Int. J. Middle East Stud. 36 (2004), 231–252. Printed in the United States of AmericaDOI: 10.1017.S0020743804362045

Dilek Barlas

F R I E N D S O R F O E S ? D I P L O M A T I C R E L A T I O N S

B E T W E E N I T A L Y A N D TU R K E Y, 1 9 2 3 – 3 6

Turkey’s foreign policy and relations in the early Republican era, before and duringWorld War II, has been subject to systematic and scholarly research, leading to numerouspublications since the 1970s.1 Although no less significant than Britain, Germany, or theSoviet Union in shaping Turkish inter-war foreign policy and priorities, Italy does notseem to have received a similar degree of attention in this growing literature. Italy isusually treated in the works on Turkish foreign relations only as a threat that Turkey’sforeign and strategic policy aimed to counter after 1934.2

Turkish diplomatic historiography generally tends to view Italian–Turkish relationson a continuum extending from the Tripolitanian War of 1911 to World War II. This viewsuggests that the Italian policy of expansionism was an ever-present menace to the newrepublic throughout the inter-war years.3 Indeed, Italian vocal claims on Turkey as well asRome’s bullying of its Adriatic neighbors in the early fascist era lends strong credenceto this view. Most students of Italian foreign policy interpret Mussolini’s policies ascontinuous with and similar to those of the liberal period. In other words, fascist Italy’sforeign policy is portrayed as having inherited the expansionist policies of the past.4

However, it is also widely agreed that Mussolini’s foreign policy was consistent onlyin its inconsistency.5 For instance, Marco Rimanelli defines Mussolini’s diplomacy asfluid, constantly shifting according to the circumstances.6 Elements of both continuityand inconsistency in Italian foreign policy were also operative in Rome’s relations withAnkara in the inter-war years. As a result, Italian–Turkish relations in this period os-cillated between antagonism and friendship. Moreover, from time to time antagonismand friendship went hand in hand, which led the French diplomats to label Italian–Turkish relations “amiadversion” (amity-adversity).7 Turkish diplomatic historiographyconventionally focuses solely on the element of adversity and fails to account for shiftsor changes in the direction of amity in these relations. This approach inevitably over-looks, among other things, a period of “warmth” in Italian–Turkish relations between1928 and 1932.8 Gradually improving relations between the two countries during thisshort period were characterized by rapprochement. The existing literature mentions thisimproved climate in Italian–Turkish relations in passing, if at all, or as a tactical moveby Mussolini.

This article pursues a number of aims. The first two are related to Italian–Turkishbilateral relations. Thus, it aims to offer an introduction to Italian–Turkish relations as

Dilek Barlas is Associate Professor in the Department of History, Koc University, 80910 Sarıiyer, Istanbul,Turkey; e-mail: dbarlas@ku.edu.tr.

© 2004 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/04 $12.00

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an under-studied aspect of Turkish foreign policy in the inter-war years, based on thedocuments studied in Italian, British, and, to a lesser extent, French diplomatic archives.Second, it is an attempt to depart from conventional Turkish diplomatic historiographyby evaluating these relations on the basis of shifts (or inconsistencies) rather than solelyin terms of continuity. The article will thus seek out the sources and consequences ofsuch shifts in the relations between the two countries. To this end, the main focus ofthe present work will be on the period of “warmth” in Italian–Turkish relations between1928 and 1932 rather than the “cooling off” and “frost” between 1932 and 1936. Finally,this article aims to address Italian–Turkish relations as an example of the contradictionsAnkara displayed in formulating its general foreign policy in the early Republican period.Such contradictions resulted from shifts and re-orientations in foreign relations mostlyfor pragmatic reasons in search of security in an external environment largely perceivedas hostile to Turkey.

Their frustration with the existing international system provided common ground forItaly and Turkey in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Ankara was not a challenger to thestatus quo. Its resentment stemmed from being excluded from the system and from lack ofrecognition of Turkey as an equal and legitimate member of the international community.This resentment did not necessarily entail a revisionist stand. Mussolini’s Italy, however,pursued recognition of its political equality. His policy aimed at securing a greater say andshare in world affairs as a full-fledged Great Power, not as the least of great powers. WhileAnkara viewed the international system as composed of horizontally ordered equal andsovereign states, fascist Italy’s policy was premised on a Great Power–managed internalsystem of hierarchically ranked states. Consequently, the common ground was not tolast long, and Italian and Turkish policies evolved in diverging directions after the mid-1930s, particularly with Turkey’s admission to the League of Nations, which symbolizedthe end of its exclusion from the international system.

T H E C O N S I S T E N C Y I N T H E I TA L I A N O U T L O O K : T U R K E Y A S

A P OT E N T I A L C O L O N Y

The ambiguous relationship between Italy and Turkey depended in part on Turkey’ssecurity concerns. These concerns were based on the fact that Turkish people witnessedthe Italian aggression in Tripoli and the Dodecanese in 1912 and, following WorldWar I, had to endure the Italian occupation of Anatolia. Although Italy withdrew itsoccupation forces from Anatolia during the Turkish War of Independence,9 Mussolini’srise to power with a heavy rhetoric of change in foreign policy, dubbed tono fascista(fascist tone), immediately revived Turkish fear of Italy.10 While history loomed largelyin shaping Turkish leaders’ view of Italy, Turkey’s approach was also influenced by twointer-related factors: the need for foreign economic support and Turkey’s internationalisolation. These two factors prompted Ankara to seek rapprochement with the greatpowers of Europe to survive as a new nation-state.

Between 1922 and 1927, Mussolini’s tono fascista translated into Italy’s refusal to seeTurkey as a sovereign state. It viewed the new country as only a geographical entity—Anatolia—with promising opportunities for Italian expansion. In case of the collapse ofthe new regime in Turkey, the Italians were planning to invade the country by takingadvantage of the proximity of the Dodecanese Islands and using them as staging post. It

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was expected that the ongoing Mosul issue between Ankara and London would lead tothe disintegration of Turkey and would offer the opportunity for Rome to get its share ofAnatolia. Mussolini was convinced that the new Turkey was not strong enough to resist apowerful country such as Britain. As “a frustrated potential ally of Britain,” Mussolini’sItaly expected to be treated by Britain like “a sister rather than a waitress.”11 Mussolinibelieved that, because of the Mosul crisis, Turkey would offer this chance to Rome.

The Balkans was the region where Italian and Turkish interests conflicted. This regionplayed a crucial role not only for understanding the development of the fascist foreignpolicy in Italy in general but also specifically with regard to Turkey. The Balkans hadalways been the center of attention for Rome. Italy’s main rivalry with the OttomanEmpire and the Austrian Empire had been over the Balkans, including the Adriatic. Forthe Italian leadership of the time, the acquisition of Adriatic port cities such as Fiumeand Trieste was vital for the realization of Risorgimento, the national unification of Italy.

After he came to power in Italy, Mussolini pursued an Italian version of Lebensraumin the Balkans.12 The Balkan Peninsula, an area between the Adriatic and the Aegean,lay on the north of the Mediterranean, the Mare Nostrum of Mussolini. Actually, theearly 1920s offered conditions conducive to Italian expansion into these territories, asMussolini’s rise to power followed the collapse of both the Ottoman Empire and theAustrian Empire. Mussolini aimed to extend Italian control over the new nation-statesthat came into existence in the territories of these multi-ethnic empires. The Balkans, atthe crossroads of the two collapsed empires, became a natural target and preoccupationof the fascist regime.

