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Philosophical Review

Freedom and ForeknowledgeAuthor(s): John Martin FischerSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 67-79Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184522 .

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ThePhilosophical eview,XCII, No. 1 (January983)

FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE

John MartinFischer

A owerfulrgumentanbe madethatGod'somnisciencesincompatiblewithhuman freedom.' If God is eternal and

omniscient, hen itmightseem thatmyfreedomnow to do otherthanwhat 'm doingmustbe thefreedom o to actthat fact bout

thepast God's priorbeliefaboutmypresent ctivity) ouldn'tbe afact bout thepast.But sincethepast s "fixed," tseems that fGodexists,then I am now not free to do other thanwhatI'm doing.

Many philosophers have been attracted to an Ockhamistre-sponse to this argument.2Both the Ockhamistand the incom-patibilist an distinguish etween "hard" and "soft"facts bout the

'Nelson Pike, "DivineOmniscienceand VoluntaryAction,"Philosophical

Review74 (January 1965), pp. 27-46; "Of God and Freedom: A Re-joinder," Philosophical eview75 (July1966), pp. 369-379; and "DivineForeknowledge,Human Freedom and PossibleWorlds,"Philosophical e-view 86 (April 1977), pp. 209-216. Pike also discusses the same basicargument n the fourthchapter of his book, God and Timelessness,NewYork: Schocken Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 52-86.

2Some examples are: MarilynAdams, "Is theExistenceofGod a 'Hard'Fact?"Philosophicaleview 6 (October 1967),pp. 492-503; and WilliamL.Rowe,PhilosophyfReligion,Encino, Dickenson, 1978), pp. 154-169.

The approach sketchedbelow is called "Ockhamist"because WilliamofOckhamdistinguished etweenpropositions bout thepastwhich re nec-essary nd those whichare notand argued that mong thosepropositionsabout the pastwhichare notnownecessary re certainpropositions boutGod. (WilliamOckham,Predestination,od'sForeknowledge,ndFutureCon-tingents. arilynMcCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann trans.), NewYork: Appleton-Century-Crofts,969), pp. 46-47; 92.) Roughly,Ockhamclaimsthatthose propositionsabout the past whichare trueby virtueofcontingentfuture events are not now necessary. Such propositions, tmight e said,express "softfacts" bout thepast. A usefuldiscussion fthe

Ockhamist approach can be found in: ArthurPrior,Past, Present, ndFuture,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 121-127.John Turk Saunders agrees withthe Ockhamist thatcertainproposi-

tions about God express softfacts:John Turk Saunders, "Of God andFreedom," Philosophical eview 74 (April 1966), pp. 219-225. Saundersholds a positionwhich s even stronger hanOckhamism, incehe believesthatneither oftfactsnor hard factsneed be fixed:JohnTurk Saunders,"The Temptations of Powerlessness,"American hilosophical uarterly(April 1965), pp. 104- 107.

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JOHN MARTIN FISHER

past; the hard facts re fixedwhilethe softfactsneed notbe fixed.But theOckhamistclaimsthatGod's priorbeliefaboutmypresent

activity s a softfactabout the past and hence notfixed;myfree-dom is thuspreserved.Some Ockhamists ven claimthat theveryexistence of God is also a softfact about the past.

I shallargue that very ttractive resentation ftheOckhamistapproach, one explicitly ormulatedby MarilynAdams, is inade-quate.3 There are significantproblemswithAdams' attempt tocharacterize hehard fact/softactdistinction. urther, shallpre-

senta generalchallenge toany ortofOckhamist ttempt oexplainthisdistinction.

I. PIKE's ARGUMENT

Nelson Pike claimsto exhibit heincompatibilityfhuman free-dom and divine foreknowledge,relative to certainplausible as-sumptions bout God's

nature.4These assumptionsreflect entralfeaturesof the standardJudeo-Christian onception of God. Pikeexplicitly dopts the assumptionthat if God exists,then God isessentially mniscient nd God iseternal.On Pike'saccount,God isomniscient f and only ifGod believes all and onlytrueproposi-tions, and we mightsay thatGod is essentially mniscient fandonly fGod isomniscientn all possible worlds nwhichGod exists.Pike saysthat God is eternal fand only fGod has alwaysexisted

and alwayswill.5FollowingPike'spresentation n a differentrticle, assumethat

theterm"God" is a descriptive xpressionused tomark a certainrole,ratherthan a proper name.6 Whoever occupies the role ofGod is omniscient, mnipotent, ternal, etc. In contrast, he term"Yahweh" is a proper name; it refersto the person who actuallyoccupies the role of God (if God exists). It is not necessarily rue

3Adams,op. cit.4Pike,"Divine Omniscience,"pp. 26-31.5Thus Pike conceivesofGod's eternality s sempiternality-existence t

all times.This conception s sharedbytheOckhamist; tcan be contrastedwith heatemporalconceptionofeternality eldbyBoethius and Aquinas.

