fred moseley and tony smith - marx's capital

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VOLUME 64

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Marx’s Cap tal and egel’sLog c

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Ed ted by

Fred Moseley and TonySm th

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L braryof Congress Catalog ng- n-Publ cat on Data

Manr’sCap tal and egel’sLog c :a reexam nat on / ed ted byFred Moseley and TonySm th.

pages cm. — ( stor cal mater al sm book ser es, ISSN1570-1522volurne 64)

Includes b bl ograph cal references and ndex.

ISBN978-90-04-20952-7(hardback: alk. paper) — ISBN978-90-04-27002-2(e-book) 1. Marx, Karl,

1818-1883.Kap tal. 2. egel,GeorgW lhelm Fr edr ch, 1770—1831. ssenschaft der 3. Marx an

econom cs. 4. D alect c. I.Moseley, Fred, 1946- 11.Sm th, Tony, 1951

B501.M37M392 2014

335.4’12—dc23

2014003298

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ISSN1570-1522

ISBN978 90 04 20952 7 (hardback)

ISBN978 90 04 27002 2 (e-book)

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Contents

Acknowledgements v

Introduct on 1

Fred Moseley and TorrySm th

PART 1

Ideal sm and Mater al sm 15

1 egel,Marx and the Comprehens on of Cap tal sm 17

TonySm th

2 Cap tal Breeds: Interest-Bear ng Cap tal as PurelyAbstract Form 41

MarkMeaney

3 D alect cs on Its Feet, or the Form of the Consc ousnessof the Work ng

Classas stor cal Subject 64

juan If goCarrera

4 Wh ch ‘Rat onal Kernel"?Wh ch ‘Myst calShell"?AContr but on to the

Debate on the Connect on between egel’sLog candMarx's

Cap tal 89

Gaston Cal gar s and Gu doStarosta

PART 2

egel’s Concept and Marx’s Cap tal 113

5 The Un versal and the Part culars n egel’sLog cand Marx’s

Cap tal 115

Fred Moseley

6 On egel’sMethodolog cal Legacy n Marx 140

Roberto F nesch

7 Lost n Translat on: Once Aga n on the Marx— egelConnect on 164

R ccardo Belle/fore

8 The Secret of Cap tal's Self-Valor sat on ‘La dBare’:

ow egel elped Marx to Overturn R cardo’sTheory of ProI t 189

Patr ckMurray

9 ‘TheC rcular Course of Our Representat on’: ‘Sche n’,‘Grund’and

‘Ersche nung’ n Marx's Econom c Works 214

Igor anzel



v1 CONTENTS

PART 3

D fferent V ews of the D alect c 241

10AnOutl ne of the Systemat c-D alect cal Method:

Sc ent f c and Pol t cal S gn f cance 243

GeertReuten

11Marx, egel and the Value-Form 269

Chr stopher1.Arthur

12D alect cs of Labour and Value-Form n Marx's Cap tal:

AReconstruct on 292

Mar a L.Robles-Bdez

References 318

Name Index 329

Subject Index 330



Acknowledgements

I would l ke to express spec al apprec at on to Mount olyoke College for ts

generous f nanc al support for the conference atwh ch these papers were pre

sented, and for ts support for the many Internat onal Sympos umonMarx an

Theory (ISMT)conferences over the years (seven n all). The ISMTwould not

ex stw thout the generous support ofMount olyokeCollege.Mount olyoke

College’ssupport for th s ‘pol t cally ncorrect’ research s a sh n ng example of

the h ghest deals of l beral arts educat on —cr t cal th nk ng and the d vers ty

of deas.

I also espec ally thank Dawn Larder for her extremely capable adm n stra

t ve ass stance for th s conference and for past conferences. The ISMTconfer

ences at Mount olyoke Collegewould not run nearly so smoothly w thout

Dawn.

FredMoseley



Introduct on

FredMoseley and TonySm th

The relat on between egel'sph losophy and Marx’stheory has long been an

portant quest on n Marx an scholarsh p, and a controvers al one, because

both authors are so w de-rang ng and controvers al n themselves, wh ch

makes the relat on between them evenmore compl cated.The un que feature

of th s book s that t has a spec f c focus —on the nfluence of egel’slog c on

Marx’seconom c theory n Cap tal. It w ll not be d rectly concerned w th the

nfluence of egel’sph losophy onMarx's earlywr t ngs,or on Marx’stheory of

h story, or h s theory of the state, and so on. Rather, the ma n focus w ll be on

Marx’stheory n Cap tal.

In recent decades, there has been some new th nk ng about the relat on

between egel’slog c and Marx’sCap tal wh ch goes loosely by the name ‘New

D alect cs’,exempl f ed by the work of Chr s Arthur, TonySm th, Geert Reuten

and Roberto F nesch (all are authors n th s volume; see the Introduct on to

Arthur 2002 for a good ntroduct on to th s new l ne of research). The New

D alect cs s d fferent from the old Marx an d alect cs (or D amat), wh ch was

concerned pr mar ly w th the nfluence of egel on Marx’stheory of h story,

and the eventual tr umph of soc al sm. The NewD alect cs, by contrast, s con—

cerned ma nly w th the nfluence of egel’slog con Marx’stheory n Cap tal of

cap tal sm, as a g ven h stor cally spec f c soc ety; hence t s also called ‘sys

temat c d alect cs’ (as opposed to ‘h stor cal d alect cs’).D fferent authors have

d fferent nterpretat ons of egel’slog cand systemat c d alect cs, but they all

agree that egel’slog c s mportant forunderstand ng Marx’stheory n Cap tal.

The a m of th s book s to contr bute to th s new l ne of research.

The papers n th s volume were or g nally presented at the 22nd annual

meet ng of the Internat onal Sympos umonMarx anTheory (ISMT)at Mount

olyoke College (where Fred Moseley s Professor of Econom cs) n August

2011,and the papers have been rev sed for th s volume. The twelve authors are

d v ded between seven econom sts and f veph losophers, as s f tt ng g ven the

nterd sc pl nary nature of the subject of the relat on between egel’slog c

and Marx’seconom c theory.Seven of the authors are regular members of the

ISMTand f vewere spec ally nv ted part c pants because of the r expert se on

th s top c (Cal gar s, anzel, I go Carrera, Meaney and Robles). Th s s the

E ghthconference-volume of the ISMT(please see the l stof t tles at the end of

th s Introduct on).

© KONINKLIJKEBRILL NV,LBIDBN, 2014 DOI I0.]163/9789004270022_002



2 MOSELEY AND SMIT

In January 1858,wh le work ng on the Grundr sse, the f rst draft of Cap tal,

Marxwrote a well-known letter to Engels n wh ch he stated that a recent for

tu tous rev ew of egel’sLog c had been ‘ofgreat serv ce’ n h s own theory,

espec ally w th respect to the method employed n h s theory of proj t. e com—

mented that he had ‘overthrown’all prev ous theor es of prof t:

By the way, I am d scover ng some n ce arguments. For nstance, I have

overthrown the whole doctr ne of prof t as t ex sted up to now.The fact

that by mere acc dent I aga n glanced through egel’sLog k. . . has been

of great serv ce to me as regards the method of deal ng w th the

mater al.l

What exactly d d Marx mean by th s obv ously mportant but too-crypt c

remark? What d scover es had Marx made? Wh ch spec f c aspects of egel’s

Log cwas Marx referr ng to? And what was the relat on between these aspects

of egel’s log c and Marx’s theory of prof t spec f cally? Countless scholars

have called attent on to th s letter as ev dence of the nfluence of egel on

Marx,but no one has sat sfactor lyanswered these mportant quest ons about

the relat on between egel’slog c and Marx’stheory of prof t. These are the

k nds of quest on that Moseleyposed n organ s ngthe conference.

Part 1of th s Introduct on w lld scuss the ma n themes and controvers es of

th s volume, and Part 2 w ll prov de br ef summar es of the nd v dual

chapters.

1 Ma nThemes and Controvers es

1.1 Marx’s ‘Invers on’of egel ’sLog c

It s well known that Marx nterpreted egel’slog c as deal st (follow ng the

general nterpretat on of egel’slog c at the t me, espec ally Feuerbach), and

he cla med that he ‘ nverted’ egel’slog c n h s own theory ( n the Postface to

the second German ed t on of Cap tal):

My d alect cal log c s, n ts foundat on, not only d fferent from the

egel an, but exactly oppos te to t. For egel, the process of th nk ng,

wh ch he even transforms nto an ndependent subject, under the name

of ‘the Idea’, s the creator of the real world, and the real world s only the

external appearance of the dea.W th me the reverse s true: the deal s

1 Marx and Engels 1975a,p. 93 (bold emphas s added).



INTRODUCTION 3

noth ng but the mater al world reflected n the m nd of man, and trans

lated nto forms of thought. . .

The myst f cat on wh ch the d alect c suffers n egel’shands by no

means prevents h m from be ng the f rst to present ts general forms of

mot on n a comprehens ve and consc ous manner.W th h m t s stand

gon ts head. It must be nverted, n order to d scoverthe rat onal kernel

w th n the myst cal shell.2

TonySm th has argued n prev ouswork, and n h s chapter n th s volume, that

egel’slog c can be nterpreted as mater al st rather than deal st, follow ng

contemporary egel scholars such asTerryP nkard and Robert P ppen. Sm th’s

terpretat on can be br efly summar sed as follows: egelassumes that there

a set of fundamental object ve determ nat ons n the world.These object ve

determ nat ons of the world can be comprehended by the determ nat ons of

our thought (our thought s ‘athome n the world’).Furthermore, we can th nk

about our th nk ng and we can construct an order ngof the essent al determ

nat ons of thought. S ncewe can comprehend the world, the order ng of the

essent al determ nat ons of our thought w ll alsobe the order ng of the essen

t al determ nat ons of the world. egel’slog cappears to be deal st c, because

s about the determ nat ons of thought. But t snot really deal st c,because

sbased on the mater al st prem se that thesedeterm nat ons ofthought cor

respond to determ nat ons of real ty.

Roberto F nesch ’schapter nterprets egelas a k nd of real st. Accord ngto

F nesch , egel’s d alect c s not an external appl cat on of log cal rules to

object ve real ty,but s nstead based on the ‘self-development’ofa determ ned

content, or ‘the pecul ar log c of a pecul ar object’.Mark Meaney’s chapter

presents a s m lar mater al st nterpretat on of egel’slog c and argues that

egel’sAbsolute Sp r t s not an external force, but s nstead (us ng strange

language) the nternal un fy ngpr nc ple of an ndependently g ven object ve

real ty, wh ch s an organ c whole.And because object ve real ty s an nterre

lated organ c whole, certa n mater al st log cal rules apply to the theory of an

organ c whole (the log cal development s from the abstract to the concrete,

and from the un versal to the part culars). e argues that Marxfollowedthese

log cal rules closely because he regarded cap tal sm an organ c whole. It looks

as f these log cal rules are an external appl cat on, but the log cal rules of the

theory m rror the relat ons of determ nat on of object vereal ty tself.

So the surpr s ng conclus on of th s l ne of nterpretat on s that, although

Marx thought that he was ‘ nvert ng’ egel, he was n fact follow ng egel's

2 Marx 1976c [1867], pp. 102—3emphas s added).



4 MOSELEY AND SMIT

ownmater al st log c, n analys ng cap tal sm as an ndependently g ven objec—

t ve real ty,wh ch s an organ c whole.

owever, two chapters n th s volume, one by Juan lr‘ goCarrera and the

other by Gaston Cal gar sand Gu do Starosta, argue the contrary v ew that

egel’slog c s def n tely deal st, because the start ng po nt of h s log c s a

pure thought-form —pure Be ng.As a result of th s deal st start ng po nt, the

whole of egel’slog c s necessar ly deal st. Therefore, Marx’s nvers on s nec

essary; pure thought-forms must be replaced by real mater al forms. Marx’s

own start ng po nt s the commod ty,wh ch s a real mater al form, not a pure

thought-form, and Marx’s theory expla ns the self-development of the real

forms of cap tal sm (commod ty —money —cap tal, and so on). Cal gar s and

Starosta cr t c se Sm th’smater al st nterpretat on of egel and argue that,

even f egel’spure thought-forms are an attempt to reflect real mater al forms,

st ll has to be demonstrated that th s attempt was successful, that s, that

egel’spure thought-forms are an accurate reflect on of real mater al forms.

Much better to theor se the self-development of the real forms themselves

d rectly,rather than nd rectly through pure thought-forms.

1.2 egel’sLog cof the Concept and Marx’s Theoryof Cap tal

An mportant development n recent decades nMarx anscholarsh p has been

the explorat on of the nfluence of egel’sLog cof the Concept on Marx’sthe

ory of cap tal.3Th s connect on was f rst d scussed byph losophers n Germany

the 19608and 708.Spec f cally, t was argued that the ma n levels of abstrac

t on n Marx’stheory - cap tal n general and compet t on - were an adapta

t on of egel’s moments of the Concept —un versal ty, part cular ty and

s ngular ty (see F nesch 2009a for a rev ew of th s l terature). owever, the

ma n quest on n th s l terature (follow ngRosdolsky)waswhether or not Marx

abandoned the log cal structure of cap tal n general and compet t on n h s

later work, not the relat on between th s structure and egel's Log c of the

Concept, wh ch was presumed.

S nce the 19803,there have been several mportant works n Engl sh that

have emphas sed the relat on between Marx’stheory of cap tal and egel’s

Concept-Log c: Felton Shortall (1994), Chr s Arthur (2001a), Mark Meaney

(2002) and Roberto F nesch (2005).All these authors emphas se that Marx’s

exploratory outl nes early n the Grundr sse (pp. 266 and 275) are clearly n

terms of the moments of egel’sConcept (un versal ty, part cular ty and s n

gular ty), and that these outl nes are strong ev dence that Marxwas follow ng

egel’sConcept-Log c n some way,at least n the Grundr sse.The prox m ty n

3 The s ngular noun ‘Concept’ sm slead ng, because t means a (plural) set of categor es that

conta n an accurate account of the un versal and necessary features of real ty.



INTRODUCTION 5

t me (a few weeks) of these outl nes and Marx’sletter about egel’s‘greatser

v ce’strongly suggests that egel’sLog c of the Concept was at least part of

whatMarxhad n m nd n th s letter.These authors argue further that Marxd d

not abandon th s egel an log cal framework n later years, but ma nta ned

th s framework n all the later drafts of Cap tal.

Severalchapters n th s volume have to do w th th s mportant quest on of

the relat on between Marx’stheory of cap tal and egel’sLog cof the Concept.

Moseley’schapter argues that Marx ut l sed egel’smoments of the Concept

of un versal ty and part cular ty as the bas c log calstructure for h s theory of

cap tal and surplus-value: egel’s moment of un versal ty corresponds to

Marx’slevel of abstract on of cap tal n general (theory of the product on of

surplus-value), and egel’s moment of part cular ty corresponds to Marx's

level of abstract on of compet t on (theory of the d str but on of surplus

value). Moseley argues that Marx f rst developed th s egel an log cal frame

work n the Grundr sse and ma nta ned th s bas c framework n all the later

draftsofCap tal. F nesch ’schapter argues that Marxut l sed all three moments

of egel'sConcept-Log c, nclud ng s ngular ty,and that Marxma nta ned th s

framework unt l the end, although he changed the locat on of several key

aspects:accumulat on was moved from part cular ty to un versal ty,and nter

est-bear ng cap tal was moved from general ty to s ngular ty. In the f nal ver

s ons of Cap tal, Concept-Log c became less mportant and was replaced by

egel’sLog c of the Essence (that s to say,man festat on) as the pr mary log

calframework ofMarx’stheory.Meaney's chapter arguesthat, n the Grundr sse,

Marx ut l sed all three parts of egel’sSc enceofLog c—Be ng (s mple c rcula

t on), Essence (cap tal st product on) and Concept (cap tal as organ c un ty).

(Meaney does not d scuss the later drafts of Cap tal.)W th respect to egel’s

Concept-Log c,Meaney argues that Marx’stheory followedthe log cal rules of

the Concept, from the abstract to the concrete and from the un versal to the

part culars. e also argues that nterest-bear ng cap tal corresponds to egel’s

Idea at the end of the Log cof the Concept.

Sm th argues that the ma n part of egel’slog cthat Marxappropr ated was

not the Concept-Log c but was nstead h s Essence-Log c.Murray also argues

that Marx ut l sed both egel’s Concept-Log c and (more mportantly} h s

Essence-Log c, as compet ng po nts of v ew, or ‘d scordant d scourses' (see

next sect on).

1-3 Marx’s Cap tal as egel an Subject

Arelated ssue d scussed n several chapters has to do w th the egel an con

cept of Subject. The quest on s: does Marx’sut l sat on of aspects of egel’s

Concept-Log c mply that Marx regarded cap tal as a Subject n the egel an

sense of the term? Mo she Postone (1993)was the f rst to argue that Marx’s



6 MOSELEY AND SMIT

concept of cap tal s s m lar to a egel an Subject, n the sense that cap tal

acqu res an ndependent ex stence and dom nates the cap tal st mode of pro

duct on, s m lar to the dom nat on of object ve real ty by egel’s Subject.

Arthur (2001a)has made a s m lar argument n terms of the Absolute Sp r t —

cap tal s a un versal power wh ch dom nates over human be ngs, s m lar to

egel’sAbsolute Sp r t.

R ccardo Bello ore’schapter n th s volume presents a s m lar nterpreta

t on and adds a quant tat ve d mens on —Marx’sconcept of cap tal s s m lar to

a egel an Subject, n the sense that ‘cap tal produces surplus-value’ and s

‘self-valor s ng’.Bellof ore emphas ses that cap tal can produce surplus-value

only f t succeeds n dom nat ng labour n product on; but f cap tal does suc

ceed, then ‘cap tal produces prof t’ s a true statement of cap tal st real ty.

Bellohorepresents severalpassages fromCap tal to support h s nterpretat on,

and he argues that the German verb ersche nen(to appear or be man fested) n

these passages connotes that, although the appearances under d scuss on (for

example, cap tal appears to be self-valor s ng)are b zarre, these b zarre appear

ances are nonetheless real,that s,are truthful and accurate representat ons of

cap tal st real ty.

Igor anzel's chapter argues, to the contrary, that the verb ersche nen n

these passages (and elsewhere) does not connote that these b zarre appear

ances are true, but rather that these b zarre appearances are not only false,but

they are also necessar lyfalse. That s, these false appearances are the nev ta

ble products of cap tal sm tself;cap tal sm creates ts own smoke-screens that

h de ts true real ty. anzel d scusses n part cular a well-known passage from

the end of Chapter IVofVolume I, n wh ch Marx states that ‘value s the sub

ject’ of the valor sat on-process (and mpl c tly that cap tal s the subject).

owever, anzel argues,Marx'stheory n Chapter IV s st ll concerned w th the

sphere of c rculat on only, pr or to the product on-process. In the sphere of

c rculat on, cap tal does ndeed appear to be a self-valor s ngsubject, but th s

afalse appearance, an llus on. Marx’s theory of surplus-value proceeds to

demonstrate that cap tal doesnot tself produce surplus-value,and thus s not

a ‘self-valor s ngsubject’.Cap tal can be valor sed only by ncorporat ng labour

fromthe outs de and explo t nglabour n product on.

Patr ckMurray’schapter alsoargues aga nst the v ewof cap tal as a egel an

Subject.As ment oned above, Murray’s nterpretat on s that Marx appropr

ated both egel’sConcept-Log c and h s Essence-Log c. e argues that Marx

used egel’s Concept-Log c n order to expla n cap tal’s pretence to be a ‘self—

valor s ng subject’, and he counterposed th s Concept-Log c w th egel’s

Essence-Log c,wh ch demonstrated that cap tal s not really self-valor s ng;

cap tal s an mposter, and egel's Essence-Log chelps Marx expose the pre



INTRODUCTION 7

tence of cap tal. Meaney presents a s m lar nterpretat on and argues that,

although nterest-bear ng cap tal s the Idea ofcap tal, n the egel ansense of

be ng the culm nat on of all the prev ous theoret cal development, f nterest

bear ng cap tal s v ewed n solat on fromprof t-bear ngcap tal and the rest of

the economy (espec ally labour), as the class cal econom sts were prone to do

(espec ally the vulgar econom sts), then nterest-bear ng cap tal appears to

produce ts own nterest, but th s s a fet sh, an llus on.TonySm th also argues

aga nst the nterpretat on of ‘cap talasSubject’fora d fferent reason. Accord ng

to Sm th, a egel an Subject appl ed to soc etymeans that soc ety s harmon

ous and does not have nternal confl cts.But cap tal sm obv ouslyhas nternal

confl cts (valor sat on s coerc vely mposed onworkers bycap tal), and there

fore cap tal cannot be a egel an Subject n th s sense.

Part 2w ll prov de br ef summar es of the nd v dual chapters n th s book.

2 Summar es of Ind v dual Chapters

2.1 Ideal sm and Mater al sm

Tony Sm th’s chapter (‘ egel,Marx and the Comprehens on of Cap tal sm’)

notes that Marx adopted two mportant aspects of egel’sthought. F rst, the

methodolog cal framework of Marx’s theory, systemat c d alect cs, s taken

over from egel. But there s a major mod f cat on: wh le egel’smajor wr t

gs present an aIY rmat vesystemat c d alect c, Marx’stheory s cr t cal. Later

levels n the cr t que of pol t cal economy do not overcome the antagon sms

found at ts start; they art culate the same antagon sms n more concrete and

complex forms. Second, Marx’sconcept of cap tal was modelled on what he

took to be egel’sLog cof the Concept. Sm th argues, however, that th s con

cept of cap tal s not n fact somorph c to the Log cof the Concept that egel

a rmed, but rather llustrates the sort of Essence-Log c egel rejected. The

chapter concludes w th somecr t cal reflect onson recent attempts to connect

egel’sLog cw th Marx’scr t que of pol t cal economy.

Mark Meaney’s contr but on (‘Cap tal Breeds: Interest-Bear ng Cap tal as

PurelyAbstract Form’)responds to Roman Rosdolsky’sobservat on that Marx’s

Grundr sse manuscr pts make ‘mass ve reference’ to egel’s Sc ence of Log c.

Th s presents the challenge of tak ng each of the terms and phrases borrowed

from the Log c and l nk ng them to egel’swork. It s not enough, however,

s mply to note a s m lar ty n term nology.The employment of a term or phrase

the Log c sa funct on of tsplacement w th n the development of the whole,

and the same s true of the Grundr sse.In h s chapter for th s collect onMeaney

exam nes the spec f ctrans t on fromprof t-bear ngcap tal to nterest-bear ng



8 MOSELEY AND SMIT

cap tal, mak ng use of both ph lolog cal exeges s and a close analys s of the

log cal structure of Marx’s arguments. e expla ns Marx’s deployment of

phrases such as ‘self-reproduc ng’and ‘real cap tal’ at prec se po nts n the

manuscr pts by l nk ngMarx’slanguage to the log cal terms and phrases egel

uses n h s presentat on of ‘real sedgenus’,the concrete un versal.

juan Ir' goCarrera’s chapter (‘D alect cs on ts Feet, or the Form of the

Consc ousness of the Work ng Class as stor cal Subject’) argues that the

need to place d alect cs on ts feet s not a matter of adapt ng egel’slog c to a

mater al st po nt of v ew,but s nstead the necess ty of transcend ng the h s—

tor cal character of log c tself. It starts by cons der ng that Marx recogn ses

consc ousness as the way n wh ch human subjects govern the r act ons as

d v dual organs of the r process of soc al metabol sm. Therefore, he recog

n ses the forms of consc ousness, hence, sc ent f cmethod tself, as h stor cally

determ ned forms of soc al relat ons. Consequently, he faces log cal represen

tat on tself as the h stor cal form of a consc ousness wh ch bears the contra—

d ctorynecess ty ofproduc ng object veknowledge n order to produce relat ve

surplus-value, wh le at the same t me t must rema n bl nd to ts own al en

at on.Thus, log calrepresentat on deallyplaces nto relat on the concrete real

forms accord ng to a construct ve necess ty, wh ch appears as the object ve

product of a natural sed abstract freeconsc ousness.Onthe other hand, Marx’s

Cap tal follows n thought the real movement of the general soc al relat on of

the work ng class, thereby d scover ng the necess ty of ts consc ousness as an

al enatedbe ng that bears the necess tyofproduc ng tself as an al enated con

sc ousness that s aware of ts own al enat on and of the h stor cal powers t

der ves therefrom.

Gaston Cal gar s and Gu do Starosta’s chapter (‘Wh ch “Rat onal Kernel”?

Wh ch “Myst cal Shell"?A Contr but on to the Debate on the Connect on

between egel’sLog cand Marx’sCap tal) argues that n the Log c egelman

aged to d scover the s mplest form of ex stence of the real: the movement of

a rmat on through self-negat on.Asa consequence, he correctly presents the

method of sc ence as the systemat c unfold ng of the mmanent l fe of the

subject-matter. owever, n so far as egel's systemat c d alect c beg ns w th

the s mplest thoughtform, h s subsequent der vat on of form-determ nat ons

unfoldsawhole ser esofredundant categor eswh ch, fromamater al st stand

po nt, correspond to the mmanent necess ty of pure thought onlyand do not

express the nner movement of the s mpler determ nat ons of ‘realmater al

be ng’.Thechapter further subm ts that an mmed ate reason beh nd that spu

r ous start ng po nt res des n h s methodolog cal procedure of ‘extreme’

abstract on, wh ch arb trar ly casts as de all part cular determ nat on unt l

reach ng a wholly empty un versal. Bycontrast the chapter argues that Marx



INTRODUCTION 9

f nds a mater al st alternat ve to egel’s abstract on n d alect cal analys s,

wh ch moves by search ng for the more abstract or s mple content of the con

crete form he s mmed ately fac ng.

2.2 Marx’s Theory of Cap tal and egel’3Log cof the Concept

FredMoseley’s chapter (‘TheUn versal and the Part culars n egel’sLog cand

Marx’sCap tal’) argues that the two ma n levelsof abstract on n Marx’stheory

are cap tal n general and compet t on, and that th s log cal structure was a

creat ve appropr at on of egel’sLog cof the Concept, and spec f callythe f rst

two moments of un versal ty and part cular ty. Marx’scap tal n general cor

responds to egel’sun versal ty, and the ma n quest on addressed s the un

versal property of all cap tals - the product on of surplus-value —and the

determ nat on of the total surplus-valueproduced n the economy as a whole.

Marx’slevel of abstract on of compet t on corresponds to egel’smoment of

part cular ty,and the ma n quest on addressed s the der vat on of the part cu

lar forms of surplus-value (equal rates of prof t across ndustr es, commerc al

prof t, nterest and rent), and the d v s on of the predeterm ned total surplus

value nto nd v dual parts. Moseleyargues that Marxd scovered th s creat ve

appropr at on of egel’smoments of the Concept wh le work ng on the

Gmndn'sse, and he ma nta ned th s egel an log cal structure n all the later

drafts of Cap tal.

Roberto F nesch ’s chapter (‘On egel’s Methodolog cal Legacy n Marx’)

argues that egel’slegacy for Marx s methodolog cal; fMarx s not nterested

a forrnal st c appl cat on of models from egel’slog c,he s true to ts funda

mental pr nc ple: the Auslegungder Sache selbst, the d alect cal self-develop

ment of a determ ned content; the mode of expos t on (presentat on) of th s

content s the Darstellungswe se, wh ch s called by Marx the ‘only sc ent f c

method’. F nesch tr es to show how, from a part ally abstract ‘appl cat on’ of

the structure un versal —part cular —s ngular, wh ch clearly der ves from

egel’sSc enceofLog c,Marx moves to a d alect cally more cons stent formu

lat on of t.Th s allows us to followthe development of the several abstract on

levels of Marx’s theory of cap tal through ts d fferent stages of elaborat on,

from the f rst concept on to the ‘ nal’outl ne. Th s, although uncompleted,

turns out to be d alect callymore cons stent than the f rstdraft.

R ccardo Bellohore’s chapter (‘Lost n Translat on? Once Aga n on the

Marx— egelConnect on’) f rst summar ses Marx’s ma n cr t c sms of egel

and the v ews of a number of Marx an theor sts who have d scussed them. e

then presents h s own nterpretat on of the movement from commod ty to

money and cap tal, stress ngwhat he terms ts ‘dualpath’.The f rst path recon

structs the ‘c rcular ty' of Cap tal as Subject, as an automat c fet sh: t s here



10 MOSELEY AND SMIT

that egel’s deal st c method of ‘pos t ng the presuppos t on’ served Marx

well.The second path concerns the ‘const tut on’of the cap tal-relat on, and

therefore the ‘l near’explo tat on of workers and class-struggle n product on.

We f nd Marx’s rad cal break from egel here. Bellof ore argues t s cruc al to

d st ngu sh the ‘object ve’,th ng-l ke and al enated nature of cap tal st soc al

real ty ( ts ‘fet sh-character’) from the attr but on of soc al propert es to

the th ngs themselves as natural attr butes (‘fet sh sm’).Wh le the latter

decept ve, mere semblance [Sche n], the former appearance s all too real

[Ersche nung].

Patr ck Murray’s contr but on (‘The Secret of Cap tal’s Self-Valor sat on

“La dBare": ow egel elped Marx to Overturn R cardo’s Theory of Prof t’)

argues that Marx’s appropr at on of egel’s Log c of Essence enabled h m

to show that prol t s the necessary form of appearance of surplus-value. In

overturn ng the ex st ng theor es of prof t, Marx overturns class cal value

theory,wh ch expla ns nd v dual pr ces as express ons of nd v dual (labour-)

values,replac ng tw th a hol st c labour-theory ofvalue that holds only for the

total cap tal. For nd v dual cap tals, prof t s n fact proport onal to cap tal’s

magn tude —and, apparently, noth ng else. Cap tal’sexpans on seems to be ts

do ng;cap tal appears to be a self-valor s ng‘automat c subject’. In overlapp ng

the presentat on of cap tal, wh ch appears to m m c the self-suff c ent move

ment of egel’sConcept,w th the presentat on of surplus-value as the essence

that necessar ly appears as prof t, Marx ‘lays bare’ cap tal’s secret: cap tal

creases n value ( s valor sed) only by appropr at ng the unpa d labour of

wage-workers.

Igor anzel’s chapter (‘“The C rcular Course of Our Representat on”:

“Sche n”,“Grand” and “Ersche nung” n Marx’sEconom c Works’) deals w th the

waysMarxproceeds froma certa n cluster of concepts of pol t cal economy as

a sc ence to other ones. It starts w th a short overv ewof Marx’sprocedures n

Cap tal Volume I lead ng to the manuscr pt Chapter VI, ‘Results of the

[med ate Processof Product on’,and t showshow they correspond to a c r

cular type of theory-construct on. For a better understand ng of th s type of

theory-construct on, egel’s log co-categor al reconstruct on of the move

ment of sc ent f c knowledge from Sche nv a Wesento Ersche nung as g ven n

h s Sc enceof Log c s expl cated together w th a reconstruct on of the way

Marx draws on egel’scategory-clusters Sche n,Wesenand Ersche nung, and

the r order ngs. F nally,an ep stemolog cal account of the category-pa r Sche n

and Ersche nung w th respect to Marx’s econom c works together w th a

descr pt on of the pecul ar t es of German syntax of that pa r s presented.



INTRODUCTION u

2.3 D ferent V ewsof the D alect c

Geert Reuten’s chapter (‘An Outl ne of the Systemat c-D alect cal Method:

Sc ent f c and Pol t cal S gn f cance’)explores the methododology of system

at c d alect cs. Bu ld ng on the work of egel and Marx, Reuten reconstructs

th s method w th a v ewto the contr but on tmaymake to the nvest gat onof

contemporary cap tal sm. e argues that systemat c d alect cs prov des a frame

work for d st ngu sh ng the nst tut ons and processes that are necessary —

rather than cont ngent —for the cap tal st system. Th s methodolog cal

framework also a ds n the detect on of the strengths and weaknesses n the

actual structure of cap tal sm. Generally the earl er parts of a systemat c-d a

lect cal presentat on help del neate the strengths of the system as wellas con

trad ct ons (compare Marx’sCap tal),wh le the latter parts help to develop the

comprehens on of ts weaknesses and contrad ct ons (not fully developed n

Marx’sunf n shed project). Any undue focus on one or the other can lead to

pol t cal paralys s.Weaknesses should be understood n the context of the sys

tem’s strengths, and v ce versa. In Reuten’s v ew, the pol t cal s gn f cance of

the systemat c-d alect cal method l eshere.

Chr s Arthur’s chapter (‘Marx, egel and the Value-Form’) reconstructs

Chapter I of Cap tal,wh ch sgenerally regarded to be the chapter nwh ch the

nfluence of egel’sLog c s most eas ly detectable, and argues that egel’s

categor es are ndeed relevant. After an analys s of the commod ty us ng

egel's categor es of Be ng, categor es drawn from egel’sDoctr ne of Essence

are deployed because the oppos t ons character st c of ts structure are su ted

to a study of the doubl ng of the commod ty nto commod t es and money.

Th s d scuss on of Marx's f rst chapter s part of a broader project to prov de a

systemat c-d alect cal reconstruct on of ‘Cap tal’.Th s s prem sed on the v ew

that there s a s gn f cant homology between the movement of exchange, gen

erat ng through a pract cal abstract on a system of forms of value, and the

movement of thought, generat ng egel'ssystem of log calcategor es.

Mar o Robles-Baez’s chapter (‘D alect cs of Labour and Value-Form n

Marx'sCap tal:AReconstruct on’) reconstructs the d alect c of the determ na

t on of the soc alvalue-formofcommod t es. It argues that the mean ng of the

categor es s actual sed throughout the progress onof the moments that con

st tute the log cal structure of Marx’spresentat on of h s concept of cap tal as

a self-valor s ng Subject n Cap tal. Th s mpl es that the category of measure,

that s, money as the measure of value and the rate of prof t as measure of

cap tal, and the d alect cal un ty of the labour-value-content of commod t es

and ts money-form, are actual sed together through these moments. It s not

unt l ndustr al cap tals relate to each other that they are soc allypos ted and



12 MOSELEY AND SMIT

commod t es acqu re the money-form of pr ces of product on. The ma n con

clus on s that t s only at th s moment n the progress on that the soc al

abstract labour-t me underly ng the soc al value-forms of all k nds of com

mod t es as products of cap tals s s multaneously pos ted and actual sed.

Conclus on

Th sbookdoes not prov dedef n t veanswers concern ng the relat on between

egel’slog c and Marx’seconom c theory n Cap tal. But t does make s gn f

cant progress n understand ng th s relat on. As a number of the chapters

establ sh, Marx’saccount of many mportant d mens ons of cap tal sm traces

a d alect c of essence and appearance w th unm stakable egel an overtones.

There s also a general consensus among the authors n th s collect on that

Marxdescr bed h s concept of cap tal n terms taken from egel's Log cof the

Concept. Ev dence s also prov ded that conv nces the co-ed tors that at least

part of what Marx meant n h s famous 1858letter about egel’slog c (wh le

wr t ng the Grundr sse) has to do w th how egel’sLog cof the Concept (more

spec f cally,the moments of un versal ty and part cular ty) helped Marx d s

t ngu sh the levels of abstract on of cap tal n general and compet t on, and

thereby work out the relat onsh p between total surplus-value and ts nd v d

ual parts. (An mportant open rema n ng quest on for future research s

whether or not Marx later abandoned th s egel an framework n the later

drafts of Cap tal.) Th swould at least part ally solvethe long-stand ng mystery

ofwhat Marxmeant n th s letter, although Marxmay also be allud ng to other

ways n wh ch he found egel'sLog cuseful.

Othermatters rema n much more contested. Aswehave seen already n th s

troduct on, some authors n th s collect on hold that the order n wh ch

Marx presents the determ nat ons of cap tal sm closely corresponds to the

order ng of categor es n egel'sSc enceofLog c.Others vehemently reject th s

cla m. Many of the scholars whose papers are publ shed here regard Marx’s

cr t c sms of egel’s deal sm as completely warranted. Others hold that Marx

presented a car cature of egel an thought, and that n more char table and

defens ble read ngs egel’sdeepest ontolog cal comm tments are not open to

the standard object ons that have been made aga nst them. Some authors of

the chapters here n hold that egel’sph losophy revolvesaround an abstract

Subject whose ( mag ned) re gn over flesh-and-blood human subjects s so

morph c w th cap tal’s (all-too-real) re gn as an abstract Subject over l v ng

labour. Others f nd th s read ng of egel ncons stent w th h s ns stence that

un versals should never be re ed, and th s nterpretat on of cap tal ncom



INTRODUCTION 13

plete n l ght of Marx's ns stence that cap tal s noth ng but the products of

l v nglabour forc bly separated from the r producers.

The chapters n th s book prov de many prom s ng deas for the further

explorat on of these and other d mens ons ofwhat s one of the most nterest

g and mportant ntellectual relat onsh ps n h story. It s hoped that th s

bookw ll st mulate further research along these l nes.

Booksby the lntemat onal Sympos umonMarx anTheory

Fred Moseley (ed.) 1993, Marx's Method n 'Cap tal': A Reexam nat on, Atlant c

ghlands, Nj: uman t es Press.

Fred Moseley and Martha Campbell (eds) 1997,NewInvest gat ons ofMarx’sMethod,

Atlant c ghlands, NJ: uman t es Press.

Chr stopher]. Arthur and Geert Reuten (eds) 1998,TheC rculat onofCap tal:Essayson

VolumeTwoof Marx’s 'Cap tal’, Bas ngstoke: PalgraveMacm llan.

Geert Reuten and Martha Campbell (eds) 2001,TheCulm nat on of Cap tal; Essayson

VolumeThree ofMarx’s ‘Cap tal’,Bas ngstoke: PalgraveMacm llan.

R ccardo Bellohore and N cola Taylor (eds) 2003, TheConst tut on of Cap tal: Essayson

VolumeI ofMarx’s ‘Cap tal', Bas ngstoke: PalgraveMacm llan.

Fred Moseley (ed.) 2005, Marx’s Theory of Money: Modern Appra sals, Bas ngstoke:

PalgraveMacm llan.

R ccardoBelloflore and Roberto F nesch (eds) 2009,Re-Read ngMarx'NewPerspect ves

after the Cr t calEd t on,Bas ngstoke: PalgraveMacm llan (an Ital an translat on s

ava lable: R ccardo Bellof ore and Roberto F nesch (eds) 2009,Marx n quest one. Il

d batt to aperto dell’Internat onal Sympos um on Marx an Theory, Naples: La c tta

del sole).



PART I

Ideal smand Mater al sm



C APTER 1

egel,Marx and the Comprehens on of Cap tal sm

TonySm th

Marx’searly assessment of egelwas almost ent rely negat ve. Later,however,

as he began to construct h s cr t que of pol t cal economy he took over aspects

of egel's methodolog cal framework. The core concept n h s cr t que, the

concept of cap tal, also has unm stakably egel an echoes. I shall argue that

egel’sLog cdoes ndeed contr bute to the comprehens on of cap tal sm, but

not qu te n the wayMarx thought.

Marx’sEarlyCr t que of egel

After the French Revolut on, rel g ous leaders throughout Germany blessed

the restorat on of ar stocrat c and monarch cal pr v leges. Marx’s fellow

student-rad cals concluded that the emanc patory prom se of the French

Revolut onwould rema n unful lled n the absence of a fundamental cr t que

of rel g ous consc ousness. Ludw g Feuerbach’s 1841TheEssenceof Chr st an ty

prov ded such a cr t que. Feuerbach expla ned how the supposedly transcen

dent heavenly realm was merely a re f ed project on of earthly l fe, a result of

treat ng pred cates referr ng to human act v t es (know ng, lov ng) as f they

appl ed to an Absolute Subject (‘God s knowledge’; ‘God s love’). egel was

thought to express orthodox v ews w th an unorthodox term nology, w th

‘Absolute Sp r t’ —h s term for God —be ng a project on of the human nto an

al en (non-human) form. Bu ld ngon Feuerbach’saccount, Marx attempted to

show n deta l how egel'spol t cal ph losophy also represents the al enat on

of human ty from tself. egel conceptual sed the state as a transcendent

power over soc ety, analogous to the heavenly realm’s supposedly transcen

dent poweroverearth. just as the heavenly realm s noth ng but the project on

of human act v t es n an al en and re f ed form,Marx ns sted that the state s

grounded n the al enat on and re f cat on of soc al l fe.

Marxwent beyond Feuerbach when he asked whyrel g ousal enat on takes

place.Answer ng th s query requ red a cr t cal account of the soc alworld from

wh ch rel g ous consc ousness spr ngs:

Rel g on s the self-consc ousness and self-esteem ofman who has e ther

not yet found h mself or has already lost h mself aga n. But man s no

© KONINKLUKEBRILLNV,LEIDEN, 2014 I DO] 10.1163/9789004270022_003



18 SMIT

abstract be ng encamped outs de the world. Man s the world of man —

the state, soc ety. Th s state, th s soc ety, produce rel g on, an nverted

world-consc ousness, because they are an nverted world. . . Rel g ous d s

tress s at the same t me the express onof real d stress and also the protest

aga nst real d stress.l

It follows that:

[t]o abol sh rel g on as the llusoryhapp ness of the people s to demand

the r real happ ness. The demand to g veup llus ons about the ex st ng

state of affa rs s the demand to g ve up a state of afa rs wh ch needs

llus ons.2

Marx n t ally agreed w th most of h s cohort that emanc pat on from ‘astate

of affa rswh ch needs llus ons’meant d smantl ng the pol t cal rule of ar sto

crats and petty despots. Fa rlysoon, however,he came to see that merely pol t

cal emanc pat on would be nadequate.3 The pol t cal pr v leges granted to

ar stocrats and despots were not the root of the problem. The core ssue was

the dual sm of state and soc ety def n ng the modern state as such, a dual sm

establ shed and ma nta ned bythe ‘ego st csp r t of c v lsoc ety’.4Just as bel ef

an otherworldly, d v ne realmwas generated bymater al soc al pract ces on

earth, the ex stence of the state as an allegedly transcendent power above soc —

ety was also rooted n h stor cally spec f c soc al pract ces. And just as ‘[t]o

abol sh rel g on as the llusoryhapp ness of the people s to demand the r real

happ ness', to demand the abol t on of the state as a transcendent power s to

demand a soc al order wh ch does not requ re such a state.

Marx referred to the requ red transformat on as the democrat sat on of

soc al l fe. In so far as democracy conf rms that the supposedly transcendent

state s noth ng but the powers of soc ety n an al en form, democracy s not

merely one pol t cal form among many; t s the underly ng secret of all pol t

cal forrns.5Wh le the call formerelypol t cal emanc pat on could be addressed

Marx 1975d [1844], p. 175.

Marx 1975d [1844], p. 176.

See Kouvelak s 2003.

Marxbel eved that th s could be seenmost clearly n the countr es that had gone furthest n

pol t cal emanc pat on: ‘Pol t calemanc pat on was,at the same t me, the emanc pat on of

c v l soc ety from pol t cs, from hav ng even the semblance of a un versal content . . . The

pol t cal revolut on resolves c v l l fe nto ts component parts, w thout revolut on z ng these

components themselves or subject ng them to cr t c sm’ (Marx 19750[1844],pp. 166-7).

5 ‘[A]llforms of state have democracyfor the r truth . . . [T]hey are therefore untrue nsofar as

they are not democracy' (Marx 1975b[1843],p. 31).

#WN-n



EGEL, MARXAND T E COMPRE ENSION OF CAPITALISM 19

to ‘c t zens’ n general, th s no longer suff cesonce t s recogn sed that emanc

pat on nvolves soc o-econom c transformat on. And so the young Marx

addressed h s theory to a qu te d fferent sort of soc al agent, the proletar at,

def ned as the class ‘wh ch [stands] n an all-round ant thes s to the prem ses

of the German state’.6We could hardly be further away from the apotheos s of

the German state wh ch Marx found n egel.

At th s po nt, Marx was well aware that he had not suff c ently establ shed

h s major theoret cal and pract cal cla ms. eknew that he had not developed

an adequate understand ng of the mater al-soc alpract ces ofmodern ty,mak

g do w th vague references to ‘the ego st c sp r t of c v l soc ety’. Marx’s

mers on n the ph losoph cal debates ofh s student-daysd d not adequately

prepare h m to develop the sort of theory he now requ red. e therefore aban

doned h s polem cal engagement w th egel,and devoted years to the nten

s vestudy of class cal pol t cal economy.

Marxnever renounced h s vehement condemnat on of egel’sph losophy.

It would be natural, then, to expect that egel an thought would not have

played a construct ve role n h s mature wr t ngs. owever, n the course of

compos ng the vast manuscr pt we know as the Grundr sse Marx wrote to

Engels that egel’s Log c ‘was of great use to me as regards method of

treatment’.7Marx’sgoalwas to reconstruct n thought the essent al determ na

t ons of the cap tal st mode of product on, beg nn ng w th the s mplest and

most abstract soc al forms (‘commod ty ‘value’,‘money’)and proceed ng step

by step to progress velymore complex and concrete determ nat ons. The term

for th s sort of project s systemat c d alect cs, and for all ts undoubted short

com ngs egel’sLog cprov ded Marx w th a model for th s sort of methodo

log cal framework.8

Issues connected w th the methodolog cal d mens on of the egel—Marx

relat onsh p w ll be d scussed n the f nal sect on. In the meant me Marx’s

bel ef that egelprov ded a key to understand ng cap tal w llbe cons dered.

egel’sLog cand the Concept of Cap tal (1)

Thema n features ofMarx’sconcept of cap tal can perhaps best be ntroduced

by contrast ng Marx’s pos t on w th non-Marx an perspect ves. Ma nstream

soc al theor sts almost un versally hold that: 1) commod t es are essent ally

6 Marx 1975d [1844], p. 186.

7 Marx 1983a [1858], p. 248.

8 See Sm th 1990,Part One.



20 SMIT

means for the sat sfact onof human wants and needs;2)money contr butes to

that same end by prov d nga measure of the value of commod t es, a means for

c rculat ng commod t es, and a store of value; and 3) general sed commod ty

product on accord ngly revolves around C—M—Cc rcu ts, n wh ch unneeded

or unwanted commod t es are exchanged formoney wh ch s then used to pur

chase d fferent commod t es address ng the g ven agent’s needs and wants

more sat sfactor ly. No one, of course, would deny the ex stence of M—C—M’

c rcu ts, n wh ch soc alagents nvestmoney n the product on and c rculat on

of commod t es, hop ng to sell them later for a prof t. Butmoney s conceptu

al sed as merely a prox mate end here, sought as a means for obta n ng goods

and serv cesat some subsequent po nt n t me.9

Moreover,no one would ever deny that the proper background-cond t ons

must be n place for the c rculat on of commod t es and money to further

human flour sh ng. Some argue that relat vely extens ve pol t cal regulat on s

requ red; others advocate more m n mal pol t cal rég mes. egel made an

mensely mportant contr but on to these ongo ng debates.lo From Marx’s

standpo nt, however,these debates do not godeeplyenough nto the nature of

cap tal sm, and egel’scontr but on to them s not h s most s gn hcant contr

but on to the understand ng of modern soc ety.Wh le ma nstream theor sts

may d sagree on countless ssues, n Marx’sest mat on the r v ews share the

same fundamental flaw:they all fa l to recogn se the systemat c subord nat on

of C —M —C c rcu ts under M —C —M’ c rcu ts.

There are texts where Marx argues for the pr macy of the dr ve to expand

monetary c rcu ts by s mply appeal ng to egel’slog cal po nt that the very

concept of a quant tat ve l m t mpl es the concept ofquant t es beyond those

l m ts.11As the enem es of Marx (and of a egel an- nformed read ng of Marx)

never t re of repeat ng, however, t s lleg t mate to jump from the abstract

log cof quant ty to a substant ve cla m about a h stor cally spec f c soc al order.

9 See ayek 1976, pp. 8—9.

10 More spec f cally, he made three major contr but ons n ThePh losophy of R ght. F rst,

egel prov ded a prec se categor al analys s of standard v ews on the soc al forms of

general sed commod ty-product on (value, money, the ‘system of needs’, and so on).

Second, h s account balanced concern w th ‘the r ght’ (found n Kant and h s followers)

w th the mportance of ‘thegood’or ‘well-be ng'stressed byclass cal pol t cal econom sts

and others n the ut l tar an trad t on, thereby overcom ngthe one-s dedness of prev ous

theor sts. Th rd, egel’scla m that extens ve pol t cal regulat on s requ red forgeneral sed

commod ty-product onto funct on n an e c entand nonnat ver acceptable manner

ant c pates themes developed later by Keynes,Rawls and other cr t cs of unregulated

‘free’markets.

11 For example, Marx 1986 [1857—8],p. 200.




Amuch stronger just f cat on can be developed from the fact that n gener

al sed commod ty-product on un ts of product on are compelled to make

exchange for money the r pr mary end. The r product on s undertaken pr

vately, and the soc al necess ty of the r endeavours can only be val dated

through sale of the r products for money.12Also,w thout a suff c ently h gh

levelof monetary returns a g ven un t of product on would not be able to pur

chase the commod ty- nputs requ red to part c pate n the next c rcu t of pro

duct on. F nally, each un t must also fear f nd ng tself at a compet t ve

d sadvantage v s-d-v scompet tors beg nn ng a new round w th s gn f cantly

greater f nanc al resources. In br ef, un ts of product on that systemat cally

d rect the r endeavours to ‘valor sat on’,that s,the appropr at on of monetary

returns exceed ng n t al nvestment, necessar ly tend to surv veand growover

t me. Those that do not do so tend to be pushed to the marg ns of soc al l fe,or

el m nated altogether.

Most nd v dual agents, of course, do not make the acqu s t on of money

the r pre-em nent goal; they seek money as a merely prox mate end that ult

mately serves as a means for acqu r ng goods and serv ces.Access to monetary

resources, however, generally depends upon a connect on to un ts of produc

t on d rected towards the appropr at on of monetary returns. For example,

come allocated to nvestors, employees or pens oners, or the dependants of

any member of these groups, comes from (and returns to) M—C—M’c rcu ts.13

Th s pract cal compuls on to connect w th monetary c rcu ts compels us to

accept the theoret cal cla m that the use of money as a means n C—M—C

c rcu ts s systemat cally subord nated to the valor sat on- mperat ve, the

accumulat on of money as an end n tself.

Formost ma nstream theor sts ‘cap tal’ s s mplya general term referr ng to

anyth ng used n product on- and d str but on-processes, from tools,rawmate

r als and embod ed sk lls (so-called ‘human cap tal’) to the money that pur

chases these nputs. But the use of tools, raw mater als and embod ed sk lls

preceded the f rst hom n ds, and numerous precap tal st soc al format ons

used money to purchase products. Th s usage therefore occludes the h stor

callyspec f c nature of cap tal n contemporary cap tal sm. ForMarx, ‘cap tal’

n t ally def ned as the un fy ng pr nc ple underly ng M—C—M' c rcu ts. In

12 Thepo nt holds,ofcourse, for econom c un ts d str but ng already-produced commod t es

for sale, un ts of f nance, and so on. Marx cons ders these other sorts of cap tals at more

concrete and complex theoret cal levels than the n t al levelsummar sed here.

13 The ncome of state-off c als,state-cl ents and the r dependants can be nd rectly traced

to those sources as well, s nce state-revenues are collected fromun ts of cap tal and the

groupsment oned n the ma n text.The roleof the cap tal st state,however, sa matter for

a much later theoret cal level.



22 SMIT

sofar asthe dom nat on ofthese c rcu ts sh stor cally spec f ctomodern cap

tal sm, so too s th s def n t on.

In the most general terms, cap tal as value- n-process beg ns w th money,

proceeds to the product on and c rculat on of commod t es, and culm nates

w th an appropr at on of money exceed ng the n t al nvestment, ready for

re nvestment:

Cap tal

( (Value- n-process) )

M —C —M’

On the next level of complex ty and concreteness M —C —M’ c rcu ts are

expanded through d st ngu sh ng commod ty- nputs (C) (means of produc

t on such as raw mater als, mach nery, plant, labour-power, and so on), com

mod ty-outputs (C'),and the product on-process (P) n wh ch labour-power s

set to work on other nputs n order to produce the output.

Cap ta14—j

M—C—P—C’—M’

In a soc alworld dom nated by cap tal-c rcu ts t s leg t mate to speak of:1)the

t al money nvested on the level of soc ety as a whole n a g ven per od;

2) the aggregate set of commod t es produced and d str buted n that per od;

and 3) the total sum of money-cap tal appropr ated from sales of those com

mod t es at ts complet on, after nd v dual c rcu ts of cap tal have run the r

course. From th s perspect ve ‘cap tal’can be def ned as value- n-process on

the aggregate level. No prev ous h stor cal format on has made the ceaseless

expans on of surplus-value (the d fference between M and M') the ult mate

end of soc al l fe.

Wemust now look at how Marx descr bes cap tal (‘value- n-process’)more

closely:

[B]oth the money and the commod ty funct on only as d fferent modes

of ex stence of value tself . . . [Value] s constantly chang ng from one

form nto the other, w thout becom ng lost n th s movement; t thus




becomes transformed nto an automat c subject. . . [V]alue s here the

subject of a process n wh ch,wh le constantly assum ng the form n turn

of money and commod t es, t changes ts own magn tude, throws off

surplus-value from tself cons dered as or g nal value, and thus valor ses

self ndependently. For the movement n the course of wh ch t adds

surplus-value s ts own movement, ts valor zat on s therefore self

valor zat on . . . [V]alue suddenly presents tself as a self-mov ng

substance wh ch passes through a process of ts own, and for wh ch

commod t es and money are both mere forms.14

Marx s well aware that the not on of a non-human ‘subject’that s somehow a

‘self-mov ngsubstance’ s b zarre. These are techn cal terms assoc ated w th

the very egel an theory that Marx had earl er rejected so strongly.Marx d d

not waver n h s condemnat on of the metaphys cs of absolute deal sm.But n

effect he ns sts n th s passage that egel an categor es are requ red by the

cr t que of pol t cal economy. In h s v ew the structure of cap tal s prec sely

somorph c w th the structure of egel’3Absolute.

Marx took egel’sAbsolute to be a ‘self-actual s ngun versal’ that somehow

extemal ses tself n a ser es of forms, return ng to tself step by step. Th s

unfold ng of the Absolute embod es a ‘Log cof the Concept’, descr bed by

egel as ‘the d st nct on of the nd v dual from the un versal wh ch as such s

cont nuous w th that wh ch s d fferent ated from t and s dent cal w th t’.15n

Marx’s read ng of egel these spec f c determ nat ons are ult mately of no

nterest n and of themselves, apart from the r contr but on to the Absolute’s

self-actual sat on.16 Cap tal, the ‘self-valor sat on of value’,not only can but

must be understood n exactlythe same terms. Thepart cular determ nat ons

of value- n-process make up cap tal’s self-extemal sat on and return to tself.

When Marx uses the egel an term nology of ‘subject’and ‘self-mov ngsub

stance’ to refer to cap tal he s cla m ng that the log c of cap tal nstant ates

egel’sLog c of the Concept: cap tal s a un versal d st nct from ts moments,

wh le be ng s multaneously cont nuous and dent cal w th these moments,

wh ch together const tute cap tal’s process of self-valor sat on. Further, the

moments n th s processare ult mately ofno nterest to cap tal n and of them

selves,apart from the r contr but on to the total s ngend of cap tal-accumula

t on. The homology between egel’s Log c of the Concept and the log c of

14 Marx 1976c [1867], pp. 255-6.

15 egel 1975 [1817],§z40, translat on from P nkard 1988,p. 211.

16 AsMarx wrote n the Par sManuscr pts, egel’sLog c s ‘the essence [of man and nature]

wh ch has grown totally nd fferent to all real deterrn nateness’ (Marx 1975c [1844],

p. 330).



24 SMIT

cap tal appears exact and complete. Marx's cla m, n br ef, s that cap tal must

be comprehended as an absolute ‘Subject' n the egel an sense of the term.

One ofMarx’smost prom nent contemporary nterpreters, Mo she Postone,

expresses the po nt as follows:

Marx does not s mply nvert egel’sconcepts n a ‘mater al st’ fash on.

Rather, n an effort to grasp the pecul ar nature of soc al relat ons n cap

tal sm,Marx analyzes the soc al val d ty for cap tal st soc ety of prec sely

those deal st egel an concepts wh ch he earl er condemned as myst

f ed nvers ons . . .Marx suggests that a h stor cal Subject n the egel an

sense does ndeed ex st n cap tal sm . . . s analys s suggests that the

soc al relat ons that character sed cap tal sm are of a very pecul ar sort —

they possess the attr butes that egel accorded to Ge st [‘Sp r t’].It s n

th s sense, then, that a h stor cal Subject as conce ved by egel ex sts n

cap tal sm.l7

More spec f cally,‘theGe stconst tutes object ve real ty bymeans of a process

of extemal sat on or self-object f cat ons,and, n the process, reflex ver con

st tutes tself’ n a manner prec sely somorph c w th cap tal's re gn as a ‘sub

ject’ and ‘self-mov ngsubstance’.18On th s read ng egel’scontr but on to the

comprehens on of cap tal sm could not be more profound, even f completely

un ntended.

The s gn f cance of Marx's concept of cap tal for contemporary normat ve

soc altheory has yet to be adequately apprec ated. Contemporary l beral theo

r sts hold that our deepest pol t cal values call for an nst tut onal framework

allow ng nd v duals freelyto pursue the r own concept ons of the good wh le

ma nta n ng neutral ty regard ng compet ng concept ons of the good on the

level of soc ety as a whole. The r commun tar an cr t cs cla m that every

healthy pol t cal commun ty has a concept on of the good embod ed n ts tra

d t ons and pract ces, and that th s concept on has pr or ty over those of nd

v duals, s nce the very dent ty of nd v duals s forged through soc al sat on

to the valuesof the r commun ty.19L beral and commun tar an pos t ons are

both fundamentally flawed:ne ther ncorporates an adequate concept of cap

tal. Commun tar ans are correct to ns st that a part cular concept on of the

good s nst tut onal sed on the levelof soc ety as awhole even n the cap tal st

soc et es that most procla m the r comm tment to l beral sm. But t s not a

17 Postone 1993, pp. 74—5.

18 Postone 1993, p. 72.

19 Keytexts n th s debate are collected n Sande11984.




concept on of the human good as they fantas se; t s the nhuman good of

cap tal. L berals are correct to note how nd v duals n modern (cap tal st)

soc et es are n pr nc ple ‘free’to select the r own ends. But they do not recog

n sehow human freedom and human ends are systemat callysubord nated to

the freedom and ends of cap tal.

Marx’s nterpretat on of egelunquest onably helped h m formulate these

revolut onary ns ghts. But the quest on of what Marx h mself thought s not

the only quest on we can ask. Putt ng as dewhat Marxsa d,what shouldwesay

about the relat onsh p between egel’sLog c and the cr t que of pol t cal

economy?

egel’sLog cand the Concept of Cap tal (11)

Approach ng the quest on from the egels de, one cons derat on that should

make us pause before accept ng the standard p cture of egel accepted by

Marx,Postone and somany others s the content of the culm nat ng sect on of

egel’sLog c, the ‘Absolute Idea’.Th s sect on s devoted ent re fyto a d scuss on

of the methodology employed n that work.20Wedo not f nd hymns of pra se

to an al en Subject greed ly subsum ng flesh-and-blood human be ngs to ts

al en ends.We f nd nstead rem nders that ‘ npo nt of contents, thought sonly

true n proport on as t s nks tself n the facts’,accompan ed by a sober d scus

s on of the cla m that the progress on from one category to the next has been

s multaneously analyt c (each succeed ng category s mpl c t nwhat has gone

before) and synthet c (each determ nat on adds a new content to what has

gone before).21 Th s suggests that egel’s ‘Absolute’may not be the Grand

Puppet-Master that Marx takes t to be. A reasonably char table read ng of the

text suggests nstead that ‘absolute thought’ refers nstead to anyone’sth nk ng

so far as t ‘cogn ze[s] the mmanent soul of [the] mater al and . . . concede[s]

to t ts r ght to ts own proper l fe',Marx’sown self-professed goal.22Toput the

po nt provocat vely,to the extent Marx’ssystemat c reconstruct on n thought

ofthe essent al determ nat ons ofcap tal sm trulycaptures the cap tal stmode

20 ‘It s certa nly poss ble to ndulge n a vast amount of senseless declamat on about the

ea absolute. But ts true content s only the whole system of wh ch we have been

h therto study ng the development’ ( egel 1975[1817],§237,pp. 292-3).

21 egel 1975 [1817],§23, p. 36; §238, p. 294.

22 Marx 1986 [1857-8], p. 10.



26 SMIT

of product on n ‘ tsown proper l fe’,Marx’sth nk ng can leg t mately be sa d

to exempl fy ‘absolute thought’ n egel’ssense of the term!23

When assess ng Marx’sread ng of egel t s also mportant to recall that

egeluses cruc al terms n unfam l ar ways.It s natural to assume that to talk

of a ‘self-actual s ngun versal' s to re fy a thought-construct, treat ng t as an

ent ty somehow capable of act on. But t turns out th s s s mply egel’s nex

cusany d osyncrat cway of d scuss ng the relat onsh p between th nk ng as

an act v ty —your th nk ng, my th nk ng, the th nk ng of any ‘1’—and the

thoughts that are the products of th s act v ty:

The product of th s act v ty [th nk ng], the form or character pecul ar to

thought, s the UNIVERSAL,or, n general, the abstract. Thought, regarded

as an act v ty,may be accord ngly descr bed as the act ve un versal, and

s nce the deed, ts product, s the un versal once more, may be called a

self-actual s ng un versal. Thought conce ved as a subject (agent) s a

dr nker, and the subject ex st ng as a th nker s s mply denoted by the

term ‘1’.24

S m larly, egel tells us that the odd dea of a ‘self-act ng’content of thought s

to be understood as ‘acontent object velyand ntr ns cally determ ned’, wh ch

prec selyMarx’snot on of a cogn t on that concedes to the mater al ‘ tsr ght

to ts own proper l fe’.25The mean ng of the unden ably strange term ‘ nfm te

thought’alsoturns out tonot be as strange asf rst appears.Anyonewho accepts

that weare capable ofth nk ng about our th nk ng accepts ‘ nfm tethought’ n

egel’ssense of the term:

Thenom nal explanat on of call nga th ng f n te s that t has an end, that

ex sts up to a certa n po nt only,when t comes nto contact w th, and

l m ted by, ts other . . . In hav ng a thought for object, 1am at home w th

myself.The th nk ng power, the ‘I’, s therefore nf n te, because, when t

th nks, t s n relat on to an object wh ch s tself.26

23 Idonot need to downplaythe d fferencesbetween the two theor sts;Marx r ghtly rejected

egel's expans ve account of the a pr or constra nts on emp r cal exper ence. On the

other hand, Marx too rejected a na ve emp r c sm, and there are good reasons to assert

that egel’spos t on does not n pr nc ple rule out ‘emp r cally respons ve though not

emp r cally leg t mated' categor es. See P ppen 1989,pp. 258—60.

24 egel 1975 [1817], §2o, p. 29.

25 egel 1975 [1817], §121,p. 177;Marx 1986 [1857—8],p. 10.

26 egel 1975 [1817], §28, p. 49.




These are, adm ttedly, qu te odd ways of talk ng, even by the odd standards of

ph losophy.But the real t es towh ch egelrefersw th these terms are not odd

the way n wh ch cap tal s odd. 1cannot th nk of any reason why anyone

would adopt egel’susages n a future soc al st soc ety.But t would, I th nk, be

completely correct to say after the re gn of cap tal has been overthrown that

thought s a ‘self-actual s ng un versal', that a content can be ‘self-actual s ng’,

or that thought can be ‘ nf n te’, n egel’ssense of these terms. Th s suggests

that the relat onsh p between these egel an themes and cap tal s by no

means as nt mate asMarx supposed.

An equally mportant reason to quest on Marx’sread ng can be found n

egel’sown account of what an nst tut onal framework would have to look

l ke to nstant ate the Log c of the Concept adequately. In the most general

terms, t would have to const tute a rat onal soc al order. In egel’s(unsurpr s

gly d osyncrat c) sense of the term, the ‘rat onal ty’of any ontolog cal reg on

const tuted by a thorough med at on of un versal ty,part cular ty and s ngu

lar ty n that reg on. Such rat onal ty s establ shed theoret cally by recon

struct ng the fundamental determ nat ons of the g ven reg on as a system of

syllog sms n wh ch ‘each of [the] funct ons of the not on [un versal ty, par

t cular ty, nd v dual ty], as t sbrought by ntermed at on to coalescew th the

other extreme, s brought nto un on w th tself and produces tself’.27Th s

termed at on takes a spec f c form n spec f c reg ons. In the sphere of soc o

pol t cal nst tut ons and pract ces (‘Object veSp r t’ n egel an term nology)

rat onal ty s not merely a matter of ntermed at ons const tut ng an ‘organ c’

system reproduc ng tself over t me. ‘Rat onal ty’has n add t on a strong nor

mat ve d mens on nvolv ng the freedom and flour sh ng of nd v duals and

commun t es.

egel bel eved that the complex med at ons n modern pol t cal soc ety

connect ng nd v dual agents, a c v l soc ety ncorporat ng general sed com

mod ty-product on (part cular ty), and the modern state (un versal ty)could

be reconstructed n terms of a system of syllog smsestabl sh ng the requ s te

object ve normat v ty. e br efly reconstructed th s soc alorder as a systemof

syllog sms n the follow ng passage from TheEncyclopaed a Log c:

In the pract cal sphere the state s a system of three syllog sms. 1)The

d v dual or person, through h s part cular ty or phys cal or mental

needs (wh ch when carr ed out to the r full development g ve c v lsoc

ety), s coupled w th the un versal, .e. w th soc ety, law, r ght, govem

ment. (2) The w ll or act on of the nd v dual s the nterrned at ng force

27 egel 1975 [1817], §198, p. 265.



28 SMIT

wh ch procures for these needs sat sfact on n soc ety, n law, etc., and

wh ch g vesto soc ety,law,etc. the r fulf llment and actual zat on. (3)But

the un versal, that s to say the state, government, and law, s the perma

nent underly ng mean n wh ch the nd v duals and the r sat sfact on

have and rece ve the r fulf lledreal ty, ntermed at on, and pers stence.28

ThePh losophy of R ght should be read as egel’smost comprehens ve and

deta led attempt to establ shthe strong normat vejust f cat on of the modern

soc o-pol t cal order through th s sort of system of syllog sms.

egel’sargument for the rat onal ty of the modern soc al world cannot be

accepted. s soc al ontology ncludes free nd v duals, the r mot ves and acts,

the ntended and un ntended consequences of those acts, the (supposedly)

quas -natural assoc at on of the fam ly,free assoc at ons of nd v duals n c v l

soc ety, the pol t cal commun ty and ts customs, laws and state-apparatus,

and external relat ons among states n world-h story. ‘Cap tal’ s nv s ble. And

that, as they say, s l ke amlet w thout the Pr nce. None of the agents and

st tut ons just l sted can be adequately comprehended n abstract on from

the al en power of ‘cap tal’to subord nate human ends to ts end, the self

valor sat on of value.The quest on here, however, s not whether egel’sown

soc al and pol t cal theory s sat sfactory. It s whether egel un ntent onally

contr buted to the understand ng of cap tal sm by develop ng 3 Log cof the

Concept prec sely homologous w th the ‘log cof cap tal’.Th s would be the

case f t were poss ble rat onally to reconstruct a soc al order of general sed

commod ty-exchange as a system of syllog smsmed at ng un versal ty, part c

ular ty and s ngular ty along the requ s te l nes once cap tal has been made

v s ble.Th s cannot be done.

As noted above, egel's Log cof the Concept calls for a ‘d st nct on of the

d v dual from the un versalwh ch as such s cont nuous w th that wh ch s

d fferent ated from t and s dent calw th t’.Aswehave also seen, n the reg on

of soc o-pol t cal pract ces and nst tut ons th s ‘cont nu ty' and ‘ dent ty’are

to be taken n a strong normat ve sense n wh ch the well-be ng of nd v duals

and groups n a commun ty s systemat cally furthered by the un versal organ

ng pr nc ple of the soc ety. Cap tal s not connected to nd v duals and

groups n th s way. Fundamental human ends (health, stable commun t es,

challeng ngwork, free t me for relat ons w th fam ly and fr ends and projects

of our own choos ng, and so on) are furthered n a profoundly part al and pre

28 egel 1975 [1817], §198, pp. 264—5.




car ous manner, to be sacr f ced when the valor sat on- mperat ve demands

the r sacr f ce.

In the relevant sense appl cable to the reg on ofsoc o-pol t calpract ces and

st tut ons the concept of cap tal does not f t what egel referred to as the

Log cof the Concept. Marx, however, was correct to th nk that egel an cate

gor es llum nate the soc al ontology of cap tal sm. We just need to look

elsewhere.

‘Essence-Log c’and the Cr t que of Pol t cal Economy

Let us return aga n to the n t al level of Marx’stheory. The general sed com

mod ty-product on exam ned there nvolvesa more extens veform of soc al ty

than prev ous modes of product on. Soc al connect ons of unprecedented

scale and scope are establ shed as commod ty-producers respond to the wants

and needs of an ndef n te range of soc al agents d spersed over an ndef n te

geograph cal range. Th s soc al ty, however, takes an nd rect form. Producers

have no ex ante assurance that the r endeavours w ll actually play a role n

soc al reproduct on. The r pr vately undertaken product on must be soc ally

val dated expost through exchange or else the r effortsw llhave been wasted.

Adopt ng a term from Kant, we may term th s form of soc al ty d ssoc ated (or

asoc al) soc al ty.

In so far as pr vately undertaken product on s soc allyval dated, products

acqu re a spec al property, value (‘exchangeab l ty n def n te proport ons’).

Th s qual tat vely homogeneous property s d st nct from both the heteroge

neous qual tat ve propert es that make part cular goods or serv ces useful to

the r purchasers (‘use-value’),and from the part cular rat os n wh ch they are

exchanged for other th ngs (‘exchange-value’).S m lar cons derat ons allow us

to d st ngu sh the concrete (qual tat vely heterogeneous) features mark ng off

one form of labour from another (‘concrete labour’), and the (qual tat vely

homogeneous) feature all soc ally val dated labours share of be ng value

produc ng (‘abstract labour’).Wemust also note that f general sed commod ty

product on s to be v able a general sed means of soc al val dat on s requ red,

a part cular th ng n wh ch value (an abstract on) appears concretely n a

soc ally object ve manner, a th ng w th the abstract and homogeneous prop

erty of un versal exchangeab l ty. Th s th ng, whatever t s, s money. The fol

lOW ngd agram dep cts the nherently c rcular relat onsh ps of mutual

determ nat on n play:



30 SMIT

[Concrete labour] -»Commod ty: [Use-value] /Exchange value—vMoney

C a (D ssoc ated)oc al ty ‘j

Marx’snot on offet sh sm refers to the relat onsh p between soc al ty and the

soc al forms of commod ty, money and value. Every soc al d v s on of labour

meets soc al wants and needs by mob l s ng the creat ve powers of soc al

agents (and the powersof nature, the past cultural ach evements of human ty,

sc entch and technolog cal knowledge, and so on, that soc al agents mob l se

through the r acts). But when soc al ty takes the h stor cally spec f c form of

d ssoc ated soc al ty these soc al relat ons are med ated through relat ons

among th ngs (commod t es, money).

Before cons der ng how th s framework relates to egel’sLog cwe should

f rst pay close attent on to how egeldel nes the project of th s work:

Abstract labour —> Value 4

The study of truth . . . const tutes the proper problem of log c . . . In our

everydaym nd we are never troubled w th quest ons of the truth of the

forms of thought. Wemayalso express the problem of log cby say ngthat

exam nes the forms of thought touch ng the r capac ty to hold truth.29

The l rst part of the Log c,the Doctr ne of Be ng,cons ders explanatory frame

works (‘formsof thought’) n wh ch truths regard ng the qual tat ve, quant ta

t veandmeasured determ nat ons of nd v dual ‘someth ngs’canbe art culated.

egelestabl shes the nadequacy of th s level by show ng that thought-forms

supposedly referr ng to an nd v dual ‘someth ng’log callyrequ re a trans t on

to ts ‘other’.Th s s not to deny that the categor es of Qual ty, Quant ty and

Measurehave a ‘capac tyto hold truth’; there are theoret cal and pract cal con

texts nwh ch the use of these categor es s completely appropr ate for express

ng the truths w th wh ch we are concerned. egel’spo nt s s mply that there

are more concrete and complex ontolog cal structures (or, better, structured

processes), the truths about wh ch cannot be formulated w th these relat vely

abstract and s mple log calcategor es.

Marx’stheory beg ns where the Doctr ne of Be ng ends. egel starts w th

the pure s mpl c tyand utter empt ness of a categoryenabl ng only an afl rma

t on of be ng; Marx beg ns w th the complex ty of the ‘commod ty’ n gener

29 egel 1975 [1817], §z4, p. 41.




al sed commod ty-product on, rent n two by the mass vegulf separat ng (the

nonetheless nseparany conjo ned) d mens ons of use-value and exchange

value. egel then cons ders attempts to categor se a supposedly separate

‘someth ng’ n terms of what t s n tself, apart from ts relat onsh p to what s

‘other’,w th the ncoherence of all such attempts a result. Marx, n contrast,

beg ns h s cr t que of pol t cal economy w th a soc al world n wh ch: a) no

separate commod ty can be adequately comprehended n tself,apart from ts

relat ons to other commod t es; and b) no separate act ofproduc ng commod

t es can be adequately comprehended apart from ts relat ons to other acts

w th n a soc al d v s on of labour.30Th s swhyMarx ns sts that the mmanent

measure of value s not labour-t me, but soc allynecessary labour-t me.31

In contrast, the second major part of egel’sLog c,the Doctr ne of Essence,

does prov de categor es appl cable to the soc al ontology of general sed

commod ty-product on. Essence-categor es come after those of the Doctr ne

of Be ng n egel’s order ng because they def ne cogn t ve frameworks that

allow truths about more concrete and complex states of affa rs to be art cu

lated. The determ nat ons n the Doctr ne of Essencecome n pa rs, ne ther of

wh ch can be cons dered apart from the other. In egel an jargon, each s

reflected n the other; truths are art culated w th n explanatory frameworks

relat ng an essence and ts appearances, a cause and ts effects, a substance

and ts acc dents, and so on.

Marx’saccount of the relat onsh p between value and money s a parad g

mat c nstance of such an explanat on.32 The value of commod t es s an

‘essence’that necessar ly must appear n money.Each s ‘reflected’ n the other:

money s f rst and foremost the soc allyobject vemeasure ofvalue,wh levalue

can only be actual sed through money, ts form of appearance. General sed

commod ty-product on must be conceptual sed as a set of relat onsh ps

among th ngs (commod t es and money), w th value re gn ng as the ‘essence’

of these relat onsh ps. The underly ng truth of th s essence (abstract, homoge

neous and quant tat ve value) s adequately man fested n ts form of appear

ance (abstract, homogeneous and quant tat ve money).

As Marx shows, however, matters are much more compl cated than th s.

Moneymay be the adequate form n wh ch value appears, but what prec sely

30 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 125.

31 Labour-t me s soc ally wasted - value s not created — f d Eerent sorts of commod t es

are preferred by those w th d sposable ncome, or f sul c ent numbers of other

commod t es of the same (or subst tutable) sort have already been produced to meet

effect vedemand, or f other producers of the same (or subst tutable) sort of commod ty

have atta ned suff c ently h gher rates of product v ty. See Marx 1976c[1867],pp. 201—2.

32 See Murray 1993.



32 SMIT

s value? It s the re l ed and al en form soc al ty takes when t s n the h stor

cally spec f c mode of d ssoc ated soc al ty. From th s perspect ve value and

money together are the explanandum (what s to be expla ned), wh le the

explanans do ng the explanatory work s the form of soc al ty n general sed

commod ty-product on. From th s perspect ve soc al ty s the ‘essence’of the

realm under nvest gat on. And th s essence s not man fested n a form ade

quately express ng ts truth.When soc al ty takes the h stor cally spec f c shape

of d ssoc ated soc al ty,soc al relat ons do not and cannot appear as what they

essent ally are. When Marx wr tes that ‘each nd v dual . . . carr es h s soc al

power, as also h s connect on w th soc ety, n h s pocket' we are to take th s

assert on l terally.33Th s state of affa rs systemat cally occludes the essent al

matter, the dom nant formof soc al ty n our epoch:

In proport on as the producers become dependent upon exchange,

exchange appears to become ndependent of them . . . Money does not

create th s oppos t on and th s contrad ct on; on the contrary, the r devel

opment creates the apparently transcendental power of money.34

Marx reveals the soc al ontology of general sed commod ty-product on to be

more complex, and more b zarre, than anyth ng found n egel an soc al the

ory. But categor es from egel’sLog cmust necessar ly be employed to com

prehend t adequately, even f the egel an echoes rema n unnot ced. The

soc al ontologyofgeneral sed commod ty-product on sdef nedby twocompletely

ncommensurable Essence-Log cs n egel’ssense of the term. On the one hand,

value s the essence commod t es must possess to play a role n soc al repro

duct on. Th s essence adequately appears n the form of the money that val

dates the product on of those commod t es. But the value of commod t es s a

reflect on of the form taken by human soc al ty n our epoch, and the money

that man fests value s noth ng but the fet sh sed appearance of th s qu te d f—

ferent sort of essence. Eachessence-cla m s ncompat ble w th the other; ne

ther can be reduced to or expla ned awayby the other.

Th s very pecul ar Essence-Log c s not overcome when Marx moves to the

more concrete level of nvest gat on. The same fundamental contrad ct ons

and antagon sms rema n after Marx establ shes that general sed commod ty

product on s cap tal st product on. In stark contrast to egel's aj7’ rmat ve

systemat c d alect c, n wh ch later levels overcome the fundamental contra

d ct ons and shortcom ngs exam ned earl er, n Marx’scr t cal systemat c d a

33 Marx 1986 [1857—8],p. 94.

34 Marx 1986 [1857—8],p. 84.




lect cmore complex and concrete theoret cal levelsreproduce and deepen the

t al contrad ct ons and shortcom ngs.35More spec f cally,Marx’sconcept of

cap tal does not overcome the fet sh sm that wasa feature of the n t al levelof

Marx’stheory; the concept of cap tal s the concept of cap tal-fet sh sm.

The follow ng d agram attempts to dep ct the mutual determ nat ons on

th s level of abstract on:

Cap tal (value- n-process)

(Means of product on)

M —> C Product on-process... C’ —>M’

(Investment-cap tal) (Labour-power) (Inventory cap tal)

)

> (D ssoc ated) soc al ty

From one po nt of v ew cap tal s an all-powerful essence, un t ng ts var ous

moments n a dynam c structured process. But cap tal’s ‘act v ty’,the ‘self

valor sat on of value’, s l terally noth ng but the explo tat on of l v ng labour.35

And the powers of cap tal are l terallynoth ng but the appropr ated collect ve

creat ve powers of l v nglabour (alongw th the powers of sc ence, mach nery,

nature, pre-cap tal st cultural ach evements, and so on, that l v ng labour

mob l ses). These powers necessar ly appear n al en form as the powers of

cap tal due ent rely to the pecul ar organ sat on of soc al relat ons of our h s

tor cal epoch. The nd v dual worker s str pped of all connect on w th the

object ve cond t ons of labour (means of product on, means of subs stence),

desp te the fact that these cond t ons are noth ng but the products of collec

t ve soc al labour.37As a result the nd v dual worker s forced to put h s or her

creat ve powers at cap tal’s d sposal, thereby mak ng them n a sense cap tal’s

35 ‘Thework I am presently concerned w th s a Cr t que of Econom cCategor es or, f you

l ke, a cr t cal exposé of the system of the bourgeo s economy.It s at once an exposéand,

by the same token, a cr t que of the system’ (Marx 1983c[1858],p. 268).

35 “Thepos t ng of surplus value bywage labour s the self—valor sat onof cap tal’ (Marx 1986

[1357-8], p. 253). See also p. 390.

37 Marx 1986 [1857—8],pp. 381—4.



34 SMIT

powers.38So long as the soc al forms of ‘d ssoc ated soc al ty’ rema n n place,

everyth ngfunct ons as f cap tal were an AbsoluteSubjectw th transcendent

powers stand ng over the soc al world, subsum ng all other powers under ts

valor sat on- mperat ve. But f that form of soc al ty were to be replaced, the

supposedly absolute powers of cap tal would absolutely d ss pate. The ent re

po nt of a cr t que of pol t cal economy s to br ng that day forward by reveal

ng that the emperor, cap tal, has no clothes, so to speak.39

In the afhrmat ve systemat c d alect c of egel’sLog cthe contrad ct ons of

Essence-Log c are overcome n the advance to the Log c of the Concept. ln

Marx’scr t cal d alect c, n contrast, these contrad ct ons are repeated n suc

cess velymore complex and concrete ways."0After t has been made expl c t

that general sed commod ty-product on s cap tal st product on we st ll con

front a b zarre soc al ontology w th two antagon st c, rreconc lable and yet

equally compell ng cla ms to be the essent al matter: cap tal as ‘subject’ (and

‘self-mov ngsubstance’) on the one hand, and the powers of (and those mob l

ed by) human soc al ty on the other.41

egeld d not aff rmthe rat onal ty of the modern (cap tal st) order because

h s not on of the ‘Log cof the Concept’ shomologous w th the coerc on, al en

at on and expropr at on of cap tal. e a l rmed ts rat onal ty because, lack ng

an adequate concept of cap tal, he d d not recogn se how coerc on, al enat on

and expropr at on pervade modern soc ety.Cap tal sm does not nst tute the

sort of harmon ous reconc l at on of un versal ty,part cular ty and s ngular ty

38 ‘Inexchange for h s labour capac ty as a g venmagn tude [that s,a wage] he [the worker]

surrenders ts creat ve power, l ke Esau who gave up h s b rthr ght for a mess of

pottage . . . [T]he creat vepower ofh s labour establ shes tself as the power of cap tal and

confronts h m as an al en power' (Marx 1986[1857-8], p. 233).

39 ‘Therecogn t on of the product as ts [labour’s]own, and ts awareness that ts separat on

from the cond t ons of ts real sat on s an njust ce - a relat onsh p mposed byforce — s

an enormous consc ousness, tself the product of the cap tal st mode of product on and

just as much the KNELLTOITSDOOMas the consc ousness of the slave that he could not

be the property of the another reduced slavery to an art f c al, l nger ng ex stence, and

made t mposs ble for t to cont nue to prov de the bas s of product on’ (Marx 1986[1857—

8]. PP- 390—1)

40 ‘Theproduct v ty of labour becomes the product ve power of cap tal n the same way

as the general exchange value of commod t es f xes tself n money’ (Marx 1986 [1857—8],

P- 234)

41 ‘The cap tal st obta ns, n exchange, labour tself, labour as value-pos t ng act v ty, as

product ve labour; .e. he obta ns the product ve power wh ch ma nta ns and mult pl es

cap tal and wh ch therefore becomes the product ve power and reproduc ng power of

cap tal, a power belong ng to cap tal tself (Marx 1986 [1857—8],p. 204). See also Marx

1987a [1857—8], p. 86.



EGEL, MARXAND T E COMPRE ENSION OF CAPITALISM

requ red to nstant ate the Log cof the Concept n the soc o-pol t cal realm.

Cap tal sm therefore lacks rat onal ty n egel’sstrongly normat ve sense of

the term. It could even be sa d that egel’sLog cof the Concept prov des a

categor alframework w th n wh ch cap tal can besubjectedtocr t que,although

egel h mself, lack ng an adequate concept of cap tal, fa led to recogn se

th s.42Marx, lack ng an adequate nterpretat on of egel, fa led to recogn se

exactly wh ch categor es from egel’sLog ccome nto play n the cr t que of

pol t cal economy. Cap tal sm s def ned by a contrad ctory Essence-Log c, n

egel’ssense of the term, fromwh ch we cannot escape w thout the h stor cal

creat on of a new form of soc al ty.

Marx's Methodolog cal Framework and egel'sLog c

As noted prev ously, Marx ment oned that egel’sLog cproved useful to h m

as he worked out the methodolog cal framework of h s own theory. The exact

relat onsh p between the Log cand Marx's methodolog cal framework, how

ever, rema ns a matter of cons derable d spute. The substant ve cla ms

defended above have mpl cat ons for our understand ng of th s ssue.Noade

quate treatment of such a complex top c s poss ble n the space rema n ng.

owever,a few prov s onal remarks can be made n the course of cons der ng

two recent hypotheses:

1)Anumber of prom nent Marx an scholars hold that the systemat c order ng

of determ nat ons n Marx'scr t que of pol t cal economy closelycorresponds

to the l near order n wh ch egelpresents the categor es of h s Log c.Authors

defend ng th s cla m have greatly llum nated Marx’suse of spec f c egel an

mot fs, and Marx may well have had the order ng of categor es n the Log c n

m nd as he composed at least part of the Grundr sse( t s much less plaus ble

to th nk th s was the case as he wrote Cap tal). Nonetheless, I th nk there are

good reasons to be scept cal of th s v ew.

42 ‘As ck body s not n harmony w th the not on of body. . .The subject and pred cate of t

do not stand to each other n the relat on of real ty and not on’ ( egel 1975[1817],§172,p.

237).The same should be sa d of the s ck soc ety that s cap tal sm.The cr t cal d mens on

of egel's Log c of the Concept should not be surpr s ng to those fam l ar w th h s

normat ve assessments of the tyranny of anc ent Egypt,rel g ouscommun t es subjected

to the d ctates of an al en God the Father, or the AbsoluteTerror of Robesp erre. Allwere

condemned by egel for nst tut onal s ng an Essence-Log c n wh ch an al en power

lords over human subjects.



36 SMIT

egel and Marx both ns sted that a systemat c d alect cal theory must be

governed by the ‘ nner nature’ of what s be ng exam ned, the ‘soul of the

object’.It would be an amaz ng co nc dence f there were a one-to-one map

p ng of each step n the two systemat c progress ons unless egel’sand Marx’s

projects were n some cruc al respect the same project. Defenders of th s v ew

d sagree among themselves about what th s ‘cruc al respect’ m ght be. In

Arthur’s read ng of the Log c,for example, ts categor es are abstract ons that

supposedly determ ne mater al real ty.43Th s deal st metaphys cs, Arthur

ns sts, must be rejected. But, he cont nues, egel’sperverse metaphys cs s

prec selywhat makes h s work nd spensable for the comprehens on of a per

verse soc al order. Beg nn ngw th ‘value’,the essent al deterrn nat ons of cap

tal sm are ‘real abstract ons’ that do n fact shape mater al real ty. egel’s

comprehens ve systemat c account of abstract log cal forms thus presages

Marx’scomprehens ve systemat caccount of the real abstract ons dom nat ng

soc al l fe n cap tal sm. For Meaney, n contrast, the plaus b l ty of the cla m

that the progress on n Marx’ssystemat c theory corresponds to the order ng

of egel’sLog c s rooted n a far more pos t ve assessment of egel.44 In

Meaney’s read ng the Log cdevelops the most comprehens ve and accurate

account everprov ded of the determ nat ons oforgan cwholes. In so far as the

cap tal st mode of product on s an organ c whole, any comprehens ve and

accurate reconstruct on of ts determ nat ons w ll therefore parallel the order

g of determ nat ons n the Log c.

In the prev ous sect on of th s chapter, I argued aga nst read ng the Log cas

the unfold ng of a re f ed and all-powerful Absolute Thought, appeal ng to

egel’sown statement that ‘log c. . . exam nes the forms of thought touch ng

the r capac ty to hold truth’.Ifth s nterpretat on saccepted the foundat on of

Arthur’saccount of the relat onsh p between the Log cand the methodolog

cal framework ofMarx’stheory d s ntegrates. It s s mplynot plaus ble to th nk

that an order ng of ‘the formsof thought touch ng the r capac ty to hold truth’

must co nc de more or less exactlyw th a systemat c order ng of the essent al

determ nat ons of cap tal sm; the two projects arejust too d fferent Meaney’s

qu te d fferent (and qu te ncompat ble) explanat on for the correspondence

of the two order ngs suffers from a qu te d fferent problem. If the substant ve

account g ven n earl er sect ons of th s chapter saccepted, the soc al ontology

of cap tal s far more complex, contrad ctory and b zarre than the ‘normal’

organ c wholes egel theon'sed.

43 Arthur 2002.

44 Meaney zooz.




As argued above, egel’s and Marx’s theor es develop n qu te d fferent

d rect ons. egel’saff rmat ve systemat c d alect c moves forward through the

overcom ng of contrad ct ons to arr ve at progress velymore rat onal (onto-)

log cal forms.Marx’stheory also ‘progresses' n the sense that later determ na

t ons allow a more complex and concrete comprehens on ofgeneral sed com

mod ty-product on than earl er ones do. But n Marx’scr t cal d alect c later

determ nat ons do not prov de explanatory frameworks nwh ch h gher-order

truths can be art culated n the manner of egel’sLog c—ust the oppos te.

Themost fundamental contrad ct ons and antagon sms exam ned byMarxat

the beg nn ng levels of abstract on are not overcome as the theory progresses.

They are nstead repeated n more complex and concrete forms. Rather than

reveal ng the nner nature of cap tal n ever more adequate ways,the later cat

egor es n Marx’sprogress on reveal how cap tal’s nner nature s progress vely

obscured, so that t appears as f c rculat on-t me, mach nery, f nanc al nstru

ments, land and so on can themselves create value and surplus-value.

In any attempt to establ sh n deta l a one-to-one mapp ng of the categor es

of the Log cand the essent al determ nat ons of cap tal sm there w ll,I bel eve,

be many cases where the d sanalog es between two supposedly homologous

categor es are at least as str k ng as the parallels. Forreasons g ven n the prev

ous sect on, for example, I bel eve that the d sanalog esbetween the categor es

of utter s mpl c ty n egel’sDoctr ne of Be ng and the already expl c t and

reduc ble complex ty of the beg nn ng determ nat ons of Marx’stheory are

far stronger than any analog es that m ght be drawn.

In other cases where a part cular egel an log cal form does correspond

qu te closely to a part cular determ nat on n Marx’sorder ng, I bel eve t s

very l kelythat there w ll be one or more other places nMarx’sd alect c that t

lum nates just as well.Th swould seem to underm ne the cla m that there s

one and only one pr mary po nt of correspondence between the detenn na

t ons n the two systemat c progress ons.45

There may be good reasons, then, to regard the project of trac ng a one-to

one mapp ng between the categor es of the Log cand the determ nat on of

45 Artth and Meaney’sproposedmapp ngs between the categor esof the Log cand those

ofMarx’stheory qu ckly d verge.Arthur uses up all of the former, so to speak, by the t me

he gets to Marx's relat vely early not on of ‘the general formula of cap tal’ (the

determ nat ons that followthen are mapped to the categor es from egel’sPh losophyof

Nature). For Meaney the mapp ng w th the Log cextends much further, cover ng all the

levels of abstract on traversed n the Grundr sse. I bel eve there are numerous cases n

wh ch the correspondence between a spec f c determ nat on n Marx’sorder ng and a

spec f c egel an category defended by one s no less llum nat ng than the d fferent

correspondence proposed bythe other.



38 SMIT

Marx’scr t que of pol t cal economy as a hermeneut cal stra tjacket we need

not put on.

2) A qu te d fferent account of way egel’sLog c llum nates the method

olog cal framework of Marx’stheory sh fts attent on from the complete set of

determ nat ons n both accounts to the grand sweep of Marx’stheory and the

categor es from a part cular chapter n egel’swork. In th s perspect ve the

movement fromcap tal n general (understood as the theory of the product on

and c rculat on of total soc al cap tal), through many cap tals (the ‘red str bu

t on’ of total soc al cap tal w th n and across d fferent sectors of cap tal), to

bank-cap tal (the emp r cally e dst ng form of cap tal as such) corresponds to

the moments of un versal ty, part cular ty and s ngular ty exam ned n the

chapter of the Log ct tled ‘TheConcept’.

Marxhad egel’sprogress on n m nd at cruc al po nts as he worked out the

arch tecton c of h s theory.46 ere too, however, the quest on of what Marx

h mself may or maynot have thought s not the only quest on worth ask ng.We

may also enqu re whether there are suff c ent reasons for us to say that the

grand sweep of Marx’stheory follows egel’streatment of un versal ty, part c

ular ty and s ngular ty. Ser ouscompl cat ons ar se regard ng each of the three

supposed correspondences.