For Mussolini, in the first half of the 1920s Turkey was not a country worthy ofattention in the Balkans. In fact, the fascist leader intended to keep Turkey out of Balkanaffairs through diplomacy. This goal prompted Mussolini to personally appear at theLausanne Conference (November 1922–July 1923). Mussolini’s policy at Lausanne wasa typical example of the persistence of Italy’s former colonial policies. Italy had a specialinterest in the Dodecanese, which formed the maritime border of the two Mediterraneanand Balkan countries Turkey and Greece. He sought to contain Turkey because he fearedthat victorious Turkish nationalists might assert claims over these islands. Mussolinimust have also scorned the idea of Greece controlling various strategic islands in theeastern Mediterranean. Since Greece had already acquired the northern Aegean Islands,it had to be deterred from demanding the Dodecanese Islands.

In the final analysis, Mussolini’s presence at Lausanne was meant to convey a clearwarning to Turkey. At the time that Turkey was recognized as a sovereign state, Mussolinisecured formal recognition of Italian possession of the Dodecanese Islands. Even thoughat Lausanne the fascist leader recognized the Turkish presence in the Balkans (limitedto eastern Thrace), his insistence on the annexation of the Dodecanese by Italy madeBalkan Turkey more vulnerable to any attack on the demilitarized straits. In addition,Mussolini was present at Lausanne to assert that Italy was an equal “partner” with otherEuropean powers and that he would not allow Italy’s wartime allies to cheat Italy againover the spoils of war.13

For Mussolini, international conferences such as Lausanne were not the only forumsin which Italy could assert itself. He also demonstrated that Rome could resort to violentmethods in the Balkans without regard to international organizations. While the LausanneConference was drawing to an end in July 1923, Italian expansionism manifested itself

234 Dilek Barlas

over the port city of Fiume on the Adriatic coasts of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,and Slovenes. Mussolini proposed the incorporation of Fiume into Italy. His plan wasto annex the city in case Belgrade refused the proposal. However, the chain of eventsprompted him to shift his immediate attention to Corfu, a Greek island in the Adriatic.Italy attacked the island yet had to withdraw its troops under British pressure. Intimidatedby Italy’s aggressive behavior during the Corfu incident, Belgrade eventually concededand recognized Italy’s full sovereignty over Fiume.14

These developments led Ankara to conclude that Turkey would be the next target ofItalian expansionism in the Balkans. However, Mussolini’s attention at that time wasdirected to the Adriatic coast in the Balkans, where he found himself blocked by Frenchdominance.15 France remained “public enemy number two” to Italy since there was no“public enemy number one” after the collapse of Austria-Hungary.16 The fascist leaderwas obsessed with putting an end to French influence in the region. The best way toundermine France was to weaken its ally, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.Only after that could he turn to Turkey, whose viability as a new state, he believed, wasquestionable.

After the mid-1920s, Mussolini was better situated to implement his strategy once heconsolidated his power domestically and took complete control of the Palazzo Chigi.Thus, the fascist leader openly announced his dictatorship.17 The authoritarian statewas also reinforced in the foreign office by the dismissal of many officials and theirreplacement with committed fascists. In fact, Mussolini was convinced that the foreignoffice ought to be the most fascist of all government departments. He gave preferencefor diplomatic posts to those with party membership dating before October 1922.18 Withthese new civil servants, Mussolini was able to put his assertive foreign policy intopractice with tono fascista.

The new phase in Italian foreign relations had a clear impact on Italian–Turkishrelations. Italian diplomatic papers indicate growing Italian interest in Turkish defensivemeasures along the western coast in 1924 and 1925.19 Specifically, two events—theMosul issue and the signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925—marked the transition inTurkish–Italian relations. On the one hand, the Locarno Treaties concerned Italian policyin Europe and the Balkans and therefore inevitably concerned Turkey, as well. On theother hand, Rome expected that the Mosul issue between Ankara and London wouldlead to the disintegration of Turkey and provide Italy with a share of Anatolia.

The Locarno Treaties offered two significant advantages to Italy. First, these treaties,signed by Italy, Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium, gave Italy a greater say in Europe.The treaties gave Italy the right to protect the frontier with Germany, France, and Belgiumdefined by the Treaty of Versailles. If an “unprovoked attack” were instigated by Franceagainst Germany or by Germany against France, the victim would be helped by Italyand Britain.20 In addition, the Locarno Treaties made Italy a guarantor of the German–French frontier in cooperation with Britain. The Locarno Treaties in a sense legitimizedItaly’s right to intervene in Western Europe. Second, the treaties prepared the ground forMussolini to focus on Eastern Europe, mainly on the Balkans.21 He could now easilychallenge the status quo in Eastern Europe since the Locarno Treaties did not guaranteethe frontiers beyond the east of Germany.

After Locarno, Mussolini’s first diplomatic initiative was in the Balkans. Albania, thesmallest Balkan state, was his main political and economic preoccupation. Italian troops

Friends or Foes? 235

were withdrawn from Albania, which had been under Italian occupation since WorldWar I, in line with Comte Sforza’s diplomatic tactics based on “strategic retreats andbargains.”22 However, Mussolini wanted to prove that he was willing and able to overturnthe policies of the previous Italian prime minister, Giolitti, and Foreign Minister Sforzain the Balkans. Between 1925 and 1927, Mussolini resumed an interventionist policy inAlbania. Under Mussolini’s pressure, Tirana adopted a policy of cooperation with Rome,resulting in Italian economic and political domination of Albania. In November 1927,Rome signed a military pact with Tirana. Under this pact, the Italian government pledgedto Albanian King Zogu to preserve the political and territorial status quo in Albania. Thepact also provided for reciprocal obligations between the two states, allowing each otherarmed assistance in the event of an attack by a third party.23

Hence, Mussolini was able to achieve the old Italian goal for Albania. His Balkanpolicies were typical of change in fascist diplomacy more as a matter of style thansubstance. In other words, he did not substantially differ from previous Italian leadersconcerning Rome’s aims in Albania. However, he accomplished these goals with tonofascista instead of compromising policies like Sforza’s. Mussolini’s policy vis-a-visBelgrade was shaped along similar lines. In 1926, Mussolini ordered twenty divisionsto be ready at the Albanian border for a sudden attack on the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,and Slovenes.24

Turkey viewed Italian activities in the Balkans with apprehension. Turkish leadersbelieved that Italian aggression toward other Balkan countries would inevitably affectTurkey. Consequently, they pursued two related goals in the region: one was to devise aBalkan Locarno; the second was to reach an agreement among the Balkan countries in linewith the motto formulated by Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rustu Aras, “The Balkansfor the Balkan people.”25 In 1926, Turkish Minister Plenipotentiary in Bucharest HuseyinRagıp talked to Romanian Foreign Minister I. G. Duca about the possibility of a Balkancooperation project. He communicated to Duca four arguments advanced by the Turkishgovernment: negotiations should take place at a slow speed; Belgrade should take theinitiative in organizing the pact; no state should be excluded; and the pact should not bedirected against another Balkan state.26 Concerning the first argument, Turkey apparentlydid not rush to form a Balkan pact because of the unresolved problems among the Balkanstates.