6Pikemakesthis ssumptionexplicit n "Omnipotenceand God's Abilityto Sin," American hilosophical uarterly (1969), pp. 208-216, esp. pp.208-209.

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thatYahweh is omniscient, mnipotent, ternal,etc.; itis logicallypossible thatsome otherperson has been God.7

Since "God" isbeingused here as a nonrigiddesignator, here ssome ambiguityn theassumptions bout God's attributes.God isessentially mniscient" oes notmean that hepersonwho is infactGod is essentially mniscient, utrather, hatnecessarily,whoeverisGod is omniscient. n terms f possibleworlds,God is essentiallyomniscientust in case forany possibleworld in whichthereis apersonwho isGod, thatpersonisomniscient.One can assume that

ifGod is eternalin a particularworld,thenitfollows hatthere sone and thesame personwho isGod at all times n thatworld.Pikeneed notaccept thisparticular ssumption, s it s notcrucial tohisargument.)

Though this s theapproach totheterm"God" thatPikeappearstoadopt, itmight eem tobe an unusual and unappealing position.I shall followPike in adopting this nterpretation,ut itis impor-tant to note-thatPike could just as easily embrace the strongerinterpretationccordingtowhichthepersonwho is in factGod isessentiallyGod. Nothing in Pike's proof, or in my criticism fAdams' Ockhamism,restson adoptingthe weakerrather hanthestronger nterpretation f God's attributes.

In effect,Pike also appears to adopt whatmightbe called the"fixedpast" constraint n power attributions:

(FPC) It isnevernanyperson's ower t a timeT so toactthat hepast (relative to T) would have been different romwhat itactuallywas.

Pike's view about the fixity f the past impliesnot onlythatonecannotcausally nfluencethepast; it mpliesthatno personis freeto do somethingwhich s suchthat,werehe todo it,thepastwouldhave been different romwhatit actuallywas.

Pike's argument s essentially s follows.Suppose Jonesdid X attime T2 and God exists. Since God exists, t follows fromGod'seternalityhat He existed at T1 (a timepriorto T2). Let us call thepersonwho was God at T1, "Y." SinceJonesdid X at Ti2,tfollows

7C. B. Martin argues for this approach in the fourthchapter of hisReligious elief, Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1964).

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JOHN MARTIN FISHER

fromGod's omniscience hatHe believedatT1 thatJoneswoulddoX at T2. Now if it was withinJones' power at T2 to refrainfrom

doing X, then (1) itwas in Jones' power at T2 to act in such a waythatY would have been God and would have held a falsebeliefat

TI, or (2) it was inJones' power at T2 to act in such a waythatYwould have been God but wouldn'thave held thebeliefHe held at

TI or (3) it was inJones' power at T2 to act in such a waythatYwouldn'thave been God at T1.

But (1) is ruled out byGod's essentialomniscience, nd (2) and

(3) are ruledoutby FPC). Hence itwasnot nJones'poweratT2torefrainfromdoing X. If the argumentis sound, it can easilybegeneralizedto showthatGod's eternalitynd essentialomniscienceare incompatiblewithany human agent'sbeing freeat any time.

It should be pointedout that ncompatibilismbout divinefore-knowledge and human freedom needn't entail incompatibilismabouthuman foreknowledge nd human freedom.The problem sdeeper with-divine oreknowledgebecause of God's essentialom-niscience;perhaps it was inJones' powerat T2 so to act that Smith(who actuallyheld only correctbeliefs)would have held a falsebelief t T1. Pike wantsto insist n an asymmetryetweendivine andhuman foreknowledge.8

II. HARD AND SOFT FACTS

It is sometimes n one's power so to act thatfacts bout thepastwouldn't e facts.JohnTurk Saunders discussessuch a fact:

Althought strue hat f hadrefrainedromwritinghispaper n1965,Caesar's ssassinationouldhavebeenother han t s nthatt