Atthe beg nn ng of a egel ansystemat c order ng the ‘un versal ty’we f nd

an empty, ndeterm nate, abstract un versal ty.47At the conclus on of the

theory we atta n a comprehens on of concrete un versal ty,that s,a un versal

y whose determ nat ons are fullydeveloped and expl c t.48Marx’snot on of

‘cap tal n general’ s not homologousw th e ther of these not ons of un versal

y. ‘Cap tal n general’ s not an empty abstract on. Nor s t transcended as

Marx’stheory advances, the waythe mmed ate (s mple) form of abstract un

versal ty s transcended n egel’smethodolog cal framework; the aggregate

sum oftotal soc alcap tal determ ned on the levelof cap tal n general rema ns

the key determ n ng quant ty on more concrete theoret cal levels.49On the

other hand, ‘cap tal n general’does not correspond to the egel an not on of

concrete un versal ty e ther.The latter ncludes all essent al determ nat ons of

the relevant reg on, wh le the level of cap tal n general abstracts from all

essent aldeterm nat ons of cap tal not d rectly relevant to the product on and

46 For example, see Marx 1986 [1857—8],pp. 194—5,205—6.See also Moseley 1995and F nesch

zooga,as wellas the r contr but ons to th s volume.

47 egel descr bes ‘Be ng’,he f rst category of the Log c, n these terms.

48 In the Log c, concrete un versal ty s atta ned w th ‘the Absolute’, understood as ‘the

whole system of wh ch we have been h therto study ng the development’, that s, the

systemof ‘the forms of thought touch ng the r capac ty to hold truth’.See note 20.

49 See Moseley 1991.




c rculat on of total surplus-value. Noless mportantly, concrete un versal ty n

egel’sframework represents the culm nat on of a normat ve progress on, an

advance n rat onal ty to the h ghest form atta nable n the g ven ontolog cal

reg on. Th s all- mportant d mens on of egel’saff rmat ve systemat c d alec

t c s thoroughly absent n Marx’scr t cal d alect c.

On the theoret cal level of ‘manycap tals’,Marx explores how compet t on

tends to equal se rates of prol t through a (log cal)‘(re)d str but on’of surplus

value w th n sectors of ndustr al cap tal, and between ndustr al cap tal, on

the one hand, and non- ndustr al cap tals and rent ers, on the other. Th s

account of ‘many cap tals’ can ndeed be nterpreted n terms of the egel an

not on of ‘part cular ty'. But the theoret cal level of ‘manycap tals’ sjust one

of the places n h s theory where the egel an not on of part cular ty comes

to play.Were t not for the separat on of part cular un ts of product on from

each other and from the users of the r products at the verybeg nn ng ofMarx’s

systemat c progress on, all concrete labour would be mmed ately soc al

labour, and soc al tywould not take on the al en formof the monetary value of

commod t es. Part cular ty n th s sense pervades all levelsof determ nat ons

a systemat c reconstruct on of a soc al order based on d ssoc ated soc al ty.

Further,commod t es and money are also the part cular forms taken bycap tal

ts c rcu ts, wh le Department I and Department 11(produc ng means of pro

duct on and subs stence, respect vely) are the part cular forms of the repro

duct on of total soc al cap tal exam ned n Volume II. Part cular ty w ll

obv ously also come nto play on the much more concrete levels of the unwr t

ten books on compet t on, the state, fore gntrade and the world-market.There

does not appear to be any spec al reason for us to assert an exclus veconnec

t on between the not on of part cular ty and the levelofmany cap tals.

F nally, ‘s ngular ty’ n egel’s sense of the term can only be adequately

stant ated on a theoret cal level of full concreteness. The conceptual sat on

of bank-cap tal n the Grundr sse and Volume III of Cap tal n pr nc ple

abstracts from the state, nternat onal trade and the world-market. It therefore

lacks the full concreteness requ red for an adequate nstant at on of ‘s ngular

ty’ n egel’s sense of the term. No less mportantly, for egel ‘s ngular ty’

refers to the h ghest form of rat onal ty atta nable n a g ven ontolog cal

reg on.50NoMarx st would ever descr be bank-cap tal n these terms. Its char

acter st c c rcu t, M —M’,represents the most rrat onal form of the fet sh sm

50 In the soc o-pol t cal reg on egel descr bes the cr ter a n the follow ngterms: ‘Ther ght

of nd v duals to be subject velydeterm ned as free s fulf lled when they belong to an

actual eth cal order, because the r certa nty of the r freedom f nds ts truth n such an

object ve order, and t s n an eth cal order that they are actually n possess on of the r

own essence or the r own nner un versal ty" ( egel 2008 [1820],§153,p. 160).



4o SMIT

pervad nga soc al order ofd ssoc ated soc al ty,generat ng the bel ef that cap

tal can create surplus-value out of tself. For these two reasons ‘bank—cap tal’

cannot be nterpreted as a categoryof s ngular ty n the proper egel an sense

of the term.51

In the Log c, egel developed a methodolog cal framework progress ng

from s mple and abstract determ nat ons to progress velymore complex and

concrete levels of analys s. Marx adopted th s framework for h s cr t que of

pol t cal economy.52But th s was, I bel eve, a more creat ve adaptat on than

the two hypotheses cons dered n th s sect on suggest.

51 S ngular ty n egel's sense of the term s, however, nvoked elsewhere n Marx. t can be

d scerned n the not on ofa ‘free nd v dual ty,based on the un versal development of the

d v duals’,a form of nd v dual ty that actual ses ‘theun versal ty of the nd v dual not

as an mag nary concept, but as the un versal ty ofh s real and not onal relat ons' (Marx

1986,pp. 95,466).Unl ke egel,Marx understood that a world-h stor cal rupture from the

epoch of cap tal w llbe requ red for th s goal to be atta ned.

52 Sm th 1990.A strong defence of the cont nued v ab l ty of systemat c-d alect cal method

for cr t cal soc al theory today can be found n Reuten’scontr but on to th s volume.



C APTER 2

Cap tal Breeds: Interest-Bear ng Cap tal as Purely

Abstract Form

MarkMeaney

Introduct on

The ‘RosdolskyChallenge’

Roman Rosdolsky descr bes Marx’sGrundr sse manuscr pts as mak ng ‘mass ve

reference’ to egel’sSc enceofLog c(SL).11propose that Rosdolsky’scharacter

sat on leaves us w th an nterest ng challenge: to supply the footnotes. Tak ng

on the ‘Rosdolskychallenge’would f rst nvolvesolv ngthe problem ofjust how

to go about prov d ng c tat ons am d such ‘mass vereference’.There are over a

hundred log cal terms and phrases n the Grundn'ssethat Marxborrows d rectly

from8L.Meet ng the challenge would enta l close textual and ph lolog cal exe

ges s.To establ sh a c tat on, you would have to l nk a term or phrase as found

n the Grundr sse to a term or phrase as found n SL.The methodology sounds

s mpleenough, but anyonewho has everdone th s sort ofworkknowsjust how

m nd-numb neg d ff cult t can be. The magn tude of d ff culty ncreases expo

nent ally not least because SL s one of the most semant cally dense works ever

composed and, of course, the Grundn'ssemanuscr pts are no walk n the park

e ther. Yet,th s s prec sely what meet ng the ‘Rosdolskychallenge’ enta ls.

In th s chapter, I prov de an llustrat on of the value of the emp r cal

approach of ph lolog cal exeges s n exam n ng the relat onsh p of Marx’s

Grundr sse to egel’s8L. I choose a part cularly nettlesome trans t on n the

Grundr ssefrom prof t-bear ng cap tal to nterest-bear ng cap tal n llustrat ng

just how t ghtly Marxweaves 8L nto the fabr c of the manuscr pts. In prepar

g the trans t on, Marx descr bes cap tal as ‘self-reproduc ngand mult ply ng’

and, as such, perenn al.2 Moreover,he goes on to say that when cap tal relates

self to tself as self-reproduc ng, t d st ngu shes tself w th n tself from tself

as prof t, and then supersedes the separat on and thereby expands tself as

the subject of a self-expand ng c rcle, or sp ral.3 Cap tal breeds.4 If N colaus’s

1 Rosdolsky1992[1977],p.

2 Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 751;compare p. 851.

3 Ib d.

4 Of course, cap tal breeds only n and through relat ons w th al en labour.

© KONINKLIJKEBRILLNV,LEIDEN, 2014 I DOI l0.1163/9789004270022_004



42 MEANEY

translat on here s d ff cult, t s only because Marx’sGerman s l kew se excru

c at ngly turg d. More than one commentator has found Marx’s cho ce of

words here at least puzzl ng.Yet,Marx’s(ab)use of the German language at th s

po nt n the manuscr pts s a r ch ve n from wh ch to m ne numerous nuggets

establ sh ng a relat on of ndebtedness, n ‘dropp ng a footnote’, as t were.

Wecan go a long way toward solv ngthe puzzle of the or g n of Marx’sword ng

th s complex trans t on to ‘realcap tal’ by l nk ng the Grundr sse to SL,at the

appropr atejuncture. So,for example, bymak ng use of th s methodology, Iw ll

show how we can expla n Marx’sdeployment of phrases such as ‘self-repro

duc ng’and ‘realcap tal’ at prec se po nts n the manuscr pts by l nk ng Marx’s

languageto log cal terms and phrases egeluses n h s presentat on of ‘real sed

genus’,the concrete un versal.

In the conclus on, Imove from the llustrat on to cla m that we can meet the

‘Rosdolskychallenge’ only by ‘dropp ng a footnote’ for each and every trans

t on n the Grundn’ssemanuscr pts as mak ng ‘mass vereference’ to SL—a truly

daunt ng task.

ANote onMethod

In meet ng the ‘Rosdolskychallenge’,we must supplement ph lolog cal exege

s s of the relat on of the Grundrt'sseto SLw th an apprec at on of why Marx

would use a spec f c log cal term or phrase at a certa n po nt and yet never

aga n use that same term or phrase anywhere else n the manuscr pts. For

example, Marx uses ‘self-reproduc ng’and ‘self-expand ng c rcle’only and pre

c sely at the locat ons n the manuscr pts where he descr bes ‘real cap tal’ as

d st ngu sh ng tselfw th n tself from tself as prof t,and then supersed ng the

separat on thereby expand ng tself als SubjektdesKre ses.

I subm t that an answer to th s quest on rests on Marx’sunderstand ng of

the absolute necess ty of the order ng of the log cal categor es n SL.Marx

agreesw th egelon th s po nt. The necess ty of the order ng of log cal catego

r es makes egel’smethod the ‘sc ent f cally correct method'. In meet ng the

‘Rosdolskychallenge’,we must therefore supplement our ph lolog cal exeges s

w th anunderstand ng ofthe order ngofeconom c categor es n the Grundr sse

manuscr pts n relat on to the order ng of log cal categor es n SL.In short, we

map log cal terms or phrases n ‘dropp ng footnotes’ by rema n ng fa thful to

the log cal structure of both works. Log cal terms or phrases prov de us w th

s gnposts to log cal structure. The log cal structure of both works, n turn, pro

v des us w th clues n our construct on of a ph lolog cal map n ‘dropp ng

footnotes’.



CAPITAL BREEDS: INTEREST-BEARING CAPITAL As ABSTRACTFORM 43

Cond t ons of the Poss b l tyof Synthet c a pr or Knowledge

AReturn to the Introduct on

I do not pretend to be an econom st. I do not ent rely understand Marx's treat

ment of prof t from the po nt of v ew of econom cs. Wecan, however, prov de

an analys s of the underly ng log cal categor es of the structure of the argu

ments. We can also prov de an analys s of the log cal categor es of a part cular

argument n relat on to the structure of the whole of the Grundr sse.Moreover,

by us ng ph lolog cal exeges s,we can l nk the underly ng log cal categor es of

part cular arguments regard ng prof t and the overall log cal structure of the

manuscr pts to egel’sSL.Of course, our ph lolog cal exeges sand log cal anal

ys sof Marx’streatment of prof t must be coupled w th an apprec at on of h s

understand ng of the ‘sc ent f callycorrect method’ and the underly ng neces

s ty of the order ng of log cal categor es.

In a letter to Engels dated 16January 1858,Marx stated that a reread ng of SL

prov ded h m w th the conceptual tools that allowedh m to unlock the secrets

ofprof t.5Ofcourse, Marxtreats of the nature of prof t-bear ngcap tal, orwhat

he calls ‘real cap tal’, only at the very end of the Grundn'sse manuscr pts.

Intu t ver then, we m ght conclude that he here mpl es n h s letter to Engels

that he used 8L n order ng the ent rety of the mater als of the manuscr pts. Of

course, ntu t ons as de, prov ng such a cla m s the object of mywork. e also

expressed the des re to ‘makeaccess ble to the ord nary human ntell gence . . .

what s rat onal n the method wh ch egel d scovered but at the same t me

enveloped n myst c sm’.6Elsewhere he lamented that he w shed he had t me

to extract and make access ble the ‘rat onal kernel’conta ned n egel’streat

ment of sc ent f c method. What d d Marx take to be the ‘rat onal kernel’ n

egel'ssc ent f c method?

In the sect on ent tled ‘TheMethod of Pol t cal Economy’,Marx g ves us an

all-too-br ef account of the proper method of procedure n an expos t on of

the cap tal st mode of product on. Wh le he does not expl c tly cred t egel

here for hav ng d scovered th s method, t s clear n h s cr t c sm of egelthat

Marx s ndebted to h m for t. One beg ns w th what s g ven n exper ence:

complex or concrete th ngs. Because concrete th ngs are the result of a ‘con

centrat on of many determ nat ons', one’s n t al concept on s chaot c.

Invest gat on n t ally cons sts n mov ng analyt cally from th s chaot c concep

t on of a concrete whole to the s mple determ nat ons that are const tut ve of

t. av ng arr ved at the s mplest determ nat ons of the concrete whole, one

5 Marx1983a [1858],p.248.

6 Ib d.



44 MEANEY

then proceeds to order these determ nat ons of the whole n such a fash on

that one reconstructs the whole n one’sm nd.

Wecan see, n Marx’sshort expos t on of the nature of the ‘sc ent cally cor

rect method’,an elaborat on of what had only been h nted at n earl er works.

e re terates what had been stated n TheGerman Ideologyas the prem se of

true sc ent f c expos t on. The subject s soc ety: real men act ng together to

create and reproduce the r cond t ons of ex stence.The real rema ns after the

oret cal expos t on as before, ndependent of the thoughts of the sc ent st.

Nevertheless, the real s sa d to compr se a system of h erarch cally ordered

relat ons. The nature of the subject-matter, therefore, s not g ven to sense.

S ncethe whole s a funct on ng systemof h erarch cally ordered relat ons, the

reconstruct on of the real n the ‘wayof thought’ must be accompl shed n a

systemat c manner.

It s mportant to note at th s po nt that the term ‘concrete’has two part cu

lar denotat ons forMarx.It s on the one hand the ontolog cally pr or real. It s,

the language of the Cr t que,an ‘organ sm’.Asstated n TheGerman Ideology,

as expressed n the language of the deal sts, t s ‘substance’ or ‘soc ety as sub

ject’ or a ‘total ty’.The cap tal st mode of product on s represented n The

PovertyofPh losophyas a self-mov ng,self-reproduc ng whole compr s ng h er

arch callyordered, d alect cally related forms of ex stence. On the other hand,

the term ‘concrete’also denotes the complex. In th s sense t descr bes th ngs

such as ex st ng soc alsystems and also our sc ent f callyadequate concepts of

them. What s requ red n order to arr ve at knowledge of the complex s that

one must move from s mple or abstract determ nat ons of the whole toward a

complete elaborat on of the system of relat ons that compr se t. The ach eve—

ment of such a result n a ‘total ty of thoughts’ s sa d to be a ‘m rror ng’of the

concrete that s the ontolog callypr or real.

Now,because the concrete as ontolog cally pr or s an ‘organ sm’and so on,

the method that one uses n reconstruct ng the real n thought must be ade

quate to the object. Such a method must be based on the expos t on of what

had been termed ‘organ cdevelopment’ n earl er works. In fact, as Marx here

states, th s method s the only way that the m nd can appropr ate the real as

such, that s, n a ‘total ty of thoughts’. In say ng as much, Marx echoes what he

had sa d concern ng egel’s sc ent f c method n The Poverty of Ph losophy:

‘[l-Iegel] smerely reconstruct ng systemat cally and class fy ngby the absolute

method the thoughts wh ch are n the m nds of all’.7

In contend ng that the real (cap tal) s a system of h erarch cally ordered

and d alect cally related ‘parts’,wh ch must be appropr ated by the m nd n

7 Marx 1955 [1847]. p- 48.



CAPITAL BREEDSI INTEREST-BEARING CAPITAL AS ABSTRACTFORM 45

and through the use of a ‘sc ent callycorrect method’based on the expos t on

of ‘organ cdevelopment’, Marx s comm tted to the cla m that the real can only

be known through what egel terms W ssenschaft.I have demonstrated else

where the manner n wh chMarx’s‘lntroduct on’ s ndebted to chapter two of

sect on three of volume two of egel’sSL.8I w ll not rev s t the arguments

here; only to say that, follow ng egel, Marx d st ngu shes W ssenschajt nto

two parts or moments: cogn t on, or a ‘method of nqu ry’,and comprehens on.

Cogn t on s, n turn, further subd v ded nto two stages:analys s and synthes s.

In the n t al stage of research- nqu ry, the nvest gator f rst analyses a g ven

‘l v ngwhole’ by break ng t down nto ts ult mate const tuent ‘parts’ and

reduc ng t to ‘s mple concepts’. In mov ng from an n t al chaot c concept on,

an nvest gator proceeds by way of ‘s mple concepts’ to solate the ‘abstract

h ghest essence’ of the organ c whole. Ofcourse,weknow t tookMarxyears of

research to reduce the ‘parts’ of cap tal to ‘s mple concepts’ n solat ng ts

‘abstract h ghest essence’ am d raw econom c data n order then to beg n to

synthes se the data nto a theory.

Whereas n the n t al stage of cogn t on n research- nqu ry an nvest gator

hrst moves from the concrete to the abstract n analys s,the work of synthes s

a movement from the abstract toward a theory about the nterrelat on

among the ‘members’of the organ cwhole. I trotted out th swell-worn d ctum

only to make the po nt that Marx prov des us n the ‘Introduct on’w th a f ne

exampleofthe appl cat on ofthe latter stageofthe ‘methodof nqu ry’through

h s synthes s of ‘s mpleconcepts’ nto a general theorem of cap tal. In h s expo

s t on of the theorem, Marx moves from abstract un versal ty n def n t on,

through part cular determ nat ons n d v s on,to a demonstrat onthat cap tal s

an organ c whole of nterrelated ‘members’.As he notes n ‘Exchange and

Product on’,the method of nqu ry s complete w th the synthet c advance to,

or deduct on of, a general theorem: product on predom nates over the ‘mem

bers of a total ty, d st nct ons w th n a un ty’.9Moreover,a def n te product on

determ nes a def n te consumpt on, d str but on and exchange aswellas del

n te relat ons between these d fferentmoments.

Yet, for Marx as for egel, a general theorem s not comprehens on; cogn

t on, or the method of nqu ry, does not result n the comprehens on of the

‘l v ngwhole’.As I have d scussed elsewhere, follow ng egel, the ‘sc ent f cally

correct method’ s forMarxan a pr or synthes s and not a general deduct on of

a theorem per se.10ForMarx as for egel, the work of analys s and synthes s n

8 Meaney 2002, chapter 7.

9 Mm:973[1857—8].p-99

10 Meaney 2002,chapter 7.



45 MEANEY

the method of nqu ry prov des an dent f cat on of the ‘abstract h ghest

essence’of a g ven concrete whole, alongw th the deduct on of a general theo

rem about the nterrelat onsh p among the ‘membersof a total ty, d st nct ons

w th n a un ty’. Cogn t on or the method of nqu ry n no way results n a ‘m r—

ror ng’ n thought of the ‘l v ngwhole’ fromwh ch the nvest gat on or g nates.

Thoughnecessary,the analyt c and synthet c components of cogn t on are not

suff c entto reproduce the organ cwhole n the m nd of the nvest gator n the

‘wayof thought’.

Forexample, n an appl cat on of the method of nqu ry,Marx’sresearch no

doubt led h m to the conclus on that we must def ne ‘real cap tal’ as prof t

bear ng cap tal that becomes a commod ty by enter ng nto c rculat on as

nterest-bear ng cap tal. owever, the s mple deduct on of th s conclus on

does not fac l tate a comprehens on of prof t. In the Grundr sse, Marx labels

nterest-bear ng cap tal as the purelyabstractform of cap tal.11From a egel an

log cal standpo nt, th s s an extremely mportant observat on. It prov des us

w th a ph lolog cal clue as to the order ng pr nc ple of the whole of the

Grundr ssemanuscr pts.

Recallthat Marxd st ngu shes between two mean ngs of the term ‘concrete’.

On the f rst mean ng, the term denotes the ontolog cally pr or real: real men

act ng together to create and reproduce the r cond t ons of ex stence. The

expos t on of cap tal s thus grounded on the ontolog callypr or ‘concrete’;but,

s nce th s concrete sa systemat cororgan cwhole, t can onlybe comprehended

and through a systemat c expos t on. The second mean ng of the term ‘con

crete’ denotes the comprehens on of ‘real cap tal’ n a ‘total ty of thoughts’ by

way of the reconstruct on of th s organ c whole n the m nd through the sys

temat c expos t on of t. Accord ng to th s latter mean ng, the ‘concrete’ s not

the start ng po nt, but the end-result of the expos t on n the comprehens on

of the organ cwhole. The reconstruct on of ‘realcap tal’ n the m nd through

s systemat cexpos t on presupposes the work of cogn t on or the method of

qu ry.Comprehens on thus enta ls beg nn ng the systemat c expos t on w th

the most s mple or abstract determ nat ons of the whole dent f ed n the work

of cogn t on.The development of the systemat c expos t on starts from these

abstract determ nat ons and, through the development of progress velymore

concrete determ nat ons, f nallyarr ves at the knowledge of ‘real cap tal’ as an

organ c un ty.

In th s way, sc ent f c expos t on s for Marx what t s for egel, namely,

c rcular n nature. ‘Realcap tal’ s latent or mmanent even n the s mplest

form of s mple c rculat on. Wh le the latter s, of course, an ncomplete or par—

11 Marx 1973 [1857—8], p. 878.



48 MEANEY

whole w th n th s un versal ty.To th s extent, the absolute method s analyt c

because the analys s of the subject-matter takes place ent rely w th n the

Begrwrof the concrete total ty. owever,the complete nature of the concrete

total ty s not cogn sed w th n th s n t al un versal ty.The absolute method s

thereforejust as much synthet c because the advance s made from the n t al

abstract un versal ty to part cular determ nat ons or cond t ons of the ‘objec

t ve mmanent form’.Comprehens on of a concrete total ty s thus a funct on

of the expl cat on of the manymoments that relate to each other n const tut

g the concrete, organ c whole. Comprehens on s thus a synthet c method,

but one that we must clearlyd st ngu sh from the synthet c component of the

cogn t on of nqu ry. It s enough to say that the absolute method s also ana

lyt c to d st ngu sh t from the latter.Wh le the analys s of the subject-matter

takes place ent rely w th n the Begrg'fof the concrete total ty, the expos t on

enta ls a synthet c advance from the abstract to the concrete n an expl cat on

of the self-reproduct on of the concrete, organ c whole. For th s reason, the

absolutemethod enta ls a synthet c a pr or advance.

Iw ll not here rev ew the ent re course of SL,but suff ce t to say that egel

beg ns h s expos t on of the absolute method w th the mmed ate content of

knowledge and w th thought n ts merely conceptual phase. The log cal cate

gor esemployed prov de usw th a v ewof the mmed ate forms of ex stence of

an organ cwhole. The f rst determ nat ons must be presented as a mere d ver

s ty,because the whole s presented n ts mmed acy and not as the organ c,

self—reproduc ngwhole.W thout go ng nto spec f cs as to the prec se nature of

the log cal moves, the synthet c a pr or advance proceeds from th s n t al

med acy or abstract un versal ty to a cons derat on of the relat onsh ps

amongpart cular determ nat ons of the organ cwhole. In the second book of

the f rst volume of SL, egel demonstrates that reflect on on the mmed ate

content of knowledge reveals an underly ng real ty n terms of wh ch the

med ate be ng of that wh ch appears s to be expla ned. Reflect on on exter

nal relat ons reveals an nner essence that s presupposed by them. Th ngs are

not as they appear, but they ex st n and through nternal and external rela—

t ons. egelconcludes h s f rst volumew th an expos t on of the organ c whole

as a self-caus ngun ty of appearance and essence. In volume two, egel pro

v des a full expl cat on of th s self-caus ng un ty as a concrete total ty n the

Log cof the Concept.

In sect ons one and two of the second volume on the Log cof the Concept,

egellaysbare the absolutemethod as enta l ng amovement from the abstract

to the concrete n the presentat on of the ‘object hcat on’of an organ c whole.

In synthet c a pr or knowledge, the organ c whole s of course mmanent

w th n the ent re development and as such s the foundat on of the many cat



CAPITAL BREEDS: INTEREST-BEARING CAPITAL AS ABSTRACTFORM 49

egor es of the f rstvolume. Organ cun ty was merely mpl c t n ts appearance

be ng —pos ted or set out as what t essent ally s n essence —and, n the

Log cof the Concept, the organ c un ty s expl cated as self-reproduc ng. As

self-reproduc ng, the organ c whole s the un versal organ s ngpr nc ple of the

ent re presentat on of log cal categor es, a concrete un versal.

Elsewhere, I have documented by ut l s ng ph lolog cal exeges s prec sely

how, n ‘The Chapter on Money’,Marx used egel an log cal categor es n h s

presentat on of the arguments regard ngthe relat onamong the econom c cat

egor es of product/commod ty and money w th n s mple c rculat on, the

med ate be ng of cap tal.13In true egel an fash on, Marx beg ns h s syn

thet c a pr or advance w th the mmed ate content of knowledge and w th

thought n ts merelyconceptual phase. e presents the f rstdeterm nat ons of

c rculat ng cap tal as a mere d vers ty,because he must beg n h s a pr or syn

thes s w th c rculat ng cap tal n ts mmed acy and not w th the end-result as

an organ c, self-reproduc ng whole. I have also documented that, once Marx

exposes cap tal’s appearance n s mple c rculat on, he then moves to d st n

gu sh between the appearance and an essent al, underly ng real ty.14The

underly ng real ty s not an external relat on among th ngs, but a system of

nternal, nterdependent relat ons. F nally, I have documented how, n the

th rd, f nal and most concrete stage of h s synthet c a pr or advance, Marx

exam nes cap tal as ‘real cap tal’,a complete, complex organ c whole real sed

and through the product on of prof t-bear ng cap tal, a concrete un versal.15

Throughout the process of synthet c a pr or knowledge, cap tal as such has

been mmanent n the ent re development. It was mpl c t n ts mere appear

ance as s mple c rculat on; t was pos ted or set out as what t essent ally s n

the second stage of expos t on; and, n the f nal development, t proved tself to

be an organ cun ty of c rculat on and product on to the end of the product on

of nterest-bear ng cap tal as the purelyabstractform of cap tal.Assuch, nter

est-bear ng cap tal s the un versal organ s ng pr nc ple of the ent re manu

scr pts as the Idea of cap tal, or cap tal that relates tself to tself as cap tal.

TheRelat onofFormtoContent n theRulesofLog cat therent

StagesofExpos t on

In81., egel re terates that the rules govern ng the movement of thought n an

a pr or synthes s of log cal categor es are veryprec se.Wh le the analys s takes

place ent rely w th n the Begnf of the organ c whole, the log cal rules that

13 See Meaney 2002, pp. 15—40.

14 See Meaney 2002, pp. 41—76.

15 See Meaney 2002, pp. 77—168.



50 MEANEY

govern the relat on between log cal categor es w th n the expos t on enta l a

step-by-step synthet c advance from the abstract to the concrete n mov ng

from un versal ty through part cular ty to nd v dual ty at each stage toward

the full expl cat on of the self-reproduct on of the concrete total ty. No log cal

move swasted: each category plays an essent al role w th n the process of the

synthet c a pr or advance.The order ng of log cal categor es s thus absolutely

necessary. ere, we could d gress on egel’s cr t cal appropr at on of Kant's

development of the rules that governthe prec se relat on between log cal cat

egor es n cond t on ng the poss b l ty of synthet c a pr or judgements. We

m ght also d scuss egel’suse of Ar stotle n h s cr t c sms of Kant. Suff ce t to

say,however,that the absolute necess ty of the order ng of log cal categor es n

an a pr or synthes s of the Begrg'lfof an organ c whole s the reason why egel

ma nta ns he has developed the sc ent f cally correct method n SL. Marx

agrees w th th s cla m; t s,as t were, the ‘rat onal kernel’ of egel’sexpos t on

ofmethod.

egeltells us that the rules of log c that govern the relat on between log cal

categor es n an a pr or synthes s of the Begrtjfof an organ c un ty depend on

the goal of the log c of a part cular sect on w th n the whole of SL.As I say,

egel beg ns h s presentat on of the Idea w th the mmed ate content of

knowledge and w th thought n tsmerely conceptual phase. egel ntends for

the log cal categor es n the Log c of Be ng to prov de us w th a v ew of the

med ate forms of ex stence of an organ c whole. As a consequence, the

expos t on of the content of the Log cof Be ng s an expos t on of the external

relat ons between th ngs as they appear as objects of sense. Because egel s

concerned n th s sect on to expose the external relat ons between objects of

sense, the log cal categor es are themselves externally related to each other. As

egel states, the log cal rules that govern the relat on between categor es n

the a pr or synthes s w th n the Log cof Be ngenta l a mere ‘pass ng over nto’

as a ‘trans t on’or a ‘van sh ng of one nto the other’ of log cal categor es.

L kew se, n the beg nn ng of Marx's a pr or synthes s of the Begnf of ‘real

cap tal’,the rules of the log cof be ng govern the relat on among log cal catego

r es that underg rd and govern the relat on among econom c categor es n

Marx’streatment of ‘s mplec rculat on’.W thout go ng nto spec f cs as to the

prec se nature of the log cal moves, Marx frequently refers n th s sect on of

the manuscr pts to the relat ons among product/ commod ty and money as a

‘pass ngover nto’ of one econom c category nto the next or a ‘van sh ng of

one nto the other’. e thus beg ns h s a pr or synthes s of the Begnf of cap tal

properly accord ng to the ‘sc ent l cally correct method’,w th cap tal’s mmed —

ate forrns of ex stence. Such forms of ex stence are th ngs or objects of sense.

The log cal rules that govern the relat on among the log cal categor es that



CAPITAL BREEDS: INTEREST-BEARING CAPITAL ASABSTRACT FORM 51

Marx uses to structure h s presentat on of ‘s mple c rculat on’ enta l that he

presents the econom c categor es as externally related. The commod ty s

exchanged for money and money s exchanged for the commod ty n a v rtual

‘ nfm te ser es’ of exchanges. Accord ng to the prec se rules that govern the

log c of be ng, the commod ty drops out of c rculat on only to be consumed,

wh le money rema ns hoarded as dead treasure. S mplec rculat on s n noway

product ve of cap tal. As Marx states, s mple c rculat on cannot ‘ gn te tself

from w th n’ and, as a consequence, ts ‘ mmed ate be ng’ s ‘pure llus on'.

S mple c rculat on s the ‘med at on of extremes', wh ch t does not ‘pos t’.In an

a pr or synthes s, Marx proves dec s vely that cap tal cannot be def ned n

terms of an external relat on among th ngs.

In the Log c of Essence, the prec se rules of log c that govern the relat on

between categor es lead egel to demonstrate that reflect on on the mmed

ate contents of knowledge reveals an underly ng real ty n terms of wh ch the

med ate be ng of that wh ch appears s to be expla ned.The process of syn

thet c a pr or knowledge reveals an nner essence that s presupposed by the

external relat ons of Be ng.Const tut ve relat ons are not solely external. The

rules of the Log c of Essence enta l an expos t on of relat onal propert es of

th ngs, rather than an expos t on of the external relat ons between th ngs.

Because the Log cof Essence s an expos t on of the essent al relat ons w th n

an organ c whole, egel def nes the log cal categor es of Essence relat onally.

In Be ng, log cal categor es van sh nto each other; n Essence, log cal catego

r es are const tuted n dyad c relat ons.

L kew se, n the Grundr sse, Marx’s expos t on of the essence of cap tal st

product on reflects the log cal form of the categor es of the Log cof Essence n

an a pr or synthes s from the abstract to the concrete. Once Marx exposes

cap tal’s appearance n s mple c rculat on, he then moves to d st ngu sh

between appearance and an essent al, underly ng real ty.Because the second

stage of h s a pr or synthes s s an expos t on of nternal, essent al relat ons,

Marx uses the log cal categor es of the Log c of Essence to def ne econom c

categor es relat onally.W thout go ng nto spec f csas to the prec se nature of

the log calmoves, the log cal rules that govern the structure of the log cal cat

egor es that underg rd Marx’spresentat on of the essent al relat on among

econom c categor es requ re that he beg n w th a relat velys mple dent ty, for

example, money, the commod ty or the whole of the work ng day.Marx then

uses the appropr ate log cal rules to demonstrate that the s mple dent ty of

money, the commod ty or the whole of the work ng day ‘ mpl es’ or ‘pos ts’

contrad ctory s des,wh ch are nevertheless correlated aspects of an nd v dual

ser es.The log cal rules that structure the relat on among spec f c log calcatego

r es n essence enta l that the contrad ctory s des of these econom c categor es



52 MEAN EY

are phases n an a pr or synthes s of a s ngle, more concrete whole. The log cal

categorythat underg rds th s more concrete whole l kew seenta ls log cal cat

egor es that underg rd the contrad ctory s des of econom c categor es that

then are superseded n the a pr or synthes s of a s ngle, even more concrete

whole. At the end of the second stage of the expos t on, the log cal rules

that govern the relat on between spec f c log cal categor es enable Marx to

demonstrate how these twofold relat ons among econom c categor es are

superseded —preserved yet transformed - n an essent al organ c un ty of the

d fferent, nterdependent ‘moments’ of product on and c rculat on. e can

thereby ach eve at the end of the second stage of h s expos t on a new def n

t on of ‘c rculat ng cap tal’ as a ‘total ty’of nseparable moments. The organ c

un ty of c rculat ng cap tal w ll then serve as the bas s of a th rd stage n Marx’s

synthet c a pr or advance.

egelach eves the goal of the expos t on of the Log cof Essence and br ngs

the second stage of the a pr or! synthes s of the Begnf of an organ c un ty to

complet onwhen he demonstrates that the matter under cons derat on s an

essent al,organ c un ty of d fferent but nterdependent ‘moments’.In the th rd,

f nal and most concrete sect on of SL, egel w ll scrut n se th s complex

organ c whole. Through the Log c of the Concept, egel presents, not the

becom ng of the organ c whole, but rather the organ c whole as t ‘proceeds

from tself’.Because the content of the expos t on of the Log cof the Concept

d ffersessent ally fromthat of the two preced ng sect ons, the log cal rules that

govern the log cal form or relat on between categor es d ffer as well. In Be ng,

the categor es pass over nto each other. ‘Trans t on’character ses the r order

g of one category n relat on to the next n an a pr or synthes s from the

abstract to the concrete. In Essence, ‘reflect on’character ses how each cate

gory s related to or reflected n the next. The nature of the relat on of the cat—

egor es n the Log c of the Concept s ne ther one of ‘trans t on’ nor one of

‘reflect on’.The Log c of the Concept s the log c of ‘development’ proper.

‘Development’ s an expl cat on ofwhat s mmanent nwhat has come before.

Each category represents the whole of the organ c un ty when v ewed from a

certa n perspect ve. Each s therefore both the whole of the system and one of

s spec f c ‘moments’.The general mot f cont nues to be a synthet c a pr or

advance fromthe abstract to the concrete n mov ngfromun versal ty through

part cular ty to nd v dual ty.Thus,wh le each category s the whole of the sys

tem from a certa n po nt of v ew, the log cal rule that governs the relat on

between categor es cont nues necessar ly to d ctate a movement from the

abstract to the concrete.The prec se pos t on ng of each category s therefore a

funct on of the relat on to the others as determ ned by the Begnf of the con

crete, organ c un ty n the process of a synthet c a pr or deduct on.



54 MEANEY

L kew se,w thout go ng nto spec f cs as to the prec se nature of the log cal

moves, the rules of log cgovern ng the relat on among the log cal categor es

that Marx uses n h s cons derat on of c rculat ng and f xed cap tal as Sp€C flC

‘form-determ nat ons’of c rculat ng cap tal enta l that Marx then develop an

expos t on of the ‘object f cat on’of cap tal. Marx f rst descr bes how cap tal

supersedes the means of product on n the r ‘ mmed ate form’and then pos ts

them n a form adequate to ts own ‘end- n- tself’.Marx descr bes, n turn, how

mach nery then undergoes a ser es of transformat ons such that cap tal

endows mach nery w th a pr nc ple of self—movementor a ‘soul’of ts own.

In conclus on, we see for egel that the log cal rules that govern the prec se

relat on between log calcategor es are dependent at each stage of the a pr or

synthes s on the subject-matter under cons derat on and the thought of t.

egel repeatedly emphas ses that form and content are rec procally related

and determ ned by one another. Thus, at each stage n the process of a syn

thet c a pr or deduct on, the nature of the content determ nes the form of

th nk ng;but, l kew se,the form of th nk ng determ nes the nature of the con

tent. S ncethe form and content are nseparable, the development of the log

cal categor es n an a pr or synthes s of the Begrwrof an organ c whole s

absolutely necessary. The log cal rules of trans t on from one log cal category

to the next nexorably l nk each categoryto the pr or development and, n turn,

formand content determ ne subsequent developments. Eachcategoryappears

w th n a systemat c whole of the a pr or synthes s. It depends on the rules of

log cthat govern the development of the categor es that precede t and on the

rules oflog cthat governthe development of the categor es that follow.Indeed,

each category requ res the whole of the a pr or synthes s n order to have any

sense at all.

Marxwas keenly aware of the rules of log c that govern a synthet c a pr or

deduct on of the Beger of an organ cun ty; ndeed,wef ndh m character s ng

egel’sSL as ‘reconstruct ng systemat cally and class fy ng by the absolute

method the thoughts wh ch are n the m nds of all’. ewas keenly aware of the

t mate, rec procal relat on between form and content n the synthet c a pr

or advance of log cal categor es n the absolute method. Because Marx sought

the complete comprehens on of the ent re nature of cap tal and, to be more

spec f c, of cap tal n general n the Grundr sse, he d d not cons der egel’s

treatment of the rules of log cthat govern the order ng of log cal categor es n

a presentat on of the absolute method l ghtly; rather, he understood those

mles, he saw the absolute necess ty of the order ng of the categor es and, as a

consequence, he understood the sc ent f c nature of a d alect cal expos t on

of cap tal as organ c un ty based on egel’streatment of the absolute method.

e therefore respected the prec se order ng of the log cal categor es n h s



CAPITAL BREEDS: INTEREST-BEARING CAPITALASABSTRACTFORM

presentat on of econom c categor es n h s a pr or synthes s of the Begnf

of cap tal.

Comprehend ng Prof tand Interest n the Grundr sse

The ‘RosdolskyChallenge’Rev s ted

To summar se, we must supplement our ph lolog cal exeges s n meet ng the

‘Rosdolskychallenge’ w th an understand ng of the rules of log c that govern

each stage of the process of an a pr or synthes s of the Begnf of an organ c

whole, n order properly to understand Marx’sorder ng of econom c catego

r es n relat on to egel’sorder ng of log cal categor es. In short, we map log cal

terms or phrases n ‘dropp ng footnotes’ by rema n ng fa thful to the log cal

structure of both works. Log calterms or phrases prov de us w th s gnposts to

log cal structure. The log cal structure of both works, n turn, prov des usw th

clues n our construct on of a ph lolog cal map n meet ng the ‘Rosdolsky

challenge’.

When we turn our attent on to the trans t on n the Grundr ssemanuscr pts

from prof t-bear ng cap tal as ‘real cap tal’ to nterest-bear ng cap tal as the

purelyabstractform of cap tal,wemust rema n m ndful of the rec procal rela

t on of form to content n an a pr or synthes s, or n comprehens on. The log

cal rules of the movement fromone log calcategoryto the next nexorably l nk

each category to the pr or development n the advance, and, n turn, form and

content determ ne subsequent developments. Each log cal category appears

w th n a systemat c whole. It depends on the rules of log c that govern the

development of the categor es that precede t and on the rules of log c that

govern the development of the categor es that follow.Indeed, each category

pl cates the whole of the a pr or synthes s n hav nganymean ng at all.One

cannot, therefore, as w th formal log c,s mply extr cate forms of thought from

8Land apply them p ecemeal to some externally g ven content. The employ

ment of any one log cal category n an a pr or synthes s of the Begrg'lfor com

prehens on of an organ cwhole comm ts one to the use of them all n a proper

deployment of the ‘sc ent f cally correct method’. In short, Marx would not

s mply extr cate log cal categor es from the m ddle of SLand apply them n

some p ecemeal fash on n blatant v olat on of the rules of log c that govern

the relat on between log cal categor es at each stage, prec sely because he

sought a synthet c a pr or deduct on, that s, the comprehens on, of c rculat

g cap tal.

It so happens that I use a passage taken from the very end of the manu

scr pts to llustrate the value of the emp r cal approach ofph lolog calexeges s



56 MEANEY

n exam n ng the relat on of the Grundr sse to SL.Imust therefore rely on the

reader to bear n m nd that I abstract from some very r ch content ndeed n

order to make my po nt. I w ll argue v a our qual f ed, ph lolog cal exeges s

that Marxmakes use of that part of the Log cof the Concept that egel terms

the ‘process of genus’ n h s cons derat on of the genes s of ‘real cap tal’.

Consequently,I abstract not only from the log cal expos t on that mmed ately

precedes th s trans t on, but also from the ent rety of the two preced ng stages

of h s synthet c a pr or deduct on. So,for example, at the end of the f rst stage

of h s a pr or synthes s, the rules of the Log c of Be ng enta led that Marx

def nemoney as dead treasure n h s character sat on of the mere appearance

of the Begrt'fof c rculat ng cap tal. At the end of the second stage, the rules of

the Log cof Essence enta led that Marx def ne money as ‘real sed cap tal’ n h s

cons derat on of the essence of c rculat ng cap tal. That s, when money f rst

stood at the beg nn ng of the product on-process, the ‘presuppos t ons’ of cap

al ‘appeared to come n from the outs de’ as external presuppos t ons for the

ar s ngofcap tal. Th s ‘second’return ofmoney to the beg nn ng of the real sa

t on process of cap tal affordeda chance to clar fycerta n ssues that rema ned

unclear upon the ‘f rst’entrance ofmoney n the real sat on-process, that s, as

money n ‘trans t on from ts role as value to ts role as cap tal’.Marx states at

the end of the second stage of h s synthet c a pr or advance that now money

as ‘real sedcap tal’ represents a completed c rcu t of product on and c rcula

t on, n wh ch the ent re process s now c rcumscr bed bycap tal tself. Cap tal

‘no longer proceeds from presuppos t ons n order to become, but rather t s

self presupposed, and proceeds from tself to create the cond t ons of ts

ma ntenance and growth’.16

In keep ng w th the prec se nature of the rules that govern the progress of

synthet c a pr or know ng,Marxuses the categor es of the Log cof the Concept

to re-present at a h gher level of expos t on all the many econom c categor es

that served to expose the becom ng of cap tal. As I say,I must therefore rely on

the reader to bear n m nd that I abstract from some very r ch content ndeed

order to make mypo nt. In our use of ph lolog cal exeges s,we must rema n

m ndful of the ent re log caldevelopment that has led up to th s po nt at the

end of the th rd, f nal and most concrete stage of the a pr or synthes s of

the Begrgfof c rculat ng cap tal as organ c un ty.Aswew llsee, the rules of the

Log cof the Concept enta l that Marxdef ne money as nterest-bear ng cap tal

or the purelyabstractform of c rculat ng cap tal. In ‘dropp ngfootnotes’ at the

end of the manuscr pts, ph lolog cal exeges s coupled w th the analys s of

the rules of log c that govern the log cal structure of the arguments w ll pro

16 Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 460.




v de us w th the ev dence to exh b t how Marx made use of the Log cof the

Concept n h s a pr or synthes s to def ne money as the purelyabstractform of

c rculat ngcap tal.

TheGenerat on ofProf tand the Reproduct onofCap tal as Cap tal

In the f nalsect ons of the Grundr ssemanuscr pts, we f nda number of log cal

terms and phrases of part cular note that are useful for our purposes. These

terms and phrases serve as ph lolog cal nd cators that Marxrema ns log cally

cons stent r ght up unt l the very end of the manuscr pts n follow ngthe rules

of log cthat govern the relat on between spec f clog calcategor es n the Log c

of the Concept n egel’sa pr or synthes s or comprehens on of Begr jf For

example, Marx’s use of such terms as ‘self-reproduc ng’, ‘perenn al’, ‘self

mortal s ng’, ‘proceed ng from tself’ as an ‘act vesubject’,and the ‘subject of

the process’all have mportant correlates to log cal terms and phrases n SL,at

a prec sejuncture. Of part cular note sMarx’suse of the phrase sub spec ecap

tal s when he states, ‘Surplusvalue thus measured by the value of the presup

posed cap tal, cap tal pos ted as self-real z ngvalue—sprof t; regarded not sub

spec eaetem tat s, but sub spec e—cap tal s, the surplus value s prof t!l7Marx

further descr bes cap tal as ‘self-reproduc ng’as follows: ‘[C]ap tal as cap tal,

the produc ng and reproduc ng value, d st ngu shes tself w th n tself from

self as prof t, the newly produced value.’18F nally, after cap tal has d st n

gu shed tself w th n tself from tself as prof t, and n so far as th s newly pro

duced value s tself ‘of the same nature as the cap tal’,Marx states that t

‘supersedes the separat on aga n, and pos ts t n ts dent fy to tself as cap tal

wh ch, grown by the amount of the prof t, now beg ns the same process anew

larger d mens ons’.19It s here of course that Marx descr bes cap tal as cap

tal as a ‘self-expand ng c rcle’,a sp ral.

Aga n,w thout a doubt, t can be d ff cult to v ew such terms or phrases as

‘self—reproduc ngand mult ply ng’ as log cal terms or phrases, but, accord ng to

egel, that s prec sely how we must v ew them. For, after he addresses the

reproduct on of the l v ng organ sm n the l fe-process of absorpt on and

ass m lat on of an external object, egel demonstrates how the log cal rules

that govern the relat on between categor es n the Log cof the Concept enta l

that we then cons der ‘self-reproduc ng nd v dual ty’,or the ‘processof genus’

n a synthet c a pr or advance toward Begr f The three moments of the

concept —un versal ty, part cular ty and nd v dual ty —form the bas s of the

17 Marx 1973 [1857-81» P- 746

18 Ib d.

19 lb d.



53 MEANEY

process.Iw llnot here go nto the exact log calmoves that precede the becom

ng of genus; I w ll only say that egel n t ally def nes the ‘self-reproduc ng

d v dual ty’as ‘self- dent cal’ n the part cular moments of ts ex stence.

In the process ofgenus,the concept relates tself to tself through self-repro

duc ng nd v dual ty. The log cal rules govern ng the relat on between log cal

categor es enta l that egel def ne the process as one n wh ch the genus d s

t ngu shes tself w th n tself from tself and relates tself to tself through self

reproduc ng nd v dual ty. Genus relates tself to tself as a process of

product on of tself as a product. The product s ‘theactual concept - the germ

of the l v ng nd v dual’,namely, sperm. egel def nes the process of genus as

an nf n te process. The genus d st ngu shes tself w th n tself from tself as

self-reproduc ng nd v dual ty,and then supersedes the separat on n ts own

process of self-reproduct on and mult pl cat on, only to beg n the process

aga n n a self-expand ng c rcle.The result s the ‘real sedgenus’,or the concrete

un versalas mmanent and actual n all ts part culars.

egel closes out the chapter ent tled ‘L fe’w th conclud ng remarks on a

newv sta that opens up to us through the ‘real sedgenus’.The self-reproduc ng

and mult ply ng nd v dual tyof the l v ngspec es cond t ons the poss b l ty of

the expl c t emergence of the Idea. What had been merely mpl c t now

becomes expl c twhen the Idea relates to tself as Idea through s mple un ver

sal ty, and abstract mage.The latter s the form of the l v ng spec es wh ch s

produced n a m nd n the f rst,most abstract moment of cogn t on. In short,

the development of the ent re SLvan shes n th s s mpleun versal ty or abstract

form of the l v ngspec es as t s produced n the m nd n and through the n

t al emergence of log cal category of ‘cogn t on’,the Idea as t relates to tself

as Idea.

ln meet ng the ‘Rosdolskychallenge’,we are able to dent fy numerous ph l

olog cal nd cators through the use of dent cal log cal terms and phrases here

at the close of the manuscr pts n a s de-by-s decompar son of the Grundr sse

manuscr pts and SL.For example, as we note above, Marx def nes cap tal at

th s juncture n h s synthet c a pr or advance as ‘self-reproduc ng’s nce cap tal

‘d st ngu shes tself w th n tself from tself as prof t’ (the germ), and, n so far

as th s newly produced value s tself ‘of the same nature as the cap tal’,then,

‘after t has d st ngu shed the prof t, as newly reproduced value, from tself as

presupposed, self-real z ng value . . . t supersedes the separat on aga n, and

pos ts t n ts dent ty to tself as cap tal, wh ch, grownby the amount of prof t,

now beg ns the same process anew n larger d mens on’.20Cap tal breeds!

Moreover, Marx states that once cap tal s pos ted as ‘self-reproduc ng’, t s

20 Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 746.




pos ted as cap tal, or cap tal as cap tal. In short, Marx def nes prof t-bear ng

cap tal (sub spec e cap tal s) as ‘real cap tal’.As‘realcap tal’,prof t-bear ng cap

tal s ‘valuepos ted as s multaneously self-reproduc ngand mult ply ng, and as

constantly self-equ valent presuppos t on, d st ngu shed from tself as surplus

value pos ted by tself12‘In an a pr or synthes s, Marxhas now demonstrated

that cap tal s a concreteun versal mmanent n and expand ng through tspar

t cular moments of product on and c rculat on.

W th the advent of ‘real cap tal’, there s cond t oned the poss b l ty that

cap tal should atta n a h gher form of ex stence n the expos t on than prev

ously observed. ‘Real cap tal’ s further def ned as real s ng tself aga n as

money.There now ex sts the poss b l ty of a more complete or complex expos

t on of cap tal w th the presentat on of t as t enters nto c rculat on as a com

mod ty. Th s t does as nterest-bear ng cap tal. ere Marx tells us that cap tal

does not stand oppos te labour n exchange; rather, nterest-bear ng cap tal

stands oppos te prof t-bear ng cap tal.22As such, nterest-bear ng cap tal s

sa d to be the purely abstract form of prof t-bear ng cap tal, or ‘cap tal as t

relates to tself as cap tal’.23We can see here that Marx progresses from a con

s derat on of ‘real cap tal', or cap tal as cap tal, to a cons derat on of ‘cap tal as

relates to tself as cap tal’.As I stated at the outset of th s chapter, th s s

an extremely mportant observat on that Marx makes. In labell ng nterest

bear ng cap tal the purelyabstractform ofprof t-bear ngcap tal, Marxrema ns

log cally cons stent n closely follow ng the rules of the synthet c a pr or

advance of absolute method that govern the relat on between log cal catego

r es n the Log cof the Concept. Ph lolog cal exeges sshows us that he carr es

h s synthet c a pr or deduct on beyond the emergence of cap tal as a concrete

un versal n prof t-bear ng cap tal, through to the po nt at wh ch cap tal now

relates to tself as cap tal through nterest-bear ng cap tal as the purelyabstract

form of cap tal.

In so far as Marx follows the rules of the Log cof the Concept, he carr es h s

a pr or synthes s to the po nt at wh ch the Idea of cap tal has become expl c t.

For, n egel’s synthet c a pr or deduct on of Begr m the Idea f rst becomes

expl c t as Idea through the ‘real sedgenus' n self-reproduc ng nd v dual ty as

concrete un versal ty. The expos t on of concrete un versal ty cond t ons the

poss b l ty of the emergence of the Idea as t relates to tself as Idea. egel

def nes the n t al emergence of the Idea as t relates to tself as Idea as the

‘abstract form’or s mple un versal ty of the Idea.

21 Marx 1973 [1857—8]. 1).878

22 Marx 1973 [1857—8].p- 353

23 Marx 1973 [1857-8], P-373



60 MEANEY

PurelyAbstract Formas Fet sh

Aswe have seen, Marx follows egel n def n ng the real as an organ c whole.

S nce t s an organ cwhole and not a s mple un ty, t compr ses d fferent ele

ments that ntegrate to form the whole. These d fferent elements comb ne to

forma un ty prec selybecause the r ntegrat on s a funct on of the organ s ng

pr nc ple of the whole. The latter, wh le present n the part cular elements, s

not reduc ble to them. It must therefore be a un versal organ s ng pr nc ple of

the whole. Because each of these part cular elements conta ned w th n the

whole s determ ned by the un versal organ s ng pr nc ple, each conta ns th s

pr nc ple of the whole w th n tself. It therefore may be sa d of each part cular

element that t s an express on or representat on of the whole. But s nce t s

only a part of the whole, t expresses or represents the whole only n a part al

manner. The fullest real sat on of the un versal organ s ng pr nc ple awa ts the

complete systemat c expos t on of the system of relat ons that orders and

organ sesthe ntegrat on of the many elements, n h erarch cal fash on.

As each form of ex stence of the organ c whole s only part of the whole,

each s ncomplete w th n tself. It therefore requ res for ts very ex stence the

other elements that compr se the whole. egelwould say that what each ele

ment or form of ex stence excludes from tself, t requ res n order to ex st as a

part. In th s way,each element s ‘contrad ctory' w th n tself, when taken n

solat on from the other parts. It excludes from tself the ‘other' forms of ex s—

tence, yet requ res them for ts very ex stence. It therefore conta ns w th n ts

ex stence reference to what t excludes. In other words, s nce the un versal

organ s ngpr nc ple of the whole s mmanent n each part, each part s deter

m ned by that wh ch s external to t, that s, ts oppos te. Thus, each part s

both d fferent from, or n oppos t on to, every other part. Yeteach s at one and

the same t me n dent ty w th every other, as parts of a whole. The h gher,

more complete or complex formof ex stence that emerges from the contrad c

tory nature of the more part al man festat ons of the whole does not abol sh

these lower forms when t emerges. Rather t ncludes and preserves w th n

tself the less complex, less adequate forms. egel terms th s spec al relat on

Aujhebung.Th s s a core concept of the ‘sc ent f callycorrect method’.

Anyth ngless than the complete expos t on of the organ cwhole s a part al

and therefore nadequate man festat on of t.When a h gher, more complete

or more complex form of ex stence emerges w th n the synthet c a pr or

advance, t cancels out the nadequac es of the less complex. But th s does not

mean that th s h gher, more complex form of ex stence ann h lates the less

developed forms of ex stence. These less developed forms are n fact trans

formed, s nce they are now parts of or elements n a greater whole w th n the

systemat cexpos t on.They are ncluded and preservedw th n the more com



CAPITAL BREEDS: INTEREST-BEARING CAPITAL ASABSTRACT FORM 61

plexwhole, s nce the whole sdependent upon the d fferent forms of ex stence

that un te to produce t.

The synthet c a pr or advance cont nues up to the complete expos t on of

the un versal organ s ng pr nc ple. egel’selaborat on of the absolute method

for a systemat c expos t on of an organ c un ty s complete w th the synthet c

a pr or! deduct on of the most complete, most complex stage or form of ex s

tence n the advance, that s, the Idea of the organ c whole. As the h ghest,

most complex, most complete man festat on of the organ c whole, t s the

aforement oned un versal organ s ngpr nc ple. It has, n th s sense, been pres

ent all along s nce the outset of the expos t on.W th the advent of the Idea, all

the part al man festat ons of the whole are ncluded or preserved yet trans

formed [aufgehoben] as parts of the concrete (complex), organ c whole con

ta ned n a ‘total tyof thoughts’w th n the m nd of the sc ent st.The end-result

the complete expos t on of organ c un ty compr s ng a system of relat ons of

d fferent forms of ex stence organ sed by the un versal pr nc ple.

L kew se, Marx’s systemat c expos t on of ‘real cap tal’ n the Grundr sse s

complete w th the synthet c a pr or deduct on of the most complex stage or

form of ex stence of the advance, that s,money as nterest-bear ng cap tal. As

the h ghest, most complex,most complete man festat on of the organ cwhole,

s the aforement oned un versal organ s ng pr nc ple. It has, n th s sense,

been present all along s nce the outset of the expos t on n s mple c rculat on

and money as the un versal representat ve of wealth.W th the advent of the

so-calledpurely abstractform of cap tal, or ‘cap talas t relates to tself as cap

tal’,the Idea of cap tal, all the part al man festat ons of the organ c whole are

now ncluded or preserved yet transformed [aufqehoben]as now ‘parts’of the

concrete (complex), organ c un ty of ‘real cap tal’ w th n ts most complex

man festat on as the purelyabstractform ofmoney as nterest-bear ngcap tal.

Wemust keep th s core concept ofAujhebung n the forefront of our m nds

as we perform the work of a qual f ed ph lolog cal exeges s at the close of the

Grundr sse n prov d ng c tat ons for such r ch log cal categor es as “self-repro

duc ng’ and purely abstract form. The danger ex sts that we m ght fa l to keep

n m nd n a ‘total ty of thoughts’ all that has come before that has led to th s

po nt n the two texts. In short, our attempt at ‘m rror ng’the concrete m ght

end n a p le of shards —scattered, d sconnected ‘parts’—when we fa l to hold

together the ‘l v ngwhole’ n our m nds n a comprehens on of ‘realcap tal’.And

just so,Marx cr t c ses a host of pol t cal econom sts forth s reason n conjunc

t on w th h s synthet c a pr or deduct on of cap tal as ‘self-reproduc ngand

mult ply ng’ n the conclud ng sect ons of the manuscr pts.

These cr t c sms are related to and bu ld on cr t c sms found n the

‘Introduct on’.There, Marx cr t c ses the method of the pol t cal econom sts



52 MEANEY

because t led them to a concept on of the whole as compr s ng ‘acc dental

relat ons’.Asa result, they engaged n a ‘crude tear ng-apart’ of product on and

s part cular determ nat ons. Theymerely ‘setalongs de t [prof t-bear ng cap

al]’ ts part cular determ nat ons; as a result, the class calpol t cal econom sts

neglect the ‘real relat onsh p’ among part cular determ nat ons n the ‘l v ng

whole’.Th s cr t c sm of method s brought to bear n the clos ng sect ons of

the Grundr sse.The pol t cal econom sts see nterest-bear ng cap tal ‘setalong

s de’ prof t-bear ng cap tal. F nance-cap tal nvests n ndustr al cap tal and

real ses ‘an ncreased amount of money’ extracted from prof t-bear ng cap tal

g venthe nvestment. From the perspect ve of such pol t cal econom sts as Dr

Pr ce,money as nterest-bear ng cap tal appears to have an ‘ nnate qual ty’ by

v rtue ofwh ch t ncreases n ‘enormous quant t es result ng fromgeometr cal

progress on of numbers’.24In th s way, the r method pred sposes pol t cal

econom sts to regard cap tal as a ‘self-act ng th ng’, as a mere self- ncreas ng

number,w thout any regardto the cond t ons of reproduct on. Marxnotes that

th s not on of cap tal as a ‘self-reproduc ng be ng’,as a value ncreas ng by v r

tue of an ‘ nnate qual ty’of money, has led pol t cal econom sts to create mar

vellous nvent ons that leave ‘the fantas es of the alchem sts far beh nd’.

Bycontrast, the core concept of Aujhebung n Marx’s‘sc ent cally correct

method’ allows h m to understand why the pol t cal econom sts would per

ce vethe ‘ ncreased amount ofmoney’ n nterest-bear ng cap tal as an ‘ nnate

qual ty’ of money. All the preced ng developments of the expos t on of ‘real

cap tal’ do n fact van sh w th the emergence of an ncreased quant ty of

money as nterest-bear ng cap tal, that s, understood n terms of Aufhebung.

Themethod of pol t cal econom sts such as Dr Pr ce enta ls that they see only

an ncreased quant ty of money because of a ‘crude tear ng-apart’ of the ‘real

relat onsh ps’ of the ‘l v ngwhole’.Eventhough the preced ng developments n

the expos t on do n factvan shw th the emergence of nterest-bear ng cap tal

as an ncreased quant ty of money,Marx’smethod allowsh m s multaneously

to see n nterest-bear ng cap tal the Idea ofcap tal, or ‘cap talas t relates tself

as cap tal’,a purely abstractform, because the h gher, more complete or more

complex form of ex stence that emerges from the contrad ctory nature of the

more part al man festat ons of the organ c whole has not abol shed these

lower forms when t emerges. Rather, money as nterest-bear ng cap tal

cludes and preserves w th n tself the less complex, less complete stages of

the expos t on of ‘real cap tal’.The appl cat on of egel’sW ssenschaf ‘allows

Marx to hold a ‘total tyof thoughts’ n h s m nd so that he s able to see n th s

‘ ncreased quant ty’ the true source of the ‘self-reproduct on and mult pl ca

24 Marx 1973 [1857—8],pp. 842—3.




t on’ of ‘real cap tal’. As Marx states, ‘L v ng labour, as appropr ated and

absorbed by cap tal, appears as cap tal's own v tal power, ts self-reproduc ng

power.’25

Conclus on

We cannot overstate the value of ph lolog cal exeges s n exam n ng the rela

t on of the Grundr sse to SL.Though ‘m nd-numb ngly d f cult’, ph lolog cal

exeges s s essent al n meet ng the ‘Rosdolskychallenge’. owever, we must

supplement ph lolog cal exeges sw th a close analys s of the log calstructure

of the arguments. In short, wemust supplement ph lolog cal exeges sthrough

close attent on to the rules of log cthat governthe stages n the progress of the

synthet c a pr or know ng of Begnjf n W ssenschaj ,or comprehens on. We

can accurately map log cal terms or phrases n ‘dropp ng footnotes’ only by

rema n ng fa thful to the log cal structure of both works. Log cal terms or

phrases can prov de usw th s gnposts to log calstructure, but wemust be care

ful to follow the rules of log c that govern the prec se relat on between log cal

categor es n accurately construct ng a ph lolog cal map and thus ‘dropp ng

footnotes’ n meet ng the ‘Rosdolskychallenge’.

25 Marx 1973, pp. 821—2.



C APTER 3

D alect cson Its Feet, or the Form of the

Consc ousness of the Work ng Classas stor cal

Subject

juan Ir'z' goCarrera

1 Plac ng D alect cs R ght S de Up

In h s afterword to Cap tal,Marx def nes h s method as a d alect cal one. In so

do ng, he expl c tly recogn ses egel as ‘the flI‘Sto present ts [d alect cs’] gen

eral form ofwork ng n a comprehens ve and consc ous manner’.1 owever,he

also po nts out:

My d alect c method s not only d fferent from the egel an, but s ts

d rect oppos te . . .W th h m t s stand ng on ts head. It must be turned

r ght s de up aga n, f you would d scover the rat onal kernel w th n the

myst cal shell.2

What does t mean to place d alect cs r ght s de up, start ng from egel’s

nvers on?

The quest on cannot be avo ded, unless someone were to bel eve that Marx

was ncoherent and actually based h s developments on the log c of egel—of

wh ch the latter cons dered h s method to be ts content3 —although he stated

the necess ty of nvert ng th s method.

Could t be about replac ng ‘ dea’where egeluses the term w th ‘matter’ n

order to reconstruct a d alect cal log c?4Is t about prov d ng ‘mater al st con

tent’ for egel’s log c?5Is t about plac ng ‘cap tal’where egel places ‘ dea’?6

These changes mply chang ng the content upon wh ch log c operates. But

Marx refers to plac ng the method tself r ght s de up. Therefore, the po nt s

the very form of the process of knowledge.

Marx 1965 [1867], p. 20.

Marx 1965 [1867], pp. 19—20.

egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 53.

Althusser 1972,p. 172.

Lev ne 2006, p. 49.

Meaney 2002, p. 8; Arthur 1993,pp. 86—7.

wkwa

© KONINKLIJKEBRILLNV,LEIDEN, 2014 DOI10.1163/9789004270022_005



T E CONSCIOUSNESS OF T E WORKING CLASSAS ISTORICAL SUBJECT

Could t be about Marx apply ng the ‘Log cof Essence’where egel appl es

the ‘Log cof Be ng’?7In th s case, the nvers on would only have a part al char

acter, as f t could be sa d that egel’slog c uses arms where t should use legs.

But the problem po nted out by Marx s that egel’smethod s nverted from

head to toe.

Could the change n formmean proceed ng froma general log cal structure

to one part cularly appropr ate to ts object? In an early stage of the develop

ment ofh s thought, Marxasserted:

owever, th s comprehens on [Begre fén]does not, as egel th nks, con

s st n everywhere recogn z ng the determ nat ons of the log calconcept

[des log schen Begrqys],but rather n grasp ng the proper log c of the

proper object.8

Do we thus reach the answer by resort ng to a log c that starts from the s m

plest category wh ch represents the proper object and makes th s category

develop tself through ts own movement, so as to engender a more complex

category,and so on, unt l an ntegral system of categor es wh ch belong to the

proper object s completed? For example, s t about the development of the

concept of the commod ty engender ng the concept of money, and the devel

opment of the latter engender ng the concept of cap tal, and so on?9Marx

h mself rejects the deal st nvers on nherent n such a procedure:

Apply th s method to the categor es of pol t cal economy and you have

the log c and metaphys cs of pol t cal economy . . . wh ch makes them

look as f they had newly blossomed forth n an ntellect of pure reason;

so much do these categor es seem to engender one another, to be l nked

up and ntertw ned w th one another by the verywork ngof the d alect c

movement.lo

Moreover,Marx cr t c ses h mself w th regard to the r sk of lett ng the form of

presentat on generate the appearance that h s researchhas fallen nto th s sort

of deal st nvers on:

The product becomes a commod ty; the commod ty becomes exchange

value; the exchange value of the commod ty s ts mmanent

Sm th 1990, pp. 51—3.

Marx 1970b [1859], p. 92.

F nesch 2006, pp. 128-9.

10 Marx 1976b [1847], p. 165.

(DmV



66 CARRERA

money-property; th s, ts money-property, separates tself from t n the

form of money . . . It w ll be necessary later. . . to correct the deal st man

ner of the presentat on, wh ch makes t seem as f t were merely a matter

of conceptual determ nat ons and of the d alect c of these concepts.11

It happens that log c s a construct ve necess ty produced by thought, whose

movement as such s al en to the movement of the necess ty that determ nes

the object. Marx develops, apropos of Proudhon, the unavo dable contrad c

t on mpl ed by any attempt to follow n thought, at the same t me, the neces

s ty taken from real ty and a log cal-construct ve necess ty:

When M.Proudhon spoke of the ser es n the understand ng, of the log cal

sequenceof categor es,he declared pos t vely that he d d not want to g ve

h story accord ng to the order n t me . . . Thus for h m everyth ng hap

pened n the pure ether of reason. Everyth ngwas to be der ved from th s

ether by means of d alect cs. Now that he has to put th s d alect cs nto

pract ce, h s reason s n default. . . [N]owwe have M. Proudhon reduced

to say ng that the order n wh ch he g ves the econom c categor es s no

longer the order n wh ch they engender one another. Econom c evolu

t ons are no longer the evolut ons of reason tself. What then does M.

Proudhon g ve us? Real h story . . . ? No! story as t takes place n the

ea tself? St llless!. . .What h story does he g ve us then? The h story of

h s own contrad ct ons.12

The problem w th log c,whatever ts alleged degree of general ty or s ngular ty,

res des n ts exter or ty w th respect to the real necess ty. Every log cal repre

sentat on rules ts path based on the subst tut on of the real necess ty by a

construct ve necess ty that appears as bear ng the power to put thought nto

mot on:

Log c—m nd's co n of the realm, the speculat ve or mental value of man

and nature - ts essence wh ch has grown totally nd fferent to all real

determ nateness and hence unreal —s al enated th nk ng, and therefore

th nk ng wh ch abstracts from nature and from real man: abstract

th nk ng.13

11 Marx 1973 [1857—8], pp. 147, 151.

1z Marx 1976b [1847l: p. 169.

13 Marx 1975c [1844], p. 330.



T E CONSCIOUSNESS OF T E WORKING CLASSAS ISTORICAL SUBJECT 67

Once aga n, what s the po nt? Let us address the quest on by reproduc ng the

paths followed by egel and Marx as they present the unfold ng of the r

methods.

2 egel's Ideal st c Construct on of ‘PureKnowledge’Wh ch

Immed ately s ‘Fulf lledBe ng’

egelrecogn ses that sc ent f c knowledge, as the ‘sc enceofman fested sp r t’,

starts from ‘emp r cal, sensuous consc ousness’, an ‘ mmed ate knowledge’,

therefore, a knowledge wh ch emerges from pract ce.14

But egel deal st cally nverts the fact that knowledge s alwaysknowledge

of one’ssubject v ty w th respect to the object upon wh ch one s go ng to act.

Instead of fac ng the quest on of knowledge as the d scovery,by the subject, of

the necess ty of ts act on regard ng the potent al ty of the object, he nverts

the quest on nto that of the re-establ shment ofthe dent tybetween the sub

ject ve process of know ngand the object vedeterm nat on of the potent al ty,

where the former engenders the latter. e thus represents mmed ate knowl

edge as perta n ng to a subject v ty wh ch confronts tself from ts own exter

or ty,s nce t s not capable of recogn s ng the object as ts own self-real sat on.

It deals w th a subject v ty whose l m tat on n determ n ng the object res des

that wh ch s not developed even n ts self-consc ousnessas the determ nant

of the object, n the fact that t does not recogn se tself as a determ nant.

Consequently, for egel, the overcom ng of mmed ate cogn t on does not

cons st n the deepen ng of knowledge of the determ nat ons of the subject

and of those of the object, but rather the po nt s to abstract the movement of

knowledge tself, s nce th s movement tself has engendered subject v ty as

wellas ts real sat on as object v ty.Therefore, mmed ate knowledge s not fol

lowed by the d scovery of the content wh ch determ nes the necess ty of the

subject and of the object, bypenetrat ng nto th s content. For egel,the po nt

s mply to penetrate the ‘s gn f cance . . . of mmed ate knowledge’ tself.15

Thus, the veryforms of the subject’sconsc ousness, already empt ed of the r

h stor cal determ nat ons by hav ng been abstracted from the object of the r

act on,16become nverted as f they were the pure object of knowledge wh ch

tsmovement engenders the consc ousness:

14 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 69.

15 lb d.

16 Consequently, free consc ousness that bears the al enat on n the commod ty —h s be ng

the h stor cally spec f c determ nat on of egel’s own consc ousness — s ra sed to an

abstractly free consc ousness.




The relat onsh p that the subject of the act on establ shesw th h s/her object

by deally appropr at ng h s/her own potent al ty w th respect to the object’s

potent al ty n order to transform t, namely,the capac tyof the human subject

to organ se h s/her consc ous act on, appears here completely nverted. egel

represents t as f t were a part cular concrete form of an mpersonal rat onal

y,of a self-consc ousness, wh ch does not ar se from human subject v ty,but,

conversely,determ nes t. ere, freedom s not a h stor cally determ ned soc al

relat on whose development s borne n the development of human subject v

y as t object vely advances n know ng ts own transform ng powers, and

therefore transcend ng tself. Qu te the oppos te: egel deal st cally nverts

freedom, creat ng the appearance that t const tutes the attr bute of a self

consc ousness that only relates to tself n the complete mposs b l ty of tran

scend ng ts own dent ty:

The Idea, namely, n pos t ng tself as the absolute un ty of the pure

Not on and ts real ty and thus contract ng tself nto the mmed acy of

be ng, s the total ty n th s form - nature. But th s detem nat on has not

suedfrom a processofbecom ng,nor s t a trans t on, aswhen above, the

subject ve Not on n ts total ty becomesobject v ty,and the subject veend

becomesl fe.On the contrary, the pure Idea nwh ch the detenn nateness

or real ty of the Not on s tself ra sed nto Not on, s an absolute l bera

t on forwh ch there sno longer any mmed ate determ nat on that snot

equallypos ted and tself Not on; n th s freedom,therefore, no trans t on

takes place.25

What s the concrete real ty of th s freedom? It s but each and all of the con

crete forms of the soc al relat on n the cap tal st mode ofproduct on —pr vate

property, value, contracts, r ght, fraud, moral ty, eth cs, fam ly, just ce, gu lt,

pol ce, state, and so on —conce ved as forms nherent by nature n human sub

ject v ty by grace of the self—consc ousIdea.26Thus:

The state s the actual ty of the eth cal Idea . . . the actual ty of concrete

freedom . . . The pr nc ple of modern states has prod g ous strength and

depth because t allowsthe pr nc ple of subject v tyto progress to ts cul

m nat on n the extreme of self-subs stent personal part cular ty,and yet

25 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 843.

26 egel 2008 [1820].




had already set h s own problem: ‘Theph losophers have only nterpreted the

world n var ous ways; the po nt s to change t’.30

Th s problem places us mmed ately n the f eldof act on. And the f rst step

n the very real sat on of act on corresponds to ts organ sat on. ow could

act on be organ sed through a consc ousness that goes beyond the nterpreta

t on of real ty,other than byquest on ng oneself about the object vepotent al

y of one’s act on and, therefore, about th s act on’s necess ty? That s, the

po nt s now to answer oneself about the potent al ty of one’sact on v s-a-v s

the potent al ty of ts object, namely, about the determ nat on of one’ssubjec

t v ty as the necessary concrete form of real s ng the potent al ty of the object

upon wh ch act on s to be taken.

Marx faces for the f rst t me the problem he has pos ted by reproduc ng

egel’scourse and, consequently, w th the perspect ve that the movement of

soc al l fe should be expla ned start ng from the movement of the state.

Therefore, the overcom ng of the ban' ers to the reproduct on of soc al l fe

should ar se from the real sat on of the state’s ought-to-be. owever,just as

Marxaddresses the pract ce of such reproduct on, he f ndsthat there sa supe

r or soc al power that mposes upon th s assumed ought-to-be, namely,pr vate

nterest:

[T]heAssemblydegrades the execut ve power,the adm n strat ve author

es, the l feof the accused, the dea of the state, cr me tself,and pun sh

ment as well, to mater al means of pr vate nterest . . . [wh ch means to]

solve each mater al problem n a non-pol t calway, .e.,w thout any con

nect on w th the whole of the reason and moral ty of the state.31

If the state, and even ts dea, are but mater al means of pr vate nterest, s

pol t cal freedom not then a form of th s same pr vate nterest? owcould the

state be the subject wh ch s the bearer of human freedom f the pol t cal free

dom wh ch const tutes t has pr vate nterest as ts content? F nally,how s t

poss ble to advance, act ng pol t cally n a rat onal manner, w thout beg nn ng

to respond w th regard to the necess ty of pr vate nterest?

At the po nt where egel'sabstract on found an answer by resort ng to the

state as ‘the actual ty of the eth cal ldea’,thus br ng ngdown all antagon sm to

an nsuff c ent development of that Idea n ts h stor cal course, Marx’sanaly

s s nds a quest on, namely,the quest on about the necess tyof the subord na

t on of the state, of pol t cs, to pr vate nterest. Therefore, Marx seeks to f nd

30 Marx 1976a [1845]»p. 5.

3 l Marx 1975a [1842], pp. 259, 262.



72 CARRERA

the necess tyofpr vate nterestwhere t man fests tself n an mmed ate man

ner, where the lack of all gener c un ty represented by the state seems to pre—

va l, that s, n ‘c v lsoc ety’,whose qual ty s that ‘the only bond between men

natural necess ty’.32The quest on s now about the organ sat on of the pro

cess nwh ch human be ngs sat sfythe r natural needs, whose po nt of depar

ture s the organ sat onof the process of soc alproduct on.”

F fteen years after sett ng h s problem, Marx synthes sed the path followed

by h s analys s:

My nqu ry led me to the conclus on that ne ther legal relat ons nor pol t—

cal forms couldbe comprehended whether bythemselves or on the bas s

of a so-calledgeneral development of the human m nd, but that on the

contrary they or g nate n the mater al cond t ons of l fe, the total ty of

wh ch egel . . . embraces w th n the term ‘c v lsoc ety’;that the anatomy

of th s c v l soc ety,however, has to be sought n pol t cal economy.34

Now,the analys s faces the categor es of pol t cal economy.But as soon as these

categor es are quest oned concern ng the r necess ty,they show that:

We have proceeded from the prem ses of pol t cal economy . . . [I]n ts

own words, we have shown that the worker s nks to the level of a

commod ty. . . Labourproduces not onlycommod t es; t produces tself

and the worker as a commod ty. . . Th s fact expresses merely that the

object wh ch labour produces —labour's product —confronts t as some

th ng al en, as a power ndependent of the producer . . .w th n the produc

g act v ty, tself.35

S nce pol t cal economy s a system of categor es, ts cr t que n search of ts

necess tyas a concrete formof the consc ousness that organ ses th s al enated

produc ng act v ty,therefore, as a form of al enated consc ousness tself,po nts

towards ts s mplest category: ‘The f rst category n wh ch bourgeo s wealth

presents tself s that of the commod ty!36

ButMarx’sanalys s could not stop at a category, namely, at a form n wh ch

th s al enated consc ousness conce ves,and therefore nterprets, ts own deter

m nat ons. s analys s needed to face the commod ty tself. e recogn ses n

32 Marx 1967b [1844], pp. 225, 236—7.

33 Marx and Engels 1998 [1845]»PP-47. 48-9. 98

34 Marx 1987b [1859], p. 262.

35 Marx 1975e [1844], pp. 270—80.

36 Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 881.




the commod ty the s mplest real concrete n wh ch the h stor cally spec f c

character of the al enated organ sat on of soc al product on s man fested.

W th th s, he recogn ses the commod ty as the concrete fromwh ch the repro

duct on n thought of the determ nat ons of the subject v tyable to supersede

the cap tal st mode of product on must necessar lybeg n:

In the f rst place, I do not start out from ‘concepts’,hence I do not start

from the ‘concept of value’. . .What I start out from s the s mplest soc al

form n wh ch the labour-product s presented n contemporary soc ety,

and th s s ‘the commod ty?”7

From the Grundr sse to A Contr but on and Cap tal Marx makes here a def n

t ve step forward n putt ng d alect cs on ts feet: n the same way that n b ol

ogy t s clear that the cell from wh ch one departs s a real concrete and not a

concept or a category, the commod ty, namely, ‘the econom c cell-form [ n

bourgeo s soc ety]’,38 s equally so.

3.2 TheD alect cal Reproduct on of the Concrete

Marx presents the po nt of departure of the d alect cal development by stat

g, ‘Thewealth of those soc et es n wh ch the cap tal st mode of product on

preva ls,presents tself as “an mmense accumulat on of commod t es”, ts un t

be ng a s ngle commod ty.’39

On confront ng the commod ty as a real concrete and not as a categoryor a

concept, the f rst knowledge of t could enter an expos t on only as a s mple

med ate knowledge, that s, as the s mple observat on of a fact for whose

necess ty the very po nt of departure cannot account. The supersess on of

egel’s nvers on s already man fested here n a twofold manner. Aga nst

egel’sabstract ‘pure knowledge’,we have here the modest determ ned con

crete be ng of the commod ty and the modest mmed ate knowledge wh ch

has not gone beyond the appearance presented by soc al wealth n cap tal st

soc ety. Moreover, the same supersess on s expressed n the un ty tself

between knowledge and be ng: here, the ex stence of the commod ty obl ges

thought to get nto mot on from ts exter or, far from that ‘pure knowledge’

fromwhose mmed ateness ‘pure be ng’ emerged.At the same t me, th s po nt

of departure s empty of any concept able to be placed n mot on, e ther by

37 Marx 2002 [1879/1881],p. 241.

33 Marx 1965 [1867], p. 8.

39 Marx 1965 [1867], p. 35.



74 CARRERA

pos ng upon t a g ven log cal structure, or by expect ng that t can get nto

mot on by tself as a consequence of ts proper log c.

Toovercome ts mmed ateness, knowledge needs to confront analyt cally

the commod ty n ts real ty, n search of the necess ty that g ves t ts character

as that s mplest soc al form.The po nt s to confront the commod ty n ts real

ex stence, n order to analyse t w th the purpose ofd scover ngwhy t presents

the pecul ar soc al property of be ng a use-value that bears the unnatural

power of be ng an exchange-value. Marx performs th s analys s, thus d scover—

g that th s attr bute of the commod ty, ts value, emerges from ts be ng a

mater al sat on ofa labour wh ch appears to lack any spec f c qual ty. e ra ses

the quest on about the necess ty of th s labour as the determ nant of value, a

quest on wh ch can only be answered by analys ng th s same labour. e thus

d scoversthat the labour represented as the value of commod t es embod es a

mater al qual ty, that of be ng a product ve phys olog cal expend ture of the

human body, and a soc al qual ty,that of be ng that phys olog cal expend ture

appl ed to the product on of use-values for other nd v duals, of soc al use-val

ues,wh ch has been governed n ts appl cat on bya pr vate consc ousness and

dependently of those nd v duals.

Thus, the analys sd scovers soc allynecessary abstract labour, performed n

a pr vate and ndependent manner, to be the human act v ty that prov des the

commod ty w th ts exchangeab l ty, w th ts value. Nevertheless, t cannot

answer the quest on ofwhy th s mater al sed labour represents tself n such a

way.The only place where thought can object velyexam ne the man festat on

of th s necess ty s where th s necess ty real ses tself. Therefore, unless one

attempts to forcea log calmovement upon the object, the only path opened to

d alect cal knowledge s to reproduce by means of thought the movement

through wh ch the commod ty expresses ts value n real ty, that s, to follow

eally the commod ty n the pract cal express on of ts value n the process

of exchange. ow s th s poss ble? F rstly, to say that the commod ty has an

attr bute —namely, ts capac ty to be exchanged - s the same as say ng that t

has a potent al ty to be real sed.Therefore, ts real determ nat on s ts aff rma

t on as th s real sed potent al ty, or n other words, ts negat on as that same

to-be-real sed potent al ty. Its determ nat on s the aff rmat on of ts attr bute

through ts own negat on. Secondly,thought s the subject’s capac ty v rtually

to appropr ate h S/her own potent al ty w th respect to the potent al ty of ts

object.Thought thus confronts the real commod ty and real ses ts own deter

m nat on; that s, t aff rms tself as a subject v ty that knows, negat ng tself as

a subject v ty that bears knowledge as a potent al ty yet to be real sed.

Now, t becomes apparent that although the value ofa commod ty s a quan

t ty of soc allynecessary abstract labour, t necessar ly takes the form of a cer




ta n quant ty of another pr vatelyproduced use-value.That s, n the cap tal st

mode of product on, soc al labour only man fests tself n the form of a th ng

that relates mutually ndependent producers w th each other.At the moment

they act as nd v dual organs of soc al labour, that s, at the moment they orga

n se the r soc al labour, commod ty-producers do not appear to be related

between themselves, beyond each of them be ng the bearer of an nd v dual

port on of soc ety’s total labour-power. owever,they do not bear th s port on

as the capac ty to perform a certa n concrete labour already determ ned bythe

same organ sat on of soc al labour, but n so far as t concerns the r capac ty to

perform labour n general, to expend product vely the r body n general. Then,

each one dec des, accord ng to h s/her own consc ousness and w ll,namely, n

a pr vate and ndependent manner, n wh ch concrete useful form he/she

expends h s/her labour-power. Each one thus aff rmsh m/herself as a subject

freefromall personal dependency w th respect to those forwhom he/she works.

Nevertheless, the recogn t on of h s/her labour as soc ally useful s not an

attr bute that belongs to h m/her, but a pr vate attr bute of everybody else’s

w ll.The capac ty to recogn se the soc al character of the labour performed by

each one s an attr bute nherent to the others, and onlyonce the same labour

has been mater al sed n ts product. Therefore, th s mutual recogn t on s

establ shed through the equal sat on of those products n exchange as mater

al sat ons of that sole soc al relat on that ex sted between the r producers at

the moment n wh ch each of them had to g ve, n a pr vate and ndependent

manner, a concrete form to h s/her capac ty to perform labour n general.

Prov ded th s gener c labour-power has been appropr ately appl ed, that s to

say, prov ded abstract labour has been mater al sed n a soc ally useful con

crete form, the mater al ty of that same labour srepresented as the soc alattr

bute borne by ts product to relate, n exchange,w th another wh ch bears the

same mater al sat on. That s, the mater al ty of soc ally necessary abstract

labour s represented as the value of ts product, and th s product presents ts

spec f c soc al determ nat on as a commod ty. Th s s the nd rect form n

wh ch the mater al un ty of soc al product on organ sed n a pr vate and nde

pendent manner mposes tself.The value-form taken by commod t es s the

general soc al relat on that the pr vate ndependent producers establ sh

between themselves n an nd rect manner.

G ven that he/she performs h s/her labour n a pr vate and ndependent

manner, the commod ty-producer fully controls ts nd v dual character, and

therefore aff rmsh mself/herself as an nd v dual free fromany relat onsh p of

personal dependence. owever, at the same t me, he/she lacks any control

over h s/her labour’s soc al character. The powers of h s/her own nd v dual

labourw th respect to the un ty of the process of soc almetabol sm completely



76 CARRERA

escape h s/her control. Consequently,he/ she has to subm t h s/her consc ous

ness and w ll (wh ch s nherent n a free nd v dual) to the soc al powers borne

by the product of h s/her labour.Value,and therefore h s/her capac ty to take

part n the organ sat on of soc allabour, and then n soc al consumpt on, snot

h s/her personal attr bute. It s an attr bute al en to h s/her person; t belongs

to h s/her commod ty.The mater al product of the labour that the consc ous

ness and w ll of h s/hers that s nherent n a free nd v dual have governed

confronts h m/her as the bearer of a soc al power that s al en to h m/her and

towh ch h s/her consc ousness and w llare subm tted. Therefore, the freecon

sc ousness and w ll of commod ty-producers are the form n wh ch the al en

at on of the r consc ousness and w ll as attr butes of commod t es s real sed.

The r free consc ousness s the form taken by the r al enated consc ousness.

Thus, they behave towards the commod ty n a fet sh st c way.

Start ng from the movement of the commod ty, we d scover al enated con

sc ousness. owever,we have not made th s d scovery by log cally develop ng

the category ‘commod ty’,but by reproduc ng through thought the real move

ment of commod t es. Now,the fact that th s al enated consc ousness s the

one wh ch the commod ty-producer employs to governh s/her part c pat on

h s/her product on confronts us w th the follow ng ev dence: just as our

po nt of departure was that ‘ mmense accumulat on of commod t es’, al en—

ated consc ousnesswas alreadypresent n ts real sat on at the po nt of depar

ture tself.Moreover,consc ousness s the form n wh ch human subjects bear

the r capac ty to govern the r nd v dual labour as organs of soc al labour.

Therefore, regard ng commod ty-producers, we see that the r capac ty to gov

ern the r nd v dual labour s an attr bute that fullyconcerns the r consc ous

ness and w ll. Nevertheless, at the same t me, they lack any control over the

soc al character of the r labour. Th s control s an attr bute object f ed n the

commod ty.Therefore,when commod ty-producers look at the movement of

the r own product, what confronts them s the movement of the r al enated

capac ty to govern the r soc al labour. We can then say that, n both A

Contr but onand Cap tal, the po nt of departure s the spec f c h stor cal form

presented to the subjectsof act on by the r own consc ousness n the cap tal st

mode of product on. owever, t would have been mposs ble to beg n

abstractly from the consc ousness tself of commod ty-producers, n order to

d scoverfree consc ousness as the form of al enated consc ousness. It s mpos

s bleto d scoverobject velythe fet sh sm of commod t es w thout d scover ng,

f rst,the spec f c form nwh ch soc al labour s organ sed, wh ch s the produc

t on of commod t es. ere, the soc al relat on takes form n the consc ousness

and w ll of ts subjects, and not v ce versa.




In add t on, let us not ce that what confronts us here snot the abstract con

sc ousness of an abstract commod ty-producer. Actually, t s the very con

sc ousness wh ch has ach eved th s d scovery,namely, t s ourown consc ousness.

Its power to produce the sa d d scovery,and therefore the development of ts

freedom, s but an express on of the development of ts al enat on.

Letus cont nue follow ngthe movement of the commod ty.The same devel

opment of the form of value makes t ev dent that, even though the general

soc al relat on appears to ar se a poster or from the mater al process of pro

duct on, the organ sat on of th s process requ res that one commod ty n par

t cular becomes placed apart by the movement ofthe rest, to act as the soc ally

recogn sed substant ve express on of soc al labour performed n a pr vate and

dependent manner. The general sed product on of commod t es, wh ch

makes soc al wealth appear as an mmense accumulat on of commod t es,

pl es the developed ex stence of money.Therefore, the po nt s not that the

commod ty has become money, or that the category ‘commod ty' has engen

dered the category ‘money’,by follow ng a log cal necess ty. The po nt s that

the movement of commod t es, namely, the movement of the s mplest spec f c

concrete, has placed us n front of the real necess ty that determ nes the ex s

tence ofmoney as that object f ed express on.

The real sat on of commod t es as values takes us from product on to c rcu

lat on.When we confronted product on, we d scovered commod ty-producers

to be nd v duals free fromanypersonal dependence who soc ally relate them

selves n an nd rect waythrough commod ty-exchange,wh ch operates beh nd

the r backs, thus determ n ng the r consc ousness and w ll as al enated. Now,

c rculat on, we see that that nd rect relat on takes the concrete form of a

d rect relat on, a consc ous and voluntary one, asperson hcat ons of commod

es. Thus we d scover that the nd rect relat on between persons, that s, the

econom c relat on, real ses ts necess ty under the form of a d rect relat on

between person f cat ons, that s,as a jur d cal relat on.

Onceaga n, the accumulat on of commod t es fromwh ch we departed was

alreadymed ated n ts ex stence by the jur d cal relat ons between commod ty

Owners, but we were unable to account for these relat ons at that po nt.

Therefore,those who attempt to start byeras ngthe spec f c tyof commod t es

as the soc al representat on of the mater al ty of soc allyuseful abstract labour

performed pr vately are unable to go beyond the representat on of the rela

t onsh p that ex sts between econom c relat ons and jur d cal relat ons as an

external one. S ncejur d cal relat ons appear to emerge from the w llofmutu

ally ndependent nd v duals, these concept ons fallv ct m to the appearance

that human be ngs are abstractly free subjects by nature. From th s follows

the appearance that al enat on s externally mposed upon th s nature, thus



78 CARRERA

h nder ng the recogn t onofal enat on asthe content of freedom, and thus the

recogn t on of freedom as a h stor cal soc al relat on.

When we cont nue by follow ngw th our thought the real movement of

commod t es n c rculat on, we come to face the concrete form n wh ch the

un ty between soc al product on and consumpt on s establ shed. At the stage

where we had completed the f rst development of the form of value, we knew

that the only poss b l ty for th s un ty was the exchange of commod t es n the

exact proport on n wh ch they were mater al sat ons of the same quant ty of

soc ally necessary abstract labour. Now we d scover that th s determ nat on

aff rms tself by tak ng a concrete form that appears as ts own negat on: those

commod t es whose product on exceeds or falls short, v s-d-v sthe amount of

the solvent soc al necess ty for them at the r value, reta n the r capac ty to

enter the exchange-relat on. But they do so by represent ng a greater or lesser

amount of soc al labour than the soc ally necessary one wh ch they actually

embody. That s, the real sat on of the values of commod t es takes concrete

shape, n compet t on, through the sell ng of commod t es above or beneath

the r values.