Ankara’s suggestion that Belgrade take the initiative in organizing the pact was closelyrelated to the pending problems between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenesand its neighbors—namely, Italy and its “ally,” Bulgaria. According to the Turkish gov-ernment, Belgrade’s initiative in this project would help the kingdom solve its problemswith these neighbors. Finally, no Balkan country was to be isolated, but all of them wereto be invited to participate in a future Balkan pact. In this way Ankara planned to preventany attempt by a group of Balkan countries to form a bloc against the others. Formingpartial blocs would make the Balkans more vulnerable to manipulation by great powerssuch as Italy and France. In sum, any kind of hegemony by a great power or by a blocover the Balkans had to be avoided.

The second event that affected Italian–Turkish relations was the Mosul issue betweenTurkey and Britain. Unlike its policy on the Balkan region, where Rome’s policy wasmarked by initiative and activism, in the Middle East Mussolini followed a strategydependent on Britain. In the early years of his power, as the fascist leader was directly

236 Dilek Barlas

involved in the Balkans, he intended to shape his policy in Anatolia as an ally of Britain.The fascist leader knew that Italy could not easily compete at that stage with Britishpower and influence in the Middle East. For a while, Italy had to remain a “frustratedally” of Britain.27

Under these circumstances, the Mosul crisis offered an opportunity for Italy to carveout a future sphere of influence in Anatolia. In this way, Mussolini would be able to realizeItaly’s colonial dream in Anatolia, as he expected the disintegration of the Republic ofTurkey during the crisis. Therefore, fascist policy was geared toward reviving the oldexpansionist designs of Italy over Turkey by profiting from the conflict between Britainand Turkey. London used all its means not to relinquish this oil-rich region to Ankara.At Lausanne, it was decided that the Mosul issue would be settled within nine monthsby direct negotiations between Turkey and Britain, or, failing that, the problem wouldbe referred to the Council of the League of Nations.28 Bilateral negotiations led to adeadlock, and the Council of the League of Nations decided in December 1925 on theattachment of Mosul to Iraq, which was placed under British Mandate for twenty-fiveyears. On 6 June 1926, Turkey accepted the League of Nations’ decision by signing atreaty with Britain concerning the establishment of the Turkish–Iraqi frontier. Accordingto this treaty, Turkey, in return for relinquishing Mosul, was to receive 10 percent of Iraqioil revenues for twenty-five years.29

In January 1925, meanwhile, Italian diplomats in Turkey recommended to the governorof the Dodecanese Islands that the Datca and Marmaris regions be inspected for possiblelanding operations. The Italian consul in Antalya even complained that his location wasnot suitable for obtaining information on Turkish military measures on the coastal lineacross from the Dodecanese.30

Ankara was alert to the possibility that Italy might send troops to Anatolia becauseof the Mosul crisis.31 Turkish press reports of the time emphasized the possibility ofItaly’s using Rhodes as a military base in case of war.32 In fact, Italian diplomatic re-ports included extracts from daily Turkish newspapers such as Ikdam, whose headlinesalarmingly pointed to the Italian military preparations.33 Moreover, the Turkish pressin Antalya published articles opposing the presence of the Italians in the province.The press proposed that Italian schools and hospitals be closed. The perpetuation ofthese institutions, argued the press, proved that Italy had not given up the idea oftaking over Antalya. The governor of the province had a similar opinion. He openlystated to the Italian authorities his belief that Italy still had territorial ambitions con-cerning Antalya and that the existence of Italian hospitals and schools confirmed theseintentions.34

The Italian mind set, which was fixated on colonialist expansion plans, was unsur-prisingly reflected in the strategies developed by some Italian diplomats in Turkey. Atelegram sent from the Italian Embassy in Turkey to the Italian Foreign Ministry focusedon the advantages to Italy of pursuing colonial goals in southeastern Turkey. The tele-gram identified 1927 as the critical year to pursue colonial expansion into Turkey as thenew Turkish regime began to consolidate domestically and before it acquired effectivemeans to defend itself. It suggested that Italy occupy the Adana region instead of Izmirand Antalya, as an Italian presence in this region offered better economic and politicalbenefits.The Adana region was rich in resources that would make a great contribution tothe Italian economy.35

Friends or Foes? 237

Politically, the possession of the region would be a substantial reward for Italianexpansionism. It would offer an opportunity for Italy to cooperate closely with Britainin the Middle East. Since Italy would provide a counter-balance in the Adana region,Britain could be at ease in Mosul. Moreover, if the opportunity arose for Italy to supporta Kurdish revolt in the region in cooperation with Britain, the door to Persia and theCaucasus would be wide open. The telegram also claimed that such a scenario mighteven help Italy to come to better terms with the Soviet Union. In other words, if Italycould offer the Soviets economic advantages in the Mediterranean, then Moscow mightwithdraw its support of Turkey.36

The handling of the Mosul issue by the Great Powers convinced the Turkish politicalleaders that these powers could at any time form a coalition against Turkey. It added fuel tothe Turkish fear of Europe’s Great Powers as the main threat to Turkey’s independenceand territorial integrity.37 Between 1923 and 1927, the Turkish Foreign Ministry letRome know on various occasions that it was not certain about the policies of the GreatPowers vis-a-vis Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rustu Aras openly said to theItalian ambassador in Ankara, Felice Orsini that, in case of Italian–British collaboration,Turkey would consider approaching other Great Powers. More specifically, Aras warnedOrsini that Turkey might even conclude an agreement on the Mediterranean with France,although Turkey was not at all on good terms with France at the time. Ankara had in factsigned a convention of friendship and good neighborhood with France in May 1926. Themain purpose of this convention was to secure the border between Turkey and Syria, thena French Mandate, in case of armed confrontation with the European powers, particularlyover Mosul. However, Rome saw the signing of the 1926 convention as Turks’ courtingthe French.38

Thus, the nature of Italian–Turkish relations in general had not changed when Mus-solini came to power. The same Italian colonial intentions toward Turkey that had existedat the beginning of the 20th century remained in effect. The Italian military presence inthe Dodecanese Islands was perceived as a continuous threat to Turkey’s security, whichhad already been compromised by the demilitarization of the Straits at British insistenceduring the Lausanne Conference.39

Almost weekly, the Turkish press carried reports on the imminence of an Italianlanding at Izmir.40 Italian involvement in Albania heightened Turkish uneasiness towardItaly. In fact, the Turkish fear of Italy was not unjustified. Referring to a conversationwith the Italian consul-general at Mersin, a British diplomat wrote later: “[he] was at nopains to hide his belief that at no distant date the flag of Savoy would be waving in thefertile Cilician plain.”41

C H A N G I N G R E L AT I O N S : I TA LY W O O S T U R K E Y A S

A R E G I O N A L AC T O R

By late 1927, the Italian diplomatic papers indicate that there was constant probing onboth sides for a high-level Turkish diplomatic visit to Rome. Consequently, a high-levelTurkish visit to Rome took place in 1928. Various factors contributed to the changingrelations between Turkey and Italy. Between 1925 and 1926, the Turkish land fron-tiers were secured under friendship treaties concluded with the Soviet Union and Iran.Moreover, to solve the Syrian–Turkish and Iraqi–Turkish border problems, in May 1926

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Turkey signed a convention with France and in June 1926 a treaty with Britain. Turkeyhad already realized at that time that it could not afford to confront the Great Powers onall fronts. In 1927, Turkey was finally able to turn its attention from its land borders tothe Mediterranean Sea.