8Pike says in his original paper: "The important hing to be learnedfrom hestudyof Smith'sforeknowledge f Jones'action s thattheprob-lemofdivineforeknowledgehas as one of its pillarstheclaimthattruth sanalyticallyonnectedwithGod's beliefs. o problemof determinismriseswhen dealing withhuman foreknowledgeof futureactions.This is be-cause truth s not analyticallyonnectedwithhuman beliefeven when asin thecase of humanknowledge)truthscontingentlyonjoinedtobelief."Pike, "Divine Omniscience,"p. 43. Thus it is clear thatPike as wellas theOckhamistneeds he distinction etweenhard and softfacts.

70




wouldnothave precededby 2009 yearsmywritinghispaper, twouldbeabsurd oargue hat thereforeidnothave t n my ower

to refrain romwritinghispaper n 1965.9

It isobviousthatthemere fact hat f Saundershad refrained romwritinghis paper, then Caesar's assassinationwouldn't have pre-ceded Saunders' writinghis paper by 2009 yearsdid not renderSaunders incapable of refraining;relativeto 1965, "Caesar died2009 years prior to Saunders' writinghis paper" expresses a softfact bout thepast. Of course, it was not in Saunders' power so toact that Caesar would not have died on the steps of the Senate.Relativeto Saunders' lifetime,he fact hatCaesar died on thestepsof the Senate is a hard factabout the past.

Pike agreeswith heOckhamist hatthereare bothhardand softfacts bout thepast.'0 It is noteasy to providea precisecharacter-izationofthe hard fact/softactdistinction. ikehimeselfprovidesno suchaccount,thoughhe claims wecan recognizeclear examples

ofeach sort. I1The disagreementbetweenPike and theOckhamistis about where to draw the line. Pike's position s that ftheordi-narynotionsof beliefand existence re applied to God, thenGod'sbelief t T1 and God's existenceat T1 (includingthefact hatY wasGod at T1) are hard facts bout thepastrelative oT2. And iftheyweresoftfacts bout the pastrelative o T2,thiswould show thatwewere ascribingbeliefsand existenceto God in a special,nonstan-

dard way.Given the hard fact/softact distinction, he appropriate in-

terpretation f Pike's claim about the fixity f the past should bemade explicit:

(FPC*) It is nevernanyperson's ower t a timeT soto actthat ny

9Saunders,op. cit.,p. 224. Unfortunately, aunders' arithmetics wrongsince there s no 0 B.C. or 0 A.D. Hence, Caesar's death preceded Saun-ders' writing is paper by 2008 years For simplicity'sake, however, shallignore thisand proceed withSaunders, Pike, and Adams in adding a yearto history.

10Pike,"Of God and Freedom," pp. 369-370; Rowe makes a similardistinction etween factswhich re "simply bout the past" and factswhichare not, in WilliamRowe, op. cit.,pp. 162-165.

1 "Pike, p. cit.

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JOHN MARTIN FISHER

hardfact bout hepast relativeoT)wouldhavebeendiffer-entfromwhat tactuallywas.12

MarilynAdams presents n accountofthedistinctionwhichshe

believessupportscompatibilismgainstPike'sattack. t willbe use-

fultoconsiderMarilynAdams' attempt t giving n accountofthe

distinction:

(B) "Statement is at least n = df. "The happening r nothap-part bouttimeT' pening,actuality r nonac-

tualityf somethingt T is anecessaryconditionof thetruth f P."

l2Put in termsof possibleworlds,the fixedpast constraints:

(FPC*) A possibleworldW* (in whichan agentdoes other thanwhathe does in W at T) can establishthatthe agent had it in his

power at T in W to do otherwiseonly fW and W* have thesame hard facts bout thepast relative o T.