Aga n, the po nt here s not that the category ‘commod ty’ has log cally

engendered the category ‘compet t on’.Nor s t the case that we have started

byabstract ng the commod ty from the cont ngenc es of compet t on, bycon

struct vely ntroduc ng the s mpl fy ng assumpt on of the mmed ate real sa

t on of value, and that we are now l ft ng th s assumpt on. owever, the po nt

also not that the commod ty we came to know at f rst carr ed n tself, as a

latent potent al ty, the necess ty of engender ng the movement of compet

t on. On the contrary, as the elementary form of the n t al accumulat on of

commod t es, t was the full express on of the real sat on of all the concrete

determ nat ons of compet t on. But t was mposs ble at that stage for us to

apprehend t as suchw th our thought. Onlybybeg nn ng w th the commod ty

as the s mplest spec f cconcrete could we come completely to appropr ate ts

determ nat on as a fullconcrete.

As soon as the movement of commod t es n c rculat on demands that we

account for ts concrete form as compet t on, we advance another step n rec

ogn s ngthe determ nat ons of the consc ousness and w ll of person f cat ons.

Allthe d rect relat ons that they establ sh n the organ sat on of soc al l fe nec—

essar lyhave an antagon st c character.

Themovement ofmoney as a means of c rculat on synthes ses the determ

nat ons of commod t es that we have developed thus far. C—M—C: n order to

sat sfy the r human needs by purchas ng commod t es wh ch bear use-value

for them, commod ty-producers must have f rst appropr ately acted as al en—

ated person hcat ons n the product on and real sat on of value. Th s s a pro




duct on of use-values whose cond t on l es n the product on of value.

Therefore, the object ve of the c rcu t rema ns beyond t. But when we deally

follow the movement of money, we f nd out that the very form of th s move

ment confronts us w th the funct ons of money as board and as means of pay

ment. ere, commod ty-product on has as ts mmed ate a m the product on

of the object hed general soc al relat on: both c rcu ts end n money.

owever,the product on of the general soc al relat on s, above all, the pro

duct on of the capac ty to open the c rcu t of the process of soc almetabol sm,

that s, the product on of the capac ty to put nto mot on nd v dual labours as

organs of soc al labour. Thus, the reproduct on by means of thought of the

movement of money faces us w th the movement of the object ed general

soc al relat on, wh ch opens the c rcu t of product on of commod t es w th the

med ate a m of produc ng more of tself:M - C - M’.Nowwe recogn se the

general soc al relat on as cap tal, that s, as the capac ty to put soc al labour

to mot on w th the mmed ate a m of produc ng more of th s same capac ty.

The reason for th s c rcu t res des w th n the c rcu t tself.Th s s a modal ty of

organ s ng the process of soc al metabol sm wh ch has ts self-mult pl cat on

as ts mmed ate a m. Therefore, th s s a soc al relat on that acts as the mme

d ate subject of soc alproduct on, namely, an automat c organ sat on of soc al

product on. The consc ousness and w ll of the nd v duals are concrete forms

that embody the real sat on of th s organ sat on,wh chassuch confronts them

as an al en power that dom nates them.

We thus d scover that commod ty-product on, from whose s mplest con

crete express on we departed, s not a product on of use-values med ated by

the product on of value.We recogn se th s determ nat on now as an appear

ance. Commod ty-product on has the valor sat on of cap tal as ts mmed ate

a m, and use-values for human l fe are produced only prov ded that surplus

value s produced. It s not about the category ‘commod ty’engender ng the

category ‘cap tal'.On the contrary, we are now able to recogn se that the s m

plest concrete from wh ch we departed, the commod ty, s the product of

cap tal.

At the stage where we recogn sed the commod ty as the s mplest concrete

presented by the cap tal st mode of product on, t appeared that no general

soc al relat on pre-ex sted the pr vate dec s on about the concrete form n

wh ch each producer would expend h s/her nd v dual port on of soc ety’s

labour-power. The general soc al relat on only appeared to emerge from pr

vate product on, ruled by these dec s ons; so th s al enated soc al relat on

appeared, then, as the one wh ch determ ned the consc ousness of the com

mod ty-producers, n the form of the necess ty to produce value. Now t

becomes ev dent that the object f ed soc al relat on pre-ex sted the putt ng



80 CARRERA

to act on of soc al labour n a pr vate manner, and that the w ll of the cap tal

t, as the person f cat on of cap tal, s but the concrete form under wh ch th s

modal ty of organ s ng soc al product on real ses ts necess ty.

ad we stopped before reach ng th s po nt, we would have fallen v ct m to

an appearance wh ch was the nverse of the true content. It would have been

poss ble for us to d scover that the commod ty from wh ch we departed s

not the s mple product of labour,but the product of a labour al enated to cap

tal. Nevertheless, we now recogn se the true concrete determ nat on, only

because we departed from the commod ty as that s mplest concrete wh ch

confronted us n ts mmed ateness.

Asthe substant ve form of the general soc al relat on, money act ng as cap

tal starts by recogn s ng as soc allynecessary the labour pr vately mater al sed

n two types of commod t es, namely, labour-power and means of product on.

Then, the labour-power s transformed nto l v ng labour, wh ch becomes

mater al sed n a pr vateand ndependent manner n a new commod ty,wh ch

turn s transformed nto money,as t s recogn sed n c rculat on as a mater

al sat on of soc allynecessary abstract labour.

When we faced the commod ty for the f rst t me, pr vate ownersh p of one’s

means of product on appeared to be necessary n order to produce t. Now,

from a more developed concrete po nt of v ew,we see that the content s the

oppos te one: the worker sells h s/her labour-power because, as a free nd v d

ual, he/she s separated from h s/her means of product on. Workers are free

d v duals n a double sense. Freedom, wh ch we knew to be the form of the

al enat on n commod t es, shows through ts real movement that, actually, t

the form of the al enat on n cap tal.

It s not about the category ‘cap tal’engender ng the category ‘commod ty

labour-power’,and even less so about construct ng a category ‘cap tal’wh ch

sat sf es the requ rement of treat ng labour-power as a commod ty. What we

have done s to reproduce n thought the fact that the general soc al relat on

proper to the cap tal st mode of product on puts tself nto mot on by deter—

m n ng the worker’scapac ty to work as ts own product.

Bythus follow ngthe movement of cap tal, we d scover that the true con

tent enclosed by the exchangeof commod t es as equ valent mater al sat ons

of soc al labour mpl es that the worker s forced to render more soc al labour

than that mater al sed n the means ofsubs stence he/she rece ves n exchange.

That s,the exchange of equ valents s the formtaken by the explo tat on of the

worker by cap tal.

In t ally,when we d scovered the commod ty as the object f ed form of the

general soc al relat on n the cap tal st mode of product on, t appeared that,

on the one hand, the d rect producer had complete control over h s/her nd



TI-IECONSCIOUSNESS OF T E WORKING CLASS AS ISTORICAL SUBJECT 81

v dual labour wh le, on the other hand, no d rect control ex stedover the soc al

character of labour.Wecan now see that, on the one hand, the d rect producer

of commod t es, the worker, rema ns a free nd v dual although he/she does

not have complete control over h s/her nd v dual labour.As th s free nd v d

ual, he/she must obey the author ty of the cap tal st who has purchased h s/

her labour-power. On the other hand, the cap tal st d rectlycontrols the work

er’slabour, thus controll ng a soc al labour, albe t n a pr vate way.Then, just at

th s stage of reproduc ng the movement of the general soc al relat on, we are

able to recogn se the commod ty fromwh ch we departed as the product of a

certa n d rect organ sat on —therefore consc ous and voluntary —of soc al

labour.We thus d scover that pr vate labour s not merely such, but a contra

d ct on n tself: pr vate labour soc ally organ sed w th n tself.

As an object ed soc al relat on that mmed ately a ms at produc ng more

of tself, cap tal real ses ts determ nat on by lengthen ng the work ng day.

owever, th s, ts very movement, confronts us w th the negat on of ts own

reproduct on, n so far as the lengthen ng of the work ng day underm nes the

reproduct on of labour-power.When we followthe development of th s con

trad ct on, we f nd that ts f rst pole s mply reproduces the antagon st c rela

t onsh p between the workers as sellers of the same commod ty, namely, the

compet t on among themselves. On the contrary, the second pole causes th s

compet t on to take the concrete shape of ts oppos te, namely, sol dar ty as

the normal form of sell ng labour-power at ts value.

Thus far, t appeared that the owners of commod t es were only able to

relate d rectly w th each other as person f cat ons on an nd v dual bas s,

namely,jur d cal relat ons could not go beyond pr vate ones. But after follow

g the movement of cap tal, we d scover that the antagon st c relat ons

between person f cat ons necessar ly have a publ c character, namely, a pol t

cal character, n so far as the un verse of the sellers of labour-power confronts

the un verse of ts purchasers. In th s confrontat on, the former determ ne

themselves as the work ng classand the latter as the cap tal st class.That s,the

d rect organ sat on of soc al labour through the valor sat on of cap tal has

class-struggle as ts necessary concrete form. In other words, n the cap tal st

mode of product on, the pol t cal act on of soc al classes s the concrete form

taken by cap tal-valor sat on. In turn, the concrete forms of class-strugglecon

front us w th the determ nat on of the state as the pol t cal representat ve of

the total ty of the nd v dual cap tals of soc ety.

Now,th s concrete form taken by the buy ng and sell ng of labour-power

confronts us w th the fact that, where the ndependent act on of nd v dual

cap tals as the subjects of valor sat on appeared to be the only poss ble un ty

w th n the process of soc al metabol sm, these are not the actual subjects of



82 CARRERA

the sa d un ty. In a concrete manner, total soc al cap tal s the subject of that

un ty.Therefore, the veryal enated subject of th s mode of organ s ng the pro

cessof soc al metabol sm s the un ty of ts self-reproduct on.

The contrad ct on between a l m ted work ng day and cap tal’s valor sat on

confronts usw th the product on of relat ve surplus-value.In t, the apparently

dependent movement of each nd v dual cap tal n pursu t of an extraord

nary surplus-value, ach eved by develop ng the product v ty of ts workers,

results n the reduct on of the value of the workers’means of subs stence, and

therefore the reduct on of the value of labour-power and, f nally,the ncrease

of the rate of surplus-value.

Let us follow the movement of cap tal nto the product on of relat ve

surplus-value and leap forward, for reasons of brev ty, to ts most powerful

form: the system of mach nery of large-scale ndustry. Now,we are able to rec

ogn se that the commod ty fromwh ch we departed was the concrete real sed

formofveryd fferent determ nat ons from those wewere able to d scover n t

as the s mplest spec f cconcrete. As that s mplest concrete, we knew t as the

product of a free nd v dual,who as such exerted complete control overh s/her

d v dual labour but lacked any control over ts soc al character, sohe/ she had

to al enate h s/her consc ousnessto the soc alpowersofthe product ofh s/her

labour, or, n other words, he/ she had to produce value. The development of

cap tal as the subject of the product on of relat ve surplus-value shows us now,

f rstly,that the commod ty fromwh ch we departed concretely s the product

of the labour of a collect ve ofdoubly-free nd v duals. Secondly, th s collect ve

worker consc ously governs the labour of ts nd v dual organs by means of a

product on-plan elaborated by an object ve, namely sc ent f c, consc ousness.

Therefore, the collect veworker acts w th complete control over the un ty of

ts labour as a pr vate organ of soc al product on. owever, t lacks any control

over the general soc al character of ts labour. Consequently, t has to al enate

s consc ousness n the serv ceof the soc alpowers of the product of ts labour,

that s, t has to produce surplus-value.40

Thus far, we have followed cap tal along the complete movement of ts c r—

cu t ofvalor sat on, that s to say,along the processw th n wh ch surplus-value

emerges fromcap tal.Theonlymovement that cap tal presents us, beyond th s

c rcu t, s the reproduct on of th s same c rcu t.Aswe followth s reproduct on,

we are confronted by three contents that appeared nverted n the buy ng and

sell ngof labour-power n c rculat on, beyond the exchange of equ valents as

the necessary form of explo tat on. F rstly,under the form of the worker’sfree

dom, he/she s a forced labourer for total soc al cap tal. Secondly, under the

40 In go Carrera 2008 [2003], pp. 15—23.




form of the worker’spersonal nterest n reproduc ng h m/herself, the need of

cap tal to reproduce labour-power s ach eved. Th rdly,under the form of pr

vate property based on one’sown labour, pr vate property based on the gratu

ous appropr at on of the product of others’labour asserts tself.

Certa nly the latter determ nat on was present n the commod ty from

wh ch we departed. Why d d we not depart d rectly by mak ng ev dent th s

actual content? Because t would have mpl edwewere attempt ng to d scover

the necess tyborne n the commod ty produced bycap tal byturn ng the po nt

of departure nto an abstract on. G ven ts own a m, the d alect cs that repro

duces the concrete n thought can only start from the mmed acy w th wh ch

the un ty between the subject and the object (the subject’sown al enated soc al

relat on) actually confronts the former under ts s mplest concrete form.41

Aswe follow the reproduct on of cap tal, we f nd out that the expans on of

the pr vate capac ty d rectly to organ se soc al labour develops beyond the

concentrat on of each nd v dual cap tal, through the central sat on of cap —

tals. And n th s double movement, we confront the most developed concrete

formofthe contrad ct on that emerges fromthe factthat the mmed ate object

of soc alproduct on s the extens ve and ntens vemult pl cat on of the capac

y to put soc al labour n mot on. Th s attr bute determ nes the cap tal st

mode ofproduct on asa revolut onaryone,w th respect to the development of

the product ve forces of soc al labour. Nevertheless, the same attr bute deter

m nes t as a barr er to th s development. Its extreme express on n th s sense

the transformat on of an ncreas ng part of the work ngclass nto a surplus

populat on for cap tal, that s,for ts own general soc al relat on.

The reproduct on by way of thought of the movement of the mater al sed

soc al relat on br ngs us now to the spec f c h stor cal determ nat on of the

cap tal st mode of product on. Th s s the development of the product ve

forcesof labour bymeans of the ever ncreas ng soc al sat on of pr vate labour.

The soc al sat on of labour mpl es that consc ousness s able to govern the

organ sat on of the process of soc al metabol sm by object vely know ng the

potent al ty of human product ve act v ty w th respect to the potent al t es

presented by ts env ronment. Pr vate labour mpl es that consc ousness s

unable to know n an object vemanner the same potent al t es and the r un ty,

as they confront t as powersmater al sed n the products of labour to wh ch t

subm tted. The cap tal st mode of product on s tself a contrad ct on n con—

stant development towards ts own supersess on through the complete soc al

sat on of labour.

41 Marx 1965 [1867], pp. 583—6.




duc ng the real necess ty embod ed n ts object, t needs to replace th s

necess ty w th an deal construct ve necess ty, w th a log c that puts nto

mot on a system of categor es, n order to appear as the most pure express on

of an abstractly free subject v ty.

Therefore, the need to develop a d alect c the nverse of egel’s—a d alect c

that replaces construct ve necess tyw th the reproduct on of real necess ty n

thought - f nds ts bas s n a form of a spec f c h stor cal development of the

product ve forces of soc al labour. It ar ses from the need of the process of

soc al metabol sm to nvert the mode by wh ch t rules tself. That s, th s d a

lect c has ts po nt of departure w th n a mode of product on n wh ch the

subject lacks complete control over the soc al powers of h s/her own labour.

Thus,these powers confront h m/her asan object f edattr bute of the mater al

product of that labour and, therefore, as al en to h s/her own subject v ty.

Therefore, even the object ve consc ousness (namely,sc ent f c consc ousness)

of the sa d subject needs to stop at that appearance. And th s need takes con

crete shape n a method of cogn t on that subst tutes the necess ty nherent n

s object w th an deal construct ve necess ty al en to that object v ty. The

rad cal nvers on of th s mode of regulat ng the process of soc al metabol sm

pl es that the subject’sconsc ousness reaches the complete dom nat on of

h s/her cond t on as an nd v dual organ of soc al labour and, therefore, that

the subject’s consc ousness recogn ses the power of soc al labour as h s/her

own power. owever,th s new form of consc ousness can only be engendered

by the development of the pre-ex stent one. Therefore, ts b rth appears as the

vers on of the most powerful form of the pre-ex stent method. Thus, the pro

duct on of the new consc ousness takes concrete shape n the method of cog

n t on that, g venthat t has the necess ty tselfof ts object as the onlynecess ty

to follow,forces ts subject to face h s/her own al enat on. And th s s the f rst

step g ven by that subject n the h stor cally spec f c development of h s/her

freedom.

The product on of th s consc ousness s, therefore, the concrete through

wh ch the method of the ‘reproduct on of the concrete bywayof thought’nec

essar ly could be developed for the f rst t me n h story.

egel’sSc enceofLog c s the soc al object f cat on (a text) of the process n

wh ch a consc ousness, h stor cally determ ned by ts soc al be ng, produces

tself on the bas s of stopp ng at the appearance of be ng an abstract self

consc ousness, wh ch n ts own movement engenders the real. It s the most

developed express on of an al enated consc ousnesswh ch, n order to repro

duce tself n ts al enat on, needs to take the nvers on nherent n any log cal

representat on to ts f nal consequences.



86 CARRERA

Topresuppose the requ rement of a log calnecess ty to apprehend any real

concrete n thought s, by tself, to presuppose that the real concrete lacks all

proper necess ty to be mentally followed. lf real necess ty ex sted, what sense

would there be to resort to a mental construct ve necess ty nstead of s mply

follow ngthe development of the real one w th our thought? Therefore, the

real formsmust appear as be ng unable to relate, to move by themselves, at the

beg nn ng of the process of representat on. Nevertheless, when they emerge

from th s process, they do so full of the relat ons that log c has establ shed

between them.

owever, egel does not cons der concrete forms to be unable to move by

themselves. Instead, he d scovers the form of the real movement, namely, self

afBrmat on through self-negat on.45Nevertheless, at the same t me, he repro

duces the appearance proper of the representat on by nvert ng the sa d

movement, as f t emerged from the movement of a consc ousness that has

self as ts sole determ nat on, of a self-consc ousness:

Accord ngly,what s to be cons dered here as method s only the move

ment of the Nat on tself, the nature of wh ch movement has already

been cogn zed; but hrst, there s now the added s gn f cance that the

Nat on s everyth ng, and ts movement s the un versal absolute act v ty,

the self-determ n ng and self-real z ng movement . . . The method . . . s

therefore not only the h ghestforce, or rather the sole and absoluteforce

of reason, but also ts supreme and sole urge to f nd and cogn ze tselfby

means of tself n everyth ng.46

owever,by d scover ng that self-a l rmat on through self-negat on s the s m

plest and more general form of determ nat on, egel takes ph losophy to the

end of ts h stor cal poss b l ty to bear the advance of the object ve consc ous

ness n the organ sat on of soc al metabol sm. e does so, as the very form of

h s method makes ev dent the need for the m ss ng f nal step, n wh ch real

necess ty s put n the place thus far occup ed by deal necess ty. After egel,

ph losophy can only w thdraw towards the rat onal cult vat on of the pureSt

formal exter on’ty(log calpos t v sm) or towards the cult vat on of the crudest

rat onal ty (N etzsche,postmodern sm).

Cap tal s not a concept whose movement obeys the necess ty mposed

upon t by thought. The relat on s completely the oppos te. Cap tal s a general

soc al relat on, that s,a mode of organ s ng soc al labour and, therefore, soc al

45 Man: 1975c [1844]. p. 332

46 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 826.




consumpt on. In th s mode of product on, the organ sat on of soc al labour

w th n each un t of product on s an attr bute that pr vately perta ns to t.

Conversely,each product ve un t lacks control over the general soc al charac

ter of the labour t performs. Soc al labour s organ sed n a pr vate and nde

pendent way.The un ty between soc al product on and consumpt on s thus

establ shed n an nd rect manner. The capac ty to pr vately organ se soc al

labour operates as an attr bute mater al sed n the product of the same labour.

Atthe same t me, the mmed ate a m that rules the putt ng nto act on of soc al

labour s not the product on of soc al use-values,but the expanded reproduc

t on of the same object f ed capac ty to put nto act on soc al labour n a pr

vate manner. The object f ed soc al relat on s the one that puts nto act on

soc al labour n order to produce more of tself. Such s cap tal’s essent al

determ nat on.

Aga n, consc ousness s, above all, the capac ty of human subjects to rule

the r own nd v dual labour as organs of soc al labour. owever, n the cap tal

st mode of product on, th s power confronts ts subjects as a power that

belongs to the mater al product of the r soc al labour.That s, the determ na

t on proper of the subjects’consc ousness confronts the r consc ousness tself

as a power located beyond t, as an autonom sed capac ty to put nto act on

soc al labour wh ch the r consc ousness tselfmust obey,that s,ofwh ch con

sc ousness must act as a concrete formof real sat on. Assuch, the sa d autono

m sed capac ty puts consc ousness nto movement. In real ty, the movement

ofcap tal puts thought nto movement, determ n ng t asan al enated thought.

As a h stor cal form of the development of the product ve forces of soc al

labour, cap tal determ nes a spec f cmovement of consc ousness. The spec f

cally cap tal st form of develop ng the product ve forces of soc al labour con

s sts n the progress ve soc al sat on of pr vate labour. That s, t cons sts n the

development of the capac ty to organ se soc al labour through the object ve

knowledge of one’sown determ nat ons, as a concrete form of the real sat on

of the development of the organ sat on of soc allabour as the negat on of such

object ve knowledge. The development of the product ve forces of mmed

ately soc al free labour as an attr bute of ts very negat on, namely, of pr vate

labour, s the contrad ct on that synthes ses the h stor cal potent al t es and

the absolute l m t of the cap tal st mode of product on. And the transforma

t on of the mater al ty of the labour n wh ch the development of the sa d con

trad ct on takes concrete form (the product on of relat ve surplus-value)

determ nes the work ng class to be the subject whose act on real ses such

development.

The cap tal st soc al relat on tself needs to engender th s soc al subject,

wh ch produces ts consc ousness under the form n wh ch every construct ve



88 CARRERA

necess ty —that as such seems to make thought move by tself ndependently

of the actual movement of ts object —must d sappear. At the same t me, the

place of th s construct ve necess ty can only be taken by the reproduct on n

thought of the movement of the verynecess ty of the real concrete. Therefore,

s about a subject whose general soc al relat on prov des t w th no start ng

po nt other than be ng npossess onofan al enated consc ousness and, conse

quently, a consc ousness wh ch s a pr soner of the deal st c nvers ons of log

cal representat on. But t s about a subject determ ned by ts general soc al

relat on as the bearer of the necess ty to develop ts consc ousness up to the

po nt of free ng t from any nverted construct on. It s, therefore, about an

al enated subject whose soc al be ng makes t the act ve subject of the revolu

t onary transformat on of the mode of organ s ngthe process of soc al produc

t on, wh ch t accompl shes by abol sh ng all al enat on. The reproduct on of

the concrete by means of thought, through wh ch every subject rules h s/her

d v dual labour ashe/she completely knows h m/ herself as an organ of soc al

labour, thus asserts tself as the concrete form of the general soc al relat on.

Marx's Cap tal s the soc al object f cat on (a text) of the process n wh ch,

for the f rst t me n h story,the movement of the general soc al relat on of the

work ngclass as an al enated subject confronts th s subject w th the necess ty

to rule ts consc ous act on by g v ngan account of ts own al enat on, wh ch t

can do because t has the real development of the latter as the only source of

s own flow.Th s al enated subject, wh ch advances n ts freedom by becom

g aware of ts al enat on, thus becomes aware of the h stor cal power that

th s same al enated soc al relat on prov des t as the necessary subject of ts

supersess on.And know ngsuch powersmeans noth ng other than organ s ng

such rad cal supersed ng act on. In other words, Cap tal s n tself the develop

ment, performed for the f rstt me and n a form that allows ts soc al reproduc

t on, of the al enated consc ousness of the work ngclassthat produces tself as

an al enated consc ousness that s aware of ts own al enat on and of the h s

tor cal powers t der ves therefrom.



C APTER 4

Wh ch ‘Rat onal Kernel’?Wh ch ‘Myst calShell’?

AContr but on to the Debate on the Connect on

between egel’sLog cand Marx’sCap tal

Gaston Cal gar s and Gu doStarosta

1 The Issue at Stake

Thequest on about egel’slegacy n the Marx an cr t que of pol t cal economy

has been one of the most w dely debated ssuesw th n the h story of Mann'st

thought. In recent decades, a new strand of scholarlyworkhas emergedwh ch

has rad cally challenged the ‘rece ved w sdom’ about the ‘ egel—Marx

connect on’.l Usually grouped under the ‘systemat c d alect c’ label, th s novel

assessment of the ntellectual relat onsh p between the two German th nkers

has dec s velybroken w th the orthodox v ewsofD amat asep tom sed n Stal n2

and ofl c alSov etmanuals, wh ch n turn drew d rect nsp rat on from the clas

s cal works of Engels,3Plekhanov4 and Len n.5On the other hand, th s new cr

t que has alsoprov ded an alternat ve to the v ewsassoc atedw th the so-called

‘WesternMarx st’trad t on, whose nterest n the recoveryof the egel anl ne

age nMarx’sthought fundamentally centred on re nstat ng the role of subjec

t v tyaga nst the crude object v sm and econom sm of D amat.

Th smore recent strand of research has focused on the methodolog calrel

evance of egel’sthought for the development of the Marx an cr t que ofpol t

al economy. More spec f cally,whereas n earl er stud es the emphas s was

ma nly on the relat onsh p between egel’sPhenomenologyof Sp r t and the

‘young Marx’,th s more recent l terature has focused on the l nks between

Cap tal and egel’sSc enceofLog c.Although there are var ous part cular con

trovers esoverthe prec se nature of th s connect on, most contr but ons agree

that the structure of the argument n Cap tal s organ sed n a d alect cal form

wh ch, at the veryleast, can be sa d to draw formal nsp rat on from the general

form of movement of categor es that egel deploys n h s Log c.Thus Marx’s

1 See,for nstance, Murray 1988,Reuten and W ll ams 1989,Sm th 1990,Moseley 1993b,Moseley

and Campbell 1997,and Arthur 2002.

Stal n 1947 [1938].

Engels 1987a [1877], 1987b [1872-82] and 1991[1886].

Plekhanov 1965 [1891],and 1976 [1895].

Len n 1977 [1908], and 1976 [1895-1916].

AOJN

© KONINKLIJKBBRILLNV, LEIDBN, 2014 I DO] l0.1163/9789004270022_006



90 CALIGARIS AND STAROSTA

presentat on s seen as nvolv ng a (synthet c) movement from the more

abstract or s mple form-determ nat ons of the subject-matter (namely,cap tal)

to the ncreas ngly more concrete or complex forms n wh ch t moves and

eventually man fests n ‘emp r cal’real ty, thereby culm nat ng n the ntellec

tual reproduct on of cap tal as the un ty of those many determ nat ons.

Inasmuch as the trans t on from one econom c form to the next s seen as

be ng dr ven by the development of the contrad ct ons mmanent n each of

them, the r relat onsh p s generally deemed as nternal and grounded n d a

lect cal necess ty, n contrast w th the extemal ty that nev tably results from

the use of formal log c.

Now,beyond th s general consensus w th n the ‘systemat c d alect c’ l tera

ture, two broadly def ned approaches can be dent f ed.6 F rstly, there s the

group of authors who exam ne the egel—Marxconnect on through the so

called ‘homology-thes s’.Perhaps the most emblemat c contr but on from th s

perspect ve can be found n the work of Chr sArthur,7who argues for the ex s

tence of a very close ‘homologybetween the structure of egel’s Log c and

Marx’sCap tal’.8Accord ng to th s approach, a str ct mapp ng of most catego

r es of the Sc enceofLog conto the systemat c presentat on n Cap tal s pos

s ble (and actually llum nat ng), “because cap tal s a very pecul ar object,

grounded n a process of real abstract on n exchange n much the same wayas

egel’sd ssolut on and reconstruct on of real ty s pred cated on the abstrac

t ve power of thought’.9

The second strand w th n the ‘systemat c d alect c’ l terature cons sts n a

mater al st read ng of egel’swork n general and the Log c n part cular. Tony

Sm th’swork s perhaps the most representat ve of th s perspect ve.10 The

essent al po nt made bySm th s that egel’sd alect cal method j dly co nc des

w th Marx’s, notw thstand ng the latter’s repeated remarks to the contrary

throughout h s l fet me. The Log c s thus read as a systemat c-d alect cal expo—

s t on of the fundamental ontolog calstructures of realmater al be ng, that s,

as a ‘mater al st ontology’.llThe relevance of the Log cthus der ves from pro

v d ng the bas c categor esthat are needed to capture the ‘ ntell g b l ty’of the

mater al world.12

In sum,whereas forArthur’sapproach the content of the Log c spurely and

absolutely deal st, accord ng to Sm th’s nterpretat on t s sheer mater al sm.

6 See R ccardo Bellof ore n th s volume, pp. 167—72.

7 Arthur 2002.

8 Arthur 2002, p. 7.

9 Arthur 2002, p. 8.

10 Sm th 1990.

11 Sm th 1990, p. 8.

12 Sm th 1990, p. 5.



W IC ‘RATIONAL KERNEL’? W IC ‘MYSTICAL S ELL'? 91

Whereas for Arthur’s homology-thes s the Log ccan shed l ght on cap tal st

soc al forms only, for Sm th’s egel-as-mater al st read ng ts f eld of ‘appl ca

b l ty’ or relevance s broader and could n pr nc ple nclude non-cap tal st

soc al forms and natural forms aswell. F nally,whereas accord ng toArthur the

Marx an cr t que of pol t cal economy can benef t from the d scovery of

homologous log calforms mpl c t n the nner connect on between the d ffer

ent form-determ nat ons of cap tal, for Sm th the quest on s rather that of

becom ng aware of the general ontolog cal structures that organ se the system

at c order ng of econom c categor es.

Now,th s debate about the s gn f cance of the Log cforthe cr t que ofpol t

cal economy can be reframed n terms of Marx’swell-known expl c t state

ment about the relat onsh p between h s d alect cal method and egel’s:the

key ssue at stake seems to be the establ shment of the prec se nature of the

rat onal kernel w th n the (allegedly) myst cal shell.13Th s chapter attempts to

contr bute to the debate by prov d ng an alternat ve perspect ve on the con

nect on between egel’sLog cand Marx’sCap tal to the twojust sketched out

above. Draw ng on Juan l go Carrera’swork on the relat onsh p between the

d alect cal method and the cr t que of pol t cal economy,14we shall argue that

the methodolog cal and sc ent f c s gn f cance of the Log c —the ‘rat onal

kernel’ —does not come down to offer ng the purely log cal form of cap tal’s

pecul ar nverted ontology. ere we tend broadly to concur w th Sm th’s

cr t que of the homology-thes s. owever, contra Sm th, we shall also show

that the content of the Log ccannot be s mply taken over for a Marx an ‘sys

temat c d alect c’.Aswe shall see, the ‘myst cal shell’affects the very structure

of egel’sbook.

2 Marx sts on Sc enceof Log c’sRat onal Kernel and Myst cal Shell

In the found ng works of D amat, the Log c s usually taken as conta n ng ‘the

fundamental laws of d alect cs’,wh ch are then to be appl ed to more concrete

objects such as h story,cap tal sm, and soon. It s thus argued that egelwould

have d scovered those lawsbut ‘ nh s deal st fash on asmere laws of thought’.15

In so far as those texts do not offer any substant ve cr t que of the spec f ccon

tent developed n the Log c (wh ch n many cases they s mply reproduce

almost word by word), t must be assumed that for th s read ng the rat onal

13 Marx 1983a, p. 248, and Marx 1976c [1867], p. 103.

14 In go Carrera 1992,2007, 2013,and n th s volume.

15 Engels 1987b [1872-82], p. 356.




kernel cons sts n the d alect cal unfold ng of the log cal categor es just as s

presented by egel. For ts part, the myst cal shell s seen n egel’scla m that

the subject of those d fferent log calforms s not the real human be ng ‘reflect

g’ n h s bra n the structure and movement of matter or nature, but the

‘AbsoluteIdea’.Th s pos t on s n cely expressed by Len n’s famous aphor sm:

the quest on s how to ‘read egel mater al st cally . . . that s to say . . . cast

as de for the most part God, the Absolute, the Pure Idea, etc."5 It would seem,

then, that the matter comesdown to the subst tut on ofa mater al st term nol

ogy for egel’s deal st one, that s, replac ng the term ‘Idea’w th the word

‘matter’.

Th s orthodox nterpretat on has been challenged from two oppos ng per

spect ves.The f rst one subm ts that uncr t cally appropr at ng the systemat c

d alect cal method unfolded n the Log cnecessar ly nvolves accept ng egel’s

absolute deal sm. In th s sense, there s mply s no rat onal kernel to d scover.

At the other end, some authors argue that the Log cdoes not deal w th any

metaphys cal super-subject, but only unfolds systemat cally all the necessary

categor es for mak ng ntell g ble the more abstract ontolog cal structures of

the mater alworld.Asa consequence, th s read ng tends to conclude that there

actually s no myst cal shell. egel'sLog c s therefore seen as all rat onal kernel

from beg nn ng to end.

Luc o Collett ’s nfluent al Marx sm and egel s a good llustrat on of the

f rst perspect ve.l7 Accord ng to th s author’s provocat ve thes s, the ma n

ach evement of egel’sLog c s to offer, for the f rst t me n the h story of ph

losophy,a sol d expos t on and just f cat on of ‘ deal sm n a log cally coherent

fash on’.18And t does th s prec sely by resort ng to the d alect cal method.

Collett makes h s case by cr t cally exam n ng the d alect c of the f n te and

the nf n te that egel develops n the ‘Log cof Be ng’.In th s read ng, the dem

onstrat on of the contrad ctory character of the f n teconta ned n those pages

const tutes a key moment n egel’sspeculat ve ph losophy, s nce ‘f n tude s

the most stubborn categoryof the understand ng’.19The reason for th s specu

lat ve s gn f cance s that n the f n te the understand ng grasps ‘thenegat on as

f xed n tsemand t therefore stands n abrupt contrast to ts afl rmat ve’,20hat

,the nf n te. In st ck ng to the f x tyof f n te be ng, that s, n deny ng the d s

solut on of the f n te or the ‘ceas ng to be of the ceas ng-to-be’,21the under

16 Len n 1976 [1895-1916], p. 104.

17 Collett 1973 [1969].

18 Collett 1973 [1969], p. 8.

19 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 129.

20 egel 1999 [1812-16], p. 130.

z 1 egel 1999 [1812—16],pp. 130—1.



W IC ‘RATIONALKERNEL’?W IC ‘MYSTICALS ELL’?

stand ng can only grasp t ‘as rreconc lable w th the nf n te’22and, hence,

condemns the med at on between them to fa lure. On the contrary, w th the

awareness of the contrad ctory character of the f n te and ts result ng ‘onto

log cal nstab l ty’, egel s able to reveal how the f n te, through ts own mma

nent d alect c, passes over nto the nf n te. In th s way, he overcomes the

rad cal oppos t on between them, a task wh ch the understand ng s unable to

ach eve. owever, Collett ’sargument goes on, egel can only succeed at th s

by condemn ng the f n te to unreal ty or deal ty. In other words, egel can

prov de a rat onally coherent speculat ve med at on of the f n te and the nf

n te by reduc ng the former to a van sh ng moment of the latter’s process,

wh ch alone possesses ‘true’real ty.On the other hand, Collett po nts out that

for egel only thought has un versal ty and nf n ty.The d alect c of the f n te

s thus equated by egelto the ‘ann h lat on ofmatter’.ThusCollett concludes

that th s demonstrat on of the d alect cal or self-contrad ctory character of

f n te be ng must of necess ty enta l absolute deal sm, s nce the sensuous

mater al world (the f n te) s conce ved as a mode of ex stence of thought (the

f n te). The d alect cal method, that s, the concept on accord ng to wh ch

‘everyth ngf n te s alterable and per shable’ and ‘be ng mpl c tly the other of

self, s dr ven beyond what t mmed ately sand overturns nto ts oppos te’,23

s for Collett nherently deal st c.24

Now, f we exam ne more closely the d alect c of the f n te n Sc ence of

Log c, t becomes clear that, pace Collett , those pages do not develop a demon

strat on of the deal character of the sensuousmater al world and therefore do

not prov de the key argument for the deal st nature of egel’ssystem.25The

only th ng that egel s prov ng there s the fact that th ngs are ‘fm te’means

that they carry w th n themselves the necess ty of the r own negat on.

Consequently, they cannot be properly grasped f represented as self-subs stent

ent t es or mmed ate (or unmed ated) aff rmat ons.Instead, th ngs or objects

need to be grasped as self-mov ng,that s, as subjects of the r own qual tat ve

transformat on nto another ‘f n te’form. An object thus real ses ts own qual

tat ve determ nat on bybecom ng another, that s,through self-med at on.Th s

s, n our v ew, all that egel s try ng to expound n those pages: real forms of

‘be ng’af rm through self-negat on. It s n that spec f csense that accord ng to

h m real ty s the movement ofcontrad ct on. Toput t d fferently, egel’spo nt

those pages sjust to say that the true nf n te s noth ng but the mmanent

self-movement of the f n te, wh ch t aff rms through self-negat on. Collett ’s

22 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 130.

23 egel 1991 [1817], p. 130.

24 Collett 1973 [1969], pp. 14-15.

25 See oulgate 2005, p. 429.



W IC ‘RATIONALKERNEL’?W IC ‘MYSTICALS ELL'?

‘Cap tal’, egel’sLog cdeals w th the fundamental categor es of thought that

are necessary to grasp the nner ntell g b l ty of real ty. In th s treatment of

log cal categor es, Sm th argues, egel ‘der ve[s] three general types of catego

r al structures’, one of ‘s mpleun ty’,another of ‘d fference’and, f nally,another

of ‘un ty n d f‘ference’.28Moreover, n so far as those categor al structures are

manently and contrad ctor ly connected, t s poss ble to ‘construct a sys

temat c theory of categor es by employ ng the d alect cal method’.29

In th s read ng, the Log c turns out to be ent rely ‘compat ble w th Marx’s

mater al st ontology’,3°so that there s no reason to reject t for ts deal sm.

Moreover,the alleged ground of egel’s deal sm cannot even be found where

Marxh mself thought t could be located, that s, towards the end of the cate

gor al construct on, at the po nt where egel unfolds the trans t on to

the realm of nature and of human sp r t as the self-negat ng act on of the

Absolute Idea. Accord ng to Sm th, n those passages egel ‘ s ndulg ng n

p cture-th nk ng, n mag nat ve representat ons that on h s own terms belong

on a pre-ph losoph cal level’,31 form of express on that he was compelled to

resort to n order to make h s ph losophy appeal ng to a ma nly Chr st an

readersh p.

Now, f we set as de the thorny quest on of textual support for th s read ng,

Sm th’s nterpretat on would ndeed be plaus ble and, f correct, would cer

ta nly free egel’sph losophy from charges of absolute deal sm. owever,th s

would not automat cally turn egel nto a mater al st n Marx’sspec f c sense.

In order to prove th s, a d fferent k nd of argument wouldbe needed. Aboveall,

proof should be prov ded that the structure of real mater al be ng actually

co nc des w th the structure of pure thought-forms presented n the Log c.

Sm th’sfurther cla m that the categor es presented n that work ‘are n t ally

won n confrontat on w th the emp r cally g ven’32w ll not do e ther, s nce that

far fromguarantee ng that the systemat corder ngof those categor es deally

reproduces the ‘ mmanent l fe’of real mater al be ng. Toput t d fferently, the

quest on about the allegedmater al st character of the Log ccannot be settled

w th ev dence of egel’srecogn t on of an object ve real ty ex st ng outs de

thought. Instead,we th nk that the crux of the matter swhether the egel an

systemat c d alect c of log cal forms correctly reproduces the more abstract

determ nat ons ofmater al real ty ‘bymeans of thought’.

28 Sm th 1990,pp. 5-6.

29 Sm th 1990, pp. 6, 13.

30 Sm th 1990, p. 36.

3 1 Sm th 1990, p. n.

32 Sm th 1990, p. 4.




Aswe ntend to show n the next sect on, egel’ssystemat c development n

the Log c s nherently flawedas an deal reproduct on of the nner connect on

between the more abstract forms of mater al real ty. In a nutshell, we argue

that n so far as h s systemat c d alect c beg ns w th the s mplest thought-form

(that s,w th a purely deal orformal abstract on), h s subsequent der vat on of

categor es sbound to followthe mmanent necess ty of ‘pure thought’ as such,

wh ch, we shall further subm t, does not express the nner movement of the

s mpler determ nat ons of ‘realmater al be ng’.In th s sense, we do th nk that

the pecul ar form g ven by egel to h s systemat c d alect c s mmanently

bound to an deal st standpo nt, although forveryd fferent reasons from those

put forward by Collett .Th s does not mean that there s noth ng to recover

from egel’s mmanent development of thought-forms. It only means that

those rat onal elements need to be carefullyd scoveredw th n a presentat on

wh ch s, by v rtue of ts deal st nature, structured n such a form and r dden

w th categor es that would have no place n a mater al st systemat c d alect c.

Seen n th s l ght, the ma n problem w th Sm th’sperspect ve s not that h s

mater al st read ng of egel s not conv nc ng. Rather, the key ssue s that he

takes over from egel a systemat c d alect c wh ch s qu te s mply flawed. As a

consequence, alongs de the ‘rat onal kemel’, he cannot but carry over the

‘myst cal shell’.

3 The Rat onal Kernel and Myst cal Shell n egel’sLog c

Abstract on versusAnalys s

The start ng po nt of the Log c s ‘pure be ng’ as thoroughly ‘empty th nk ng’.33

In other words, the book beg nsw th be ng as a thought-formor the thought of

be ng.The profoundmean ng and broader s gn f canceof th s pecul ar po nt of

departure n egel’sph losophy has been the subject of numerous controver—

s esamong commentators, part cularlyw th regard to the connect on between

th s category of thought and ‘real be ng’. owever, few scholars have actually

taken egelto task forbeg nn ng h s systemat c d alect c w th a thought-form.

We shall cons der below the mpl cat ons that th s po nt of departure has for

the ma n theme of th s chapter, namely, the rat onal kernel and myst cal shell

to be found n the Log c.For the moment, let us f rst cr t cally exam ne the

methodolog cal procedure that s presupposed by egel's d scovery of ‘pure

be ng’as the s mplest categorythat sets nto mot on the subsequent d alect cal

unfold ng of log cal forms.

33 egel 1999 [1812-16], p. 82.



W IC ‘RATIONAL KERNEL’? W IC ‘MYSTICALS ELL'? 97

egel’scho ce of categor al start ng po nt and the procedure by wh ch he

arr ves at t followsfromh s dea that true speculat veph losophy must nvolve

presuppos t onless th n/r ng.34The ‘beg nn ng’,he states, ‘must be an absolute,

or what s synonymous here, an abstract beg nn ng; and so t may not presup—

pose arzyth ng’.35‘Str ctly speak ng’,he further argues n the Encyclopaed a, ‘th s

requ rement s fulf lled by the freedom that abstracts from everyth ng, and

grasps ts pure abstract on, the s mpl c ty of th nk ng”.36More concretely, the

procedure through wh ch one can arr ve at th s pure abstract on cons sts n

cast ng as de any thought that enta ls a certa n complex ty or concreteness,

that s, any thought whose content presupposes the ex stence of any other

thought. At th s juncture, one could of course object that such an elementary

abstract on would not have been reached on properly sc ent f cgrounds, that

, that t would be the result of a purely formal procedure that does not guar

antee that we have actually reflected the mmanent l feof the subject-matter

under cons derat on. In other words, th s categorywould be a purelyformal

abstract on result ng froman act of subject ve reflect on that rema ns external

to the object of cogn t on. Indeed, egel’s retrospect ve d scuss on of the

beg nn ng of sc ence n the sect on on the Absolute Idea speaks to th s ssue:

the s mplest category const tut ng the po nt of departure of h s Log c s

dep cted as an ‘abstract un versal',wh ch s sa d to be arr ved at by abstract ng

from all determ nacy.37 In other words, pure be ng, as the category that sets

to mot on the (synthet c) movement of the Log c, s a category ak n to those

of the ‘understand ng’ or ‘representat onal thought’, that s, one wh ch only

grasps objects one-s dedly n terms of the r abstract self- dent ty.38In fact, as

Carlson suggests, t could be sa d that t s actually the understand ng that

undertakes the act of abstract on and not speculat vethought as such.39In th s

sense, egel saw the spec f c ty of h s ‘absolute method’ as essent ally res d ng

the synthet c moment, that s, n the reconst tut on of the un ty of the d ffer

ent moments of the total ty through a movement from ts most abstract

thought-form (pure Be ng) to tsmost concrete (the Absolute Idea).40Thus, he

d d not seem to recogn se anyth ng spec f cally speculat ve n the procedure

through wh ch the s mplest category s arr ved at, that s, n the reverse

34 oulgate 2005, p. zgff.

35 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 70.

36 egel 1991 [1817], p. 124.

37 egel 1999 [1812-16], pp. 69—72,827—9.

33 egel 1999 [1812-16],pp. 7955, 828.

39 Carlson 2007, pp. 27—8.

40 egel 1999 [1812—16],pp. 830-1, 838.




movement from the concrete to the abstract wh ch the synthet c phase of sys

temat c sc ence presupposes.

St ll, for egel such a d scuss on of the nature of the act of abstract ng s

mater al at the n t al stage of the nvest gat on, s nce, str ctly speak ng, sc

ence proper has not actually begun. Ashe puts t some pages later n the Log c,

‘[w]hen be ng s taken n th s s mpl c ty and mmed acy, the recollect on that

s the result of complete abstract on . . . s left beh nd, outs de the sc ence’.41

As a contemporary egel scholar n cely puts t, n order to rema n f rmly on

the path to a sc ence w thout presuppos t ons, ‘wemust even abstract from

and set as de — ndeed del berately forget —he very fact that pure be ng s the

product of abstract on’.42Indeed, once the standpo nt of ‘absolute know ng’ s

adopted, and therefore thought as such s taken to be the leg t mate mmed ate

object of the nvest gat on, the sc ent f cally poor nature of the procedure

through wh ch ts s mplest category has been grasped (that s, the relat ve pov

ertyofformal abstract on) doesnot comprom se the val d tyof the subsequent

d alect cal unfold ng that ‘pure Be ng’sets nto mot on. Thus, regardless of the

procedure used, the essent al po nt s that n th s process the speculat ve

th nker has never abandoned h s/her ‘object—realm’,amely, pure thought. In

th s sense, as long as (some vers on of) the dent ty of thought and be ng

reached n the PhenomenologyofSp r t s taken on board, egel’sargument s

perfectly coherent on th s score, although, as we argue below, t s st ll nher

ently t ed to h s deal sm.

owever,matters are veryd fferent froma mater al st standpo nt. From th s

perspect ve, the method of formal abstract on as the prelude to synthet c

development s rather problemat c. In effect, when the mmed ate object of

the act of cogn t on s not thought of as an ex st ng form of ‘mater al be ng’,the

formal abstract on result ng from arb trar ly cast ng as de all spec f c determ

nat ons nev tably takes us rather far from, and actually outs de, the very

‘object-realm’that we or g nally set about to cogn se, namely, mater al real ty.

Follow ng Marx’s example n The Poverty of Ph losophy,43 f we abstract from

the mater als wh ch make up a house, the result w llbe a purely deal represen

tat on of a house w th no mater als, someth ng wh ch has no real referent,

s nce there s no such th ng n mater al real ty. ence, n abstract ng from par

t cular features of a concretemater al object (aprocedure that can be repeated

as many t mes as the th nker w shes n order to f nd an ever s mpler or more

un versal determ nat on), we w ll no longer be deal ng w th really ex st ng

41 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 99.

42 oulgate 2005, p. 87; egel 1999 [1812-16], p. 99.

43 Marx 1976b [1847], p. 163.



W IC ‘RATIONAL KERNEL’? W IC ‘MYSTICALS ELL"? 99

objects but w th purely deal or mental abstract ons, that s, w th ‘pure

thoughts’. On th s bas s, the subsequent reconst tut on of the un ty of the

object cannot but result n a purely deal construct, wh chw ll rema n external

to the object of cogn t on that const tuted the start ng po nt, and wh ch only

by chance w ll reproduce n thought ‘the mmanent l feof the subject matter’.

It followsfrom th s that fora mater al st, the consequence of us ng the method

of formal abstract on s, f he/she does not w sh to become a egel an deal st,

the relapse nto Kant an dual sm, where the theoret cal construct, no matter

how nternally cons stent or coherent, w ll nev tably be rad cally separated

from the real object of cogn t on.

Th s s why we th nk that a mater al st engagement w th egel'sLog ccan

not avo dthe cr t que of the n t al formalabstract on that sets nto mot on the

whole systemat c development. Th s sprec selythe cornerstone ofFeuerbach’s

foundat onal cr t que of egel, as the follow ngpassage from Pr nc plesof the

Ph losophy of the Future eloquently puts t. egel an ph losophy, Feuerbach

states:

presupposes noth ng; th s s noth ng more than to say that t abstracts

from all objects g ven mmed ately . . . In short, t abstracts from every

th ng fromwh ch t s poss ble to abstract w thout stopp ng to th nk [s c],

and makes th s act of abstract on from all object v ty the beg nn ng of

tself.44

Afewyears later, Marxwould develop n ThePovertyofPh losophya cr t que of

egel’s deal st abstract on along clearly Feuerbach an l nes.

Is t surpr s ng that everyth ng, n the f nal abstract on —for we have here

an abstract on, and not an analys s - presents tself as a log cal cate

gory? . . . If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged acc dents,

an mate or nan mate, men or th ngs, we are r ght n say ng that n the

f nal abstract on, the only substance left s the log cal category.Thus the

metaphys c ans who, n mak ng these abstract ons, th nk they are mak

g analyses . . . are r ght n say ng that th ngs here below are embro der

s of wh ch the log cal categor es const tute the canvas.45

The s gn f cance of the latter passage for the purpose of our argument s that t

br ngs to l ght Marx’s alternat ve to egel’sprocedure of formal abstract on,

namely analys s.Unfortunately,desp te the stark contrast between abstract on

44 Feuerbach 1986 [1843].P-19

45 Marx 1976b [18471.11153




and analys s made n the text above, and the many occas ons on wh ch Marx

h ghl ghts the mportant role of analys s as a necessary moment of h s sc en

t f cmethod,46 there s no place n h s works where he fleshes out n any deta l

the spec f c form of the analyt cal process w th n h s mater al st ‘systemat c

d alect cal’approach. Moreover,desp te all the l ght that the recent works on

Marx’smethod have cast on the form of h s systemat c argument, they have

been ma nly focused on the synthet c aspects of Marx’sd alect cal presenta

t on (that s, on the expos t on of the d alect cal movement ‘fromthe abstract

to the concrete’), at the expense of an nsuff c ent themat sat on of the pecu—

l ar roleof the phase of analys s n h s d alect cal nvest gat on generally,and n

h s presentat on n Cap tal n part cular.47And yet, wewould l ke to argue that

s of utmost mportance to grasp the d fferencebetween mater al st analys s

and egel’s deal st abstract on. True, many authors have h ghl ghted the d s

t nct on between the abstract ons ofMarx’scr t que of pol t cal economy and

those of convent onal soc al sc ence.48 owever, not so many have cr t cally

engagedw th egel’sabstract ng procedure. More mportantly, as lf goCarrera

po nts out, most authors have overlooked that the d fference n the respect ve

k nds of abstract on emerges as a result of the veryform of the process of cog

n t on on the bas s ofwh ch those abstract ons are dent f ed.49Th s d fference

n formnot only appl es to the synthet c or genet c phase as s usually assumed,

but cruc ally perta ns to the process of analys s as well.

Although Marx d d not leave us any wr tten forrnal sat on of the spec f c ty

of mater al st analys s, t s poss ble to grasp ts concrete work ngs from the

‘analys sof the commod ty’ conta ned n the open ng pages of Cap tal.50Ashe

expl c tly states n the ‘Marg nal Notes on Adolph Wagner’s Lehrbuch der pol —

t scher Oekonom e’,h s analys s takes as a po nt of departure ne ther the con

46 Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 100, and 1989, p. 500.

47 An outstand ng except on can be found n the work of In go Carrera (1992,2007,2013,and

th s volume), on whose contr but on we fundamentally draw.

48 See Gunn 1992, p. 17,Clarke 1991,p. 813, and Murray 1988, p. 12.1le

49 If go Carrera 2013, p. 5011‘.

50 S nce t s n the synthet c phase only that the unfold ng of the real movement or l fe of

the subject-matter and hence the explanat on actually takes place, the presentat on of

the f nd ngsof the d alect cal nqu ry could take, n pr nc ple, a fullysynthet c form (In go

Carrera 1992,p.41). owever,th s s not the wayMarx structured h s d alect cal expos t on

Volume I of Cap tal n general and n Chapter I n part cular; th s expos t on tends to

clude, n a ‘styl sed'form,br ef presentat ons of the analyt c process (In goCarrera 1992.

p.46). In a context where Marxwaspresent ng h s mater al st-d alect cal method for the

f rst t me, h s dec s on to nclude the analyt cal phase n the expos t on m ght haveplayed

the r61eof br ng ng out ts spec f c ty v s-d-v s egel’s deal st procedure.



W IC ‘RATIONAL KERNEL’? W IC ‘MYSTICAL S ELL'? 101

cepts of pol t cal economy nor any concept whatsoever.51Instead, he starts

w th the mmed ate observat on of ‘the s mplest soc al form n wh ch the

labour-product s presented n contemporary soc ety’:52the commod ty n the

form nwh ch t appears. From th s start ng po nt, Marxproceeds by tak ng the

d v dual commod ty ‘ n h s own hand’ and analys ng ‘the formal determ

nants that t conta ns as a commod ty and wh ch stamp t as a commod ty’.53

These ‘forrnal determ nants’ Marx n t ally d scovers by look ng at the use

value of the nd v dual commod ty,wh ch n cap tal st soc et es acts as bearer

of a second, h stor callyspeaj c attr bute of the products of labour.Ashappens

w th every real form, the f rst th ng he encounters when fac ng the exchange

ab l ty of the commod ty s ts mmed ate man festat on —the quant tat ve

relat on ‘ nwh ch use-values of one k nd exchange for use-values of another’.54

The next step n the analys s of exchangeab l ty s the uncover ng of the more

abstract form (hence the content) beh nd that spec f c formal attr bute of the

commod ty, th s be ng the onlyway n wh ch we can penetrate through the con

crete form n wh ch an mmanent determ nat on presents tself. Thus, the fur

ther analys s of the commod ty reveals that exchange-value sactually the ‘mode

of express on’ or ‘form of man festat on’ of a content d st ngu shable from t —

value —the substance of wh ch res des n the abstract labour congealed or

mater al sed n t.

As s now w dely acknowledged n the l terature, the sequence at that par

t cular stage of Marx’s argument cons sts n go ng from farm to content.

owever,the crux of the matter does not s mply res de n real s ng th s (wh ch,

at any rate, s expl c tly announced by Marx h mself n those pages), but n

grasp ng the prec se way n wh ch properly d alect cal analys s d scovers the

content beh nd the form and, therefore, the r nner connect on.

As In go Carrera po nts out, convent onal sc ent f cmethod analyses a con

crete form by separat ng what repeats tself from what does not n order to

arr ve at a certa n character st c. In tum, th s common attr bute makes poss

ble the mental construct on of a def n t on of that concrete formas that wh ch

has th s or that attr bute.55 On h s part, egel’spure abstract on n the Log c

proceeds by cast ng as de all part cular features of objects (that s,all determ

nacy) n order to f nd through that one step the ‘abstractun versal’that const

tutes ts s mplest element. Regardlessof the r d fferences,these two procedures

have n common that they result n str ctly mental abstract ons or categor es

51 Marx 2002 [1879/1881], p. 241.

52 Ib d.

53 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 1059.

54 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 126.

55 In go Carrera 2013, pp. 50—1.




wh ch, by the r ownnature as ‘pure thoughts’,cannot but rema n external and

al en to the forms ofmater al real ty.Conversely,d alect cal thought analyses a

concrete form by, f rst of all, fac ng t as embody ng a qual tat ve potent al ty

for transformat on, and second, bygrasp ng that qual tat ve potent al ty as the

concrete form nwh ch a more abstract form real ses ts own qual tat ve poten

t al ty, that s, ts real necess ty.Thus the d alect cal deal appropr at on of the

un verse of d fferent real forms does not proceed through an dent f cat on of

the d st nct veness of forms on the bas s of the degree of repet t on of certa n

attr butes. But ne ther does t operate by abstract ng j vm every part cular

determ nat on. Rather, t analyt cally separates the d fferent forms byd scover

g as mmanent n a part cular concrete form the real sed potent al ty of

another real form,wh ch s abstract w th respect to the f rst one, but concrete

w th respect to another form ofwh ch t s the real sed potent al ty.

Wh le convent onal sc ent f cmethod grasps the general determ nat on of

real forms as mmed ate aff rmat ons and hence self-subs stent ent t es, the

d st nct ve mark of the process of analys s n d alect cal research s to grasp, n

the same analyt c movement,both the concrete form under scrut ny and the

more abstract one ofwh ch the former s the developed mode of ex stence. In

other words, d alect cal thought grasps each form as the aff rmat on through

self-negat on of another, more abstract one (hence, as subjects of the r own

movement). Moreover, n contrad st nct on to egel anabstract on or conven

t onal sc ent f c analys s, Marx’sd alect cal analys s at no po nt leaves the ter

ra n of the real. Both the mmed ate concrete form that he encounters and the

relat vely more abstract one d scovered through analys s (the content) are

wholly object ve and real determ nat ons of the object under scrut ny. Th s

analyt cal procedure must be then renewed for those other more abstract

forms,but now treated as the real concrete whose nner content the research

try ng to uncover. Onlyonce all those nner form-determ nat ons have been

d scovered through analys s should the nvest gat on undertake the ‘retum—

journey’ through wh ch those abstract determ nat ons, now n the r self-move—

ment, lead to ‘the reproduct on of the concrete by means of thought’.56

Ideal Reproduct onof the Ideal versusIdeal Reproduct onof the

Concrete

Let us now return to the thought of be ng w th wh ch the Log cbeg ns. Aswe

have seen, th s pure be ng s the product of total abstract on and, from a mate

r al st standpo nt, cannot be a real be ng; t can only ex st as a thought—form.

owever, t could st ll be argued, as Sm th does, that such thought of be ng s

56 Marx 1973 [1857-8], p. 100.



W IC ‘RATIONAL KERNEL’? W IC ‘MYSTICAL S ELL’? 103

‘ somorph c’w th (hence reflects) real mater al be ng, so that there would be

noth ng problemat c n unfold ng the mmanent l fe of the former as a subst

tute for the latter. Ifwe took on board egel'scharacter sat on of pure be ng as

be ng that s mply s,one could argue that the least that can be thought about

any real object s that t s. Thus, accord ng to th s v ew the structure of deal

be ng would fully co nc de w th that of real be ng on th s po nt.57 owever,

noth ngguarantees that the s mplest (or rather poorest orempt est) statement

that we could utter ‘tomake an object ntell g ble’actually co nc des w th the

s mplest form n wh ch a real concrete ex sts. In fact, aswe suggest later on, the

s mplest form of ex stence of ‘realmater al be ng’ s not ‘pure be ng’.In l ght of

the prev ous sect on, we would be ent tled to cla m that the former and the

latter co nc de only after subm tt ng an ex st ng object to mater al st analys s

the sense d scussed above. In other words, only f after uncover ng the

respect ve content of each fonn-determ nat on that we f nd w th n the real

concrete under scrut ny,we encountered pure be ng as the s mplest of them

all,would t be sc ent f callycorrect to undertake the synthet c phase of repro

duct on w th that ‘category’as start ng po nt. owever,we have shown that

th s s not what egel actually d d. And ne ther s t what those mater al st

read ngs of egel do.58

St ll, f we further ns sted on the somorph c structure between the respec

t ves mplest forms of deal and mater al be ng, the d vergencebetween egel’s

eal st construct on and mater al real ty would re-emerge n the second step

of the systemat c unfold ng of categor es, namely, the pass ng over of pure

be ng nto pure noth ng. If n the case of pure be ng there s at least the formal

poss b l ty that t deallyreflects the s mplest determ nat on ofmater al be ng,

the case of pure noth ng even that formal poss b l ty should be ruled out

fromthe outset. Indeed, fromamater al st standpo nt, the real tyofpure noth

g s s mply mean ngless. Thus, as Feuerbach’s early cr t que sharply puts t,

‘the oppos t on tself between be ng and noth ngness ex sts only n the mag

nat on, for be ng, of course, ex sts n real ty —or rather t s the real tself —but

noth ngness, not-be ng, ex sts only n mag nat on and reflect on’.59

57 oulgate 2005, pp. 140—2.

58 Sm th's nterpretat on s a case n po nt. Desp te correctly d st ngu sh ng between formal

and real abstract ons (Sm th 1990, p. 60), he approv neg presents egel’s ‘analys s' as

volv ng the ‘appropr at on of the results of emp r cal stud es’undertaken by ‘emp r cal

sc ences’ (Sm th 1990,p. 4); wh ch s certa nly d fferent from the deal appropr at on of

the real abstract forms of a g ven concrete object.As a matter of fact, those abstract ons

borrowed fromemp r cal sc ences havebeen constructed on the bas s of the convent onal

sc ent f c method. Asargued above, they cannot but be purely formal or deal.

59 Feuerbach 1983[1839],p. 126.




av ng ruled out the mater al ex stence of pure be ng and noth ng, one

could st ll search for the alleged correspondence between egel’s Log cand

mater al real ty n the th rd moment of the r d alect c, that s, n ‘becom ng’.60

Thuscons dered,be ngand noth ng couldbe sa dtobejust analyt cal moments

wh ch are necessary to grasp the truly s mplest log cal category —becom ng —

wh ch would at last reflect the s mplest form of real mater al objects, be ng a

subject that pos ts tsownmovement. Ifth s were the case,one could conclude

that, desp te conce v ng t as a movement of pure thought, egel would have

managed to grasp the s mplest content of real be ng. owever, ‘becom ng’ s

for egel a category that s st ll qu te far from fully express ng the const tut ve

contrad ct on of a self-determ n ng or self-mov ng subject. In so far as egel’s

Log cunfolds the mmanent necess ty of thought as such, start ng from ts s m

plest (or rather empt est) form,h s categor aldevelopment needs to gothrough

a long ser es of st ll more complex thought-forms before be ng able to express

fully the sa d movement of contrad ct on that const tutes the s mplest deter

m nat on of real mater al ty.

In fact, the actual po nt at wh ch egel’sexpos t on eventually reaches a

category that fully expresses the s mple movement of a self-determ n ng sub

ject, comes qu te a fewpages and categor es later. Spec f cally,th s po nt s only

reached w th the category of ‘be ng-for-self’,where egel f nally states that

‘qual tat ve be ng f nds ts consummat on’ so that, therefore, we have at last

arr ved at ‘absolutely detem ned be ng’.61 owever, from a mater al st stand

po nt, th s begs the quest on as to why cogn t on of the real concrete needs to

go over those other mperfect forms of deally express ng the s mplest move

ment of mater al qual tat ve determ nat on, wh ch only grasp the latter n ts

outward or external man festat ons: whether as an mmed ate aff rmat on

(be ng) or as the extr ns cun ty of two opposed mmed ate aff rmat ons (deter

m nate be ng). Indeed, one would be led to conclude that the unfold ng of

those categor es s qu te s mply superfluous. In effect, from th s perspect ve,

the mperfect forms of deallyexpress ng the ‘aff nn ngthrough self-negat on’

are not mater ally const tut veof what th s movement actually s.

St ll,a f nal argument for a mater al st read ng of the categor es preced ng

‘be ng—for-self’ould state that the r expos t on corresponds to the analyt cal

process of d scovery of the category that s able fully to express the real move

ment of aff rmat on through self-negat on. The problem w th th s l ne of rea

son ng s that accord ng to egel’sperspect ve, those poorer waysof conce v ng

qual tat ve be ng have the same status of object v ty as ts fully-developed

60 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 82.

6 1 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 156.



W IC ‘RATIONAL KERNEL'? W IC ‘MYSTICAL S ELL"? 105

shape. In th s sense, the movement from these poorer forms of express ng

qual tat ve be ng to ts consummat on n be ng-for—selfs not seen by egel as

essent ally analyt c but synthet c. In so far as the Log cunfolds the mmanent

necess ty of ‘pure thought’ as such, the mperfect forms of th nk ng about th s

pecul ar ‘be ng’are as const tut ve of th s ‘object—realm’s the r perfectly devel

oped modes of ex stence. Thus, t s ent rely coherent for egel to nclude

those categor es n h s systemat c d alect c of thought-forms. owever, the

consequence of th s s that any attempt to take over egel’sLog cas a whole

w ll take the myst cal shell (that s, the whole ser es of superfluous mperfect

categor es that pure thought needs to pos t beforereach ng the plen tude of ts

content) alongs de the rat onal kernel (the categorythat eventually expresses

the determ nat on at stake n an adequate form).

It followsfrom th s that a read ng of the Log cfroma mater al st perspect ve

cannot cons st n just ‘cast ngas de God, the Absolute, the Pure Idea, etc.’or n

uncover ng the log calstructure art culat ng the systemat corder ng ofcatego

r es. For both the categor es and the form of the r unfold ng are, from the very

beg nn ng, of an nherently deal st character. Instead, a mater al st read ng

must cons st n carefully recogn s ng wh ch real determ nat ons could be

reflected by egelat certa n stagesofh s deal st systemat c d alect c. Ev dently,

the recogn t on of those determ nat ons can onlytake place v s-d-v sthe actual

knowledge of those s mpler forms of mater al real ty.Thus, str ctly speak ng,

the ssue at stake s not s mply to read the Log cfrom a mater al st perspect ve.

The quest on s rather to appropr ate ts ‘use-value’to rewr te t mater al st

cally, that s, to unfold the s mpler determ nat ons of mater al real ty n the r

ner connect on. Needless to say, th s obv ously exceeds the scope of th s

chapter. ere we just offered a d scuss on of the po nt of departure of such a

mater al st appropr at on of the rat onal kernel of egel’sLog c,wh ch wehave

ent f ed w th h s category of ‘be ng-for-self’.62Our a m n th s sect on was

thus much more modest; the po nt was s mplyto showthe ntr ns cally deal st

nature of egel’ssystemat c development n order to shed l ght on ts d ffer

ence from Marx’smater al st approach. Let us therefore elaborate further on

th s po nt, through an exam nat on of the general form taken by egel’ssys

temat c unfold ng of categor es.

Towards the end of the Log c egel d scusses th s quest on expl c tly. ‘What

s to be cons dered here as method’, he states, ‘ s only the movement of the

62 On th s we s mply drew on the work of In go Carrera,who fleshes out the d scoveryofthe

sa d po nt of departure —that s, al‘r rm ngthrough self-negat on of real mater al be ng —

as str ctly emerg ng as a result of mater al st analys s n the sense d scussed above (In go

Carrera 1992,pp. 3-5).




Not on tself. . . the un versal absolute act v ty.’63 owever, th s movement s not

presented by egel as s mply tak ng the gener c form of aff rmat on through

self-negat on through wh ch a self-determ n ng subject real ses ts own mma

nent necess ty. Instead, n so far as he conce ves of t as a pure movement of

thought str v ng for a fullydeveloped mode of express ng ts truth-content, he

presents t as the un ty of the threemoments through wh ch thought needs to

pass n order to self-pos t n such an adequate shape. Thus, he concludes, ‘the

whole form of the method s a tr pl c ty’.64The movement of all rmat on

through self-negat on,wh ch as the s mplest content of the ‘ mmanent l fe’of

anymater al object, const tutes the gener c form taken by a mater al st-d alec

t cal unfold ng, s represented by egel as the abstract sequence of an aff nna

t on, a negat on and, lastly,the negat on of the negat on. In other words, egel

does not d rectly present the th rd moment, wh ch s the only one that const

tutes the effect ve mater al real ty of the object. Instead, he f rstly needs to

pos t the pr or two ‘ mperfect’moments, wh ch are just formal stages through

wh ch thought needs to go to grasp the ‘truth’ of the object, as f they were

const tut ve of the effect ve object ve real ty of the object tself. Th s ‘tr ad c

structure’ of the absolute method, wh ch der vesfrom the deal st character of

the egel an d alect c, s also eloquently cr t c sed by Marx n ThePoverty 0f

Ph losophy:

Sowhat s th s absolute method? The abstract on of movement. What s

the abstract on of movement? Movement n abstract cond t on. What s

movement n abstract cond t on? The purely log cal formula of move—

ment or the movement of pure reason.Where n does the movement of

pure reason cons st? 1npos ng tself, oppos ng tself, compos ng tself; n

formulat ng tself as thes s, ant thes s, synthes s; or,yet, n aff rm ng tself,

negat ng tself, and negat ng ts negat on.65

In br ef, what s rat onal n egel’sd alect c, that s, ts method of mmanent

development of the l feof the subject-matter, appears nverted under the mys

t cal form of the three moments of self-develop ngpure thought. Aga n, th s

myst cal shell d rectly stems from the fact that egel’s systemat c d alect c

does not deally followthe mmanent l fe of a concrete mater al object but an

eal one, namely pure thought. egel’s ‘myst c sm’ n the Log c therefore

der ves from be ng the deal reproduct on of the deal. By contrast, n mak ng

63 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 826.

64 egel 1999 [1812—16],p. 836.

65 Marx 1976b [1847], p. 164.



W IC ‘RATIONAL KERNEL’? W IC ‘MYSTICAL S ELL"? 107

analys s nstead of abstract on, Marx'ssc ent f cmethod at no po nt leavesthe

concrete mater al object of nvest gat on beh nd. Nomatter how abstract and

far from ts mmed ate sensuous ex stence the analyt cal process eventually

takes h m, he rema ns w th nthe mater al tyof the object.As a conse

quence, the moment of systemat c synthet c unfold ng cannot but be the

‘reproduct on of the concrete bymeans of thought'.

Among all the places where Marx expounds th s k nd of mater al st deal

reproduct on, t s also probably n the f rst chapter of Cap talwhere t can be

found w th utmost clar ty and n a more ‘styl sed’form. Spec f cally,th s repro

duct on only starts n sect on Ill of Chapter I, ent tled ‘The value-form, or

exchange-value’.66Asargued elsewhere, str ctly speak ng the f rst two sect ons

of that chapter are not part of the synthet cmovement of the d alect cal expo

s t on but const tute ts analyt cal prelude.67As we have seen, the analyt c

stage only separates a concrete form from a more abstract one, whose real sed

potent al ty t carr es w th n tself n the form of ts own mmanent potent al

y.In th s sense, the analyt c stage does not deally reflect the mmanent self

movement of the object under cons derat on. It s therefore not about the why

but about the what. Ev dently,s nce the apprehens on of real forms accord ng

to the r relat ve degree of abstractness or concreteness deally expresses the

object ve necess ty (the real relat ons) res d ng n the object and are not the

product of the subject ve capr ce or mag nat on of the sc ent st, the mere ref

erence to the ‘what’carr es mpl c tly some h nt of the ‘why’.Thus, f the d alec

t cal analys s reveals that the value-form s the concrete form n wh ch the

object f cat on of the abstract character of pr vate and ndependent labour

aff rms tself as an abstract form, the separat on between the two already says

someth ng about the real relat on nvolved. But th s someth ng s no more

than, as t were, a ‘po nt ng out’,an external observat on. The actual expos t on

of that nner connect on between content and form—hence ts explanat on —

takes place n the synthet c phase of reproduct on,wh ch faces the challenge of

prec selyshow ng that movement wh ch the analys swas ncapable of unfold

g.Th s cons sts n deally follow ngthe real sat on of the d scovered potent

al ty mmanent n the commod ty,namelyvalue.Fromthen on, the commod ty

ceases to be grasped n ts exter or ty as an ‘ nert’external object and the expo

s t on starts to follow ts self-movement as the subject of the development of

66 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 138.

67 See Starosta 2008 for a close exam nat on of the structure of Marx’sexpos t on n Chapter I

of Cap tal. For a more deta led d scuss on of the methodolog cal mpl cat ons of Marx’s

eal reproduct on n general, see In go Canera 2007,2013,and n th s volume.




those determ nat ons prev ously d scovered through analys s nto ever more

concrete forms.68

The unfold ng of th s movement spoken n ‘the language of commod t es’69

prec sely what the deal reproduct on cons sts of. Value be ng the purely

soc al power of the commod ty, t cannot be mmed ately expressed n ts sen

suous corporeal mater al ty.Asthe capac ty of the commod ty to be exchanged

for other d fferent commod t es, value can only be man fested n the soc al

relat on of exchangebetween commod t es. Therefore,the value of a commod

y necessar ly expresses tself only n the use-value of the commod ty that s

exchanged for the commod ty n quest on as ts equ valent. In th s way,value

takes the concrete shape of exchange-valueas ts necessary form ofman festa

t on. In ts most developed form, value acqu res ndependent ex stence as

money and the express on of value n the part cular commod ty act ng as

money becomes determ ned as pr ce. The oppos t on nherent n the com

mod ty s thus extemal sed through the doubl ng of the commod ty-form nto

ord nary commod t es and money. The power of d rect exchangeab l ty of

commod t es negates tself as such to become aff rmed as a soc al power

monopol sed by the money-form.

It s n the course of the movement of th s reproduct on, when seen from

the po nt of v ew of ts qual tat ve content, that the answer to the quest ons

wh ch the analyt c stagewas mpotent fully to prov de sg ven. In other words,

s the development of the express onofvalue that unfolds the explanat on as

to why the object f cat on of the abstract character of pr vately performed

labour takes the soc al formof value or,to put t d fferently,why pr vate labour

value-produc ng. In a nutshell, the ssue comes down to the fact that t s

only the express on of value that progress velyreveals to us the problem that

the commod ty-four: of the product of labour s meant to solve.We are refer

r ng to the med at on n the establ shment of the un ty of soc al labour when

performed n a pr vateand ndependent manner.Ands nce th s un ty becomes

condensed n the money-form, t s the unfold ng of ts determ nat ons, syn

thes sed n the pecul ar t es of the equ valent-form and der ved from ts gen

eral determ nat on as the form of mmed ate exchangeab l ty, that prov des

the answer to the quest on as to why pr vately performed soc ally necessary

labour must produce value.

Note, however, that the properly d alect cal unfold ng of the movement of

th s qual tat ve determ nat on s, n essence, already ach eved w th the s mple

form of value. The subsequent passage to the other, more developed forms of

68 In go Carrera, n th s volume, p. 74ff.

69 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 143.




value s s mply a formal movement that merely general ses and makes expl c t

the qual tat ve content already expressed n the s mple form (namely, the

manent necess ty for value to acqu re an outward, d fferent ated mode of

ex stence). In other, more polem c terms, the sequence of the more developed

forms of value as such snot structured accord ng to an mmanent necess tyof

those forms. As In go Carrera puts t, the sequence of forms of value ‘doesnot

ply a s mpler form [of the exchange-relat on] engender ng a more concrete

one. Instead, the unfold ng of the former's necess tyev dences the necess tyof

the ex stence of the latter!” Th s s, we th nk, the actual mean ng beh nd

Marx’sremark that ‘thewhole mystery of the form of value l es h dden n th s

s mple forrn’.71

In l ght of th s, we can now br ng out a cruc al d fference between Marx’s

and egel’srespect ve deal reproduct ons. Spec f cally,Marx’s deal reproduc—

t on of the commod ty-form s mply follows the real sat on of ts mmanent

necess ty to ‘aff rrn’bydevelop ng a more concrete mode of ex stence asmoney

(that s, through self-negat on). owever, unl ke egel’s deal st method of

reproduct on n the Log c, n order to do th s Marx does not need to med ate

th s expos t on w th a pr or pos t ng of the nadequate forms nwh ch thought

conce vesof those mmanent determ nat ons of the commod ty wh ch dr ve

them to self-movement. ForMarx,those nadequate conceptual sat ons of the

ner determ nat ons of the commod ty are not const tut veof the object ve

real ty of the commod ty tself, and have therefore no place n the systemat c

unfold ng of ts mmanent l fe. Instead, they are seen by Marx as (fet sh sed)

appearances through wh ch non-d alect cal thought grasps those determ na

t ons n the r sheer exter or ty. In any case, those apparent relat onsh ps

between real forms should have been already exam ned and ruled out by the

vest gat on n the prev ous methodolog cal phase of analys s. InMarx’spre

sentat on, when d scuss ons of those essent ally deolog calsc ent f crepresen

tat ons of real relat ons do occur,they tend tohavestatus of an external remark,

and are del berately located aj ‘er the mmanent determ nat on has been

unfolded.

4 Conclus on

Th schapter offered a contr but on to the debate on the methodolog cal con

nect on between egel’sLog cand Marx’sCap tal through a d scuss on of the

70 In go Carrera, 2013,pp. 58—9.

7 1 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 139.




rat onal kernel and myst cal shell found n the former. Very br efly put, our

argument was that n that work egelmanaged to d scover the s mplest form

of the real, namely, the movement of self-determ nat on of the subject. As a

consequence, he correctly presents the method of sc ence as the systemat c

unfold ng of the mmanent l fe of the subject-matter. Aga nst Collett ,wehave

argued that th s s the rat onal kernel to be found n h swork and t snot nher

ently t ed to absolute deal sm. owever, nstead of tak ng the s mplest formof

real mater al be ng as po nt of departure, h s expos t on beg ns w th the s m

plest thought-form (‘purebe ng’).The systemat c d alect c that follows there

fore nev tably unfolds a whole ser es of redundant categor es wh ch, from a

mater al st standpo nt, correspond to the mmanent necess tyof pure thought

only.In other words, they do not express any object ve determ nat on of real

mater al be ng. Th s s the Log c’smyst cal shell.

Wehave also argued that an mmed ate reason beh nd that spur ous start

g po nt res des n h s methodolog cal procedure of ‘extreme’formal abstrac

t on, wh ch arb trar ly casts as de all part cular determ nat on unt l reach ng a

whollyempty un versal, namely, the thought ofbe ng. Bycontrast we have seen

that Marx f nds a mater al st alternat ve to formal abstract on n d alect cal

analys s.Instead of the sheer abstract on fromapparently cont ngent features

of objects, Marx’s analys s moves by search ng for the real more abstract or

s mple content of the concrete form he s mmed ately fac ng.The procedure s

then repeated by further analys ng each of the relat vely more abstract deter—

m nat ons d scovered, unt l reach ng the s mplest mmanent content of the

t al concrete. Mater al st analys s therefore rema ns f rmly w th n the real

object through and through.

Three ma n conclus ons can be drawn from th s w th regard to the current

debate on Marx's d alect cal method n Cap tal. F rstly, n so far as the deal

reproduct on of the concrete by means of thought needs to reflect deally the

spec f c mmanent determ nat ons of the subject-matter, th s method does not

proceed, as D amat would have t, by apply ng the ‘generallaws of d alect cs’ or

‘abstract log cal structures' onto more concrete doma ns of knowledge. In th s

sense, the movement of aff rmat on through self-negat onmust not be turned

to an absolute general pr nc ple that needs to be appl ed to econom ccatego

r es. As the form of movement, the ‘ nner l fe’,of the concrete object that we

want to appropr ate by means of thought, t has to be followed n ts spec f c

modes of ex stence and development. Th s swhy,for nstance, Marx’sCap tal,

as a cr t que of pol t cal economy, s not (pace Engels)an appl cat on of d alec

t cal log c to pol t cal economy,but the deal reproduct on of the real determ

nat ons of cap tal as the al enated soc al subject of bourgeo s soc ety, start ng

w th ts s mplest mode of ex stence, namely, the commod ty.




Secondly, the problem w th egel’sunfold ng of categor es n the Log cdoes

not s mply res de n h s absolute deal sm, but fundamentally n the method

olog cal procedure by wh ch he arr ves at ts po nt of departure and the form

taken bythe subsequent synthet c reconst tut on of the un ty of the mmanent

determ nat ons of h s object. In other words, even fwe took on board Sm th's

po nt that egelcons dered the ndependent ex stence of an object vereal ty

outs de thought, h s systemat c d alect c would be st ll defect ve from a mate

r al st standpo nt. As a consequence, t should not be s mply taken over but

f rst needs to be thoroughly ‘rewr tten’mater al st cally.

F nally,although not expl c tly addressed n th s chapter, t does followfrom

our d scuss on that the structures of the Log cand Cap talcannot be treated as

homologous as nArthur’sv ew.Asthe prev ous sect on has shown, the general

formofmot on of the synthet c stage of reproduct on d ffersbetween the two

works, w th egel’s deal st d alect c r dden w th superfluous formal steps n

the argument wh ch have no place n Marx’smater al st approach.

In sum, a mater al st appropr at on of the methodolog cal ns ghts found n

the Log cfor the cr t que of pol t cal economymust carefullycast as de ts mys

t cal shell.



PART II

egel’sConcept and Marx’sCap tal



C APTER 5

The Un versal and the Part culars n egel’sLog c

and Marx’sCap tal

Fred Moseley

I have argued n a number of papers that there are twoma n stages (or levelsof

abstract on) n Marx’stheory n Cap tal.1The f rst stage has to do w th the pro

duct on of surplus-value and the determ nat on of the total surplus-value, and

the second stage has to do w th the d str but on of surplus-value and the d v

s onofthepredeterm ned total surplus-value nto nd v dualparts (equal rates of

prof t,commerc al prof t, nterest and rent). The total amount of surplus-value

determ ned at the f rst stage (the product on of surplus-value)and then th s

predeterm ned magn tude s presupposed n the second stage (the d str bu

t on of surplus-value). Th s keyquant tat ve presuppos t on of the pr or deter

m nat on of the total surplus-value s repeated many t mes, n all the drafts of

Cap tal, as I have shown n my papers. Thus, there s a clear log cal progress on

from the determ nat on of the magn tude of the total surplus-value n the f rst

stage to the determ nat on of the nd v dual parts n the second stage. Other

authors who havepresented s m lar nterpretat ons of the product on and d s

tr but on of surplus-value and the pr or determ nat on of the total surplus

value n Marx’stheory nclude PaulMatt ck, Roman Rosdolsky,Enr que Dussel,

Dav d Yaffeand Duncan Foley.

To take the most mportant example, n Marx’stheory of pr ces of produc

t on n Part II of Volume III, the total surplus-value s presupposed, as already

determ ned nVolumes I and I], and the total surplus-value (S) s used to deter

m ne the general rate of prof t (r = S / C), wh ch n turn s a determ nant of

pr ces of product on (C s total cap tal nvested).Asa result, the predeterm ned

total surplus-value s d str buted to nd v dual ndustr es n such a way that all

dustr es rece ve the same rate of prof t.

Th s log cal progress on from the determ nat on of the total amount of sur

plus-valueto the determ nat on of the nd v dual parts of surplus-value follows

d rectly from Marx’s labour-theory of value and surplus-value. Accord ng to

Marx’s theory, all the nd v dual parts of surplus-value come from the same

source —he surplus-labour ofworkers.Therefore, the total amount of surplus

value must be determ ned pr or to ts d v s on nto nd v dual parts. And the

1 Moseley 19933, 1997,2000, 2002, and 2009.

© KONINKLIJKEBRILLNV,LEIDEN, 2014 | 001 10.1163/9789004270022_007



T E UNIVERSAL AND T E PARTICULARS IN LOGIC AND CAPITAL 117

11. Compet t on, or the d str but on of surplus-value

1. General rate of prof t and pr ces (Part II ofVolume III)

of product on

2. Commerc al prof t (Part IV)

3. Interest (Part V)

4. Rent (Part VI)

5. Revenue and ts sources (cr t que (Part VII)

of vulgar econom cs)

Th s chapter argues that th s log cal structure of the two levels of abstract on

of cap tal n general and compet t on was heav ly nfluenced by egel’sLog c

of the Concept, and the f rst two moments of the Concept: un versal ty and

part cular ty. The f rst sect on w ll rev ew the key features of egel’sLog c of

the Concept, and the follow ng sect on w ll d scuss Marx’scr t cal appropr a

t on of egel’slog c n h s own theory of the product on and d str but on of

surplus-value. An append x to th s chapter (ava lable at: www.mtholyoke.

edu/~fmoseley) d scusses other, prev ous nterpretat ons of the relat on

between egel’sLog cof the Concept and Marx’stheory that have been pre

sented by Felton Shortall, Chr s Arthur, MarkMeaney and Roberto F nesch .

In January 1858,wh le work ng on the Grundr sse, Marx wrote a letter to

Engels n wh ch he stated that a recent fortu tous rev ew of egel’sLog chad

been ‘ofgreat serv ce’ n h s own theory, espec ally w th respect to the method

employed n h s theory of prof t. e commented that he had ‘overthrown’all

prev ous theor es of prof t:

Bythe way, I am d scover ng some n ce arguments. For nstance, I have

overthrown the whole doctr ne of prof t as t ex sted up to now.The fact

that by mere acc dent I aga n glanced through egel’sLog lc. . . has been

of great serv ce to me as regards the method of deal ng w th the

mater al.3

What exactly d d Marx mean by th s obv ously mportant but too crypt c

remark? Wh ch spec f c aspects of egel’sLog cwas Marx referr ng to? And

what was the relat on between these aspects of egel’slog cand Marx’stheory

of prof t? Many scholars have called attent on to th s letter, as ev dence of the

nfluence of egel on Marx, but no one (to my knowledge) has sat sfactor ly

answered these mportant quest ons about the relat on between egel'slog c

3 Marx and Engels 1975a,p. 93; bold - emphas s added; regular tal cs —emphas s n the or g

nal.Th s convent on w llbe followedthroughout th s chapter.



u8 MOSELEY

and Marx’s theory of prof t. Th s chapter w ll also suggest answers to these

quest ons, and w ll expla n what Marxmeant by th s mportant remark.

1 egel’s Log c of the Concept

egel’s log c beg ns w th mmed ate appearances, wh ch he calls ‘Be ng’.

egel’slog c then proceeds to Essence, the ‘ nner nature’ of the mmed ate

appearances. F nally,the Concept [Begrtf] (somet mes translated as ‘Not on’)

the ‘punchl ne’ of egel’slog c—the explanat on of the mmed ate appear

ances n terms of the Essence, n a prec se log cal order.

egel’sConcept has three moments: un versal ty [Allgeme nhe t], part cu

lar ty [Besonderhe t], and s ngular ty [E nze nhe t] (somet mes translated as

‘ nd v dual ty’). The prec se log cal order of explanat on s the follow ng: The

start ng po nt of the Concept s the un versal, wh ch s the Essence or sub

stance that has already been dent f ed n the Log cof Essence. The Concept

then proceeds to an explanat on of the part culars, wh ch presupposes the

nature of the un versal, and adds add t onal determ nat ons n order to d ffer

ent ate the presupposed un versal nto ts part cular forms. In other words,

the part culars are expla ned as part cular forms of the un versal tself,as ‘self

part cular sat ons’ of the presupposed un versal. It s n th s sense that the un

versal substance s also a ‘subject' that creates ts own part cular forms. F nally,

the Concept proceeds to s ngular ty, n wh ch the un versal ach eves concrete

ex stence and the perfect embod ment n a part cular form.

Th s log cal relat on between the un versal and the part culars n egel’s

Concept —the un versal s the start ng po nt and ts nature s presupposed n

the explanat on of the part culars — s clearest n egel’s expos t on of the

Concept n the short vers onofh s log c n the Encyclopaed aofthePh losoph cal

Sc ences.The follow ng are a few passages from the Encyclopaed a, w th my

comments:

The Nat on s the pr nc ple of freedom, the power of substance

self~real sed.4

In other words, the substance s the un versal that real ses tself n the part cu

lars.Th s substance s presupposed n ts self-real sat on as part culars.

4 egel 1975 [1817],p. 223.




The Not on as Not on conta ns the three follow ng ‘moments’ or func

t onal parts.

(1) The f rst s Un versal ty —mean ng that t s n free equal ty w th

self n ts spec f c character. (2)The second sPart cular ty - that s, the

spec f c character, n wh ch the un versal cont nues serenely equal to

self (3) The th rd s Ind v dual ty - mean ng reflect on- nto-self of the

spec f c characters of un versal ty and part cular ty; wh ch negat ve self

un ty has complete and or g nal determ nateness, w thout any lossof ts

self- dent ty or un versal ty.5

Explanat on of real ty beg ns w th the un versal, and ts spec f c character. In

the further explanat on of the part culars, the un versal s presupposed (‘con

t nues serenely equal to tself’, ‘w thout any loss of ts self- dent ty or

un versal ty’).

For egel, the un versal substance s the Absolute Sp r t, wh ch ncamates

self n part cular forms of object ve real ty.Th s s of course the deal st nature

of egel’sph losophy, wh ch Marx completely rejected. ForMarx, the un versal

substance s mater al st —abstract labour.

In the same sect on, egel emphas sed that the un versal of the Concept s

not a mere common property, but s nstead a subject that ‘self-part cular ses’

self as these part cular forms, and ‘f nds tself at home’ n these part cular

forms ‘w th und mmed cleamess’.

The not on s generally assoc ated n our m nds w th abstract general ty,

and on that account t s often descr bed as a general concept on. We

speak, accord ngly, of the not ons of colour, plant, an mal, etc. They are

supposed to be arr ved at by neglect ng the part cular features wh ch d s

t ngu sh the d fferent colours, plants, and an mals from each other, and

by reta n ng those common to them all . . .

But the un versal of the not on s not a mere sum of features common

to several th ngs, confronted bya part cular wh ch enjoys an ex stence of

s own. It s, on the contrary, self-part cular z ng or selflspec /jl ng, and

w th und mmed cleamessf nds tselfat home n ts ant thes s.6

The subject that self-part cular ses tself ‘w th und mmed cleamess’ s obv

ouslypresupposed n the explanat on of ts part cular forms.

5 egel 1975 [1817], p. 225.

6 egel 1975 [1817],p . 227.



120 MOSELEY

In The ob!Fam ly,wh ch Marx and Engels wrote n 1844,there s a remark

able summary of what Marx called ‘the essent al character of the egel an

method’, wh ch he labels ‘substance as subject’ ( n a sect on ent tled ‘The

Mystery of Speculat ve Construct on’).7 The descr ptor ‘as subject’ nd cates

that the substance creates the part cular forms,as part cular forms of tself,as

we saw n the Encyclopaed a.

Marx’sd scuss on n th s sect on s llustrated w th the famous example of

‘the Fru t’ and part cular fru ts (pear, apple, and so on). A long excerpt from

th s very nterest ng sect on sworth t:

If I form the general dea ‘Fru t’from actual apples, pears, strawberr es,

and almonds, and f I go further to mag ne that my abstract dea, ‘the

Fru t’,der ved from actual fru ts, s an external ent ty, and ndeed the true

essence of the pear, the apple, etc., I am declar ng — n the language of

speculat on —hat ‘the Fru t’ s the ‘Substance’ of the pear, the apple, the

almond, etc. . .

I then declare apples, pears, almonds, etc. to be merely forms of ex s

tence, mod , of ‘the Fru t’ . . . Part cular, actual fru ts are taken to be only

apparent fm ts whose true essence s ‘theSubstance’, ‘the Fru t’ . . .

av ng reduced d fferent actual fru ts to one abstract ‘Fru t’,to the

‘Fru t’,speculat on must somehow try to get back aga n from the ‘Fru t’,

from Substance to dgferent, actual ord nary fru ts such as the pear, the

apple, the almond, etc. n order to g ve the appearance of hav ng some

actual content . . .

If the apple, pear, almost, and strawberry are really noth ng but ‘the

Substance’,‘theFru t’,then the quest on ar ses: ow does t happen that

‘theFru t’man fests tself to me now as apple, now as pear, and now as

almond; whence th s appearance of d vers ty so str k ngly n contrad c—

t on w th my speculat ve ntu t on of the un ty, ‘the Substance’, and ‘the

Fru t’?

Th s, answers the speculat ve ph losopher, s because ‘the Fru t’ s no

dead, und fferent ated stat c essence but l v ng, self-d fferent ated,

dynam c. . .

The d fferent ord nary fru ts are d fferent l fe-forms of the ‘oneFru t';

they are crystall zat ons of ‘theFru t’ tself. . .

One must no longer say as one d d from the standpo nt of Substance

that a pear, an apple, and an almond s ‘the Fru t’ but rather that ‘the

7 Marx and Engels 1956 [1844],pp. 78—83.I d scovered th s remarkable sect on as a result of

reread ng Arthur (1978),for wh ch I am grateful.




Fru t’ pos ts tself as pear, as apple, as almond. The d fferences wh ch

d st ngu sh apple, pear, and almond fromone another are really self-d f

ferent at ons of ‘theFru t’,convert ng the part cular fru ts nto d fferent

members of the l fe-process of ‘theFru t’.