Second, the Mosul issue did not lead to the collapse of the republic of Turkey, contraryto Rome’s expectations. Ankara chose to make concessions to the British on the Mosulissue for the sake of the survival of the republic. The Turkish leaders knew that they wereill equipped militarily to confront Britain on matters such as Mosul. In a sense, they hadto compromise so as not to aggravate their international isolation. Turkey’s politicalleaders did not want to give the Great Powers a pretext on the Mosul issue that couldlead to the collapse of the new republic.42 With the resolution of the Mosul problem,Turkey would be less likely to disintegrate or fall into the Great Powers’ hands.

Above all, Rome’s image of Turkey began to change. Turkey was no longer identifiedonly with Anatolia but was increasingly seen as part of the Balkans. The new Italianimage of Turkey was mainly shaped around the new situation in the Balkan Peninsula.Belgrade’s policies vis-a-vis Rome were decisive in terms of the changing Italian strategytoward Turkey within the Balkan context. In the fall of 1927, the Kingdom of Serbs,Croats, and Slovenes concluded an alliance with France to deter Italian aggression. Thegrowing French influence in Eastern Europe dated back to the formation of the LittleEntente in 1922. In addition to the Paris–Belgrade alliance of 1927, the parliament inBelgrade refused to ratify the Conventions of Nettuno, signed with Italy on 20 July1925.43 The Paris–Belgrade alliance prompted Rome to seek closer links with Ankara asan extension of Mussolini’s plan to create a group of client states that looked exclusivelyto Rome.44

The French influence in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and in Romania,and the entente system Paris established in Eastern Europe, constituted models for thenew Italian policy toward Turkey in the Balkans. At that stage, Turkey began to appearto Italy more as a regional actor than as only a potential colony. Mussolini’s diplomacythen featured new aspects in relations with Ankara. Rome wanted to take advantage ofTurkey’s international isolation to turn Ankara into a pro–Italian actor. Not a member ofthe League of Nations until 1932, Turkey was a suitable candidate to become part of anItalian-led system in the eastern Mediterranean.

However, Turkey’s initial response to the changing Italian attitude was mixed. Ankarawas concerned about being dragged into any kind of conflict in the Balkans. PrimeMinister Ismet Inonu expressed to Orsini, the Italian ambassador, Turkey’s two mainconcerns. The first was the possibility that Belgrade might turn its back on Ankara afterthe signing of the Paris–Belgrade alliance in 1927.45 The second concern was the futureof deteriorating Rome–Belgrade relations and their likely repercussions on Turkey. Headvised Orsini that problems between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, andSlovenes were to be resolved peacefully.46

Turkish leaders were aware that Rome would not suddenly become amicable withAnkara. Nevertheless, they thought that, for its survival, Turkey had to profit from therivalries between the Great Powers. In addition to the Ottoman debts, the French militarypresence in Syria and its naval power in the Mediterranean gave France a strongerhand in its dealings with Turkey.47 Well equipped diplomatically and militarily, Pariscould manipulate Belgrade against Ankara and might even gain influence over Sofia

Friends or Foes? 239

and Athens.48 For Ankara, the Paris–Belgrade collaboration could precipitate Turkey’scomplete exclusion from the Balkans.

France was a common problem for Turkey and Italy. Around that time, Rome wasoffering an alternative alliance system to Ankara against the Paris–Belgrade axis inthe Balkans. Mussolini thought that the best way to undermine the Paris–Belgrade co-operation was to make overtures to other Balkan countries. Turkey and Greece formedimportant pillars of the new Italian policy. Both countries had an interdependent signif-icance in Italian strategic calculations in the eastern Mediterranean. The French ententesystem in the Adriatic would be countered by forming an Aegean bloc among Italy,Greece, and Turkey.

Indeed, Turkey seemed the best candidate to cooperate against the Paris–Belgradeaxis for a number of reasons. First, unlike Greece, which was at odds with Rome overCorfu, Italy had not been involved in any direct conflict with Turkey since 1921. Second,Turkey, not a Slavic country, was less inclined than other Balkan countries to cooperatewith Belgrade. Unlike Romania, another non–Slavic nation, Turkey was not a memberof the Little Entente sponsored by France. Last but not least, Turkey would be a usefulally because of its strategic position. Geographically, it oversaw the passage from theMediterranean to the Black Sea and the gateway to the Middle East and Asia.

From Turkey’s perspective, a sense of insecurity was more accentuated than in mostBalkan countries because of its international isolation, marked by its “outcast” status vis-a-vis the League of Nations. The political and economic problems with Europe’s GreatPowers—namely, Britain and France—ruled out the normalization of Turkey’s foreignrelations with these countries. The intimate relations between Britain and Greece, on theone hand, and France and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, on the other,made Turkey even more isolated in the region. Improved relations with Italy were likelyto offer the first concrete step out of Turkey’s international isolation.

Rome was convinced that it would be advantageous for Italy to be in close cooperationwith Turkey in a manner similar to the cooperation between Paris and Belgrade. TheItalian Foreign Ministry invited Turkey’s political leaders to Milan.49 In April 1928,Undersecretary of the Italian Foreign Ministry Dino Grandi (who became the Italianforeign minister in 1929) met with Turkish Foreign Minister Aras in Milan. The meetingwas intended to allay Turkish fears of Italy. Mussolini also attended the meeting toprovide evidence of Italy’s good intentions. At the meeting, Italian officials tried toexplain to the Turks that Italy was not a potential enemy of Turkey.50

The main purpose of the meeting, however, was to find out whether Turkey wouldcooperate with Italy in the Mediterranean. In Milan, Italy’s political leaders also metwith Greek Foreign Minister Michaliko Poulos. It was not a coincidence that the Italianleaders wanted to have Turkish and Greek officials in Milan at the same time. Their aimwas to see whether Greece could be integrated into a future cooperation arrangement withItaly and Turkey against Paris and Belgrade. To achieve this goal, Italy’s political leadersnot only sought simultaneous improvement of their relations with Turkey and Greece,but they also tried to contribute to the reconciliation of Turkish–Greek differences. TheMilan meeting was the first step toward resolving the post–Lausanne Turkish–Greekproblems, which also stood in the way of the realization of the Italian strategy.