In "Pike on PossibleWorlds,Divine Foreknowledgeand Human Free-dom,"Philosophical eview88 (July1979), pp. 433-442, Joshua Hoffmancriticizes ike's interpretationf thefixityf thepast.HoffmanconstruesPike as claimingthatthepossessionof everypowerentails heoccurrenceor nonoccurrenceof past circumstances.That is, Hoffmanattributes oPiketheclaimthatthetruth f a statement scribing particularpowertoan agent at a time in a world W entails hat the past be as it is in W

(Hoffman,pp. 441-442).Pike himselfputs the constraint n a misleadingway, saying: "If weassumethatwhat swithinmypowerata givenmomentdetermines setofpossibleworlds,all of the membersof thatsetwillhave to be worlds nwhich what has happened in the past relativeto the given momentispreciselywhat has happened in the past relativeto thatmoment n theactualworld."Pike,"DivineForeknowledge,"p. 215. But nothing nPike'spositionrequires acceptance of the radical doctrineattributed o himbyHoffman.Pike's fixedpast constraint ommitshimto theclaimthat fanagentperforms n act inworldW,thenanypossibleworldW*inwhichhe

refrains romperforming heactmusthave the same pastas W, fW* s toestablishthatthe agent can in W refrainfromperforming he act. Buttheremaybe possibleworlds includingW) in which he agentcan performthe act and doesperform heact) inwhichthe pasthistoriesrelative othetimeof the act) are all different romone another; hence, the truth f apower-ascription eed not entailthe past history.Hoffman'scriticism fPike missesthemarkand leaves the fixedpast constraint nscathed.

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Thusthe tatement,Caesardied2009 years efore aunderswrotehispaper" s at east npart bout44 B.C.,sinceCaesar's eath tthat

time s a necessaryonditionfthe ruthfthat tatement.t s alsoatleastnpart bout1965A.D.since aunders'writingispaper n1965A.D. is also a necessaryondition fthe ruthfthat tatement.iven(B) thenotion f a "hard"factmaybe explained s follows.

(C) "Statement expresses = df. "P isnot t least npart bout'hard'fact bout time " any time future relativeto

T. ts13

Adams uses this account to present an Ockhamist response toPike's argument. On her account, God's belief at T, and the factthatY was God at T1 are deemed soft facts bout T,.

Adams claims that her account shows why "Caesar died 2009yearsbefore Saunders wrotehis paper" does not express a hardfact bout 44 B.C. But her account does not xplain thisunlessit s

interpreted o imply hatno sentence expresses a hard fact.Adamssaysthat"Caesar died 2009 yearsbefore Saunders wrotehis paper"is at least in part about 1965, since Saunders' writinghis paper in1965 isa necessary onditionof the truth f that tatement. ut thisseems plainly false; the statement ntailsthat Caesar's death andSaunders' writing ispaper be separated by 2009 years,but tdoesnot entail any two particular dates for the two events. The state-

mententailsthatthe two events tand n a certain emporalrelation,but itdoes notentail that theyoccur on any specificdates. Hence,Saunders' writinghis paper in 1965 is not necessary onditionofCaesar's death being 2009 years priorto Saunders' writing is pa-per,ifwe interpret Q is a necessary onditionforP" as "P entails

Q"~

One might reply that since it is true that Saunders wrotehispaper in 1965, "Saunders wrote his paper in 1965" is materiallyimplied y "Caesar died 2009 years prior to Saunders' writinghispaper." So ifwe interpret Q is a necessary onditionforP" as "Pmaterially mplies Q," Saunders' writinghis paper in 1965 is a

13Adams,op. cit.,pp. 493-494.

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JOHN MARTIN FISHER

necessary onditionofthetruth f "Caesar died 2009 yearspriorto

Saunders' writinghis paper." But it is obvious that fthissense of

"necessarycondition"is adopted, thenno sentencewillexpress ahard factabout 44 B.C. So Adams' accountof Pike's intuitive is-

tinction s inadequate as it stands. Adams givesno explicationof

thenotionof a necessaryconditionbyreference owhichshe can

say that "Caesar died 2009 years prior to Saunders' writinghis

paper" does not express a hard factabout 44 B.C.Consider also the statement,"John F. Kennedy was assassi-

nated." Given the entailmentinterpretation, his statementex-presses a hard factabout 1961, since it does not entail he occur-

rence of anything subsequent to 1961. Of course, there are

logicallypossible worlds in which Kennedy was assassinated in

1961. Butwewanttosaythat n 1962 (and in 1963,untilNovember

22nd), it waswithinOswald's powerso tohave acted thatKennedy

wouldn'thave been assassinated.And again, it is obvious thatthe

material implication interpretationof "necessary condition" is

inadequate.Complex statements urtherllustrate he inadequacyof theen-

tailment ccountof "necessary ondition." fJonesdid notbelieve

at T1 that he would do X at T2,then"EitherSmithknewat T1 that

Joneswould do X at T2 orJonesbelievedat T1 thatJoneswoulddo

X at T2" should not express a hard factabout T1; the Ockhamist

would saythatJonesmighthave been able so to act at T2 thatthis

disjunctive tatementwould be false.Yet on Adams' account,thestatement xpresses a hardfactabout T1, since itstruthdoes not