In every member of that ser es ‘the Fru t’ g ves tself a more devel

oped and expl c t spec f c ex stence unt l t s f nallythe l v ngun ty as

‘summary’ of all fru ts, a un ty conta n ng those fru ts as d ssolved n and

also produced from tself.

In the language of speculat on, th s operat on I call conce v ng

Substance as Subject, and nner Process,asAbsolutePerson, and th s con

ce v ngconst tutes the essent al character of the egel anmethod.8

Th ssummary s not expl c tly n terms of egel’smoments of the Concept, but

the log c s the same. The substance ‘Fru t’ s the un versal, whose ex stence s

presupposed n the explanat on of the part cular forms,as part cular forms of

self:After dent fy ng the un versal substance, the theoret cal task s to ‘get

back aga n’ to the determ nat on of the part cular forms on the bas s of the

presupposed un versal substance.

Marxr d culed the deal sm of egel’sspeculat vemethod, and argued that

egel’scla ms to der ve part cular fru ts from the un versal Fru t were mere

empty assert ons. S nce the un versal Fm t has no content, no propert es of ts

own, t cannot be used to der vethe propert es of part cular fru ts.The specula

t vemethod can onlyappear to der vethe propert es of the part cular fru ts by

‘g v ngthese propert es names’,and assert ng that these names of actual th ngs

are (somehow) ‘created’ by the Fru t (pp. 81—2).9

owever, Marx eventually ut l sed a log cal structure that s s m lar to

egel’smoments of the Concept (the nature of the un versal s presupposed n

the further determ nat on of the part cular formsof tself) n h s theory of the

product on and d str but on of surplus-value,w thout the deal st un versal,

and w th a mater al st un versal (abstract labour); the log cal structure of

Marx’stheory w ll be exam ned at length n the next sect on.

8 Marx and Engels 1956 [1844],pp. 78-83.

9 Marx and Engels 1956 [1844],pp. 81—2.n the last three paragraphs of th s sect on, Marx fur

ther r d culed err Szel ga’s egel an presentat on of the ‘Myster esof Par s': ‘ av ngprev

ously reduced such actual relat onsh ps as law and c v l zat on to the category of mystery,

thereby convert ng 'the Mystery” nto a substance, he now r ses toa truly speculat ve egel an

he ght and transforms “theMystery" nto a self-ex st ngSubject.Th ssubject ncarnates tself

actual s tuat ons and persons . . . But nowhere does he develop any actual content, so h s

speculat ve construct on s free from all d sturb ng compl cat ons, from all amb guous d s

gu ses, and str kes the eye n ts naked beauty.’



122 MOSELEY

2 Marx’sLog c n sTheory of Cap tal and Surplus-Value

egel’sLog cof the Concept s appropr ate for Marx’stheory of surplus-value

because they both assume a s m lar log calrelat on between the un versal and

the part culars. egel’sConcept beg ns w th the determ nat on of the un ver

sal,and then expla ns the part cular forms as part cular forms of the (predeter

m ned and presupposed) un versal. S m larly,Marx’s theory beg ns w th the

general form of surplus—value,and then expla ns the part cular forms of sur

plus-value, w th the predeterm ned general form of surplus-value presup

posed, alongw th add t onal part cular determ nat ons. The reason whyMarx’s

theory beg ns w th the general form of surplus-value s that t s based on the

assumpt on that all the part cular forms of surplus-value comej 'om the same

source—he surplus-labour ofworkers. Therefore, the general form of surplus

value must be determ ned f rst, and then the part cular forms, wh ch depend

on other factors bes des surplus-labour, can be determ ned. The part cular

forms of surplus-value are ‘d fferent l fe-forms’of the un versal surplus-labour;

they are ‘ ncarnat ons’ or ‘crystall sat ons’of surplus-labour.

Therefore, Marx d v ded h s theory of surplus-value nto two bas c levels of

abstract on, wh ch correspond to egel’sf rst two moments of the Concept:

cap tal n general (the product on of surplus-value), wh ch corresponds to

egel’smoment of un versal ty,and compet t on (or many cap tals) (the d str

but on of surplus-value),wh ch corresponds to egel’smoment of part cular

y. S ngular ty s much less mportant n Marx’s log c, and w ll be d scussed

br eflybelow (wew llsee that Marx related cred t-cap tal to egel’smoment of

s ngular ty, although w th a veryd fferent mean ng).

Marx added a quant tat ve d mens on to egel’s Log c of the Concept,

because Marx’stheory s a theory of cap tal sm, and quant ty s the ma n th ng

about cap tal sm. More prec sely, the ma n phenomenon of cap tal sm that

Marx’stheory expla ns s AM,the total quant ty of surplus-value produced n

the cap tal st economy as a whole. The f rst level of abstract on of Marx’sthe

ory (cap tal n general, wh ch corresponds to egel’sun versal ty) expla ns the

quant ty of surplus-value produced by each and everycap tal (more prec sely

by each and everyworker), and thus expla ns the total surplus-valueproduced

by all cap tals (and allworkers)together n the economy as a whole. The second

level of abstract on of Marx’s theory (compet t on, wh ch corresponds to

egel’spart cular ty) expla nshow the total surplus-value s d str buted among

d v dual cap tals, that s, how the total s d v ded up or spl t nto nd v dual

parts,w th the predeterm ned total surplus-valuepresupposed.

Th s connect on between Marx’stheory of surplus-value and egel’slog c s

strongly suggested by the fact that Marx used the same German word for h s




log cal category as egel d d for h s log cal category —‘allgemet'n’.Th s obv ous

connect on between Marx’slog c and egel’slog chas been obscured all these

years by the fact that th s same German word has been translated nto twod f

ferent Engl sh words: ‘general’ n translat ons ofMarx, and ‘un versal’ n transla

t ons of egel.lo Iron cally, the m slead ng translat on of ‘allgeme n’ n Marx’s

theory as ‘general’was n t ated by Marx h mself n the French ed t on of

Volume I and by Engels n the Engl sh ed t on, apparently n a m sgu ded

attempt to popular se Marx’s egel an theory.Th s s clearly a cosmet c change,

wh ch does not change the log c of Marx’stheory, and wh ch has done much

more harm than good.In anycase, everyoneshould nowunderstand that Marx

used the same German word for ‘cap tal n general’ that egel used for ‘un ver

sal’,wh ch suggests that Marx was us ng s m lar log c n th s all- mportant

aspect of h s log cal method (the determ nat on of the un versal pr or to the

part culars).11

The rema nder of th s chapter w ll rev ew the var ous drafts of Cap tal and

relevant letters, w th emphas s on Marx’sexpl c t use of egel’smoments of

un versal ty and part cular ty as the log cal structure of h s own theory of the

product on and d str but on of surplus-value.

The ‘Grundr sse’ (1857—8)

Averystrong nd cat on that Marxwas ut l s ng egel’sLog cof the Concept n

h s theory ofcap tal are two sketchy,exploratory outl nes early n the Grundr sse

that Marx nserted nto the rst draft of what later became Part II ofVolumeI

of Cap tal (pp. 264 and 275, n sect on I (‘TheProduct on Process of Cap tal’) of

the ‘Chapter on Cap tal’ n Notebook 11(wr tten n November 1857).The bas c

structure of both of these outl nes s egel’sthree moments of the Concept:

10 I learned th s mportant l ngu st c s m lar ty from F nesch 2005, p. 3, for wh ch I am

grateful.

11 Geert Reuten states n h s chapter n th s volume (p. 264) that Marx’sfrequent use of the

terms ‘general’(or ‘un versal’)and ‘part cular’ s not ev dence that Marx s us ng the Log c

of the Concept, because these terms could also refer to Essence-Log c. owever, egel’s

own use of these terms s certa nly w th n the Log cof the Concept.Theyare ntroduced

the f rst chapter ofVolumeIIon the Log cof the Concept (or the Subject veLog c)and

are the fundamental concepts n the rest of the volume, nclud ng Chapter 3 on the

Syllog sm. ‘Un versal and ‘part cular’ do not appear n a systemat c way n Book II of

Volume I on the Log cof the Essence. Therefore, t would seem that the most reasonable

terpretat on s that, when Marx uses the terms ‘un versal’and ‘part cular’,us ng the

same words as egel, and w th the same mean ng (the log cal pr or ty of the un versal

over the part culars), th s was also w th n a framework s m lar to egel’sLog c of the

Concept. Roberto F nesch ( n th s volume and prev ous papers) presents a s m lar

nterpretat on.



124 MOSELEY

un versal ty (translated as ‘general ty’), part cular ty and s ngular ty (U—P—S).

I w ll focus on the second outl ne (p. 275)because t s the clearest:

Cap tal

1. General ty

(1) [General ty of cap tal]

a. Emergence of cap tal out of money

b. Cap tal and labour

c. Elements of cap tal (Product. Rawmater al. Instrument)

(2) Part cular zat on of cap tal

a. C rculat ng cap tal, f xed cap tal, turnover of cap tal

(3) S ngular ty ofcap tal

Cap tal and prof t

Cap tal and nterest

Cap tal as value, d st nct from tself as nterest and prof t

11. Part cular ty

(1) Accumulat on of cap tals

(2) Compet t on of cap tals

(3) Concentrat on of cap tals

III. S ngular ty

(1) Cap tal as cred t

(2) Cap tal as stock cap tal

(3) Cap tal as money market

We can see that th s outl ne has two sets of U - P —S tr ads, a broad tr ad as

sect ons of Cap tal and a narrower tr ad as subsect ons w th n the broad sec

t on of General ty.The contents of the broad General ty as a sect on of Cap tal

s m lar to what was later ncluded n cap tal n general (that s, the f rst two

volumes of Cap tal and Part I of Volume III).The narrow General ty as a sub

sect on of the broad General ty s essent ally the theory of surplus-value (Parts 11

and IIIofVolumeI), the most mportant part of cap tal n general. The narrow

Part cular ty as a subsect on of the broad General ty ncludes f xedcap tal, c r

culat ng cap tal, and so on. More mportantly, the broad Part cular ty as a sec

t on of Cap tal ncludes accumulat on, compet t on and concentrat on. The

mean ng of ‘compet t on’ s not spec f ed here, but we w ll see that later n the

Grundr ssecompet t on ncludes the equal sat on of the prof t-rate, the most

portant aspect of the d str but on of surplus-value. As Marx’s th nk ng

developed,accumulat on and concentrat on weremoved from Part cular ty to

General ty (because they have to dow th cap tal as a whole), and Part cular ty

would nclude onlycompet t on (that s,the d str but on of surplus-value).The



T E UNIVERSAL AND T E PARTICULARS lN LOGIC AND CAPITAL 125

narrow S ngular ty as a subsect on of the broad General ty ncludes prof t and

terest, and the broad S ngular tyas a sect on ofCap tal ncludes cred t, stock

cap tal and the money-market. Marx’sth nk ng on S ngular ty n both senses

rema ned essent ally the same, although th s was much less mportant n

Marx’s theory.

Th rty-l ve pages after the second outl ne ( n Notebook Ill), Marx nserted

an mportant methodolog cal comment, wh ch expla nswhat subject h s the

ory was concerned w th at th s early stage, and what subjects h s theory was

not yet concerned w th, and th s comment aga n clearlyut l ses egel'sthree

moments of the Concept:

To the extent that we are cons der ng t here, as a relat on d st nct from

that of value and money, cap tal s cap tal n general, .e. the ncarnat on

of the qual t es wh ch d st ngu sh value as cap tal from value as pure

value or as money. Value,money, c rculat on, etc., pr ces etc are presup

posed, as s labour etc. Butwe are st ll concerned ne ther w th a part cu

lar form of cap tal, nor w th an nd v dual cap tal as d st nct from other

d v dual cap tals etc.Weare present at theprocess of tsbecom ng.Th s

d alect cal process of ts becom ng s only the deal express on of the real

movement through wh ch cap tal comes nto be ng. The later relat ons

are tobe regarded as developmentscom ngoutof th sgem. But t snec

essary to establ sh the spec f c form n wh ch t s pos ted at a certa n

po nt. Otherw se confus on ar ses.12

We can see that cap tal n general s descr bed n egel an terms because ‘we

are present at the process of ts becom ng’. In other words, Marx’stheory of

cap tal n general expla ns how cap tal produces surplus-value, that s, how a

g ven quant ty of money becomes more money,and n th s waybecomes cap

tal. The ma n qual ty that d st ngu shes cap tal from value and money s the

product on of surplus-value. The ‘later relat ons' are the part cular forms of

surplus-value wh ch w ll be expla ned as ‘developments com ng out of th s

germ’of surplus-value n general.

Marx’smanuscr pt then goes on n the rest of Notebook III to sketch out

for the f rst t me h s theory of surplus-value, nclud ng absolute and relat ve

surplus-value and the transfer of constant cap tal. Dussel (2008 and 1985,

Cap tulo 8) has emphas sed Marx’s‘d scovery'of h s theory of surplus-value n

these pages n Notebook 11]of the Grundr sse.

12 Marx 1973 [1857-8]. p- 310



126 MOSELEY

The mportant letter that Marx wrote n January 1858, n wh ch he stated

that he had found egel'smethod ‘ofgreat serv ce’ n h s theory of prof t (d s

cussed above n the ntroduct on), was wr tten wh le Marx was wr t ng

Notebook IVof the Grundr sse. Notebook IVbeg ns w th a sect on that Marx

t tled ‘Confus on of prof t and surplus-value’.The ma n ‘confus on’d scussed by

Marx n th s sect on was that of Carey and Bast at and R cardo (separately),

who confused the rate of prof t w th the share of prof t of total ncome, and

thus argued that a fall n the rate of prof t was caused by a fall n the share of

prof t ( gnor ng altogether the compos t on of cap tal and ts effect on the rate

of prof t). Marx summar sed:

But at bottom, surplus value —the foundat on of prof t, but st ll d st nct

from prof t so called—has never been developed.”

Th s s prec sely what Marx's theory of surplus-value accompl shed — t f rst

expla ned surplus-value,as d st nct fromprof t and as the foundat on ofprof t.

Notebook IVcont nues w th the theory of surplus-value,and then moves on

to sect on II of the ‘Chapter on Cap tal' (‘The C rculat on Process of Cap tal’,

the subject-matter of Volume II of Cap tal). In the m ddle of a d scuss on of

overproduct on and a cr t que of Proudhon, Marx br efly d scussed (over two

pages) the general rate ofproj t for the f rst t me n h s publ shed wr t ngs, and

he clearly stated (at th s early stage) that a cons derat on of the general rate of

prof t has to do w th the d str but on of surplus-value and belongs ‘ n the sec

t on on compet t on':

Ageneral rate ofprof t as such s poss ble only f. . . a part of the surplus

value —wh ch corresponds to surplus labour — s transferred from one

cap tal st to another . . . The cap tal st class thus to a certa n extent d s

tr butes the total surplus value so that, to a certa n degree, t [shares n t]

evenly n accordance w th the s zeof ts cap tal, nstead of n accordance

w th the surplus values actually created by the cap tals n the var ous

branches of bus ness . . . Compet t on cannot lower th s level tself; but

merely has the tendency to create such a level.Further developments

belong n the sect on on compet t on.14

F fteen pages later, Marx nterjected another nterest ng methodolog cal pas

sage,wh ch aga n ut l ses l-legel’smoments of the Concept:

13 Marx 1973 [1857-8]. P- 385

14 Man 1973 [1857-8]. pp. 435—6




Before we go any further, just one remark. Cap tal n general, as d st nct

from part cular cap tals, does ndeed appear (1)only as an abstract on;

not an arb trary abstract on, but an abstract on wh ch grasps the spec f c

character st cs wh ch d st ngu sh cap tal from all other forms of

wealth . . . These are aspects wh ch are common to every cap tal as such,

or wh ch make every spec f c sum of values nto cap tal . . . (2) however,

cap tal n general, as d st nct from the part cular real cap tals, s tself a

real ex stence. Forexample, cap tal n th sgeneralform, although belong

g to nd v dual cap tal sts, n ts elementalform as cap tal, forms the

cap tal wh ch accumulates n the banks or s d str buted through

them . . . Wh le the general s therefore on the one hand only a mental

mark of d st nct on, t s at the same t me apart cular real form alongs de

the form of the part cular and the nd v dual. (Wew ll return later to th s

po nt, wh ch, wh le hav ngmore of a log cal than an econom c character,

w ll nevertheless have a great mportance n the course of our nqu ry.

The same also n algebra. For example, a, b,and c are numbers as such; n

general; but then aga n they are whole numbers as opposed to a/b, b/c,

c/b, c/a, b/a etc., wh ch latter, however presuppose the former as the r

general elements.)15

Wecan see from th s passage that: 1)cap tal n general s an abstract on wh ch

grasps the essent al character st cs of cap tal (wh ch s of course pr mar ly the

product on of surplus-value);and 2) n add t on to th s theoret cal abstract on,

cap tal n general has a real ex stence n a part cular cap tal - as bank-cap tal

or cred t-cap tal. Cred t-cap tal can be nvested n any ndustry n the economy,

and n that sense t s general; but t also belongs to part cular nd v duals and

s a real part cular form of cap tal. ln egel’sterms, cred t-cap tal could be con

s dered as the s ngular ty of cap tal - the real ex stence of cap tal n general n

a part cular cap tal (as n Marx’soutl ne d scussed above).

The algebra c example n th s passage s also nterest ng: a, b and c are whole

numbers, numbers n general,wh ch arepresupposed n the determ nat on of

the fract ons a / b, and so on. In s m lar fash on, surplus-value n general (or the

total surplus-value) s a whole number, wh ch s presupposed n the determ

nat on of the fract ons nto wh ch the total surplus-value s d v ded.

It seems reasonable to conclude from the above d scuss on of the f rst four

notebooks of the Grundr sse that the aspects of egel's log c that Marx was

referr ng to n h s famous letter about the ‘great serv ce’ of egel’smethod

n h s theory of prof t must have been the three moments of egel’sConcept:

15 Marx 1973 [1857-8], PP- 449—50.



128 MOSELEY

un versal ty,part cular ty and s ngular ty.16Marx had already f gured out that

h s theory of cap tal and surplus-value would be structured n a s m lar way.

The two outl nes n Notebook 11are clearly n terms of egel’sthree moments,

and there are other methodolog cal comments n Notebooks 111and IVthat are

also made n terms of egel’sthree moments, and Notebook IVbeg ns w th a

sect on ent tled ‘Confus onof prof t and surplus value’.And, most mportantly,

the log c of Marx’s theory of cap tal and surplus-value s s m lar to that of

egel’sLog cof the Concept: Marx’stheory beg ns w th cap tal n general —he

essent al character st cs of cap tal, ma nly the product on of surplus-value —

wh ch corresponds to egel’s moment of un versal ty (the same German

word!). Marx’s theory then proceeds to compet t on (or many cap tals) —the

theory of the general rate of prof t and other aspects of the d str but on of sur

plus-value —wh ch corresponds to egel’smoment of part cular ty. And f nally

Marx’stheory proceeds to cred t-cap tal —he general form of cap tal n a real

part cular cap tal —wh ch corresponds to egel’smoment of s ngular ty.l7

Further ev dence w ll be presented below from the rest of the Grundr sse

and from the later draftsofCap talto support th s conclus on, but the ev dence

d scussed so far seems suff c ent to me. What other aspects of egel’slog cal

method could Marx have been referr ng to n th s letter? ow would these

other aspects of egel’smethod prov de a log cal framework for Marx’stheory

ofprof t (surplus-value)?Andwhat textual ev dence from the Grundr sseex sts

to support any d fferent nterpretat on ofMarx’smean ng n th s letter?

In the rest of the Grundr sse,there are a half-dozen br ef comments on the

equal sat on of the rate of prof t, and t susually stated n these passages that

the analys s of equal rates of prof t belongs to the part of the theory on compet

t on (or many cap tals), after the part on cap tal n general. Two mportant

examples w ll be d scussed here (see also pp. 552,557,669, 761and 767).

In NotebookVII(the last notebook of the Grundn'sse), n a d scuss on of the

confus onof econom sts who th nk that f xedand c rculat ng cap tal somehow

16 In th s letter, Marx used the term ‘prof t’here as a synonym for what he later called

‘surplus-value’.Aswe have seen, he had been work ng on h s theory of surplus-value, not

h s theory of prof t as later def ned. e had recently d scovered the d st nct on between

surplus-value and prof t, and had probably not yet expla ned th s d st nct on to Engels,

and that s probably why he used the more fam l ar term ‘prof t’ n h s letter to Engels.

17 owever, as Tony Sm th ( n th s volume) has emphas sed, Marx’s use of the term

‘s ngular ty' s very d fferent from egel’s s ngular ty. In egel’ss ngular ty, a part cular

form s the perfect embod ment of the true nature of the un versal, whereas for Marx.

cred t-cap tal s the oppos te of the true nature ofcap tal - t s the mostkth/u'sed formof

cap tal, wh chmakes t appear as f nterest comes fromcap tal tself,w thout any relat on

to labour and the product on-process.




produce prof t ndependently of surplus-labour, Marx comments on the ‘con

fus on’of prev ous econom sts:

The greatest confus on and myst f cat onhas ar sen because the doctr ne

of surplus prof t has not been exam ned n ts pure form by prev ous

econom sts, but rather m xed n together w th the doctr ne of real prof t,

wh ch leads up to d str but on, where the var ous cap tals part c pate n

the general rate of prof t. Theprof t of the cap tal sts as a class, or the

prof t of cap tal as such,has to ex stbefore t can bed str buted, and t s

extremely absurd to try to expla n tsor g n by ts d str but on.18

In th s mportant passage, Marx cr t c ses prev ous econom sts because they

‘m xed up’ the theory of surplus-value ‘ n ts pure form’ (surplus-value n gen

eral and the determ nat on of the total prof t of the cap tal st class as a whole)

and the theory of ‘real prof t’ (the part cular forms of surplus—valueand the

d str but on of the total surplus-value among nd v dual cap tal sts).W th the

help of egel’s log c, Marx d d not make th s m stake. Marx d d not ‘m x up’

these two stages of the theory; nstead Marxkept these two stages str ctlysepa

rate and log cally sequent al. F rst the general form and total amount of sur

plus-value are theor sed, and then the part cular forms and the nd v dual

amounts of prof t are theor sed, w th the general formand the total amount of

surplus-value presupposed.

It s nterest ng to recall that Marx stated n h s famous letter about egel’s

method that he had ‘overthrown' all prev ous theor es of prof t. We can now

have a better dea what Marxmeant by ‘overthrow’—hat he had clearly d st n

gu shed between the theory of cap tal and surplus-value n general and the

theory of the part cular formsof cap tal and surplus-value.

Later n Notebook VII, n sect on 111(‘Cap tal and Pro t’) of the ‘Chapter on

Cap tal’,there s another br ef but mportant comment about the equal sat on

of the prof t-rate. Marx commented aga n that the equal sat on of the prof t

rate has to do w th the d str but on of surplus-value among d fferent cap tals,

wh ch should be exam ned at the subsequent stageofmanycap tals,not n the

t al stage of cap tal n general, wh ch s what Marx was work ng on at

the t me:

The total surplus-value, as well as the total prof t,wh ch s only the sur

plus value tself,‘computed dtferently, can ne ther grow nor decrease

through th s operat on [the equal sat on of prof t-rates], ever; what s

13 Marx 1973[1857-81vP-634



130 MOSELEY

mod f edthereby s not t, but only ts d str but on among the d fferentcap

tals. owever,th s exam nat on belongs onlyw th that of the many cap

tals, t does not yet belong here [that s, n the stage of cap tal ngeneral] .19

In March 1858,wh le Marx was f n sh ng the Grundr sse, he wrote a letter to

Lassalle n wh ch he stated that he waswork ng on the f rst part of h s ‘bookon

cap tal’ —the part on ‘cap tal n general’ —and that cap tal n general would be

d v ded nto three sect ons:1)the product on-process; 2) the c rculat on-pro

cess;and 3) the un ty of the two,or cap tal and prof t and nterest.20

Wecan see that these are the same three sect ons ofthe Grundr sse. owever,

these sect ons are now sect ons of ‘cap tal n general’,rather than sect ons of

the ‘Chapter on Cap tal’.Thus, Marx appears to have real sed more clearly as a

result ofh s workon the Grundr ssethat h s theory of cap tal should be d v ded

to cap tal n general and compet t on, and so on, and that h s theory n the

Grundr sse was only about cap tal n general; t was not a complete theory of

cap tal. The theory of compet t on would come later. Marx began to develop

h s theory of compet t on n the Manuscr pt of 1861—3,nd developed t much

more thoroughly n the Manuscr pt of 1864—5,nd th s theory ncludes the

general rate of prof t and other part cular forms of surplus-value that have to

dow th the d str but on of surplus-value.

Several weeks later (2 Apr l), Marx wrote a letter to Engels n wh ch he

outl ned the overall log cal structure of h s book on cap tal:

1. Cap tal conta ns four sect ons:

a) Cap tal ngeneral (th s s the subject-matterof thef rst part).

b) Compet t on, or the act on of the many cap tals upon one

another.

c) Cred t,here cap tal as the general pr nc ple confronts the nd

v dual cap tals.

(1) Share cap tal as the most h ghly developed form (turn ng ntO

commun sm) together w th all ts contrad ct ons.21

Ev dently, Marx’swork n the Grundr sse on h s theory of the product on of

surplus-value, at the level of abstract on of cap tal n general, and the br ef

d scuss ons of the general rate of prof t wh ch he real sed ‘must be analyzed

later n the sect on on compet t on’,had g ven h m suff c ent clar ty about the

19 Marx 1973[1857—8],p. 760 (brackets added).

20 Marx 1983d, p. 287.

2 1 Marx and Engels 1975a, p. 97.




relat on between cap tal n general and compet t on (essent ally the produc

t on and d str but on of surplus-value,or the general formof surplus-valueand

s part cular forms), and about the overall log calstructure of h s theory, that

he was able to wr te down these new mproved outl nes.

Although Marx d d not use the egel an U—P—S tr ad n th s outl ne, the

log cal structure of th s outl ne s essent ally the same as the earl er outl nes,

but w th much greater clar ty and prec s on, espec ally about compet t on.

Marx’scap tal n general corresponds to egel’sun versal ty; Marx’scompet

t on corresponds to egel’spart cular ty; and Marx’scred t-cap tal and share

cap tal correspond to egel’ss ngular ty. Compet t on s about the part cular

forms and nd v dual parts of surplus-value, wh ch w ll be analysed after the

general form and the total amount of surplus-valuehavebeen expla ned at the

level of abstract on of cap tal n general. The three volumes of Cap tal are

almost ent rely about sect ons (a) and (b) n th s outl ne. Marx never reallygot

to sect ons (c) and ((1)(although there s some mater al n Part VofVolume III

that belongs to sect on (c) on cred t-cap tal).

The Manuscr pt of 1861—322

The second draft of Cap tal was the Manuscr pt of 1861—3a huge work, 23

notebooks n all, and eventually publ shed n s xvolumes n German and f ve

volumes n Engl sh).23The recent publ cat on of th s manuscr pt n ts ent rety

sheds new l ght on the development of Marx's theory of the d str but on of

surplus-value, wh ch was eventually publ shed n VolumeIII of Cap tal.About

two-th rds of th s manuscr pt s the prev ously publ shed Theor esof Surplus

Value,much of wh ch s about the d str but on of surplus-value.24The other

22 See Moseley (2009) for an extens ve d scuss on of the further development of Marx’s

theory of the d str but on of surplus-value n the Manuscr pt of 1861-3, nclud ng a

summary table on p. 146 that traces n deta l the subjects Marx d scussed n th s

manuscr pt.

23 The Manuscr pt of 1861—3was publ shed for the f rst t me n ts ent rety n German n the

Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, abbrev ated as MEGA, n 1976-82.The Engl sh translat on

was publ shed n 1988-94 by Lawrence 84W shart and Internat onal Publ shers, as

Volumes 30 to 34 of the 50-volume Marx and Engels CollectedWorks.The publ cat on of

th s ent re manuscr pt s an mportant event n Marx anscholarsh p.Th smanuscr pt s

an mportant l nk between the Grundr sse and Cap tal and prov des many valuable

s ghts nto the log cal structure and content of Cap tal,espec allyMarx’stheory of the

d str but on of surplus-value nVolumeII].It should be carefully stud ed byall those who

w sh to understand Marx’s Cap tal. See Dussel 2001for a deta led textual study of th s

manuscr pt, and Moseley20018for an ntroduct on to Dussel'sbook.

24 Theor esofSurplus Valuerearranges some of the mater al nMarx’sor g nal Manuscr pt of

1861—3nd om ts some passages. See Moseley 2009 for further d scuss on.




exam nes surplus-value as such (the total surplus-value of cap tal as such) at

the level of abstract on of cap tal n general, and then later exam nes the par

t cular forms and nd v dual parts of surplus-valueat the levelof abstract on of

compet t on.

Marx repeated th s general theme many t mes throughout Theor esof

Surplus Value;I w ll just d scuss a few h ghl ghts here. W th respect to Adam

Sm th, Marx argued that Sm th actually had a theory of surplus-value n

general —that surplus-value s the excess of the value produced by workers

over the wages they are pa d —and that th s excess-value produced by the

unpa d labour of workers ncludes the part cular forms of surplus-value of

prof t and rent. owever, Sm th’slack of clar ty about th s d st nct on led to

many errors:

Thus Adam Sm th conce ves surplus value. . . as the general category, of

wh chprof t proper and rent of land are merelybranches. Nevertheless,

he does not d st ngu sh surplus value as such as a category on ts own,

d st nct from the spec f cforms t assumes n prof t and rent. Th s s the

source of much error and nadequacy n h s nqu ry,and of even more n

the work of R cardo.26

Afewpages later, Marxmade a s m lar comment, aga n n terms of the general

form of surplus-value and ts part cular forms:

We have seen how Adam Sm th expla ns surplus value n general, of

wh ch the rent of land and prof t are onlyd ferentforms and compo

nent parts. . . BecauseAdam makes what s n substance an analys s of

surplus value,d st nctfrom tsspec alforms, he subsequentlym xes t up

d rectlyw th the further developed formofprof t.Th s error pers sts w th

R cardo and all h s d sc ples . . . [T]he confus on creeps n mmed ately

not when he s deal ng exprofesso[spec f cally]w th prof t or rent - those

part cular forms ofsurplus value—but where he sth nk ng of them only

as forms of surplus value n general, as DEDUCTIONSFROM T E

LABOUR BESTOWED BYT E LABOURERS UPON T E MATERIAL.27

AsAdam Sm th resolves surplus value not only nto prof t but also nto

the rent of land —two part cular k nds of surplus value, whose move

ment s determ ned by qu te d fferent laws —he should certa nly have

26 Marx 1988:: [1861—3],pp. 388-9; Marx 1963, p. 82.

27 Marx 1988a [1861—3],p. 394—5;Marx 1963,p. 89 (cap tal sed emphas s n the or g nal).



134 MOSELEY

seen from th s that he ought not to treat the general abstract form as

d rectly dent calw thany of tspart cular forms.28

W th respect to R cardo, Marx made a s m lar cr t c sm —that R cardo also

fa led to separate the theory of surplus-value n general and the theory of ts

part cular forms:

In the cr t que of R cardo,wehave to separate what he h mselffa led to

separate. s theory of surplus value, wh ch of course ex sts n h s work,

although he does not def ne surplus valueas d st nct from ts part cular

forms, prof t, rent, nterest. Secondly,h s theoryofprof t.29

Nowhere doesR cardocons der surplusvalueseparately and ndepen

dentlyj om ts part cular forms —prof t ( nterest) and rent.~°’o

Marx argued that R cardowas not able to prov de a sat sfactory theory of the

general rate of prof t prec sely because he fa led to follow the correct log cal

method w th respect to the general form of surplus-value and ts part cular

forms. Spec f cally,R cardo assumed the rate of prof t n h s very f rst chapter

onvalue,w thout expla n nghow the rate ofprof t sdeterm ned. Marxargued

that, nstead of assum ng the rate of prof t n the beg nn ng, R cardo should

haveabstracted altogether fromthe rate ofprof tat the beg nn ng ofh s theory,

because the rate of prof t s a part cular form of surplus-value that has to be

expla ned through a ‘number of ntermed ate stages’.Marx summar sed h s

cr t c sm of R cardo's faulty log cal method as follows:

Instead of postulat ng th s general rate of prof t, R cardo should have

exam ned how far ts ex stence s cons stent w th the determ nat on of

value by labor-t me and he would have found that nstead of be ng con

s stent w th t, pr ma fac e, t contrad cts t, and that ts ex stence would

thereforehavetobeexpla ned through a number of ntermed ary stages,

a procedure very d fferent from merely nclud ng t under the law of

value. ewould then have ga ned an altogether d fferent ns ght nto the

nature of prof t and would not have dent f ed t d rectly w th

surplus-value.31

28 Marx 1988a [1861—3],p. 398; Marx 1963, p. 92.

29 Marx 1989a [1861—3],p. 397; Marx 1969, p. 169.

30 Marx 1989b [1861-3], p. 9; Marx 1969, p. 373.

31 Marx 1989a [1861-3], p. 401;Marx 1969, p. 174.




The ma n ‘ ntermed ate stage’ s the determ nat on of surplus-value n general

and the total amount of surplus-value at the level of abstract on of cap tal n

general.

In another passage, Marx cr t c sed R cardo for h s ‘lack of the power of

abstract on’:

The equal zat on of the surplus-values n the d fferent trades does not

afect the absolute s ze of th s total surplus-value;but merely alters ts

d str but on among the d fferent trades. The determ nat on of th s sur

plus-value tsef however,onlyar sesout of the determ nat on ofvalueby

labor-t me. W thout th s, the averageprof t s the averageofnoth ng, pure

fancy. And t could then equally well be 1,000%or 10% . . . One can see

that though R cardo s accused of be ng too abstract, one would be just

f ed n accus ng h m of the oppos te: lack of the power of abstract on,

ab l ty,when deal ngw th the valuesof commod t es, toforget prof ts,

a factor wh ch confronts h m as a result of compet t on.32

In other words, R cardo was unable to forget the part cular forms of surplus

valuewhen deal ng w th the general form of surplus-value.33

The last chapter of Theor esof Surplus Value s a long f rst draft of ‘Revenue

and Its Sources’,wh ch ncludes a cr t que of ‘vulgareconom cs’, accord ng to

wh ch the part cular forms of surplus-value are determ ned separately and

dependently, and the total surplus-value, f t s cons dered at all, s deter

m ned by add ng up the autonomous nd v dual parts, so that an ncrease n

one of the parts would result n an ncrease n the total. Marx argued that th s

apparent mutual ndependence of the part cular forms s an llus on;the fun

damental determ nant of all these part cular forms s surplus-labour, and the

total amount of surplus-value sdeterm ned bysurplus-labour pr or to the d v

s on of th s total nto nd v dual parts, so that an ncrease n one of the parts

would result n a reduct on n some other part, w th the total unchanged.

The breakdown ofsurplus-value, that s,ofpart of the valueofcommod

t es, nto these spec al head ngs or categor es, sveryunderstandable and

does not confl ct n the least w th the lawof value.But the whole matter

32 Marx 1989a [1861-3], p. 416;Marx 1969, pp. 190—1.

33 In the rest of the Manuscr pt of 1861-3,Marxmade the same mportant po nt w th respect

to a number of authors; for example James M ll (Marx 1989b [1861—3],. 275;Marx 1972,

p. 85), John Stuart M ll (Marx 1989a [1861—3],p. 69; Marx 1972, p. 228), anonymous

pamphlet (Marx 1989b [1861—3],pp. 388—9;Marx 1972, p. 254), Cherbul ez (Marx 1991

[1861—3],pp. 299—300;Marx 1972, pp. 376—7).



136 MOSELEY

myst f edbecause these d ferent parts of surplus-value acqu re an

dependent form, because they accrue to d fferent people, because the

t tles to them are based on d fferent elements, and f nallybecause of the

autonomy w th wh ch certa n parts [of surplus-value] confront the pro

cess as ts cond t ons. From parts nto wh ch value can be d v ded, they

become ndependent elements wh ch const tutevalue, they become con

st tuent elements.34

Thuswe can see that Marx’scr t cal exam nat on of class cal econom cs n the

Manuscr pt of 1861—3lso helped h m to develop n th s manuscr pt h s own

theory of the part cular forms of surplus-value, that s, theory of the d str bu—

t on of surplus-value, at the level of compet t on, beyond cap tal n general. In

Moseley (2009), I d scuss at length the development n th s manuscr pt of

Marx’s theory of the part cular forms of surplus-value —the general rate of

prof t (and pr ces of product on), rent, nterest and commerc al prof t. Marx

ma nta ned throughout th s manuscr pt, w th clar ty and emphas s, the d s

t nct on between the general formof surplus-valueand the part cular formsof

surplus-value, wh ch he patterned after egel’smoments of the Concept of

un versal ty and part cular ty. The general form and the total amount of sur

plus-value must be determ ned pr or to the part cular forms and nd v dual

amounts of surplus-value. The four-sect on outl ne of May 1858 (d scussed

above at the end of the sect on on the Grundr sse) rema ned the bas c log cal

structure ofMarx’stheory of the product on and d str but on of surplus-value.

The Manuscr pt of 1861—3tarted out n sect on (a) of th s outl ne (cap tal n

general) and moved progress vely nto sect on (b) (compet t on). Sect ons (c)

and (d) were st ll ‘beyond the scope’.

TheManuscr pt of 1863-5(VolumeIII of ‘Cap tal; 1894)

The Manuscr pt of 1864—5s the bas s of what we know asVolume IIIof Cap tal,

wh ch was heav ly ed ted by Engels.35Th s manuscr pt s ma nly about the

34 Marx 1989b [1861—3],p. 511;Marx 1972,p. 511(brackets n the translat on).

35 Th s draft ofVolumeIII s the only full draft of th s volume, and was publ shed for the rst

t me n German n the MEGA,11/42 (1993).Unfortunately, t has not yet been translated

to Engl sh, although thankfully there s a translat on n the works (by Ben Fowkes).

wh ch should be publ shed soon, and Engl sh Marx st scholars w ll f nally have the

opportun ty to study th s mportant manuscr pt n the or g nal.

The draft ofVolumeIII n the Manuscr pt of 1864—5 s the bas s of Engels’sed ted ver

s on ofVolumeIIIw th wh ch we are fam l ar.There are some d fferences between Marx’s

manuscr pt and Engels’sVolume III,ma nly that Engels made Marx’smanuscr pt look a

lot more organ sed and complete than t actuallywas,espec allyPart Von nterest, and to




part cular forms of surplus-value —he general rate of prof t (and pr ces of pro

duct on), rent, nterest and mercant le prof t, and further developsMarx’sthe

ory of these part cular forms that he f rst developed n the Manuscr pt of

1861—3.n other words, th s manuscr pt s ma nly about the d str but on of

surplus-value, at the levelof abstract on ofcompet t on, beyond cap tal n gen

eral. In th s draft, there s less use of the egel an term ‘part cular forms of

surplus-value’ than n the Manuscr pt of 1861—3,ut the log c of the theory of

these part cular forms of surplus-value s the same as n the earl er drafts —he

general form and total amount of surplus-valueare determ ned f rst, and then

presupposed n the further determ nat on of the part cular forms of surplus

value.The same theory sworked out n greater deta l and greater depth n th s

manuscr pt. Thus the log cofMarx’stheory of the product on and d str but on

of surplus-value cont nues to be s m lar to the log cof egel’smoments of the

Concept, un versal ty and part cular ty —he un versal s determ ned f rst, and

then the part culars are determ ned as part cular forms of the presupposed

un versal.

Because of a space constra nt, I w ll not d scuss th s manuscr pt n deta l.

SeeMoseley2002for an extens ve d scuss on ofMarx's theory of the part cular

forms of surplus-value nVolume III of Cap tal,w th emphas s on th s egel an

feature of Marx’slog calmethod.

VolumeI of ‘Cap tal’ (1867)36

The f rst German ed t on of Volume I of Cap tal was of course publ shed two

years later n 1867.Volume I presents Marx's theory of surplus-value n general

at the level of cap tal n general. The expos t on s much more complete and

pol shed than n prev ous drafts,but the log cofMarx'stheory of surplus-value

general s essent ally the same —surplus-value s determ ned by surplus

labour, and the total amount of surplus-value s determ ned by the total

amount of surplus-labour.

One week after Marx f nally f n shed Volume I (and wrote to Engels n a tr

umphant mood at 2 am. n the morn ng that ‘th s volume s f n shed!’),37he

wrote another letter to Engels(24August) nwh ch he stated that one of the two

‘bestpo nts' of h s book was the treatment of the general form of surplus-value

a lesser extent Part IIIon the fall ngrate of prof t. owever,these d Eerences do not affect

the subject of th s chapter; the theory of the part cular formsof surplus-value sthe same

both.

36 SeeMoseley (2003) for an extens ve d scuss on of Marx’sf nal presentat on of h s theory

of surplus-value n general at the levelof abstract on of cap tal n general n the VolumeI

of Cap tal.

37 Marx and Engels 1975a, p. 180.



138 MOSELEY

pr or to and ndependently of ts part cular forms (cont nu ng to use the same

egel an concepts f rst ut l sed n the Grundr sse):

The best po nts n my book are: . . . z) the treatment of surplus-value

dependenth of ts part cular forms as prof t, nterest, rent, etc. Th s

w ll be seen espec ally n the second volume. The treatment of the par

t cularforms by class cal economy, wh ch always m xes them up, s a

regular hash.38

Th s statement s s m lar to the open ng statement of Theor esofSurplus Value

d scussedabove,and also to the f rst art culat on of th s mportant po nt n the

Grundr sse (p. 684), all n s m larly egel an terms. Clearly, Marx cons dered

th s d st nct on between the general form of surplus-value and ts part cular

forms to be an extremely mportant part of h s log calmethod, and t was pat

terned after egel’smoments of the Concept. Th smust have been what Marx

meant n h s famous 1858letter about egel’s‘great serv ce?"9

F ve months later ( n January 1868), Marx made a s m lar comment n

another letter to Engels.Th s t me the pr or treatment of the general form of

surplus-value s descr bed as the f rst of the ‘three fundamentally new ele

ments’ of h s book:

1)That n contrast to all former pol t cal economy, wh ch from the very

outset treats the d ferent fragments of surplus value w th the r f xed

formof rent, prof t, and nterest as alreadyg ven,If rst deal w th thegen

eralform of surplus value, n wh ch all these fragments are st llund ffer

ent ated — n solut on, as t were.40

In th s sentence, ‘part cular forms of surplus-value’ s expressed as ‘d fferent

fragments of surplus value’,but the mean ng s obv ously the same. ere Marx

seems to be suggest ng a metaphor from chem stry to llustrate the relat on

between the general form of surplus-value (und fferent ated solut on) and ts

part cular forms (d fferent ated fragments)“1

38 Ib d. Accord ng to Marx’s plans at that t me, the ‘second volume’ would nclude both

‘BookII’on the c rculat on-process and ‘BookIII' on the part cular forms of surplus-value

(see Marx 1976c [1867],p. 93).

39 The other ‘best po nt' ment oned by Marx n th s letter was the d st nct on between

abstract labour and concrete labour.

4o Marx and Engels 1975a,p. 186.

41 The two other ‘newelements’ment oned n th s letter are abstract/concrete labour and

the explanat on ofwagesas an rrat onal express on of the value of labour-power.




Conclus on

I conclude that, wh le Marxwas work ng on the Grundr sse,he f gured out the

log cal relat on between surplus-value n general and the part cular forms of

surplus-value,w th the help of egel’smoments of un versal tyand part cular

y,and th s s what Marxmeant n h s mportant january 1858letter, n wh ch

he wrote that egel’smethod had been ‘ofgreat serv ce’ n develop ng h s own

theory of prof t. Marx’s general form of surplus-value was patterned after

egel’s un versal ty, and Marx’s part cular forms of surplus-value were pat

terned after egel'spart cular ty. In both theor es, the general or the un versal

determ ned pr or to the determ nat on of the part culars, and the un versal

presupposed n the determ nat on of the part culars, that s, the part culars

are expla ned as part cular forms of the presupposed un versal. Marx ma n

ta ned th s egel an log cal structure for h s theory of the product on and d s

tr but on of surplus-value throughout all the drafts of Cap tal, and Marx

cons dered th s log cal structure to be one of the two best po nts of h s theory.



C APTER 6

On egel’sMethodolog cal Legacy n Marx

Roberto F nesch

Introduct on

In th s chapter I shall not deal w th class c ssues concern ng Marx’srelat on

sh p to egel, such as the concept of al enat on or the nvers on of concrete

and abstract, real and deal (mater al sm versus deal sm). 1shall just ment on

the matter of fact that egel anph lologyhas shaken the foundat ons ofMarx’s

dea of egel,so that we need at least to recons der Marx’sassumpt ons about

egel.l

I shall focus on the structure ofMarx’stheory of cap tal from the Grundr sse

to the ‘hnal’ vers on of Cap tal and argue that we can f nd a development,

wh ch corresponds to the follow ng pattern: un versal ty (or general ty) —par

t cular ty —s ngular ty; t ev dently recalls egel’s theory of judgement and

syllog sm.2In sp te of th s s m lar ty (and many others), I do not th nk we have

to look for analog es or homolog es between Marx’s theory of cap tal and

egel’slog c; th s alleged ‘I-legel anapproach’ has paradox cally resulted n a

verynon-d alect cal att tude n many scholars. In fact,Marx h mself cr t c sed

any external appl cat on of categor es to a g ven content. A formal st c appl ca

t on of determ ned categor es extrapolated from egel’sSc ence of Log c to

externally prov ded mater als s the oppos te of the d alect cal method, wh ch

cons sts n the (self-)development of that content tself. In the end, th s sup

posedly ‘ egel an’ nterpretat on of Marx’sCap tal contrad cts egel’s dea of

d alect c. It also contrad cts Marx’searly dea of a ‘pecul ar log c of a pecul ar

object’,expressed n the Manuscr pts of 1843.3F nally,Marx h mself cr t c sed

1 Even n soph st cated d scuss ons on these top cs, many scholars have rarely quest oned

whether Marx’s nterpretat ons of egelas e ther an deal st or a supporter of an al enat on

theory were cons stent or tenable. I have dealt n deta l w th th s top c n F nesch 2006.

2 See egel 1975[1817],§163.‘General’ s the translat on of Allgeme n. S nce th s term means

‘un versal'as well, n part cular n the context of judgement and syllog sm, t can better be

translated as un versal ty - part cular ty —s ngular ty. ‘Cap tal n general’ [Kap tal m

Allgeme nen] and ‘un versal ty’ [Allgeme nhe t]mean the same th ng.

3 Marx 1976c, p. 296, Marx 1975b [1843], p. 91:‘[C]omprehend ng [Begreg'fen]. . . cons st[s] . . . n

grasp ng the spec f c log c of the spec f c subject [e gent ml chenGegenstandes]'.

© KONINKLIJKEBRILLNV,LEIDEN, 2014 DOI l0.1163/9789004270022_008



ON EGEL’S MET ODOLOGICAL LEGACY IN MARX 141

th s att tude n a famous letter to Engels, where he d st ngu shed between

Lassalle’ssupposed d alect c and the actual d alect cal methodology.4

Mystart ng po nt s the assumpt on that egel’slegacy n Marx s method

olog cal; f Marx s not nterested n a formal st c appl cat on of models from

egel’s log c, he s fa thful to ts fundamental pr nc ple: the Auslegung der

Sache selbst, the d alect cal self-development of a determ ned content; the

mode of expos t on (presentat on)5 of th s content s the Darstellungswe se,

wh ch s called by Marx the ‘onlysc ent f c method'.6

Th s does not exclude that, as a matter of fact, n several passages Marx

seems to follow egel’sdeterm ned patterns. owever,these are just examples

ofhow abstract log calcategor eswork at lower levelsof abstract on; the same

th ng happens n egel’sph losophy of nature or sp r t. Th s s not external

appl cat on, but just the way those abstract categor eswork at a lower levelof

abstract on; the pecul ar funct on ng of each of these more concrete levels

redeterm nes also the waythose abstract categor eswork n t.

In th s chapter, I shall showhow,from a part ally abstract ‘appl cat on’of the

structure un versal —part cular —s ngular, Marx moves to a d alect cally more

cons stent formulat on of t. Th s w ll allow us to follow the development of

Marx’stheory of cap tal through ts d fferent stages of elaborat on, from the

f rst concept on to the ‘f nal’outl ne, wh ch, although uncompleted, turns out

to be d alect cally more cons stent than the f rst draft.7

It swell known to those who are fam l ar w th the MEGA2hat Marx real sed

only a part of h s whole project. In the debate on the ‘reduct on’or ‘ mprove

ment’of the d alect cal method and the changesthat occurred n the structure

of the Cap tal concept from the 1857—8Manuscr pt (the f rst draft, the so-called

Grundr sse) to Cap tal (the four-book plan), many po nts have been made:

4 Marx and Engels 1973,pp. 274—5,Marx 1983b[1858],p. 261:‘It s pla n to me from th s one note

that, n h s second grand opus, the fellow ntends to expound pol t cal economy n the man

ner of egel. e w ll d scover to h s cost that t s one th ng for a cr t que to take a sc ence to

the po nt at wh ch t adm ts of a d alect cal presentat on, and qu te another to apply an

abstract, ready-made system of log c to vague present rnents ofjust such a system’.

5 ‘Darstellen’does not s mply perta n to the rhetor c of the presentat on of g ven results, but

the way the theory tself develops through ts d fferent levelsand categor es toward total ty.

It s n fact expl c t that Marx s referr ng to egel’sDarstellung when he uses th s word. The

process of expos t on pos ts results, and produces theory and ts log cal cons stency.

6 Marx 1976—81,p. 36, Marx 1986 [1857—8],p. 38.

7 Th s nqu ry s today poss ble thanks to the new cr t cal ed t on of Marx’sand Engels’sworks,

the Man-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, wh ch, for the veryf rst t me, makes ava lable all the or g

nal mater als wr tten byMarx; these can be compared w th Engels’sed tor al render ng. For

the rad cal novelt es connected to th s ed t on see the Introduct on to Bellof oreand F nesch

2009.



142 FINESC I

severalhave thought that Marxkept the not on of ‘cap tal n general' through

out; some haveargued that th s concept was dropped, wh le others have stated

that t was reframed n a new plan.8

Th sdebate, n myop n on, has not been focused enough on the veryexpl c t

d alect cal framework of the broader theory of cap tal. Most of the scholars

havema nly stud ed the relat onsh p between cap tal n general and compet

t on, wh le the further, more concrete levels of abstract on have been s mply

nored, and also the connect on of these w th the tr ad un versal ty - part cu

lar ty - s ngular ty.We have actually four levels of abstract on: 1)a sort of level

zero, commod ty and money, and commod ty-c rculat on; z) un versal ty (or

cap tal n general), 3) part cular ty (bas cally connected to compet t on), and

4) s ngular ty (cred t and share-cap tal). I have deeply analysed the ntr ns c

d alect c of these concepts n another essay;9here Iwould l ke to deal w th two

part cular ssues: 1)how, desp te changes, cap tal n general was not dropped;

on the contrary ts structure became more cons stent thanks to some mod f ca—

t ons; and 2) how several vexed quest ons n the trad t onal debate der ve not

from the accompl shment of a new plan for Cap tal, but from an ncons stent

return to the old one.

If we set apart “levelzero’ (Marx called t ‘Vorchapters’,‘pre-chapters’), we

have a tr part te structure (un versal ty [Allgeme nhe t],or cap tal n general

[Kap tal mAllgeme nen] —part cular ty —s ngular ty), wh ch, as stated, clearly

refers to egel’sdoctr ne of judgement and syllog sm.In order to d scuss the

cons stency of th s d v s on and the part cular problems l nked to cap tal n

general, wehave to reconstruct how these categor es were def ned at the beg n—

n ng and how the r framework changed wh le the theory was worked out by

Marx n ts var ous drafts.

From 1857—8to 1861—3

Marx wrote some outl nes of h s theory of cap tal n the 1857—8Manuscr pt:

[A] (1)The general abstract determ nat ons, wh ch therefore apperta n

more or less to all forms of soc ety, but n the sense set forth above.

(2) The categor es wh ch const tute the nternal structure of bourgeo s

soc ety and onwh ch the pr nc pal classesare based. Cap tal,wagelabour.

8 For a summary of these debates see F nesch zooga, and 2009b. More recently on th s

top c: e nr ch 1989;Arthur zoom; Moseley 2009.

9 See F nesch 2005.




10

ll

landed property. The r relat on to one another. Townand country. The 3

large soc al classes. Exchange between them. C rculat on. Cred t system

(pr vate). (3) The State as the ep tome of bourgeo s soc ety. Analysed n

relat on to tself. The ‘unproduct ve’ classes. Taxes.Nat onal debt. Publ c

cred t. Populat on. Colon es. Em grat on. (4) lntemat onal character of

product on. Internat onal d v s on of labour. lntemat onal exchange.

Export and mport. Rate of exchange. (5)World market and cr ses.10

[B] I. (1)General concept of cap tal. —(2) Part cular ty of cap tal: c rcu

lat ng cap tal, f xed cap tal. (Cap tal as means of subs stence, as raw

mater al, as nstrument of labour.) (3) Cap tal as money.

II. (1) Quant ty of cap tal. Accumulat on. —(2) Cap tal measured n

terms of tself. Prof t. Interest. Valueof cap tal, .e.cap tal n d st nc

t on from tself as nterest and prof t. (3)The c rculat on of cap tals:

(a) Exchange of cap tal w th cap tal. Exchangeof cap tal w th reve

nue. Cap tal and pr ces; (5) Compet t on of cap tals; (y) Concen

trat on of cap tals.

III. Cap tal as cred t.

IV. Cap tal as share cap tal.

V. Cap tal as money market.

VI. Cap tal as source of wealth. The cap tal st.ll

[C] I. General ty: (1)(a) Evolut on of cap tal from money. (b) Cap tal and

labour (med at ng tself by al en labour). (c) The elements of cap

tal, d st ngu shed accord ng to the r relat onsh p to labour (product,

raw mater al, nstrument of labour). (2) Part cular sat on of cap tal:

(a) C rculat ng cap tal, f xedcap tal.Turnover ofcap tal. (3)S ngular ty

of cap tal: Cap tal and prof t. Cap tal and nterest. Cap tal as value,

d st nct from tself as nterest and prof t.

Marx 1976—81,p. 43, Marx 1986 [1857—8],p. 45.

Marx 1976—81,p. 187, Marx 1986 [1857—8],p. 195. It cont nues: ‘After cap tal, landed

property would have to be dealt w th. After that wagelabour.Then, assum ng all three, the

movement of pr ces as c rculat on now def ned n ts nner total ty.On the other hand, the

three classes as product on pos ted n ts three bas c forms and presuppos t ons of

c rculat on. Then the State. (State and bourgeo s soc ety. —Taxat on, or the ex stence of

the unproduct ve classes. —The nat onal debt - Populat on. —The State n ts external

relat ons: Colon es. Fore gn trade. Rate of exchange. Money as nternat onal co n. —

F nally the world market. Encroachment of bourgeo s soc ety on the State. Cr ses.

D ssolut on of the mode of product on and form of soc ety based upon exchangevalue.

The real pos t ng of nd v dual labour as soc al and v ce versa).’



144 FINESC I

II. Part cular ty: (1)Accumulat on of cap tals. (2) Compet t on of cap

tals. (3)Concentrat on of cap tals (quant tat ve d fference of cap tal

as at the same t me qual tat ve, as measure of ts volume and effect).

111. S ngular ty: (1) Cap tal as cred t. (2) Cap tal as share cap tal.

(3) Cap tal as money market.12

FromAand the cont nuat on ofB( n footnote 12)we draw the famous s x-book

plan, later expl c tly reported n a letter to Lassalle (22February 1858):

[D] The whole s d v ded nto 6 books: 1.On Cap tal (conta ns a few ntro

ductory C APTERS).2. On Landed Property. 3. On Wage Labour. 4. On

the State. 5. Internat onal Trade. 6.World Market.”

Th s plan s repeated n the Preface to A Contr but on of 1859.14

From Band Cwe have a structured plan of the book on cap tal, the f rst of

s x.Among these outl nes there are d fferences that are normal n an n t al

phase; f, however, we compare the two ndexes Band Cw th the actual draft—

g of the manuscr pt, the second one, wr tten later, s the one that s substan

t ally followed. In the 1857—8Manuscr pt, although Marx also ment oned

d fferent top cs that go beyond the l m ts of un versal ty,he d d not transcend

s boundar es as for the str ct log cal development of categor es.

The further tr part t on of un versal ty n C s conf rmed n E, n another let

ter to Lassalle (11March 1858):15

[E] 1.Value, 2. Money, 3. Cap tal n General (the process of product on of

cap tal; process of ts c rculat on; the un ty of the two, or cap tal and

prof t; nterest).

Po nts 1and 2 of Ecorrespond to the ‘Vorchapters’of po nt 1 n D; f nally, n F, n

a letter to Engels of 2 Apr l 1858,we have a substant al conf rmat on of the

ent re structure of the book on cap tal, accord ng to the or g nal Cmodel:

[F] Cap tal falls nto 4 sect ons. a) Cap tal en général. (Th s s the sub

stance of the f rst nstallment.) b) Compet t on, or the nteract on of

many cap tals. c) Cred t, where cap tal, as aga nst nd v dual cap tals, s

12 Marx 1976—81,p. 199, Marx 1986 [1857—8],pp. 205—6.

13 Marx and Engels 1973, pp. 550—1,Marx 1983c [1858], p. 270.

14 Marx 1980,p . 99, Marx 1987b [1859], p. 261.

15 Marx and Engels 1973,pp. 553—4,Marx 1983d [1858], p. 287.




shown to be a un versal element. d) Share cap tal as the most perfected

form (turn ng nto commun sm) together w th all ts contrad ct ons.16

After he f n shed h s work on the 1857-8Manuscr pt, Marx wrote ts ndex, G,

where he cons dered top cs that later would be part ofVolume1.What we had

C s taken up and expanded:

[G] 1)Value . . . II) Money. . . 111)Cap tal n general

Transformat on ofmoney nto cap tal

(1) The product on process of cap tal

(a) The exchange of cap tal w th labour capac ty

(b) Absolute surplus value

(c) Relat ve surplus value

((1) Pr m t ve accumulat on

(Presuppos t ons for the relat on of cap tal and wagelabour)

(e) Invers on of the law of appropr at on.

(2) The c rculat on process of cap tal.17

For the hrst t me we have here the concept of accumulat on w th n the frame

work of un versal ty, although t s l m ted to the ‘pr m t ve’one.18In C, accu

mulat on was not supposed to be part of un versal ty, but part cular ty

(compet t on).

Un versal ty [Allgeme nhe t] of cap tal, or also cap tal n general [ m

Allgeme nen] s a category used by Marx only unt l the end of 1862.In the

1857—8Manuscr pt t s def ned as 1) the ‘qu ntessence’ of cap tal, what each

cap tal has n common opposed to the ‘many’cap tals, a lower level of abstrac

t on. Elsewhere Marx cons ders t as 2) total soc al cap tal before ts art cula

t on n part cular cap tals.There s a also th rd po nt: 3)the d st nct on between

‘becom ng cap tal’ [werdendes Kap tal] and ‘become cap tal’ [gewordenes

Kap tal]. Cap tal has ‘become’once t has pos ted as ts own result what at f rst

was a presuppos t on, wh ch t tself has not pos ted; t s ‘becom ng’when t s

the mak ng of t, but has not yet worked t out. Once ts presuppos t ons

have been pos ted by tself, once t has become, ts result s cons dered as an

ach evement of the ent re cap tal, and so surplus-value becomes prof t The

relat onsh p cap tal/prom s the last step of un versal tyand the start ng po nt

16 Marx and Engels 1973,p. 3123 , Marx 1983f [1858],p. 298.

17 Marx 1980, p. 3ff, Marx 1987a [1857—8],p. 423.

l 8 In Bthere was a reference to that, but n the actual manuscr pt the expos t on was l m ted

to pr m t ve accumulat on, as t was later reported n G.



146 FINESC I

of part cular ty.19Part cular ty s character sed bymany cap tals act ng as un

versal, that s, f ght ngaga nst one another for self-valor sat on; n each part c

ular cap tal the un versal law (self-valor sat on) s at work. In s ngular ty,Marx

exposes how fewpart cular cap tals ncarnate n the r own s ngular f gurethe

funct on of un versal cap tal (bank-system). The product ve cap tals stay n

front of th s un versal as ts part cular form of real sat on. ln egel an terms, t

the un versal reflected n tself; a s ngular that, n ts part cular form, acts as

un versal. Th s s the bas s on wh ch w ll then be developed the cred t—system

and share-cap tal.20

If we analyse how th s dea was structured n the 1857—8Manuscr pt, t

seems that Marx meant to develop the concept of a ‘typ cal’cap tal, one and

many at the same t me (as f we stud ed ‘man’ n general before deal ng w th

part cular ‘men’). e started w th value, ts transformat on nto cap tal, and

then developed cap tal-product on and -c rculat on; at th s po nt, he could

move forward/tum back to value, as valor sed value, as cap tal produced by

cap tal; prof t as the result of cap tal.The d st nct on between prof t and nter

est was n th s manuscr pt the passage to many cap tals (so far these were not

yet cons dered). The framework of many cap tals n ‘compet t on’ was sup—

posed to be the placewhere accumulat on should be treated. In th s structure,

accumulat on came after not only prof t, but nterest!

Th s dea of the ‘genus’cap tal s conf rmed by the way Marx developed the

po nt 111of G n the general outl ne of cap tal n general ( )wr tten e ther after

A Contr but on (1859)or r ght before the 1861—3Manuscr pt (1861).It s a l st of

‘chapters’; for each of these there are prec se references to pages from the

1857—8Manuscr pt, nd cat ng the mater al to be used for the new vers on.

ere are the t tles for the top cs connected to the ‘f nal’Volume 1.

19 The concepts of ‘becom ng and ‘become’der ve from egel’sSc enceofLog ctoo (see the

pages on ‘Concept n general’).They have log cal (non-h stor cal) mean ng: they descr be

the process through wh ch the system pos ts ts presuppos t ons (becom ng) and the

status of accompl shment of that process (become). There was at f rst an amb guous

overlapp ng between these two d mens ons; pr m t ve and proper cap tal st c

accumulat on wereat f rst not adequately d st ngu shed, alsobecause the pos t on of the

latter was not yet clearly f xed.The f nal d st nct on w ll be expl c tly made w th Cap tal

Volume 1 (1867);w th the French ed t on (1872—5),he two Accumulat ons would each

havean ndependent Sect on.

20 For a more deta led analys s of th s po nt see F nesch 2013.




[ ] The Process of Product on of Cap tal

1)

Transformat on ofmoney nto cap tal

aa) Trans t on . . .

bb) Exchange between commod ty and labour capac ty. . .

g) Thelabour process

Absolute surplus value . . .

Absolute and necessary labour t me . . . Surplus labour. Surplus

populat on.

Surplus labour t me . . .

Surplus labour and necessary labour. . .

Relat ve surplus value

aa) Cooperat on of masses . ..

bb) D v s on of labour . . .

gg) Mach nery . . .

Pr m t ve accumulat on . . .

Surplus product. Surplus cap tal . . .

Cap tal produces wage labour . . .

Pr m t ve accumulat on . . .

Concentrat on of labour capac t es. . .

Surplus value n var ous forms and through var ousmeans

Connect on of relat ve and absolute surplus value . . .

Wagelabour and cap tal

Cap tal, Collect ve force, C v l sat on. . .

Reproduct on of the worker through the wages . . .

Self-transcend ng l m ts of the cap tal st product on . . . Labour

self transformed nto soc al labour. . .

Real economy. Sav ngof labour t me. But not antagon st cally . . .

Man festat on of the lawof appropr at on n the s mple commod ty

c rculat on. Invers on of th s law . . .

CIRCULATION PROCESS OF CAPITAL . ..

CAPITAL AND PROFIT . . .21

If we look at the t tles of the chapters n G and ,we have: 1)Product on pro

cess of cap tal, 2) C rculat on process of cap tal, and 3) Cap tal and prof t. The

f rst two are exactly the same as Volumes 1and 2 of the future ‘f nal’vers on.

The th rd, wh ch s not n G, s s m lar to the f rst sect on of the ‘ nal’Volume3

(and they are the same as n E).

21 Marx 1980, p. 2566' . Marx 1986 [1861—3],pp. 514—6.



148 FINESC I

Desp te th s cons stent framework,we also have some changes, n part cular

connected to accumulat on: although st ll talk ng about ‘pr m t ve’accumula

t on, categor es such assurplus-product and surplus-cap tal refer to a f rstdraft

of a theory of the cap tal st c form of accumulat on proper, followed after by a

separate paragraph on pr m t ve accumulat on. ere, however, only the accu

mulat on of a s ngle ‘typ cal’cap tal s taken nto account; therefore, desp te

th s nterpolat on (accumulat on before prof t and sow th n un versal ty), the

general dea —accord ng to wh ch we had before cap tal as such n ts s ngular

typ cal form (un versal ty) and then many cap tals (part cular ty) —does not

change.

From 1861—3to 1863—5

Wh le wr t ng the 1861—3Manuscr pt, Marx mod f ed some elements of h s

theory; th s complex process would, however, take a long t me; after th s text,

the term ‘cap tal n general’was not used aga n.

The manuscr pt started as a cont nuat on of A Contr but on, follow ng .

Unl kewhat s cla med n the Introduct on to the MEGAvolume, n th s per od

Marx wrote a f rst draft of the th rd part of cap tal n general (cap tal and

prof t), maybe at the same t me as the draft of part 1,maybe after th s was

concluded.22The top cs he cons dered n th s th rd part followed more or less

the correspond ng po nt of , but espec ally excluded (b) (compet t on),

(c) (cred t) and (d) (share-cap tal) of F (that s, they don’t transcend the l m ts

of cap tal n general).

Marx nterrupted the manuscr pt after the chapter on surplus-value, and

began the h story of the theory of t (March 1862),as he d d n A Contr but on;

th s huge part of the manuscr pt, where research and expos t on23arem xed

together, Marx dealt for the f rst t me w th a few categor es (ment oned, how

ever, n all the prev ous plans) that gobeyondun versal ty, or cap tal n general:

abstract theory of compet t on (and ts double process: w th n one branch,

wh ch results n market-values,and among d fferent branches, wh ch results n

the product on-pr ces), and, connected to that, the theory of d fferent al and

22 See also footnote 36.

23 I am referr ng to the famous d st nct on made by Marx between Forschugswe seand

Darstellungswe se n the afterword to the 1872second ed t on of Cap tal Volume 1(Marx

1987d [1872],p. 709, Marx 1996 [1867], p. 19; n th s vers on, Darstellung s translated as

‘presentat on’, and We seas ‘method’).




absolute rent?“ Some room was ded cated to nterest, but not yet cred t and

share-cap tal (or f ct t ous cap tal). 1would l ke to stress that these mportant

novelt es do not change anyth ng n the old outl ne: all the top cs ment oned

are, after cap tal n general, exactly n the same pos t ons they were supposed

to be accord ng to prev ous plans; they represent only the r further real sat on.

Actual changes are to be found elsewhere: accumulat on-theory.

As I sa d, Marx talked about accumulat on w th n the framework of cap tal

general (that s: before cap tal s pos ted by tself) already n the 1857—8

Manuscr pt; however, he dealt not w th cap tal st c accumulat on proper, but

rather pr m t ve accumulat on. owever, after relat ve surplus-value, Marx

took nto account the re nvestment of the produced surplus-value.25

Accumulat on appeared aga n n a passage on c rculat on, where he d st n

gu shed between pr m t ve accumulat on and cap tal st c accumulat on

proper,26 and also surplus-cap tal I and surplus-cap tal 11.27Accord ng to C,

these top cs should come later, but, ev dently, the log cal cons stency of the

theory tself brought Marx to treat them there. In the 1861—3Manuscr pt the

accumulat on of the s ngle ‘typ cal' cap tal s n fact dealt w th after the pro

duct on of relat ve surplus-value. It s nterest ng to po nt out that accumula

t on was taken up aga n n the f nal part of th s manuscr pt28 n a framework

very close to what w ll be called total soc al reproduct on, wh ch ev dently

pl es the relat onsh p among many cap tals.29Th s s the accumulat on/

reproduct on of soc ety as awhole.Bothof these twoaccumulat ons/reproduc

t ons (respect vely of a s ngle ‘typ cal’cap tal and of soc ety as a whole) appar

ently come now before the relat onsh p cap tal/prof t, that s,before cap tal n

general s ‘accompl shed’. If plac ng the f rst one (accumulat on of a s ngle

Cap tal) before prof t d d not change the old outl ne, the second (soc ety as a

whole) causes some trouble, s nce t ncludes many cap tals.

Before I cons der th s po nt, 1would l ke to emphas se that the ‘ant c pat on’

of accumulat on s necessary to develop a d alect callymore cons stent theory

24 Th s also clearly emerges from a couple of letters to Engels (Marx and Engels 1990,pp.

271—81,Marx 1985a [1862], and 1985b [1862]).

25 Marx 1976-81, p. 2948”,Marx 1986 [1857—8],pp. 312—3.

25 Marx 1976—81,p. 3675, Marx 1986 [1857—8],pp. 387-8.

27 Marx 1976—81,pp. 365—6,Marx 1986 [1857—8],pp. 334-5

28 Marx 1973-82. 1)-22433, Marx 1994 [1861—4],pp. 206—7.

29 Also n other passages, n relat on to the cr t c sm of Sm th's dogma, accord ng to wh ch

all the annual product would become revenue, Marx comes to terms w th Quesnay’s

Tableau économ que.Also h s correspondence w th Engelsw tnesses th s (letter of GJuly

1863,the same per od when he l kelywrote the ment oned pages (Marx and Engels1990,

P-3523‘.Marx 1985d [1863], pp. 485—6)).



15o FINESC I

of cap tal. In order to be accompl shed (to reach the relat onsh p cap tal/

prof t), cap tal needs to pos t ts presuppos t ons (separat on of labour-power

and means ofproduct on, and ava lab l tyof the mater al cond t ons for repro

duct on). In order to have th s process not as a mere occas onal event, but a

structural element of th s system, t s not suff c ent to show how th s happens

once on the bas s of presuppos t ons not pos ted by cap tal; f we d dn’t have

those, the process tself would not take place. Tobe effect velypos ted, cap tal

needs to show how t tself pos ts the cond t ons of ts own reproduct on. Th s

why accumulat on] reproduct on s necessary before prof t.

owever, although the analys s of the accumulat on of a s ngle, ‘typ cal’

cap tal s a necessary cond t on, t s not sul c ent. Where does th s typ cal

cap tal f nd the mater al elements for ts further reproduct on, the new nputs

that t does not produce tself? It s then necessary to cons der the nteract on

w th others n order to pos t the cap tal—prof trelat onsh p. Marx’sawareness

about the necess ty of‘c rculat onand reproduct on' ofmany cap tals as cond

t on of the be ng-pos ted of a s ngle typ calcap tal was expl c tly ment oned n

the 1861—3Manuscr pt:

Th s can only emerge n the c rculat on process wh ch s n tself also a

process of reproduct on.

Furthermore t snecessary to descr be the c rculat on or reproduct on

process before deal ng w th the already ex st ng cap tal —cap tal and

prof t —s nce we have to expla n, not only how cap tal produces, but also

how cap tal s produced. But the actual movement starts from the ex st—

g cap tal — .e. the actual movement denotes developed cap tal st pro

duct on, wh ch starts from and presupposes ts own bas s. The process of

reproduct on and the pred spos t on to cr s swh ch s further developed

t, are therefore onlypart ally descr bed under th s head ng and requ re

further elaborat on n the chapter on ‘Cap taland Prof t’.30

The cond t ons of the accumulat on of a s ngle cap tal mply a relat onsh p

w th other cap tals w th wh ch t exchanges (th s s a system where products

assume the commod ty-form).Manycap tals are then to be cons dered w th n

the framework of un versal ty,because they are necessary to reach the cap tal—

prof t relat onsh p, ts accompl shment. In Marx’s or g nal plan, one of the

d st ngu sh ng elements between un versal ty and part cular ty was the rela

t onsh p one/many cap tals. There were also other relevant d st nct ons,

3o Marx 1978—82,p. 1134,Marx 1989b [1861—3],p. 143.W th ‘C rculat on and reproduct on'

Marx ntended total soc al reproduct on n the sense of Part III of Cap tal Volume 2; n

fact, n the f rst draft of that book (Manuscr pt I of 1864—5),e would t tle the respect ve

part n th s way (Marx 1988b,p. 301).




espec ally the dea of cap tal pos t ng ts presuppos t ons, w th the cap tal—

prof t relat onsh p as ts culm nat on. In order to keep th s more cruc al

moment, wh ch s const tut ve of cap tal's nature, Marxchanged the pos t on

of accumulat on (of a s ngle and many cap tals), putt ng t before prof t. 80, to

keep a cons stent concept of un versal ty (or cap tal n general), he needed to

make a few changes to h s or g nal dea. Th s made the concept of cap tal n

general more cons stent.

At the end of 1862,Marx recons dered h s plans. There were a few novelt es:

1) ehad real sed that accumulat on(s) and manycap talsneeded to be ant c

pated, at least for a f rst analys s;2) for the f rst t me, he had substant ally dealt

w th top cs that were beyond un versal ty (compet t on, rent). We have some

portant remarks by h m n a famous letter to Kugelmann and n two new

outl nes he wrote more or less n the same per od.

In the letter to Kugelmann of 28 December 1862he states:

The second part?”has now at last been f n shed, .e. save for the fa r copy

and the f nal pol sh ng before t goes to press. There w ll be about 30

sheets of pr nt. It s a sequel to Part 1,1'abut w ll appear on ts own under

the t tle Cap tal,w th AContr but on to the Cr t que of Pol t calEconomy

as merely the subt tle. In fact, all t compr ses s what was to make the

th rd chapter of the f rst part, namely ‘Cap tal n General’. ence t

cludes ne ther the compet t on between cap talsnor the cred t system.

What Engl shmen call ‘ThePr nc ples of Pol t calEconomy’ s conta ned

th s volume. It s the qu ntessence (together w th the f rst part), and

the development of the sequel (w th the except on, perhaps, of the rela

t onsh p between the var ous forms of state and the var ous econom c

structures of soc ety) could eas lybe pursued by others on the bas s thus

prov ded.32

If we take ser ously the content of th s letter, Marx wr tes very nterest ng

th ngs: 1)he does not abandon cap tal n general; on the contrary, he cla ms he

wants to deal onlyw th that. Toconf rm th s, he further says that all the top cs

that come after cap tal n general (always the same: compet t on, cred t-sys

tem) w ll not be cons dered. 2) Marx w ll not use th s ‘t tle’(cap tal n general)

and announces the new one, Cap tal, w th A Contr but on to the Cr t que of

Pol t calEconomyas subt tle.

Th s s cons stent w th what I argued before.Wehave a new outl ne of cap

tal n general, wh ch ncludes accumulat on and a f rst analys s of many cap

tals. Compet t on s st ll excluded, because these many cap tals do not ‘freely’

31 The f rst part sA Contr but on.

32 Marx and Engels 1990, pp. 639—41,Marx 1985c [1862], p. 435.



152 FINESC I

teract; the r nteract on s cons dered only to establ sh what mutual propor

t ons among them are necessary n order to have total soc al reproduct on.

There s no analys sof the rfree nteract on n the market, where each of them

l ghts for self-valor sat onand the defeat of the other cap tals. In compet t on,

they act as ‘part cular’,because they each str ve n the r nd v dual ex stence to

accompl sh the r ‘un versal’goal: self-valor sat on (and they do not do th s n

total soc al reproduct on). In the cred t-system we have, moreover, part cular

cap tals that act as un versal (bank as un versal cap tal confront ng many par

t cular perform ng cap tals).

Achange of one feature of the or g nal def n t on of cap tal n general does

not change ts more general dent ty (pos t ng ts presuppos t ons), nor does t

change the further art culat on n un versal/part cular/s ngular.33 Why then

d d Marx not use th s concept any more? Cap tal n general was or g nally the

f rst part of three; now, s nce Marx s say ng that he w ll not deal w th part two

(compet t on) and three (cred t-system), t would not have made sense to use

‘1’ n the new project, f ‘2’and ‘3’were not go ng to follow. ‘1’ tself was sup

posed to become the whole book; t deserved a new t tle of ts own.34

If we look at the two new plans (sect ons 3 and 1;2 s not cons dered yet)

wr tten by Marx n e ther November or December 1862to outl ne the new

project,35we can f nd a conf rmat on of what he later wrote to Kugelmann: he

tended to deal only w th cap tal n general:35

33 For a more art culated analys s of the structure of part cular ty and s ngular ty See

F nesch 2001and 2013.

34 It s not true, however,that Marxmore n general gaveup these categor es. The structure

s ngular - part cular —un versal occurs n the theory of equ valent n the value-form

(from 1867 to 1883).Money as general equ valent can also be translated as un versal

equ valent (see footnote 2). It s also the un versal/general commod ty n front of the

many s ngular commod t es that thus become ts part cular forms of real sat on. Th s s

ev dence that Marx d d not g veup th s conceptual framework.

35 These plans are n notebook XVIII(all n all there are 23).Th s notebook was put together

w th notebook XVIIas one. At f rst, notebook XVIIhad a d fferent t tle: 'Second last

notebook’ (‘second' because there was a f rst “Lastnotebook’ that became later notebook

XVI).Accord ng to Marx's annotat on, the ‘Second last notebook’ (later notebook XVII)

was wr tten n January ’62’.Success vely, n October—November’62,as Marx h mself wrote

on t, parts related to Sect on 3 were added to t, f ll ng the space n notebook XVIIleft

empty nJanuary. S nce t was not enough, a new notebook (XVIII)was added and bound

w th XVII.In th s new part we have the two plans, wh ch were probably wr tten n e ther

November or December 1862.The MEGAapparatus sm staken on th s (Marx 1987d[1372]»

p. 2398). Th s wrong conclus on was corrected n the apparatus of a subsequent MEGA

volume: Marx 1992,p. 15‘.The letter to Kugelmann comes d rectly after these outl nes.

36 Marx 1978—82,pp. 1861—2,Marx 1991 [1861—3],pp. 346—7.




[I] The f rst sect on ‘Product on Process of Cap tal' to be d v ded n the

follow ng way: 1) Introduct on. Commod ty. Money. 2) Transformat on

of money nto cap tal. 3) Absolute surplus value. (a) Labour process

and valor sat on process. (b) Constant cap tal and var able cap tal.

(c) Absolute surplus value. (d) Struggle for the normal work ng day.

(e) S multaneous work ng days (number of s multaneously employed

labourers). Amount of surplus value and rate of surplus value (magn

tude and he ght?). 4) Relat ve surplus value. (a) S mple cooperat on.

(b) D v s on of labour. (c) Mach nery, etc. 5) Comb nat on of absolute

and relat ve surplus value. Relat on (proport on) between wage labour

and surplus value. Formaland real subsumpt on of labour under cap tal.

Product v ty of cap tal. Product ve and unproduct ve labour. 6) Recon

vers on of surplus value nto cap tal. Pr m t ve accumulat on. Wakef eld’s

theory of colon sat on. 7) Result of the product on process. E ther sub

6) or sub 7) the C ANGE n the form of the Lawof Appropr at on can

be shown. 8) Theor es of surplus value. 9) Theor es of product ve and

unproduct ve labour.

[J] ‘The th rd sect on ‘Cap tal and Prof t’ to be d v ded n the follow ng

way: 1) Convers on of surplus value nto prof t. Rate of prof t as d st n

gu shed from rate of surplus value. 2) Convers on of prof t nto average

prof t. Format on of the general rate of prof t. Transformat on of values

to pr ces of product on. 3) Adam Sm th’s and R cardo’s theor es on

prof t and pr ces of product on. 4) Rent. (Illustrat on of the d fference

between value and pr ce of product on.) 5) story of the so-called

R card an law of rent. 6) Lawof the fall of the rate of prof t. Adam Sm th,

R cardo, Carey. 7) Theor es of prof t. Query: whether S smond and

Malthus should also be ncluded n the Theor es of Surplus Value.

8)D v s on of prof t nto ndustr al prof t and nterest. Mercant le cap tal.

Money cap tal. 9) Revenue AND ITSSOURCES.The quest on of the rela

t on between the processes of product on and d str but on also to be

ncluded here. 10)REFLUXmovements of money n the process of cap

tal st product on as a whole. 11)Vulgar economy. 12)Conclus on. “Cap tal

and wage labour’.

In my op n on, these conf rm what I have been argu ng. As for Sect on 1,both

the ndex and the fact that, n january 1863,Marxjust cont nued what he had

worked out n the f rst f venotebooks started n 1861,follow ngthe same model,

W ththe only except on that accumulat on (reconvers onof surplus-value nto

Cap tal) s now expl c tly ment oned.



154 FINESC I

More controvers al s the ndex for Sect on 3. 1showed how Marx took up

what he had worked out at the beg nn ng of 1862(‘Lastnotebook 2’,now called

notebookXVII,wr tten beforehe stud ed compet t on and rent n more depth).

These parts were now (October—November1862)complemented by new texts

on commerc al cap tal and reflux of money (last part of notebooks XVIIand

XVIII).So far, there s no real change of structure. owever, our cruc al ques

t on s th s: are those parts that were supposed to come after cap tal n general,

wh ch Marx more systemat cally dealt w th n the 1861—3Manuscr pt (compe

t t on and rent), organ cally nserted nto the theoret cal development of ts

theory, or not? I do not th nk so.

There s no compet t on n th s outl ne. Po nt 2 from] —‘Convers on of prof t

to average prof t. Format on of the general rate of prof t. Transformat on of

values nto pr ces of product on’,wh ch corresponds to the respect ve sect on

the 1864—5Manuscr pt (chapter 9 n Engels’sVolume 3), does not ment on

compet t on. The part on th s top c from notebook XVI(December 1861)had

been wr tten before the analys s of the two d mens ons of compet t on that

paralleled Marx’s cr t c sm of Sm th’s and R cardo’s theor es of product on

pr ce. There, he sa d, ‘Therelat on of compet t on, n so far as we have cons d

ered t here as an llustrat on (not as belong ng to the development tself),

enta ls that the surplus value the nd v dual cap tal st makes s not really the

dec s ve factor.’37Marx uses the techn cal term ‘ llustrat on', that s:not belong

g to ‘development' tself; th s word w ll be later used aga n for rent. A few

pages later he wrote:

One can only speak of an average rate of prof twhen the rates of prof t n

the d fferent branches of product on of cap tal are d fferent, not when

they are the same. A closer nvest gat on of th s po nt belongs to the

chapter on compet t on. Nevertheless, the dec s ve general cons der

at ons must be adduced here. F rstly, t l es n the nature of a common or

general rate of prof t that t represents the average prof t; the average of

veryd verse rates of prof t.”

What s ‘def n telygeneral' s not compet t on, but the fact that a ‘general’rate

of prof t s an averageof many d fferent rates of prof t. owever,noth ng s sa d

about how th s average s produced, nor whether or not th s w ll be part of the

systemat c development of the theory of cap tal. ere the result of compet

t on sjust stated, because weare abstract ng fromthe real movement ofmany

37 Marx 1978-82, p. 1605,Marx 1991[1861-3], p. 75.

38 Marx 1978—82,p. 1623,Marx 1994 [1861—4],p. 94.




cap tals;wejust assume the r average result bymak ngan algebra c sum of the

d v dual rates of prof t and d v d ng them by the number of g ven cap tals;

th smere calculat on s not part of compet t on;cap tals do not compete n any

way (and th s s also why we do not have market-values here)?9 If Marx says

‘theanalys s of th s s part of the chapter on compet t on’, t s mpl ed that th s

not the chapter on compet t on. Moreover, there s no reference here to

future paragraph 3 of the 1864—5Manuscr pts (chapter 10 n Engels’sed t on),

where compet t on w llbe expl c tlyanalysed (at a h gh levelof abstract on)“

West ll have noth ng at all on cred t and share-cap tal (hct t ous cap tal).41

Asfor rent-theory, t s n the plan but, aga n,just as ‘ llustrat on’;exactly the

same term s used n a letter to Engels (2August 1862):‘Inow propose after all

to nclude n th s volume an extra chapter on the theory of rent, .e.,bywayof

“ llustrat on” to an earl er thes s of m ne’.“2

To summar se: 1)The ‘new’ top cs of the 1861-3Manuscr pts are not really

new; compet t on and rent had always been n Marx’splans. They are new n

the sense that Marx dealt w th them more systemat cally n the 1861—3

Manuscr pts. 2) If compared w th the prev ous plans, however, the r pos t on

d d not change after th s deeper analys s; t was accumulat on (of a s nglecap

tal and many cap tals) that changed ts pos t on. 3)After th s change, the con

cept ofcap tal n general (the process ofpos t ngcap tal’sownpresuppos t ons)

was not dropped; on the contrary, that concept became more cons stent.

4) Marx’sf nal dec s on was to reduce the ent re expos t on to cap tal n gen

eral only (d fferently named) and to nsert the novelt es as just ‘ llustrat ons’

39 What s theoret cally dec s ve for an outl ne of the theory of compet t on s not a gener c

reference to t, but the ‘development’ [Enlw cklung] of the category ‘market-value’as a

necessary moment for a cons stent passage to product on-pr ce. In the central part of the

1861—3Manuscr pt (Theor esof Surplus Value),Marx dealt for the f rst t me w th th s ssue

(Marx 1978-82, p. 854, Marx 1989b [1861—3],. 430); t was taken up n s m lar terms and

further analysed n the 1863—5Manuscr pt, second sect on, th rd paragraph (chapter 10 n

Engels’s ed t on) (Marx 1992, p. 2303', Marx 1998 [1894], p. 171ff).Th s part s beyond

un versal ty, because t s necessary to real se, to sell the produced commod t es on the

market n order to establ sh the levelsofmarket-pr ces.Th s mpl esnot an abstract result

of compet t on (as mpl ed n paragraph two, chapter 9 n Engels’sed t on), but actual

compet t on, w th n one branch and among branches.

40 There s another outl ne n the 1861—3Manuscr pt of what later became Part IIof Volume3,

where compet t on s ment oned (Marx 1978-82, pp. 1816—17,Marx 1991[1861—3],p. 299).

owever, t s not clear what Marx meant here, espec ally because there s no ment on

of the dec s ve category, market-value. t s not poss ble to understand f here t s an

‘ llustrat on’or not.

41 I am not go ng to cons der here the role of nterest. About th s top c see F nesch 2013.

42 Marx and Engels 1990,p. 271,Marx 1985a [1862],p. 394.



156 FINESC I

(because he probably understood he d d not have the t me and energy to get

through such a b g and compl cated subject).

In January 1863,Marx began to wr te Sect on 1 [I], or better cont nued what

he had wr tten n 1861.After the expos t on of the accumulat on of a s ngle

cap tal, he started to analyse total soc al reproduct on, or the accumulat on of

cap tals,wh ch swhat he called n th s per od ‘c rculat on and reproduct on’,a

theme that was fam l ar to h m also through Quesnay’sTableau économ que.If

Marxhad understood that both accumulat ons should be placed beforeprof t,

t was not yet clear what the prec se pos t on of the second (total soc al repro

duct on) should be, also because he had not yet prec sely outl ned the struc

ture of Sect on 2. It was then better to start over n a more systemat c wayw th

a th rd huge manuscr pt: 1863—5.

1863—5

In the 1863—5Manuscr pt, for the f rst t me Marx wrote Cap tal accord ng to

the ‘f nal’three-volume plan.43 e started w th Volume 1and then passed to the

th rd, sk pp ng aga n Volume 2. After wr t ng sect on one of Volume 3, he went

back and wrote for the f rst t me Volume 2;and then he f n shed Volume3.

Wehave only a fewpages that have surv ved fromVolume 1(the ma n part s

the famous s xth chapter on ‘Resultsof the Immed ate Process of Product on’).

It s,however,certa n that th s text later became the bas s for later manuscr pts;

would be started over n 1865and further mod f ed before the publ cat on of

the f rst German ed t on n 1867.In that f rst draft,Marxprobably d d not mean

towr te a new account of the commod ty and money and commod ty-c rcula

t on, but to cont nue on the bas s ofA Contr but on.At a certa n po nt he also

dec ded not to nclude Chapter 6 and also to wr te the h story of the theory n

a separate book. These mod f cat ons do not alter the structure descr bed

above, so Iw ll not deal w th th s here and w ll nstead move to Volume 2.

The f rst po nt to stress s that cap tal-c rculat on has always been placed

w th n the framework of un versal ty.What has changed s not th s, but the

necess ty to nclude the analys s of total soc al reproduct on (the second step

of accumulat on-theory) w th n th s framework.Marxdrew th s conclus on n

the 1861—3Manuscr pt; we have seen how, at the end of that manuscr pt, he

43 I am talk ng about the three ‘trad t onal' volumes;at th s po nt a separate fourth one on

the h story of the theorywas not foreseen.Marxtalked expl c tlyabout these three books

only later n a letter to Kugelmann;here, next to those three books there was a fourth on

the h story of the theory; these four books were to be publ shed n three volumes (Marx

and Engels 1974,pp. 533—4,Marx 1987c [1866], p. 328). I shall come back to th s later.



0N EGEL’S MET ODOLOGICAL LEGACY IN MARX 157

tr ed to develop a f rst formulat on of total soc al reproduct on, r ght after the

accumulat on of a s ngle cap tal. At that moment, Marx d d not have a new

plan for Sect on 2 (what w ll later be Volume 2).When n the f rst half of 1865

he wrote for the f rst t me Volume 2, he l sted three chapters: 1) C rculat on

process, 2) Turnover, and 3) w thout a prec se t tle. Only when he actually

wrote that chapter d d he prov de a t tle: ‘C rculat onand Reproduct on’;44the

same as the terms used n the 1861—3Manuscr pt to des gnate total soc al

reproduct on. Th s s the f nal outl ne of Volume2.Marxw ll never f n sh th s

text; although we have e ght manuscr pts and a fewdrafts, the book rema ned

a rough draft. In sp te of th s rough status, what was never changed was the

structure of the three chapters, wh ch can be cons dered def n t ve.Thanks to

th s complex system of presuppos t ons, t was f nally poss ble adequately to

pos t cap tal and reach the cap tal/prof t relat onsh p, the f nal step of un ver

sal ty (or cap tal n general).

The b ggest ssue concerns Volume 3 and cap tal n general. Marx’ssolut on

at the end of 1862was to keep that concept and nsert the add t onal new top

s only as llustrat ons. Th s d d not nclude cred t and f ct t ous cap tal and

probably not the second part of the tendency of the rate of prof t to fall.If we

now compare the outl ne of Volume 3 n the 1863—5Manuscr pt and the plan

of 1862 (J), t s ev dent that they are d fferent;45here s a l st of the ma n

var at ons:

1) A chapter on compet t on (paragraph 3, chapter 10 n Engels's ed t on);

Marx states here that the transformat on s the result of the double pro

cess of compet t on. In] we have only the t tle of what would be para

graph 2 (chapter 9 n Engels’sed t on).

2) The tendency of the rate of prof t to fall s more elaborated than n the

1861—3Manuscr pt; the second part espec ally s more developed, where

Marx sketches a theory of econom c cycles.46

3) There s, for the f rst t me, a f nal complex chapter ded cated to cred t and

f ct t ous cap tal. For the readers of the trad t onal ed t on prov ded by

Engels n 1894, t s not poss ble to see that ‘cred t and f ct t ous cap tal’

(the developed form of share-cap tal) s the f nalpart of the book on cap

tal; and also that nterest s the necessary d alect cal passage to that part

44 Compare Marx 1988b,pp. 139and 3013'.

45 Desp te the many changes, the general outl ne s s m lar to the one you can f nd n Engels's

ed t on, except for the part on cred t and f ct t ous cap tal, wh ch was completelyaltered.

45 On th s see F nesch 2001and Reuten 2004.



158 FINESC I

as a whole." The f rst four chapters of Engels’sed t on (Part V,chapters

XXI—XXIV),orrespond to the manuscr pt (chapters 1—4).In the manu

scr pt there s, however, a f nal chapter 5 w th one s ngle t tle: cred t and

f ct t ous cap tal (aga n: the same f nal step s nce 1857—8).Engels trans

formed the general t tle nto the t tle of just one chapter (XXV)next to

many other chapters, most of wh ch were noth ng but Engels’sed tor al

creat ons; he put together quotat ons Marx had collected n h s manu

scr pt, fonn ng chapters that d d not ex st n Marx’smanuscr pt (XXVI,

XXXIlI—XXXV).Marx’s po nt 5 was l ke th s:

[K] 5.Cred t and f ct t ous cap tal.