In fact, the Italian press interpreted the meeting of leading Italian figures with theTurkish and Greek officials as a political victory for Italy. To them, the Mediterranean

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nations finally realized that Italy was the only Great Power that cared about their inde-pendence. The press mirrored the mind set of the Italian leadership, reporting that somepowers intended to create discord among the Mediterranean powers to establish theirsupremacy in the region.51 These powers, according to Rome, were France and its “ally,”the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, even though their names were not spelledout. The Italians wanted to give the impression that only Italy could preserve “stability”in the Mediterranean and portrayed Italy as a Mediterranean country working towardcooperation in the Mediterranean. The press reported that Rome would ensure balanceand harmony in the region.52

Unlike the Italian press, the Turkish press reflected the mixed public opinion in Turkeytoward the Milan meeting. On the negative side, it warned Turkey’s political leaders tokeep all political options open and not to rely only on Italy. The editorials constantlypointed to Italy’s unfriendly attitude in the past. They also suggested a policy of wait-and-see until the Italian ambitions over Anatolia crystallized. Reports drew attentionto the emigration policy of over-populated Italy as a factor for its special interest inAnatolia. The Antalya region close to Rhodes seemed especially attractive for Italianemigration.53

On the positive side, the Turkish press noted that Italy seemed to be giving up itspursuit of military expansion into Anatolia. The fact that Italy sought Turkish–Greekrapprochement was a sign of Rome’s intention to change the “traditional alliance system”of the Great Powers. On balance, the Turkish press welcomed the Italian initiative inMilan for improving Turkish–Greek relations. Moreover, it was reported on 6 April1928 that the meeting between Mussolini and Tevfik Rustu Aras in Milan made a majorcontribution to resolving the problems between Turkey and Greece.54

Following the Milan meeting, Turkey signed the Treaty of Neutrality and Reconcili-ation with Italy on 30 May 1928. Both parties agreed not to engage in any political andeconomic designs against each other. According to the treaty, Italy and Turkey undertookto remain neutral in case of aggression by a third party against any party to the treaty. Forinstance, if Belgrade attacked Italy with the help of the French, Turkey would remainneutral. Above all, according to this treaty Italy was to abstain from exerting pressureon Turkey. In fact, on 5 June 1928, a few days after the signing of the treaty, Mussoliniexpressed the Italian view of Turkey in the Italian Senate: “[f]rom now on, Rome mustrecognize Turkey as it is, given its strength and population.”55 Mussolini’s speech markedthe elevation of Turkey’s standing from a potential colony to a sovereign state with whichItaly had to forge close economic, political, and military links.

The brief era of improved relations between Turkey and Italy was inaugurated underthe new foreign minister, Dino Grandi, of Italy. In 1929, after Mussolini appointed Grandias foreign minister, Italy moved for a few years toward a less vocal fascist diplomacy.In general, as many scholars argue, fascist diplomacy marked a change in style ratherthan in substance. The fascists’ aim, like that of the Italian liberals, was not to be theleast of the Great Powers but to win “glory and power.”56 Where fascists differed fromthe liberals was in their adoption of a military style in conducting policy and in theirglorification of war.

Grandi, who had the correct fascist credentials as a man of violence, was probablythe most sophisticated among the squad leaders.57 Even though he was convinced thatItaly had to retain supremacy in the Adriatic to “safeguard the Latin race against Slav

Friends or Foes? 241

expansionism,” Grandi suggested that glory be postponed until Italy had rearmed andfascism’s enemies had been immobilized.58 Even though he was distrustful of disarma-ment and against the League of Nations, he wanted to show the “determining weight” ofItaly and therefore participated in the London Naval Conference of 1930 and the ongoingefforts of the league.59

The Grandi era coincided with the 1929 world economic crisis. The move away fromaggressive rhetoric in Italian diplomacy under Grandi was not simply a coincidence;it was the reflection of crisis diplomacy that dictated another three years of caution inMussolini’s diplomacy.60 Italy had to wait until the crisis was over because it lackedthe kind of economic and military muscle that would allow it to be an independentplayer in international power politics.61 The era of Grandi could thus be defined as “witheverybody and against all.”62

In December 1928, Grandi made an official visit to Turkey to discuss Turkish–Greekrelations.63 A few months after the Turkish–Italian treaty, in September 1928, Romehad signed a similar treaty with Greece. Rome expected that the Turkish–Italian and theGreek–Italian treaties would serve as building blocks for a tripartite alliance, and Romewas ready to work to reconcile Turkish–Greek differences. The exchange of minoritieswas the major hindrance to the restoration of normal relations between Ankara andAthens. Their disagreements on the status of the Greek patriarchate in Istanbul createdfurther strains.

Turkey’s very weak navy also had to face a Greek navy flexing its muscles in theAegean in the 1920s.64 In fact, Greek naval maneuvers prompted Ankara to propose toAthens a treaty that would reciprocally limit the naval forces of both countries. AlthoughItaly’s political leaders were keen to ameliorate Turkish–Greek relations, they did notwelcome this Turkish proposal. In the Milan meeting in 1928, Mussolini asked TurkishForeign Minister Aras why Ankara was trying to leave Rome out of the process. Healso requested an explanation of the Turkish intention to sign a neutrality treaty withGreece.65

At the same time, Mussolini realized that Rome needed appropriate instruments todraw the two difficult neighbors, Turkey and Greece, into its orbit. Arms were seen asa particularly suitable means to facilitate Italian political and economic penetration intoTurkey. In fact, the restoration of Italian–Turkish relations had a significant impact onthe Turkish armament programs. By the end of 1929, Italy appeared to be the favoredsupplier for new Turkish naval arms. For the Italian government, the political significanceof the naval arm supplies to Turkey probably far exceeded its commercial significance forthe Italian shipbuilders. Rome was willing to provide a financial guarantee for Turkishorders that no other foreign government was willing or able to match. This guarantee wassignificant, as the financing of the Turkish naval arms programs was the key question.Turkey had not recovered economically from the devastation of the wars. It was alsostruggling to settle Ottoman debts. Ankara could afford to order new warships onlyunder long-term financial arrangements with favorable terms. Rome agreed to provideItalian shipbuilders with a financial guarantee for up to 70 percent of the value of apossible Turkish order.66

The change in Rome–Ankara relations following the Italian–Turkish treaty was so dra-matic that London described the treaty as bringing the “lion” and the “lamb” together.67 Atthe same time, the British ambassador in Turkey commented that the recent agreement

242 Dilek Barlas

had opened the door for considerable Italian economic expansion in Turkey.68 Againaccording to the British, this relationship also suited Turkish interests because of unre-solved problems with France and Greece.69 Moreover, by helping Turkey to modernizeits navy, Italy found an appropriate way to compete with France, its main rival in theMediterranean.

