’s material interests. The Pivot per se, on the other hand, illustrates a deep anxiety shared by many U.S. decision-makers that America’s global leadership and its international image were declining due to the 2008 fi nancial crisis and the costly “war on terror” in the Greater Middle East, while China plots to disrupt the Asia-Pacifi c order. Accordingly, an economic architecture prompted by the U.S., rather than China, is urgent and indispensable. Regarding the security dimensions of the Pivot, China’s rapid military development, noted for its A2/AD capability, undoubtedly has become an “existing threat” that severely challenges America’s dominant role in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, to control and contain China’s increasing sea power by relocating U.S. naval and air forces to the Asia-Pacifi c region, and to bolster security ties with America’s traditional allies there were priorities for the Obama administration.

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Despite the great concerns of the Chinese government and the abundant criticism of the “exceptional” and “hegemonic” thinking of the U.S., many U.S. political elites view a pro-American world dominated by this so-called “benevolent hegemon” (Kristol and Kagan 1996; Kagan 1998) as good for the U.S. and the rest of the world. As Secretary of State Clinton (2011) asserted, the Asia-Pacifi c region is eager for American leadership, and the U.S. is the only power with a long record of providing for the common good.

Acknowledgments

I acknowledge the support of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Republic of China, Taiwan, and the Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan, in the preparation of this article. The research was conducted under the project funded by MOST, 104-2410-H-005-062-MY3, “President Obama’s Counterterrorism Approach: War on Extremism Discourse and Policy Practices.” I am grateful to Professor Kosuke Shimizu, Dr Ching-Chang Chen, and Dr Nien-Chung Chang Liao for their support and constructive comments on earlier versions of this article. All remaining errors belong solely to the author.

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No.34　(2017) William S. Bradley, Empire Melancholia

No.35　(2018) Chin-Kuei Tsui, Framing the American-led World Order: President Obama’s Pivot to Asia Policy and the Belief of American Exceptionalism

Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku UniversityAfrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University 67 Tsukamoto-cho, Fukakusa, Fushimi-ku, Kyoto, Japan ISBN 978-4-904945-67-4