Addenda

Roleof Cred t n the cap tal st c product on

I.

11.

Ill.

Confus on

III. Cont nuat on from page 561

Confus on. Cont nuat on from page 583.“8

4) After cred t and f ct t ous cap tal, there s a sect on for rent, a sort of book

w th n the book. It s no longer an ‘ llustrat on’as t was n J.

5) There s a f nal sect on on revenues and the r sources. Th s was already n

J ( n the 1861—3Manuscr pt we also have a f rst expos t on of th s sect on),

but there rent was excluded. Now t s ncluded.

These top cs, wh ch ev dently go beyond the l m ts of un versal ty, are no lon

ger just ‘ llustrat ons’(some of them were not even ment oned before at all),

but are now structural parts of the theory.Why were they put n? Are they

necessary for a cons stent theory of cap tal? What s the status of cap tal n

general now?

Beforewe deal w th these quest ons, we need to look at how Marxwas plan

n ng to structure the concept of cap tal now that the ma n focus had changed

The new three-volume plan was l ke th s: Volume 1was supposed to conta n

both Book 1 (product on-process) and 2 (c rculat on-process); Volume 2 was

supposed to conta n Book3 [Gesamtgestaltungen]; Volume 3was supposed to

47 Th s mpl ed some changes n the concept of nterest from the or g nal plan; see F nesch

2005.

48 Marx 1992, p. 7‘.




conta n Book 4 (h story of the theory, never wr tten)“9 Even f the old general

log cwas not changed, now the focus s no longeron the three levelsof abstrac

t on (U —P —S, cap tal n general, compet t on, cred t and f ct t ous cap tal),

but on essence and man festat on.50 Volume 1 should nclude what comes

before prof t (Book 1on product on + Book 2 on c rculat on, that s, essence),

whereas Volume2 should treat the forms ofman festat on (Book3)after prof t.

The t tle of sect on 3 of 1862(J) s cap tal and prof t, the same as sect on 1of

Volume 3. The quest on s: n order to analyse even at the h ghest level of

abstract on the forms of man festat on of cap tal, s t poss ble not to nclude

compet t on, cred t and f ct t ous cap tal, and rent as organ c parts of the the

ory?The answer s no.Th s swhyMarx,wh lewr t ng the manuscr pt, changed

h s m nd once more and went back to the old plan (U—P—S), but w th n the

new framework essence/man festat on. Not those ent re books, but the r

abstract essent al l nes needed to be ncluded. Th swas the onlywayhe could

be able to speak sc ent f cally, at the end, of the three classes of soc ety presup—

posed by R cardo n the ntroduct on to h s book:51cap tal sts, wage-workers

and rent ers.52

The abstract average prof t cannot be a man festat on f s not pos ted by

phenomenal agents (many cap tals free to nteract) n compet t on; th s cannot

be mere llustrat on, but needs to develop categor es; nterest tself as the ‘nat

ural’ fru t of the ‘th ng’cap tal cannot be conce ved, f the dea of an average

ga n of cap tal (average prof t) has not become common sense among act ng

cap tal sts. Also cr ses and cycleshave to be sketched; moreover, how can cap

tal st c phenomenal l fe be descr bed w thout cred t and share-(f ct t ous)

cap tal? What s the relat onsh p between real accumulat on and f ct t ous

accumulat on? Summar s ng: to draw an outl ne, even at a very abstract level,

49 Marx and Engels 1974,pp. 533—4,Marx 1987c [1866], p. 328: [L] ‘The whole work s thus

d v ded nto the follow ngparts: BookI.The Process of Product on of Cap tal. BookII.The

Process of C rculat on of Cap tal. Book III. Structure of the Process as a Whole. Book IV.

On the story of the Theory.The f rst volume w ll nclude the f rst 2 books. The 3rd book

w ll, I bel eve, f ll the second volume, the 4th the 3rd.’

50 I would l ke to po nt out that ‘man festat on’, or ‘phenomenon’ [Ersahe nung], does not

mean non-essent al or just secondary [Sche n].There s here another aspect of egel’s

her tage: phenomenon s the necessary form of man festat on of essence, and so

co-essent al; essence does not appear as such, but n d fferent forms. Phenomenon s the

way essence cons stently man fests tself at the surface. Sche n s, on the contrary, the

bel ef that man festat ons, as they appear, are not ‘essent al’,but essence tself.

51 Compare R cardo 1821,Preface.

52 Th s d d not happen n the 1861—3Manuscr pt Not by acc dent n J’s conclus on only

cap tal and wage-labour are ment oned. S ncerent was onlyan ‘ llustrat on’,he could not

deal w th the ‘three' classes.



160 FINESC I

of how cap tal st c phenomenal dynam cs work, more than un versal ty s

requ red. It was then theoret cally necessary to return to lower levels of

abstract on.

What sworth emphas s ng sthat an analys sof these top cs (lower levelsof

abstract on) after cap tal and prof t s not a new plan. It s s mply F (except for

accumulat on and total soc alreproduct on). Also nclud ng rent after cap tal

not new; t s D.Wehave, then, the return of U—P - Sw th n the framework

of man festat on. Desp te th s return, the structure essence/man festat on

rema ned the bas c framework of th s f nal expos t on; th s s why the old cat

egor eswere not ment oned any more: they d d not represent the pr nc pal

outl ne.

Problems

Marx’s1864—5Manuscr pt forVolume 3 rema ned unf n shed. e more pers s

tently tr ed to f n shVolume 2,53wh le forVolume 3we have only a few mater

als —no general recons derat on, just spec al manuscr pts for spec f c top cs.54

Th smanuscr pt s then, on the one hand, the only substant al reference po nt

for th s part of the theory (Volume3) and, on the other hand, a draft, w th

manyunaccompl shed parts, n part cular the ones I'vebeen referr ng to so far.

In the end, t turned out to be a m x of two plans and th s caused a few prob—

lems; a book on cap tal n general was tw sted to nclude —not as llustrat ons

but organ cally - top cs fromlower levels of abstract on. Even f they followed

Marx'sold deas, n a fewcaseshe was not able to show the med at on between

d fferent parts; therefore, expos t ons of connected top cs at d fferent levelsof

abstract on lay next to one another w thout suff c entmed at on. I th nk that

at least two ofthe mostcontrovers alpo nts scholarshavebeen debat ng about

for more than a century der ve from these ncons stenc es.

53 Almost all the manuscr pts for Volume 2 and Engels's ed tor al mater als have been

publ shed n the second sect on of M3642: see 11/4.1,11/11,11/12.A volume w th the few

rema n ng mater als (ll/4.3) has recently appeared. In 11/13,Engels’sed t on of 1885has

been republ shed. On th s see Becker 2009.

54

Almost all the Marx an manuscr pts for Volume 3 and Engels's ed tor al mater als have

been publ shed n the second sect on of MBGAZ:ee 11/4.2and 11/14.A volume w th the

few rema n ng mater als (II/4.3) appeared n 2012, complet ng th s sect on. In 11/15»

Engels'sed t on of 1894has been republ shed On th s see Roth2009.



0N EGEL’S MET ODOLOGICAL LEGACY IN MARX 161

1)The transformat on-problem. We have paragraph two (chapter 9 n Engels’s

ed t on) at the level of abstract on of cap tal n general. In fact, compet t on

plays no role for the calculat on of the average prof t, we havejust an algebra c

sum and d v s on. Compet t on s here just a label and, s gn f cantly,the term

barely occurs (two t mes, referr ng to the equal sat on-process, wh ch s actu

ally the subject of the next paragraph). The real sat on of products plays no

role and there s no market-value. Values and pr ces d verge. Paragraph three

(chapter 10 n Engels’sed t on) s on the contrary an analys s of how the two

compet t ons (w th n one branch and among branches) produce market

values and then product on-pr ces thanks to a long-run trend to equal sat on,

where commod ty-real sat on s essent al. ere there sno d vergencebetween

market-values and pr ces, because product on-pr ces are noth ng but an aver

age to wh ch market-pr ces tend n the long run (they never cease to real se

approx mately the r market-values).

We have then, next to each other, two paragraphs that belong to d fferent

levelsof abstract on and no med at on.

2) The second case regards the tendency of the rate of prof t to fall. In the

f rst part we have th s tendency expla ned on the bas s of the ncrease of the

organ c compos t on of cap tal.Wedon’t need any real sat on of commod t es

to understand that, because we know from the f rst volume that there s an

tr ns c trend n cap tal gradually to nvest more n constant cap tal. Th s s a

process that can be stud ed n ts pure form, sett ng compet t on apart. In the

second part, we can f nd a sketched theory of econom c cycles,where concepts

emerge for wh ch compet t on s cruc al, such as cr s s,overproduct on, and so

on. ere the fall of the rate of prof t s due to the mposs b l ty of sell ngcom

mod t es produced.

The two parts are at d fferent levels, but, aga n, no real med at on s

g ven.55

As for the general outl ne, further quest ons concern the f nal sect on on

cred t and f ct t ous cap tal. As I sa d, Engels'sed t on deeply m sled the nter

pretat on of th s part, s nce he transformed the general t tle of the f nalsect on

of cap tal-theory nto the t tle ofjust one chapter next to many others,most of

wh ch were noth ng but Engels’screat on. In sp te of the unf n shed status of

55 Th s swhy also n the 1857—8Manuscr pt (whose cons stent expos t on do not go beyond

the boundar es of cap tal n general), Marxhad treated both averageprof t n the waywe

f nd t n chapter 9 of Engels’sed t on, and the tendency of the rate ofprof t to fallbecause

of the growth of the constant part (Marx 1976—81,p. 346—7and 625,Marx 1986 [1857-8],

pp. 263-4 and Marx 1987a [1857—8],pp. 136—7).They do not requ re compet t on and so

can be ncluded n the ‘general’cons derat on on cap tal and prof t



162 FINESC I

th s part, t sclearwhat Marxwanted to dealw th n most of the text (chapters

28—32n Engels’sed t on): the relat onsh p between real and f ct t ous accu

mulat on, and a sketch of a theory of the econom c cyclewh ch could take nto

account both accumulat ons (real and f ct t ous) and the r mutual feedback.

Th s swhat he once called s ngular ty; t svery mportant to po nt out that n

th s manuscr pt (1864-5)Marxwrotefor thef rst t me the f nal part of h s the

ory of cap tal accord ng to the plans wr tten n 1857—8.

F nally,the pos t on of rent after cap tal s not new at all. It corresponds

aga n to the plans of 1857-8.The d fference s that rent s analysed only for

what relates to the general theory of surplus-value, n part cular for ts connec

t on w th the averageprof t.As for the other books on compet t on, cred t and

f ct t ous cap tal, what was added n the end was not the r ent re expos t on,

but only the r more abstract aspects, nasmuch as they were connected w th

the general theory of cap tal; th s s what he needed to outl ne cap tal’s phe

nomenal dynam cs at the h ghest levelof abstract on.

Conclus on

Wehave seen, f rst, how Marx started w th a gener c ‘d alect cal' outl ne of the

concept of cap tal (U—P—S).Secondly, because of the ntr ns c cons stency of

the concept of un versal ty,he made some changes that resulted n a d alect

callymore cons stent framework of t.Th rdly,at a certa n po nt Marx seemed

to g veup not the oldproject, but the dea he could ent rely real se t:hewanted

to treat only cap tal n general, art culated on two levels: essence and man fes—

tat on. owever,th s new model turned out not to be cons stent w thout the

ntroduct on of at least the most abstract elements of more concrete levelsof

abstract on: compet t on, cred t and f ct t ous cap tal, and rent. Therefore, the

old project re-emerged n the new one.

What s egel an about th s? F rst the dea that an ntr ns c necess ty l es

s de th ngs; f a sc ent st wants to make sense of them, he or she has to let

the r nternal log c develop: the Auslegung der Sache selbst. Marx, l ke many

others of h s generat on, thought that, accord ng to egel,th s was the way the

Idea created the mater al world; th s was h s ‘ deal sm’;accord ng to Marx, t

was nstead just the waythe sc ent f c lawswere reproduced n thought. Today

weknow that Marx’scr t c sm suntenable and that th s translat on of real nto

thought smuch closer to egel’satt tude than he could mag ne.

On the other s de, we have a cons stent presence of the tr ad U—P—S. It s

not an appl cat on of these categor es to pol t cal economy; the concept of

cap tal tself demonstrated ts ntr ns c d alect cal nature and showed n ts




self-expos t on that t has a structure that corresponded to those categor es.

These are: the process of pos t ng ts presuppos t ons (un versal ty); the free

teract on ofmany part cular cap tals that nd v duallytry to real sethe r un

versal law,self-valor sat on (part cular ty); part cular cap tals that n the r s n

gular ex stence ncarnate the un versal nature of cap tal (pure self-valor sat on,

the bank as mater al agent of nterest-bear ng cap tal); they stay as ex st ng

un versals n front of all other d fferent part cular types of cap tals, wh ch bor

rowmoney-cap tal for the r undertak ngs (s ngular ty).



C APTER 7

Lost n Translat on? Once Aga n on the Marx— egel

Connect on

R ccardo Bellof ore

Introduct on

Th s chapter w ll deal n steps w th the Marx— egelconnect on n Cap tal.

The f rst step (sect on 1)w ll be to survey the most relevant pos t ons n shap

g the wr ter’s own v ews.The second step, n two sect ons, w ll be to rev ew

Marx’scr t c sms of egel (sect on 2) and then to cons der the debate w th n

the lntemat onal Sympos umonMarx anTheory (ISMT)(sect on 3).The th rd

step w ll be to argue that t s exactly egel’s deal sm wh ch made the Stuttgart

ph losopher cruc al for the understand ng of the cap tal relat on. Th s th rd

step s d v ded nto three sect ons. In t ally (sect on 4) I shall cons der Collett ’s

read ng of Marx-cum- egel, and also some converg ng cons derat ons by

Backhaus n h s perspect ve on the d alect c of the form of value. 1shall then

present myown nterpretat on, show nghow the movement from commod ty

to money, and then to cap tal, must be understood as follow ng a dual path.

The f rst path (sect on 5) reconstructs the ‘c rcular ty’of Cap tal as Subject, as

an automat cfet sh: t shere that egel’s deal st cmethod of ‘pos t ng the pre

suppos t on’ served Marxwell.The second path (sect on 6) leads us to d g nto

the ‘const tut on’of the cap tal-relat on, and therefore nto the ‘l near’explo ta

t on of workers and class-struggle n product on. ere we meet Marx’s rad cal

break from egel,and understand the mater al st foundat on of the cr t que of

pol t cal economy.

1 Three Waysof Look ngat D alect cs

In recent decades the relat onsh p between Marx and egel has been at the

centre ofattent on. Letus start fromthe mean ng ofthe term ‘cr t que’ nMarx’s

cr t que of pol t cal economy.AlfredSchm dt remarked that forMarx there are

no soc alfacts n themselveswh ch can be apprehended through trad t onal

d sc pl ne-boundar es. The real ‘object of knowledge’ s the soc al phenom

enon as a whole,hence cap tal as total ty. But th s latter must be understood

© KONlNKLIJKEBRILLNV, LEIDBN, 2014 DO! 10.1163/9789004270022_009



LOST IN TRANSLATION: T E MARX- EGEL CONNECTION 165

not as f the emp r cally g ven cond t ons of product on are the mmed ate

object of knowledge. Theory and ts ‘object ve’content are related, but they

are not one and the same. The method of nqu ry,Schm dt expla ns, dealsw th

mater al from h story, econom cs, soc ology,stat st cs, and so on, and through

the ‘ solat ng’ and ‘analys ng‘of understand ng. The method ofpresentat on,

n contrast, has to br ng concrete un ty to these solated data. ‘Presentat on’

[Darstellung] proceeds from mmed ate ‘be ng’to med at ng ‘essence’,wh ch s

the ground of be ng. Essent al real ty must ‘appear’ [ersche nen],but th s con

crete nstant at on of essence s d st ngu shed from ts man festat on.l

If Schm dt stresses the ep stemolog cal m le of d alect cs by show ng the

nner connect on of objects and concepts, Roberto F nell ns sts that appear

ance, wh le ‘exh b t ng’ [Darstellung] essence, fundamentally d storts t.2The

method of Cap tal s the pos t ng of thepresuppos t ons.3Weencounter here a

second role for d alect cs: that of an act ve ‘d ss mulat on’of the nner essence

by the outer surface. Th s pos t ng of the presuppos t on must be framed n

egel an tenns: cap tal s ndeed an ‘ nv s ble’Subject n a k nd of perenn al

movement n a c rcle.Value valor s ng tself s a ‘closed’total ty, where labour

reduced to labour-power. No element escapes the power of the total s ng

Subject. The log c of d ss mulat on proper to th s all-encompass ng Subject

does not allow us to speak properly of a log cof contrad ct on.

Thus, the f rst perspect ve has stressed the essence/appearance d st nct on,

the second perspect ve the total tar an c rcular tyof cap tal. Between the two,

another role for d alect cs may be d scerned as ‘concret on’(concret sat on):a

movement of ‘systemat c’ expos t on [Darstellung] mov ng from ‘s mple’and

abstract categor es to more ‘complex’and concrete not ons. In th s th rd per

spect ve on d alect cs, every category s redef ned at each stage or layer of the

theoret cal d scourse, so that there are many conceptual ‘transformat ons’.We

meet aga n a ‘c rcle’,s nce the comprehens on of what s more complex and

concrete has to have an effecton the more s mpleand abstract not on. Thepos

s b l ty s, however, open to read th s d alect cal deduct on n a stronger way,a

1 Schm dt 1968.Later n th s chapter I shall quest on some amb gu t es and errors n the Engl sh

translat ons of some of Marx’s bas c categor es. In these f rst sect ons, more devoted to a

personal survey of the l terature, I prefer to ma nta n the term nology used by the authors

I am cons der ng, or adopted by the r translators. 1l m t myself to nsert ng n parentheses

the German for those nouns or verbs wh ch are more relevant for the d scuss on n the later

sect ons of the chapter.

2 F nell 2004.

3 I f rst heard th s formula n Ital an from F nell h mself n the early 19805.F nell ’sread ng

of Marx very much nfluenced me. That method must, however, be complemented and

uprooted by the problemat c of ‘const tut on’.



166 BELLOFIORE

fourth perspect ve, that s,as the progress vemovement of the concepts them

selves—progress vely nstant at ng and appropr at ng soc al real ty. D alect cs

here stands somehow between the quest on of the ‘systemat c’organ sat on

of the presentat on and the quest on of the ‘systemat c'generat on of cap tal

tself as a subject (or rather, as we see, Cap tal as Subject).

2 Marx contra egel

If one takes the l ne that systemat c d alect cs has to do just w th a concep

tual exh b t on of the categor es, egel an method s compat ble w th a k nd

of ‘real st’metaphys cs. If one takes the l ne that systemat c d alect cs has to

do w th cap tal as a self-susta n ng ‘ deal' real ty, the usual read ng of egel as

an deal st seems to pose no problem at all.The ssue s relevant because most

contemporary egel an read ngs of Marx by Marx sts run aga nst Marx’svery

expl c tcr t c sms of egel.Wemeet at least three of them.

The f rst s h s 1843 cr t c sms of egel’s Ph losophy of R ght, where the

attack s on egel dent fy ngbe ng and thought. The emp r cal realm s trans

formed nto amoment ofthe Idea,and reason pretends to transform tself nto

real, part cular and corporeal subjects. The abstract on s made substance —

hypostat sat on: the un versal becomes an ent ty ex st ng n ts own r ght. We

have here at the same t me the reproduct on of a Feuerbach an nvers onof

subjectand pred cate: the un versal concept that should express the pred cate

of some subject s nstead seen as the subject ofwh ch the actual subject s the

pred cate. In the Econom cand Ph losoph cManuscr pts of 1844,Marx argued

that egel, f rst, dent hedobject f cat onand estrangement, so that overcom ng

estrangement meant overcom ng object v ty, and, second, dent j ed object v

y and al enat on, because the pos t ng as object ve cannot escape al enat on

self, wh ch s a necessary phase for self-consc ousness recogn s ng n the

object noth ng but self-al enat on. For the f rst s de, egel grants true real ty

onlyto the Idea, and for the second s de, he sees n the emp r cal real ty noth ng

but a momentary ncarnat on ofthe Idea tself

Asecond cr t c sm s the one ncluded n the Introduct on to the Econom c

Manuscr pts of 1857—58.egel confuses the order of knowledge w th the order

of real ty.The ‘concretum’as substratum s always presupposed, but t s nec

essary to take nto account the double movementbetween the abstract and the

concrete.The mode of nqu ry concerns the trans t on from the concrete of

sens ble mater al ty, appropr ated analyt cally, to the abstract log cal forms,

wh ch have to be sequent ally and synthet cally exh b ted. Marx fullyendorses

egel on the need to ascend from the abstract to the concrete. Knowledge S



LOST IN TRANSLATION: T E MARX- ECEL CONNECTION 167

no mere descr pt on: t s genet c ‘expos t on’[Darstellung], the exh b t on of

the whole and the understand ng of the effectual const tut on of the whole.

The ‘concrete’ s the concentrat on of many determ nat ons, hence un ty of the

d ference: t s a result. But egel s cutt ng out the f rst half of th s ep stemo

log cal c rcle, where the concrete s the po nt of departure n real ty, that s, n

observat on and ‘representat on’ [Vorstellung]. egel s conflat ng the order of

knowledge w th the order of real ty.

The th rd cr t c sm of Marx's s n the Afterword to the 1873second ed

t on of Cap tal Volume I. Marx def nes h s d alect cal method as the oppos te

of egel’s, n that for h m ‘the deal s noth ng else than the mater al world

reflected n the m nd of man, and translated nto forms of thought’.4D alect cs

leads to the ‘pos t veunderstand ng of what ex sts’,but also to a ‘s multaneous

recogn t on of ts negat on, ts nev table destruct on15‘[l]t regards everyh s

tor cally developed soc al form as be ng n a flu d state, n mot on, and there

fore grasps ts trans ent aspect as well; and because t does not let tself be

pressed by anyth ng, be ng n ts very essence cr t cal and revolut onary’.6

Unfortunately, n egel,who presented t for the f rst t me n ts general form

of operat on, d alect cs stands on ts head, and must be turned r ght s de up

aga n, ‘ norder to d scover the rat onal kernel w th n the myst cal shell’.7

3 Some Pos t ons n the ISMTDebate

A consensus among all the ISMTauthors s that Marx s a systemat c d alec

t c an, that s, he proposes the art culat on of categor es to conceptual se an

ex stent concrete whole. For Roberto F nesch , Geert Reuten and Tony Sm th

there sanother po nt of agreement, n that for these three authors Marx’scr t

c sms of egel’s deal sm are m sd rected regard ng the systemat c-d alect cal

method.

For Sm th systemat c d alect cs helps n the reflect ve clar jfcat on of the

categor es used n emp r cal soc al sc ence, and allows us to unve l cap tal st

‘fet sh sm’.8Moreover, d st ngu sh ng between what s ‘necessary’ and what s

‘cont ngent’, t grounds revolut onarypol t cs by po nt ng towards the transfor

mat on of fundamental structures. Marxd d not real se that h s cr t c smsonly

Marx 1976c [1867], p. 102.

Marx 1976c [1867], p. 103.

lb d.

lb d.

Sm th 1990.

D“301A



168 BELLOFIORE

attacked egel’squ te extravagant term nology and ndulgence n p cture

th nk ng.Onthe method there was no substant al d sagreement. Both authors

th nk that a category s a pr nc ple un fy ngd fferent part culars, and that un

versaland nd v dualsare reconc led (un ty of dent ty n d fference). Argument

beg ns from an mmed ate, and nadequate, s mple un ty, an ‘abstract’ un ver

sal ty;therefore th s moment has to g veway to a moment where d erence s

emphas sed,now mak ng un ty mpl c t. The negat on of s mple un ty develops

to the emergence of real d fference. Th s d alect cal pos t ng of d fference s

sublated nto a complex un ty- n-dtference that ncorporates the moment of

d fference,and s thus a negat on of the negat on.

The d alect cal argument moves through the ‘pos t ng’ and ‘overcom ng’of

contrad ct ons—wh ch are noth ng but the tens on between what a category

herently s and what t expl c tly s.The ‘truth’,the result reached n th s way,

can be a category of s mple un ty looked at from a h gher-level perspect ve. It

a new determ nate start ng po nt. The movement goes on w th an nternal,

mmanent, necessary deduct on n the process of concret on. Sm th’s egel

does not deny the ndependence of the real process, nor the presence n real

y of an rreduc ble res due of cont ngency. More than that, the Content for

the movement of categor cal determ nat ons s not self-generated, though

the ‘trans t ons’ are ndeed self-act ng —the mean ng be ng that the concep

tual movement sjust f ed by the object ve content of each category.Absolute

Sp r t, Idea, s def n tely not a metaphys cal Subject.

Cap tal s arch tecton cally structured on a systemat c-d alect cal log c

Sm th’s strategy seems to be to see noth ng but egel n Marx’s 1857—8

lntroduct on, and to locate the po nt of ntersect onw th n Cap tal read as the

Log cof Essence.There are three fundamental ontolog cal (formal) structures

egel’s Sc ence of Log c. Be ng [Se n] s ‘s mple un ty’, aggregat ng solated

and self-conta ned ent t es. Essence [Wesen]—the ‘pr nc ple of un ty' connect

g them together —subsumes these ent t es; t may,however, reduce d fferent

un t es to mereappearances, leav ng the r sk of fragmentat on, and ma nta n

g the separat on between the two poles. Concept [Begr f] s nstead an

ontolog cal structure of ‘un ty- n-d ference’wh ch med ates harmon ously the

d fferent nd v duals and the common un ty.Marx, accord ng to Sm th, bu lds

on the second level of Sc enceof Log c,w thout a one-to-one mapp ng- The

commod ty s abstract labour9 n an al enated form. Fet sh sm permeates the

commod ty —fet sh sm mean ng that soc al ty cannot present tself as what

essent ally s, a relat on w th n soc ety,but rather appears only as a relat on

9 Sm th def nes abstract labour as labour n so far as t has been proven to be soc ally "6683300"

InmyV ew,abstract labour s rather labour wh ch hasyet to be proven soc al.



170 BELLOFIORE

part cular ty, wh ch deals w th one/many cap tals n compet t on. The many

cap tals are now understood as part cular cap tals n the r dynam c of self

valor sat on. Afourth and f nal level s s ngular ty. It deals, among other th ngs,

w th nterest-bear ng cap tal, where the un versal tyof cap tal ex sts as a par

t cular ex st ng cap tal, and t s therefore s ngular. L keReuten and Sm th, he

conf nes Marx’s debt to egel to the methodolog cal level only. L ke Reuten

and Sm th, F nesch f nds untenable Marx’sread ng of egel as deal st.

We f nd someth ng d fferent w th Patr ck Murray and Chr s Arthur. Both

authors see clearly the s gn f cance of the charge of deal sm levelled by Marx

aga nst egel, and egel’sLog c. Murray asserts that ‘ f we exam ne egel’s

character zat on of the ‘concept’.. . and compare t to Marx's descr pt on of

cap tal . . . t seems clear that the absolute, self-real z nglog cof the egel an con

cept resembles the movementof cap tal’.12Marx shared w th egel an approach

based on an mmanent log c of theory, but egel put log c before exper ence.

egel dent f ed processes n thought and real processes, whereas Marx

ns sted on an ndependently ex st ng world. Moreover, egel’s abstract ons

were ‘general’;Marx’swere mostly ‘determ nate’.Evenmore relevant, the oppo

s t on of essence and appearance must not be med ated, as egel ma nta ns,

but uprooted, as Marx r ghtly retorts. Marx’s reason ng s nextr cably l nked

to the tw n dynam cs ofhypostat sat on and nvers on:cap tal as an ‘automat c’

Subject, as an ‘encompass ng’ [ bergre fende] Subject of the whole process, as

a self-mov ngand self-act vat ng substance. Value s a th ng-l ke substance, and

as cap tal t really transmutes nto a Subject.The log cof cap tal (and not only

the log c of Cap tal) s the log c of egel (as the log c of absolute deal sm),

because of the somorph smbetween the ‘cap tal-fet sh’as a total ty and the

‘unfold ng’of the Idea.Weare here beyond a merely methodolog cal read ng of

systemat c d alect cs.13

Arthur ns sts that the debt Marx owes to egel s not just the (ep stemo

log cal) mmanent log cof sc encebu lt upon the ns stence that ‘presentat on’

[Darstellung] must show the log cal necess ty for the dual nature of the com

mod ty to ‘unfold’the evermore complex forms ofcap tal st pol t cal economy.

There s that too, of course: theoryfaces an ex st ng total ty, and analys ng ts

olated moments would lead to a very l m ted and d storted understand ng.

The moments must be located n the whole,w th the systemat c progress on of

12 Murray 1988,pp. 216-17(emphas s added).

13 Already n h sbookMurrayhad advanced some reservat ons concem ng Marx’scr t c sms

of egel, but they were mostly conf ned to footnotes. In footnote 19, p. 239, he wr tes,

‘Whether or not a closer study of egel could defuseMarx’scr t c sms s, I bel eve, st ll an

open quest on'.Murray’sdoubts overMarx’sread ngs of egel have ncreased over t me.



LOST IN TRANSLATION! T E MARX- EGEL CONNECTION 171

categor es allow ng us (as n Sm th) to apprehend object-doma ns of ncreas

g complex ty, the progress on tself be ng dr ven (as n Reuten) by the con

s derat on that any category under cons derat on s def c ent n determ nacy

w th respect to the next. It s exactly th s def c ency to be overcome —he l m ts

of the category —wh ch prov des the mpulse to a trans t on, to a determ na

t on of a further category, n a sequence enr ch ng each category and mov ng

towards the concrete. Th s s pecul arly relevant because, as the reference to

the understand ng of un versal monetary exchange lead ng to value-form(s)

shows very well, the cap tal st system s — n part - made of log cal relat ons.

Cap tal s actually, and up to a po nt, an deal real ty.

But the other half of the story s that egel s relevantfor Marx not n sp te

of but rather because of h s deal st ontology:‘cap tal s a very pecul ar object,

grounded n a process of real abstract on n exchange nmuch the same wayas

egel’sd ssolut on and reconstruct on of real ty s pred cated on the abstrac

t ve power of thought. It s n th s sense that t may be shown that there s

a connect on between egel’s “ nf n te” and Marx’s “cap tal” 114The somor

ph sm between egel’slog c and the actual ty of cap tal s val d, and —Arthur

concludes —the homology w th the Idea s prec sely a reason for cr t c s ng t

as an nverted real tywhere self-mov ngabstract ons have the upper hand over

human be ngs. The po nt to be noted, however, s that for the substance of

value genu nely to become the sp ral of cap tal, as value creat ng more value,

as money augmented w th more money, cap tal must enter the ‘non- deal’

realm of the transformat on ofuse-values,the ‘h ddenabode of product on’,and

subsume (not only formally but also really) ‘labour’as ts l v ng‘ ntemal other’

(nature be ng the ‘externalother’).Cap tal s def ned n terms of ts rresolvable

oppos t on to labour, but t has found ways to atom se and demob l se t. Th s

‘resolut on’of ts bas c nternal contrad ct on, though temporary and cont n

gent (as Reuten would say),character ses awhole epoch, a whole mode of pro

duct on. But cap tal rema ns l m ted and l able to overthrow: labour rema ns

a counter-subject, v rtually present, f emp r cally not effect veexcept n some

part al way.

My approach s very s m lar to Arthur’s. A key nfluence for me has been

Collett , part cularly h s nnovat ve (and Rub n an!) read ng of value-theory n

h s 1968 ntroduct on to Bernste n, the year after collected n FromRousseau

to Marx and the last two chapters of h s 1969Marx sm and egel.“ The last

chapter of the latter, n part cular, ‘The Idea of “Bourgeo s-Chr st an" Soc ety’,

parallels many of Murray’sand Arthur’s arguments. Before go ng deeper nto

14 Arthur 2002, p. 8.

15 Collett 1972 [1969]; Collett 1973 [1969].



172 BELLOFIORE

th s, however, I want to remove from the table what I th nk s a red herr ng:

the ssue of the nature of egel’s‘ deal sm’,and even more so the quest on of

whether Marxwasunfa r n h s cr t c smof the Stuttgart ph losopher. Myop n

on s s m lar to Sucht ng’s n an unpubl shed paper of h s on egel’sSc ence

of Log c as log c of sc ence.16 egel grasped better than anyone before h m,

and better than most after h m, the fundamental features of modern sc en

t f c nqu ry. s method, however, was fundamentally deal st. But I am not a

egel expert; I could be fundamentally wrong here. Th s s mostly rrelevant.

Becausewhat s mportant to the top c at hand s that egel’sSc enceofLog c

was essent al for the mature Marx exactly because ts deal sm accurately

reflectsthe ‘ deal st’and ‘total tar an’ nature of cap tal st ‘c rcular ty’ of cap tal

as money begett ng money. To put t bluntly: even f Marx’s egel s not the

‘real’ egel, t s the ‘fake’ egel that matters. At the same t me, the thes s of

a str ct homology between egel and Marx cannot be stretched too far.More

than be ng grounded n a formal repl cat on of the U—P —8 structure map

p ng a one-to-one correspondence between the three volumes of Cap tal and

Sc enceof Log c,the homology 1am ns st ng upon s bu lt (and d ssolved!) n

the f rst seven chapters ofVolume 1,and relates Cap tal as Subject to Absolute

ldea as Subject.

4 Luc oCollett and ans-Georg Backhaus on Marx-cum- egel

egel's absolute deal sm amounts to God becom ng real n the world, to s

presence n the modern and bourgeo s c v land pol t cal nst tut ons, so that

these h stor cal real t es are n fact ‘myst cal’objects.l7 owever strange t may

seem, th s sprec selythe po nt where Marx’sworkand egel’sco nc deJust as

the nst tut ons of the bourgeo sworld are sensuous ncarnat ons of the supra

sens ble,or n other words pos t veexpos t ons of theAbsolute, so too n Cap tal

the ‘commod ty’ has a ‘myst cal’character —‘ t s a very strange th ng, abound

g n metaphys cal subtlet es and theolog cal n cet es’,to quote Marx d rectly.18

Marx sees n cap tal st real ty a world turned ups de-down. Abstract human

labour s l ke the ‘abstract man’ of Chr st an ty. Value, soc al un ty becom ng

an object, leads to the paradoxof the soc albond asa self-pos t ng relat onsh p

that pos ts tself ndependently of the nd v dualswhom t ought to relate and

med ate between —t sa relat onsh p becom ng a th ngwh ch, pos ted outs de

16 Sucht ng 1997.

17 Collett 1973 [1969].

18 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 163.




d v duals, dom nates them l ke God, though t s the r own estranged soc al

power.

The commod ty s a ‘use-value’,a ‘th ng’,conceal ng n tself a non-mater al

object v ty, ‘value’:‘the commod ty, just l ke the Chr st an, s the un ty of the

f n te and the nf n te, the un ty of oppos tes, be ng and non-be ng together’.19

In fact t s the same Marxwho emphas ses that the commod ty s and s not

a use-value! The ‘d alect c of matter’ s conf rmed as the log c of th s ups de

down world. Beh nd the relat ve exchange-value there s a real ‘absolute’or

tr ns c value, ex st ng n the related th ngs themselves —namely, a hypostat

sat on of ‘value’.

Marx, horr b le d ctu, accepts the argument that value s a metaphys cal

ent ty, and merely conf nes h mself to not ng that t s the th ng, .e. the

commod ty tself or value, that s the scholast c ent ty. . . [T]hese con

trad ct ons are nnate n the subject-matter, not n ts verbal express on.

Th s soc ety based on cap tal and commod t es s therefore the meta

phys cs, the fet sh sm, the ‘myst cal world’ —even more so than egel’s

Log c tself.20

The world of commod t es and cap tal s a ‘myst cal’one, even more so than

egel’sLog c tself. The d scourse could not be clearer.The ‘commod ty’ as the

mater al sat on of labour (that s,as value) has an mag nary,purelysoc alex s

tence.The ‘abstract un versal’,wh ch ought to be the property of the concrete,

becomes a self-subs st ng ent ty and an act ve subject, w th the concrete and

sensuous count ng only as the form of man festat on of the abstract-un versal —

the pred cate of ts own substant al sed pred cate. ForCollett egel’sd alect

cal log c s noth ng but the ‘pecul ar method for the pecul ar object’,prec sely

due toh s absolute deal sm.The ph losoph cal cr t que of egeland the cr t cal

pol t cal economy of cap tal sm, n Cap tal as well as n the Grundr sse,are one

and the same.

Backhaus arr ves at very s m lar conclus ons n h s paper ‘OnMarx’srevolu

t on s ng and cr t que of econom c theory: the determ nat on of the r objects

as a total ty of deranged forms’.21Marx attr butes to the ‘object ve legal ty’ of

soc ety not only a contrad ctory character but also a patent rrat onal ty. The

realm of the Vern ckteFormen (the ‘deranged’forms, where th s d splacement

alludes at the same t me to craz ness and pervers on) s there from the start, at

19 Collett 1973[1969], p. 278.

20 Collett 1973[1969], p. 280.

2 1 Backhaus 2009 [1997].



174 BELLOFIORE

the beg nn ng of Cap tal, and does not come nto be ng only n Volume III.The

not-yet-developed form of exchange-value s already a mst f cat on of real ty,

wh ch, however, s the ‘appearance’ of th ngs as they are ( t s a ‘man festat on’,

an Ersche nung, not a semblance, a Sche n—more on th s later n th s chapter).

It s cap tal st real ty tself wh ch sparadox cal.

The two fundamental deas of Marx’s d alect cal development n value

theory are very s mple for Backhaus.22 F rst, a contrad ct on n the commod

y tself sfound, the contrad ct on of be ng at the same t me ‘use-value’and

‘value’—sens ble and suprasens ble. Second, only as money s the commod ty

really a commod ty.The true quest on wh ch g ves ts spec f c ty to Marx’scr

t que of pol t cal economy s opened from here: how the value-th ng (as com

mod ty, money, cap tal), the Fet sch, s const tutedfrom a human bas s —hat s,

how the soc al, supra- nd v dual substance wh ch svalue develops nto a form

wh ch presents tself as someth ng over and beyond human be ngs. The rela

t onsh p between substance and form, or between essence and appearance,

must be thought of as a necessary nner connect on, as a non- dent ty wh ch

at the same t me an dent ty. Essence must appear (th s s an Ersche nung),

but th s appearance s a d stort on: everyth ng appears ups de-down. S nce, n

general exchange, ‘th ngs’present themselves n a non-mater al connect on,

commod t es h de a ‘phantom’mode of ex stence. ForBackhaus, as for Collett ,

th s pecul ar object requ res a pecul ar sc ence to nvest gate t. L ke Collett ,

Backhaus quotes Marx on Ba ley,accord ng to whom the paradoxes of speech

just reflect a paradox of real ty tsef23 Essence must man fest tself, but th s

man festat on s not the essence, because th s appearance [Ersche nung] s a

‘reversal’ [Umkehrung] and an nvers on [Verkehrung].The phenomenon, or

‘form’, s a mater al, d stort ng ‘ve l’wh ch conceals at the same t me that wh ch

paradox cally reveals.

Before go ng on I have to alert the reader to the convent on I w ll adopt

n the follow ngregard ngthe translat on of some egel an terms structur ng

Marx’sd scourse.24Sche nhas to do w th the phenomena at the surface when

they are cons dered n themselves as the essence: as such, th s explanat on of

cap tal st real ty may be llusory and ‘vulgar’,a mere semblance. Ersche nung

22 Backhaus 2009 [1997],pp. 456-7.

23 Backhaus 2009 [1997], pp. 486—7.See Collett 2012,p. 76.

24 Usefulglossar esor commentar es wh ch enter nto these translat on- ssues are: Inwood

1992;Ehrbar 2010; e nr ch 2008; and F nesch 2012.See also egel 1991[1817],the Glossary!

but also ‘lntroduct on: Translat ng egel’sLog c'by an' s and Geraets, and Sucht ngfs

Somem nor ty comments on term nology’.




has to do w th those same phenomena as they ‘appear’or ‘present themselves’.

It s the necessary man festat on of the essence,the way the latter cannot but

appear at the phenomenal level.But n Marx t s at the same t me aperverted

and crazy man festat on of the essent al laws,hence the ‘derangement’of the

Vern' ckteFormen. ere I translate as ‘appearance’ or ‘man festat on’ a determ

nat on w th an element of self-subs stence.

The ‘essence’ man fests tself by v rtue of an ‘exh b t on’,a ‘presentat on’:

a Darstellung. Th s term s very often translated as ‘representat on’. Though I

used ‘representat on’ n the past, now 1verymuch prefer ‘exh b t on’—exactly

because t s less mundane and more techn cal, thus help ng to real se Marx’s

d alect cal jargon. It alsomakes t eas er to understand that th s ‘presentat on’

not n labour-hours but n money. It s the processual expos t on of the sys

tem wh ch s necessaryfrom the po nt ofv ewof the log calreconstruct on of the

whole. If what s exh b ted s recogn sed as such, as a result of a complex pro

cess of med at on, then t s an ‘appearance’,a ‘man festat on’; f otherw se, t

a ‘semblance’ or ‘ llus on’. owever, as I shall show later, n Cap tal all th s

cannot be reduced to someth ng ‘closed ns de the m nd of the ph losopher

do ng sc ence and look ngat the self-development of the subject-matter tself’,

as F nesch puts t.25Vorstel ung s rendered by me as a mental or not onal

representat on: t s an ‘ deal’ant c pat on, or the way agents grasp cap tal st

forms. I nterpret Ausdracken n a stronger way than usual: t s ‘to express’,as

referr ng to a mavementfrom the nner (as a ‘latent’or ‘potent al’ real ty) to the

outer (the ‘object f ed’form). In fact, t s the ‘genet c’process ‘const tut ng’ the

Darstellung.26

25 F nesch 2012,p. 1323.

26 Aperfectly acceptable d fferent convent on oftranslat on couldbeto employ‘presentat on’

for Ersche nung, but n th s case the term should not be used forDarstellung.The pos t ve

aspect of th s cho ce would be the poss b l ty of avo d ng translat ng Ersche nung as

‘appearance’, an amb guous term often taken as equ valent to ‘false’and ‘ llusory’ by

many nterpreters ( ndeed, one of the ed tors of th s book, Fred Moseley, quest on ng

my nterpretat on, subm tted a quote from Volume III of Cap tal w thout real s ng that

the term ‘appear' n the Engl sh translat on corresponds to three d fferent terms n

German). The mportant th ng s to avo d the usual pract ce n Anglo-Saxontranslat ons

of employ ng (too many) d fferent word ngs for the same category n German, accord ng

to one’s own guesses at the r contextual mean ng. That s why translat ons of Marx n

Engl sh, even the best, are soph st cated exerc ses n sc ence-f ct on.



176 BELLOFIORE

5 Marx after egel:The ‘Fet sh-Character of Cap tal’ versus

‘Fet sh sm’

Letme goback,and reconstruct the d alect cs of value,money and cap tal. The

‘commod ty’presents tself [Darstellung] from the start as a dual ent ty: t s a

‘use-value’,a product w th some ut l ty, and has an ‘exchange-value’, a quan

t tat ve relat onsh p w th other commod t es. It seems that the not on of an

‘ ntr ns c' or ‘absolute’value s then a contrad ct o n adjecto, but th s s a mere

lus on [Sche n].Beh nd th s f rst def n t on of ‘exchange-value’wemust detect

‘value’:the real dual ty s between use-value and value. Th s dual ty w th n the

commod ty,as the result of the product ve process, corresponds to a dual ty

the labour produc ng t, n the act v ty. The expend ture of labour-power —

or the l v ng labour performed by workers - can be seen as dual too: as ‘con

crete’labour, nasmuch as t produced the commod ty as use-value; and as

‘abstract’labour, nasmuch as t produces value. Note that use-values and con

crete labours are non-homogeneous, thus ncommensurable. Value, on the

contrary, s a ‘gelat ne’ [Gallerte] of labour ‘pure and s mple’: a homogeneous

amount, wh ch s commensurable as such. Its def n t on as a gelat ne relates

objecttj edlabour to l v nglabour as aflu d.

Th s dea of value as the object f ed congelat on of the ‘abstract’ l v ng

labour of human be ngs —value as a substance whose magn tude may be mea

sured n un ts of t me (accord ng to some soc al average) — s very problem

at c ndeed. That s why Marx enters nto a d scuss on of the form of value n

the th rd paragraph of sect on I of Chapter I.What s the problem? ‘Value’,as

has been ntroduced so far, s a mere ‘ghost’.It s yet to be shown how th s

‘purely soc al’ ent ty —‘value’as def ned n sect ons 1and Il —can ga n a mate

r al ex stence (even beforef nal exchange on the commod ty-market, as Marx

w shes). Beforeexchange,what we seem to have n front of us are just concrete

labours ‘embod ed’ n def n te use-values that are ncommensurable. Ne ther

concrete labours nor use-values can be added one to another. Marx therefore

goes on to demonstrate that an actual, pract cal ‘doubl ng’ n real ty (com

mod ty/money) corresponds to the conceptual dual ty w th n the commod ty

(use-value/value). Therefore, Marx’sanalys s of the forms of value (wh ch are

Emche nungfonnen) reconstructs the log c of the constellat on n wh ch the

values of all commod t es are exh b ted by one ‘excluded’commod ty perform

g the role of the un versalequ valent- the process ofDarstellung.When th s

rolebecomes customar lyand pol t cally f xedto one commod ty, the un versal

equ valent smoney.Themoney-form, or g nat ng from Form C,that s,the un

versal-equ valentform, ‘sublates’(that s, conserves and transcends) Form A,




the elementaryform ofvalueand FormB,the totalform ofvalue.Money s noth

ngbut a egel an syllog smmade actual.

Money as a commod ty’ s produced by labour: Marx mostly refers to gold.

Once a def n te commod ty has been selected to play the role of the un versal

equ valent, the ghost has been able to ‘take possess on’ of a ‘body’—he goth c

undertone s more than merely rhetor cal. Money s l terally a ‘valueembod

d’ [verkb'rperterWert] n the use-value of gold. Note that n general, labour s

‘embod ed’ n commod t es only as concrete labour, not as abstract labour —

all the current translat ons n any language notw thstand ng, w th the r w ld

uses of ‘embod ment’ everywhere. Asfor abstract labour, Marx says, t s rather

‘conta ned’ [enthalten] n commod t es. S ncemoney as a commod ty s value

embod ed,the abstract labour conta ned n the commod t es exchangedaga nst

that money s also exh b ted n the concrete labour embod ed n gold. In other

terms, the ‘exh b t on’of commod t es’abstract labour requ res the ‘embod ment’

[Verkb'rperung] of the concrete labour produc ng gold as money. ‘Exchange

value’has thus developed nto a second def n t on. It s not just the exchange

rat o between any two commod t es but rather the amount of each of them

that s exchanged for some amount of money.

Notewhat money sforMarx.It snot just the un versalequ valent, val dat ng

expost the abstract labour wh ch s ‘ mmed ately pr vate’and only ‘med ately

soc al’.Money s also and pr mar ly the ‘ nd v dual ncarnat on’ [Inkamat on]

of value result ng from soc al labour —aga n, the Chr st an undertone s not

merely rhetor cal. As such, the labour produc ng gold as money s the only

pr vate labour that s at the same t me mmed ately soc al labour. When Marx

speaks of unm ttelbare gesellschaftl cheArbe t [ mmed ately soc al labour] he

always refers exclus velyto the concrete labour produc ng money as a com

mod ty and exh b t ng the abstract labour produc ng the commod t es to be

sold on the market. Th s latter s a verm ttelte gesellschaftl cheArbe t, a soc al

labour wh ch s always ‘med ated’ through the exchange of th ngs,27by the

‘re f cat on’wh ch s connected to the ‘fet sh-character’ [Fet schchara/cter] of

the cap tal st mode of product on and c rculat on. The Fet schcharakter —the

‘object ve’,th ng-l ke and al enated nature of cap tal st soc al real ty — s actu

ally very real: an Ersche nung. What s decept ve, a semblance or Sche n, s to

attr bute soc al propert es to the th ngs themselvesas the r natural attr butes:

th s latter s Fet sch smus,fet sh sm. But onlyth s s done outs de of the soc al

27 These not ons should not be confused w th ‘soc al sed'labour [vergesellscha/leteArbe t]

or w th ‘total' labour [geme nsameArbe t].




portant to real se that n th s equ valence, amount ng to an equal sat on n

substance, money (as the un versal equ valent) s ‘pass ve’,‘commod t es’ are

‘act ve’.That s why the ‘mater al sat on’ n gold of the value of commod t es

s sa d by Marx to be a Mater atur, an unusual term mean ng that the mate

r al represent ng value must have some pecul ar propert es wh ch make t

adequate to be a proper express on and ‘formof the man festat on’ of value

tself.29 For Marx, gold as world-money s exactly that: a Wertko'rper,a ‘body

of value’,wh ch s at the same t me the un versally recogn sed Mater atur of

abstract wealth.

Th s s a very uncerta n log cal sequence. The just f cat on by Marx of h s

perspect ve s that the un versal ‘c rculat on of commod t es’ must be always

thought of as ntr ns cally monetary —Warenaustausch and Z rkulat on for h m

make sense only n cap tal sm as an essent ally monetary economy. ‘Exchange’

cannot be conce ved as a barter-l ke ‘exchangeof products’ (that s, as unm t

telbare Produktenaustausch), w th the problems nherent n barter generat

g money as the r solut on.30Commod t es enter the market alwaysw th a

pr ce-tag already aff xedto them, the r money-name. Thanks to the pr ce-form

taken by values, commod t es are presumed to be alreaay transformed nto an

amount of (gold as) money beforeactual exchange. Thecommod ty-pr ceas an

amount of ‘ deal’money s a ‘mental representat on’ (a Vorstellung)—someth ng

ant c pated and not onal —ofgold as ‘real’money.Asa consequence t s always

poss ble to translate th s ‘external’measure of the magn tude of each com

mod ty’svalue n money-terms, as they are not onally ant c pated by produc

ers before exchange, nto the mmanent measure n amounts of labour-t me.

We have now all the elements to move on to the way n wh ch Marx deter

m nes the ‘value of money’,wh ch s the nverse of the ‘monetary express on

of [soc ally-necessary] labour t me’.Accord ng to Marx, the quant tat ve deter

m nat on of the value of money s f xedat thepo nt ofproduct on ofgold, that

, at the entry-po nt of gold as money nto the c rcu t. Gold s exchanged at

f rst just as a mere commod ty aga nst all other commod t es. Th s exchange

not, str ctly speak ng, already monetary. The (pr vate) labour-t me requ red

to produce gold s equal sed w th the amount of (pr vate) labours produc

g the other commod t es w th wh ch gold s exchanged, so that the same

amount of labour-t me s congealed n one and the others. Th s s st ll —Marx

29 I owe th s suggest on to Fr eder Otto Wolf, n personal conversat on.

30 It s a great mer t of Backhaus (2009 [1997])to have cogently stressed that Marx’slabour

theory of value s ndeed, f rst of all, a cr t que of all pr or value-theor es of cap tal sm

because they were non-monetary. Th s cr t que s st ll val d for econom c theory after

Marx (hence the l m ts not only of Neoclass caleconom sts, but also ofNeo-R card ans).



180 BELLOFIORE

expl c t—mmed ate barter (the German here s unequ vocal: unm ttelbarem

Tauschhandel). It s not yet ‘c rculat on’,wh ch always s med ated by money:

th s be ng the mean ng Marx g ves to Z rkulat on, as Backhaus conv nc ngly

says.

Only after t has entered the market n th s way, as an ‘ mmed ate product

of labour’,at ts source of product on (to be exchangedw th other products of

labour of equal value), does gold funct on asmoney.31Cold asmoney then goes

to ‘c rculat on’properly speak ng, that s, nto general sed monetary com

mod ty-exchange. Fromnowon tsvalue salwaysalready g ven. In th s perspec

t ve, the connect on betweenvalue and labour s prov ded through money as a

commod ty.Th s s argued n steps. Valuebeforeexchange s already deal money

w th a g ven (not onal) labour-content: t sa determ ned amount of conta ned

labour. Th s ‘substance’ s actual sed n c rculat on when ‘ deal’ money turns

to real money.W th the exh b t on [Darstellung] of commod t es’ value by

money not only does the concrete labour produc ng gold as money count as

(the only) mmed ately soc al labour, but we are also w tness ng a movement

f vm the nner to the outer.

W th n exchange on the commod ty-output-market ‘object f ed’labour32 s

abstract because, when exh b ted n the form of value, the products of human

work ng act v ty man fest themselves as an ‘ ndependent’ and ‘estranged’

real ty d vorcedfrom the r or g n n l v ng labour. The mpl ed ‘al enat on’ of

d v duals s coupled w th ‘re f cat on’ and ‘fet sh sm’: re f cat on, because

soc al relat ons necessar lytake the mater al appearance [Ersche nung] of an

exchange between th ngs —th s s the fet sh-character; and fet sh sm, because

the products of labour have the semblance [Sche n] of be ng endowed w th

soc alpropert es as f these latter were bestowed upon them by nature. These

character st cs and th s d st nct on between ‘fet sh-character’ and ‘fet sh sm’

w ll reappear n a he ghtened l ght n the other two moments of the cap tal

st c rcu t. On the labour-market, human be ngs become the ‘person cat ons’

of the commod ty they sell, labour-power or ‘potent al’ labour, wh ch s the

commod ty ofwh chtheworkersare a mereappendage.W th n product on, l v

g labour tself, or labour ‘ n becom ng’ —organ sed and shaped by cap tal

as ‘value- n-process’,and embedded n a def n te mater al organ sat on for the

creat on of use-valueswh ch s spec f callydes gned to enforce the extract on

of surplus-value — s the true abstract subject of wh ch the concrete workers

perform ng t arejust pred cates.

31 Note that Marx does not wr te ‘commod ty’but mmed ate product of labour.

32 Th s s very often n German gegensta'ndl cheArbe t; see later for comment.




In Cap tal and n ‘Results of the D rect Product on Process’ th s s most

clearly v s ble n Marx’sd scourse on ‘cap tal’sproduct v ty’ (Marx’s emphas s

as tal cs;m ne as bold and underl n ng):

S nce l v ng labour s already —w th n the product on process — ncorpo

rated [e nverle bt] nto cap tal, the soc al product ve powers of labour all

present themselves [stellendar] as product veforces; as propert es nher

ent n cap tal, just as n money the general character of labour, n so far

as t funct oned to create value, appeared [ersch en] as the property of

a th ng... [T]he relat on becomes st ll more complex —and apparently

[sche nbar] more myster ous - n that, w th the development of the spe

c f cally cap tal st mode of product on, not only do these th ngs —these

products of labour, both as use values and as exchangevalues - stand on

the r h nd legs v s-a-v s the worker and confront h m as ‘cap tal’—but

also the soc al forms of labour appear [darstellen] asforms of the devel

opment of cap tal, and therefore the product ve powers of soc al labour,

thus developed, appear [darstellen] as product ve powers of cap tal. As

such soc al forces they are “cap tal sed” v s-a-v s labour. . .The soc al

forms of the r own labour. . . confront the workers . . . as comb nat ons

wh ch, unl ke the r solated labour capac t es, belong to cap tal, or g

nate from t and are ncorporated [e nverle bte]w th n t?"3

And a few l nes below:

33

34

In th s process, nwh ch the soc alcharacter st cs of the r labour confront

them as cap tal sed, to a certa n extent —n the way that e.g. n mach nery

the v s ble products of labour appear [ersche nen] as rul ng over labour —

the same th ng ofcourse takes place forthe forcesofnature and sc ence,the

product of general h stor cal development n ts abstract qu ntessence:

they confront the workers as powers of cap tal. They become n fact

separated from the sk ll and knowledge of the nd v dual worker,and

although —f we look at them from the po nt of v ew of the r sourc —

they are n turn the product of labour, they appear [ersche nen] as

corporated [e nverle bt] nto cap tal wherever they enter the labour

process.34

Marx 1982a [1863—6],pp. 455—8(emphas s added).

Marx 1982a[1863-6], p. 458 (emphas s added).



132 BELLOFIORE

AllMarx’sd scourse s pred cated not on semblance [Sche n], but on man fes

tat on [Ersche nung] n the exh b t on [Darstellung] of cap tal. Th s perspec

t ve can be rebutted only fwe look at th s ‘paradox cal’real tyfrom thepo nt of

v ewof ts source: l v ng labour com ng from the explo tat on of workers as l v

g bearers of labour-power.Th s s the (cr t cal and revolut onary) d scourse

on the const tut onof cap tal as the automat c fet sh becom ng a Subject.

Another note about translat on s necessary here.When n Cap tal Volume1

Marx uses Arbe t, labour, he alwaysmeans lebend geArbe t, labour ‘ n mot on’.

When labour s eventually object f ed n the value of the commod ty35 —when

ceases to be a flu dand s congealed n a gelat ne - t has morphed nto dead

labour. Ifwe onlylookat cap tal st product on and c rculat on from that po nt,

we rema n nescapably n a R card an sett ng —aspract cally allMarx st econo

m sts do today.

6 Marx Beyond egel:The ‘Const tut on’ of the Cap tal-Relat on

Tobe actually self-grounded,valuemust be produced byvalue. But dead labour

cannot produce more dead labour.What s needed s that cap tal ‘ ntemal se’

product on the act v ty wh ch may turn less dead labour nto more dead

labour: that s, the only ‘otherness’ to dead labour, wh ch s the l v ng labour

of human be ngs. Th s happens onlywhen workersas bearers of labour-power,

and thereby as potent al l v ng labour, become a (very spec al) commod ty

bought and sold on the (labour-)market. We have already argued that com

mod t es, as values, are a ghost-l ke ‘object v ty’ [Gegenstc' ndl ckhe t].Nobody

knows how to handle th s value, unt l t takes a separate and autonomous form

from the commod t es themselves: money. It s only when the oppos t on

w th n the commod ty has become a real dual ty —when value-as—content s

dupl cated by value-as-form —that egel’sontolog cal categor es start to ga n

actual ty, and ‘valuebegett ng value’becomes the nstant at on of the Absolute

Idea. Onlynow not onlythe ghost of value has become the Chrysal sas money:

th s money-Chrysal s ‘exh b t ng’value has also been able to mutate nto a but—

terfly—namely, ‘self-valor s ng value’.On a system c scale, however, th s ‘ deal

t c’butterfly cannot but be grounded n the ‘mater al ty’of cap tal as vamp re.

35 Marx very often employs gegensta'ndl ch and the l ke,wh ch means ‘becom ng object ve'.

the object v tystand ng n front ofhuman be ngs,as someth ng wh ch has ts or g n n the

processual moment of labour as act v ty.




‘Labour’ s a very complex category. It must be art culated n all ts com

plex ty. ‘Labour-power’ and ‘l v nglabour' have really become cap tal’s labour

power and cap tal’s l v ng labour. At the same t me labour-power cannot but

be ‘attached’to workers as human be ngs, n a soc al relat on w th other work

ers. Workers are ncluded n cap tal (dead labour) as an nternal other (l v ng

labour), to borrow Chr s Arthur’s enl ghten ng express on. We are meet ng a

new k nd of ‘embod ment’. The verb here s not verko'rpem (tak ng the body,

carnat on) but e n-verle ben:the absorpt on of workers (as l v ng bearers of

labour-power,and hence as the agents who haveto expend human l v nglabour

as act v ty) nto the bodyofcap tal (as the cap tal st cally shaped conf gurat on

of use-values, of ‘matter’,so that the technolog cal and organ sat onal structure

of the labour-process becomes an adequate ‘content’for the successfulvalor

sat on of money-cap tal). Before t was a ‘possess on’and ‘ ncarnat on’; now t

ntemal sat on n the ‘mechan cal' body of cap tal.

Marx’scap tal as self-valor s ngvalue sconf rmed asak n to egel’sAbsolute

Idea, seek ng to actual se tselfwh le reproduc ng ts own ent re cond t ons of

ex stence. owever, cap tal’s zomb e-l fe s dependent on a soc al cond t on:

cap tal must w n the class-struggle n product on, a ‘contestedterra n’: t has to

suck away from workers the r l fe, so that t may come back to l fe as ‘undead’.

Workersmay res st the r ncorporat on as nternal moment of cap tal: th s sur

mountable ‘barr er’ or ‘obstacle’[Schranke] may become an nsurmountable

‘l m t’ [Grenze], when confl ct becomes antagon sm. The key po nt s that t s

not poss ble to have labour w thout pump ng t outfrom labour-power: t s not

poss ble to use labour-power w thout ‘consum ng’the body of the workers them

selves,as the l v ngbearers oflabour-power.Cap tal produces only thanks to th s

very spec f c ‘consumpt on’, wh ch creates a very spec f c ‘contrad ct on’. Th s

ndeed the true p llar of the labour-theory ofvalue as a theory trac ng the new

‘valueadded’ produced n the per od back to the l v nglabour spent byworkers.

AsTomba conv nc ngly h ghl ghts, the consumpt on of workers’bod es (and

m nds!) has no poss ble compensat on?6

When egel an ontologyseems to comej lly nto be ng n cap tal st real ty as

s own realm, t turns out that t cruc ally hangs on cap tal’s success n explo t

g and command ng labour. Even though ‘labour’ s embod ed nto cap tal,

cap tal st ll cannot but depend on t.The ‘c rcular ty’of cap tal —he ontolog cal

c rcle of ‘pos t ng the presuppos t on’ —has as ts unconsc ous secret the ‘l near’

process of ‘suck ng’l v ng labour n excess of the necessary labour needed to

reproduce workers. The total ty of cap tal ex sts only to the extent to wh ch t

36 Tomba 2012.




ent ty w th tself may be asserted... [N]ow, n the c rculat on M—C- M,

valuesuddenlypresentstself[stelltdar]asa substancewh ch

passesthrougha process and forwh chcommod t esnd

money are both mere forms.But there smore to come: nstead of s mply

represent ng [darzustellen] the relat ons of commod t es, t now enters

to a pr vate relat onsh p w th tself, as t were. It d fferent ates tself as

or g nal value from tself as surplus-value,just asGod the Father d fferen

t ates h mself fromh mself as God the Son,although both are of the same

age and form, n fact one s ngle person.37

Ubergretfende s translated nto Engl sh as ‘act vefactor’ (Moore and Avel ng),

‘dom nant’ (Fowkes) or ‘common to all part cular forms’ (Ehrbar). These

express ons catch only part of the mean ngs of the word. Marx employed th s

term w th a double accent. The f rst was, as n egel, that of ‘overgrasp’.Th s

a neolog sm the translators of TheEncyclopaed aLog c adopted to follow

egel’spos t ve aspect of the process of Aujhebung, that s, the speculat ve

comprehens on wh ch ‘reachesback and embraces w th n ts scope’the oppo

s t on of the moments n ts d alect cal stage.38Asun versal ty ‘overgrasps’par

t culars and nd v duals, n the same way thought ‘overgrasps’what s other

than thought. So, the Subjekt develop ng nto Ge st ncludes object v ty and

subject v ty w th n ts grasp. But the term also means ‘overreach ng’and ‘over

r d ng’,border ng on ‘dom nant’,and I th nk these terms convey some ofMarx’s

tent on n us ng th s word.

For Re chelt these formulat ons conf rm how Marx, rather than ‘coquet

t ng’ w th egel, was obl ged to employ a d alect cally structured argument

for an ‘object ve’constra nt, ‘s ncethere ex sts a structural dent ty between the

Marx an not on ofCap tal and the egel annot onofSp r t . . . In Marx’sthought

the expans on of the Concept nto Absolute s the adequate express on of a

real ty where th s event s happen ng n analogous manner... egel an de

al sm, accord ng to wh ch human be ngs obey a despot c not on, s ndeed

more adequate to th s nverted world than any nom nal st c theory w sh ng

to accept the un versal as someth ng subject vely conceptual. It s bourgeo s

soc ety as ontology’.39The d alect cal method s as good or bad as the soc ety

37 Marx 1976c[1867],pp. 255-6 (emphas s added).

38 egel 1991 [1817].

39 Re chelt 1979,p. 92, p. 94, p. 97 (emphas s added). Postone (2011),after quot ng the same

phrases from Marx. wr tes n a s m lar ve n that ‘Marx expl c tly character zes cap tal

as the self-mov ng substance that s Subject. In so do ng, he mpl c tly suggests that a



186 BELLOFIORE

to wh ch t corresponds: t s val d only where the un versal ty asserts tself

at the expense of the nd v dual; and t s n fact the ph losoph cal doubl ng of

the real nvers on.The character st c feature of mater al st c d alect cs s the

‘method of w thdrawal’;that method has to d ssolve tself as soon as ts cond

t ons of ex stence d sappear.40

The second quote s from Cap tal Volume 111,Chapter XXIV.It shows that

cap tal as the automat c fet sh, as a Subject, s st ll there n the whole of the

book, together w th the connected not on of ‘deranged’ forms. The quote s

about nterest-bear ng cap tal, def ned byMarx n Chapter XXIXas ‘themother

of every nsane form [verr ckteFormen]’.41

In the form of nterest-bear ng cap tal, cap tal appears [ersche nt] mme

d ately n th s form, unmed ated by the product on and c rculat on

processes. Cap tal appears [ersche nt] as a myster ous and self-creat ng

source of nterest, of ts own ncrease. The th ng money (money, com—

mod ty, value) s now already cap tal s mply as a th ng; the result of the

overall reproduct on process appears [ersche nt] as a property devolv—

g on a th ng n tself; t s up to the possessor of money, .e. of com

mod t es n the r ever-exchangeable form, whether he wants to spend

th s money as money or h re t out as cap tal. In nterest-bear ng cap tal,

therefore, th s automat c fet sh [automat sche Fet sch] s elaborated nto

h stor cal Subject n the egel ansense does ndeed ex st n cap tal sm’ (p. 8) and that ‘the

soc al relat ons that character ze cap tal sm are of a verypecul ar sort —they possess the

attr butes that egel accords the Ge st . . .Marx’sSubject s l ke egel’s: t s abstract and

cannot be dent f ed w th any soc alactors; moreover, t unfolds temporally ndependent

ofw ll' (p. 9).Unfortunately, Postone’sperspect ve s hampered not only by an nsulEc ent

account ofthe monetary aspects ofvalueand cap tal,but alsoby a bl ndness to the equally

fundamental process of ‘const tut on’ of cap tal as a Subject w th n the class-struggle

d mens on. Asa consequence, he does not see that the ‘standpo nt of labour’ he s sokeen

to cr t c seastotally nternalto cap tal sm srather,at the samet me, andaga nst'

cap tal, and hence t s the keymater al st foundat on of the cr t que of product v sm.

40 Sm th (1993a,p. 150,footnote 25) quotes Backhaus, Re chelt, Krahl, Rosdolsky and Klaus

artmann, as nterpreters who compared Marx’sand egel’sph losoph cal frameworks.

Unfortunately, he does not enter nto a deta led (or even cursory, for what t s worth)

commentary on Backhausand Re chelt.I havelearned a lot over the years fromSm th, but

h s read ng of cap tal as a pseudo-subject —a not on wh ch, I must confess, I do not f nd

very llum nat ng —leads me to regret that he d d not engage n a ser ous confrontat on

W ththe l terature I am stress ng here.

41 "’1‘117‘193l18941-9596.



LOST IN TRANSLATION: T E MARX— EGELCONNECTION 187

spureform, self-valor z ngvalue, moneybreed ng money,and n th sform

no longer bears any marks of ts or g n. The soc al relat on s consum

mated n the relat onsh p ofa th ng, money,to tself. . .The fet sh character

[Fet schgestalt] of cap tal and the representat on [Vorstellung] of th s

cap tal fet sh [Kap talfet sch] s now complete.42

The myst f cat on of cap tal, now entered nto agents’ deas about the process,

does not make th s ups de-down, perverted and crazy, ‘deranged' world less

real and powerful.

The last quote goes back to Chapter VIIof Cap tal Volume I, and g ves a clue

from where the ‘occult ab l ty to add value to tself’ comes to cap tal:

The use of a commod ty belongs to ts purchaser, and the seller of labour

power, by g v ng h s labour, does no more, n real ty, than part w th the

use-value that he has sold. From the nstant he steps nto the workshop,

the use-value ofh s labour-power;and thereforealso ts use,wh ch s labour,

belongs to the cap tal st. Bythe purchase of labour-power, the cap tal st

corporates [e nverle bt] labour, as a l v ng agent of fermentat on, nto

the l felessconst tuents of the product, wh ch also belongs to h m. . .By

turn ng h smoney nto commod t es wh ch serve as the bu ld ng mater

als for a new product, and as factors n the labour process, by ncorpo

rat ng l v ng labour[-power] [lebend geArbe tskraft e nverle bt] nto the r

l feless object v ty, the cap tal st s multaneously transforms value, .e.,

past labour n ts object f ed and l feless form, nto cap tal, value wh ch

can perform ts own valor zat on process, an an mated monster wh ch

beg ns to ‘work’,‘as f ts body were by love possessed’.43

We see clearly the tens on between the two s des of the co n —a tens on wh ch

the translat on downplays, translat ng as ‘l v nglabour’ (the act v ty actual

ng labour-power) what n the or g nal s l v ng labour-power (the workers

be ng bearers of that labour-power, and really performng that act v ty). One

truth s that the labour of the workers s of cap tal. But there s another truth,

that labour cannot but be the work of the workers themselves.The reference

to the ‘l v ng’ferment and the ‘consumpt on’ of workers, and the ns stence

on the ‘l v ng labour-power’ wh ch s ‘embod ed’,‘ ncluded’ n the an mated

monster, po nts towards an unresolved and st ll ‘open’ class-contrad ct on.

42 Marx 1981[1894],p. 516(emphas s added).

43 Marx 1976c[1867],p. 302 ( tal cs n or g nal, bold emphas s added).



188 BELLOFIORE

The sc ent f c and revolut onary po nt of v ew of Marx s that that bourgeo s

‘truth’may be proved false, soc ally and pol t cally, from a po nt of v ew wh ch

expresses another real ty: the one accord ng to wh ch cap tal s the product of

l v nglabour, wh ch s noth ng but the act v tyof l v ngbearers of labour-power.

We have to deal w th two antagon st c ontolog es. Marx an theory should be

engaged n a reconstruct on/ nterpretat on ofCap talthat cannot be separated

from the effort of prov ng that ( egel an and R card an) c rcular v ews about

cap tal sm are false— n pract ce.



C APTER 8

The Secret of Cap tal’s Self-Valor sat on ‘La dBare’:

ow egel elped Marx to Overturn R cardo’s

Theory of Prof t

Patr ckMurray

At the core of Marx’sCap tal l es h s revelat on of cap tal’s secret, how cap tal

makes money out of money, or, n Marx’smore techn cal language, how value

valor sed. In Marx’s theory of surplus-value, cap tal’s secret s ‘la d bare’:

money makes money by appropr at ng —w thout need ng to v olate commer

c al fa r play —the unpa d labour of wage-workers. Marx’s theory of surplus

value beg ns h s complex theory of prof t, wh ch overturns both R cardo’s

theory ofprof t and h s nd v dual st c theory ofvalue. Prof t ncludes ncomes

the forms of prof t of enterpr se, nterest and rent; the total annual prof t s

the sum of those ncomes for the year.

Prof t, and another bas c cap tal st soc al form, wages, keep cap tal’s secret

wellh dden. Prof tmeasures tself aga nst the sum ofmoney nvested;the rat o

of the two sums, of prof t to nvestment, s the rate of prof t. The rate of prof t,

then, appears to have noth ng to do w th what part of the nvestment goes to

pay wages, much less w th how much unpa d labour a cap tal appropr ates.

And th s s not merely a matter of appearances. The act on of compet t on

among cap tals all chas ng h gher rates of prof t tends to br ng about a general

rate of prof t, so the s ze of nd v dual prof ts s determ ned by the s ze of the

d v dual cap tal nvested. S nce cap tal per se appears as the var able deter

m n ng prof t, cap tal seems to valor se tself. A general rate of prof t mpl es

that the prof t returned to an nd v dual nvestment n fact bears no d rect rela

t onsh p to the fract on of the nvestment devoted to wages or to the unpa d

labour appropr ated through that nvestment.Turn ng to the wage, t presents

self as compensat on for the labour done by a wage-worker, as the ‘pr ce of

labour’.That appearance puts a stop to the thought that prof t ar ses from

unpa d labour: there sn’t any. The appearances and real t es nvolved w th

prof ts and wages seem to torpedo Marx’s cla m that the source of prof t s

unpa d labour —and w th t h s theory of explo tat on. But, as Marxwas fond of

say ng n the face of an mpasse, ‘let us cons der the matter more closely’.In

order tooverturn the extant theor es ofprof t and wages,Marxhas to ntroduce

twokeyd st nct ons, between labour and labour-powerand between constant

© KONINKLIJKEBRILLNV,LEIDEN, 2014 DOI 10.1]63/9789004270022_010



190 MURRAY

and var able cap tal, and to revolut on se ( n a second way)the class cal labour

theory of value.

Marxhad already put the labour-theory of value on a new conceptual bas s

by dent fy ng value as a h stor cally spec f c soc al form. In A Contr but on to

the Cr t que,Marx wr tes, ‘the labour wh ch pos ts exchange-value s a spec f c

soc al form of labour’.1W th th s concept on of value as the consequence

of the pecul ar soc al character of commod ty-produc ng labour, wh ch neces

sar ly appears as money, Marx reveals one of cap tal sm’s secrets. Value s some

th ng str ctly soc al, and money s the d splaced soc al form of commod ty

produc ng labour: ‘Although t s thus correct to say that exchange-value s a

relat on between persons, t s however necessary to add that t s a relat on

h dden by a mater al ve l’.2That ‘mater al ve l’ s money and the pr ce-system.

By reveal ng money to be the necessary express on of value, Marx demon—

strates that ‘money,though a phys cal object w th d st nct propert es, repre

sents . . . noth ng but a mater al express on of a spec f c soc al form of labour’.3

To solve the conundrums that the general rate of prof t poses for the class cal

labour-theory of value,Marx f rst argues that the labour-theory ofvalue sfalse

at the levelof nd v dual commod t esand cap tals. Marx responds not by aban

don ng a labour-theory of value; that would be to g ve up on sc ent f c under—

stand ng. Rather,he reconst tutes value-theory, d rect ng t at the level of the

total ty of commod t es and pr ces, cap tals and prof ts (and, by mpl cat on,

the r representat ve or al quot parts).

Pol t cal economy’sfa lure to reconc le the theory of value w th the forma

t on of a general rate of prof t, l ke ts t n ear for the soc al spec f c ty of value

and value-produc ng labour, s not acc dental; nattent on to matters of form

show ts conf nement to the ‘bourgeo s hor zon’. Marx’s term ‘bourgeo s hor —

zon’refers to the m ndset that was the target ofh s cr t c sms of the ph losophy

and econom cs of Proudhon’s book The Ph losophy of Poverty.4 Of class cal

pol t cal economy Marxwr tes:

Yet even ts best representat ves rema ned more or less trapped n

the world of llus on the r cr t c sm had d ssolved, and noth ng else s

Marx 1970b [1859], p. 36.

Marx 1970b [1859], p. 34.

Marx 1970b [1859], p. 35.

Marxwr tes to Annenkov that Proudhon ‘doesnot r se above the bourgeo s hor zon' (Marx

and Engels 1975b, p. 190).

hooke



OW EGEL ELPED MARX TO OVERTURN RICARDO'S T EORY OF PROFIT 191

poss ble from the bourgeo s standpo nt; they all fell therefore more or

less nto ncons stenc es, half-truths and unresolved contrad ct ons.5

In the patterns of bourgeo s th nk ng Marxf nds knots of unworkable b furca

t ons: m nd versus world, form versus content, pass ve versus act ve, mmed

ate versus med ated. These dual sms ar se from the dogma that whatever can

be d st ngu shed n thought can ex st separately. The bourgeo s m ndset s

always look ng to factor out the purely subject ve from the purely object ve,

pure form from pure content.

egel taught Marx to recogn se and transcend the l m tat ons of the ‘bour—

geo s hor zon’, though Marx judged that egel ran afoul of h s own cr t c sms

of that m ndset.‘5At the age of 19,Marx wrote to h s father about how, after

gulp ng n egel,he understood the reason for the breakdown of h s attempt

towr te a book onjur sprudence from the standpo nt ofKant and F chte.Marx

expla ns, ‘Them stake lay n my bel ev ng that the one (form) could and must

be developed n separat on from the other (matter), and consequently I

obta ned no actual form, but only a desk w th drawers n wh ch I then strew

sand’.7By contrast, Marx d scovered, n egel’sConcept, an alternat ve to the

b furcat ons of the bourgeo s m ndset: ‘The concept s ndeed the med at ng

between form and content’.8 Through egel, Marx developed the ‘log cal

chops’ to overturn the class cal theor es of value and prof t. Of part cular

mportance was egel’sLog cof Essence: Essence must appear as someth ng

other than tself.9 In ‘The Necess ty of Money: ow egel elped Marx to

Surpass R cardo’s Theory of Value’, I argued that egel’s Log c of Essence

enabled Marx to break w th R cardo’stheory of value and conclude that value

must appear as money.10In the present chapter, I argue that Marx leans on

5 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 969.

6 ‘Form and content are a pa r of determ nat ons that are frequently employed by the

reflect ve understand ng, and, moreover, ma nly n such a way that the content s

cons dered as what s essent al and ndependent, wh le the form, on the contrary, s

essent al and dependent Aga nstth s,however, t must be remarked that n factboth of

them are equally essent al’ ( egel 1991[1817],§133,add t on, p. 202). Marx's cr t que of the

‘bourgeo shor zon’ echoes egel’scr t c sm of the 're lect ve understand ng.

Marx 1967a [1837]. P-43.

lb d.

egel 1991[1817], §u4, p. 165.

10 Murray 1993.

CDQN



192 MURRAY

egel’sLog cof Essence aga n: surplus-value must appear as prof t; prof t s the

transformed form of surplus-value.ll

In a letter to Engels of 16January 1858,Marxwr tes, n the m dst of work on

the Grundr sse, ‘I am gett ng some n ce developments. For nstance, 1 have

thrown overthe ent re doctr ne ofprof t asprev ouslyconce ved. In the method

of treatment the fact that by mere acc dent I have aga n glanced through

egel’sLog chas been of great serv ce to me.’Marx follows up:

If there should ever be t me for such work aga n, I should greatly l ke to

make access ble to the ord nary human ntell gence, n two or three

pr nter's sheets, what s rat onal n the method wh ch egel d scovered

but at the same t me enveloped n myst c sm [nryst j z erthat].12

Let us look further nto each of these provocat ve po nts.

Marx says that, w th the a d of the rat onal aspect of the method that egel

myst f ed, he has ‘overthrown the ent re doctr ne of prof t as prev ously con

ce ved’.Marx’s statement naturally ra ses several quest ons, wh ch 1w ll try to

answer n order: 1)What d d Marxmean by h s statement that egelmyst f ed

h s method? 2)What d d Marx f nd to be rat onal n egel’smethod? 3)What

were the shortcom ngs of the prev ous concept ons ofprof t? 4)What were the

‘n ce developments’ that Marxmade? 5) ow d d reacqua nt ng h mself w th

egel’sSc enceofLog chelp Marx to make these advances?

1 ow,accord ng to Marx, D d egelMyst fy sOwn Method?

What d d Marx mean by egel’s‘myst f cat on of h s method’? Let me nd cate

several aspects of egel’smethod, as Marx understood t, that he would have

cons dered ‘myst fy ng’.

1)Marx objected to egel for mak ng log c nto a d sc pl ne d rected at free

stand ng log calent t es. ForMarx,th s Platon st understand ng of log calent

t es re f es what are properly conce ved of as the log cal aspects of worldly

th nk ng. Marx adopts Feuerbach’s assessment: ‘ egel sets out from the

estrangement of substance. . . from the absolute and f xedabstract on.’l3F xed

11 ‘Marxshows n Cap tal. . .the necess ty. .. for the category of value to be transformed nto

the category of pr ce of product on’ (Murray 1988,p. 263,23n).

12 Marx and Engels 1975b,p. 102.See also Marx 1976c [1867],pp. 102-3.

13 Marx 1964 [1844], p. 172.



OW EGEL ELPED MARX TO OVERTURN RICARDO’S T EORY OF PROFIT 193

thought-abstract ons, ‘torn from real m nd and from real nature', become the

shadowy objects of nqu ry n egel’s log c.14

2)Marxtraces the f xat on of the abstract ons nvest gated n egel’slog c to

h s Phenomenology of Sp r t, ‘the true po nt of or g n and the secret of the

egel anph losophy’.15Marx dent f es egel’s standpo nt n thePhenomenology

asthat of ‘modern pol t cal economy’: ‘ egrasps labour as the essenceofman';

however,much as the labour that const tutes value s abstract labour, ‘theonly

labour wh ch egel knows and recogn ses s abstractly mental labour’.l6Marx

spellsout the connect on between egel’sreduct on of act v ty to ‘sheer act v

y’and h s pos t ng an ndependent realm of log calabstract ons:

The r ch, l v ng, sensuous, concrete act v ty of self-object f cat on s

therefore reduced to tsmere abstract on, absolutenegat v ty—an abstrac

t on wh ch saga n xed as such and cons dered as an ndependent act v

y—as sheer act v ty. Because th s so-called negat v ty s noth ng but the

abstract, emptyformof that real l v ngact, ts content can n consequence

be merely a formal content begotten byabstract on from all content. Asa

result there are general, abstractforms ofabstract on perta n ng to every

content and on that account nd fferent to, and, consequently, val d for,

all content —hought-forms or log cal categor es torn from real m nd and

from real nature.17

Tothat accompl shment, Marx o Tersth s back-handed compl ment:

egel’spos t ve ach evement here, n h s speculat ve log c, s that the

def n teconcepts,the un versalf xed thought-forms n the r ndependence

v s-a-v snature and m nd are a necessary result of the general estrange

ment of the human essenceand therefore alsoofhuman thought.“

egel’slog c s the necessary outcome of h s estrangement from the worldl

ness of human act v ty: ‘ s thoughts are therefore f xed mental shapes or

ghosts dwell ng outs de nature and man. egel has locked up all these f xed

mental forms together n h s Log c’.19W th egel, log c s the money of m nd:

l4 Marx 1964 [1844], p. 189.

15 Marx 1964 [184.4], p. 173.

’6 Ma“ 1964 [1844].P ?

17 Mm 1954 [1844], p. 189.

18 lb d.

19 Marx 1964 [1844], p. 190.



194 MURRAY

Log c (m nd’s co n of the realm, the speculat ve or thought-value of man

and nature —the r essence grown totally nd fferent to all real determ

nateness, and hence the r unreal essence) s al enated th nk ng, and

therefore th nk ng wh ch abstracts from nature and from real man:

abstract th nk ng.20

In these observat ons on abstract on and log c n the economy of egel’s

thought, we f nd a remarkable ant c pat on ofMarx’smature theory ofvalue as

congealed abstract labour and ofmoney as the necessary express on of value,

d fferent to the part cular t es of commod t es.21

3) Because egelreduces ‘the r ch, l v ng, sensuous, concrete act v ty of self

object cat on’ to ‘sheeract v ty’,to abstract thought, the only sort of object v

y that he recogn ses s pure th nghood, a ghostly object v ty: ‘ t s equally clear

that a self-consc ousness.. . can only establ sh th nghood ( .e. establ sh some

th ng wh ch tself sonlyan abstract th ng, a th ng of abstract on and not a real

th ng)’.22Marx goes on to descr be such an object as ‘only the semblance of an

object, a p ece of myst f cat on’.23L kew se, R cardo reduces wealth to con

gealed labour: ‘The ndependent,mater alform ofwealth d sappears and wealth

shown to be s mply the act v ty of men’.24

4)Marx objected to what he took to be egel’stheolog cal construal of log c.

In descr b ng Feuerbach’s‘greatach evement’,Marx l sted f rst ‘[t]he proof that

ph losophy s noth ng else but rel g on rendered nto thought’.25 egel treats

the abstract ent t es of h s log c as deas n the m nd of God; they funct on as

archetypes for the creat on of nature and sp r t.

5) egel, then, myst hed log c by treat ng t as purely a pr or —ust as nd f

ferent to the ‘realdeterm nateness' of nature and m nd as value s nd fferent

to part cular use-values—as opposed to emerg ng by reflect on on human rea

son ng about the world.

6) Follow ng Feuerbach, Marx, n h s early study of egel’s Ph losophy of

R ght, charged egel w th mpos ng prefabr cated log cal forms onto h s

objects of study, such as the fam ly,c v l soc ety and the state: ‘ edevelops h s

th nk ng not out of the object, rather he develops the object n accordance

20 Marx 1964 [1844], p. 174.

2 1 See Murray 1988, p. 49.

22 Marx 1964 [1844], p. 180.

23 Marx 1964 [1844], p. 183.

24 Marx 1991 [1861-3], p. 345.

25 Marx 1964 [1844], p. 172.




w th ready-made th nk ng put together n the abstract sphere of log c’.26Marx

s ststhat concepts must ar se out ofone's th nk ng overthe objects of nqu ry

the world —or reflect on on that th nk ng engagement.

7)Marx objects to the ‘presuppos t onlessness’ of egel an sc ence.

8) Marx traces the myst f cat on of the d alect c back to egel’slog c, to h s

concept on of the syllog sm. egel’s ‘rat onal syllog sm’ reverts to the ‘st ll

perfect comb nat on of mmed acy and med at on’ character st c of the

sphere of essencezz"

In general, egel conce ves of the syllog sm as med ator, as a m xtum

compos tum. One can say that n h s development of the rat onal syllo

g sm the whole transcendence and myst caldual sm of h s system comes

to the surface. The m ddle term s the wooden sword, the concealed

oppos t on between un versal ty and s ngular ty.28

Marx adds, ‘Anyth ng further than th s belongs n the cr t que of egel an

log c’.29IfMarx were flatly opposed to log c,th s task would be po ntless.

2 What sRat onal n egel’sMethod?

Though one m ght th nk that Marxwas flatlyopposed to log c n anyth ng l ke

egel’ssense, ev dence ex sts aga nst that conclus on; not least sMarx’sdes re

towr te up what s rat onal n egel’smethod. Marxrecogn ses the pert nence

of log cal categor es and relat ons —not only those of ord nary formal log c.We

do recogn se common patterns n everyday and sc ent f c reason ng whose

content and movements can be attended to as such, though alwaysas aspects

of concrete reason ng about nature or sp r t. In a passage from the f rst ed t on

of Cap tal, Marx pra ses egel’sattent on to the content of some bas c log cal

forms:‘before egel,profess onal log c ans even overlooked the content of the

form of the parad gms of judgment and syllog sm’f”Ottend ng to the content

of forms belongs to the rat onal aspect of egel’smethod.

26 Marx 19703 [1843], p. 14.

27 egel 1991 [1817], §114, p. 178.

28 Marx 1970a [1843],p. 85. egel wr tes, ‘the rat onal s noth ng but the w log sm’ ( egel

1969 [1812—16],p. 665).

29 Marx 1970a [1843], p. 89.

30 As quoted n Murray 1988, p. 115.




Class cal pol t cal economy seeks to reduce the var ous f xed and mutu

allyal en forrnsofwealth to the r nner un ty bymeans of analys s and to

str p away the form n wh ch they ex st ndependently alongs de one

another. It seeks to grasp the nner connect on n contrast to the mult

pl c ty of outward forms. It therefore reduces rent to surplus prof t, so

that t ceases to be a spec f c, separate form and s d vorced from ts

apparent source, the land. It l kew sed vests nterest of ts ndependent

form and shows that t s a part of prof t. In th s way t reduces all types of

revenue and all ndependent forms and t tle under cover of wh ch the

non-workers rece ve a port on of the value of commod t es, to the s ngle

form of prof t. Prof t,however, s reduced to surplus-value s nce the value

of the whole commod ty s reduced to labour; the amount of pa d labour

embod ed n the commod ty const tutes wages,consequently the surplus

over and above t const tutes unpa d labour, surplus labour called forth

by cap tal and appropr ated grat s under var ous t tles.34

ereMarx allows that class cal pol t cal economy has the three levels of con

cepts that he d st ngu shes n h s own account: the part cular appearance

forms of surplus-value (prof t of enterpr se, nterest and rent), prof t and

surplus-value. For all that t accompl shed, however, ‘[c]lass calpol t cal econ

omy occas onally contrad cts tself n th s analys s. It often attempts d rectly,

leav ngout the ntermed ate l nks,to carry through the reduct on and to prove

that the var ous forms are der ved from one and the same source.’35Th s s not

acc dental, saysMarx:

34

35

36

Th s however s a necessary consequence of ts analyt cal method, w th

wh ch cr t c smand understand ng must beg n. Class caleconomy s not

terested n elaborat ng how the var ous forms come nto be ng [gene

t schzu entw ckeln],but seeks to reduce them to the r un ty by means of

analys s,because t starts from them asg venprem ses. But analys s s the

necessary prerequ s te of genet cal presentat on, and of the understand

g of the real, format ve process n ts d fferent phases.36

Marx 1972 [1861—3],p. 500.

Ib d.Th s lackof proper conceptual med at on s one ofMarx’smost common cr t c sms:

‘Ascan be stud ed n the case of the R card an school, t s completely wrong-headed to

seek d rectly to present the laws of the prof t rate as laws of the rate of surplus-value, or

v ce versa’ (Marx 1981[1894], p. 136). See Engels 1978 [1884], p. 93.

Marx 1972 [1861—3],p. 500.



198 MURRAY

Class calpol t cal economy’s fa lure to make sense of the development of cat

egor es shows ts conf nement to the ‘bourgeo shor zon’.

R cardowas not the lastword on prof t and surplus-value from the R card an

school. Comment ng on a l ttle-known 1821pamphlet ent tled TheSourceand

Remedy of the Nat onal Dm cult es.A Letter to Lordjohn Russell, Marx reflects

on the l m tat ons ofR cardo’stheory ofprof t, dent f es advances made bythe

author and br ngs out the l m tat ons of the author's R card anstandpo nt:

Th s scarcely known pamphlet...conta ns an mportant advance on

R cardo. It bluntly descr bes surplus-value . . . as ‘surplus labour’, the

labour wh ch the worker performs grat s, the labour he performs over

and above the quant ty of labour bywh ch the value of h s labour-power

replaced . . . Important as t was to reduce value to labour, t was equally

portant [to present] surplus-value, wh ch man fests tself n surplus

product, as surplus labour. Th swas n fact already stated by Adam Sm th

and const tutes one of the ma n elements n R cardo’sargumentat on.

But nowhere d d he clearly express t and record t n an absoluteformf”7

Th s author’sblunt descr pt on of surplus-value as surplus-labour counts as an

advance over R cardo.Marx dent f es a second advance over R cardo: ‘ ethus

d st ngu shes the general form of surplus labour or surplus-value from the r

part cular forms,someth ng wh ch ne ther R cardonor Adam Sm th [does], at

least not consc ously or cons stently.’38The author self-consc ously art culates

the d fference between surplus-value and ts several forms of appearance,

whereas prev ous class cal pol t cal econom sts were prone to m x up these

d fferent conceptual levels.Thus, th s author makes some progress n address

g Marx’sconcern about a lack of proper med at on n th nk ng about sur

plus-value, prof t and surplus-value’spart cular appearance-forms (prof t of

enterpr se, nterest and rent).

Allthe same, the pamphlet has ts l m tat ons:

The pamphlet s no theoret cal treat se .. .It does not, consequently,

make the cla m that ts concept on of surplus-valueas surplus labour car

r es w th t a general cr t c sm of the ent re system of econom c catego

r es,nor can th s be expected of t. The author stands rather on R card an

37 Marx 1972 [1861—3],pp. 238—9.

38 Marx 1972 [1861—3],p. 254.




ground and s only cons stent n stat ng one of the consequences nher

ent n the system tself.39

A ‘general cr t c sm of the ent re system of econom c categor es’was the task

that Marxundertook n Cap tal.40

Let us turn from Marx’sgeneral assessment to a number of spec f c short

com ngsof class cal pol t cal economy d rectlyperta n ng to surplus-value and

prof t. These po nts spec fy the d f cult es n ‘the ent re doctr ne of prof t as

prev ously conce ved’.