On the Italian–French rivalry in the Balkans and the Mediterranean in 1928–32, Turkeystood closer to Italy than France. Turkey’s political leaders thought that the root ofuneasiness in Europe was French hegemony. For instance, even though Tevfik RustuAras denied the emergence of a bloc against France and the states in its orbit in aconversation with British diplomats, he claimed it was French policy that made this apossibility.70 An interesting indication of where Turkey stood in relation to the Italian–French rivalry was a series of conversations between the under-secretary of the Turkishnavy, Captain Mehmet Ali Dalay, and the Italian naval and air attache, Lieutenant-Commander Maroni, in December 1928. In response to Maroni’s inquiry about theTurkish naval tender, Mehmet Ali confided to Maroni that the contract might be splitbetween the French and Italian shipbuilders, although the state of relations with Francedid not warrant such a deal.71 During a later conversation, Mehmet Ali assured Maronithat the contract would be awarded to the Italian shipyards and admitted that the presentpolitical climate worked in Italy’s favor.72

On 24 May 1929, the conclusion of the Turkish naval tender in favor of the Italianshipbuilders was made public.73 The next day, the Italian Foreign Ministry officiallynotified the Ministry of Marine in Rome that the contract to supply warships to theTurkish navy was finalized.74 The Turkish orders from the Italian shipyards representedthe high tide of Italian–Turkish relations in the inter-war years. The Italians were quickto conclude that the awarding of the naval contract signaled a change in Italy’s imagein Turkish minds. The improved climate in Italian–Turkish relations had immediateconsequences with military significance. For instance, the Turkish army changed thelocation of its annual large-scale military exercise from Izmir in the west to Diyarbakir,near the Iraqi and Syrian borders in the east.75 Also in 1929, the Turkish navy began tosend its first junior officers to Italy for training.76

Italy’s supply of naval arms to Turkey worried the Greeks. In that regard, Italy faceda dilemma. Originally, Rome had sought simultaneous improvement in its relationswith Turkey and Greece. The supply of naval arms to Turkey was meant to serve thispurpose.77 For a while it involved the risk of deepening the Turkish–Greek rift. However,Italy was able to keep Greece happy by supplying naval arms to the Greek navy, as well.In response to Turkish naval modernization, Greece decided to augment its navy withlight units. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos was personally more inclined toward Italyas the supplier for new destroyers.78 In October 1929, Greece ordered two destroyersfrom Italian shipyards. With the Greek order, the Italian strategy toward Turkey andGreece was back on track. The impact of improved relations with Ankara and Athenswas evident in the Italian navy’s strategic war plans for 1929–31. In case of a war againstYugoslavia and France, the Italian navy assumed Turkish and Greek neutrality in theeastern Mediterranean.79

In 1930, Turkey and Greece finally worked out their differences and concluded afriendship treaty. They also signed a protocol to end the naval arms race in the Aegean.This treaty was partly the outcome of Italian attempts to reconcile Ankara and Athens.

Friends or Foes? 243

In the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Aras expressed his government’s gratitude toMussolini and Grandi for their efforts toward Turkish–Greek reconciliation.80 It shouldbe added that the Turkish–Greek treaty was also a result of the efforts to promote regionalcollaboration in the Balkans. Indeed, it can be seen as a precursor to a wider regionalcooperation scheme in the peninsula. As the Balkan nations began to feel the effects ofthe 1929 world economic crisis, their political leaders went on to revive the Turkish ideaof founding a Balkan entente. In October 1930, the first Balkan conference met in Athens.A few weeks later, Ankara and Athens solidified their relations with the Turkish–GreekTreaty of Friendship, Neutrality, and Conciliation.

The signing of the Turkish–Greek treaty prompted diverging political expectations inAnkara and Rome. The latter hoped that Turkey, having reconciled with Greece, wouldcontribute to a similar political reconciliation between Athens and Sofia.81 Turkey hadalready concluded with Bulgaria a treaty similar to the Turkish–Italian treaty in March1929.82 Turkey’s signing of treaties with Bulgaria and then with Greece raised Italianexpectations of an even larger alliance that would include Italy, Turkey, Greece, andBulgaria.83 Such an alliance would also prevent a pro–Slavic rapprochement betweenBulgaria and Serbia.84

For Rome, an Italian-led alliance with Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria would help Italyextend its influence over the Black Sea, as well. In that case, fascist Italy would alsobe able to control the eastern Black Sea coast. On the one hand, regional collaborationwith Ankara, which already had close relations with Moscow, might serve as catalyst forimproved relations between Rome and Moscow.85 On the other hand, the Italian leadersbelieved that Rome had to balance Soviet influence in Turkey. The Italians were hopingto sign a treaty that would give them a formal say in Turkey’s foreign relations, as did theTurkish–Soviet Treaty of 1925. Under that treaty, Moscow and Ankara pledged not toengage in any sort of alliance with other countries without informing each other first.86

Italy expected the same kind of relationship with Turkey.

T U R K E Y A N D I TA LY D R I F T A PA RT

When French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand announced a new agenda for Europeancountries—the founding of a European union—Rome revitalized its plan regardingAnkara and Moscow. Briand’s idea of a European union was exclusivist in that theSoviet Union and Turkey were not among the countries invited to discuss his plan. Romestood firmly against Briand’s proposed European union idea. However, the proposal alsoseemed to have been perceived as an opportunity for Italy to capitalize on the increasedsense of isolation in Turkey. The Italian diplomatic papers point to Mussolini’s intentionto press on with his Italian–Soviet–Turkish alliance plan in the form of an alternative tothe exclusivist union idea of France.87 He believed that Italy, Turkey, and the Soviet Unionwere victims of the European system established by Britain and France. By proposing aPan-European union, France intended only to ratify the existing European system and itsinequalities.88 In other words, Italy accused France of emphasizing again the differencebetween the defeated and the victorious countries of World War I, although Italy hadbeen a victor, too. For the fascist leader, Italy, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, as the threecountries that had pioneered reformist movements, could and had to collaborate againstFrench intrigues in Europe.89

244 Dilek Barlas

Ankara was not against the idea of a European union, but it was against the Frenchversion proposed by Briand because it excluded Turkey.90 Ankara admitted that thereformist policies in Turkey, Italy, and the Soviet Union provided to a certain ex-tent common ground for these three countries to improve their relations.91 One of themain reasons for Turkey to be on good terms with Italy and the Soviet Union wasits distrust of French policy in the region. In fact, the French ambassador in Turkeywas suspicious of a triple arrangement involving Turkey, Italy, and the Soviet Union.When he asked Turkish Foreign Minister Aras whether there was “the possibility of aRusso–Turkish–Italian naval agreement,” Aras said, “Russia and Italy had more thanhinted at such a combination but he had turned it down and intended to retain thatattitude.”92

Turkey’s main priority and interest was to develop its relations with its Balkanneighbors. Indeed, the process had started with the first Balkan conference. The worldeconomic crisis generated a strong impetus for Balkan states to develop new foreign-policy strategies. For instance, Turkey was busy working on an arrangement for Greek–Bulgarian reconciliation that would prepare the way for a wider regional “alliance” thatincluded Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria but excluded Italy. Ankara was also promotinga framework to incorporate Yugoslavia93 into this “alliance,” which, if realized, would,against the Italian will, contribute to Yugoslav–Bulgarian reconciliation.94 On 20 October1931, Turkey hosted the second Balkan conference in Istanbul. During this conference,as at the first one, the Balkan delegates tried to find common solutions to the effects ofthe world economic crisis in their countries. Turkey had economic problems that weresimilar, if not identical, to those of the other Balkan countries.