entailthat anythinghappens afterT1; thetruth f thedisjunction

does notentailthat nything appens (or fails o happen, etc.)after

T1.In defense of Adams' approach, one mightofferthe following

accountof a necessary ondition:Q is a necessary onditionforP if

and only fP wouldnotbe true orhavebeen true) fQ weren't rue(or hadn'tbeen true). Let us call this nterpretationhe "counter-

factual"accountof a necessary ondition. t isplausibleto saythat

ifSaunders hadn'twritten is paper in 1965, then twouldn't ave

been thecase thatCaesar died 2009 yearspriorto Saunders' writ-

ing his paper. Thus, Adams could say,on the counterfactual c-

count,that "Saunders wrotehis paper in 1965" is a necessary on-

74




dition of "Caesar died 2009 years prior to Saunders' writinghispaper." Also, it is perhaps reasonable to say (thoughI'm notsure)

that f Oswald had not shotKennedy n 1963, then Kennedywouldnot have been assassinated. f this s so, then Adams could saythat"Oswald shotKennedy in 1963" is a necessary onditionof "JohnF. Kennedywas assassinated."Similarly, fJones hadn'tdone X at

T2,then twould have been false thateitherSmithknew at T1 thatJoneswould do X at T2orJonesbelievedat T1 thatJoneswoulddoX at T2. Thus, Adams could say that "Jones did X at T2" is a

necessarycondition of the disjunction.But there s anothersortofproblemwhich fflicts othplausible

accounts-both the counterfactual nd entailment nterpretationsof"necessary ondition."Suppose "Smith xistedatT1" istrue. t isa necessarycondition of the truthof this statement on both thecounterfactual nd entailment ccounts)that t s not the case thatSmithexisted for the first ime at T2. It is obvious that Smith's

existing t T1- ntailsthat he doesn't existfor the first ime atT2*

And if Smith had existed for thefirst imeat T2,thenhe wouldn'thave existed at T1, so the counterfactual ccount fares no betterthan the entailment ccount. Thus, by (B), the statement Smithexisted at T1" is at least in part about T2; by C) the statementfails

to expressa hard fact bout T1. But sinceSmithneed notbe eternal(or essentiallyomniscient),this is a disastrous resultforAdams'account. The same sort of argumentshows that Adams mustsay

that "Jonesbelieved at T1 thatJoneswould do X at T2" does notexpressa hard fact boutT1. This is because "It isnot the case thatJonesbelievedforthefirst imeatT2 thathe woulddo X atT2" is anecessary onditionof Jones believed at T, thathe would do X at

T2"

Also, it is a necessarycondition on both interpretations)f thetruth f the statement, Piece of salt S dissolvedat T1j," thatS did

notdissolveat T2. One wantstosaythatthis tatement xpressesahard fact bout T , but Adams' account does notcapturethis ntui-tion (since the statement s at least in part about T2).

It is not easy to see how Adams could provide an account of'necessary condition"whichwould avoid all the problemsraisedabove. Without uch an account,she hasn'tpresentedan adequateexplanationof the distinction etween hard and soft facts.

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JOHN MARTIN FISHER

III. THE INCOMPATIBILIST'S CONSTRAINT

Various contemporaryOckhamistshave argued thaton anyac-ceptable account of the distinctionbetween hard and softfacts,

God's priorbeliefwill be a softfact bout the past. I shallnotherefurther iscussparticular ompatibilistccountsof thedistinction;rather, shall sketch constraint n the accountof the distinctionwhich n incompatibilistmightuse todefeatany ompatibilisthar-

acterization f the distinction. hat is, I shall develop an explana-

tionoftheclaimthatGod's priorbelief sa hardfact bout thepast;this explanationwillnot mplythathumanforeknowledges also ahard factabout the past. This mightprovide a wayin whichPikecould defend both his incompatibilitylaim and the asymmetrythesis-the thesisthat God's foreknowledgeundermineshumanfreedom n a wayin whichhuman foreknowledgedoes not.