1)Where well-thought-out concepts of surplus-value,prof t and the spec f c

forms of appearance of surplus-value (prof t of enterpr se, nterest and rent)

and the r conceptual relat onsh ps are needed, the d scourse of pol t cal econ

omy s loaded w th confus ons, ncons stenc es and m ss ng or m xed-up d s

t nct ons. ‘Atbottom, surplus-value — n so far as t s ndeed the foundat on of

prof t, but st ll d st nct from prof t commonly so-called —has never been

developed’.41The ‘General Observat on’ w th wh ch Theor es of Surplus Value

beg ns s:

Alleconom sts share the error of exam n ng surplus-value not as such, n

s pure form, but n the part cular forms of prof t and rent. What theo

ret cal errors must necessar ly ar se from th s w ll be shown more fully n

Chapter III [of Cap tal Volume 111],n the analys s of the greatly changed

form wh ch surplus-value assumes as prof t.42

2) L kew se,where well-thought-out concepts of the rate of prof t and the

rate of surplus-value and the r conceptual relat onsh p are needed, we aga n

get conceptual confus on:

R cardo’s d sc ples, just as R cardo h mself, fa l to make a d st nct on

between surplus-value and prof t . . . It does not occur to them that, even

one cons ders not cap tals n d fferent spheres of product on but each

cap tal separately, nsofar as t does not cons st exclus vely of var able

cap tal, .e., of cap tal la d out n wages only, rate of prof t and rate of

39 Ib d.

40 See Marx’s letter to Lassalle of 22 February 1858(Marx and Engels 1975b,p. 10).

41 Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 384. On R cardo see Marx 1969 [1861-3], p. 168.

42 Marx 1963 [1861—3],p. 40. See also Marx 1963 [1861-3], pp. 82 and 89.



200 MURRAY

surplus-value are d fferent th ngs, that therefore prof t must be a more

developed, spec f callymod f ed form of surplus-value.43

3) Pol t cal economy lacked the dea that the concept of prof t must be

developed out of the concept of surplus-value and shown to be a ‘transformed

forrn’of t. egel an deas such as ‘more developed forms’ l e beyond the ‘bour—

geo shor zon’ of the class calpol t cal econom sts.

4) Pol t cal economy d d not correctly draw the conceptual d st nct on

between labour-power and labour, wh ch prov des the necessary foothold for

develop ng the concept of surplus-value. Engelsspells out th s fa lure:

Labour s the measure of value . . .Wages,the value of a def n te quant ty

of l v ng labour, are alwayssmaller than the value of the product that s

produced by th s quant ty of l v ng labour, or n wh ch th s s expressed.

The quest on [of ‘the value of labour’] s nsoluble n th s form. Marx

posed t correctly,and thereby answered t. It s not the labour that has a

value . ..It s not labour that s bought and sold as a commod ty, but

rather labour-power.44

5)Lack ngthe d st nct on between labour-power and labour, pol t cal econ

omy could not draw the d st nct on between constant and var able cap tal;

stead, t tangled t up w th the d st nct on between f xed and c rculat ng

cap tal.45

6) Lack ng the d st nct on between constant and var able cap tal, pol t cal

economy could not conce ve properly of the rate of surplus-value, the organ c

compos t on of cap tal, prof t or the rate of prof t.

7) Pol t cal economy, then, lacked the correct account of the qual tat ve

source of prof t and the quant tat ve determ nants of prof t and of the rate of

prof t. 80, pol t cal economy could not answer the quest on: what determ nes

the average rate of prof t?

8) Class calpol t cal economy fa led to reconc le the class cal labour-theory

of value w th the fact that cap tals of a) d ffer ng organ c compos t ons of

cap tal and b) d ffer ng tumover-t mes tend to form a general rate of prof t.

Marx lays out the argument, conclud ng, ‘The theory of value thus appears

compat ble w th the actual movement, ncompat ble w th the actual phe

nomena of product on, and t m ght seem that we must abandon all hope of

43 Marx 1972 [1861—3],p. 85.

44 Engels 1978 [1884], p. 101.

45 See Marx 1969 [1861—3],p. 170,and Engels 1978 [1884], p. 99.




understand ng these phenomena’.46R cardo recogn sed the problem n the

f rst chapter of h s Pr nc ples; n fact, Marx shows that R cardo’s examples

actually prove that h s theory of value cannot be reconc led w th the general

rate of prof t.47 owever, as Marx sets forth n deta l, R cardo obfuscated th s

resultbythrow ng the spotl ght on secondary matters.48Other pol t cal econo

m sts, notably Malthus, recogn sed th s bas c contrad ct on w thout f nd ng

a way to overcome t. Instead, they a) rejected the labour theory of value

(Malthus),b) argued that t appl ed to precap tal st soc et esbut not to cap tal

m (Torrens) or c) tr ed unsuccessfully to reconc le the contrad ct on through

one subterfuge or another (later R card ans).49On th s contrad ct on, Engels

observes, class cal pol t cal economy was sh pwrecked: ‘Around 1839, the

R card an school foundered on surplus-values"0At least by the wr t ng of the

Grundr sse n 1857-8,Marx knew that the labour theory of value n ts nd v

dual st c concept on s untenable: that was the truth at the other end of the

st ckMarxgot hold of n overturn ng the rece vedconcept ons of surplus-value

and prof t. To throw ‘overthe ent re doctr ne of prof t as prev ously conce ved’,

Marx had to overthrow the class cal labour theory of value and red rect t

from nd v dual commod t es and cap tals to the ‘heap’of commod t es and

the total cap tal.

4 owMarxAddresses These Shortcom ngs of Class cal Pol t cal

Economy

Marx draws the necessary d st nct ons, develops the requ red concepts and

d scovershow to reconc le a reconce ved labour theory of value w th the for

mat on of a general rate of prof t among f rms of d ffer ng organ c compos

t ons and/ or tumover—t mes.Marx draws the d st nct ons between labour and

labour-power and between constant and var able cap tal, clar fy nghow the

latter d st nct on d ffersfrom that between f xedand c rculat ng cap tal. These

d st nct ons open the conceptual space for an adequate concept of surplus

value and of the rate of surplus-value, wh ch, n turn, are needed n order to

develop the concepts of prof t and the rate of prof t as ‘transforrned forms’of

surplus-value and the rate of surplus-value, respect vely.

46 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 252.

47 Marx 1969 [1861—3],pp. 190—1.

48 See Marx 1969 [1861—3],p. 181.

49 Marx 1981[1894], pp. 268-9. See also Marx 1969 [1861—3],p. 191.

50 Engels 1978 [1884], p. 101.



202 MURRAY

To overthrow the ex st ng doctr nes of prof t, Marx had to overthrow the

d v dual st c class cal labour theory of value; only then could he reconc le a

labour theory of value w th the general rate of prof t Marx replaces the fa led

labour theory ofvalue,wh ch expla ns nd v dual pr ces as express ons of nd

v dual values,w th a hol st c labour theory of value that holds at the aggregate

level,that s,for the total cap tal,and expla nssubord nate phenomena on that

bas s.51Ind v dual pr ces do not match nd v dual values; nd v dual proj ts do not

match nd v dual surplus-values. St ll, the labour theory of value holds at the

aggregate level and expla ns nd v dual phenomena w th transformed value

categor es: ‘The sum of the prof ts for all the d fferent spheres of product on

must accord ngly be equal to the sum of surplus-values,and the sum of pr ces

of product on for the total soc al product must be equal to the sum of ts

values’.52Pr ces of product on expla n nd v dual pr ces no longer n terms of

d v dual valuesbut rather on the bas sofcost-pr ce (the sum ofconstant and

var able cap tal) plus prof t, as determ ned by the average rate of prof t, wh ch

depends on the aggregate surplus-value (= aggregate prof t), the AM of the

total cap tal.53Ind v dual prof ts are no longer expla ned by nd v dual surplus

valuesbut bythe transformed formsof surplus-valueand rate of surplus-value.

namely prof t and rate of prof t.

Marxpulls together the crux of h s object on to nd v dual st c value-theory,

and the ch ef po nts ofh s hol st c labour theory of value, n a passage from h s

cr t c sm of R cardo (what Marx calls ‘cost-pr ce’here swhat he calls ‘pr ce of

product on’ n Volume 111):

ence, f proj ts as a percentage of cap tal are to be equal over a per od,

say of a year, so that cap tals of equal s ze y eld equal prof ts n the same

per od of t me, then thepr cesof the commod t esmust be d fferent from

the r values. The sum total of these cost-pr cesof all the commod t es

taken together w llbe equal to the r value.S m larlythe total prof t w llbe

equal to the total surplus-valuewh ch all these cap tals y eld, for nstance,

51 ‘Everysect on of the aggregate cap tal [Gesamtkap tal] would n accordance w th ts

magn tude part c pate n the aggregate surplus-value and draw a correspond ng part

[al quot Te l]of t. And s nce every nd v dual cap tal s to be regarded as shareholder n

th s aggregate cap tal, t would be correct to sayf rst that ts rate ofprof t s the same as

that of all the others [because] cap tals of the same s ze y eld the same amount of

prof t... Compet t on more or less succeeds n th s by means of ts equal zat ons’ (Marx

1969 [1861-3], p. 29).

52 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 273.

53 ‘The product on pr ce of the commod ty has also developed, as a transformed form of

value’ (Marx 1981[1894], p. 263).




dur ng one year. If one d d not take the def n t on of value as the bas s,

the average pro/ t, and therefore also the cost-pr ces, would be purely

ag nary and untenable. The equal sat on of the surplus-values n d f

ferent spheres of product on does not affect the absolute s ze of th s total

surplus-value; but merely alters ts d str but on among the d fferent

spheres of product on. The determ nat on of th s surplus-value tself,

however, only ar ses out of the determ nat on of value by labour-t me.

W thout th s the averageprof t s the averageof noth ng, pure fancy.And

t could then equally well be 1,000per cent or 10per cent.54

Marxw ll not abandon a labour theory of value;w thout t, the general rate of

prof t,wh ch s requ red to arr ve at pr ces of product on, s left unexpla ned.

Bythe same token, we see why Marx objects to R cardo’smethod, wh ch treats

value and the general rate of prof t as be ng on the same conceptual level.The

theory of value must account for the general rate of prof t by account ng for

the total surplus-value (prof t) before t can be used to expla n the necessary

transformat on ofvalues nto pr ces of product on.

Impl cat ons ofMarx’sOverthraw ngof the Class calDoctr nesof

Front and Valuefor the Organ sat on of ‘Cap tal’

S nce overthrow ng prev ous doctr nes of prof t requ red Marx to overthrow

the nd v dual st c class cal theory of value and replace t w th a hol st c one,

there are major mpl cat ons for how Marxhad to organ se Cap tal. The class

cal labour theory of value fa lsnot only as a theory of prof t but also as a theory

of pr ces. That conclus on m ght appear to cons gn the f rst volume of Cap tal

to h story’sdustb n. Bohm-Bawerkcla med that Marx’stheory of pr ces of pro

duct on n Volume III contrad cted h s theory of value n Volume I, publ shed

1867.W th what we know today, Bohm-Bawerk’scla m looks qu te d fferent.

But how shall we express th s d fference? Shall we say,s mply, that Marx was

wellaware of a contrad ct on? After all,Marxrecogn ses the ncompat b l ty of

R card an value-theory w th a general rate of prof t already n the Grundr sse.

Or shall we take what I argue s the more plaus ble route of deny ng any con

trad ct on between the f rst and th rd volumes of Cap tal? But how can we do

that? Suppose that, ten years after hav ng overthrown R cardo’s nd v dual st

labour theory of value,Marxd d not wr te hundreds of pages of Cap tal on the

bas s of t. Suppose that Cap tal s wr tten, from the beg nn ng, on the bas s of

the new,aggregate theory ofvalue.Then Marx’scla msabout value and surplus

valueperta n to the ‘heap’of commod t es and the total cap tal or the r al quot

54 Marx 1969 [1861—3],p. 190.



304 MURRAY

parts, not to nd v dual commod t es or cap tals.55Appl ed to each actual nd

v dual commod ty or cap tal, v rtually all the cla ms of the f rst two volumes of

Cap tal are false and long known to be false by Marx.

If t can be avo ded, why accept a read ng of Cap tal Volumes 1and II that

has such a consequence? We can avo d t by read ng Cap tal as wr tten from

start to f n sh from the standpo nt of the hol st c labour theory of value that

Marxdeveloped n overthrow ngprev ous doctr nes of prof t.When Marxuses

examples and wr tes of part cular commod t es and cap tals n the f rst two

volumes,he refers not to actual nd v dual commod t es or cap tals but rather

to representat ve commod t es and cap tals that are al quot parts of the total

‘heap’of commod t es or cap tals.56Wh le t s generally false that nd v dual

commod t es sell at pr ces determ ned by the r nd v dual values, t s true that

an al quot part of the heap of commod t eswould sellat a pr ce determ ned by

s value. L kew se,the prof t real sed byan nd v dual cap tal w ll generally not

be determ ned bythe nd v dual amount of surplus-valuecreated by the work

ers h red by that cap tal. But the prof t to an al quot part of the total cap tal

would be determ ned by the surplus-value created by the workers employed

across all cap tals. There sno contrad ct on between Volumes I and 111because

Marx never puts forward the nd v dual st c theory of value that he had dem

onstrated to be false by 1858.

D scordant Overlapp ngD scourses: Unmask ng Cap tal’sPretence to

Be Se f-Valor s ng

Marx organ ses the three volumes of Cap tal n order to expose the cap tal

fet sh, cap tal’s pretence to match what Marx thought egel cla med for the

Concept. Marxorgan ses th s d sclosure across the three volumes of Cap tal by

overlapp ng the apparent Concept-Log c of cap tal and the Essence-Log cof

surplus-value. e s multaneously develops the concept of cap tal, w th ts pre

tence to the self-conta ned development character st c of egel’sConcept,

self-valor sat on, and lays out the Essence-Log c of surplus-value, whereby

55 SeeMurray 2005.‘Incap tal st product on, each cap tal s assumed to be a tm t, an al quot

part of the total cap tal' (Marx 1963 [1861—3],p. 416; Marx 1991,p. 299). Fred Moseley

comments that th s passage ‘clar f esthe mportant po nt that the nd v dual cap tals

wh ch Marx often used as llustrat ons n Volume I of Cap tal. . .are not n fact nd v dual

cap tals, but are nstead deal representat ves of the total cap tal . . . and thus that the real

subject ofVolume I s th s total cap tal’ (Moseley 2009, p. 142).

56 In a letter to Engels (8 January 1868),Marx suggests the metaphor of the total soc al

surplus-value n solut on, wh ch neatly f ts the dea of al quot parts: ‘1f rst deal w th the

general form of surplus-value, n wh ch all these elements are st ll und fferent ated — n

solut on as t were’ (Marx and Engels 1975b,p. 232).




surplus-value necessar ly appears as prof t: ‘prof t s the form of appearance

of surplus-value’.57The concept of surplus-value ncorporates the antagon st c

and explo tat ve class-relat onsh p between cap tal sts and wage-workers: t

‘lays bare’ cap tal’s underp nn ngs. Marx calls attent on to the d srupt on

caused by the overlapp ng of the apparent Concept-Log cof cap tal and the

Essence-Log cof surplus-value:

ln surplus-value, the relat onsh p between cap tal and labour s la d bare.

In the relat onsh p between cap tal and prof t, .e. between cap tal and

surplus-value as t appears... cap tal appears as a relat onsh p to tself a

relat onsh p n wh ch t s d st ngu shed as an or g nal sum of value, from

another new value that t pos ts. It appears to consc ousness as f cap tal

creates th s newvalue n the course of tsmovement through the produc

t on and c rculat on processes.58

Ident fy ng th s d srupt ve overlap spec f es how Marx both accounts for and

exposes cap tal’s pretence to be a Concept-l ke ‘self-valor s ng’ ‘automat c

subject’.

That cap tal appears to valor se tself ar ses naturally out of the way that

surplus-value necessar ly appears, that s, as prof t. Prof t s measured aga nst

the value of cap tal’s nputs nto the product on-process (cost-pr ce); conse

quently,due to the format on ofa general rate ofprof t,the magn tude of prof t

a funct on of the magn tude of cap tal nvested. S nce t s proport onal to ts

magn tude —and to noth ng else apparent to everyday consc ousness —cap tal’s

growth seems to be ent rely ts own do ng. Marx’s counter-d scourse of sur

plus-value exposes the truth about prof t and cap tal’s seem ngly nherent

power to valor se tself.The sole source of prof t,hence of cap tal’svalor sat on,

the unpa d labour of product ve wage-workers.

The phenomenon of wages, l ke that of prof t, supports cap tal’s fet sh st c

pretence to ndependence, to be ‘self-valor s ngvalue’.Marx reconce ves wages

as the transformed form of the value of labour-power.Marx does not br ng n

the category of wages unt l Chapter XIXof Volume 1,after he ntroduces the

concept of surplus-value, and draws the d st nct ons between labour and

labour-power and between constant and var able cap tal and prov des a

57 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 139.

58 Marx 1981[1894],p. 139.‘Just as Marx rejects as llusory the presupposed ndependence

from sensuous actual ty that he f nds n egel’sph losoph cal log c, so, too, does Marx

denude the concept of cap tal of ts secur ng ndependence from natural objects and

l v ng human labour’ (Murray 1988,p. 219).



205 MURRAY

thorough treatment of absolute and relat ve surplus-value. The wage-form

cludes features that are not present n the concept of the value of labour

power.Marx ntroduces h s exam nat on of these features w th th s short para

graph: ‘Let us f rst see how the value (and the pr ce) of labour-power s

represented n ts converted [verwandelte] form as wages'.59The wage appears

to be ‘the pr ce of labour', compensat on forthe labour done: ‘Onthe surface of

bourgeo s soc ety the worker’swage appears as the pr ce of labour, as a certa n

quant ty of money that s pa d for a certa n quant ty of labour’.60 ence ‘all

labour appears as pa d labour’.61Leftunchallenged, th s understand ng of the

wageas ‘thepr ce of labour' would thwart Marx’s‘lay ngbare’ of cap tal: unpa d

labour accounts for prof t.

The wage-formblocks draw ng the d st nct on between labour and labour

power; t leaves no wayto account for surplus-value and allows no conceptual

space for the essent al category of var able cap tal. L keprof t and the rate of

prof t, the wage s an appearance-form that covers up the true source of prof t:

Wemay therefore understand the dec s ve mportance of the transfonna—

t on [Verwandlung]of the value and pr ce of labour-power nto the form

of wages, or nto the value and pr ce of labour tself. All the not ons of

just ce held byboth the worker and the cap tal st, all the myst f cat ons of

the cap tal st mode of product on, all cap tal sm’s llus ons about free

dom, all the apologet c tr cks ofvulgar econom cs, have as the r bas s the

form of appearance d scussed above, wh ch makes the actual relat on

v s ble, and ndeed presents to the eye the prec se oppos te of that

relat on.62

Byf rst develop ng the essent al categor es of labour-power and var able cap

tal, and only later ntroduc ng the appearance-form ofwages,presented as the

transformed form of the value of labour-power, Marx d scloses the wage—form

to be the necessary formof appearance of relat ons of dom nat on and explo

tat on. Th s s a blow to the Tr n ty Formula’s assurance that all’swell n the

world of cap tal st relat ons.

Th s pattern runs throughout Cap tal: Marx moves from observable phe

nomena nterpreted n everydayways, for example, wages and prof ts, to the r

essent al determ nants. e then works back and develops the appearance

59 Marx 1976c [1867141 697

60 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 675.

61 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 680.

62 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 680.



OW EGEL ELPED MARXTO OVERTURN RICARDO’S T EORY OF PROFIT 207

forms as transformat ons of the essent al forms. Of the revenue-forms that

Marx cons ders n the chapter on the Tr n ty Formula, the wage s the f rst he

develops. Not ce how he descr bes each of these revenue-forms. In each case,

the term ‘transformat on’ [Verwandlung] s gnals that Marx s show ng how an

essent al category, one of those that enable Marx to ‘lay bare’ cap tal’s pre

tences, s (necessar ly) transformed nto a category of appearance that con

f rms cap tal’s pretences. Of course, n the egel an concept on, wh ch Marx

adopts, these transformed categor es of appearance belong to the essence.

0n Read ng Chapters IVand Vof ‘Cap tal’VolumeI

What Marx called the ‘Chapter on Cap tal’ n the Grundr sse, beg ns n Cap tal

w th Chapter IV,‘The General Formula for Cap tal’. That formula s M —C—M

+ AM, and Marx calls AM ‘surplus-value’. As we learn n the f rst chapter of

Volume 111,Cost Pr ce and Prof t', th s AM s numer cally, but not conceptually,

the same as what Marx calls ‘prof t’.AM s the prof t to the total cap tal, M,

wh ch s dent f ed n Chapter I of Volume III as total cost-pr ce. Cost-pr ce s

the transformed formof the sum of constant cap tal and var able cap tal: ‘Ifwe

call cost pr ce It,the formula C = c +v + s s transformed [verwandelt s c/z] nto

the formula C = k + s, or commod ty value = cost pr ce + surplus-value’.53In

Chapter IV,then, Marx ntroduces the phenomenon that he ntends to expla n

bydevelop ngthe concept of surplus-value and later show ngthat the category

ofprof t s the ‘transformed form of surplus-value’.It s the same phenomenon

that Marx engages w th at the beg nn ng of Volume III.64The fact that Marx

calls th s AM‘surplus-value’,not ‘prof t’,and does not ntroduce the term ‘prof t’

unt l the f rst chapter of Volume III, s mportant. It tells us much about how

Cap tal s organ sed and to what ends.

Chapters IVand V of Volume I are to be read n the l ght of the f rst two

chapters ofVolume 111,where Marx ntroduces the concepts of cost-pr ce and

prof t and the rate of prof t. The AMthat Chapter IV ntroduces s not the AM

of th s or that nd v dual cap tal but rather the net prof t to all cap tals. Or,

wh ch amounts to the same th ng, t s the AMof an al quot part of that total

cap tal. Chapter Vof Volume 1makes t clear that the AMof Chapter IVrefers

to the sum of the prof ts to all cap tals —or to an al quot part of the total

63 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 118.

64 In the f rst draft of the chapter ‘Cost Pr ce and Prof t', n the Econom cManuscr pt of 1861—

63.Marx makes th s expl c t: ‘Wenow return, therefore, to the po nt of departure from

wh ch we proceeded n cons der ng the general form of cap tal’ (Marx 1988a [1861—3],

p. 80).



208 MURRAY

cap tal.65Though the AMof th s or that nd v dual cap tal can be expla ned by

the theory that surplus-valuear ses out of c rculat on rather than product on,

by a ‘mark-up’theory, the fact that there s a net surplus-value to the total cap

tal cannot be expla ned n th s way.

In Chapter I ofVolume 111,AMappears as proj t, a category that s conceptu

ally pa red w th the category of cost-pr ce.Th s pa r ng d st ngu shes prof t

from the category of surplus-value. Prof t s del ned as what rema ns after the

cost-pr ce s deducted fromthe net proceeds fromthe sale of the commod t es

produced n the spec f ed t me-per od: ‘as an excess of the sale pr ce of the

commod ty over ts cost pr ce’.66Marx argues that the category of cost-pr ce,

by lump ng constant and var able cap tal together, erases that essent al

d st nct on.67It naturally produces the llus on that AMar ses not n produc

t on but rather n c rculat on. ‘Thus f commod ty value s formed w thout any

other element bes des the cap tal st’s advance of value, there s no way of see

g how any more value s to come out of product on than went nto t, unless

someth ng s to come out of noth ng’.68If AMcannot come out of product on —

as t cannot f the wage s ‘the pr ce of labour’ —then t appears that t must

somehow come out of c rculat on. Colonel Torrens thus ns sted that prof t

must ar se n c rculat on, wh le Ramsay rebuked h m for mply ng that value

could come out of th n a r.Marx c tes both Torrens and Ramsay n ChapterV of

Volume I and aga n n Chapter I ofVolume 111.59he way that Torrens accounts

forAM(for the total cap tal), wh ch flowsnaturally fromthe appearance-forms

of cost-pr ce and prof t, s shown n Chapter Vof Cap tal Volume 1to fa l:ga ns

and losses cancel one another out. Th s leaves the quest ons of what g ves r se

to AMand what determ nes ts magn tude unanswered. Not only are these

quest ons unanswered, Marxcharges that they are unanswerable on the bas s

of cap tal’s un nvest gated appearance-forms (cost-pr ce, prof t and rate of

prof t). e observes, ‘But fwe start from th s rate of prol t, we can never estab

l sh any spec c relat onsh p between the excess and the part of cap tal la d

out on wages’.70So,Marx does not start Cap tal that way.

65 In d scuss ng n Volume III the not on that surplus-value ‘der ves from the sale [of the

commod ty] tself’,Marx observes, ‘Wehave already dealt w th th s llus on n deta l n

Volume 1,Chapter 5’(Marx 1981[1894], p. 128).

66 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 138.

67 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 253.

68 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 129.

69 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 264, and 1981[1894], pp. 128-9, respect vely.

70 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 138.




Marxstarts from the phenomena that appear as prof t and the rate of prof t.

These appearances, as Marxargues n Chapters I and ll ofVolume III,naturally

lead to 1) conclud ng that AM ar ses n c rculat on, not product on, and

2) attr but ng to cap tal a myster ous power to throw off prof ts (to valor se

self).That pretence to self-valor sat on leads Marx n Chapter II ofVolumeIII

to compare cap tal to egel'sConcept:

Wem ght say n the egel an fash on that the excess s reflected back nto

self from the rate ofprof t, or else that the excess,wh ch s character sed

more spec f cally by the rate of prof t, appears as an excess wh ch the

cap tal produces over and above ts own value . . . [C]ap tal appears as a

relat onsh pto tsef a relat onsh p nwh ch t s d st ngu shed, as an or g

nal sum of value, from another new value that t pos ts. It appears to

consc ousness as f cap tal creates th s new value n the course of ts

movement through the product on and c rculat on processes.71

Towardthe end of Chapter IVof Volume I,wh ch takes up the same phenom

ena that w ll be exam ned n a very d fferent l ght n the open ng chapters of

VolumeIII (namely as the necessary appearance of an essence, surplus-value,

as someth ng other than tself),Marxdescr bes cap tal as a Concept-l ke ‘auto

mat c subject’ that ‘changes ts own magn tude, throws off surplus-value from

self cons dered as or g nal value, and thus valor ses tself ndependently...

[V]alue suddenly presents tself as a self-mov ng substance wh ch passes

through a process of ts own’.72In Chapter IVofVolume 1,Marx does not work

through the reasons why prof t seems to ar se n c rculat on and cap tal seems

to be an ndependent, self-mov ngsubstance, as he does n the open ng chap

ters ofVolume III.Marx does not ntroduce cost-pr ce, prof t and rate of prof t,

as categor es of appearance, unt l the beg nn ng of Volume III, after he has

developed the necessary essence-categor es (labour-power as opposed to l v

ng labour, constant cap tal and var able cap tal, surplus-value and the rate of

surplus-value)and has explored the dynam cs of surplus-value at length.When

Marx does ntroduce the categor es of prof t and the rate of prof t, he ntro

duces them as transformat ons of the essent al categor esof surplus-value and

rate of surplus-value,wh ch appear necessar lyas someth ng other than them

selves,namely prof t and the rate of prof t.

71 Marx 1981[1894],p. 139.‘But how th s happens s now myst f ed, and appears to der ve

from h dden qual t es that are nherent n cap tal tself (Marx 1981[1894],p. 139).

72 Marx 1976c [1867], pp. 255—6.



210 MURRAY

Wecan compare what Marxdoesw th surplus-value and ts form of appear

ance, prof t, to what Marxdoes n Chapter I of Cap talVolume I,w th value and

ts formofappearance, money.Marxbeg nsw th a phenomenon that everyone

fam l ar w th, namely, that a use-value generally presents tself w th a pr ce.

But he does not descr be the phenomenon n that way; nstead, he says that

wealth n the form of a commod ty has an exchange-value.73At the beg nn ng

of sect on III,Marx aga n avo ds us ng ‘money’or ‘pr ce’,say ng that commod

t es ‘possess a double form, .e. natural form and value form’.So, when Marx

troduces the money-form as the culm nat on of the d alect c of the value

form,he ntroduces t not asthe fam l areverydayphenomenon - commod t es

have pr ces —but rather as the necessary form of appearance of value, the

transformed form of value, wh ch has f rst been shown to be the essence of

exchange-value.

5 owD d egel elp Marx Surpass R cardo’sTheory of Prof t?

Let us go to the crux of the matter before turn ng to some broader cons der

at ons. Marx wr tes of Adam Sm th’s th nk ng on surplus-value and prof t:

‘AdamSm th. . . should certa nly have seen from th s that he ought not to treat

[the] general abstract form as d rectly dent cal w th any of ts part cular

forrns’.74As ment oned above, th s fa lure to d scr m nate forms s one of the

most fundamental cr t c sms Marx makes of prev ous theor es of prof t. Marx

med ately attr butes Sm th’stheoret cal fa lure to a methodolog cally nar

row emp r c sm:

W th all later bourgeo s econom sts, as w th Adam Sm th, lack of theo

ret cal understand ng needed to d st ngu sh the d fferent forms of the

econom c relat ons rema ns the rule n the r coarse grabb ng at and nter—

est n the emp r cally ava lable mater al. ence also the r nab l ty to

form a correct concept on of money, n wh ch what s n quest on s only

var ous changes n the form of exchange-value,wh le the magn tude of

value rema ns unchanged.75

73 Martha Campbell observes,‘AlthoughMarxnever regards exchange value as anyth ng but

money pr ce, he does not spec fy that t s unt l he shows what money pr ce nvolves’

(Campbell 1997,p. 100).

74 Marx 1963 [1861—3],p. 92.

75 Ib d. Of R cardo’smethod Marx says,‘Butthe faulty arch tecton cs of the theoret cal part

(the f rst s x chapters [of R cardo’sPr nc ples]) s not acc dental, rather t s the result of




ereMarx assoc ates the two ch ef fa l ngs of class cal pol t cal economy: 1) t

does not grasp the necessary formal d fference between a commod ty and the

money for wh ch t s exchanged (though the r value-magn tudes are the

same); and 2) t does not grasp the necessary formal d fference between prof t

and surplus-value (though the r value-magn tudes are the same).75

ere l es the short answer to the quest on: how d d egelhelp Marx surpass

R cardo’stheory of prof t? egel taught Marx to take matters of form n ear

nest, not to take g ven concepts for granted but to probe the r content n a

pa nstaldng emp r cal and conceptually self-reflect veway that I call ‘redou

bled emp r c sm’.77From egel, Marx learned to develop concepts, a thought

fore gn to the m ndset of the class cal pol t cal econom sts, to show how one

concept s the transformedform of another, as prof t s the transformed formof

surplus-value, and to demonstrate the necess ty of such transformat ons.78

More part cularly, Marx learned from egel's Log c of Essence not to treat

essenceand appearance as separable:Essencemust appear as someth ng other

than tself.Essence s not some mpercept ble th ng or force that stands alone,

dependent of ts express on. No,the two are one complex real ty.

What MarxLearned from egel:Not an Exhaust ve L st

1)Immanent cr t que:Marx learned from egelto advance sc ence byway of an

manent cr t que of prev ous th nkers.79Marx’smature theory of prof t s a

case n po nt; he arr ves at t by prob ng the fa lure, wh ch had been seen by

Malthus, Ba ley and others, of the nd v dual st c class cal theory of value to

account for the general rate of prof t.

R cardo'smethod of nvest gat on tself and of the def n te taskwh ch he set h mself n h s

work. It expresses the sc ent f c def c enc es of th s method of nvest gat on tself”(Marx

1969 [1861—3],p. 167).

76 ‘ln elaborat ng [d e Entw cklung] the concept of value, he [R cardo] does not clearly

d st ngu sh between the var ous aspects, between the exchangevalue of the commod ty,

as t man fests tself:appears n the process of commod ty exchange, and the ex stence of

the commod ty as value as d st nct from ts ex stence as an object, product, use-value’

(Marx 1972 [1861—3],. 125).Marx also makes th s k nd of compla nt regard ng R cardo's

approach to surplus-value and prof t.

77 See Murray 1997.

73 ‘Th s whole BLUNDERof R cardo's . . . spr ng[s] from h s fa lure to d st ngu sh between

surplus-value and prof t; and n general h s treatment of def n t onsofform s crude and

uncomprehend ng, just as that of the other econom sts’ (Marx 1989a [1861—3],. 439).

79 egel 1969 [1812—16],p. 581.



212 MURRAY

2) Conceptualclar ty:Qu te a fewof the m stakes of the pol t cal econom sts

nvolvelack of clar ty about concepts; often the r concepts are vague,confused

or amb guous. egel wrote, ‘[P]h losoph z ng requ res, above all, that each

thought should be grasped n ts fullprec s on and that noth ng should rema n

vague and ndeterrn nate’.80Marx’smature theory of prof t s aga n a case n

po nt, s nce,beforeMarx,no clear conceptual d st nct ons were drawn between

labour and labour-power, constant and var able cap tal, surplus-value and

prof t or the rate of surplus-value and the rate of prof t.

3)Not tak ng conceptsfor granted: Marxdoes not take categor es for granted.

Marx compla ns over and over about pol t cal econom sts tak ng concepts for

granted rather than ‘develop ng’ them, reach ng back to h s f rst ser ous

encounter w th them n the Par sManuscr pts. One of Marx’sbas c cr t c sms

ofR cardo s that he s mplyassumes the general rate of prof t rather than prob

g t to determ ne ts conceptual compat b l ty w th h s nd v dual st c theory

of value.81As we have seen, class cal pol t cal economy made a bad show ng

where the category ofwageswas concerned:

Class cal pol t cal economy’s unconsc ousness of th s result of ts own

analys s and ts uncr t cal acceptance of the categor es ‘value of labour’,

‘natural pr ce of labour’,etc. as the ult mate and adequate express on for

the value-relat on under cons derat on, led t nto nextr cable confu

s ons and contrad ct ons, as w ll be seen later, wh le t offered a secure

base of operat ons to the vulgar econom sts who, n the r shallowness,

make t a pr nc ple to worsh p appearances only.82

Because of h s attent on to forms,Marx’ssc ent f c agenda reaches far beyond

the hor zon of pol t cal economy.The dea that a system of categor es needs to

be cr t c sed f ts n perfectly w th the asp rat ons of Marx’s‘redoubled emp r

c sm’,but t s fore gn to an emp r c sm unreflect ve about ts categor es.

4)Essencemust appear as someth ng other than tself.From egel’sLog cof

EssenceMarx learned the bas c conceptual f gure:Essencenecessar ly appears

as someth ng other than tself. Essence and appearance are recogn sed to be

nseparable. egel supersedes the convent onal understand ng of the catego—

r es of the Essence-Log cas ‘products of the reflect ng understand ng, wh ch

both assumes the d st nct ons as ndependentand at the same t me pos ts the r

80 egel 1991[1817],§80 add t on, pp. 127—8.

81 See Marx 1969 [1861—3],p. 174.

82 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 679.




relat onal ty as well... [I]t does not br ng these thoughts together’.83 egel’s

advance n grasp ng the Log c of Essence shows up n Marx’s treatments of

value and of surplus-value:value necessar ly appears as someth ng other than

self,money; surplus-value necessar ly appears as someth ng other than tself,

prof t.

5)Systemat c d alect c: to developconcepts and transformforms: Marx learns

from egel’slog c to develop categor es method cally, n a structure of mutual

presuppos t on, not just to postulate them. Develop ng the necessary forms

of appearance of essences s a cruc al case of develop ng categor es. Marx

rebukes R cardo for postulat ng a general rate of prof t and then mak ng a

faulty effort to check to see f t s compat ble w th the law of value as R cardo

had (too narrowly, as t turns out) conce ved of t.84Needless to say, ‘[h]ow

from the mere determ nat on of the “value”of the commod t es the r surplus

value, the prof t and even a general rate ofproj t are der ved rema ns obscure

w th R cardo’.85More generally, Marx compla ns that R cardo’s Pr nc ples,

start ng w th the f rst chapter, s a conceptual hodgepodge.86Marx ns sts that

the general rate of prof t must be developed out of the theory of value, not

s mply postulated. The very dea of transformed forms s egel an n nsp ra

t on.When we move from the phenomena n the r everyday nterpretat on to

the r essence, we move n order to comprehend them. In revers ng d rect ons

and mov ng from essent al categor es to the r necessary forms of appearance,

wegraspappearance-forms, such asmoney and prof t,as transformed forms of

essent al categor es, value and surplus-value, respect vely.In proceed ng n th s

wayMarxdevelops categor es and ach eves a conceptually adequate represen

tat on of cap tal st actual ty —‘absolute form’.

83 egel 1991 [1817], §114, p. 179.

84 Marx 1969 [1861—3],p. 174.See also Moseley 1993a, p. 163.

35 Marx 1969 [1861—3],pp. 190—1.

35 Marx 1969 [1861-3], pp. 164,168,190.



C APTER 9

‘TheC rcular Course of Our Representat on’:

‘Sche n’,‘Grund’and ‘Ersche nung’ n Marx’s

Econom c Works

Igor anzel

Introduct on

The a m of th s chapter s to deal w th the methodolog cal aspects of Marx’s

econom c works,and here espec allyw th the wayshe proceeds from a certa n

cluster of concepts ofpol t cal economy as a sc ence to other ones.l I start w th

a short overv ewofMarx’sprocedures n Cap talVolumeI lead ng to the manu

scr pt ‘Chapter VI.Results of the Immed ate Process of Product on’ and show

how they correspond to a c rcular type of theory-construct on.

For a better understand ng of th s type of theory-construct on, I then anal

yse egel’s log co-categor al reconstruct on of the movement of sc ent f c

knowledge from Sche n v a Wesen to Ersche nung as g ven n h s Sc ence of

Log c and I show how Marx draws on egel’s category-clusters Sche n, Wesen

and Ersche nung, and the r order ngs. Based on th s account I also propose a

translat on nto Engl shof the category-pa r Sche nand Ersche nung that takes

to account these pecul ar t es. Because I make th s proposal only at the end

of th s chapter, I shall use throughout my text the German terms for th s pa r

as well for categor es that are related to t. As the pr mary source for the quo

tat ons I w ll use the texts publ shed n the MEGAed t on; all the quotes n

Engl sh are my translat ons from German. For a better understand ng of the

categor es employed by Marx, I nsert nto the Engl sh quotat ons n square

brackets the correspond ng German terms n the r bas c, for example, nl n

t ve form. In the Engl sh translat ons of quotat ons from egel’sW ssenschaft

der Log k1use the German terms for those categor es. In order to d st ngu sh

the categor es of cogn t on from the r l ngu st c express ons, 1put the former

tal csand the latter n quotat on-marks. I cap tal se those categor eswh ch

stand for clusters of categor es.

F nally, I g ve an ep stemolog cal account of the category-pa r Sche n

and Ersche nung w th respect to Marx’s econom c works together w th a

1 Th s paper was wr tten w th the support of the grant VEGA,number 1/0221/14.

© KONINKLIJKEBRILLNV, LEIDBN, 2014 DOI l0.1163/9789004270022_Oll



‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND’ AND ‘ERSC EINUNG’ IN MARX'S ECONOMIC WORKS 215

descr pt on of the pecul ar t es of German syntax n relat on to that pa r.

Basedon th s account, I propose an nterpretat on of the term ‘subject’from

Chapter IVof Cap tal Volume I, and of chosen sect ons n Marx’smanuscr pts

used by Engels n the publ cat on of Cap tal Volume III.2

1 Marx’s ‘C rcular’Log cof Theory-Construct on

Marxstarts Chapter I of Cap talVolume I,w th the follow ngstatement:

The wealth of soc et es n wh ch the cap tal st mode of product on pre

va lsappears [ersche nen] as an ‘ mmense collect on of commod t es’; the

d v dual commod ty appears as ts elementary form. Our nvest gat on

therefore beg ns w th the analys s of the commod ty.3

Then, n a sequence of steps he subjects the commod ty to a ser es of analyses,

basedonwh ch he reduces n thought the exchange-valueof a commod ty to ts

value-character, and then n turn der ves the concepts of exchange-valueand

money as a form of exchange-value. Th s enables h m also to move to under

stand ng how surplus-value s produced. All these steps, f nally, lead, or to be

moreprec se ( fMarxhad stuck to h s n t al plan), should have led, to ‘ChapterVI.

Results of the Immed ate Process of Product on’. Its most mportant aspect,

from the po nt of v ew of th s chapter, swhat Marx labels as ‘C rkellaufunsrer

Darstel ung’,that s, the ‘c rcularcourse of our representat on’4 w th respect to

what should have been the end of the f rst volume of Cap tal:

The commod ty, as the elementary form of bourgeo s wealth, was our

po nt of departure, the prerequ s te for the emergence of cap tal. On

the other hand, commod t es appear now [ersche nen] as the product

of cap tal . . . If we cons der soc et es of developed cap tal st product on,

the commod ty appears [ersche nen] n them as the constant elementary

2 See Marx 1992and Marx 2012.I would l ke to thank Dr Gerald ubmann from the Berl n

Brandenburg sche Akadem e der W ssenschaften n Berl n, Germany, for enabl ng me to

access the manuscr pt Marx 2012shortly before ts publ cat on.

3 Marx 1987d [1872], p. 69, Marx 1976c [1867], p. 125.The term ‘ersche nen’ appears n the

German or g nal only once, not tw ce as n the Engl shtranslat on.

4 Marx 1988c, p. 24, Marx 1976c [1867], p. 949.



216 ANZEL

presuppos t on of cap tal and also the mmed ate result of the cap tal st

process of product on.5

e also states the follow ng: ‘Thecommod ty, as the un versally necessaryform

of the product, as the spec f c character st c of cap tal st mode of product on,

shows tself palpany n the large-scaleproduct on that emerges n the course

of the development of cap tal st product on'.6

The last trace of Chapter VI can be found n the f rst ed t on of Cap tal

Volume I, at the very end of ‘The Modern Theory of Colon sat on’, where he

says the follow ng:

Supposethe cap tal st has advanced and consumed n the process ofpro

duct on £5,000, £4,000 n means of product on, £1,000 n labour-power,

w th a rate of explo tat on of labour of 100%.So,the value of the product,

e.g., of x tons of ron, s £6,000. If the cap tal st sells the ron at ts pr ce,

then he real sesa surplus-value of£1,000,that s,the unpa d labour mate

r al sed n the ron . . .The mmed ate result of the cap tal st product on s

commod ty,even f a commod ty mpregnated w th surplus-value. Weare

thrown back to our po nt of departure, the commod ty.7

I nterpret these statements asmean ng that wh leMarx n sect on 1of Chapter

I of Cap talVolume I chooses the mass of commod t es together w th a s ngle

commod ty as an average sample from th s mass as a po nt of departure for

h s expos t on wh le g v ngno conceptual just f cat on for th s cho ce, at the

(supposed) end of th s volume, th s po nt of departure rece ves ts just f ca

t on. S multaneously, Marx expl c tly nd cates how th s ‘end-po nt’ of der va

t on d ffersfromthat po nt of departure:

The commod tythat emerges from cap tal st product on s determ ned

d fferently from the commod ty we began w th as the element, the pre

suppos t on of cap tal st product on. Webegan w th the nd v dual com

mod ty as an ndependent art cle n wh ch a spec f camount [Quantum]

of labour-t me s object f ed and wh ch therefore has an exchange-value

of a def n te s ze [Gr je]. The commod ty now appears [ersche nen] fur

ther determ ned n a twofold manner: 1)What s object f ed n t. . . s a

spec f cquantum [Quantum] of soc allynecessary labour. But whereas n

5 Ib d.

6 Marx 1988c, pp. 29—30,Marx 1976c [1867], p. 953.

7 Marx 1983f [1867], p. 619.



‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND' AND ‘ERSC EINUNG' IN MARX'S ECONOMIC WORKS 217

the commod ty as such t rema ns qu te undec ded (and s n fact a mat

ter of nd fference) fromwhom th s object f ed labour s der ved etc., the

commod tyas the product of cap tal conta ns part ally pa d and part ally

unpa d labour . . .2)The nd v dual commod ty does not only appear [ers

che nen]mater ally as an al quot part of the total produce of cap tal, but

as an al quot part of the total lot produced by t.Wedo not at all have n

front of us the nd v dual ndependent commod ty, the s ngle product.

Not nd v dual goods, but a mass of commod t esappears [ersche nen] as

the result of the process.8

About h s own conceptual der vat on he cla ms that t ‘showshow the com

mod ty as the product of cap tal . . .must be thought d fferently from the way

wh ch we conce ved t at the outset of our development of the nd v dual

dependent commod ty’.9

Basedon h s cycl cal conceptual development, Marxcla ms that Proudhon

does not take nto account the mass of commod t es as the product of the

total cap tal, where the whole mass of commod t es, produced, for example,

n one week, ‘breaks down nto one part whose pr ce = the weekly wage = the

var able cap tal la d out dur ng the week and conta n ng no surplus

value...and another part whose pr ce cons sts only of surplus-value, etc’.10

Andbecause Proudhon st cks to the concept of an solated commod ty, Marx

argues, ‘Proudhon s qu te r ght as far as the appearance goes [sowe t als der

Sche nre cht]’,llwh le comment ng on h s paradoxes as follows: ‘They cons st

n the fact that he regards the confus on wrought by econom c phenomena

[Ersche nungen] n h s own m nd as the laws govern ng those phenomena

[Gesetz der 1 'rsc/2e nung]’.12

2 egel and Marx's ‘C rcular' Log c

If one looks at the works of Marx’s publ shed n Sect on II of the MEGA,as

well as the quotat ons from them g ven above, one w ll read ly see that he

uses German terms such as ‘Ersche nung’, ‘Grund’, ‘Begr ndetes’, ‘Gesetz der

Ersche nung’ and ‘Ersche nungsform’.These stand for categor es employed by

Marx 1988c, p. 33, Marx 1976C[1867]. PP- 953-4

Marx 1988c, p. 43, Marx 1976c [1867]. P- 955

10 Marx 1988c, p. 49, Marx 1976c [1867]. P-972

11 Ib d.

12 Marx 1988c, p. 50, Marx 1976c [1867]. P-972



213 ANZEL

Marx n the process of construct ng h s econom c theory. In such an endeav

our, as I w ll show now, he expl c tly draws on egel’sSc ence of Log c.

Marx swell aware of the fact that those categor es play a cruc al role n the

cycl calmethod of theory-construct on.Marx del berately used th s method n

the framework of h s endeavour to construct an econom c theory (for exam

ple, n the movement from the concept of exchange-value ‘back’ to that of

exchange-value; from the concept of the mass of commod t es ‘back’to that

of the mass of commod t es, and so on). Some nstances of the cycl calmove

ment nMarx’seconom c works are summed up nTable1.The aster sked terms

d cate that the concepts der ved d ffer from those wh ch were the po nt of

departure for the der vat ons; prec sely what th s d fference s I w ll expla n

below.

TABLE1 Examples ofMarx’s cycl cal relat ons between concepts n h s econom c theory

ExamplesofMarx’sc rcular conceptual movements Locat on of the movements

from to

Sect on 1

Exchange-value Exchange-value‘ l

Sect on 111

Chapter 1,Cap tal

Volume 1

Sect on 1,Chapter 1,

Cap tal Volume I

Massof commod t es Massof commod t es" l

‘ChapterVI.Results of the

Immed ate Process of Product on’

Sect on 1,Chapter 1,

Average (sample) Average (sample) Cap tal Volume]

commod ty commod ty‘ I

Chapter XII,

Cap tal Volume III

Wage Wage‘ Ins de Chapter XIX

Cap tal Volume 1

(Cont nued)



‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND' AND ‘ERSC EINUNG’ IN MARX'S ECONOMIC WORKS 219

TABLE1 (Cont nued)

ExamplesofMarx’sc rcular conceptual movements Locat onof the movements

from to

Chapter IV,Cap tal,

Prof t (AM =M' —M) Prof t‘ ( ndustr al, Volume I

merchant, enterpr se, t

nterest, average, Chapters 1to IV,

average rate of, etc.) Parts IVand VCap tal

Volume III

Pr ce"r Chapters 1to 11113

Pr ce = Cap tal Volume I

Product on-pr ce l

Chapter X,Cap tal Volume III

Marx s also well aware of the fact that the development of pol t cal economy

as a sc ence, n the framework n wh ch he operates, went from the apparent

phenomena to the r essence. For example, he argues that R cardo ‘hasreduced

the apparent relat v ty [Sche nrelat v tdt] wh ch these th ngs (for example,

d amonds and pearls) possess as exchange-values, to the true relat on h d

den beh nd the appearance [Sche n],to the r relat v ty as mere express ons of

human labour’.14And, at the same, he swell aware of the fact that the knowl

edge of th s essence can serve as the explanatory bas s for ‘back—der vat on’of

these phenomena. Th s cycle I descr be n German terms: Sche n -+Wesen —>

Ersche nung.

Marx acknowledges that categor es such as Sche n, Ersche nung, Grand,

Begn' ndetes, Gesetz der Ersche nung, Ersche nungsform, and so on, hold not

Onlyfor thought-movements n pol t cal economy as a sc ence but also n

other sc ences.So, for example, he declares that the fact ‘that n the r appear

ance [Ersche nung] th ngs are often presented n an nverted way s some

th ng fam l ar n every sc ence'.15 e also states —thus un fy ng, on the bas s

13 I do not represent here the sh fts of mean ng of the term ‘pr ce’ n the movement from the

f rst to the second and th rd chapter.

14 Marx 1983f,p. n3, Marx 1976c [1867], p. 177.

15 Marx 1987d [1872],p . 500, Marx 1976c [1867], p. 677.



220 ANZEL

of appl ed categor es of cogn t on/knowledge, pol t cal economy and celest al

mechan cs —hat a sc ent f c analys s of compet t on s poss ble only f we can

grasp the nner nature of cap tal, just as the apparent [sche nbar] mot ons of

heavenly bod es are ntell g ble only to someone who s acqua nted w th the r

real [w rkl che]mot ons, wh ch are not percept ble to the senses.16

F nally, n order to pass over to the analys s of egel’scategor es, let me put

Marx’sstatement about Ersche nungsform s de by s de w th egel’spassage n

wh ch he ntroduces the trans t on from the category-cluster of Be ng to that

of Essence.

Bythe way,for the Ersche nungsfonn Be ng s the mmed ate. S nce knowl

‘valueand pr ce of labour' or ‘wage’ edge wants to cogn se [erkennen] what

holds, n contrast to the essent al be ng s nandfor tsef t does not stop

relat on [wesentl chesVerhc' ltn j ]wh ch at the mmed ate and ts determ na

ersche nt—he value and pr ce of t ons, but penetrates through t on the

labour-power —what holds for all presuppos t on that beh nd [h nter] th s

Ersche nungsformenand the r h dden be ng there s someth ng else than be ng

background [verborgener nteryrund]. tself, that th s background

The former reproduce themselves [ ntergrund]const tutes the truth of

d rectly, spontaneously, as usual forms be ng. Th s cogn t on [Erkenntn s] s a

of th nk ng, the latter must f rst be med ated knowledge [W ssen]because

d scovered by sc ence.17 t s not g ven mmed ately w th and n

essence,but starts from an other, the

be ng,and had to make the prel m nary

way,the way of com ng out from be ng

or, rather, go ng nto th s. . . through th s

med at on t f nds the essence.18

In order to understand the mportance of egel's Sc ence of Log c for Marx’s

econom c works and espec ally the creat on of Cap tal,one has to understand

pr mar ly the d fferencebetween egel'sunderstand ng ofwhat the categor es

of Sc enceof Log cas a wholestand for and what they could stand for, under a

certa n re nterpretat on, accord ng to Marx.

Wh le for egelthose categor es stand for a ph losoph cal reconstruct on of

the developmental stages of the absolute sp r t before the creat on of nature

and the f n te (human) m nd [Ge st],19Marx re nterprets those categor es n

16 Marx 1987d [1872],p. 315,Marx 1976c [1867], p. 433.

17 Marx 1987d [1872],p . 504, Marx 1976c [1867], p. 682.

18 egel 1986 [1812—16],Bd. 2, p. 13, egel 2010, p. 337, egel 1969, p. 389.

19 egel 1986 [1812—16],Bd. 1,p. 44, egel 2010, p. 29, egel 1969, p. 350.



‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND’ AND ‘ERSC EINUNG’ IN MARX’S ECONOMIC WORKS 221

such a way that they stand for the ph losoph cal reconstruct on of the appro

pr at on of the (natural and/or soc al) world by humans. Th s re nterpreta

t on thus takes place n the framework of a real st ep stemologyto wh ch Marx

turned not later than 1843—4n the Cr t que of egel’s ‘Ph losop/{yof R ght’.20

After g v ng an overall (‘macroscop c’) character sat on of Marx’s relat on

to egel’sSc ence of Log c, let me now turn to ts ‘fme’category-structures,

namely, to the nterlocked cha n of category-clusters that I d agram as Sche n—>

Wesen—>rsche nung, because, as shown above, th s cha n plays a central role

Marx’sunderstand ng of the method of construct on of h s econom c the—

ory.I shall start w th an overv ew of th s cha n and ts subclusters as g ven by

egel and then I shall show how th s cha n and ts subclusters reappear n

Marx’seconom c works.

Sche n s character sed by egel n t ally by the term ‘Unwesen’,21hat s, as

someth ng non-essent al, advent t ous, and as ‘thewhole rest wh ch rema ned

from the sphere of be ng’.22

From Sche n,v a reflect on and ts var ous levels ( dent ty, d fference, oppo

s t on, contrad ct on), egel arr ves at the category Grund as the central cate

goryof the cluster Wesen. ere t s worth not ng that egel, l keMarx, regards

essence as someth ng nternally d fferent ated and contrad ctory.” At the

same t me he treats the category Grund as a Clusterof categor es; key among

them, from the po nt of v ew of Marx’seconom c works, are those offormelle

Grund and reale Grund.

Let me beg n w th the former. egel relates the category Grund w th the

statement ‘Alleshat se nenzure chenden Grund’,24wh ch s normally translated

as ‘Everyth nghas ts sufl c ent reason’.In my v ew,he alludes here to two pos

s blemean ngs of the German term ‘Grund’:1)as the ground ofcerta n phenom

ena, where egel also uses the term ‘Grundlage’,25wh ch can be translated as

‘bas s’;and 2) as reason n the sense of g v ng a reason or reasons n the just

f cat on of someth ng. In order to understand such an amb gu ty of mean ng,

one has to turn to egel’scategoryformelle Grund,wh ch I translate asformal

ground. egel v ews t as a stage:

20 On th s see anzel1999, pp. 190—2.


22 lb d.

23 There s, however, a profound d fference n the r respect ve understand ng of th s

contrad ct on. For a cr t que of egel’sunderstand ng of the contrad ct on n essence by

Marx see h s Cr t que of egel’s‘Ph losophyof R ght’. For an analys s of th s cr t que see

anzel 1999, pp. 193—5.

24 egel 1986 [1812—16],Bd. 2, p. 82.

25 Ib d.



222 ANZEL

That a Grund s, therefore the pos ted s the Grund, conversely thus

the Grand s the pos ted.. .Because of th s dent ty of the Grand and

Begru'ndeten, the Grand s suag c ent.. . [N]oth ng s n the Grand that s

not n theBegn' ndeten,and noth ng s n the Begr ndeten that s not n the

Grund.26

In order to understand th s quote and to prov de a correct Engl sh translat on

of the German terms n t, one should compare t w th egel’sv ews n the note

attached to the expos t onof the categoryformal ground.

ere, v a a character sat on of the use of the concept of force n mechan cs,

egelshows that the German term ‘Grund’has two poss ble mean ngs, namely.

two ep stem c categor es that correspond to t. F rst, t refers to the bas s of

certa n phenomena —wh ch I translate as ‘the ground'. Th s ground grounds —

th s s my translat on of the German verb ‘zubegr nden’ —these phenomena.

The latter are ‘the grounded'; th s s my translat on of the German noun ‘das

Begr ndete'.Second, f myexpl cat on holds, then the ground s the ep stem c/

cogn t ve reason that just f es the or g n and ex stence of the phenomena.

ere the term ‘reason’ s the second mean ng of the German noun ‘Grund’.

Due to the spec f c tyof the German language here, egel had to use the term

‘Grund’ n Sc enceofLog cto stand both for the category ground and for the

category reason.That one s multaneouslyhas to take nto account both mean

ngs comes to the surfacewhen egel shows that n the sc ence of mechan cs —

w th respect to the understand ng of the relat on between the forcesand the r

effects—hese effects are the reasons n the conceptual der vat on of the forces,

that s,the latter are the reasoned.But,on the other hand, forces are the ground

of the effects of the forces; the latter are the grounded. egel therefore v ews

the knowledge of the ground as that of formal ground as an ncomplete and

unf n shed type of knowledge of the ground. It cannot be the ult mate type 0f

knowledgeof theground because theground sconceptually reasoned v a tsphe

nomena wh ch are, however;determ ned by t.

In add t on, egel locates another def c t of cogn t on at the level of the cat—

egoryformal ground. edeclares,When reflect onabout determ nate reasons

[Gr nde] st cks to that form of the ground [Grand] wh ch was here obta ned,

then the ass gn ng of the ground [Grund] rema ns only a mere formal sm and

empty tautology'.27What egel has n m nd here s that at the level of cogn

t on represented by the categoryformal ground, the ground s reasoned v a ts

phenomena [Dase n]wh ch are the reason, so that the ground and ts phe

nomena are character sed v a the same cogn t ve content, That s, one has





‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND’ AND ‘ERSC EINUNG' IN MARX’SECONOMIC WORKS 223

here an ‘ dent cal bas s [Grundlage] of the ground [Grund] and the grounded

[Begr ndeten]’.28So, the requ rement that ‘the ground [Grund] ought to have

another content than what s to be expla ned’29cannot be fulf lled at the level

of cogn t on character sed by the categoryformal ground.

What s the mportance of egel’sreconstruct on of the categoryformal

ground w th respect to Marx’seconom c works? It makes t poss ble to under

stand, for example, how and whyMarxwas able to hook up h s work n the l eld

of pol t cal economy to the works of other pol t cal econom sts. Sucha connec

t on on Marx’spart, v a the categoryformal ground, s stated n Chapter 1of

Cap talVolume Iw th respect to the concept of value: ‘[l]t was only the analy

s s of the pr ces of commod t es wh ch led to the determ nat on of the s ze

of value [Werthgrojge],only the common money-express on of commod t es

wh ch led to the establ shment of the r value-character’.30Stated otherw se,

by know ng the quant tat ve determ nat on of the pr ce, one der ves/d scov

ers the ex stence of the quant tat ve determ nat on of value. The presence

of the categoryformal ground can also be found w th respect to the concept

surplus-value n the above comment by Marx,where he states, ‘In actual fact,

the rate of prof t s that, fromwh ch one h stor callydeparts. Surplus-valueand

the rate of surplus-value are, relat ve to th s, the essent al and nv s ble to be

nvest gated’.31

The spl t between the supposed relat on of determ nat on (for example,

force determ nes ts effects), and the movementof cogn t onfrom the reason to

the reasoned (for example, from effects to the r force) s overcome accord ng

to egel at the level of knowledge of the ground as the real ground.32 ere

the ground s already the reason, ts phenomena are the reasoned, and the very

ground s conceptually der ved, that s, reasoned v a someth ng else than ts own

phenomena. Th s ‘someth ng else’ s multaneously stands for a content wh ch

d ffers from that g ven n the ground. Does there ex st n Marx’s econom c

works a counterpart to egel’sreal ground? In my v ew, t s the concept of

value understood n such a way that value has ts or g n n labour, and the con

cept of surplus-value understood n such awaythat surplus-value has ts or g n

surplus-labour. Once value and surplus-value are conceptually reasoned v a

labour and surplus-labour as the reason, then n both cases reason and the

reasoned have d fferent contents.

28 lb d.

29 egel 1986 [1812—16],Bd. 2, p. 99; egel 2010, p. 400; egel 1969, p. 458.

30 Marx 1987d [1872], p. 106,Marx 1976c [1867], p. 168. l translate Marx’s ‘Werthgrr'g'Be’s ‘s ze

of value'.

31 Marx 1992, p. 52, Marx 1981 [1894], p. 134

32 See egel 1986 [1812—16],Bd. 2, p. 102; egel 2010, p. 402; egel 1969, p. 461.



ANZEL

The mportance of the d fferent at on of the two mean ngs of the German

term ‘Grund’,aswellas the d fferent at on between the categoryformal ground

and the category real ground, allows one to understand what Marx meant

when he spoke about the h stor cal pr or ty — n cogn t on n the framework

of pol t cal economy as a sc ence —of the concept of prof t n respect to that

of surplus-value and of the concept of the wage n respect to that of the

value (pr ce) of labour-power. Both the concept of prof t and the concept of

wage at the level of Sche nare the reason by means of wh ch the r respect ve

ground —surplus-labour and value of labour-power —are der ved, that s, are

the reasoned. Then, v a Marx's conceptual endeavour, the concepts of prof t“

and wage“ —here, I ut l se the notat on g ven n Table 1 above —are der ved.

They are der vedas the grounded from the r respect veground, the concept of

surplus-value and the concept of value of labour-power, the latter be ng the

reason. Below,I w ll show also how the category real ground has a central role

Marx’sthought-movement from the descr pt on of product on of value to

that of product on of surplus-value n the passage from Chapters 1to 111,v a

Chapter IV,to Chapter V n the f rst volume of Cap tal.

egel then br ngs n the category Cond t on wh ch he relates to the cate—

gory-cluster Grund. Th s enables h m to reflect on the relat on of these two

categor es and on the ssue of the cond t on ngof the ground. It s notable that

egel declares that ‘the real ground s . . . essent ally cond t oned?"3 Once one

terprets th s statement n such a way that the ground of ts very ex stence

(that s, before one tr es to der ve ts respect ve phenomena) depends on the

presence of certa n cond t ons, th s enables one to understand —at the level

of categor es —the fact that Marx v ewed the ground of econom c processes

cap tal sm —value and surplus-value - as cond t oned n ts very ex stence.

Onlyunder certa n essent al soc al cond t ons34does concrete labour acqu re

the add t onal determ nat ons of abstract labour and surplus abstract labour,

and use-value those of value and surplus-value.

The category Cond t onenables egel also to deal w th the ssue of the rela

t on of the ground to the grounded, that s,w th the cond t ons under wh ch

the essence’sground ersche nt and thus acqu res var ous Ersche nungen. Once

all the cond t ons —the essent al and those (non-essent al) perta n ng to the

product on of the grounded, descr bed as Ersche nungen —are g ven, then

one can speak of the ‘emergence of the th ng [Sache] nto ex stence’.35 ere

33 egel 1986 [1812-16], Bd. 2, p. n3; egel 2010,p. 410; egel 1969, p. 470.

34 Marx expl c tly employs the term ‘essent al cond t ons’ n the Grundr sse (Marx 1973

[1857—8],pp. 463—4), n the Econom c Manuscr pts of 1861—63(Marx 1982b [1861-3l»

p. 2287) and n Cap tal Volume I (Marx 1976c [1867],pp. 270-2).

35 egel 1986 [1812-16], Bd. 2, p. u9; egel 2010,p. 414; egel 1969, p. 474.




ex stence s the category wh ch med ates between the cluster Grand and the

clusterErsche nung. In the latter egel also ntroduces the category Gesetzder

Ersche nung used, as shown above, very often byMarx.

3 Poss bleMean ngs and Translat ons of Sche nand Ersche nung

What lessons can be drawn from the comparat ve treatment of egel and

Marxg ven above? From the po nt of v ewofGerman syntax the follow ngfact

should be ment oned. The noun ‘Sche n’has, unl ke the noun ‘Ersche nung’—

‘Ersche nungen’ —no plural form. So, wherever Marx employs the term

‘Ersche nungen’, ts mean ng can be e ther surface phenomena before they are

explanator fyder vedfrom (reasoned on the bas s of) the r respect veessence, or,

surfacephenomena after such der vat on. Th s amb gu ty, forced upon Marx by

the pecul ar ty of German, has to be taken nto account when translat ng the

term ‘Ersche nungen’. ow should the term ‘Sche n’be translated? A.V.M ller

opted for ‘ llusory be ng’.36In my v ew, Sche n should be not reduced to pure

lus on;the former can serve, as shown above n the case of pol t cal economy

as a sc ence, as a po nt of departure for the thought-movement to and the d s

coveryof the quant tat ve determ nat on (s ze) of the ground. Worth not ng

here s that Marx, when deal ng w th Sche nand the correspond ng concepts

of pol t cal economy nvolved n commod ty-fet sh sm, character ses these

concepts as ‘object ve forms of thought?"7 I propose to translate egel’sand

Marx’sSche n and Marx’sErsche nungen, when the latter stands for phenom

ena as yet not der ved by explanat on from the essence, as ‘appearance(s)’. If

Ersche nung(en) stands for the phenomenon (phenomena) already der ved

by explanat on from the essence, l opt for the translat on ‘man festat on(s)’.

Engl sh s n the fortunate s tuat on that t can form plurals from both

express ons.

Another d fference between ‘Sche n’and ‘Ersche nung’ s that wh le the latter

comb ned by Marx w th the noun ‘Form’to make ‘Ersche nungsform’,the for

mer, to the best of my knowledge, s not.38So,aga n, Marx’s‘Ersche nungsform’

36 See egel 1969 [1812—16].

37 Marx 1987d [1872],p. 106,Marx 1976c [1867], p. 169.It s another ssue when Sche n turns

to llus on, say, n theoret cal sc ence or n human pract cal act on.

38 Onlywhen the whole MEGAed t on s ava lable on a CD-ROMw ll one be able to state th s

w th complete certa nty.The same holds for the German noun ‘dasSche nen'employed by

egel.Whether t s used also by Marx w ll rema n an open quest on unt l one s able to

perform str ng-searches n the d g tal sed ed t on ofMEGA.



2.26 ANZEL

has to be translated accord ng to the mean ng he ass gns to t: as ‘form of

appearance’ or as ‘formof man festat on’.

Worth ment on ng here also s the follow ng feature of the German lan

guage.Wh le the noun ‘Ersche nung’corresponds to the verb ‘ersche nen’,and

the noun ‘Sche n’to the verb ‘sche nen',the latter verb s used pr mar ly n the

common-sense mean ng of, for example, ‘Essche nt, als ob. . . ’,that s, ‘lt seems

as f. . . '.Marx, at least n my v ew, therefore used not only the verb ‘sche nen’,

but also somet mes the term ‘ersche nen’ n order to g ve an ep stemolog cal

character sat on of the knowledge atta ned at the level of appearances and

g ven n everyday consc ousness; n th s case the translat on should be ‘to

appear”.So,forexample, he declares (the underl n ng and translat on are m ne,

the tal cs are Marx’s):

ImMehrwerth st das Verhé ltn fs In surplus-value, the relat onsh p

zw schen Cap tal und Arbe t blongelegt;

Verhéltn Bvon Cap tal und Prof t,

d.h. Cap tal und dem Mehrwerth, w e er

e nerse ts als m C rculat onsprocefS

real s erter UeberschufS ber den

Kostenpre fSder Waare, andrerse ts

durch se n Verhaltn f zum

Gesammtcap tal naherbest mmter

UeberschufShen]; m das

Cap tal als Verhr' ltmj?zu s ch selbst, e n

Verhalm Bwor n er s ch als urspr ngl

cheWerthsumme zu e nem von hm

selbst gesetzten Neuwerth untersche

det. DafSes d esen Neuwerth wé hrend

se ner Bewegung(lurch den

Product onsprocefSund den

C rculat onsproceB erzeugt, d eB st m

Bewusstse n. Aber w e d eBgesch eht,

tnunmyst f c rtndm von hm

selbst zukommenden occult qual t es

herzukommen.39

39 Marx 1992, p. 64, Marx 1981[1894], p. 139.

between cap tal and labour s la d bare;

the relat on of cap tal and prof t, that

s,cap tal and surplus-value as, on the

one hand, the excess over the cost-pr ce

of the commod ty real sed n the

process of c rculat on and, on the other

hand, as t appears, v a ts relat on to the

total cap tal, as a more determ ned

excess, the cap tal appears as a relat on

to tsey, a relat on n wh ch t d ffers as

the or g nal sum of value from the new

value t tself pos ts.That t produces

th s newvalue n the course of ts

movement through the process of

product on and process of c rculat on.

th s s n the consc ousness. But how th s

takes place, s now myst f ed and seems

to come fromoccult qual t es belong ng

to the cap tal tself.



‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND’ AND ‘ERSC EINUNG' IN MARX'S ECONOMIC WORKS 227

Marxsomet mes d samb guates the mean ngs of the noun ‘Ersche nungsform’

and of the verb ‘ersche nen’ n such a waythat he comb nes them w th another

express on. In the case when he employs the noun at the level of knowledge

of phenomena before he passes to the conceptual grasp ng of the underly ng

soc almechan sm produc ng the respect ve phenomena, he uses the expres

s on ‘erste Ersche nung.s_form’,“0that s, ‘l rst form of appearance'.41 e also

employs th s type of clar f cat on w th respect to the verb ‘ersche nen'; for

example, he uses the express on ‘zuerst ersche nen’,42that s, ‘to appear f rst’,43

or ‘urspn' ngl ch ersc/ze nen’,44that s, ‘to appear n t ally’,45 or ‘unm ttelbar

ersche nen’,46that s, ‘to appear d rectly’.47Th s clar f cat on enables h m, as I

w ll show below, to use the term ‘ersche nen’as a character sat on of the phe

nomena wh ch serve h m as the po nt of departure of the thought-movement

t0 the ground of these phenomena. Once the phenomena are the ‘end-po nt'of

the thought-der vat on start ng from the ground, then they can serve—as 1w ll

show below —the purpose of understand ng why certa n soc al phenomena

are conceptually reflected n the m nd as appearances, that s, reflected n a

d storted, ups de-down way.

Asto the ep stemolog cal aspect of Marx’scycl calmovement from appear

ance v a essence and ground to man festat on, wh ch egel character sed as

‘retreat nto the ground and com ng out of t’,48he follow ng quest on can be

stated: how does man festat on d ffer, from the po nt of v ew of knowledge,

from appearance? In order to answer th s quest on let me turn to Marx’sder

at on of prof t on the bas s of surplus-value n the Grundr sse. In t ally, at

the level of appearance, Marx character ses prof t as an excess over the cost

pr ce Itw th wh ch the elements enter ng nto the product on-process are pur

chased,and where th s excesscomes out of the processof product on together

W th k; thus, n symbols, t takes the form It ->k + Ak,where ‘->’stands for the

product on-process and ‘Ak’or th s surplus. Once Marxbr ngs n the concepts

ofvar able cap tal v,constant cap tal 6,total advanced cap tal c +vand surplus

value3perta n ng to the process of cap tal st product on as the latter’sessence,

40 Marx 1983f [1867]; p. 102,Marx 1987d [1872], p. 165.

41 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 247.

42 Marx 1983f [1867], p. 18;Marx 1987d [1872], p. 70.

43 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 126.

44 Marx 1983f [1867], p. 22; Marx 1987d [1872], p. 75.

45 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 131.

45 Marx 1983f, p. no; Marx 1987c,p. 173.

47 Marx 1976a, p. 257.

48 egel 1986, Bd. 2, p. 103; egel 2010,p . 402; egel 1969, p. 462.



223 ANZEL

\_W_/\ YJL.__V_J

Appearance Essence Man festat on

FIGURE1 Schemat c representat on ofMarx’s der vat on of the concept of proj t n the

Grundr sse

h s approach here can be represented as c + v —> + v + s. Then, f nally, Marx

moves conceptually n such a way that he reasons the concept of cost-pr ce k

v a the concepts of constant cap tal, var able cap tal and the r sum, thus the

mean ng of the symbol ‘k’ s now constructed as c +v c=k, and the excess of the

cost-pr ce s reasoned v a the concept of surplus-value, so the mean ng of the

symbols ‘Ak’ s now constructed already as s c= Ak.49Marx’s movement from

appearance v a essences ‘back’to man festat on n th s case can thus be repre

sented symbol callyv a the d agram presented as F gure 1.

ere the dashed arrows nd cate that the concepts of advanced cap tal,

excess over advanced cap tal from the appearance-level of cogn t on, as well

as concepts of constant and var able cap tal and of surplus-value from the

essence-level of cogn t on, reappear, v a a sh ft, at the level of man festat on

the der vat on of the concept of prof t. In the words of Marx: ‘Theproduct

of cap tal s prof t. The magn tude of surplus-value s therefore measured by

the s ze of the value of cap tal’.50Thus, at the level of knowledge of man festa

t on are nvolved not only concepts g ven already at the level of knowledge of

appearance, but also concepts that are g ven for the f rst t me at the level of

knowledge of essence.

Th s s expressed by egel as follows: man festat on s the un ty of appear

ance and of the mmed acy of be ng to wh ch the essence has aga n restored

self:51Stated n more understandable, ep stemolog cal terms: the concepts

ntroduced at the levelof knowledgeof essence as the reason —as the explanans —

are sh fted n the process of explanat on to the reasoned —o the expla ned, to the

49 ere the symbol ‘c='stands for the construct on of the mean ng g ven on the r ght s de by

means of the mean ng g venon the left s de.Thus,the sh ftof cogn t on fromappearance

to man festat on can be v ewed here as a restructur ng/reconstruct on of the n t al

construct ons of the mean ng of the terms ‘A’and ‘Ak.’

50 Marx 1976-81, p. 620.

51 egel 1986 [1812—16],Bd. 2, pp. 147—9, egel 2010, pp. 437—8, egel 1969, pp. 499—500.




explanandum. So,wh leat the levelofappearance concepts nvolved n thegrasp

g of essence are yet not g ven, they are already g ven at the levelof man festa

t on.Th s s the ep stem cd ference betweenknowledgeat the levelof appearance

and knowledgeat the levelofman festat on.

4 The Mean ng of ‘Sche n’,‘Ersche nung' and ‘ersche nen' n Cap tal

VolumeI and the 1863-7Manuscr pts

G venthe above explanat on of the pecul ar t es of the German terms ‘Sche n’

and ‘Ersche nung’,and of the waysMarx employs the categor es correspond ng

to them, t s poss ble to g ve an explanat on of the categor es employed by

Marx n the f rst volume of Cap tal and n the 1863—7Manuscr pts.

The statement g ven by Marx at the very beg nn ng of Cap tal Volume I

uses the term ‘ersche nen’ n follow ng context:

The wealth of soc et es n wh ch the cap tal st mode of product on pre

va lsappears [ersche nen] as an ‘ mmense collect on of commod t es’; the

d v dual commod ty appears as ts elementary form. Our nvest gat on

therefore beg ns w th the analys s of the commod ty.52

Marx uses here the term ‘ersche nen’ n the sense of ‘appears’ because t s for

h mthe po nt ofdeparture ofh s thought-movement to the ground ofthe com

mod ty, ts value.

In Chapter IVof th s volume he states, ‘“M—C—M" s . . . the general formula

for cap tal, n wh ch t appears d rectly [unm ttelbar ersche nen] n the sphere

of c rculat on’.53 ere the verb ‘ersche nen’ s un f ed w th the term ‘unm ttel—

bar’ n order to expressthat the descr pt on ofthe processes of c rculat on s,as

the case g venabove, the po nt of departure for the movement to the under

stand ng of the ground of the (seem ngly) myster ous or g n of prof t g ven by

the d fference between M' and M.

Let me now turn to Chapter XIX(‘The Transformat on of the Value (and

Respect ver the Pr ce) of Labour-Power nto Wages’).Just as Marx n the pre

ced ng chapters was able to expla n the ground of any commod ty, nclud ng

labour-power, namely, value, he ass gns to the category of wage the status of

appearance by stat ng:

52 Marx 1987d [1872],p. 69; Marx 1976c [1867], p. 125.The term ‘ersche nen’ appears n the

German or g nal only once, not tw ce as n the Engl shtranslat on.

53 Marx 1983f [1867], p. no; Marx 1987d [1872]p. 173;Marx 1976c [1867], p. 257.



230

ANZEL

On the surface of bourgeo s soc ety the worker’s wage appears [ers

che nen] as the pr ce of labour, as a certa n quant ty of money that s pa d

for a certa n quant ty of labour. Thus people speak of the value of labour,

and call ts express on n money ts necessary or natural pr ce. On the

other hand they speak of the market pr ce of labour, .e. pr ces wh ch

osc llate above or below ts necessary pr ce.54

Then he g ves an add t onal ep stemolog cal evaluat on of the term ‘valueof

labour’:

In the express on ‘valueof labour’, the concept of value s not only com

pletely ext ngu shed, but nverted, so that t becomes ts contrary. It s an

express on as mag naryas the value of the earth. These mag nary expres

s ons ar se, nevertheless, from the relat ons of product on themselves.

They are categor es for the forms of appearance [Ersche nungsformen] of

essent al relat ons.55

Based on such an evaluat on, he states the follow ngcr t que of pol t cal econ

omy as a sc ence:

Class cal pol t cal economy borrowed the category ‘pr ce of labour’

from everyday l fe w thout further cr t c sm .. .The pol t cal econo

m st. . . never d scovered that the course of the analys s had led not only

from the market-pr ce of labour to ts presumed value, but also to the

resolut on of th s value of labour tself nto the value of labour-power.

Class cal pol t cal economy’s. . . uncr t cal acceptance of the categor es

‘value of labour', ‘natural pr ce of labour’, and so on . . . offered a secure

base of operat ons to the vulgar econom sts who . . .make t a pr nc ple to

worsh p appearances [Sche n] only.56

Next, Marx expla ns - v a the descr pt on of a soc o-econom c mechan sm —

how the value (pr ce) of labour-power ‘ srepresented n ts converted form as

wages’,57and then, based on th s explanat on, draws the follow ng conclus on:

‘Thewage-form thus ext ngu shes every trace of the d v s on of the work ng

day nto necessary labour and surplus-labour, nto pa d labour and unpa d

54

55

56

57

Marx 1987d [1872],p. 498; Marx 1976c [1867], p. 675

Marx 1987d [1872], p. 500; Marx 1976c [1867], p. 677.

Marx 1987d [1872],pp. 500-1; Marx 1976c [1867], pp. 677—8,p. 679.

Marx 1987d [1872], p. 501;Marx 1976c [1867], p. 679.



‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND' AND ‘ERSC EINUNG’ IN MARX’SECONOMIC WORKS 231

labour. All labour appears [ersche nen] as pa d labour’.58In the last sentence,

the term ‘ersche nen’has the mean ng of appearance because t s here charac

ter sed as be ng (seem ngly) unrelated to necessary labour and surplus-labour.

Then he speaks about the

dec s ve mportance of the transformat on of the value and pr ce of

labour-power nto the formofwages,or nto the valueand pr ce of labour

self. . . all the apologet c tr cks of vulgar econom cs, have as the r bas s

the form of appearance [Ersche nungsform] d scussed above, wh ch

makes the actual [Mr/cl che]relat on nv s ble,and ndeed presents to the

eye the prec se oppos te of that relat on. World h story has taken a long

t me to get to the bottom of the mystery of wages; noth ng s eas er to

understand than the necess ty, the ra son d’étreof th s form of appear

ance [Ersc/ze nungsform].59

ere, aga n, 1 translate not only the f rst but also the second occurrence of

Ersche nungsform as ‘formof appearance’ because here t stands for a surface

phenomenon whose underly ng mechan sm was already d scovered.

At the very beg nn ng of the 1863—7Manuscr pts, n Chapter I [‘Verwandlung

vonMehrwerth n Proj t’],Marx g ves an overall character sat on of h s concep

tual endeavour n the planned th rd volume:

In the r real movement, cap tals confront one another n certa n con

crete forms, for wh ch both the shape cap tal assumes n the mmed ate

product on-process and ts shape n the process of c rculat on man fest

themselves [erschet'nen]merely as part cular moments. The conf gura

t ons of cap tal, as developed n th s volume, thus approach step by step

the form n wh ch they man fest themselves on the surface of the soc ety,

the act on ofd fferentcap tals oneach other, that s, n compet t on and

n the everydayconsc ousness of the agents of product on themselves.60

ere, I translate the German terms ‘ersche nen’ and ‘aujbeten auf der

Oberjldche’as ‘man fest themselves’ and as ‘man fest themselves on the sur

face’,respect vely, because Marx’s a m s to der ve/expla n n a step-by-step

manner the phenomenal character st cs of cap tal asa whole, produced n the

mutual nteract ons of part cular cap tals, by employ ng as the explanatory

ground the concepts obta ned n Cap tal Volume1,wh ch grasp the un versal

53 Marx 1987d [1872],p. 502; Marx 1976c [1867], p. 680.

59 Marx 1987d [1872], pp. 502—3;Marx 1976c [1867], pp. 680—1.

60 Marx 1992, p. 7; Marx 1981 [1894], p. 117.



232 ANZEL

character st cs common to anyand all part cular ndustr al cap tals.61Therefore

also, the term ‘concrete fonns', n the above quote, perta n ng already to the

result of nteract ons of part cular cap tals, should stand, n Marx’samb t on,

already for the der ved/expla ned forms, thus for thought-concreteforms and

notfor the superf c al ‘sense’-c0ncretefonnsof everydayconsc ousness.

After such a general statement, Marxmoves the nvest gat on on to the con

cept of prof t, stat ng, ‘The nvest gat on w ll nonetheless show that the cost

pr ce, n the economyofcap tal,acqu res thefalse appearance [falseher Sche n]

ofa category ofvalue ofproduct on tself?62And he states that even though con

stant and var able cap tals g ven n the valueof the produced commod ty have

d fferent or g ns,and that what un f es them sjust the fact that they replace

both port ons of the cap tal advanced to tr gger the product on-process, nev

ertheless, ‘[t]h s real state of affa rs,however,from the standpo nt of cap tal st

product on, necessar ly man fests tself ups dedown [nothwend g ersc/ze nen n

verkehrter We se]’.53 e spells out what he has here n m nd as follows:

Prof t, as we are or g nally faced w th t, s thus the same th ng as surplus

value, save n a myst f ed form, though one that necessar ly ar ses from

the cap tal st mode of product on. Becauseno d st nct on between con

stant and var able cap tal can be recogn sed n the apparent format on

[sche nbare B ldung] of the cost-pr ce, the or g n of the change of value

that occurs n the course of product on s sh fted from the var able cap

tal t0 the cap tal as a whole. Because the pr ce of labour-power appears

[ersche nen] at one pole n the transformed form of the wage, so does

surplus-value at the other pole n the transformed form of prof t.64

What Marx does here s to expla n/der ve the soc al mechan sms produc ng

false, d storted knowledge, v a wh ch actors nvolved n product on concep

tually reflect the r own pract cal act on and on the bas s of wh ch they prac

t cally act. Th s knowledge of phenomena, f taken by tself pr or to and/0r

outs de such explanat on/der vat on, has the status of appearances, forwh ch

Marxemploys here the German terms falscher Sche n’,‘ersche nen nverkehrter

We se’and ‘sche nbare B ldung’.

But once th s knowledge s already shown, v a der vat on/explanat on, as

be ngnecessar lygenerated fromthe respect ve soc almechan sms, t obta ns

61 On the methodolog cal reconstruct on of th s method of explanat on/der vat on see

anzel 1999.

62 Marx 2012,p. 29; Marx 1981 [1894], p. 119.

63 Marx 2012, p. 21;Marx 1981[1894], p. 121.

64 Marx 2012,p. 26; Marx 1981[1894], p. 127.



234 ANZEL

commod ty real sed n the c rculat on process and on the other hand

as an excess determ ned more prec sely by ts relat onsh p to the total

cap tal, cap tal appears as a relat onsh p to tse f[ersche nen als Verha'ltmj?

zu s ch selbst]; a relat onsh p n wh ch t s d st ngu shed, as an or g nal

sum of value, from another value that t pos ts.That t produces th s new

value [Neuwerth] n the course of ts movement through product on and

c rculat on, th s s n consc ousness. But how th s happens s now mys

t f ed, and seems [sche nen] to come from occult qual t es belong ng to

cap tal tself.67

In the f rst quote g ven here, the German term ‘Oberjldcheder Ersche nungen’

stands for the knowledgeof phenomena fromwh ch both the concepts of sur

plus-value and rate of surplus-value had been der ved, thus, the former knowl

edge stands n relat on to the latter one as that of appearance to that of the

ground of th s appearance; therefore I translate that German term as ‘surface

of appearances’.

In the second quote Marx shows that once n knowledgethe pr ce for wh ch

labour-power s purchased s conceptuallyun f edw th the pr ce for wh ch the

other components enter ng the product on-processare be ng purchased under

the mean ng of the term ‘product on-pr ce’,the or g n of the surplus-value n

surplus-labour cannot be grasped any more. One thus arr ves at a myst f ed,

d storted and nverted, that s,ups de-down representat on [Vorstel ung]of the

ground of the cap tal; we thus understand Marx labels by means of the term

‘transposed consc ousness’.68Therefore, Marx’s term ‘ersche nen’ should here

be translated as ‘toappear’.

In the th rd quote, the phrase ‘prof t s . . .a transformedform ofsurplus-value’

stands for the knowledgewh ch can be character sed by the category-pa r and

d rect on of explanat on/der vat on ground —>man festat on of th s ground—

appearance. V a the phrase ‘v ce versa' Marx sh fts to another category-pmr

and to a d fferent type of conceptual der vat on, namely that of appearance —+

ground of th s appearance; the former s the start ng po nt for the der vat on/

d scovery of the latter, that s, from the former the latter has to be cogn t vely

‘s fted out’.

F nally,the rema n ng part of the th rd quote above expresses the fact, as

shown already above, that Marx relates egel’scategory substance-subject to

a level of knowledge about cap tal to wh ch ne ther the category gmund nor

man festat onoftheground can be ass gned,but onlythe category appearance.

At th s level of knowledge about cap tal, as n Chapter IVof Cap tal Volume I,

67 Marx 1992, p. 64; Marx 1981[1894], p. 139.

68 Marx 1992, pp. 60—1;Marx 1981[1894], p. 136.



‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND’ AND ‘ERSC EINUNG’ IN MARX’SECONOMIC WORKS 235

Marx character ses the self-valor sat on of value expl c tly v a the express on

‘occult’.In fact, he uses th s express on n a context wh ch he expl c tly relates

to egel, stat ng:

The excess, how t —speak ng n egel's manner —reflects tself back nto

self, or, stated otherw se, the excess character sed more spec f cally by

the rate of prof t, appears [ersche nen] thus as an excess wh ch the cap

tal y elds annually over and above ts own value or produces n a certa n

per od of c rculat on.‘59

So, the general conclus on s that Marx’s log c of thought-movement from

exchange-value n Chapter I of Cap tal Volume 1up to product on-pr ce, rate

of prof t and average rate of prof t n the 1863—7Manuscr pts does not draw on

egel’s category substance-subject n a pos t ve sense, that s, at the level of

knowledge character sed by the category ground and/or the category man

festat on. On the contrary, t ass gns that category to the level of knowledge

character sed by the category appearance, that s, to a level wh ch, n certa n

c rcumstances, can turn nto llusory,false forms of knowledge.

5 The Mean ng of ‘Valueas Subject’ n Chapter IVof Cap tal Volume I

In Chapter IVof Cap tal Volume I, Marx, when deal ng w th the general for

mula of cap tal C—M—C', declares about value that t:

constantly go ng from one form nto the other, w thout be ng lost n

th s movement; t thus becomes transformed nto an automat c sub

ject . . . In truth, . . .value becomes here the subject of a process n wh ch,

wh le constantly assum ng the form n turn of money and commod t es,

changes ts own magn tude, throws off surplus-value from tself cons d

ered as or g nal value, valor ses tself. For the movement n the course of

wh ch t adds surplus-value s ts own movement, ts valor sat on as self

valor sat on. It has acqu red the occult ab l ty to pos t value because t s

value. It br ngs forth l v ng offspr ng, or at least lays golden eggs . . . [N]ow

value suddenly presents tself as process ng, self-mov ng substance, for

wh ch commod t es and money are both mere forms. Value therefore

now becomes process ng value, process ng money, and, as such, cap tal.

It comes out of c rculat on, enters nto t aga n, preserves and mult pl es

69 Marx 1992, p. 64; Marx 1981 [1894], p. 139.



236 ANZEL

self w th n c rculat on, emerges from t w th an ncreased s ze, and

starts the same cycle anew.7°

Can these reflect ons be v ewed as correspond ng to, or even as an appl ca

t on of, egel’scategory of a self-mov ng substance, that s, substance-subject

wh ch the latter employs n the cluster Concept n the Subject ve Log cof h s

Sc ence of Log c?71To answer th s quest on one has to take nto account the

locat on of Chapter IV n the overall structure of the f rst volume of Cap tal.

In the three chapters before Chapter IVMarx g ves an explanat on of the law

of value and also der ves/expla ns on ts bas s the laws perta n ng to money

and the pr ces of commod t es. In sect on I of Chapter IVMarx br ngs n a new

phenomenon, namely, that the consc ous a m of the agents of product on s

to make money, conc sely expressed n the general formula g ven above. In a

subsequent step, n sect on II,Marx shows that th s phenomenon cannot be

expla ned on the bas s of sc ent f c laws der ved n Chapters I to 111:The form

of c rculat on w th n wh ch money turns nto [entpuppen] cap tal contrad cts

all the prev ously developed lawsbear ng on the nature of commod t es, value,

money, and c rculat on tself’.72Th s explanatory deadlock s then expressed

by h m v a the conceptual ant nomy: ‘Cap talcannot. . . ar se from c rculat on,

and t s equally mposs ble for t to ar se apart from c rculat on. It must have

s or g n n c rculat on and not n c rculat on’.73

At the same t me Marx prov des the conceptual framework n order to

escape from th s deadlock. e declares:

The format on of cap tal must be poss ble even though the pr ce and the

value of commod ty be the same, for t cannot be expla ned by referr ng

to any d vergence between pr ce and value. If pr ces actually d ffer from

values, we must f rst reduce the former to the latter, .e., d sregard th s

s tuat on as an acc dental one, n order to have n front of oneself the

phenomenon of the format on of cap tal on the bas s of the exchange

of commod t es n ts pur ty, and to prevent our observat ons from be ng

terfered w th by d sturb ng nc dental c rcumstances wh ch are rrel

evant to the actual course of the process.74

70 Marx 1983f [1867], pp. 109—10;Marx 1987d [1872],pp. 171—3;Marx 1976c [1867], pp. 255-6

71 For a d scuss on of th s see the contr but ons of R ccardo Bello ore, Patr ck Murray and

TonySm th n th s volume.

72 Marx 1983 [1867], p. 110;Marx 1987d [1872], p. 173;Marx 1976c [1867], p. 258.

73 Marx 1983f [1867], p. 119;Marx 1987d [1872], p. 182;Marx 1976c [1867], p. 268.

74 Marx 1983f [1867], p. 119;Marx 1987d [1872], p. 182;Marx 1976c [1867], p. 269.



‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND' AND ‘ERSC EINUNG’ IN MARX’SECONOMIC WORKS 237

Thus, all laws from Chapters 1to 111 n the r un ty prov de the necessary but

sufl c ent bas s for the el m nat on of that ant nomy and for the conceptual

grasp ng of the ground of cap tal as a type of soc al relat on. Th s means that

from the po nt of v ew of Marx’sa m to expla n the or g n of the ‘self- ncrease’

of money expressed n the general formula of cap tal, the whole content of

Chapters 1to 111serve h m as an ntroductory ‘descr pt on’ of the phenomenon

of cap tal-format on descr bed n Chapter IV,whose ground has yet to be to be

conceptually grasped. So, th s phenomenon has here the ep stem c/cogn t ve

status of appearance. Th s smy nterpretat on ofMarx’scla m:

The c rculat on of commod t es s the start ng-po nt of cap tal . . . If we

d sregard the mater al [stogl cher] content of commod t es, .e., the

exchange of var ous use-values, and cons der only the econom c forrn

brought nto be ng by th s process, we f nd that that ts ult mate prod

uct s money.Th s ult mate product of commod ty-c rculat on s the f rst

form of appearance [Ersche nungsform]of cap tal...money... [ s] ts

f rst form of appearance.75

Therefore Marx evaluates the cogn t ve/ep stem c status of the descr pt on

of value n sect ons 1and II of Chapter IV,where t s v ewed only as a self

creas ng ent ty, as nsuff c ent because value n th s descr pt on d splays the

‘occult’— n respect to the understand ng of value g ven n Chapters I to 111—

property of add ng out of noth ng —that s, seem ngly w thout any added

labour —to tself an added value (that s, surplus-value).76Only start ng from

sect on 111does Marxmove to the explanatory ground of value v ewed n t ally

as a self- ncreas ng ent ty, wh le conceptually grasp ng that ground start ng

from Chapter Vof Part III of Cap tal Volume I. ere the real ground of cap tal

conceptually grasped, wh le the occult, that s, apparent self-valor sat on of

value s expla ned, so that the former stands for the h stor cally spec f c soc al

relat on ofproduct on between the owners of labour-powerand the owners of

the means of product on, wh le the latter stands for a false, d storted form of

reflect on n the consc ousness of the agents of product on.