The Italians were concerned that Turkey might pursue an independent path and forman alliance with the other Balkan states. Turkey’s political leaders seemed to favor Pan-Balkan cooperation over the tripartite-alliance proposal of Italy. In his interview with theItalian daily Popolo d’Italia, Aras stated that as three treaties of friendship already boundTurkey, Greece, and Italy, there was no need for an additional tripartite pact.95 Aras’sstatement proved that the Italian concerns were not unjustified. Italian Foreign MinisterGrandi recommended that Italy take precautions against the independent diplomacy ofAras in the Balkans.96

In addition to diverging Italian and Turkish ideas on the political situation, there wereserious financial limitations that undermined Italy’s pursuit of political, military, andeconomic influence in Turkey. In fact, the 1929 world economic crisis seriously curbedItaly’s ability to pursue an effective policy to this end. Italy’s thin finances sloweddown the construction of naval units for Turkey. For instance, the Zafer and Tinaztepedestroyers, which were supposed to be delivered in 1931, were delivered only afterTurkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu’s visit to Rome in May 1932.97

The world economic crisis presented Turkey with a dilemma vis-a-vis Italy. In the early1930s, in addition to paying the Ottoman debts, the Republic of Turkey had launched anambitious program of industrialization. As a result, Turkey asked for economic aid fromItaly to build not only its navy but also its national industry. Indeed, in 1929 Turkishdiplomats were optimistic that Italian–Turkish relations would soon be solidified by acredit agreement.98 In 1930, it was reported that the Banca Commerciale had agreed toextend a loan of 500,000 pounds sterling to the Turkish Treasury to assist the Turkishgovernment.99

Friends or Foes? 245

In May 1932, Inonu made an official visit to Rome to discuss with Mussolini pendingeconomic and political issues. The political leaders of the two countries decided to im-prove their commercial relations, which had been deteriorating since the world economiccrisis.100 They also discussed the possibility of a 300 million Italian lira loan to Turkey.101

The process that was supposed to lead to the Turkish borrowing of 300 million Italianliras, however, ran into difficulties. The protracted negotiations on the conditions for therelease of the credit frustrated both the Italians and the Turks.

The Italian diplomats in Turkey criticized the Turks for acting with a “Balkan mental-ity” in their dealings with the Western Europeans on economic issues.102 They claimedthat the Turks were always suspecting that the foreign states would be asking concessionsfrom Ankara in return for economic aid. They accused Ankara of not having confidencein European countries. For its part, Ankara was determined not to repeat the Ottomanexperience of foreign debts, which Turkey was still paying to those same countries.Therefore, Turkey’s political leaders had been extremely cautious about their economicinvolvement with Europe. Naturally, Ankara wanted to opt for a country that would makethe best offer. In addition, it desired that such an offer not be attached to any politicalconditions.103

To improve its bargaining position, Turkey had asked for a loan not only from Rome,but also from Moscow. In April 1932, Turkey’s political leaders, including Inonu, visitedthe Soviet Union and agreed to receive a credit of $8 million from Moscow. They did nothesitate to accept the Soviet offer because Moscow gave the aid without interest. Italywas asking 6.5 percent interest for the 300 million Italian liras that it was planning to lendto Turkey.104 The Italians interpreted Turkey’s policy as turning its back on old friends.105

They argued that Turkey had to count on its old friends when seeking economic aid fromabroad.106 Regarding the Italian loan, Rome turned out to be unwilling or unable, or both,to release the cash portion of the credit, most of which was to be spent on naval armsand aircraft built in Italy for Turkey.107

Turkish–Italian commercial relations did not improve to a great extent, either. Ingeneral, the Turkish state, which developed etatist policies after the world economiccrisis, became even more cautious in its economic relations. Protectionist measures thatTurkey had implemented in foreign trade affected its trade with Italy. Ankara increasedcustom duties to curb imports from foreign countries, including Italy. In spite of politicaldifferences and disagreements about financial issues, however, Rome and Ankara agreedin 1932 to renew the Turkish–Italian Treaty of 1928 for five more years. They also signeda convention to delimit territorial waters between Anatolia and an Italian-owned island,Castellorizzo, off the Turkish mainland.108

In the summer of 1932, Italy changed the style of its foreign policy. That changeaffected its relations with Turkey. Mussolini dismissed Grandi to revitalize the tonofascista in foreign policy. The appointments of Fulvio Suvich, a native of Trieste, asunder-secretary within the Foreign Ministry, and of Baron Pompeo Aloisi, an expertin Balkan affairs, as the chef de bureau, confirmed the growing Italian interest in theBalkans.109 After that, Italian territorial claims over Yugoslavia were more vocal. At thesame time, Rome stressed its intention to enlist allies against Belgrade. At the first phaseof the disarmament conference in Geneva, moreover, Mussolini declared his intentionson matters concerning international affairs. He was already known to be against theVersailles Treaty system and seeking to revise it. He saw the League of Nations as an

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obstacle to Italy’s revisionist aims. For Mussolini, a stable understanding among the bigstates, rather than the League, would better guarantee the peaceful development of thesmaller states.110 To put it differently, Rome did not favor the preservation of the statusquo, especially through an international organization.

Again in 1932 Italy opposed Turkey’s entry into the League of Nations. Italy’s firmstand against Turkey’s membership in the League adversely affected Turkish–Italianrelations. The issue also clearly showed the Italian bias toward minor powers. Rome triedto foster the impression that peace could survive only with the Great Powers’ initiatives.The Italian approach to the League and to Turkey’s membership was closely linked tothe Four-Power Pact proposal that Mussolini made. In March 1933, Mussolini presentedhis ideas for a Four-Power Pact to British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. Forhim, the four Western powers—France, Germany, Britain, and Italy—should cooperateto preserve peace. The proposal implied cooperation among only the Great Powers.Moreover, the four powers would have the power to revise the treaties that might lead toconflict among states.111 In a sense, Mussolini declared his view that the existing treatiescould lead to conflicts among the European powers and needed to be revised.

The declaration of the Four-Power Pact proposal set Turkey and Italy apart. The issuealso reflected the divergence of interests between the Great Powers and the minor powers.The world economic crisis had already sharpened the contrast between the industrializedand non-industrialized worlds. Mussolini’s Four-Power Pact definitely widened the gapbetween the great and minor powers. Turkish reaction to the Four-Power Pact was,needless to say, less than positive. Ankara did not consider the pact a step toward peace.On the contrary, it saw it as contributing to the policies of the Great Powers to intervenein other parts of the world. Mussolini’s Four-Power Pact proposal prompted Turkey’spolitical leaders to recall the political bargaining at Lausanne, where they had struggledto make Italy, France, and Britain accept Turkey’s vested rights. At the same time, theycould not help but emphasize Italy’s position and power in the international hierarchy.In Aras’s words, “Italy was ‘masquerading’ as a great power. . . . She was putting herpotentialities for influencing the course of events in Europe to a strain disproportionateto their capacity. It was an absurdity for her to pretend she could exercise the sameinfluence as such powers as Great Britain, France or Germany.”112 In fact, Mussolini’sFour-Power Pact could never materialize because of British and French reluctance toinvolve Hitler’s Germany in such an arrangement.