Consider thefactthatCaesar died 2009 years priortoSaunders'writinghis paper. What lies behind our viewthat this fact s not ahard fact bout44 B.C.? We might aythat t s a softfact bout44

B.C. because one and thesame physicalprocesswould havecount-ed as Caesar's dying2009 yearspriorto Saunders' writinghis pa-per, if Saunders wrote his paper in 1965, and would nothavecountedas Caesar's dying2009 yearspriorto Saunders'writing ispaper, if Saunders hadn'twritten is paper in 1965. This capturesthe "futuredependence" of softfacts; softfact s a fact n virtuef

eventswhichoccur in the future.Similarly,uppose that Smithknew at T1 thatJoneswould do X

atT2. Smith'sknowledge sa softfact boutT1 because one and thesame stateof Smith'smind (at T1) would count as knowledgeifJonesdidX atT2,and wouldnotcountas knowledge fJonesdidn'tdo X at T2. Exactlythe same sort of futuredependence explainswhyboth facts-the fact about Caesar's death and the fact about

Smith's knowledge-are soft facts.Thus, an incompatibilistmightinsist on the following ortofconstraint n an accountof the hard fact/softactdistinction: heonlywayin whichGod's beliefat T1 about Jonesat T2 could be asoftfact bout thepastrelative o T2 wouldbe ifone and thesamestateof themindof thepersonwhowas God at T1 would countasone belief fJonesdid X at T2, but different elief ornot a beliefat all) ifJonesdid not do X at T2. But it is implausibleto supposethatone and thesame stateof themind of the personwhowasGod

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at T, would count as different eliefsgivendifferent ehaviorbyJones at T2.

Suppose again thatJonesdid X at T2. Y (beingGod) believed atT, thatJoneswould do X at T2. Let's saythatY'smindwas instateat TI; thisconstitutedHis believingthatJoneswould do X at T2.Now ifY's mind were in state s and Jonesdid notdo X, Ys mindbeing n would still ountas a beliefthatJoneswoulddo X. (In thiscase, Y wouldn'tbe God, since he wouldhave a falsebelief.)Hence,Ys mindbeingins at T, wouldnot ountas one belief fJones did X

at T2 and anotherbelief or not a beliefat all) ifJones did not do Xat T2.Someone mightagree thatthe incompatibilist'sonstraint s ap-

propriate but disagreewithwhat I have said about itsapplication.That is,one might rgue that fJoneshadn'tdone X atT2,thenthestate of God's mind that actuallyconstitutedHis believingthatJones would do X would not have constitutedthatbelief. Thispositionmight be supported by extending Putnam's point thatmeanings and beliefs in't n the head.'4 AccordingtoPutnam,mybeliefthatwater is wet-the stateof my mind thatconstitutesnfact,mybelievingthat-would have been a different elief-thebeliefthatXYZ iswet-if lakes and oceans on earthhad been filledwithXYZ ratherthanwater. On thisapproach, the state of God'smind at T, that counts as His belief thatJones will do X at T2countsas thatbeliefpartly n virtueof the factthatJones does in

fact do X at T2'But thispictureofGod's omniscience shighlymplausible.God's

omniscience would be seriouslyattenuated if the same state ofGod's mind at T, would constitutedifferent eliefs about Jones,depending on Jones' behaviorat T2. The following s a more ap-pealing pictureof God's omniscience.An Ockhamistmightdenythe appropriateness of the constraint, laimingthatwhile it's nottrue that one and

the same stateof God's mind at T, would con-stitutedifferent eliefs,depending on Jones' behavior at T2, it istruethatGod's mindwouldhavebeen ina differenttate tT, (fromtheone itwas actually n), ifJoneshad notdone X at T2.Whereas

'4HilaryPutnam,"The Meaningof Meaning"' reprintednHilaryPut-nam,Mind,Language,andReality, London: CambridgeUniversity ress,1975), pp. 215-271, esp. pp. 223-227. RobertStalnakersuggestedtometheidea for the incompatibilist'sonstraint nd pointed out therelevanceof Putnam'spointto it.

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JOHN MARTIN FISHER

Y'smindwas actually n state at T1, twouldn'thavebeen ins,had

Jonesnot done X at T2.