Th s, n turn, means that egel’scategory substance-subject has ts counter

parts n those concepts of pol t cal economyg ven n Chapter IVof the f rstvol

ume ofCap talwh ch correspond to the levelof cogn t on of the soc al relat on

ofcap tal character sed bythe categoryphenomenonas appearance and not by

the category real ground. Stated otherw se, egel’scategory substance-subject

75 Marx 1983f [1867], p. 102;Marx 1987d [1872], p. 165;Marx 1975C[1867]. P-247

76 Marx 1983f [1867], p. 109;Marx 1987d [1872], p. 172;Marx 1975C[1867]. P-255



238 ANZEL

does not contr bute to Marx’sconceptual grasp ng of the very real ground of

the soc al relat on character sed by h m v a the econom c term ‘cap tal’.

So,Marx’s log c of thought-movement from exchange-value to value, from

value to exchange-value, money and pr ce, as well that from value to surplus

value, draws ne ther on I-Iegel’smovement from the clusters of categor es n

the Object ve Log cto those n the Subject ve Log c n Sc ence of Log c,nor on

egel’smovements ns de the clusters g ven n the Subject ve Log c. Instead,

as shown above, Marx n h s thought-movements n Cap tal Volume I and

related manuscr pts draws on egel’smovements ns de the clusters from

the Object ve Log c,the latter of course be ng re nterpreted by Marx from the

po nt of v ew of a real st c ep stemology.Under th s real st c re nterpretat on

egel’s clusters of categor es n the Object ve Log c can be v ewed as corre

spond ng to the categor es of what Marx labelled as the appropr at on of the

world by a th nk ng head.77

Conclus ons

The conclus on of the above reflect ons on Marx and egel s that central to

the understand ng of the ‘arch tecture’ofMarx’seconom c works, espec ally of

Chapter XIXof Cap tal Volume I and of the 1863—7Manuscr pts used by Engels

h s ed t on of the th rd volume of Cap tal, s a restructur ng, from the po nt

of v ew of a real st c ep stemology, of egel’scategory-clusters centred on the

sequence appearance —>ssence —>man festat on g ven n the Object ve Log c of

h s Sc enceofLog c.W thout tak ng nto account the fact that Marx employed

the d fference between ep stemolog cal mean ngs of the terms ‘appearance’

and ‘man festat on’, the cycl cal thought-der vat ons performed by h m n

these works cannot be understood asy eld ngan ncrease of knowledge.

As shown above, the translat on of the ways Marx employs the German

terms ‘Ersche nung' and ‘ersche nen’depends on the ep stem c status of the

respect ve passage where these terms are employed. In passages where Marx

deals w th the everyday,transposed ( nverted) knowledge of the actors of pro

duct on before t s der ved/expla ned, the translat ons should be ‘appearance’

and ‘toappear’.In the passageswhere Marxhas already der ved/ expla ned th s

knowledge on the bas s of h s knowledge about the real ground of the cap tal—

t soc al relat on, the translat ons should be ‘man festat on’ and ‘to man fest

tself’.

77 Marx 1976—81,p. 37; Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 101.



‘SC EIN’, ‘GRUND’ AND ‘ERSC EINUNG’ IN MARX'S ECONOMIC WORKS 239

It s worth not ng that Marx had a negat ve v ew, presented already n

1844/1845 n Chapter 6 of The olyFam ly, of egel’scategory substance-subject

g ven n the Subject ve Log c,namely:

In egel there are three elements, sp noz st c substance, F chte’sself-con

sc ousness, and egel’snecessar ly antagon st c un ty of the two,absolute

sp r t. The f rst element s the metaphys cally car catured [travest erte]

nature n separat on from the human be ng; the second s the metaphys

cally car catured sp r t n separat on from nature; the th rd s the meta

phys cally car catured un ty of both, the real human be ng and the real

human spec es.73

St ll, certa n clusters of categor es from egel's Subject ve Log c can also be

real st cally re nterpreted. Theycould be v ewedas correspond ng to categor es

volved n the creat on of thought-projects of the future pract cal transforma

t on of the (natural and/or soc al) world, namely, to what Marx labelled as the

‘pra/ct sch-ge st ge’appropr at on of the world.79 ere Imean espec ally egel's

cluster Teleologyw th ts subclusters the subject vepurpose, the means and the

carr ed-out purpose. F nally,certa n categor es from the Subject ve Log ccould

also be real st cally re nterpreted, that s, nterpreted n such a way so as to

grasp n categor es the structure of human pract cal act on n transform ng the

world. ere I mean espec ally egel’scluster L few th ts subclusters the l v ng

d v dual, the l fe-processand the genus.80

78 Marx and Engels 1957 [1844], p. 146.

79 Marx 1976—81,p. 37. M. N colaus’s translat on of the German ‘prakt sch-ge st ge' as

‘pract cal and mental’ (Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 101) s, at least n my v ew, m slead ng

because t does not grasp what Marx meant here, namely, the creat on —nm nd —of the

plans ofj ture pract cal act on. A better translat on would be ‘pract co-mental’.An even

better translat on of ‘prakt sch-ge lst ge'should draw on the translat on of the German

‘Ge st’ as ‘m nd’.

80 It rema ns an open quest on what should be the ‘fate' of those categor es n egel’s

Subject ve Log c wh ch would not f nd ( n a re nterpreted form) the r way nto the

clusters for e ther pract co-mental act on or for the descr pt on of pract cal act on. t s

poss ble, as a work nghypothes s,that due to the development ofmodern symbol c log c,

formal syntax and formal semant cs, they n fact drop out of the ph losoph cal bus ness

of nvest gat on nto categor es of cogn t on, and reappear n a transformed way ns de

modern symbol c log c, formal syntax and formal semant cs. ere I mean espec ally the

re nterpretat on of the categor es appear ng n egel’scluster judgement. On th s see

Wall? 1995.



PART III

D ferent V ewsof theD alect c



C APTER 10

AnOutl ne of the Systemat c-D alect calMethod:

Sc ent f c and Pol t cal S gn f cance

Geert Reutenl

Introduct on

Marxand egelboth contr buted to development of the method ofsystemat c

d alect cal presentat on, or systemat c d alect cs (SD) for short. Marx h m

self only br efly wrote expl c tly on th s method n h s scant methodolog cal

wr t ngs.2In th s chapter] reconstruct th s method, and f ll n, ormake expl c t,

any apparent methodolog cal gaps,w th a v ew to what we can learn through

SD n the nvest gat on of the contemporary pol t cal economy of cap tal sm.

Th s chapter s d v ded nto four sect ons. Sect on 1prov des a synops s of

the method. Sect on 2 sets out the concepts and pr nc ples of research pr or

to an SDpresentat on. Sect on 3 d scusses several general pr nc ples of an SD

presentat on. Sect on 4 s the substant al part of the chapter and sets out the

pr nc ples and method of the SDargument or presentat on tself.Under these

ma n sect ons, subsect ons are numbered consecut velyand used for nternal

cross-referenc ng (§§1—14).

SD s a superb sc ent f c method for the synthes s of knowledge about a

soc al system, and thus for the comprehens on of a pol t cal economy.In terms

of our purpose, the method allows one to theor se what nst tut ons and pro

cesses are necessary —rather than cont ngent —for the reproduct on of the

cap tal st system.Th s take on the method, n t allydeveloped n collaborat on

w th M chael W ll ams, allows for the detect on of strengths and weaknesses

n the actual structure of the system tself.Generallyspeak ng, the earl er parts

of an SDpresentat on help del neate the strengths of the system as well as ts

contrad ct ons (compare Marx’sCap tal),wh le the latter parts help to develop

the comprehens on of ts weaknesses and contrad ct ons (not fullydeveloped

Marx’sunf n shed project). Any undue focus on one or the other can lead

1 Un vers ty of Amsterdam, Faculty of Econom cs and Bus ness (http://www1.fee.uva.nl/pp/

greutenl). I thank W jnand van der Woude for h s useful comments and ed t ng of drafts of

th s chapter. I alsogratefullyacknowledge the d scuss on of an earl er vers onof the chapter

bythe other contr butors to th s book and Martha Campbell.

2 Notably the 1857‘Introduct on’ to the Grundr sse —Marx 1973[1857-8].

© KONINKLUKEBRILLNV, LEIDEN, 2014 I DOI10.]163/9789004270022_012



244 REUTEN

to pol t cal paralys s —weaknesses should be understood n the context of the

system’s strengths, and v ce versa. §§12—14of sect on 4 outl ne the pol t cal

s gn f cance of the SDmethod.

In terms of the h story of thought, the SDmethod that I flesh out connects

substant ally w th egel’sLog c of Essence. egel's method s espec ally use

ful n terms of sett ng out the strengths of the cap tal st system. owever,for

the reasons outl ned n §1z, t s not capable of deal ng w th mmanent weak

nesses. At that cruc al po nt I dev ate from egel’s‘log c’ n a s gn f cant way.

The mpat ent reader w ll f nd cold comfort n th s chapter —the detect on

of system-weaknesses s only d scussed n the last quarter of the chapter. Th s

s,moreover, a chapter on method. The deta l of the strengths and weaknesses

requ res a systemat c presentat on of the contemporary pol t cal economy of

cap tal sm tself.

1 TheMethod of Systemat c-D alect cal Presentat on n Br ef

§1 A m and Synops s

In pr nc ple the method of SDmay apply, w th qual f cat ons, to natural and

soc al object-realms. For brev ty, n th s chapter I w ll refer ma nly to the cap

al st pol t cal economy ( n br ef the cap tal st system, or cap tal sm), from

wh ch I also take examples, generally w th reference to Marx’s Cap tal, wh ch

s assumed to be the most well-known SDtext to the reader.

SDhas n common w th other sc ent f c methods that t seeks to know rel —

ablywhat can be known. One ma n d st nct on frommost other approaches s

the SDcla m that the key to the rel ab l ty of that knowledge l es n the nter

connect on of all relevant knowledge about some object-total ty. SD s scept cal

of any part al knowledge, nclud ng model-bu ld ng, although t does not d s

m ss th s knowledge a pr or (§3, §7).W der perspect ves can show the l m ts,

not the fals ty,of part al knowledge.

Asecond ma n d st nct on fromall other approaches s the method through

wh ch the nterconnect on of the relevant knowledge s ga ned (§§9—14).The

rema nder of th s sect on prov des a synops s of the method, wh ch further

sect ons flesh out. Us ng the metaphor of a pyram d, as shown n F gure 1,w ll

help n outl n ng the method.

The start ng po nt, denoted n the f gure by ‘a’, s an all-encompass ng

concept on of some object-total ty (cap tal sm) that abstractly captures the

essence of that object-total ty (compare the ‘commod ty' forMarx’sCap tal).At

the same t me, th s start ng po nt pos ts what all objects and processes n th s

total ty have n common (§9).Wh le t s mportant to know what the ent t es

and processes n the concrete world have n common (that s, a), t s,however.



AN OUTLINE OF T E SYSTEMATIC-DIALECTICAL MET OD 245

start ng po nt of

systemat c presentat on

B,moments: levels

uopuutuuaapaauoo3393mm

from to concrete

5..

V v

comprehens on ofconcrete emp r cal real ty

[end-po nt of systemat c-d alect calpresentat on]

FIGURE1 Systemat c nvest gat on and presentat on

more mportant to knowhow these ent t es and processes are nterconnected

w th n that commonal ty. Th s nterconnect on s exh b ted n the d alect cal

conceptual movement between synchronous stages. Each layer, denoted by

a ‘B ’,s called a synthet c ‘moment’ (§4). As we move down the pyram d, we

get an ever w der and more concrete grasp of the object-total ty. Each stage

of th s d alect cal presentat on sets out how the system, n t ally pos ted

abstractly (a), can ex st. It thus prov des the cond t ons of ts ex stence n the

concrete world —each t me nearer to ts emp r cal real ty and so expand ng our

grasp of t. In the end, th s grasp w ll be appropr ate to a full comprehens on

of the essent al work ng of the object’s emp r cal real ty, here denoted by ‘Y’

(§§10—14),s a self-reproduc ng or self-susta n ng ent ty. Th s comprehens on,

n pr nc ple, allows us pract cally to apply knowledge of the object-total ty

( n the case of a ‘natural’object-realm) or pract cally to reorgan se that total ty

( n the case of a soc al object-realm).

2 Research Pr or to Systemat c-D alect cal Presentat on

§2 Object-Total ty

Acond t on for an SD nvest gat on s that ts object-realm, n our case cap tal

m, s nherently system c; that s, t cons sts of nteract ng const tuent parts

form ngan ntegrated whole (compare §12on necess ty). Th s s an ontolog cal




un ty- n-d fl'erence:dm n]. of

pre-systemat c research

%

.55

E_°

3-3

.8&

v

§§~

‘0

.0

CU

emp r cal phenomena

[emp r calmum ofearl eranalyt calesearch]

FIGURE2 Research pr or to SDpresentat on

object-total ty s that t can be successfullycaptured by one un fy ng concept

(§z).Wh ch concept th s could or should be s the result of an enormous cre

at ve research-process nvolv ng a great deal of tr al and error. owever, once

th s un fy ng concept s presented as the start ng po nt of an SDpresentat on

w ll seem obv ous and s mple —and t should! Nevertheless, on page one

of an SDwork t w ll not be obv ous that the author m ght be able to present

the complex ty of the total ty (cap tal sm n the case of Marx) on bas s of that

‘s mple’,though n fact very abstract, un fy ng concept.

The pyram d n F gure 2 s a metaphor c mage of th s abstract determ n

at on, or research pr or to the SDpresentat on.4 The a m of th s phase s to

move from ex st ng knowledge (the base of the pyram d) to the abstract start

g po nt (the pyram d’s apex, at)of the systemat c presentat on proper. Th s

seek ngof the ‘un ty- n-d fference’ snot a stra ghtforward process. The base of

the pyram d represents analyt cal research and past emp r cal stud es, wh ch

one of ts connotat ons; nstead of detem nat on; ‘const tut on’m ght be another approx

mat on. In the current context, one major aspect of th s abstract determ nat on s the sub

sumpt on of phenomena under more general phenomena, as spec es under a genus. Note

that subsumpt on does not const tute the r actual nterconnect on (see §10).

4 Tony Sm th (1990,pp. 4—5)calls th s the ‘stage of appropr at on’; Patr ck Murray (1988,2000,

and 2003) calls t ‘phenomenolog cal nqu ry'.



absraceem na on

248 REUTEN

un ty- n-d Eerence: end-po nt of start ng Po nt of

pre-systemadc systemat c

B.

5.

levels

from to concern:

B.

ttttttttttt Y

comprehens on of concrete emp r cal real ty

[end-po nt ol'systemat c-d alect cal presentat on]

emp r cal phenomena

[emp r cal start ng po nt ofearl er analyt cal research]

FIGURE3 From research pr or toSDto systemat c nvest gat on and presentat on

developed through the process of mak ng conceptual d st nct ons between

phenomena and of part al analyses, n both everydaycultural h story and sc

ent f c h story.Th s un ty- n-d vers ty (a n F gure 2) s then the start ng po nt

for the SDpresentat on, as nd cated n F gure 3.

We have good reason to bel eve that pre-systemat c research along these

l nes was also the path taken by egel and Marx, to arr ve at the respect ve

start ng po nts of the r systemat c d alect cs.5

There s,however, a cruc al d fference between egeland Marx concern ng

the cr t cal appropr at on of ex st ngrelevant knowledgeat th s research-stage,

wh ch then fed the content of the systemat c presentat on. The ph losopher

egel drew on the rece ved v ews of contemporary emp r cal sc ences for

data on the natural and soc al realms; h s task was to ga n hol st c knowledge

from h s synthet c systemat sat on of these rece ved v ews. e was hes tant

about speculat ng on the fate of knowledge at the research-front er: ‘The ow]

of M nerva spreads ts w ngs only w th the fall ng of the dusk’.6

For Marx th s was veryd fferent. s study of the then- nfluent al pol t cal

econom c wr t ngs made h m scept cal of the rece ved v ew. Therefore,

5 See also Sm th 1993b,p. 18.Marx descr bes th s research n one of h s few methodolog cal

wr t ngs (1973[1857—8]).For the mportant ns ghts of the next two paragraphs I draw on

Damsma 2014,chapter 1.

6 End of Preface of the Ph losophy ofR ght, 1821.

uonuunuraapaauoava aq uxs




although he often drew on these wr t ngs, he felt compelled to carry out con

ceptual and emp r cal analys s of h s own.7 In Cap tal th s analys s s set out

alongs de and dur ng h s systemat c presentat on. Although th s analys s s

systemat callyplaced at the appropr ate po nts (by chapter), th s g vesMarx’s

SDpresentat on a very d st nct ve complex on, part cularly s nce he usually

doesnot clearly d st ngu sh between h s analyt cal and h s synthet c texts.Th s

often compl cates the detect on of the systemat c order.8

3 Systemat c-D alect calPresentat on - General Pr nc ples

Beforewe d scuss the argument of the SDpresentat on proper n sect on 4,th s

sect on br efly sets out some general SDpr nc ples.

§4 Systemat cOrder and D alect calMoments

The relat ve s gn f canceof a contemporary phenomenon does not necessar ly

perta n to ts h stor cal emergence. Although h story s mportant n expla n

g howthe ex stent came nto be ng, t cannot expla n why t s ‘what t s’,nor

how the ex stent s reproduced as an nterconnected whole.9Therefore the sys

temat c order and conceptual progress on of SDhas noth ng whatsoever to do

w th the h stor cal emergence of nst tut ons and processes.The fact that ‘com

merc al cap tal’ emerged h stor cally pr or to ‘ ndustr al cap tal’, for example,

does not mply that the former should have systemat c pr or ty.

The term ‘moment’refers to the const tuents (each surface 5, n F gure 1)

of each progress on of the SDpresentat on. Each new moment marks a con

ceptual progress on. Generally, a moment s a compos t on of concepts that

belongtogether; these concepts are thus pos ted as mmed ately connected, or

connected bya med at ng concept.

In a text, systemat c order ng s nev tably sequent al. Nevertheless ontolog

callywe alwayshave the s multane ty of all moments.

7 See also Murray (2003, pp. 157,160),who calls th s Marx’s phenomenolog cal nqu ry, as d s

t nct from h s presentat on.

8 The ns ght that the d st nct complex on of Marx’stext s due to th s m xture of analys s and

synthes s, I owe to Damsma 2014,chapter 1.As w th all good deas, th s s obv ous n h nd

s ght. Forme at least, th s at once clar f edmany of the puzzles of the systemat c structure/

order ng of Cap tal. Further, TonySm th’s1990book has been most mportant n the detec

t on and del neat on ofMarx’sanalyt cal and synthet c work.

9 Reuten and W ll ams 1989,p. 34.See also Sm th 1990,pp. 8-9; Arthur 2002, p. 75;Murray 2003,

pp. 152—3;nd F nesch n th s volume, footnote 14.



250 REUTEN

§5 Def n t onand ConceptualProgress

The def n t onof concepts s an nherent part of analys s (§3), and s useful for

that endeavour. owever,to the extent that conceptual development s central

to the development of sc ence generally,the pos t ng of concepts as ‘dehn t ve’

can hamper th s develOpment,evenw th n non-d alect cal d scourses. Start ng

from an abstract concept of a total ty (01),SD sets out nterconnect ons n a

layered movement of ncreas ngly concrete concepts (5,). In so far aswe there

fore have conceptual development, SD eschews def n t ons. Nevertheless, at

each d alect cal level, or moment (§4), t del neates concepts for the moment’.

(Th s means, for example for Marx’sCap tal, that an early concept of ‘cap tal’—

Cap tal Volume I, Part II - s d fferent from later, r cher conceptual sat ons).

Even so, the early concept s not untrue: ndeed, t s true, but only abstractly

(‘encompass ngly’) so. Its truth s conta ned n the newly developed con

cept. Conceptual development progress velydeta ls a concept’s cond t ons of

ex stence.

§6 AbsenceofPresuppos t ons and Assumpt ons

SD not only eschews dehn t ons (§5), t also eschews the ntroduct on of

assumpt ons. Although SDeschews assumpt ons, t s somet mes not poss ble

to avo d the ntroduct on of an ent ty or process wh ch cannot be mmed

ately ‘grounded’(see §10for explanat on of th s term), because that ground ng

requ res the ntroduct on of another moment that tself cannot be ntroduced

med ately. In that case, the as-yet-ungrounded ent ty s ntroduced on the

bas s of an expl c t temporary assumpt on/requ rement that t can ndeed be

grounded later.10(Unfortunately many systemat c d alect c ans call th s post

poned ground ng a ‘presuppos t on’ at that part cular po nt).11Generally the

10 These self- mposed requ rements of ‘expl c t’temporary assumpt ons, and ‘reference’to a

later moment, s mpl fyread ng and are a courtesy to the reader.

11 Th s s a m slead ng use of the term presuppos t on (‘tac tly assume to be the case’).My

v ew s that the use of the term ‘presuppos t on’stems froman nadequate translat on of

the German noun ‘Voraussetzung’that egel somet mes used. One mean ng s ndeed

‘assumpt on’,but egeladopted another, ‘pos t ng n advance’,wh ch s better translated

as ‘requ rement’ (or, n th s case, ‘pos t ng the requ rement). egel’s use of the verb

voraussetzen [‘topos t n advance’] m ght be translated as ‘to requ re’. (Compare Inwood

1992,pp. 224—6.)Th s would nd cate that we pos t a moment wh ch st ll requ res further

cond t ons of ex stence.

Marx apparently does not cons stently use the term ‘Voraussetzung' n the way nd

cated above.Tothe extent that h s use s s m lar to the one nd cated, the standard FowkeS

Engl sh translat on of Cap talVolume I (Marx 1976c[1867])makes t d Ecult to detect t.

For example, n Part II, the terms Voraussetzungor voraussetzen are translated var ously



AN OUTLINE OF T E SYSTEMATIC-DIALECTICAL MET OD 2.51

temporary ntroduct on of as-yet-ungrounded moments s merely due to the

fact that, whereas the ent t es or processes s multaneously co-ex st ontolog

cally,the r wr tten ep stemolog cal presentat on must be sequent al.

Evenw th th s qual f cat on, such SDassumpt ons/requ rements are always

grounded w th n the presentat on. An SDpresentat on s not complete unt l

all the relevant const tuents of a g ven object-total ty are endogenously deter

m ned, that s, when there are no ungrounded assumpt ons or exogenous

var ables.12

§7 Synthes s and the RoleofAnalys s

SD nvest gat on s the process of nqu ry from a systemat c start ng po nt

(F gure 1). Th s nvest gat on results n the systemat c presentat on that one

fmds n an SDtext (such as Marx’sCap tal). An SDpresentat on s synthet c.

In §3, 1 nd cated that SD nvest gat on requ res su hc ent conceptual and

emp r cal analys s for ts synthet c presentat on. owever, f the ex st nganaly

s s s poor, then clearly the synthes s w ll be defect ve. In th s case the author of

an SDwork w llneed to undertake the appropr ate analys s.13In terms of expo

s t on, these add t onal p eces of analys s can usually be moved to addenda

( ndependent of the presentat on), so that the systemat cpresentat on proper

purely synthet c.

§8 Immanency and Immanent Cr t que

The SD presentat on of a soc al total ty s an mmanent one. That s, t sets

out the system from the perspect ve of the object-total ty’s pr nc ples, norms

and standards. Th s s a pr nc ple adopted from Marx. Even f the system s

presentedfrom w th n tself th s does not mply the absence of any evaluat on

or assessment. When the norms and standards are taken to the r log cal con

clus ons,we may detect poss ble ncons stenc es, wh ch an mmanent cr t que

makes expl c t.

as 'pre-cond t on’ (p. 260), ‘assumpt on'l‘assume' (pp. 267, 271,275, 276), ‘ rnpl es’ (p. 273)

and ‘presupposes' (pp. 274,279).Marx also uses the terms Unterstellen, rendered ‘assump

t on’ (p. 263),and Geseut, rendered as ‘suppose’ (p. 263).

12 See footnote 3 above on the term ‘determ nat on’.

l3 In §3Inoted that Marxwasconfronted w th th s exact problem, so that he had to engage n

analys sh mself. Inmy2000paper on SDIneglected the poss ble requ rement for analys s

along w th the systemat c nvest gat on and Gu doStarosta (2008)r ghtly cr t c sed me for

th s.



252 REUTEN

4 Systemat c-D alect calPresentat on

In th s last sect on we d scuss the systemat c presentat on proper. Str ctly,the

‘presentat on’ s the text of an SDwork. owever, t should be emphas sed that

alongs de the actual wr t ng process, the author s engag ng n a compl cated

SD nvest gat on.

§9 Systemat cStart ng Po nt: Requ rements

The pre-systemat c research (§3) leads up to the start ng po nt of an SD

presentat on. Th s start ng po nt s an all-encompass ng moment, wh ch com

prehens vely captures the object-total ty. That s, t abstractly (that s, mpl c—

ly) captures all the nterconnect ons of all the necessary moments of the

total ty.Any start ng po nt s nev tably abstract n that t cannot mmed ately

grasp ts object n ts full,concrete nterconnectedness. At the start ng po nt we

merely have the appropr at on of analys s as an abstract determ nat on (a n

F gure 3). Or,we have ‘merely’pos ted a un ty- nd fference, the un fy ng con

cept of the object-total ty —such as ‘freew ll’for egel (Ph losophy ofR ght), or

‘the commod ty’ for Marx (Cap tal). Th s concept s so utterly abstract —even

though t s s mple —hat by tself t can have no ex stence and t thus appears

poss ble. It w ll at least provoke the quest on of how th s abstract on can

be encompass ngly true, and prompt further argument or presentat on. (At

the start of Marx’sCap tal, for example, t s not obv ous how the commod ty,

or commod f cat on, could be the un fy ng concept of the cap tal st pol t cal

economy). Thus the start ng po nt s apparently mposs ble on ts own: that s,

s cond t ons of ex stence (grounds) are not apparent.14

At the beg nn ng t s, of course, as yet unproven that the start ng moment

(or) ndeed s the un fy ngconcept of the object-total ty. Th s has to be shown n

the process of progress veconcret sat on and d fferent at on (B).As egelsays,

at the beg nn ng ‘d fference s st ll sunk n the un ty, not yet set forth as d ffer

ent’.Only on complet on of the presentat on w llwe know that ‘[t]he truth of

14 Most SDtreat ses use the term ‘contrad ct ons’to descr be such an apparent mposs b l ty

(as well as s m lar apparent mposs b l t es that occur later on n the presentat on).

The term ‘contrad ct on’ s generally, however, too problemat c n the Engl sh language

‘Contrad ct on’ nev tably has the connotat on of ‘ ncons stency’,wh ch s not at ssue.

wh le n th s context ‘apparent mposs bth more prec selyconveysthe mean ng. (588

also Sm th 1990, pp. 6, 13;Reuten and W ll ams 1989, pp. 26—30.)‘ContIad ct on’ s the

common translat on for the German Gegensatz,wh ch s less problemat c n German;

the Engl sh ‘contrad ct on’ s closer to the German W derspruch.That s not to say that 1

exclude the term ‘contrad ct on’altogether (§14),but merely refra n from us ng t n th s

context.




the d fferent ated s ts be ng n un ty.And only through th s movement s the

un ty truly concrete.’15Once the presentat on s complete —and thus when the

t al un fy ng concept s shown to be nherent n the object-total ty, n ts full

concreteness (y) —we w ll have come full c rcle, conf rm ng the truth of the

abstract start ng po nt.16Thus the ult mate test of a start ng po nt s the suc

cess of the presentat on tself.l7

§lo ‘Ground ngMoments’ or ‘Cond t onsof Ex stence’:

TheModeofPresentat on orAryumentat on

Through the start ng po nt, we a m to f nd out wh ch ent t es, nst tut ons and

processes are necessary to make an object-total ty, n our case the cap tal st

system, nto a potent ally reproduc ble constellat on. That s, a constellat on

that s potent ally cont nuous and self-susta n ng ( n many places, of course,

th s has been the case for one to nearly two centur es). We seek the ‘necessary’

moments, n contrad st nct on to ‘merely’cont ngent moments (§12).

In Marx’sCap tal, for example, through the start ng po nt of the commod

y and commod ty-relat ons —an apparently mposs ble un fy ng concept for

a soc ety —the cap tal st mode of transcend ng th s apparent mposs b l ty s

presented. Cap tal Volume I sets out the f rst ma n stage of th s presentat on

n the sequence of the commod ty, exchange, the monetary-value d mens on

(Part I), then cap tal and the product on of cap tal (Parts II to V1),followed by

the accumulat on of cap tal (Part VII).Its result s the contour of a potent ally

reproduc ble constellat on, one that requ res further concrete ground ng of

15 egel 1985 [1833], p. 83.

16 Compare Murray 2003, p. 157and Arthur 1997,p. 31.

17 Systemat cally,the start ng po nt s merely the entry-po nt nto the system. In pr nc ple

w th ntroductory, referent al and explanatory qual f cat ons—we could alsohave entered

at some other moment (th nk of the metaphor c pyram d).Our quer es m ght havebeen

somewhat d fferent, although another entry-po nt would aga n have posed an apparent

poss b l ty. (For example, Marx m ght have entered h s SD n Cap tal at the moment of

cap tal-accumulat on, lack ng,at that po nt, moments such as the product on of cap tal.

Th swould have requ red the ntroduct on of the temporar ly ungrounded moment (§6)

of th s product on of cap tal, wh ch t must be assumed can be grounded once we have

come full c rcle). In th s respect, the spec f c entry-po nt s somewhat arb trary. owever,

to the extent that an abstract and s mplemoment/concept s eas er to understand than a

concrete and complex concept, t s preferable to start w th the former.The pr ce of th s

way of beg nn ng the presentat on, as the reader of a convent onal SDwork w ll know, s

that the moments mmed ately follow ngthe start ng po nt can be qu te d cultprec sely

because of the r abstractness.



254 REUTEN

the moments presented n th s sequence (Cap tal Volumes II and 111,as wellas

the books wh ch Marxhad planned but d d not even beg n to draft).

Beg nn ng from the start ng po nt, an SDpresentat on must pose the prox

mate cond t on ofex stenceof a moment, that s,the mmed ate requ rements

necessary for the ex stence of that moment. The term nology for a prox mate

cond t on of a moment s ts ‘ rst ground’, or ‘ground ng moment’.18To the

extent that th s ground ngmoment cannot ex st by tself (that s, to the extent

that t s non-endogenous), that moment requ res new prox mate ground ng

moment(s). Thus the or g nalground ng moment's cond t ons of ex stence are

progress vely developed. In sum then, we have a development or the move

ment of (a ser es of)ground ng moments.19Ateach po nt, the d alect cal pre

sentat on s dr ven forward by the nsuj c ency, that s, the mposs b l ty, of a

pos ted moment.

Th s process must cont nue unt l we have presented all the cond t ons of

ex stence of the ent re system —all the cond t ons that make t a potent ally

reproduc ble system. If successful, all ground ng moments w ll be ent rely

endogenously determ ned. Throughout th s movement, there s 1)conceptual

d ferent at on and z) conceptualconcret sat on.These are two s des of the same

co n. I br efly expand on each.

1) Conceptual d ferent at on: W th the progress ve ground ng movement,

we have ncreased d fferent at on of phenomena. Recall that the process of

research pr or to the SDpresentat on, abstract determ nat on (§3), results n

a un gr- n-d ference (see the left pyram d n F gure 4). W th n that research

process, phenomena are subsumed under more general phenomena —much

l ke spec es are subsumed under a genus. (For example, the sale of output, the

lease of land and lend ngmoney are all market-transact ons.) In such a way,an

abstract connect onbetween phenomena s establ shed.

Th s un ty- n-d fference does not exh b t the nterconnect on and con

crete determ nat on, or del neat on, of the var ous subsumed phenomena.

For th s the r d ference- n-un ty would have to be systemat cally shown: n

what respects phenomena d ffer (see the r ght pyram d n F gure 4). Each new

18 The terms ‘cond t on of ex stence' and ‘ground' are used nterchangeably. The f rst term

has the advantage of focus ngon e dstence,and s perhaps n t allymore transparent. The

term ‘ground ngmoment’ has the advantage of focus ng n on the momentary. therefore

emphas s ng ts ncompleteness.

19 Th s movement, together w th the two qual f cat ons outl ned n the rema nder of th s

sect on, s n my v ew the core of egel's Essence-Log c(that s, the second part of h s

Log c).




un ty-Ind ana

start ng po nt of

end-po nt of'pre-systemat c research systemat c presentat on

uonauruuanapaauoocopapuxs

/ 5- \

\

1 \‘

emp r cal phenomena comprehens on of concrete emp r cal real ty

[emp r cal start ng pO m0f earl er analyt cal feseafdll [end-po nt of'svsternat c-d alect cal presentat on]

:

o

:1 / I | l \

5 resultsof ponry a mo a n lads

5 “d P“ / frombout:toconcrete \

,: research

g

a

.3

a

1 ?

f

ttlftlt?

FIGURE4 From research pr or toSDto systemat c nvest gat on and presentat on

ground ngmoment s also a more concrete determ nat on of the r d fferences.

(Throughout all of Cap tal, for example, we have the d fferent at on of ‘cap tal’

several ways, such as n Cap tal Volume 111,nto ndustr al, commerc al and

money-/f nance-cap tal.) These ncreas ngly concrete d fferences thus appear

to have been pos ted n preced ng moments only mpl c tly.In th s manner,

d fferences that were not prev ously set forth as such, appear n ncreas ngly

concreteforms. The ground ng moment at a new level (say,‘cap tal’at the end

of Cap tal Volume 1)sets out a st ll (relat vely) abstract ex stence that cannot

yet actually ex st,wh ch dr ves the presentat on forward as descr bed.20

W th th s d fferent at on, each ground ng moment, each level of (relat vely

abstract) ex stenceof the total ty (5,) s further determ ned as a part cularform

ofex stence.At each levelent t es are a un ty of form and determ nate ex stence —

that s, as determ ned at that level.21In Marx’sCap tal Volume I, for example,

money has a d fferent form of ex stence w th n the moment of Chapter I —

where ‘abstract labour’ s ts placeholder —than at ts more developed form

n Chapter 111.Cap tal’ga ns d fferent, ever more concrete, forms of ex stence

throughout the three volumes of Cap tal. In Part I of Cap tal Volume II, for

example, cap tal s pos ted as s multaneously ex st ng as var ous forms n a c r

cu t(M—C ...P...Cj'—M').

20 Compare egel 1991[1817],§§1zo-4, and 1985 [1833],pp. 81—3.

21 Compare egel 1991[1817], §§124—3o.



256 REUTEN

2) Conceptual concret sat on: Through the movement from abstract con

cepts and determ nat ons to concrete concepts and determ nat ons (that s,

through ncreas ngly concrete grounds or cond t ons of ex stence), we set out

essent al nterconnect ons. Th s goes on unt l the level of emp r cal real ty s

reached, that s, the level at wh ch all the essent al nterconnect ons pos ted

earl er (Bl—Bu)ppear n exper ence (y). We should now be able to compre

hend exper ence n ts essent al nterconnectedness.Emp r c sts and pur st pos

t v sts w ll argue that we have made an unnecessary detour: d d we not have

the emp r cal real tybefore us all th s t me?Yes,wehad emp r cal appearances,

but —and th s s the po nt of SD—we cannot s mply ‘read’ phenomena and

understand the r nterconnect ons and the relat ve mportance (necessary or

otherw se) of d fferent phenomena to a total ty. Nevertheless, phenomenal

real ty s ndeed real ty (I do not say ‘the’real ty) and the ult mate yardst ck for

an SDendeavour.Essenceand appearance are nseparable, even f we d st n

gu sh the two throughout the course of the systemat c presentat on. As egel

argued ‘[e]ssencemust appear . .. [It] s not beh ndor beyond appearance, but

s nce the essence swhat ex sts, ex stence s appearance'.22

On complet on, f successful the n t al un fy ng concept s shown to be

herent n the concrete object-total ty. On arr val at th s ‘end’we are now n a

pos t on to re-comprehendthe start ng po nt, the earl er moments, and so forth

(compare §9 ‘full c rcle’).

Th s sect on has focused on systemat c ‘presentat on’, the argument by

wh ch a total ty s outl ned, n a sense the ‘result’.The (creat ve) process by

wh ch th s presentat on s del neated s systemat c nvest gat on. I make some

remarks about th s process n an append x at the end of th s chapter.

§11 Forces,Tendent al Forces and the r Express ons

(Ground ngMoments Cont nued)

In §1o,wesawthat the start ngpo nt ofa presentat on sprogress velygrounded

bya movement ofmoments, the nsuff c encyof each pos ted moment dr v ng

the presentat on forward.Th smovement del neates the ncreas ngly concrete

22 egel 1991[1817],§131.Patr ck Murray (for example n th s volume) forcefully stresses that

th s s one of the key po nts that Marx took over from egel.

The ep stemolog cal process through wh ch we reach the eventual comprehens on of

appearance and exper ence n the r essent al nterconnectedness, and so of the un ty of

essence and appearance, wasmetaphor cally p ctured as a pyram d (F gure1).Th s should

not convey the mpress on that n my v ew real ty s ontolog cally layered. owever,I do

not cla m that there can be no other pos t ons w th n the Marx an d scourse, evenw th n

the ‘newd alect cs'; see Brown,Slater and Spencer 2002(and the r references).




cond t onsof ex stence of both the start ng moment and the furthermoments

necess tates. Earl er cond t ons of ex stence do not become rrelevant or

untrue —they rema n relevant and true —but are transcended by ever more

concrete cond t ons: ‘aconcentrat on ofmany determ nants’, asMarxputs t.23

Theground, n prov d ng cond t ons ofex stence (§10), s often further deter

m nedbyaforce (or synonymously,a compuls on), the man festat on ofwh ch

termed as that force’sexpress on.24A force and ts express on are central to

an SDpresentat on of processes and the r dynam c effects w th n the object

total ty.(Forexample, the compuls on to produce surplus-value,wh ch mpl es

the compuls on toward the commod f cat on of labour-power, s expressed n

a rate of surplus-value. The compuls on to accumulate cap tal along w th the

plementat on of new product on-techn ques s expressed n a rate of accu

mulat on). In the follow ng paragraphs, I br efly expand on: 1)tendent alforces;

2) the r express ons;and then 3) the nteract on of mult ple tendent al forces.

1) Tendent alforces: When a pol t cal-econom c force (tout court) has an

absolute character for the total ty the operat on of that force s necessary for

the ex stence and reproduct on of that total ty.(Forexample, the compuls on

to accumulate cap tal s necessary for cap tal sm’sreproduct on).25 That sa d,

t should then be recogn sed that a force almost never has such an absolute

character n regard to any nd v dual const tuent part of that total ty, s nce

there may be a certa n balance of cont ngent nfluences act ng upon an nd

v dual ent ty —a balance of cont ngenc es that does not apply to s m lar ent

t es generally.26(Forexample, whereas a prof table nd v dual enterpr se could

del berately nterrupt ts cap tal-c rcu t, cease to accumulate and l qu date —n

sp te of the var ous constra nts that w ll ‘usually’act upon t not to do so—the

collect vegroup of enterpr ses must necessar lyaccumulate n order to repro

duce cap tal sm). It s n th s latter sense that l adopt the term ‘tendent al force’,

or equ valently ‘tendency’, n keep ng w th the absolute character of that force

for the total ty as a whole. A tendent al force m ght not always predom nate

any nd v dual case, but t must apply to a s gn f cant enough number of

cases (note th s does not necessar ly mean ‘onaverage’)such that, abstract ng

23 Marx 1973 [1857—8], p. 101.

24 egel sets out th s connect on n D v s on B—C,on Relat onsh p, of h s Log cof Essence

(1991 [1817]. §§135-41).

25 It can of course be the case that a forcew llbe counteracted at t mes by the operat on of

other forces.Th s nteract on of forces s d scussed n the th rd po nt n th s subsect on.

26 Note that such a cont ngency s not an ep stemolog cal or methodolog cal defect

(perhaps at least some of these cont ngenc es can ndeed be adequately theor sed), but

ontolog callyunderdeterm ned.




f rstmoment (Chapter XIII)sets out one constellat on of nterconnected ten

dent al forces and the r s ngle express on n the rate of prof t (a concentrat on

of many determ nants). The second moment (Chapter XIV)sets out counter

tendenc es. The th rd moment (Chapter XV)sets out the express on of the ear

l er moments n a rate—of-prof tcycle.30

§1z Necess ty and Cont ngency n a Soc al Object-Realm

(Ground ngMoments Cont nued)

Foran object-total ty to ex st, all of ts cond t ons of ex stence (grounds) must

necessar ly beMj lled. The ground ng movement (§§10-11) dent f es wh ch

phenomena (ent t es, nst tut ons and processes) n an object-total ty are

necessary and wh ch are cont ngent. Phenomena are cont ngent when these

couldbe d fferent w thout chang ng the essence,the essent al funct on ng and

potent al reproduct on of the system.An example m ght be the dress-codes of

bankers,wh ch presumably have no econom c mpact.Another m ght be reta l

open ng hours, or the personal d str but on of ncome between nd v duals,

wh ch presumably do have an econom c mpact. They are cont ngent n the

sense that an endless var ety of open ng hours or of personal- ncome d str bu

t ons are, n pr nc ple, compat ble w th the cap tal st system.

Th s mpl es that by means of the presentat on, we f nd wh ch nst tut ons

and processes are merely cont ngent and so ‘ n pr nc ple’ changeable w th n

the system. Th s poss b l ty of change w th n the system s thus an mportant

pol t cal consequence of the SDmethod.31

SD s generally concerned w th necess t es and not w th cont ngenc es. The

pl cat on s that everyth ng that s not dealt w th, s, n pr nc ple, changeable

w th n the system.Necessary nst tut ons and processes const tute the system.

30 Th s rate-of-profrt cycle tself has the character st cs of a tendency —prolonged per ods of

steadygrth or of stagnat on cannot be excludeda pr or .The th rd moment nMarx’s

expos t on of the prof t-cycle s, after all, the synthes s of two other underdeterrn ned

tendenc es. In fact, the name g ven to these three together, n Part III,‘the tendency of the

rate of prof t to fall’, s m slead ng because t focuses attent on on the f rst moment only.

See Reuten 2004 and Reuten and Thomas 2011.

31 See Reuten and W ll ams 1989,pp. 35-6. Th s pol t cal relevance works n two d rect ons.

The personal d str but on of ncome between nd v duals,forexample, could, n pr nc ple,

be changed w th n the system. On the other hand, the corollary s that f the major ty

of people are not sat sf ed w th the system even w th, for example, that red str but on,

makes sense to str ve for poss ble alternat ves to the system tself.W thout referr ng

to the method cal necess ty—cont ngency d st nct on, Sm th 1990, pp. 38—40,and 1993b,

p. 28 cast th s pol t cal relevance of SD n terms of ‘fundamental’ and hon-fundamental

stmctures'.



260 REUTEN

On the other hand, cont ngenc es can take us nto ‘an endless sea’of ndeter

m nate poss b l ty (‘ t could be th s way,or that way’). owever, we w ll see n

§§13—14hat the ssue s somewhat less s mple than t may appear here —at

some cruc aljunct ons we cannot neglect cont ngenc es.

Addendum: egel and Marx on necess ty and cont ngency: Wh le necess ty s

central to egel’s Essence-Log c,32there s no room for cont ngency n h s

work. Tomy knowledge the same appl es for other SDworks.33In h s lectures,

not publ shed by h m, egel s quoted as say ng, ‘The sole a m of ph losoph

cal nqu ry s to el m nate the cont ngent. Cont ngency s the same as external

necess ty, that s,a necess ty wh ch or g nates n causes wh ch are themselves

no more than external c rcumstances’.34 In h s Encyclopaed a Log c, egel

beg ns the presentat on of th s ssue w th the category of ‘poss b l ty’, n the

sense that everyth ng that we perce ve s poss ble (he means ‘determ nate pos

s b l ty’,not f ct onal poss b l ty by assumpt on). Next he ntroduces the cat

egory of ‘cont ngency’ (acc dental ty). The po nt here s these cont ngenc es

(for example, bankers’ dress-codes) may have grounds (or perhaps must have

grounds), though these grounds are not a part of, or are not essent al to, the

object-total ty at hand. egel’sth rd category s that of ‘necess ty’.Necess t es

pos t the object-total ty as an nterconnected whole (as set out n § o above).

A‘necessary’moment conta ns the antecedent moment transcended n tself.35

Th s makes sense as far as t goes. Aswe have already seen n §11,necessary

forcescould have cont ngent quant tat ve express ons. ‘Normally’th s poses no

problem n the systemat c presentat on to the extent that, f rstly,th s has no

consequences for the systemat c nterconnect on of moments, and, secondly,

we comprehend these cont ngent express ons w th n a total ty, that s, when

we have reached the end-po nt of the presentat on. (Aga n, n §§13—14ont n

genc es that are relevant for the systemat c presentat on w llbe treated).

Wh le egel s expl c t about necess ty and cont ngency, n h s scant meth

odolog cal wr t ngs Marx s not, and we must use the content of h s texts

to make nferences. These nferences are compl cated by the fact that Marx

expounded analys salongs deh s synthet c presentat on, w thout clearlysepa

rat ng the two (§3).Often h s (apparent) analys s does ntroduce cont ngency.

32 In h sEncyclopaed aLog c t s the most substant al element of the Log cof Essence’slast

D v s on C: ‘Actual ty’.

33 The except on s Reuten and W ll ams 1989.Arguments for nvest gat ng cont ngency are

set out on pp. 16—17,24—5,31,147 and 263—4.

34 egel 1837, p. 28; compare 1991[1817],§§143—5.

35 egel 1991 [1817],§§142—9;compare 1985 [1833], p. 80.




Evenso, cons der ng the general structure of h s argument throughout Cap tal

(and cons der ng the prel m nary-draft character of espec ally Parts IVtoVIIof

Cap tal Volume III) 1th nk that Marx’ssynthet c argument ma nly addresses

necess ty. (I cannot substant ate th s ssue here, as t would requ re an exten

s ve study.) If th s s correct, Marx nevertheless ntroduces the type of cont n

gency that I treat n §§13—14.

start ng po nt of

systemat c presentat on

[$7. moments:cf ceptualevels\

/ fromabstra toconcrete \

/ .. g

/ B...cont ngen systemextens on :

/ y \L

comprehens on ofconcrete emp r cal real ty

[end-po nt of systemat c-d alect calpresentat on]

uopau uuaaparouooaouaq uxs

FIGURE5 Systemat c nvest gat on and presentat on w th system extens on

§13 ‘System-Extens on’ Type 1:Becom ng Necessary

The SD method outl ned n §§9—12takes nsp rat on from egel’s 1817

Encyclopaed aLog c.That sa d, t must deal w th certa n methodolog cal l m

tat ons to be appropr ate for the development of an mmanent cr t que of the

(contemporary) pol t cal economy of cap tal sm, forwh ch Marx’sCap tal la d

the parad gmat c foundat ons.36

At least for the object-total ty of the cap tal st pol t cal economy,a egel an

account of SD s nadequate because of the complete separat on between

necess ty and cont ngency t ns sts upon (compare §12).Thus §13and §14w ll

set out two reasons why th s separat on s not appropr ate, and why part cu

lar cont ngenc es should ndeed be dealt w th. In each case, the result s that

36 Reuten and W ll ams 1989represents our endeavour to develop th s art culat on further.



262 REUTEN

a part cular type of cont ngency must enter the systemat c presentat on as a

‘system-extens on’. The layer 3,,+1 n F gure 4 shows a placeholder for these

system-extens ons. Even so, I stress that SD cannot deal (and n my v ew,

should not try to deal) w th other types of cont ngency.

The f rst type of system-extens on s requ red because of the organ c char

acter of the cap tal st system. ere a moment that was once cont ngent may

‘become necessary’.Cons der the jur d cal property-form of the enterpr se. At

f rst s ght, t appears to be cont ngent whether th s form s that of the f rm

(w th unl m ted l ab l ty), or that of the corporat on (w th l m ted l ab l ty). In

qu te a few c rcumstances today th s st ll s cont ngent. owever,both a gener

al sed ncreas ngconcentrat on of cap talw th n enterpr ses and a general sed

cont nued central sat on of cap tal-enterpr ses would be mposs ble w thout

the corporate form of enterpr se (that s, l m ted l ab l ty). Another example

the part cular structural developments n f nance n the twent eth century

wh ch meant that a cont nuous ‘creep ngpr ce- nflat on’became necessary to

the cap tal st system.37

In the case of the form of enterpr ses, Marx ntroduces the jo nt-stock com

pany (JSC) at the end of Chapter XXIIIand expands on t n Chapter XXVII, n

h s ‘f nal draft’ for Cap tal Volume 111.e does not see the JSC as essent ally d f

ferent from nterest-bear ng cap tal but rather as a developedform of t.38One

m ght see th s as an mmanent development of the system (compare §10on

the form of ex stence). The case of creep ng nflat on m ght s m larly be theo

r sed as an mmanent organ c development (even f more compl cated than

the former case).

A r g d egel an m ght argue that n such cases an ontolog cally new sys

tem comes nto be ng, requ r ng a new systemat sat on n accord w th ts new

necess t es. owever,we do not have the replacement of the or g nal group of

necess t es by another d fferent group. Instead, new necess t es are added to

the ‘prev ous’necess t es. If th s s correct, the organ c development of the sys

tem adds ever more necess t es —the mpl cat on s that the system s becom

gmore restr ct ve. Th s ns ght, a consequence of the SDmethod, s of course

pol t cally mportant.

37 Reuten 2003. In the same book n wh ch that paper appears, Tony Sm th (Sm th 2003.

p. 26) takes a s m lar v ew n mak ng a d st nct on between egel's (or egel an)

and Marx an SD:‘Marx an systemat c theory s rev sable. stor cal developments n

cap tal sm may. . . lead us to d scover systemat c necess ty n areas prev ously overlooked’.

(I suppose that ‘overlooked’ s just an unfortunate term, because that could make t an

ep stemolog cal rather than an ontolog calmatter).

38 See Reuten 2002, pp. 191—8.




System-extens ons, at least n my own nvest gat ve exper ence, occur

toward the ‘end’of the presentat on (th s alsoappl es to the system-extens on

d scussed n §14,and Marx’s ntroduct on of the 180). Th s s n accordance

w th the suggest on that pr or ty should be g ven to prox mate grounds ‘most

necessary’ for the reproduct on of the system (§10).

§14 ‘System-Extens on’Type2: Ontolog cal System c Weaknesses and

Cont ngency

The f rst type of system-extens on (§13) s mportant n assess ng the strength

ofthe cap tal st system—nclud ng tspotent al for reproduct on. Wed scussed

the poss b l ty of ncreas ng system c restr ct ons stemm ng from the organ c

development of the system.

A second type of system-extens on concerns system-weaknesses. There s

l ttle to no scope for comprehend ng these w th n a egel an SD.The reasons

for th s stem from egel’sv ew of contrad ct ons, comb ned w th the v ew on

necess t es.

For egel - and here I am n agreement w th h m —a contrad ct on can

have no concrete ex stence. Contrad ct ons ex st as nternal processes, but n

the r external express ons contrad ct ons are actually transcended n one way

or another at a g ven po nt n t me. Thus the cap tal st system ‘temporar ly

resolves’these contrad ct ons n one way or another, whence cap tal sm has a

concrete ex stence.

owever,I d sagree w th egel on how contrad ct ons are actually resolved.

Because egel d d not deal w th cont ngency (§12), he had to resolve con

trad ct ons at the level of necess ty. In th s regard, th s mode of resolut on

pl es that contrad ct ons are ‘d mmed’ (played down).39 Consequently,

system-defects are reconc led. egel’sSDhas therefore been called utop an.

(Apparently w th th s n m nd, Tony Sm th calls egel’s an aff rmat ve SD).4°

Th s resolut on and reconc l at on s executed through egel’sSubject veLog c

(or the Log cof the Concept —the th rd part of the Log c).

The key ssue here s not that contrad ct ons are resolved —there s agree

ment that they are —but a d fferent apprec at on of those resolut ons, nclud

39 There s no adequate Engl sh translat on for egel’s(and Marx’s)usage of the German

term aufheben (I adopt ‘transcend’ or ‘resolve’as the context requ res). In egel’scase as

d scussed n §14,contrad ct on does not d sappear, but 1th nk that t s fa r to say that, not

only s a contrad ct on ‘d mmed’(playeddown) on ts transcendence nto a new moment,

but salsodom nated bythat transcend ngmoment

40 See, for example, Sm th n th s volume.



264 REUTEN

g the r robustness. Th s d fferent apprec at on would seem to be a matter of

how the process of resolut on s understood.

Along w th th s d fference, Sm th and I, and apparently Marx n Cap tal,

adopt from egel’smethod h s Essence-Log c — ts strength —and leave as de

h s Subject ve Log c.41

Consequently some contrad ct ons requ re cont ngent resolut ons.42Rather

than be ng understood as a drawback of the method, th s should be under

stood as a strong po nt, prec sely because the pract ce of the cap tal st system

ndeed one of cont ngent resolut on of ts contrad ct ons or weaknesses. In

other words, even though the system has clearly h stor cally been robust n

terms of establ sh ng ts necess t es, t s nevertheless vulnerable because of ts

contrad ct ons.43

Apart from n a footnote (to §9), I have not used the term ‘contrad ct on’

before th s sect on. I am ncl ned to reserve th s term for ontolog cal defects

and vulnerab l t es (weaknesses that are not resolvedat the level of necess ty).

The cont ngent resolut on of these contrad ct ons - and the defects thereof —

41 I d Eer w th any nterpretat ons of Marx's Cap tal that h nt at Marx bas ng h mself on a

Subject ve Log c,as Fred Moseley ( n th s volume) does. Marx exper mented w th t n

the Grundn'sse manuscr pt (see Meaney 2002, and n th s volume). owever, he never

personally publ shed th s manuscr pt There s no textual ev dence whatsoever der v ng

from Cap tal that Marx there adopts a d alect cal Subject ve Log c. (Use of the words

‘general’or ‘part cular' are of course not ev dence for th s e ther, as there s room for these

terms n d alect cal Essence-Log c.)

42 In Reuten and W ll ams 1989(pp. 26—30),we nd cated why an SDfor the cap tal st pol t cal

economy could not reach beyond egel's Essence-Log c.Sm th (Sm th 1990)made th s

po nt n amuchmore soph st cated manner (unfortunately,at that t me we d d not know

each other and the pr nt ng of the books co nc ded). See also Sm th 1993band n th s

volume.Sm thand I seem to agree that contrad ct on maybe a pers stent and rreduc ble

character st c of soc al real ty.Reuten andW ll ams1989,more so than Sm th, emphas sed

the cont ngency of, and sh fts n, the essent al transcendence of contrad ct on —

so pos t on ng cont ngency w th n the essent al SD(as I do n the current text). Even so,I

do not th nk wesubstant ally d sagree on th s.

43 Chr sArthur takes a very d fferent pos t on n h s SDproject (elements of t are outl ned

Arthur 2002 and n http://www.chr sarthur.net/towards-a-systemat c—d alect c-of

cap taLpdf). e h ghl ghts the dom nance of cap tal w th n the system (we agree on

th s) and therefore cons ders egel'sSubject ve Log cto prov de an adequate framework

for present ng that dom nance. R ccardo Bello ore ( n th s volume), w thout expl c tly

endors ng egel’s Subject ve Log c, pos ts that fet sh sm empowers cap tal n a way

s m lar to t be ng a Subject n the egel an sense.




make these an nherent character st c of concrete real ty.44We have more or

less (un)stable cont ngent pract ces wh ch ‘temporar ly’overcome contrad c

t ons. It should be emphas sed that these cont ngent resolut ons nev tably

face all the forces earl er pos ted n the SD as necessary. The ns ght ga ned

from th s ‘system-extens on’—vulnerab l ty n the face of necessary forces and

the vulnerab l ty of the very strengths of the cap tal st system — s of tremen

dous pol t cal mportance.

To llustrate a ‘system-extens on’due to ontolog cal weaknesses of cap tal

m, I w ll br efly d scuss the (d s)cont nuous accumulat on of cap tal as gen

erat ng a cr s s-r dden cycl caldevelopment of cap tal. Th s s one of the ma n,

and probably one ofthe most mportant caseswhere th s second type of ‘exten

s on’becomes s gn f cant. Such an extens on s requ red when the systemat c

presentat on arr ves at a po nt when a necessary cond t on of ex stence (for

example, the cond t on requ r ng a cont nual accumulat on of cap tal) lacks

su c ent determ nat on —‘underdeterm nat on’. Further ‘determ nat on’ can

only be prov ded at the level of cont ngency, as opposed to the level of neces

s ty.Usually,th s mpl es that several solut ons are poss ble. Of course, n real

y one solut on w ll be the case at one part cular t me. Th s w ll not mply,

however, that th s part cular solut on w ll be repeated n the same shape n

future (or for that matter, that t has not been d fferent n the past).

In Marx’sCap tal Volume I,and n the ‘ naldrafts’for Cap tal Volumes IIand

III,we see th s underdeterm nat on at the level of necess ty - and hence the

troduct on of a ‘requ red cont ngency’ n each of the parts of the presenta

t on deal ng w th the accumulat on of cap tal: PartVIIofVolumeI (accumula

t on); Part III ofVolume II (reproduct on); Part III ofVolume III (development

of the rate of pro t).45Generally, there are suff c ent cond t ons to determ ne

the accumulat on of cap tal, but not for the cont nual accumulat on of cap tal.

Its cont ngent resolut on s n econom c cr s s and the cycl caldevelopment of

cap tal. Even f these cycles have certa n common character st cs, the length

44 Thus —whereas an ‘apparent mposs b l ty’ (§9) s a matter of the l m ts of the

presentat on (wecannot ntroduce all the prox matecond t ons ofex stenceofa moment

at the same t me) wh ch s resolved at a later po nt n the presentat on —‘contrad ct on’

s an ontolog cal l m t of the system. Tothe extent that the object-realm for egel’sLog c

‘thought’, he can say ( egel 1985 [1833],p. 71), ‘[T]he essence of ph losophy cons sts

prec sely n resolv ngthe contrad ct on of the Understand ng. Th s manner of resolv ng

contrad ct on s not appropr ate to a presentat on of a soc al object-realm.

45 Tothese wem ght add the drafts for chapters of Cap talVolume IIIthat casually deal w th

monetary aspects of the cycle: Chapters XXI,XXII,XXX,XXXI.See Reuten 2002, pp. 189—

90; th s paper deals w th all of Parts 111o Vof Cap tal Volume III.



266 REUTEN

and ampl tudes of the r phases are cont ngent; thus theform ofex stenceof the

cycle s cont ngent.

The ‘non-necess ty’ - that s the cont ngency —of the form of these cycles

clearly of great pol t cal mportance, espec ally when v ewed from the

perspect ve of the soc al forms of subsumpt on of labour (as nclud ng unem

ployment) dur ng the course of a bus ness-cycle.

Conclus ons

The method of systemat c d alect cs s part cularly well su ted to dent fy ng

wh ch nst tut ons, ent t es and processes are necessary, rather than cont n

gent, for the cont nued reproduct on ofan object-total tysuch as the cap tal st

system. Such a system’sstrength s that t mmanently generates these neces

s t es (§§9-12).46 To the extent that t does, the SDmethod outl ned here —

wh ch bu lds on egel’sEssence-Log c — s capable of clearly exh b t ng th s

reproduct on of necess t es. owever, a egel an SD s not su ted to the com

prehens on of a system that organ cally generates new necess t es (§13).Nor s

able to detect and theor se any weaknesses n the mmanent generat on of

necess t es n casesofunderdeterm nat on, asa consequence of ts nadequate

treatment of contrad ct ons and necess t es (§14).In th s respect, the ncorpo—

rat on of requ red cont ngenc es s an mportant mprovement of the method.

The pol t cal s gn f cance of th s ns ght s that t reveals system c weaknesses

and vulnerab l t es.

Append x: Systemat c Invest gat on

Sect on 4 of th s chapter focused on systemat c ‘presentat on’, the argument

by wh ch a total ty s outl ned, n a sense the ‘result’.The process by wh ch

th s presentat on s del neated s systemat c nvest gat on. (Th s nvest gat on s

self preceded by the appropr at on of analyt cal and emp r cal research d s

cussed n §3;compare §7). ln n t ally ground ng the start ng po nt, and then

later moments, the prox mate cond t ons of ex stence are presented (§10).But

what sprox mate? Th s s,to a degree, a matter of the creat ve process of nves

t gat on. As a consequence, there are no hard-and-fast rules or gu del nes for

vest gat on—here are no cr ter a other than the content of the argument.

46 Another strength s that t mmanently subsumes the agents of these necess t es.Th s s a

matter of content that I have not dealt w th.




Nonetheless, to g ve the reader a feel for the process, 1w ll make a few

comments based on my exper ence n SD nvest gat on and presentat on."'7

Systemat c order ng s not usually obv ous. Dur ng the nvest gat ve process,

a transpos t on and re-transpos t on of moments occurs for larger collect ons

of moments (say chapters or parts), but more often w th smaller groups of

moments (th nk of the order of sect ons w th n a chapter). Th s s largely a

matter of what best ‘f ts’.

An example w ll clar f}Ith s. Based on everyday exper ence, and analys s,

banks and the corporate form of enterpr ses would seem to requ re system

at c placement. When should these be ntroduced nto the presentat on? In

Cap tal, Marx ntroduced these only n Volume III.Th s order ng, however, s

not the only poss b l ty.Transpos t ons of larger moments, such as the ntro

duct on of banks and the corporate form, do make a d fference n the argu

ments that can be made —at least n how conc sely they can be made. Th s

seems to be less the case for smaller transpos t ons, where there s often some

arb trar ness.

In the var ous ed t ons of Cap tal, we do see some smaller transpos t onal

d fferences. In order to d scover the relat vely larger transpos t ons we should

compare the last vers on w th the earl est drafts, that s, those of 1857—8nd

1861—3.48oberto F nesch has, beyond th s, compared n ne of Marx’splans for

the order ng of Cap tal, from 1857to 1866.In part cular, F nesch outl nes Marx’s

transpos t on of the moment of the accumulat onofcap tal n these plans,and

the consequences th s had for the general structure of the presentat on.49

The process of Marx’swr t ng of Cap tal underscores the mportance of

systemat c nvest gat on. Marx wrote h s ‘l nal draft’ for Cap tal Volume III n

1864—5;h s f nal drafts for Cap tal Volume 11date from 1865 to 1870and from

1877to 1878,from wh ch Engels ed ted Cap tal Volumes II and III. Marx pub

l shed Cap tal Volume I n 1867.Desp te h s be ng under pressure from var ous

people to publ sh, the dec s on was h s. After 1867Marx worked almost exclu

s vely 0n rev s ons of Part III of Cap tal Volume 11(1877-8), dy ng n 1883.Why

47 Reuten and W ll ams 1989,as well as a book that I am currently wr t ng.

48 Between these drafts we have more than just larger transpos t ons n the SD—he content

of the argument changes (one example sMarx’sv ewon the bus ness-cycle —see Reuten

and Thomas 2011).In an mportant study, Mark Meaney (2002) sets out how much of

Marx's Grundr sse (the 1857—8manuscr pt) s homologous w th egel’sObject ve Log c

as well as h s Subject ve Log c (or h s Log cof the Concept) —compare Meaney n th s

volume. In Cap tal, however, the Subject ve Log c s d scarded —see Sm th 1990,and n th s

volume.

49 F nesch 2010,and n th s volume.



268 REUTEN

was t that for more than 20 years he had a more or less complete structure,

and drafts, of Cap tal Volumes II and 111w thout car ng to publ sh these, com

plet ng h s l fe-work?My answer s that Marx was stuck. Not because he was

not able to wr te the fullwork, but because he had already publ shed Cap tal

Volume I. I suspect that th s publ cat on prevented h m from mak ng both

smaller and larger transpos t ons of moments overthe three volumes.Anyone

w th exper ence n do ng systemat c-d alect cal nvest gat on and presentat on

knows that mportant transpos t onal changesare bound to occur up unt l the

f nal draft of the j dl text. Publ sh ng Cap talVolume I set t ‘ nstone', and pre

vented these transpos t ons.50

50 I make th s remark here, although the ssue would deserve a full paper. In a 2009 paper

I prov ded some hypotheses regard ng the connect on between Cap tal Volume]

and the ‘l nal draft’ for Part II of Cap tal Volume III (the part on ‘the' transformat on

problem). I suppose th s (non-)connect onj ‘om Volume III to Volume I was one major

stumbl ng-block.



C APTER 11

Marx, egel and the Value-Form

Chr stopher].Arthur

Introduct on

It s generally recogn sed that of all the chapters of Marx's Cap tal t s the f rst

chapter of Volume I n wh ch the subterranean nfluence of egel’sSc ence

ofLog c,and of ts categor es, s eas ly detectable. owever, th s observat on

has not been much supported by deta led accounts of just wh ch categor es

are relevant. The present chapter reconstructs the d alect c of the value-form

order to show how egel’scategor es llum nate t. After an n t al analy

s s of the commod ty, us ng egel’scategor es of ‘Be ng’(qual ty, quant ty and

measure), the rema n ng categor es deployed are drawn from egel’sDoctr ne

of Essence, because the oppos t ons character st c of ts structure are su ted

to a study of the doubl ng of the commod ty nto commod t es and money.

These compr se: essence and appearance; reflect on and the determ nat ons

of reflect on (namely: dent ty, d fference, contrad ct on and ground); pos t

g the presuppos t on; the nverted world; force and express on; actual ty,

together w th tsmodal categor es;and substance.

Th spresent d scuss on of Marx's f rst chapter spart of a broader project of

m ne to prov de a systemat c-d alect calreconstruct on of the categor es of h s

Cap tal.1Systemat c d alect c s a method of exh b t ng the nner art culat on

of a g ven whole. Sc ence, n treat ng such a total ty, must eluc date a set of

categor es, captur ng the forms and relat ons const tut ve of the total ty, n an

ordered presentat on. There s a s gn f canthomologybetween the movement

of exchange, generat ng a system ofpureforms of value, abstracted from the

natural spec f c tyof commod t es, and the movement of thought, generat ng

egel’ssystem of log cal categor es, abstracted from the real mater al world.

Moreover theform of value as such, wh ch spr ngs from exchange as a process

of ‘abstract on',may be analysed regardless of any labour-content. Indeed theo

ret calpr or tymust be accorded to ‘form-analys s’because t s the pract ce of

exchange that establ shes th s necessary form of soc al synthes s n the f rst

place, before labours expended are commensurated n t. ere, then, I analyse

the value-form as such, ‘bracket ng’the or g n of the objects of exchange.

1 SeeArthur 2002for more on th s; chapter 1has a rev ew of relevant l terature.

© KONINKLUKEBRILLNV, LEIDEN, 2014 D01 l0.1163/9789004270022_013



270 ART UR

Whereas egel abstracts from everyth ng through the power of thought,

exchange abstracts only fromwhat spresented to t, a del m ted sphere of use

values.Sothe d alect c ofcap tal s lessgeneral than egel's n scope, but w th n

s own terms equally absolute, n so far as t s founded on all-round abstrac

t on to leave quas -log cal forms of be ng of commod t es. But the value-form

of the commod ty s not an ax om, or an emp r cal g ven, upon wh ch all else

depends; the or g nat ng formga nsactual ty and truth onlywhen grounded n

the total ty to wh ch t g ves r se through a d alect cal log c.

owever,I go further than just draw ngattent on to methodolog cal lessons

from egel’ssystemat c order ng of categor es, as do others. I draw also on h s

ontology. egel shows how an deal ty bu lds tself up, moment by moment,

to a self-actual s ng total ty, an ‘Absolute’.If then, as I bel eve, cap tal has n

part an deal real ty, then f t can be shown to ncarnate egel’sbluepr nt t

may be self-susta n ng n the same way. egel’slog c can be drawn on n such a

study because cap tal s a verypecul ar object, grounded n a process of pract

cal abstract on n exchange n much the same way as egel’sd ssolut on and

reconstruct on of real ty s pred cated on the abstract ve power of thought.

Abstract on s ‘out there’. Conversely I nterpret egel’s self-actual s ng ‘Idea’

as the ontolog c speaf c to cap tal, because t has relevance only to a system of

self-mov ngabstract ons. In general I have no problem w th a system of catego

r es such as Ar stotle and Kant art culated. But I bel eve egel’sv ew of system

pecul ar n that he cla ms ‘the Concept’ s the self-act ng author of ts own

forms. I say the same of cap tal.]ust as egelholds that ‘th nk ng tself, devo d

of personal ty, [ s] the product ve subject’,2so I take cap tal as a ‘product ve

subject devo d of personal ty’. It s as f egel, n h s ph losophy, absolut sed

the spec f c d alect c of cap tal, although h s factual knowledge of fully func

t on ng cap tal was ga ned second-hand, n h s read ngs of class cal pol t cal

economy and the Engl shnewspapers. owever, n a short chapter such as th s

1cannot do more than demonstrate that egel’slog c llum nates the catego

r es of Marx’s f rst chapter.3

What s the start ng po nt of Cap tal?Does ts movement followthe method

of r s ng from abstract determ nat ons to the concrete whole, as outl ned n

Marx’s unpubl shed 1857‘lntroduct on’? The concrete as the un ty of d verse

z egel 1985 [1833], p. 9.

3 I covered some of th s ground n Arthur 2004.That treatment used an apparatus taken from

Russell'stheory of relat ons. The d alect cal expos t on presented here s better. For the devel

opment of the systemat c d alect c beyond that of th s chapter see Arthur 2009,wh ch takes

the argument to the General Formula for Cap tal on the bas s of egel's Doctr ne of the

Concept.



MARX, EGEL AND T E VALUE-FORM Z71

determ nat ons s then the result, not the start ng po nt. Or d d Marx reject

th s n beg nn ng Cap tal w th a concretum (as he says n h s ‘Noteson Adolph

Wagner’),namely the commod ty,because wealth presents tself to us mmed

ately as ‘aheap of commod t es'? Confus on on th s po nt s resolved by tak ng

account of two d fferent mean ngs of ‘abstract and concrete’.

Marx speaks n h s Preface to Cap tal of the power of abstract on by analogy

w th the m croscope because t y elds ‘theeconom c cell-form’,the commod ty.

ere the ‘abstract’means that wh ch s taken apart from the whole that sup

ports t, and w th n wh ch t ga ns ts mean ng; t s separated off from t. But,

espec ally f the commod ty s not understood as med ated n the whole, t may

be taken n mmed ate exper enceas ‘concrete’ n the sense of tang ble.

owever,a more usual sense of the ‘abstract’ s that wh ch results from the

most general way of th nk ng about anyth ng, ach eved by leav ng as de all

s spec f c character st cs so as to generate a s mple mmed acy for thought,

namely a pure category not suscept ble to analys s (as s the concrete, of

course).

If th s d st nct on s accepted then we observe that Cap tal has two beg n

n ngs: the analyt c, and the synthet c (or systemat c).4 Cap tal s the object,

but th s s analysable nto the movement of money, and money med ates

commod ty-exchange. Thus Cap tal beg ns from the commod ty, and further

analyses t nto two aspects: ts usefulness and ts exchangeableness. Wh le use

fulness rema ns a stand ng cond t on of commod ty-exchange, exchangeable

ness cannot be reduced to t, but s a soc al determ nat on that follows ts own

law. The value—form s the abstract start ng po nt for a systemat c-d alect cal

development of the concrete whole of cap tal st product on art culated n

terms of the total s ng concept of ‘value’.Although our analyt cal start ng

po nt, namely ‘the commod ty produced by cap tal’, appears as a concrete

one, the pract cal abstract on mposed n exchange from every g ven feature

of t leads to a systemat c d alect c of ‘pure form’homologous w th the ‘pure

thoughts’ of egel’slog c.

(Belowthe ntroduct on of a egel an log cal category s flagged n bold).

The Forms of Value (1):The Commod ty

Th s f rst sect on themat ses what t s to be a commod ty. Th s s value n the

shape ofbe ng [Se n]—he f rst doma n of egel’sLog c—and ts determ nat ons

4 In th s nterpretat on 1followBanaj 1979,p. 40.Note also that egel saysh s Log chas ‘equally

both a synthet c and an analyt cal beg nn ng ( egel 1991[1817],§238).



272 ART UR

here also follow those n the Log c,namely ‘qual ty,quant ty, and measure’,5to

wh ch correspond n our case, t w ll be seen, ‘exchangeableness’, ‘magn tude’

and ‘exchange-value’.

The foundat on of the systemat c presentat on of the categor es of cap tal

that the value-form sa pure form mposed on ‘products’w thout express ng

any mater al content g ven n them. All the bod ly character st cs of the com

mod ty are abstracted from n exchange. Th s leaves the ‘be ng of exchange’

vo d of any determ nacy whatsoever, yet there s someth ng-there (Dase n s

egel’sterm). For, f t s the movement of exchange wh ch makes th s be ng

present, then that be ng does after all have a determ nat on, namely the bare

qual ty of ‘exchangeableness’,wh ch anyth ng appear ng n exchange must

have. (I d st ngu sh th s from ‘exchangeab l ty’,wh ch s value n a measurable

sense —see below.)

owdoes someth ng prove that t has exchangeableness? Th s requ res the

commod ty to have others aga nst wh ch t may exchange. It s only n so far as

a commod ty s translated nto a second commod ty that ts exchangeableness

demonstrated. Butthat th s exchangeablenesshasyet been reta ned, and not

d ss pated n ts real sat on, s shown f the second commod ty n turn proves

self ‘ofworth’ through be ng exchanged aga nst a th rd commod ty, and soon.

An ever-chang ng ser es of commod t es passes through our hands endlessly,a

spur ous nf n ty. But a genu ne nf n ty s pos ted when the other commod

t es are grasped only as complementary forms of the f rst n a closed system

wh ch all commod t es refer back to each other. The commod ty returns to

self hav ng been presented n ts other, but t s one and the same n both

cases.When the exchangeableness of a commod ty s brought back to t, the

commod t es ga n ‘be ng-for-self’.Everycommod ty s now character sed as n

tself an ‘exchangeable’.

owever, n egel’s log c the ‘be ng—for—self’hus developed s problemat c.

It s ‘one’wh ch excludesother ones, the many, yet s not d st ngu shable from

them; n the r mutual def n t on they are all one and the same, hav ng no nner

spec f c ty. egelargues that the r separateness s susta ned therefore only by

the r cont nual ‘repuls on’ of one another, ‘aprocess of rec procal exclud ng’.6

The ‘one’determ nes tsbe ng through the negat ve relat on to other such ones,

5 ere I leave as de the subtlet es of be ng and noth ng. Forthat see chapter 8 ofArthur 2002:

there I show that, cons der ng the commod ty, although what s not ‘value’ s of course ‘use

value’, t s wrong to dent fy ‘noth ng’ and ‘use-value’ (see footnote 13,p. 173);rather. be ng

and noth ng are moments of value;def n ng tself negat vely,value s mply s the absence of

use-value, wh ch becomes ts own pos t ve presence, so to speak.

6 egel 1991 [1817], §§96—7.



274 ART UR

loaf’, for example. A commod ty must be del m ted as an exchangeable, for

stance ‘a loaf’, to be an example of a commod ty, yet th s l m t s equally

sublated s nce any number, for nstance of ‘loaves’,may be taken as together

exchangeable s nce, f one s, all the many dent cal ones taken together are

too. Because t s rare for commod t es to be exchangeable one for one, room

has to be made for the commod t es related to be numerous, n order for a

number of un ts of one commod ty to exchange aga nst another number of

un ts of another commod ty.

Exchangeable commod t es, then, take determ nate shape n a del m ted

quant ty, y eld ng the category of magn tude, def ned as a number of un ts.

The str k ng th ng about th s quant f cat on s that, although each good has ts

own natural ndex of magn tude (we ght or whatever) n terms of wh ch hag

gl nggoeson, these commod t es seem unable to refer to anycommon ndex of

exchangeableness because, exhypothes ,as naturally d verse goods, the r ndex

of amount d ffers absolutely (no one would exchange two pounds of gold for

two pounds of ron). ere magn tude s a pure number, and y elds a rat o of

such numbers: ‘l’llg ve you s x of these for four of those’ s the quant tat ve

form of the offer for exchange.

Brought nto un ty w th tself n th s way, as reflex ve, ‘magn tude’ passes

over nto the rat o of quanta. Thus n our case, the number of un ts of one

commod ty, w th respect to the number of un ts of another commod ty, s the

quant tat ve bear ng on one exchangeable of another. Magn tude thus related

to tself n such a rat o of quanta s the be ng-for- tselfof quant ty n that the

rat o s the manner nwh ch a quantum relates to tself hav ngpassed through

the other related quantum.

Measure (that s,‘spec fy ngmeasure’) egeldef nes as qual tat ve quant ty.

1d v de t nto ‘rule',‘ser esof (spec f c) measures’ and ‘un ty ofmeasure-relat ons.

Qual ty and quant ty are un f ed here n that the rat o mpl c tly re nstates

qual ty f t rema ns the same wh le ts terms alter.When there s the re terated

ent ty of tsquot ent, wehavea magn tude that reta ns ts ‘qual ty’,regardless

of th s ‘external’var at on n the quanta so related.

In our case ‘measure’ s ‘exchange-value’.Th s depends on the presence of

a stable rate of exchange that one commod ty has aga nst another. If t s so.

then a rule s operat ng. Prorata exchangehas a qual tat ve character because

rema ns the same regardless of the ncrease (or decrease) n the number

of commod ty-un ts related n t. The key po nt about th s s that the rat o

abstracts from the spec f c tems nvolved. If, n th s rate of exchange, two of A

exchange aga nst three of B,and four ofAaga nst s x of B,then t s clear that a

mle s be ng followed.Cons dered as a result, such pass ng over of the one s de



MARX, EGEL AND T E VALUE-FORM 275

to the other g ves the commod ty ts spec f cmeasure, ts exchange-value;what

‘amounts to’,so to speak, s spec f ed n someth ng other than tself.

owever, every rate of exchange taken by a commod ty d ffers for every

commod ty related to the g ven commod ty. Thus ts exchange-values are so

many measures, y eld ng a ser es of spec f c measures (of exchange-values)

spec fy ng t n d fferent ways.

I now turn as de to d scuss egel on ‘realmeasure’ [DasRealeMass]. egel’s

treatment of ‘measure’ n h s Sc ence of Log c s too long and confused, but

the Encyclopaed a t s too short! My treatment of measure n th s sect on

closer to the abbrev ated account n egel’sEncyclopaed a than t s to the

longer d scuss on n h s Sc ence of Log c n wh ch he d st ngu shes ‘realmea

sure’ from ‘spec fy ng measure’. At th s po nt, then, t s necessary to d scr m

nate between them and to d scuss prec selywhat s covered by the categoryof

measure here. In the Sc enceof Log c, egel develops the category of spec fy

g measure, n wh ch someth ng s measured by someth ng else ( n our case

the exchange-value of one commod ty s g ven n terms of another), n order

to der ve ‘real measure’. Now I th nk egel's argument very dub ous, although

I have no space here to show th s. It seems to me that ‘real measure’ s not

a ‘surface’ category character st c of ‘be ng’but a category of ‘essence’,for t

measures a supposed mmanent magn tude. ere, then, 1am concerned only

w th ‘spec fy ng measure’. (Yetwe st ll have ava lable to us the category of ‘real

measure’ to deploy further on, prec sely when we reach the category of ‘value

as essence’ presented n money).

To resume: the members of th s ndef n teser es of measures cannot here

be measur ng d fferent qual t es of the commod ty,because exchangeableness

a un tary determ nat on; thus f a ‘measurable’ s present t must ex st n a

form that s nd fferent to all the spec f c exchange-values,wh ch are all equ va

lents of one another as ts measures. All these spec f cmeasures be ng val d,

they are subst tutable. Sowe reach the not on that there must be some un ty

to them, that, although they are all d fferent exchange-valuesof a commod ty,

they must represent the same ‘measurable'.

In my argument ‘the ser es of spec f c measures’ plays a role superf c ally

s m lar to that of egel’s‘nodal l ne of measures’, n generat ng the trans t on

to ‘essence’,so t s worth expla n ng our d fferent strateg es here. egel devel

ops the category of the ‘nodal l ne’from h s cons derat on of the way n wh ch

quant tat ve changes n a th ng eventually g ver se to a qual tat ve change. Every

new qual ty w ll have ts own proper measure, of course, hence such changes

n success on generate a nodal l ne of measures. e argues that these chang

g qual t es nevertheless have the same permanent substratum nd fferent



276 ART UR

to them and the r measures. Th s s ‘measureless’, n egel’s pecul ar term

nology. In th s ‘ nd fference’ to measure he sees ‘the becom ng of essence’. In

our case a s nglequal ty,namely exchangeableness, rema ns the same however

large or small the number of commod t es related as exchangeable. Butwhen

a commod ty s cons dered quant tat vely, namely n terms of ts ‘exchange

ab l ty’, t has many measures, as ts exchange-value s spec f able n terms of

many other commod t es.Myargument then s that we can suppose that there

some common element n th s ser es of measures, appear ng phenomenally

var ous ‘external’exchange-values: exchange-value as such. Inj ne, I replace

egel’sd achron c l ne w th a synchron c ser es n order to get to my own f nal

term ofmeasure.

Th s s:the un ty of measure-relat ons (replac ng egel’s‘themeasureless’).

The ser es of spec f c measures, exchange—values,taken n th s un ty as sub

st tutable ways of g v ngthe measure, leads us from the exchange-values of a

commod ty to a un tary measurable, the not on of the mmanent exchange

ab l ty of a commod ty. Of course th s alwaysmust be spec f ed n some sort of

measure but s tself nd fferent to each and every ava lable spec f c measure.

‘lmmanent exchangeab l ty’ I w ll term ‘value’once we have made the trans

t on to the category of ‘essence’so that we can speak of value as the essence of

the commod ty.

Beforethat, t srelevant to exam ne a falsetrans t on n Marx.Our argument

goesfromthe ser esof exchange-valuesofa commod ty to the suppos t on that

there s an mmanent value, taken as the essence of commod ty-relat ons. Th s

val d argument svery l ke the one Marx advances when he f rst says exchange—

value appears purely as a relat on but then cons ders what s mpl ed f one

commod ty has many exchange-values equ valent to each other. These are

mutually replaceable and hence exchange-valuemust be the mode of expres

s on [Ersche nungsform] of a ‘content’ d st ngu shable from t. owever,Marx

proceeds mmed ately to a qu te d fferentargument, the notor ous ‘th rd th ng'

argument. Tak ngnow twocommod t es, he sets them as ‘equal’to each other.

hence of ‘ dent cal magn tude’,and hence equal to some ‘th rd th ng’ to wh ch

they are reduc ble. (Not ce the cla m the two commod t es are equal svery d f

ferent from the argument that all exchange-valuesof a commod ty are ‘equ va

lent’ to each other). Marx’sreason ng here s defect ve because t has not yet

been shown that the two commod t es are ‘of dent cal magn tude’, only that

they stand n a relat on of exchange;such a presupposed th rd th ng s not yet

pos ted at such an elementary level. (It s money that prov des the necessary

commun ty of commod t es and wh ch makes poss ble compar son of the r

magn tude n a ‘th rd th ng’).Bycontrast, here we s mply say that f a commod

y has many measures then these measures m ght all be do ng the same th ng




d fferent ways, that s, g v ng a measure of value as such, regardless of any

spec f cmeasure.

To sum up the ‘be ng’ of value: ‘exchangeableness’ s a category of qual ty;

quant ty and measure add to t to y eld a category of ‘ mmanent exchange

ab l ty’,des gnat ng the power of exchange ntr ns c to a commod ty; value s

s ‘essence’.

The Forms of Value (11):Money

Let us rev ew how we determ ne value as ‘essence’.Wetake the ‘abstract equ va

lence’ of the measures to result n an ‘ nd fferentness’to all categor es of be ng.

We say that f there s a genu ne un ty to exchange-value then th s po nts to

value as such as the essence of the commod ty.But such an assumpt on has to

bev nd cated n the further development of the expos t on.

If the commod ty has someth ng essent al to t, then t has value n tsey‘

d st nct from the relat v ty of exchange-value.The relat on between the two s

lum nated by egel’scategoryof reflect on ( mportant n the development of

‘reflect on’ s the d alect c of ‘presuppos t on and pos t’).9In t ally the d stance

between essence and appearance appears unbr dgeable, because we sa d the

manent un ty of measure s nd ferent to the cont ngent spec fy ngmea

sures; although they are analyt cally presupposed, value s to be taken apart

from them. So t seems value s essent al and exchange-value s nessent al, a

mere semblance [Sche n]of value, subject to extraneous nfluences, whereas

value as such s the truth ab d ng w th n the shell of the commod ty.Valuepos

s tself aga nst exchange-value, as t were. But exchange-value s the mmed

ately g ven presuppos t on of value n the rst place.Whence th s value? If t

ar ses s mply fromour external reflect on onthe set of exchange-values,wh ch

y elds value asour abstract on from t, th s reduct on means value-as-essence s

not grasped as self-speajy ng n ts appearance [Ersche nung];exchange-value

9 Although the phrase ‘pos t ng the presuppos t on’ s used n several places late n the Sc ence

ofLog c, t s themat sed n the sect on on reflect on, but not n th s exact formulat on; how

ever, t s a natural gloss on the result of ‘determ n ng reflect on’,and t s used n Mure's

Commentary accord ngly. See Mure 1950,pp. 95—6.VV1th nMarx sm, see Bellof ore and F nell

1997.p. 50. An obv ous example s well eluc dated byja rus Banaj : ‘C rculat on s pos ted as

both presuppos t on and result of the Immed ate Processof Product on.The d alect cal sta

tus of the Sphere of C rculat on thus sh fts frombe ng the mmed ate appearance (Sc/re n)of

a process “beh nd t" to be ng the pos ted form of appearance (Ersche nung)of th s process’

(Banaj 1979,p. 28; Banaj c tes Marx’s Grandn'sse (Marx 1973[1857—8]),p. 358, but pp. 255—6

are even more relevant).



278 ART UR

rema ns external to t. Conversely, f we s mply take value as a g ven essence

pr or to exchange-value th s lacks grounds. What s requ red s that value tself

pos ts exchange-value as ts presuppos t on and, therew th, pos ts tself. We

requ re a ‘determ n ng reflect on’ (to borrow egel’sterm).

Sowe now turn to the determ nat ons of reflect on. In the movement of

reflect onupon tself the commod tymust ach eve dent ty w th tself asvalue.

Yetvalue s other than ts mmed ate be ng as a mater al body.Thus value s not

after all mmed ately dent cal w th the commod ty but s d fferent from t.

Soth s requ res expl c tlythe med at ng moment of be ng-d fferent-from- tself

when value smade man fest only n another commod ty. There results there

fore the contrad ct on that value s, and s not, found n the commod ty. The

value-form n wh ch commod ty Aexpresses ts value n commod ty Bg vesthe

contrad ct on a ground allow ngco-ex stenceof the moments, asweshall show.

In ts very const tut on value s opposed to use-value. owever, n the

value-form we f nd the value that s not use-value A s borne by use-value B.

Analyt cally the value of the commod ty and ts use-value are abstract oppo

s tes that fall apart. But w th n the value-form,wh ch ex sts n the relat on of

commod ty to commod ty, nstead of fall ng apart, the oppos ng determ na

t ons of the commod ty are reflected aga nst one another.

Let us turn to the forms of appearance of value presented by Marx n h s

Cap tal In the ord nary way there s noth ng wrong w th th nk ng of a un tary

essenceman fest ng tself n d fferent appearances. Sowhy does Marx speak of

‘defects’or ‘dehc enc es’ n the express ons of value? The problem here s that

no un tary essence syet pos ted, although one must be f value s to be present

the man fold commod ty-relat ons.

(Th s problem does not ar se f one holds that mmed ately soc al labour

t me has already been g ven as th s un tary essence; then qu te naturally one

reads the development of formsof value as real sat ons of th s g ven dent ty n

commod t es, and there are no defects, because all forms are adequate expres

s ons of value, and all that s requ red s to show how the money-commod ty

emerges as a numera re).

At f rst s ght t seems the s mple form of value mpl c t n commod ty

relat ons exh b ts value adequately. Th s form s:

Form 1TheS mple Form of Express on of Value

2 of commod ty Aexpresses tsvalue n y of commod ty B.

In th s elementary form of value, f value appears n accordance w th ts law

of appearance then both related commod t es take spec f c forms of value,

such that the commod ty n ‘relat ve form’(A) expresses ts value n ts ‘equ va




lent’ (B). I follow Marx n see ng the commod ty n relat ve form as the ‘act ve’

pole of the express on, because that s the commod ty whose value s to man

fest tself, and the commod ty n equ valent-form as the ‘pass ve’pole, because

t serves merely as the mater al shape of the value of A.Marx acutely not ces

that the commod ty n equ valent-form appears there not as a value (because

s value s not be ng expressed) but s mply as a use-value.

Ideallyvalue s determ ned n oppos t on to the heterogene ty of use-value.

But value must appear f t s to have any actual ty. Immed ately a commod

y appears as a use—value, but, because the value of a commod ty s def ned

oppos t on to ts own use-value, t cannot appear there n. Paradox cally the

cla m that A s a value requ res Ato excludeth s value from tself and to pos t t

as use-value B.Even f B s tself potent ally a value, ts value-express on s as t

werest fledat b rth sothat the bodyofcommod tyBf guresas the actual sat on

ofA’svalue. It s not that commod ty Ahas ag ven essence s mply expressed n

the equ valent but that value as essence comesto be n th s express on, and s

f gured rather at the equ valent pole aswhat appears n the shape of use-value

B.The ‘pecul ar ty’ (Marx) of the commod ty n equ valent-form s that ts sen

suousbody counts as the phenomenal shape ofa supersensuousworld ofvalue.

Sohere the world of value pred cates tself on use-value n nverse fash on. In

essence value s not-use-value ( n A), that s, t s a supersensuous realm, but

as appearance value s use-value ( n B),that s, t appears as a sensuous real ty.

The def c ency of the s mple form s that n t a commod ty s related only

to one other, wh ch means that value has not yet ach eved the un versal

y of ts express on mpl ed by the presumpt on that, underly ng the web of

exchange-relat ons, there s some force that regulates them, that the many

exchange-values wh ch a commod ty may have nevertheless ex st n a un ty.

Th s ‘acc dental’ express on of the value ofA n B s therefore defect ve because

s not all-encompass ng. Moreover there s noth ng spec al about the com

mod ty B wh ch would grant t a role as a pr v leged nterlocutor of A. One

could just as well have taken A’srelat on to C,or to D,under rev ew.

Tak ng these other alternat ves nto account g vesr se to the more compre

hens ve ‘expanded form of value’.

Form 11TheExpanded Form of Express on ofValue

y of commod ty B

orx of commod ty C

orwof commod ty D

or so on and soforth.

2 of commod ty A expresses ts value n



282 ART UR

role because t attracts the other commod t es to express the r value n t as

a un tary form. It determ nes tself thus as essent ally value, becomes value

for- tself, rather than hav ng merely mpl c t value as n ts or g nal pos t on.

So value not only must appear, when the value of commod ty A appears as

what t s not, namely commod ty B; f t s to be actual t must appear as what

s, exchangeableness as such, and that s what s present n the un versal

equ valent.

As the outcome of the d alect cal (not formal) reversal A now conta ns n

sublated form the oppos t on of relat ve form and equ valent-form w th n

self, act velydeterm n ng tself to the pos t on of value n autonomous form,

and attract ng the other commod t es to t accord ngly.For the oppos t on of

act ve and pass vepoles s tself sublated n the general form. Nowthere s rec

proc ty offorces, to be concret sed n the money-form, such that t s useless to

ponder whether commod ty-value expresses tself only n money or whether

money attracts commod t es to t only because t counts as value as such.

The general form s an advance on the s mple form n wh ch the pos t ng of

the equ valent as value s the result of the act v ty of the commod ty n rela—

t ve form, hence not self-pos ted.W th the general form, reached through the

d alect c of force and express on, the or g nal commod ty A,now the un versal

equ valent, reta ns ts act ve role n express ng tself through ts relat ons to

the other commod t es, but now nstead of pos t ng them as ts equ valents t

pos ts tself as the rs; moreover just as t s, so t s value ncarnate. In no way

should the general form be read as a set of s mples, neglect ng the log c of the

reversal, because n the s mple form the equ valent spass ve but the un versal

equ valent act vely determ nes tself to the pos t on of value n autonomous

form. Th s s the pecul ar ty of the equ valent-form ra sed to a h gher power

Now the un versal equ valent s pos ted as value-for- tself, a locus of ntr ns c

value.

The general form of value s a un ty of form.Tobeg n w th we have th s con

trast between the sensuous appearance (bodyofA) of a supersensuous world

of value beh nd the body of the commod t es (such as B,C,D,and so on). Th s

‘k ngdom of laws’ s a ‘f rst ntell g ble world’ (‘ ntell g ble’here can be under

stood n Kant an terms as what g vessense to the man fold of value-bod es by

grant ng them th s essent al mean ng). But n a second step t emerges that, as

the un versal equ valent, A n ts sensuous mmed acy s a ‘second ntell g ble

world’ of valuewh ch contrasts w th the supersensuous world of value that A

or g nally pos ted beh nd B,and so on.12

12 For egelon the relat on ofthese twoworlds seeSc enceofLog c,‘TheWorldofAppearance

and .the World- n-ltself’ and ‘The D ssolut on of Appearance’; also Phenomenology of

Sp r t, Force and Understand ng: Appearance and the Supersens ble World’.




So the f rst world of value compr ses the law-l keexpress on of value n the

body of A, and the second follows from the real sat on that f value s now A,

then th s equ valent tself s not just the effect of the law of value as a force

express ng tself n t, but s tself value n another shape, namely mmed ate

value. Instead of (or as well as) value reflected back from the equ valent, the

equ valent reflects value onto tself. Because commod ty A as a sensuous real

y s at the same t me value, a second world of value s pos ted at the level

of sensuousness, complement ng the supersensuous one. These two worlds

of value stand n an nverted relat on to each other: n the f rst one value s

d fferent from use-value, whereas n the second one value s dent f ed w th a

use-value-body, commod ty A.The second value-world co-ex sts w th the f rst

that the mater al body of the un versal equ valent does not just reflect nto a

v s bleworld the h dden or g nal supersensuous world of value; t now,just as

s, counts as value n mmed ate shape.

Because the or g nat ng moment s preserved n sublated form we f nd the

k ngdom of value doubles nto reflected and mmed ate total t es. In the un

versal equ valent, value, or g nally def ned n oppos t on to the use-value of A

(hence a supersensuous real ty), s now use-value A (a sensuous real ty). Th s

outr ght dent ty of oppos tes (whereas, n the s mple form, value, def ned as

not-use-value A, s g ven n use-value B,so t s supersensuous and sensuous at

the same t me, but n relat on to two d fferent commod t es). The two worlds

of value, the sensuous and supersensuous, are here mmed ately one; the very

samecommod ty conta ns both worlds.Theyare essent ally related. The com

mod ty s ‘asensuous supersensuous th ng’ (Marx).13

We m ght call Form 111‘a'general form of value, because t s not yet deter

m ned wh ch commod ty s the un versal equ valent. For commod ty B could

follow the same route as A d d, such that t ends up as the focus of a ‘general

form’. ence the un versal equ valent pos ted n the ntermed at on of com

mod t es has not yet establ shed ts ownground to stand upon. A commod ty

funct ons as un versal equ valent only f t alone successfullysol c ts the other

Commod t es to recogn se t as the onlyappropr ate express on of the r value.

The un versal equ valent must be a un que un versal equ valent.

Let us lay out formally the problem (us ng abbrev ated express ons):

\

l3 ‘e ns nnl ch bers nnl ches D ng’:Marx 1976c[1867],pp. 163,165(translat ons corrected).




Form VTheMoney-Form of Value

20yards of l nen

1coat

40 lbs. of coffee

10lbs. of tea

alf a ton of ron

etc. l

r express the r value n an ounce of gold.

owever, the trans t on to money s not at all an easy one. The steps n the

argument are as follows:15

1) It s poss ble formally that any commod ty can serve as un versal

equ valent.

2) S nce any commod ty could have served thus, that t s gold appears

cont ngent.

3) The one that s actually selected must make tself necessary to the sys

tem. ( ow the money-commod ty ach eves th s s d scussed below).

The ex stence of money depends on the ex stence of other commod t es as ts

correlates, but f t acts as exchangeableness— n- mmed acythen th s med a

t on van shes. Wh le these commod t es are ts analyt cal presuppos t ons, as

value-for- tself money pos ts tself as not pos ted. It s to be taken at ‘face-value'.

Goldas value-for- tself presupposes that there are commod t es to bevaluedby

, but only w th money are commod t es pos ted as values n themselves. The

Upshot s that t s not commod t es that are mmed ately values, and hence

pos tmoney as the r med ated reflect on;rather t smoney that s determ ned

as value n mmed ate shape, and thus reflectsvalue nto such commod t es as

prove themselves saleable. Value, as a un tary essence, s pos ted once money

Const tutesth s un ty of form n pract ce. Moreover only f the form of value s

Pract callyconst tuted does any mater al content become soc allyrecogn sed,

and commensurated, n t. Marx r ghtly saysthe key th ng about money s that

W thout t products ‘do not confront each other as commod t es, but as use

values only’,not values.16

15 For these modal categor es see egel 1991[1817],§§l43-7

15 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 180.



286 ART UR

Th s means that money presents the moment of the r essent al un ty as

values to them when act ng as the r un que un versal equ valent. Value as

one-and-many s pos ted more concretely when commod t es both exclude

the money-commod ty from themselves and yet at the same t me ach eve an

adequate express on of value only n so far as t s the r common centre of

attract on. Money as the ‘oneOne’ s the moment at wh ch all attract on and

repuls on s brought nto a un tary focus.

owever,for value to be actual requ res not merely that there s the log cal

poss b l ty that a money-commod ty be the un que value-equ valent but that

th s un queness s effect velygrounded. But s not the presence of money s m

plypresupposed at th s po nt? More espec ally,howdoes gold ach eve ts un que

pos t on here as the un versal equ valent? By ts own act! Money s always

already the attractor of commod t es because t has mmed ate exchangeab l

y.Th s po nt needs more d scuss on. It sof no moment to enter nto a h stor

cal treatment of gold’semergence as the money-commod ty. The key ssue for

a systemat c-d alect cal presentat on of th s ‘fact’ s why gold s money now.In

the systemat c presentat on of ts role even the med at ons log callypresup

posed n ts development van sh. The money-form of value l nks back to the

s mple form,hav ngbeen developed from t bya ser es of metamorphoses that

t must run through n order to w n ts f n shed shape. owever,the presence of

gold-money retroact vely den es any other commod ty the opportun ty to ‘run

through’ the d alect c of form to become money.

Th s br ngs us to the log c of exclus on. In t ally, t seems that commod t es

must exclude one of the r number to serve as the un que un versal equ valent.

Therefore f the money-commod ty s excluded by the others the ‘fact’that t s

money only obta ns through the r act v ty.Thus we do not yet have gold ex st

g as money on ts own account; t rema ns, n effect, cont ngent on that con

d t on of ts ex stence. But f we bear n m nd that the d alect c of force and

express on ends w th the un versal equ valent act velyassert ng tself as value

for- tself,then t seems better to ask how the act v ty of the money-commod ty

excludes tself from the other commod t es, even f expos t onally t appears

otherw se.17

The answer s that money ma nta ns tself as value n autonomous form

aga nst the other commod t es; as the r centre of attract on t prevents any

other commod ty tak ng ts pos t on just because t already acts as value n

med ate form n v rtue of fulf ll ng the money-funct ons, accord ngly

attract ng other commod t es to f nd a value-equ valent n t. It seems as f the

17 For egel on presupposed ‘cond t on’, ‘fact’ [Sache], and the ground ng ‘act v ty’ that

med ates them, see egel 1991[1817],§§148—9.




other commod t es excluded gold ‘ nthe f rst place’but the boot s on the other

foot once t becomes act ve on ts own account. The alleged ‘effect’,namely

the exclus on of the money-commod ty by the other commod t es, becomes

the cause of tself when money pos ts the presuppos t on that t alone ‘was’

excluded v rtually,by actually exclud ng any other cla mant to ts throne.

The reflect on of commod t es and money nto each other s not merely a

‘pos t ng reflect on’ of value as n a mere correlat on of relat ve and equ va

lent poles of value, for th s lacks suff c ent determ nacy n that the pos t on of

the commod t es could be reversed. Nor s t adequate to ts ex stence that a

certa n commod ty s g ven a pr v leged role through some ‘external’st pula

t on, for example a state- ssue of a ‘legaltender’.What s requ red to g vevalue

s self-subs stence s a ‘determ n ng reflect on’ n the requ red sense; once n

actual ty gold s exchangeableness n mmed ate shape, t pos ts tself as ts

own presuppos t on, nstead of be ng pos ted by ts presuppos t on, namely

the commod ty-man fold. av ng sublated ts v rtual or g n n the d alect c of

the forms of value, t s not a pass vemeasure of commod ty-value, but has the

sovere gnpower of mmed ate exchangeab l tyw th other commod t es.

The po nt s not to show how a process of exclus on occurred, but to show

that the log c of money s tself exclus onary. So, although t could be s lver,

not gold, n the mag nat on, n actual ty the money-commod ty s what t s.

Th s seems a mouse of an argument, but th s s a po nt where d alect c must

acknowledge ts l m ts: that money s gold, and how gold became so, s not a

log calpo nt. Butthe demonstrat on ofwhat money s, n relat on to commod

t es, s a log cal nvest gat on. (Certa nly d alect c cannot retroject ts system c

log c nto a h stor cal force, wherew th the necess ty of money to the present

systemmakes tself nto a speculat ve requ rement that, or g nally,people act

so as to f xa commod ty as money).

It s necessary that there be money,but surely t snot necessary that money

be a commod ty. Yet n present ng the development of the value-form I pro

ceed to amoney-commod tywhen seek ngto actual se the un versal-equ valent

form.Why s th s? The methodolog cal reason s that each stage of a system

at c d alect c supersedes the prev ous one w th a m n mum of new mater al.

In stab l s ng the prev ous determ nat ons the new form requ res only the

m n mum suj7 c entcond t ons for th s, not necessarycond t ons. Thus I do not

seek to show that gold s necessary to a cap tal st economy (notw thstand ng

the present fl ght to gold). The po nt s that the systemat c development can

not have cred t-money come n stra ght away,when t s only later n the expo

s t on that t may be developed on the bas s that commod ty-money already

ex sts. At th s level of commod ty-relat ons t s suff c ent to solve the pres

ent problem by pos t ng a money-commod ty. The log cal development of the



288 ART UR

necess ty of money and ts funct ons s requ red, and s carr ed forward, even

f gold s here ts cont ngent shell. Later the defects of gold may be addressed

when the means to remedy them have been developed.

The Proper Measure ofValue

Let us now explore the form-determ nat ons that underp n the proper mea

sure of value.

When value appears n f n tude ts actual ty s that of amount. Value as

amount s ex stent as a sum of money, really d st nct from other such sums,

albe t dent cal w th them as value, and s embod ed n commod t es of def

n te worth. Such a sum of money s reflected nto tself so that money presents

value to us not n an equ valent (forwh ch t has no need) but as equ valentto

self In ts self- dent tyvalue n money-form s ‘equal to tself’; t has a reflex ve

relat on to tself.Through ts med at on commod t es worth the same sum of

money may,by abstract on from that, be sa d to be of equal worth. (Note that

to der ve the not on of ‘equalworth’here maybe to hypostat se an abstract on;

st ll requ red s a substant ve theory of what makes them of equal worth). But

would be qu te wrong to say commod t es are already of equal worth before

money made poss ble such an equ valence-relat on. In money value s equ va

lent to tself, whereas the commod ty as value s not, because t requ res an

equ valent-form outs de t.

The presence of money n such f n te shapes allows a determ nate measure

of value to be appl ed. The category of real measure18of value comprehends a

tr ad ofmoments: a) mmanent magn tude; b) monetary med um; and c) stan

dard of value.

Money has the form of a measur ng-rod of value because of ts self-equ v

alence (just as a ruler s dent cal n length to tself). Although t seems that

measure presupposes a d mens on w th n wh ch th ngs are measured, n our

case the ground ng movement s the reverse. It s the pract ce of measure that

const tutes the d mens onal ty of value.W thout t, the magn tude of value s

mere mmanence, mpl c tly quant tat ve but w thout any metr c of ts own.

Money as realmeasure ntrojects the formofmagn tude onto th s rnmanence.

owever,for value as an ‘ rnmanent magn tude’ to ga n an ndex of amount

requ res a su table monetary med um, n wh ch a real measure of the value

18 egel treats ‘realmeasure’ n the Doctr ne of Be ngof h s Log c,but we argued earl er t s

better placed n the Doctr ne of Essence, the level at wh ch we are now.




of commod t es s properly g ven.Valuenot onally has mmanent magn tude,

but th s s formless unless there s a monetary med um that crystall ses t and

g ves t phenomenal measure. Tomodel the deal mmanence of value as an

extended magn tude, the monetary med um, and ts own measure, must pro

v de for homogene ty, add t v ty, d v s b l ty, mper shab l ty, transportab l ty,

and so forth. The use of gold smerely a stepp ng-stone toward perfect ng th s.

Although n the med um of gold th s funct on of measure s effected mater

ally,the key requ rement smerely that the med um allows formeasure, that t

makes present n f n te form value as an amount of tself; t s clear th s maybe

done formally n paper-denom nat ons, even f the metr c s merely not onal

as n dollar-b lls.

Money not only g ves the measure but through th s t enables commod

t es to ga n the qual ty of be ng measurable. In the ord nary way th s s not

an ssue; a th ng has we ght pr or to ts relat on to the proper measure of ts

we ght. But n our case pract ce mposes the abstract form of measure on com

mod t es. Value s not a substance w th a g vend mens onal ty, requ r ng only a

numera re to set up a systemofmeasure.Valuega nsan mmanent magn tude

onlywhen theform ofmeasure spract callyappl edand grounds the requ red

quant tat ve d mens on. In order to g ve the measure ts operat onal actual ty

manyMarx sts bel eve t must be a product of labour,because t must be of the

same nature as what s measured, just as we ght s measured n a balance by

standard ‘we ghts’(but note the use of a spr ng-balance). owever,here weare

cons der ngmeasure as pure form correspond ng to our presentat on ofvalue

as pure mmanence. The pureform of measure requ res s mply a l near metr c

such that four dollars are worth tw ce two dollars.

Money as measure of value grounds the mputat on that value ex sts as a

magn tude mmanent to commod t es. Themonetary med um s not so much

a su table measur ng-rod for a pre-ex st ngmagn tude; t g vesa space forvalue

to const tute tself as a magn tude.19 owever,the measure—funct onof money

S mplyprov des theform of commensurat on. owthe actual magn tudes are

determ ned s another quest on. (In my v ew the magn tude of value rema ns

determ nate unt l conceptual sed asthe result ofcap tal st compet t on). But

there s some determ nat on of magn tude t s nugatory unless the money

foml prov des the d mens on of magn tude n the f rst place.

\

19 I follow Reuten 2010 n br ng ng to the fore the category of ‘monetary med um'. e

Speaks of money as a ‘hypostat c un on’ of measure and med um. Th s s s m lar to the

present d scuss on, but I prefer to say t s money as measure that un tes magn tude,

med um and standard.



290 ART UR

It s also necessary to d st ngu sh the med um of value requ red for magn

tude to become a monetary measure fromthat of the standard of value.Thus f

the monetary measure sgold, th s st ll leaves the standard pound of gold to be

determ ned. The ndex of magn tude of the standard then models the pos ted

d mens onal ty of the mmanent magn tude.

Th s concret ses the presuppos t on of a s nglemeasure that was unfulf lled

at the level of mere exchange-values of commod t es, wh ch fa led to un fy

the commod t es n a s ngle order.We may now speak of money as the value

measure proper and, f t takes shape n a med um w th an ndex of amount, we

have a workable system ofmeasurement.

Th s means the value of a commod ty appears as less than, equal to or

more than the value of another. Money makes commod t es comparable n

value. owever, there s more to money than th s measure-funct on. Value,

although tak ng f n te mode n sums of money or as embod ed n commod

t es, s not fully nd v duated. Sums of money must be numer cally d fferent

one from another, but not ce that th s d fference s purely not onal. For th s

numer cal d fference n sums of money s equallysublated n a comb ned sum

of money when the d fferent amounts merge nto one amount. ‘B ts’of money

are deally attracted nto one, but are not onally d st ngu shed by a not onal

repuls on mater ally effected by the bearers of value. Two d fferent accounts,

each conta n ng 10dollars, ach eves the necessary separat on of amounts of

value by purely formal means. But not ce that f I have 10dollars n an account,

and I enter a further 10, I do not have two ‘103’,as f the account were a cash—

box; I have a s ngle sum of 20 dollars, so here the moment of pure magn tude

takes precedence overthat of numer cal d fference;even sol can re-d v de the

amount byw thdraw ng, say,12dollars.

Commod t es come, of course, n ncommensurable phys cal amounts.

But the r money-valuesare not merely commensurable, such that the relat ve

worth of commod t es may be compared; they are add t ve. A heterogeneous

basket of commod t es cannot be (bod ly) merged, but the r deal ty as value

allowsmoney to do so.Asa homogeneous amount ofvaluewhat they areworth

together may be stated as one sum of money. Nor s the summ ng ach eved by

abstract on as when one cat and one dog make two an mals. Values are not

d st ngu shable fromone another except n magn tude, hence there sno need

to abstract from qual tat ve d fference n order to sum them; conversely pure

magn tude s not suff c ent to separate them, for deally they merge to form

one magn tude. But as embod ed, for example, n co n, value s pecul ar n that

the magn tudes are both deallyone yet mater ally many numer cally.




Th s pract cal fact that all ‘values'maymerge nto one sum of money shows

value s one substance, not a classof ndependently ex st ngsubstances. Value

a substance, ncamated n money, and s the (soc al) substance of com

mod t es. S nce value s a substance Marx can properly speak of the ‘meta

morphoses’ of commod t es (how a substance, here value, changes shape n

f n te mode), and also can character se cap tal as a ‘self-mov ngsubstance’.20

Moreover money as cap tal allows value to appear as a substance that can be

accumulated.

Toconclude: I underl ne that the systemat cpresentat on of the value-fonn

moves from s mple abstract categor es to ones less so. Tobeg n w th we den

t f ed value w th the elementary qual ty of exchangeableness; we ended by

show ng that value s a un tary substance ncamated n money.

20 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 256.



294 ROBLES-3AM

labour.4Asa substance that s crystall sed n commod t es, value swhat allows

d fferent commod t es to dent fy themselves as equals, desp te the r qual ta

t ved ferences n terms of use-values,whereas the quant ty of value, measured

terms of abstract labour-t me, s what allows them to be exchanged n a

certa n quant tat veproport on.

In Marx's v ew,th s movement of the abstract on of labour s a real process

that nvolvesa s multaneous qual tat ve and quant tat ve reduct on of labour.5

The qual ty-aspect concerns the reduct on of all nd v dual labours expended

pr vately n product on, nto soc al labour and s mple labour. Th s mpl es con

s der ng complex labour ( nclud ng ntens ve labour)6 and s mple labour as

two qual tat velyd fferent typesof labour, and the relat on between these two

what makes t poss ble to establ sh a quant tat ve relat on, that s, complex

labour as mult pl ed s mple labour.7The quant ty-aspect concerns the reduc

t on of all labour-t mes nto quanta of necessary s mple labour-t me as t s

soc allymeasured.8

Nevertheless, desp te the mportance g ven by Marx to the abstract on of

labour n determ n ng the value of commod t es, he treats t as a s mpl fy ng

assumpt on: ‘Inthe nterests of s mpl f cat on, we shall henceforth v ew every

form of labour-power d rectly as s mple labour-power; by th s we shall s mply

be sav ng ourselves the trouble of mak ng the reduct on’.9And as can be seen

below, th s s mpl fy ngassumpt on s only the f rst man festat on of a ser es of

problems that emerge from Marx’spresentat on of the determ nat on of the

soc al values of commod t es as products of cap tal throughout Cap tal.

4 It should be noted that th s movement of abstract on s not to be confused w th the abstrac

t on of the useful character of labour.

5 ‘Tomeasure the exchange value of commod t es by the labour-t me they conta n, the d ffer

ent k nds of labour have to be reduced to un form, homogeneous, s mple labour, n short to

labour of un form qual ty,whose only d fference, therefore, s quant ty.

Th s reduct on appears to be an abstract on, but t s an abstract on wh ch s made every

day n the soc al process of product on. The convers on of all commod t es nto labour-t me

no greater an abstract on, and s no less real, than the resolut on of all organ c bod es nto

a r’ (Marx 1977 [1859], p. 30). See also Marx 1972 [1861—3],p. 135.

‘Ofcourse, labour s d st nct qual tat vely aswell,not only n so far as t [ s performed] n d f'

ferent branches of product on, but also more or less ntens ve etc' (Marx 1973 [1357—3]!

p. 846).

7 ‘Morecomplex labour counts only as ntens f ed,or rather mult pl ed s mple labour, so that a

smaller quant ty of complex labour s cons dered equal to a larger quant ty of s mple labour'

(Marx 1976c [1867], p. 135).

8 See Marx 1976c [1867], pp. 129—30.

9 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 135.



DIALECTICS OF LABOUR AND VALUE-FORM IN MARX’S CAPITAL 295

The f rst problem nvolves the context where the reduct on s real sed.

Indeed, n th s regard, two oppos te nterpretat ons have been made: one con

s ders that all labours are pos ted as soc al abstract labour mmed ately at the

moment at wh ch they are expended n product on, suppos ng thereby that

the reduct on s real sed ndependently of the soc al connect on of commod

t es n the exchange;wh le the second cons ders that the reduct on can onlybe

real sed through the exchange of commod t es. Th sauthor contends that the

latter nterpretat on s the correct one.

The next problem ar seswhen cons der ng the character of abstract labour:

t phys olog cal or soc al?The response s contrad ctory n th s author’s op n

on, because t s actually both. In other words, when taken as the natural

determ nat on of any nd v dual act v ty of l v ng labour, the character of

labour expended n the sphere of product on can only be an expend tureof

phys olog cal labour that, once object f ed n commod t es, tself becomes an

object veabstract on. owever, t s an abstract on that has not yet been soc ally

pos ted. Phys olog calabstract labour thus const tutes the presuppos t on of

soc alabstract labour, wh ch can only be soc allypos ted through the exchang

g of commod t es. Th smeans that what const tutes soc al abstract labour s

not the real ty of phys olog cal labour, but rather the soc al pos t ng of th s

real ty.10The problem, though, s that nd v dual labours n a phys olog cal

sense cannot const tute soc al abstract labours because they st ll lack the

moment of s ngular ty as a soc al un ty.ll

Consequently, values as phys olog cal labour-t me object f ed n commod

t es can only be the presuppos t on at or the mmed ate determ nat on of;the r

soc alvalues, and, as such, they should be cons dered the object f cat on of cer

ta n amounts of the phys olog cal labour-t me taken to produce them. As

soc ally presupposed values, an alternat ve would be to call them nd v dual

values. Toquote Marx:

X

10 Fausto 1983,p. u7. Abstract labour cannot be cons dered as labour- n-general, whether n

a mater al sense, that s,as the phys olog calcharacter st cs common to all labours,nor as

a subject ve construct on, that s, as a s mple general sat on of all labours as concrete

labours.

11 Accord ng to Marx, th s un ty, that s, total soc al abstract labour-t me, s what removes

from ts nd v dual agents the cond t on of subjects: ‘Labour,thus, measured by t me.

does not seem, ndeed, to be the labour of d fferent persons, but on the contrary the

d fferent worldng nd v duals seem to be mere organs of th s labour... It s the labour

t me ofan nd v dual,h slabour-t me, but onlyaslabour-t me common toall;consequently

s qu te mmater al whose nd v dual labour-t me th s s’(Marx 1977[1859],pp. 30-2).



296 ROBLES-BA

Soc al labour-t me ex sts n these commod t es n a latent state, so to

speak, and becomes ev dent only n the course of the r exchange. The

po nt of departure s not the labour of nd v duals cons dered as soc al

labour, but on the contrary the part cular k nds of labour of pr vate nd

v duals, .e.,labour wh ch proves that t s un versal soc al labour only by

the supersess on of ts or g nal character n the exchange process.

Un versal soc al labour s consequently not a ready—madeprerequ s te

but an emerg ng result.12

Thus, what s der ved n the f rst movement s the ‘or g nal character’ of the

abstract on of labour, that s, ts phys olog cal determ nat on, wh ch can only

become soc al abstract labour by ts ‘supersess on’ n the exchange-process.

The reversemovement corresponds to the passage from the nd v dual value

of commod t es to the r value-form or exchange-value.Th s movement refers

to the d alect cal un ty of content and form, n wh ch form s cons dered not

only as be ng grounded by content, but also as part of the determ nat on of

content. G ven that an nd v dual value s an essent al content that cannot

appear d rectly n the use-value of the commod ty n wh ch t s object f ed, t

needs to be expressed n the use-value of a d fferent commod ty. The spec f c

commod ty n whose use-value the nd v dual values of all other commod t es

are expressed takes the money-form of the soc al values of all commod t es.13

Thus, as the mater al express on of the nd v dual values of commod t es,

money henceforth becomes the ‘be ng-there’of the r respect ve values, that s,

the mmed ate soc alform ofthe ex stenceof the r nd v dual values, and conse

quently also of the phys olog cal labour-t mes represented by them.14 It fol

lows, then, that t s only by means of the money-form wh ch commod t es

acqu re n the exchange-process that the r nd v dual values, and the phys o

log cal labour-t mes they represent, are pos ted as soc al forms:

12 Marx 1977 [1859], p. 45. See also Marx 1976c [1867], pp. 165—6.

13 W th the pos t ngof the money-form,one passes from the s tuat on where matter (that s.

the use-value) s the bearer of form (that s, the nd v dual value) to a s tuat on where

value-form s ncamated n matter (that s, n the use-value of the spec f c commod ty

that funct ons asmoney).

14 The money-commod ty s thus a un versal that s, at the same t me, a s ngular, that s, a

concrete un versal: ‘It s as f alongs de and external to l ons, t gers, rabb ts, and all other

actual an mals,wh ch formwhen grouped together the var ous k nds, spec es, subspec es:

fam l es,there ex stedalso n add t on thean mal, the nd v dual ncarnat on of the ent re

an mal k ngdom. Sucha part cular, wh ch conta ns w th n tself all really present spec es

of the same ent ty, s a un versal (l ke an mal, god, etc.)’ (Marx 1976d [1867],p. 26).




Th s necess ty to express nd v dual labour asgeneral labour sequ valent

to the necess ty of express ng a commod ty as money. . .Thus cons der

g the ex stence of the commod ty as money, t s not only necessary to

emphas ze that n money commod t es acqu re a def n t ve measure of

the r value —s nce all commod t es express the r value n the use value of

the same commod ty —but that they become man festat ons of soc al,

abstract, general labour; and as such they all act as soc al labour, that s to

say, they can be d rectly exchanged for all other commod t es n propor

t on to the s ze of the r values.15

Th s s a qual tat ve transformat on that takes the form of a quant tat ve rela

t onsh p,and n ts role as a un ty of qual ty and quant ty, moneythen becomes

the general soc al measure of the nd v dual values of commod t es as soc al

values. In other words, t s through money that the amounts of phys olog cal

labour-t me become quanta of soc al abstract labour; and t s n th s waythat

the soc al values of the commod t es are qual tat vely and quant tat vely pos

ed.Thus the qual tat ve and quant tat ve pos tedness of the soc al value of

commod t es s un f ed n the money.

Soc al Valueand theMost General Pr ce-Form

Once the measurement-un t of the money-commod ty has been establ shed,

the express on of the value of commod t es n a g ven quant ty of sa d un t

becomes the commod ty’s money-form or pr ce-form: for nstance, ‘As ngle

equat on, such as 1ton of ron =2 ounces of gold, now suff ces to express [ de

ally] the [ nd v dual] value of the ron n a soc allyval d manner'.15Th s s the

s mplest and most general pr ce-form of the soc al value of any commod ty. At

th s level of the presentat on, the value of the commod ty s fundamental,

Marx states, ‘s nceany rat onal understand ng of money has to start from th s

foundat on, and pr ce, n ts general concept, s s mply value n the money

fO n'."The follow ng chart expresses the determ nat on of the soc al value of

a Commod ty,C ,by med at on of ts general money-form:

\

‘5 Marx 1972 [1861—3],p. 136.

16 Ma” 19760[1867],p. 189(emphas s added).

17 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 295.



298 ROBLES-BAEZ

Exchange

Cl T Z s = Pt

f

(It) —' (115:)= x-I

Product on

where: l =a certa n amount of phys olog cal labour-t me;

---- --> = the mmed ate object f cat on of the phys olog cal labour-t me n the

product on of C ;

1:= the monetary express on of the commod ty, or the express on of the nd

v dual value of C, n the money;

Z s=the monetary un ts represent ng the general pr ce-form of C ;

P = the general pr ce-form of C,;

——> =the relat ons of determ nat on of the soc al value of (S by med at on

of ts money-form;

B,= the reduct on-coeff c ent, wh ch expresses the transformat on of un ts of

phys olog cal labour-t me, 1,, nto un ts of soc al labour-t me, l B ;and

k1- l B = the soc al value of C .

FIGURE1 Graph cal representat on of the determ nat on of the soc al value of a commod tyby

means of tsmoneyform

Th s chart shows that, n general, the nd v dual value of a commod ty, that s,

a certa n amount of phys olog cal labour-t me, 1,,d rectly object f ed n sa d

commod ty, s pos ted as a soc al value, X ,that s, as a quantum of soc al

abstract labour-t me, 1 n by med at on of ts pr ce-form n the exchange. Th s

transformat on s expressed by the reduct on-coeff c ent 5,,wh ch represents

the qual tat ve and quant tat ve pos t ng of the phys olog calabstract labour as

abstract labour soc allymeasured through money. It thus represents the pas

sage from a phys olog cal labour-t me-space to a soc al abstract labour-t me

space by med at on of ts soc ally determ ned value-form of ex stence: the

money-form.

The passage to the follow ngmoment traverses at least two further nsuff

c enc es: 1)s mple commod ty-c rculat on, C—M—C, does not conta n w th n

self the pr nc ple of self-renewal necessary to susta n tself by tself, as

requ red by the c rculat on of cap tal;and 2)consequent to th s, the value-form

of commod t es as determ ned n C—M—C s nsuff c ent to be cons dered the

value-form of sa d commod t es as products of cap tal.



DIALECTICS OF LABOURAND VALUE-FORM IN MARX'S CAPITAL 299

Second Moment: The Passageto Cap tal n General

The second moment corresponds to the convers on of the money-form of

value nto cap tal n general, that s, cap tal such as t presents tself as a gen

eral, essent al concept. Th s author contends that Marx presents th s move

ment n t ally as a un ty of three moments: the qual tat vedeterm nat on of ts

becom ng, M —C —M; the quant tat ve determ nat on of ts becom ng: M —

C—M'; and the measure that corresponds to the un ty of ts qual tat ve and

quant tat ve determ nat ons.

The qual tat ve determ nat on refers to the cycl cal movement M —C—M,

the a m of wh ch smoney as an end- n- tself,and the process through wh ch the

value that s or g nally advanced n the money-form passes success vely

through the ant thet cal phases M—Cand C—M,where t pos ts tself n the M

and Cforms that t assumes n turn, w thout becom nglost w th n and through

th s movement. Asa cont nuous un ty of Mand C,the value, Marx says,‘ scap

tal, and th s pos t ng tself appears as the c rculat on of cap tal’.18The value,

wh ch n t ally appeared as a pred cate of M and of C and, therefore, to some

extent as an nert substance n the s mple commod ty-c rculat on C - M—C, s

pos ted through th s movement as the essent al subject of the c rculat on of

cap tal, that s, the essent al be ng of cap tal as a self-mov ngsubstance; and

money and commod t es thus become the mater al forms of the ex stence of

cap tal. Thus, money as money s negated and superseded as a tang ble mate

r al th ng, becom ng a process. owever, th s s nqué c ent to expla n com

pletely the convers on of value nto cap tal, because the fact s that the result

‘ nwh ch the whole process van shes, s the exchange of money for money,

M—M . . . the same for the same’, wh ch makes the process ‘appear to be an

operat on as purposeless as t s absurd'.19

Toovercome the nsuff c encyof the qual tat ve determ nat on, the result of

th s process should necessar ly be the quant tat ve d aerence w th respect to

the amount of value or g nally advanced, wh ch mpl es go ng beyond ts

Ownquant tat ve l m t. For Marx, value that s not only preserved and self

perpetuat ng through c rculat on, but wh ch also ncreases ts own magn tude

by add ng a surplus-value to tself, becomes cap tal as a self-valor s ngvalue.

Thus the amount of money-value that s or g nally advanced nto c rculat on

has to be advanced w th the a m of valor s ng tself.Th s therefore shows that

‘the complete form of th s process s M —C —M', where M’ = M + AM, .e. the

or g nal sum advanced plus an ncrement’.20

18 Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 266.

19 Marx 1976c [1867], pp. 248 and 251.

20 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 251.



300 ROBLES-BAEZ

After summar s ng th s convers on, Marxargues:

But there smore to come: nstead of s mplyrepresent ng the relat ons of

commod t es, t now enters nto a pr vate relat onsh p w th tself, as t

were. It d fferent ates tself as or g nal value from tself as surplus-value,

just as God the father d fferent ates h mself from h mself as God the son,

although both are of the same age and form, n fact one s ngle person; for

onlybythe surplus-value of£10does the £100or g nally advanced become

cap tal, and as soon as th s has happened, as soon as the son has been

created and, through the son the father, the r d fference van shes aga n,

and both become one, £110.21

G venthat the becom ng of the money-valueadvanced nto the qual tyofcap

tal s due to the quant tat ve ncrement of value that value tself has bred from

self through ts own c rculat on-process, the pos t ng of cap tal s expressed

by the rec procalpos tedness of the related quanta of value embod ed n ts own

result,that s,the becom ng of both, the quantum ofvalue or g nallyadvanced

(M:God) and the quantum of surplus-value that relates to t as ts own ncre

ment (AM:the Son), nto cap tal (M’:the One). The father creates the son, but

the son also creates the father.Th s qual tat vepos t ngof the related quanta of

value, that s,of the const tuent parts of value that value tself has valor sed to

self, refers to ts own measure of real sat on as, or ts transformat on nto, a

newqual ty: cap tal.

In accord w th the n t al nature of money, the only apparent feature by

wh ch cap tal —when transformed nto money - may be measured s the

new value wh ch t has created; .e. thef rst aspect ofmoneyas the general

measure of commod t esrepeats tsef, nowas the measure ofsurplus value—

ofthe real zat on ofcap tal. In the form of money,th s real zat on appears

as measured by tselp as be ng ts ownmeasure.22

The qual tat ve relat on through wh ch the becom ng of cap tal s measured

aga nst tself can be represented thus by the quant tat ve rat o denot ng the

quantum of surplus-value (AM)that a g ven quantum of advanced money

value as cap tal (M) has created n a g ven per od of t me: that s,AM/M.Tothe

z 1 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 256.

22 Marx 1973[1857-8],p.448 (emphas s added). ‘Butas M +m, £422 advanced cap tal plus an

crement of £78on the same,M' or £500also exh b ts a qual tat ve relat on, although th s

qual tat ve relat on tself e dsts only as a relat on between the parts of a corresponde

sum, .e. as a quant tat ve rat o' (Marx 1978[1885],p. 128;emphas s added).




extent that t represents the qual tat ve pos t ng of value as cap tal, t can be

def ned as the rate of valor satlon of cap tal n general. Th s rate s the log cal

presuppos t on of the rate of prof t of cap tal, wh ch w ll be presented only at

the moment when cap tal s pos ted n the moment of appearance.

owever, cons der ng that the metamorphoses exper enced by the value

fonn dur ng th s c rculat on-process occur under the law of equ valent

exchange, th s process by tself cannot expla n the source of the valor sat on,

that s, the creat on of surplus-value. Thus, th s process proves to be nsuj75c ent

asthe foundat on of the convers on of money-value nto cap tal, and therefore

of susta n ng tself bymeans of tself.Accord ng to Marx, th s nsuff c encycan

onlybe overcome bythe ntroduct on of l v nglabour nto ‘theh dden abode of

product on’where, bymeans of ts product ve consumpt on together w th the

means of product on, the secret of the product on ofsurplus-value s la d bare,

and th s n turn allows one to reach the heart of the matter concern ng ‘not

onlyhow cap tal produces, but how cap tal s tself produced’.”

Thus, cap tal can become cap tal only bymeans of ts negat ve relat onsh p

w th ts own other, that s, labour as non-cap tal, yet labour through wh ch

cap tal becomes cap tal. Each s thus the negat on, or ‘not-be ng’,of the other.

Labourthus acqu res a further determ nat on: labour that produces cap tal as

s own other; and th s s the reason for the r be ng oppos te to each other,24

just as the r respect ve bearers, cap tal sts and wage-labourers, are oppos te.

Thus s pos ted that wh ch was presupposed, that s, labour pos ted as value

and money-produc ng labour n s mple commod ty-c rculat on, and what s

now pos ted, n other words cap tal-produc ng labour. Thus, cap tal can be

understood as the abstract substance that s transformed nto a Subject, n

other words as a self-mov ngsubstance.

Although the (re)product on of cap tal w llnot be treated here, three po nts

need to be made: F rst, as cap tal’s own products, money and commod t es

become ts own pos ted forms of ex stence, and as such are converted nto the

mater al cond t ons of the reproduct on of cap tal and of the soc alclassesthat

Composecap tal st soc ety.25Second, cons dered as a un ty of ts own processes

0fproduct on and c rculat on through wh ch t ssusta ned and self-mult pl es,

23 Ma” 1976C[1867]»PP-279-80

24 ‘The one s made v s ble n the other, and s only n so far as that other s. Essent al

d fference s therefore Oppos t on; accord ng to wh ch the d fferent s not confronted by

any other but by ts other. That s, e ther of these two. . . s stamped w th a character st c

of ts own only n ts relat on to the other: the one s only reflected nto tself as t s

reflected to the other. And so w th the other. E ther n th s way s the other’s own other’

( ege11975 [1817], §119,p. 172).

25 M5W1976¢ [1367]. P- 724~



302 ROBLES-BAEZ

cap tal s presented to tself as the subject of an expand ng movement n the

form of ‘a sp ral, an expand ng curve, not a s mple c rcle’.25And th rd, as a

result of the movement of the reproduct on of cap tal, ‘the laws based on the

product on and c rculat on of commod t es become changed nto the r d rect

oppos te through the r own nternal nexorable d alect c’,27that s, nto the

laws of cap tal st appropr at on. What th s means s that the exchange of

equ valents s transformed nto the appropr at on by cap tal, w thout equ va

lent, of the unpa d port on of labour real sed by the labour-power of the

wage-labourers.

Soc al Valueand D rect Pr ce

Theconst tuent parts of the money-formofthe value of commod t es, as prod

ucts of cap tal, are: 1) the const tuent parts of the sum of money-value or g

nally advanced as cap tal, M, n the purchase of the commod t es, C, requ red

for the r valor sat on n product on, that s,constant cap tal (means of produc

t on) and var able cap tal (labour-power); and 2) the surplus-value as the

unpa d labour-t me extracted d rectly from the wage-labourers. The sum of

money that s equ valent to the valor sed value, M’,object f ed n the commod—

es produced as products of cap tal, C', s thus composed of the money-value

or g nally advanced, M,wh ch s equal to c (constant cap tal) +v (var able cap

tal), plus a surplus-value, 3.Thus, the general pr ce-form of the value of any

commod ty as a product of cap tal can be dep cted as:

P=c+v+s

W th the pos t ng of th s pr ce-form, the s mplest and most general money

form of a commod ty s negated and superseded, obta n ng thus a greater

degree of concreteness and deterrn nacy.

In Chapter XII of Cap tal Volume I, Marx ntroduces the concept of the

soc alvalue of commod t es wh ch are of the samek ndbut produced by d ffer

ent nd v dual producers w th n the context of a branch of product on: ‘The

real value of a commod ty, however, s not ts nd v dual, but ts soc al value;

that s to say, ts value s not measured by the labour-t me that the art cle cost

the producer n each nd v dual case, but by the labour-t me soc ally requ red

for ts product on’.28

26 Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 266. See also p. 620.

27 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 729.

28 Marx 1976c [1867],p. 434. ‘The value of a commod ty s certa nly detem ned by the

quant ty of labour conta ned n t, but th s quant ty s tself soc ally determ ned’ (Marx

1976c [1867], p. 318).




From Marx’s own wr t ngs, the determ nat on of the soc al value of com

mod t es of the same k nd has been nterpreted n two oppos te ways,wh ch n

factcorrespond to the two oppos te nterpretat ons of the reduct on of labour

d scussed above under the f rst moment. One nterpretat on cons ders deter

m nat on to be the result of the we ghted average of the aggregate of all the

d v dual labour-t mes expended by all the nd v dual producers:

The total value produced d v ded by the number of products determ nes

the value of the nd v dual product and t becomes a commod ty only as

such an al quot part. It s no longer the labour expended on the nd v d

ual part cular commod ty. . . but a proport onal part of the total labour —

e., the average of the total value [d v ded] by the number of products —

wh ch determ nes the value of the nd v dual product and establ shes t

as a commod ty.29

Th s nterpretat on can only be val d f all the nd v dual labour-t mes object —

f ed d rectly n the product on of the commod t es are mmed ately taken as

amounts of abstract soc al labour-t me, wh ch would mply that, regardlessof

d fferences n methods and cond t ons of product on employed by the nd

v dual producers, any nd v dual un t of labour-t me n a phys olog cal sense

produces the same un t of soc al value; and that, depend ng on the method

and cond t ons ofproduct on for each of them, the determ nat on of the soc al

value of commod t es w ll result n the real sat on of less or more value, and

therefore of less or more surplus-value, than the value and surplus-value gen

erated by each nd v dual producer.30 It should be noted, however, that a

we ghted average s alwaysthe result of a subject ve construct on.

By contrast, the other nterpretat on cons ders the determ nat on of the

soc al value of commod t es of the same k nd as the result of an object vepro

cessof reduct on: ‘ nevery process of creat ng value, the reduct on of the h gher

type of labour to average soc al labour, for nstance one day of the former to

x days of the latter, s unavo dable'.31Th s determ nat on s thus understood as

the result of a subsequent process of soc almeasur ng through wh ch all nd

v dual labour-t mes n a phys olog cal sense that are object f ed n the produc

t on of the total mass of commod t es of the same k nd w th n a g ven branch

0f product on, regardless of the r nd v dual methods and cond t ons of

product on, are pos ted as quant t es of abstract labour-t me as soc ally

29 Marx 1972[1861-3], p. u3. See also Marx 1969 [1861-3], p. 208.

3° Marx 1981 [1894], p. 279.

31 Marx 1976c [1867], p. 306.



304 ROBLES-BAEZ

measured, that s,as of the same soc alvalue,bymed at on of the r same d rect

pr ce (that s,pr ce proport onal to soc alvalue).

The follow ng f gure llustrates the process of determ nat on of the soc al

value of commod t es of the same k nd, suppos ng that there are only two pro

ducers, each one us ng a d fferent method of product on, and that the means

of product on are c rculat ngconstant cap tal:

Exchange

1 Z5 =PD t(PDlP.,=1) PD: Z; 1'

----_----pO

,0

(1.3mm)—>(1.B°.+?~Mpl)=1" 9W1“) X°= (12B"2+)~Mp2)<—(1vlmz)

Product on Product on

where: l =the nd v dual labour-t me n a phys olog calsense d rectly expended

the product on of C ;

AMP, the soc al value of, or the soc al labour-t me object l ed n, the means of

product on employed n the product on of C ;

---- --> =the object f cat on of the d rect and nd rect labour-t mes n the pro

duct on of commod t es;

1' = the rec procal equal ty-relat onsh ps of commod t es n the monetary

space, represent ng the express on of the nd v dual value of the commod t es

the money;

Z; =the monetary un ts that represent the d rect pr ce of the commod t es;

PD= the d rect pr ce of the commod t es;

—> =the relat onsofdeterm nat onofthe soc alvalueof the commod t es

bymed at on of the r d rect pr ce;

5°,= the reduct on-coef c ents that express the transformat on of un ts of

labour-t me n the phys olog cal sense, 1,, nto un ts of soc al labour-t me;

l B = the d rect soc al labour-t me, or soc al value added, object f ed n C,:

1° = the same soc al value of the commod t es as the soc al labour-t me that

represents the r same d rect pr ce; and

9 = the rec procal equal ty relat onsh ps of commod t es n the soc al

value-space.

FIGURE2 Graph cal representat on of the determ nat on of the soc alvalue ofthe same k nd 0f

commod t esbymed at on of the r d rectpr ce



DIALECTICS OF LABOUR AND VALUE-FORM IN MARX'S CAPITAL 305

Th schart shows the pos t ng of the nd v dual values of the commod t es, C

(that s,a certa n amount of phys olog cal labour-t me, l ,object ed d rectly n

the r product on plus the value of the means ofproduct on, AM“,ransferred to

them), nto the same soc alvalue,P, that s,a certa n quantum ofsoc allabour

t me (Km, + l B° ),by means of the r same d rect pr ce, PD, n the sphere of

exchange.

The d rect pr ce of commod t es of the same k nd produced by any nd v d

ual producer can be dep cted by the follow ngformula:

PD= C+ (V + 3 ) 3%? + (L501)

where c and (v + 3,)are proport onal to km and (l §° ),respect vely.

owever,bes des acknowledg ng that the reduct on of all nd v dual labours

‘unavo dable’, Marx reduces th s to a superfluous operat on: ‘We therefore

save ourselves a superfluous operat on, and s mpl fy our analys s, by the

assumpt on that the labour of the worker employedbythe cap tal st saverage

s mple labour’.32Th s author d sagrees w th Marx’scla m that th s reduct on s

a superfluous operat on, because, even for Marx h mself, the pos t ng of the

soc alvalue of commod t es requ res that the reduct on of labour be accom

pl shednot just for all the nd v dual labours of the same k nd expendedw th n

a branch of product on, but for all nd v dual labours of d ferent k nds,wh ch

produce the d fferent commod t es n all branches of product on that const

tute soc al product on as a whole: ‘Su l ce t to say that th s reduct on s n fact

accompl shedw th the pos t ng of products of all k nds of labour as values.As

Values,they are equ valent n certa n proport ons; the h gher k nds of labour

are themselves appra sed n s mple labour'.33

What s clear from th s quote s that the reduct on of labour w th n a branch

0f product on s st ll nsuf c ent for the pos t ng of all the k nds of labours

as actual soc al labours, and, therefore, t s also nsup c ent for pos t ng the

Value-formof the commod t es produced n all branches of product on as

dy n ttve or actual soc alvalues.

\

32 Marx 1976c [1867]. P-305

33 Marx 1973[1857-8], p. 345



306 ROBLES-BAEZ

Th rdMoment:The Passageto the Appearance of Cap tal

General

As n any passage to a more concrete moment of Marx’spresentat on, the pas

sage to the moment when cap tal n general reflects tself n appearance

pl es a d alect cal nvers on: ‘In actual ty. . . .e. n the world of phenomena,

th ngs are the other way round’.34In part cular, what Marx presents here s the

log cal mpl cat on of the convers on of ‘surplus-valueand the rate of surplus

value’ that ‘are,relat ve to th s, the nv s ble essence’, nto ‘the rate of prof t and

hence the form of surplus-value as prof t’, wh ch are the r ‘v s ble surface

phenomena’.35

The po nt of departure here s the money-form n wh ch the const tuent

parts of the value of any commod ty as product of cap tal appear: C = k + 8,

where Itrepresents the cost-pr ce,that s,the part of the value that replaces the

total cap tal expended n ts product on, and s,surplus-value,wh ch appears as

a s mple excess of value over the cost-pr ce. As such, the excess as surplus

value does not appear to der ve from the (unpa d) labour object f ed n the

product on, but from the sum of all the parts of the total cap tal advanced.

Thus Marx states:

As th s supposed der vat ve of the total cap tal advanced, the surplus

value takes on the transformed formofprof t.A sum of value s therefore

cap tal f t s nvested n order to produce a prof t, or alternat vely prof t

ar ses because a sum of value s employed as cap tal. If we call prof t p,

the formula C= c +v +s = k +s s converted nto the formula C= k +p, of

commod ty value = cost pr ce +projft.36

At the moment n wh ch cap tal n general appears n the surface of phenom

ena, surplus-value acqu res the money-formofprojft. owever, as such, prof!t

must be understood essent allynot as an excessover the cost-pr ce, but rather

as someth ng that has been pos ted and grounded by cap tal tself, and there

fore, as a result of cap tal’s self-movement, as a relat onsh p to tself that

reflects tself n appearance.

In surplus value, the relat onsh p between cap tal and labour s la d bare.

In the relat onsh p between cap tal and prof t, .e. between cap tal and

34 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 138.

35 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 134.

36 Marx 1981 [1894], pp. 126—7.




surplus-value as t appears on the one hand as excessover the cost pr ces

of the commod ty real zed n c rculat on and on the other hand as an

excess determ ned more prec sebl by ts relat onsh p to the total cap tal,

cap tal appears as a relat onsh p to tself, a relat on n wh ch t s d st n

gu shed, as an or g nal sum of value, from another new value that t

pos tsF"7

Asa result, the surplus-value as prof t must be measured by cap tal tself, that

, through ts relat on w th tself as a self- ncreas ng value. In so far as t cor

responds to the moment of appearance of cap tal n general, th s measure

refersto the rate ofprof t ofcap tal as ageneral concept,wh ch sdeterm ned by

the proport on of surplus-value as prof t that the presupposed cap tal (that s,

the total cap tal advanced) has created n a g ven per od of t me. Th s rate

expresses n the follow ngmanner the proport on n wh ch cap tal tself has

creased ts own value:

Proceed ng from tself as the act ve subject, the subject of the pro

cess . . . cap tal relates to tself as self- ncreas ng value; .e. t relates to sur

plus value as someth ng pos ted and founded by t; t relates aswell-spr ng

of product on, to tself as product; t relates asproduc ng value to tself as

produced value. It therefore no longer measures the newly produced

value by ts real measure, the relat on of surplus labour to necessary

labour, but rather by tself as ts presuppos t on. A cap tal of a certa n

value produces n a certa n per od of t me a certa n surplus value.Surplus

value thus measured bythe value of the presupposed cap tal,cap tal thus

pos ted as self-real z ng value —sprof t; regarded not sub spec eaetem ta

t s, but sub spec e —cap tal s, the surplus value s prof t; and cap tal as

Cap tal, the produc ng and reproduc ng value,d st ngu shes tself w th n

self from tself as prof t, the newlyproduced value.The product of cap

tal s prof t. The magn tude, surplus value, s therefore measured by the

value-magn tude of the cap tal, and the rate ofprof t s therefore deter

m ned by the proport on between ts value and the value of cap tal.38

Thus t s that, at the moment n wh ch cap tal n general reflects tself nto

self n appearance and, therefore, at the moment n wh ch ts essent almea

sure (that s, ts rate of valor sat on as was establ shed n the second moment)

37 Marx 1981[1894], p. 139(emphas s added).

38 Mm 1973 [1857-8]. P- 746



308 ROBLES-BA

becomes the general rate ofprof t of cap tal and surplus-value as a sub spec e

cap tal s becomes prof t,39 t s pos ted as an ex st ng cap tal n general.

Soc alValueand the General Pr ce-Form

Tak ng k to represent the cost-pr ce, and r = p / K the general rate of prof t,

where p represents prof t, and K the total cap tal advanced, the general pr ce

forrn of the value of commod t es asproducts of cap tal acqu res a further con

crete form:

P=k+rK

owever, due to the fact that, as Marx asserts, ‘cap tal ex sts and can onlyex st

asmany cap tals, and ts self-determ nat on therefore appears as the r rec pro

cal nteract on w th one another’,“0the concept of cap tal n general, as a rela

t on w th tself that reflects tself from tself n appearance, s nsup c ent n

order to be pos ted as an actual soc allyex st ngcap tal.

Fourth Moment:The Passageto the Mult pl c ty of Cap tal

Th s moment mpl es two passages: the passage from cap tal n general to

many cap tals, and the passage from the latter to cap tal as a whole. Both pas

sages are d scussed by Marx n the Grundr sse and Cap tal at two d fferent lev

els of abstract on.

In the Grundr sse, Marx deals w th these passages n l ne w th egel’slog c

of the One and the Many,and therefore n terms of repuls on and attract on. In

the f rst, the one, that s, cap tal n general, pos ts the many ones, that s,many

cap tals, through ts repuls on of tself.In the second, the one One, that s,cap

tal as a whole, s pos ted through the mutual attract on of the many ones.

For the f rst passage, Marx uses egel’sdouble sense of repuls on, namely

‘repuls on n tself' and ‘external repuls on',41and relates them to the compet

t on between the many cap tals:

39 Or as Marx says t n egel an words, when ‘the excess s reflected back nto tself from the

rate of prof t, or else that the excess,wh ch s character zed more spec f callyby the rate

of prof t, appears as an excess wh ch the cap tal produces over and above ts own value,

e ther annually or n some def n te per od of c rculat on’ (Marx 1981[1894].P-139)

4o Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 414 (emphas s added).

41 See egel 1969 [1812—16],p.168.



DIALECTICS OF LABOUR AND VALUE-FORM IN MARX’SCAPITAL

309

[The] essence of cap tal, wh ch, as w ll be developed more closely n con

nect on w th compet t on, s someth ng wh ch repels tself, smany cap

tals mutually qu te nd fferent to one another. . . S nce value forms the

foundat on of cap tal, and s nce t therefore necessar ly ex sts only

through exchange for counter-value, t thus necessar ly repels tself from

self.A un versal cap tal, one w thout al en cap tals confront ng t, w th

wh ch t exchanges . . . s therefore a non-th ng. The rec procal repuls on

between cap tals s already conta ned n cap tal as real zed exchange

value.42

The f rst sense refers to the pos t ng of the many cap tals through the negat ve

relat on of cap tal n general to tself. But once the many cap tals have already

been pos ted, the second sense refers to the rec procal external repuls on of

the many cap tals aga nst one another. Accord ng to Marx, t s prec sely

through compet t on understood n th s term, that the many cap tals are pos

ed and determ ne themselves as soc allyex st ngcap tals:

42

43

45

Conceptually,compet t on s noth ng other than the nner nature ofcap

ta , ts essent al character, appear ng n and real zed as the rec procal

teract on of many cap tals w th one another, the nner tendency as

external necess ty.Cap tal ex stsand can 0an ex st as many cap tals, and

s self-determ nat on therefore appears as the r rec procal nteract on

w th one another.43

Allmoments of cap tal wh ch appear nvolved n t when t s cons d

ered fromthe po nt ofv ewof tsgeneral concept obta n an ndependent

real ty, and, further, only show themselves when t appears as real, as

many cap tals.44

Freecompet t on s the relat on of cap tal to tself as another cap tal, .e.

the real conduct of cap tal as cap tal . . . Compet t on merely expresses as

real, pos ts as an external necess ty, that wh ch l es w th n the nature of

cap tal; compet t on s noth ng more than the way n wh ch the many

cap tals force the nherent determ nat ons of cap tal upon one another

and upon themselves.45

Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 421,footnotes ' and 1'.

Marx 1973[1857—8],p. 414(emphas s added).

Marx 1973 [1857—8],p. 520.

Marx 1973 [1857—8], pp. 650—1.



310 ROBLES-3AM

Accord ngly,Marx’snot on of compet t on can be understood asa processthat

real sed at two s multaneous levels of abstract on. The f rst s on the levelof

essence: th s refers to the negat ve rec procal reflectedness of many cap tals

w th one another through wh ch they themselves, nasmuch as they arecon

cretely d fferent from one another, are pos ted as cap tals essent ally dent cal

to one another, that s,as ex st ng values that valor se themselves. ere theydo

not d ffer from one another qual tat vely, but quant tat vely. Th s s the r den

t ty w th n the r d ggerence.The second level of abstract on s appearance: th s

refers to the rec procal relat on of the many cap tals among themselves

whereby, as cap tals that are d fferent n many concrete aspects, they oppose

and compete w th each other n order to obta n the r greatest valor sat on.

Th s,by contrast, s the r d ference w th n the r dent ty.

Regard ng the second passage, Marx, n l ne w th egel, cons ders that the

rec procal repuls on of the many cap tals s counteracted by the r attract on.

sa m here s to nd cate that the mult pl c ty of cap tal passes over ntowhat

egel calls ‘ago ng-together—w th- tse%“6the one One, that s, cap tal as a soc al

who/e.And t s through th s transpos t on that the many cap tals are thus un

f ed nto an organ c total ty: ‘theonepos ted as one';47and each of them becomes

an al quot part of cap tal as a soc al whole —a soc al total ty that nonetheless

rema ns rooted n the repuls on of the many cap tals.

Thus compet t on also presents tself as a contrad ctory relat onsh p

between total cap tal and the many cap tals t compr ses, through wh chboth

are pos ted and determ ned rec procally as ex st ng soc al cap tals, and total

soc al cap tal s pos ted as cap tal n ts ex stence n-and-for- tself, w th the

many cap tals as the ex stence of the mult ple parts of t. Each cap tal s not

only one of many cap tals, but they are all also one and the same. Indeed, cap

tal as a soc al whole and the many cap tals are thus const tuted as nseparable

moments of a s ngle organ c un ty.W thout the whole, the parts do not ex st;

by the same token, w thout the parts, the whole does not ex st. The wholepre

supposes the parts, and the parts the whole. The whole and the parts are thus

two ex stences of one s ngle un ty.

. In Part II of Volume III of Cap tal, Marx concret ses h s not on of compet

t on as the rec procal relat onsh p of many cap tals to each other n the pos t

g of ndustr al cap tal, that s, the only form of cap tal that produces cap tal,

where each one of the many cap tals s cons dered a part cular branch of

dustr al cap tal, produc ng the same k nd ofcommod ty,and where the ‘ent re

46 egel 1969 [1812—16],p. 172.

47 egel 1969 [1812—16],p. 174.




mass of commod t es’ produced s regarded ‘as a s ngle commod ty’ that has

‘one pr ce’.48

G ven that compet t on s carr ed out through the exchange-relat ons of

commod t esproduced by the d fferent part cular ndustr al cap tals, t s

through the r rec procal commod ty-relat onsh ps that they are recogn sed n

relat on to each other as essent ally dent cal but s multaneously also as con

crete yd femn t.

Atthe levelof essent al real ty, t s through these relat onsh ps that they are

pos ted soc allyas dent calforms of value-as-cap tal, and therefore through

them that they are recogn sed w th each other as equals, d ffer ngonly quant

tat vely.In so far as they express the r qual tat ve pos tedness as ex st ng soc al

cap tals, these are qual tat ve relat onsh ps that are man fested by the same

quant tat verelat onsh p: the un form rate ofprof t,49wh ch s the actual sat on

of the r measure of real sat on at the moment n wh ch cap tal appears as a

mult pl c tyof part cular ndustr al cap tals. As the commonmeasure of the r

real sat on, th s rate expresses the quantum of surplus-value n the form of

prof tthat each branch of ndustr al cap tal has produced n proport on to ts

magn tude,w th n a g ven per od of t me and regardless of the mater al form

of the commod t es produced and techn cal compos t on of cap tal used to

producethem. On the other hand, the quant tat ve relat onsh p that expresses

the qual tat vepos tedness of total ndustr al cap tal refers to ts spec f cmeas

ureofreal sat on:thegeneral rate ofprof tof ndustr al cap tal as awhole,wh ch,

asmuch as t s the result of ‘the level of explo tat on of labour as a whole by

cap tal as a whole’,50denotes the total surplus-value n the form of prof t that

sa d cap tal has produced n a g ven per od of t me. Thus ‘the general rate of

prof t s the moment where total soc al cap tal establ shes ts un tyw th tself’;51

and where sa d cap tal, as such, confronts ts own other as a whole, that s,

dustr al labour as a whole.

Actual-Soc al Valueand Product on-Pr ce

S nce the un form rate of prof t expresses the pos tedness of the d fferent

dustr al cap tals as soc ally dent cal cap tals, the money-form of the value

of the commod t es that each of them produces s actual sed, acqu r ng

a pr ce-form correspond ng to th s rate. These pr ces are what Marx calls

48 Marx 1981[1894], p. 283.

49 Theun form rate of prof t cannot be the same th ng as the averagerate of prof t: the latter

can onlybe an average of the d fferent al market-rates of prof t of the ndustr al capltals.

50 Marx 1981[1894], p. 299.

5 1 Arthur 2001b, p. 144.



312 ROBLES-BA

product on—pr ces,and t s through these pr ces that the values of the com

mod t esproduced byall of the d fferent branches of ndustr al cap tal are now

pos ted, qual tat vely and quant tat vely, as actual-soc al values; and as a conse

quence, the quant t es of labour-t me object f ed n commod t es are actual

ed asdef n t vequanta ofabstract labour-t me as soc allymeasured.

In the Grundr sse,Marx refers to the d alect cal nvers on that results from

cons der ngthe compet t on between nd v dual cap tals:

The fundamental law n compet t on, as d st nct from that advanced

about value and surplus value, s that t s determ ned not by the labour

conta ned n t, or by the labour t me n wh ch t s produced, but rather

by the labour t me nwh ch t can be produced, or,the labour t me neces

sary for reproduct on. Byth s means, the nd v dual cap tal s n real ty

onlyplaced w th the cond t ons of cap tal as such, although t seemsas f

the or g nal law were overturned. Necessary labour t me as determ ned

by the movement of cap tal tself; but only n th s way s t pos ted. Th s s

the fundamental law of compet t on. . . In short, here all determ nants

appear n a pos t on wh ch s the nverse of the r pos t on n cap tal n

general. Therepr ce determ ned by labour, here labour determ ned bypr ce

etc. etc. The nfluence of nd v dual cap tals on one another has the effect

prec sely that they must conduct themselves as cap tal; the seem ngly

dependent nfluence ofthe nd v duals, and the r chaot c coll s ons,are

prec sely the pos t ng of the r general law. The market here obta ns yet

another s gn f cance. The nfluence of cap tals as nd v duals on each

other thus becomes prec sely the r pos t ng as general be ngs.52

Compet t on swhat nverts the or g nal lawbased on ‘valueand surplus-value?

wh ch was advanced at the moment of cap tal n general, nto a lawbased on

pr ces and prof ts. As a d alect cal nvers on, the or g nal law s not actually

overturned, but rather negated and superseded and, therefore, st ll preserved

as the foundat on of ‘the fundamental law of compet t on'.

Tak ngthe above n the context of compet t on between cap tals n d fferent

branches of ndustr al cap tal, th s nvers on has the follow ng mpl cat ons:

a) the actual-soc alvalueof the commod t es produced by each part cular frac

t on of total ndustr al cap tal s determ ned not ‘bythe labour t me nwh ch t

s produced’,but rather by the actual-soc al labour-t me determ ned bymeans

of ts product on-pr ce; b) the product on—pr ce s the actual sat on and there

52 Marx 1973[1857—8],p. 657 (emphas s added).



DIALECTICSOF LABOUR AND VALUE-FORM IN MARX'S CAPITAL 313

forethe negat on and supersess on of the d rect pr ce of the soc al value of

commod t esof the same k nd produced n a g ven product on-branch,” the

determ nat on of wh ch s presented n solat on from the total ty of the

branchesof ndustr al cap tal at the moment of cap tal n general n VolumeI

ofCap tal;and c) t s only bymeans of compet t on n the marketplace that all

thed fferentfract ons of ndustr al cap tal are actually pos ted w th the cond

t onsof cap tal n general, that s, ‘asgeneral be ngs’.

Fromthe above, t s poss ble to aff rm further, on the one hand, that, due to

the d alect cal un ty of form and content wh ch underl es the d fferent

moments n wh ch Marx presents h s concept of cap tal n Cap tal, the pro

cessesof determ nat on of the product on-pr ces of commod t es and of the

qual tat veand quant tat ve reduct on of the labour object f ed n them nto

actual-soc allabour can only be understood as two processes that are s multa

neoustyreal sed through each other. On the other hand, contrary to what Marx

h mselfand many Marx st pol t cal econom sts ma nta n, the determ nat on

ofthe actual-soc alvalues of all k nds of commod t es as products of ndustr al

cap talscannot be understood as a result of the we ghted averagesof the aggre

gateof nd v duallabour-t mes expended w th n the part cular branch of pro

duct on that produce them, but rather as the necessary labour-t me that s

posed or val dated soc ally by ndustr al cap tal as a whole,54and conse

quently,the determ nat on of the product on-pr ces does not mply transfer

ences of value or surplus-value among the d fferent branches of ndustr al

cap tal.55And lastly, for the ent rety of soc al ndustr al cap tal, the ‘pr ce of

product on equals value'.56

Setout below s a graph cal representat on of the process of s multaneous

determ nat on of the actual-soc al value of commod t es through the r

product on-pr ces,suppos ng that there are only two branches of ndustr al

cap tal, each one produc ng a spec f c type of commod ty, Cl or C2,w th

d fferent product on—methods,that s, w th part cular means of product on

and d fferent quant t es of d rect soc al labour-t me dec ded W th n each

53 The soc al value of commod t es, such as s def ned n Volume I of Cap tal, s concret sed

as market-value n Volume Ill. . . d _

54 ‘Ifthe value of commod t es s determ ned by the necessary labour-t me contame

them and not s mply by labour-t me as such, t s cap tal that f rst makes a reahty of th s

mode of determ nat on’ (Marx 1981[1394], P-180)

55 See Marx 1981[1894], p. 264.

56 Marx 1981[1894], p. 265.




quant t esof soc al labour-t mes, 1°“,object f ed d rectly and nd rectly dur ng

the rproduct on nto quanta of def n t ve or actual-soc al labour-t me, 21°3pr

bymed at on of the r product on-pr ces, PP,.

Theproduct on-pr ce, PP ,of the commod t es, C ,produced byany part cu

lar branch of ndustr al cap tal, , can thus be dep cted by the follow ng

formula:

PP = (C + V ) (1 + r) = C + V + P :’ (ZloMP- Bf ) + (lo Bf ) = )‘fMP- + (1° 5f ) = N

where:c =constant cap tal, equ valent to the product on-pr ces of the means

ofproduct on employed;

v,=var able cap tal;

r =the un form rate of prof t;

p, =prof ts = (c +v ) r, wh ch are equ valent to the surplus-value produced, 3,;

PM“=soc allabour-t me object f ed n the means of product on;

W,= the f nal reduct on-coe c ents by wh ch the un ts of soc al labour-t me,

l° ,are transformed nto un ts of actual-soc al labour-t me;

Xl°Mp Bf NM“ = the actual-soc al labour-t mes object f ed n the means of

product on,wh ch are equ valent to the r actual-soc al values and therefore

proport onal to q; and

W3“= the actual-soc al labour-t me d rectly object f ed n the commod t es,

wh ch s proport onal to (v, + 8,) = (V:+P )

Actual-Soc alValueand Market-Pr ce

Atthe levelof the concrete appearance of real ty, compet t on between ndus

tr al cap tals s what deterrn nes that the money-forms of the commod t es

produced n the d fferent branches of product on plus the rates of prof t cor

respond ngto them, dev ate from the r product on-pr ces and from the un

form rate of prof t, respect vely. These money—formsare the market-pr ces for

the d fferent commod t es, and the rate correspond ng to the part cular

dustr alcap tal that produces them s ts market-rate ofprojft, that s, ts con

cretemeasure of real sat on. '

Asdev at onsfrom the r product on-pr ces, the market-pr ces of commod

t esrepresent certa n amounts of actual-soc al value, that s, certa n amounts

ofactual-soc allabour-t me, wh ch may be h gher than, lower than or equal to

thoseexpressed n the r product on-pr ces. Thus sales of commod t es at the r

market-pr ces mply transferences ofsurplus-value, or prof t, fromthe branches

0f product on hav ng market-pr ces below the r product on-pr ces towards

thosebranches hav ng market-pr ces above the r product on—pnces.Moreover,



316 ROBLES-3.5.82

asmuch as they ex st, the product on-pr ces and the un form rate of prof t

const tute the centres ofgrav tyaround wh ch market-pr ces and market-rates

of prof t, respect vely, fluctuate.57

G venthat product on-pr ces and un form rates of prof t cannot be d rectly

seen, the onlywayto grasp them s through we ghted averagesofmarket-pr ces

and market-rates of prof t, respect vely.These average f gures can be called the

average or market-product on-pr ce and the average rate ofproj t, respect vely,

and the prof t correspond ng to them, the average prof t. Even though they do

not co nc de w th product on-pr ces or the un form rate of prof t, these aver

age f gures are, as Marx says, ‘byno means of merely theoret cal s gn f cance.

It s, rather, pract cally mportant for cap tal whose nvestment s calculated

over the fluctuat ons and compensat ons of a more or less f xed per od of

t me’.58What s clear here s that these average f gures do not correspond to the

product on-pr ces or to the un form rate of prof t.

Bythe same token, g ven that the nd v dual cap tals w th n any branch of

dustr al cap tal produce w th organ c compos t ons of cap tal that d ffer

fromeach other, and g venthat each part cular branch produces the samek nd

of commod t es that have the same market-pr ce, the rate of prof t of each of

them s ts nd v dualmarket-rate ofprof t, that s, ts nd v dualmeasure ofreal

sat on, wh ch d ffers not only from those of other nd v dual cap tals, but also

from the market-rate of prof t of that part cular ndustr al branch. Th s s ev

denced by the fact that, by sell ng ts commod t es at the market-pr ce, any

g ven nd v dual cap tal earns a certa n amount of prof t on the bas s ofwh ch

s own nd v dual market-rate ofprof t s calculated, whose magn tude maybe

h gher than, lowerthan or equal to the market-rate of the branch of ndustr al

cap tal of wh ch t s a fract on.

As a cap tal that s essent ally a cap tal n general, the ma n object ve of

wh ch s to valor se tself and accumulate as much as poss ble, any g ven nd

v dual cap tal does not try to extract for ts own ‘cap tal advanced n produc

t on’ s mply ‘the same surplus-value or prof t as any other cap tal of the same

s ze, or a prof t proport onate to ts s ze, no matter n what branch of produc

t on t may be appl ed’,59but, on the contrary, t w ll compete w th all other

d v dual cap tals n order to obta n the greatest valor sat on for tself. ence,

57 It s n th s sense that Marx argues that the pr ces of product on are ‘the centre around

wh ch the da ly market pr ces revolve, and at wh ch they are balanced out n def n t ve

per ods’ (Marx 1981[1894], p. 280).

58 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 291.

59 Marx 1981 [1894], p. 297.



DIALECTICSOF LABOUR AND VALUE-FORM IN MARX’S CAPITAL 317

each nd v dual cap tal w ll try to adopt and/ or employ any powerful lever

ava lableto do th s, for example technolog cal nnovat on or cred t.

Return ngto the f rst moment of the presentat on, s mple commod ty

c rculat oncan no longer be conceptual sed merely as the mmed ate appear

anceofcap tal st c rculat on, C—M—C, but rather as the grounded appearance

of the sphere of c rculat on of the c rcu t of cap tal, P . . . C' - M’ . M —C . . .P. In

th sway,any concrete commod ty that now appears ‘ sd fferent from the com

mod ty taken as the element, the start ng-po nt of cap tal st product on’.

Indeed,asa product of a determ nate nd v dual ndustr al cap tal, t man fests

tselfnot as a s mple commod ty, but rather ‘asa part both reallyand concep

tuallyof product on as a whole’ and therefore ‘represents a def n t ve port on

ofcap taland of the surplus-value created by t'.50The commod ty, the start ng

po nt of Marx’spresentat on n Cap tal, plus ts value-fonn-determ nat ons,

arethus onlygrounded retrogress velyat the moment n wh ch cap tal s pos

edasmany cap tals, and the commod ty may be thus conce ved n the un ty

of tsd versedeterm nat ons as a product of cap tal.

60 Marx 1972 [1861—3],pp- 112—13



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NameIndex

Althusser, Lou s 64n

Annenkov, P.W. 190n

Ar stotle 27o

Arthur, C.J. 36-38, 64n, 89n, 9011,9m, 94,

111,117,269n, 27on, 272n, 28on, 310

Ba ley, Samuel 211

Banaj ,]. 27 n 277n

Bellol ore, R ccardo 277n, 9011

Bohm-Bawerk, Eugen 203

Campbell, Martha 89n, 21011

Carlson, Dav d Gray 97n

Clarke, S mon 100n

Collett , Luc o 92n, 9311,9411,96, 110

Dussel, Enr que 115,125

Engels, Freder ck 56, 7211,89n, 9111,no,

197n, 200, 201, 204m, 215, 238

Fausto, Ruy 295

Feuerbach, Ludw g 17,9911,103n, 192,194

F chte, Johann Gottl eb 191

F nell ,Roberto 277n

F nesch , Roberto 65n, 117,123

Foley, Duncan 115

Gunn, R chard 100

oulgate, Stephen 93. 97-93. 103

In go Carrera,]uan 91, 94, 100—101,05,

107—109

Kant, Immanuel 191,270, 282

Lassalle, Ferd nand 199m

Len n,Vlad m r ll ch

Lev ne, Norman 5411

89. 92

Malthus, Thomas 201,2n

Matt ck, Paul 115

Meaney, Mark 36—38,45n, 49n, 64n, u7

Moseley, Fred 89n, 204n; 213n

Mure, G. R. G. 277n

Murray, Patr ck

20411, 205n, 21111

89, 100, 19m, 192n, 19411,

N colaus, Mart n 41,239

Plekhanov, Georgy 89

Postone, Mo she 24—5

Proudhon, P erre-Joseph 66, 70,190

Ramsay, George 208

Reuten, Geert 89n, 123,289n

R cardo, Dav d 134,159,189, 191,194,

198-9, 200-01, 202, 203—4,21o—un

Rosdolsky, Roman 41,55,58, 63, n5

Russell, Bertrand 27on

Shortall, Felton 117

Sm th, Adam 133,198, 210

Sm th, Tony 89n, 9011,91,94-96, 65n,

102—103,m, 128

Stal n,Joseph 89n

Starosta, Gu do 107n

Torrens, Robert 201,208

Wagner, Adolph 100

W ll ams, M chael 89n

Wolff, M chael 239

Yalfe, Dav d u5



Subject Index

absolute 17,23, 25-26, 34, 36, 3811

absolute form 196, 198,213

absolute method 47-48, 54,59

abstract

and concrete 271

al enat on 17,33, 34n

asopposed to concrete

106—107,no

from 90, 92,94n, 94-102,103n,u0

h ghest essence 45—46

un versal ty 45, 48

abstract on 8, 166, 169, 170, 171,269—71

acc dental relat ons 62

accumulat on 148,149,150

amrm through self-negat on

105n, 106, 109—110

al enated th nk ng 194

al enat on 166,180

al quot (or representat ve) part 190

of the ‘heap of commod t es' 203—4

96—99, 101—102,

93,102, 104,

of the total cap tal 202n,203-4, 204n

analys s 45, 96, 99—105,105n,107n.

107—108,110, 246

analyt cal phase 100n,100-101,107-109

a pr or synthes s 45,49-57, 59

appearance 165,168, 169, 170,174,175,180.

181,184, 186

false 6

necessary nner connect on 174

necessaryman festat on ofthe essence

165. 174

assumpt ons

eschewed n systemat c d alect cs

250—51

Arbe t 182

geme nsame 177n,178

gegenstd’ndl che 178n

lebend ge 182

unm ttelbare gesellschaj l che 177

veryesellschqflete 177n

verm ltelte gesellschq/ l che 177

Arbe tskrajl 182

lebend ge 182

Ausdn' cken 175,178

Aujhebung 57, 60—62,185

ban' er, obstacle 183

barter 179-180

beg nn ng of sc ence see po nt of departure

Begrg'tf 47—50.52. 54-57. 59. 63,168

organ c system 53

Be ng 165, 166,168, 169, 173

be ng and non-be ng 173

be ng-for- tself 104-105

doctr ne of 30—31

ea] 92, 96—98,102-105

med ate 165

ground of 165

real mater al 90, 93—96,98, 103—104,

105n,no

bourgeo s 171,172, 178n, 188

pol t cal nst tut ons 172

soc ety as ontology 185

bourgeo s hor zon 190,191,19m, 198,

210-1

cap tal 22—3,28, 33, 164, 170,171,172,173,

174, 176, 178, 181,183, 184, 184n, 186,186,187.

270, 271, 291

accumulat on of 169

as a whole 169

as a total ty 164, 183,184

as (self-susta n ng) deal real ty 166

as self-mov ng,self act vat ng substance

170, 185, 185n

as Subject 164, 165, 166, 169,170, 184,

186, 186n

dom nant

encompass ng

overgrasp 185

overreach ng 185

overr d ng 185

as vamp re 182

automat c fet sh 186

automat c subject 205

cap tal-fet sh 170,184, 187

c rculat ng 49, 52, 56—57

constant 189, 200—2208

const tut on of 164,182,184,186n

d st ngu shes tself w th n tself from tself

41.42. 57-58

184, 185

165, 170



SUBJECT INDEX

end- n- tself 54

f xedand c rculat ng 200

n general 5, n6—17, 122, 125, 127—31,133,

135.145.146. 152. 154. 157

nterest-bear ng 7. 8, 41.45-47. 55:59,

62, 170, 186

l near explo tat on of labour by 164,

183

log c of 170

many cap tals 169, 170

mult ply ng 41.57. 59

myst cat on of 208, n, 209m,209m

ontology of 184

organ c compos t on of 200—1

organ c un ty 46, 49—50,52, 54, 56, 61

part cular cap tals 170

perenn al 41,57

proceeds from tself 53

product v ty 181

prof t-bear ng 41: 43146—47155159

purely abstract form 46-47, 49,55-57,

59-62

real 42. 43. 46—47, 55. 59

real zed 56

relates tself to tself

relat on 164

self-caus ng un ty 48

self-expand ng c rcle

self-real z ngvalue

self-reproduc ng

self-valor s ngvalue

s ngular ty of 170

Sp ral 41. 57

total soc al 201—2,202n, 203—4,208

total ty 52

turnover t me of 200—1

un versal ty of 170

var able 199—202,208

zomb e’s l fe 183

c rcular v ews

egel an and R card an 184,188

c rculat on 169, 177,178,179,180, 182,184,

185, 186

Chr st an, Chr st an ty

class struggle 186m

product on 164,183

class calpol t cal economy

fa l ngs of 190—1,196—202, 210—1,

210-m, 21m, 211n,212

41. 49, 59. 62

41, 42. 57

57-58

41,21

204-7

171' 172' 173»177

331

cogn t on 45—46

commensurab l ty 178

commod ty 100—101,107—110,164, 168, 170,

173,174, 176, 177,179, 180, 180n, 182,184,186,

187, ch. 11pass m

detenn nate be ng 104

myst cal character of 172

phantom mode of ex stence 174

commun tar an sm 24-5

compet t on 5, 116—17,122, 128—31,133, 135,

154, 189, 202n

complex 165, 167, 170, 171,175, 181, 183

concept, doctr ne of 23,27,34, 35,38-40,

166, 168,169, 170,185

Concept-log c 4—5,6, 7, 12, 117—28,169,

191,204

conceptual clar ty 212

concrete 90-91, 97—98,1oo—1o1,103,

108—110,165, 166, 167, 169, 171, 173

l v ng whole 45—47,62

ontolog cally pr or real

organ c whole

organ sm 44

total ty 44, 48, 5o

total ty of thoughts

un versal 42, 58—59

whole 43,46, 52

concret on 165,168, 169

concretum 166

content 101—102,109—u0

cont ngent 167, 168, 169, 171

contrad ct on 263—66

Contr but on to the Cr t queof Pol t cal

Economy 190

cost-pr ce 202—3,207—8

cred t-cap tal 122,127,130-31

and f ct t ous cap tal 158

see also nterest-bear ng cap tal

cr t cal pol t cal economy 173

cr t que of pol t cal economy 164,174

cr t que of the ‘reflect veunderstand ng

19m, 212—3

44. 46

45—48. 50

44,46, 61

Darstellung 165,167,170,175,175n, 176,

180, 182

darstellungswe se 141

def n t on 45

democracy 18

demonstrat on 45



332

determ nate be ng 104

determ nat ons 90, 94—97,101—102,05,

108—110

double character of 210

d v s on 45

d alect cs 164, 167, 176

as concret on 165

asmethod of w thdrawal 186

ep stemolog cal role 165,167

log c of d ss mulat on 165

as systemat c exh b t on, expos t on

166, 170

new 1

ontolog cal role (as systemat cgenerat on

of Cap tal as Subject) 166

Seealso systemat c d alect cs

d alect cal method 90—94,100,100m,140,

142

d alect cal reversal 280,282

d amat 89, 91,no

d ssoc ated soc al ty 29,32, 34

dom nat on 206

dual sms 191,195

Ebzverle ben 181,187

embod ment 177,183

as possess on, ncarnat on 183

as nternal sat on n the mechan calbody

of cap tal 187

emp r cal un versal ty 47

Enthalten 177

equ valence 178,179

Ersche nung, ersche nen 6, 10,165,174.

175n, 176, 177, 181,182, 186,187

Essence log c (Wesenslog /r) 5. 6. 7. 11.31.

32, 34, 35, 168, 169, 191-2, 196, 204-7, 211-13,

254n, 264

esence 165, 167, 168, 169,170. 174. 175

and appearance 256

estrangement 166

exchange 169, 171,176,177,178,179,180, 186

exchange-value

274-77

exh b t on, expos t on

175. 177, 178, 180, 182

173, 174,176, 177, 181,

165, 166, 167, 169,

systemat c 165,166

ex stence, form of 255

explo tat on 164, 182,189

as l near process of suck ng l v nglabour n

excess of necessary labour 133

SUBJECT INDEX

express on 178,179

from the nner to the outer 175,178,

180

expropr at on 169

external relat on 94, 97, 102,107

factors of product on 196

Fet sch 186

const tuted from a human bas s 174

Fet schcharakter 177

Fet schgestalt 186

Fet sch smus 177,178

fet sh 60, 164,182

fet sh-l ke character 176,178,178n,180.

187

fet sh sm 9-10, 30, 33, 167, 168, 173,176,

178n, 180

f n te 92-93

fm tude 92—93

f xed thought forms 192—3

forces, tendent al 256—59

form 101, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 174, 175,

176, 177, 178,179, 180, 181,182, 184, 185, 186

form of value

expanded 279—80

general 280—83

money 285

s mple 278-9

total 284

formal abstract on 96-99, 101,103n,110

Gallerte 176

Gegenstc' ndl chgke t 182

Ge st 185, 186n

general ty, un versal ty

186

genet c phase seesynthet c phase

Gle ch-setzung 178

God 172, 173, 185

gold 177, 178, 179, 180,

as (real) money 179

Goth c 177

Grenze 183

ground 165,169

Grundn’sse 123-31,271,277n

168, 169, 170, 185.

egel an syllog sm 177

hol sm 169

homology 171,172

hypostat sat on 166,170,173



SUBJECT INDEX

Idea 47, 50, 58, 61, 92,166, 168, 170,171,172,

182,183

of cap tal 47. 59, 52

unfold ng of 170

deal sm 3-4, 7-9, 12, 92, 94-95» 98»

110—111,167, 170, 172

absolute 172,173

deal st 90—94,96, 99—1oon,1o3. 105—107,

111

eal st abstract on 96—100,106

eal ty 92

ent ty, non- dent ty 174,185

manent cr t que 2n

d v dual ty 50, 57, 168, 172,173,178,180,

186

f n te 92—93

carnat on 166, 172, 177,183

Inkarnat on 177

terest 189,196-7, 199

vers on 2—4

of subject and pred cate 166

omorph sm 170,171

vert ve method 194—5

Kap talet sch 187

labour 165, 171,176, 177,178, 180, 180m,182,

183, 187

abstract 168,168n, 172,176,177

as act v ty 176, 180, 182m,183, 187, 188

as contrasted w th labour-power 200,

206, 212

as counter-subject 171

as gelat ne 176

as nternal other 171,182,183

concrete 176, 177, 178. 130

as embod ed 176,177

dead 182,183, 184

d ssoc ated 169

med ately soc al 177.180

corporated l v ng 181

becom ng 180

mot on 182

labour t me 178,179

l v ng labour 169, 176,178, 180,181,182,

183, 184, 188

l v ng labour as source 181,182

med ately soc al 177

monetary express on of 178,179

necessary 183

333

object l ed 176,180,182

pr vate 169, 177,179

product ve powers of l. 181

soc al 177,181

soc al sed 177n

soc ally necessary

standpo nt 186n

total 176n, 178

labour-power 176,180,183,187

as potent al l v ng labour 180,182

labour theory of value 10,u5

l beral sm 24-25

l m t 183

log c

of be ng

of essence 50-52

of the concept 52—53,56-57

log c as the money of sp r t 193—4

178, 179

50—52. 56

man festat on 165,169,173, 174,175,179,

182

mater al 92—93,98, 102,104—107

Mater atur 179

Manuscr pt of 1861-63 131—36

Manuscr pt of 1863—65 136—37

mater al sm 3—4,7—9,12, 90

mater al st 90, 92, 94—96,98—100n,

102—106,uo—m

matter 92—93

measure 179

external 179

manent 179

measure of value 274—7,288—90

med at on 175

mental abstract ons seeformalabstract ons

method 165, 168, 172,173

c rcular 47

comprehens on 45—48,54—55,57, 61.

63

of nqu ry 165

of presentat on 165,270—71,287

sc ent f cally correct 42,45. 55,60

sc ent f c 43

true cogn t on 47

of nqu 45—46

m xtum compos tum 195

moment, d alect cal 249

money 12' 20—22!29! 31-32! 164! 169: 171'

174. 175, 176. 177, 178, 179, 180, 181,182, 184,

185. 286-7, 288—91



334

asa commod ty

as butterfly 182

as Chrysal s of value 178,182

as d splaced soc al form 190

as un versal equ valent 176,179

‘mater al ve l’ 190

necessary express on of value

194, 210, 213

value of 179

monster 187

an mated 187

as f ts body were by love possessed

187

movement of contrad ct on 93

myst cal shell 89, 91-92, 94, 105,110-111

myst l cat on 174,187

ofthe cap tal st mode of product on

206

of egel'smethod

177» 179

190-1,

192—5

nature 171,181

as external other 171

necessary 166, 167,168,169, 174,175

necess ty 90,104, 107

becom ng necessary 262—63

necessary moments 253,259-60

necess ty, egel and Marx on 260-61

negat on of the negat on 106,168

Notes on Wagner, Marx’s 271

noth ng 103-104

noth ngness 103

object of knowledge 164,165

object f cat on 48, 53-54. 165,173

object ve mmanent form 47-48

object v ty 53, 166, 173,182,182n, 185.

ontology 171,183, 184, 185, 270

oppos t on 169, 170,112,182,185

order of knowledge 166,167

order of reath 166,167

organ c development 44

paradox 172,174,182

paradox of speech 174

paradox of real ty 174

Par s Manuscr pts 212

part cular ty 4—5,9, 5o, 57, 118-24,128,

131,139, 166, 168, 171,182

Phenomenology, egel's 281n,282n

SUBJECT INDEX

ph lolog cal

clue 46

exeges s 41-43. 47. 55-56» 59. 61.63

map 42. 55

Ph losophy of story egel’s 270

ThePh losophy ofPoverty (see also Proudhon,

P erre-Joseph) 190

po nt of departure 96-97, 101-105,no

pos t ng the presuppos t on 164,165,183,

184,277-8, 287

ThePovertyof Ph losophy 190

prefabr cated (pm-establ shed) log cor

concepts 194—5

presentat on 165, 166, 170,175,175n,179

presuppos t onlessness of egel ansc ence

195

presuppos t ons

eschewed n systemat c d alect cs

250—51

pr ce 179

pr ce of product on 115,117,202, 202n, 203

Pr nc ples ofPol t calEconomyand Taxat on

(see also Dav d R cardo) 201,210—un.

213

process ofgenus 56-58

product ve powers 181

product on 165, 169, 177,178,180,181,182,

184, 186

as contested terra n 183

h dden abode of 171

product v sm 186n

Produktenaustausch 179

unm ttelbarer 179

prof t 4%42. 45: 57—58

prol t 2, 10, 117,132

average rate of 200, 203

general rate of u5, u7, 126,129,134,190.

200—3,212-3

‘mark-up’theory of 208

of enterpr se 189, 196, 199

rate of 189,199—200,202n, 206, 208,

212

tendency of the rate of prof t to fall 151

transformed form of surplus-value

200, 205, 211

pseudo-subject 169,186n

pure th nghood 194

quant ty to qual ty 275-6



SUBJECT INDEX

rat onal kernel

105,no

rat onal syllog sm

real abstract on

real cap tal

61—63

un versalorgan z ng pr nc ple 49

real sed cap tal 56

43. 50. 89. 91—92.94. 96.

195. 19511

sML103n

42,43,46-47.50:55v59»

real sed genus 42, 58—59

of log c 49. 53-55. 57-58. 63

real st metaphys cs 166

reason 166

redoubledemp r c sm 2n

rel g on 17-18

rent 189 196-7, 199

representat on 94—95,97—98,167,175

mental or not onal 175,179

reproduct on 94—96, 102—103,106—110

revenue 135

reversal 174

R card an 182, 184, 188

R card an School 197n, 198-9, 201

Rosdolsky challenge the 41,42, 55,58, 63

rules of log c 49. 53-55. 57—58,63

Sche n 10, 174, 176, 177, 182

sche nbar 181

Schranke 183

sc ence 170, 172, 174, 175, 181

Se n 173

self-consc ousness 166

self-mov ng pr nc ple 53—54

self-reproduc ng nd v dual ty 57—58

self-reproduc ng power 63

semblance 174, 175, 177, 180, 182

sens ble, supra-sens ble 166,172,174

sheer act v ty 193—4

s mple c rculat on 46, 49-51

f n te ser es 51

med at on of extremes 51

pure llus on 51

s mple un ty 168

s mple un versal ty 58

s ngular ty 4—5, 118—24,128, 131

soul 53—54

Sp r t 185

Absolute 68

start ng po nt, systemat c-d alect cal 247

335

subject v ty 53

sub spec e cap tal s 57

Subject 5—7,9-10,11, 120—21

Substance 120—21,166, 170, 171,174,176,

179, 180, 185, 185n

surplus-value 6, 180,184

product on and d str but on of 5,9,

n5-17. 122—39

general form and part cular forms 122,

127—35

surplus-value

rate of 199—200,212

syllog sm 27—28,140

synthes s 45

synthet c a pr or

advance 47-50, 52-54, 56, 58—61

deduct on 52—55,59, 61

judgments 50

knowledge 43, 48—49,56

synthet c movement 89, 98, 100,roon,

103,105,107, 111

synthet c phase 97—98,100,mm, 103,

107, 111

systemat c d alect cs 1,9, 11,19,32, 35—40,

160,167,170, 213 , 269—70,286, 287

Systemat c-d alect cal method 89-91, 96,

100, 105, 111

a m 244—45

assumpt ons, eschewed

cond t ons of ex stence

cr t que 251

general pr nc ples 249—51

ground ng moments 249—51

manent cr t que 251

moment, d alect cal 249

necessary moments 253

presentat on 252—60

presuppos t ons, eschew ng

research pr or to SD

presentat on 245—49

start ng po nt 247

synthet c character 251

systemat c nvest gat on

un fy ngconcept 247-48

250-51

253—54

250—51

266—68

256-59

45-46

95—99, 102, 104—105

tendenc es

theorem

thought-form

fred moseley and tony smith - marx's capital

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