If the Ockhamist makes this move, however,he weakens hisargumentto the conclusion thatGod's belief at T1 is a softfact

about T1. There is now an asymmetryetween softfactssuch as

Caesar's dying2009 yearspriorto Saunders' writing ispaper and

Smith'sknowing t T1 thatJoneswilldo X at T2,on theone hand,

and God's belief t T1 thatJoneswilldo X atT2,on theother.But it

wastheassimilation f thesesorts ffactswhichwasthegroundfor

claimingthatGod's beliefat T1 is a softfactabout T1.The incompatibilist an agree withtheOckhamistthatthefacts

discussed above about Caesar's death and Smith'sknowledgeare

"spurious"facts bout therelevant imes.They are temporal nalo-

gues of facts nvolving mere Cambridge" spatialproperties, uch

as the property f being ten milessouthof a burningbarn. But if

theincompatibilist'sonstraints rejected,then t s open tohimto

argue thatGod's priorbelief s a genuine act about the past.

The constraint have proposed captures the incompatibilist'snotion of thefixityf thepast. If thisconstraints acceptable,then

Pike could defendbothhis incompatibilitylaimand the asymme-

try hesis.There is,however,one formof Ockhamismwhich sn'tdefeated

bytheproposed constraint. onsider again, "If itwaswithin ones'

powerat T2 to refrain romdoingX,then 3) it was in Jones'power

at T2 to act in such a waythatY wouldn'thave been God at T1."There are twoways n which tmightbe truethat t was inJones'

power at T2 so to act thatY wouldn'thave been God at T1. First,

Jonescould have had it n hispowerat T2 so to actthatY wouldn't

have existedat T1. Second, Jonescould have been freeat T2 to act

in such a waythatY (thoughexisting)wouldn'thave filled herole

of God at T1. The Ockhamistmight gree withPike thattheexis-

tence of a particularperson is a hard factabout a time,but he

might nsistthatthe factthat the person is God is nota hard factabout a time.

Thus, the Ockhamistmight laim followingAdams) that hefact

thatY had the property fbeingGod at T1 is a softfact bout T1.

This is because the factthatY was God at T1 depends upon the

truthof Y's beliefsabout futurecontingent vents; indeed, since

God is eternal,the factthatY was God at T1 depends on thefact

thatY existed at T2.78




But theincompatibilisthould pointout thatfrom heclaimthat

Y'soccupyingthe role ofGod atT, isa softfact boutT, itdoes not

followthatJones could have at T2 so acted thatY wouldn'thavebeen God at T1. There are softfacts bout thepastwhichare such

thatone cannotnow so act thattheywouldn'thave been facts.For

instance,on Tuesday, it was a softfact about the past that on

Monday it was the case that the sun would rise on Wednesday

morning.'5 But on Tuesday, one could not have acted in such a

waythat twouldn'thave been thecase thaton Mondayit was true

thatthe sun would riseon Wednesday.Thus, even ifthefact hatYwas God at T, is a softfact boutTI,

this doesn'tsufficeo establishthatJonescould have so acted at T2

thatY wouldn't have been God at T,. Further, t is theologically

implausibleto suppose thatanyhuman agent is freeso to act that

the personwho is actuallyGod wouldn'tbe God. This would make

the identity f God dependent on human actions n an unaccept-

able way; such a God would hardly be worthyof worship. So,

whereasthe fact hatYwas God at T, mightbe a softfact bout T,,an Ockhamistwho claimsthatone could have at T2 so acted thatY

wouldn'thave been God at T, would positan unacceptableviewof

God. Incompatibilism an be defendedeven ifPike'sclaimthatthe

factthatY was God at T, is a hard fact about T, were false.

IV. CONCLUSION

Adams' formulationof Ockhamism is inadequate. I have nothere argued thatno account of the hard fact/softactdistinction

can be given which captures the Ockhamistintuition.Rather, I

have posed a challengeto Adams' Ockhamismand have presented

the incompatibilist'smotivationfor thinking hatany Ockhamist

accountwillbe unacceptable. have thus ssueda twofold hallenge

to theOckhamist:first, o formulate hehard fact/softactdistinc-

tion n a waywhichyieldsOckhamism, nd second,toexplainwhy

the incompatibilist'sonstraint s inappropriate.'6

Yale University

151 borrowthissortof example fromRowe, op.cit.,p. 165.161 have benefitedfromcommentsbyCarl Ginet,Norman Kretzmann,

T. H. Irwin, and JudithJarvisThomson. I am especially indebted toRobertStalnaker,manyof whose suggestionshave been incorporated n

thispaper.79

freedom and foreknowledge

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