The growing Italian threat led Ankara to revitalize regional cooperation efforts thatculminated in the conclusion of the Balkan entente in February 1934 among Turkey,Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The entente was officially aimed at guaranteeingBalkan borders against revision from within. It also had the broader objective of pre-venting collaboration between Bulgaria and Italy in the Balkans. Ataturk wrote to Inonuthat Italy was against this entente and that Bulgaria, as an Italian proxy, could attemptto undermine it with Rome’s encouragement.113

Italian policy led Aras to conclude that “Italy under Signor Mussolini was apparentlyfollowing the same policy as the pre-fascist Italian liberals, keeping waters troubled onthe chance of being able to fish in them, and hoping that circumstances, and princi-pally the misfortunes of others, would play into their hands.”114 The inconsistent andunpredictable policy of Mussolini, expressed elegantly by Aras, was perfectly reflectedin Italy’s relations with Turkey in this period. After the signing of the Balkan entente,

Friends or Foes? 247

Turkish–Italian relations spiraled into a deteriorating pattern. Lojacono, the Italian am-bassador in Turkey, was pretty sure that the entente would encourage Turkey to adopta stronger anti–Italian stand.115 However, Italian foreign policy incorporated a moreaggressive tune. Mussolini’s notorious speech on the future lines of Italian expansionin Africa and Asia in 1934 heralded the transition in Italian–Turkish relations from“cooling-off” to “frost.” The “frost,” which was marked by renewed fear of Italy, led toa major shift in Turkish foreign policy. This shift would eventually result in Ankara’salliance with Britain and France on the eve of World War II.116

The Turks, however, remained alone—at least, for a while—in their uneasiness re-garding Italian policy in the Mediterranean. In February 1935, the British ambassadorin Turkey was still convinced that Ankara exaggerated the Italian threat.117 It was notsurprising that Ankara had willingly endorsed the Mediterranean pact proposal of FrenchForeign Minister Barthou to preserve the peace and status quo.118 However, the proposalcould not find a lease on life because Pierre Laval replaced Barthou in October 1934.The new French foreign minister favored bilateral agreements over regional schemes.In 1935, he pursued agreement with Italy under which France and Britain relinquishedtheir economic rights in Abyssinia to Italy. At the time, London still viewed Italy as apower that could be useful in checking Germany in Europe.119 In October 1935, Italy wassatisfied by French and British conciliatory policies and went on to invade Abyssinia.The Italian invasion inevitably narrowed the gulf between Turkish and British assess-ments of the Italian aims in the Mediterranean. When the League of Nations imposedsanctions on Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia agreed to implement them. In return,Britain furnished guarantees to these three countries against the Italian threat during theimplementation of the sanctions.

C O N C L U S I O N

The Italian invasion of Abyssinia sealed the fate of Turkish–Italian relations until the endof World War II. During the Abyssinian crisis, the Turkish political leadership realizedthe limits of collective security in preventing Italian aggression from eventually turningon Turkey. Italian efforts to increase its fortifications and naval power in the DodecaneseIslands aggravated the Turkish fears. As a result, Ankara notified the League of Nationsand the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty of its intention to revise the demilitarizedstatus of the Straits, which, Ankara argued, exposed Turkey to external aggression. InJuly 1936, the Turkish delegation at Montreux was able to convince other signatories—except Italy—to give Turkey control over the Straits, and it allowed its remilitarization.Around the same time, Hitler and Mussolini were busy laying the foundations of theAxis Powers in Berlin. With Italian objections to the revision of the status of the Straitsin 1936, Italian–Turkish relations came almost full circle. Ankara then had to face amore potent Italy.

Rome took advantage of the political uncertainties of the inter-war years to strengthenits military. Indeed, fascist foreign policy was no less aggressive, ambitious, or potentiallyrevisionist in the 1920s than in the 1930s. However, Italy lacked the means and alliesto pursue its goals. The inter-war experiment with collective security was meant to endGreat Power rivalries and the consequent balance-of-power policies. Rome attempted tomake up for its lack of Great Power allies by recruiting allies of lesser stature. Italy’s

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changing image of Turkey was the direct result of such acts of balancing—particularlyagainst France. The “warmth” in Italian–Turkish relations, however, represented a clearcase of an alignment of convenience. At the time, collective security did not have muchappeal to Italy, and Turkey was excluded from the League of Nations. Thus, albeit fordifferent reasons, Italy and Turkey shared a disdain for the League in the late 1920s andthe early 1930s.

Rome and Ankara seemed to share interests at other levels too. For instance, as Italyalso sought great-naval-power status, its infant shipbuilding industry needed a steadyflow of foreign orders to survive. Turkey became an important market for Italy’s ship-building industry. The Turkish navy was rebuilt with Italian credit lines for Turkish navalcontracts during the period of warmth. However, the limits of this pragmatic approachwere evident by the mid-1930s. Fundamental differences in the Italian and Turkish viewsof the international order eventually set them apart on the eve of World War II. Turkishmembership in the League in 1932 affirmed Turkey’s place among the society of equaland sovereign nations. In contrast, the Italians grew wary of the League, particularlyafter their invasion of Abyssinia. Although Italy repeatedly tried to reassure Ankarathat it did not have any aggressive intentions toward Turkey, its geographic proximityand unreliable political leader only added fuel to Turkish apprehensions. Hence, theItalian threat dominated Turkish foreign and strategic policy from the 1930s. It alsoaccounted for Turkey’s change of heart regarding military alliances between powers ofequal strength.

The Turkish navy made its first overseas visit to the British naval base in Malta in1936. It was an unprecedented port call that affirmed Turkey’s desire to forge a link withBritain against the Italian menace in the Mediterranean. Ironically, the visiting Turkishfleet was composed mostly of naval units built in Italy; at the time of the visit, Turkey wasstill paying its outstanding debts on the ships to the Italian government. These remindersof the brief era of cooperation between Italy and Turkey became the primary meansof Turkish defense against Italy’s emerging naval power in the Mediterranean. If theshort-lived Italian–Turkish cooperation in the inter-war period was a tactical move byfascist Italy, diplomatic records provide sufficient evidence to suggest that cooperationwith Italy also served Turkish political, economic, and military interests at a time thatthe country was seeking a way out of its international isolation.

N OT E S

Author’s note: I gratefully acknowledge the grant provided by the Agnelli Foundation to support myresearch in the Archives of Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome. I thank Gareth Winrow, Aysegul Baykan, andMolly Farquharson for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

1See, for instance, Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943–1945: Small State Diplomacy andGreat Power Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973); Ludmila Zhivkova, Anglo-TurkishRelations, 1933–1939 (London: Secker and Warburg, 1976); Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during theSecond World War: An “Active” Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Cemil Kocak,Turk-Alman Iliskileri, 1923–1939 (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991); and Dilek Barlas, Etatismand Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World (Leiden: E. J. Brill,1998).

2Broke Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy, 1934–42,” Middle Eastern Studies 31 (1995):483–508; William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 61; Yucel Guclu,“Fascist Italy’s ‘Mare Nostrum’ Policy and Turkey,” Belleten 58, 238 (1999): 813–45.

Friends or Foes? 249

3Abdulahat Aksin, Ataturk’un Dıs Politika Ilkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Istanbul: Inkilap ve Aka Kitabevleri,1966), 98–105; Turkiye Dıs Politikasında 50 Yıl, Cumhuriyetin Ilk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı (Ankara: T. C.Dısisleri Bakanlıgı, 1974), 276–87; Olaylarla Turk Dıs Politikası, 6th ed. (Ankara: A.U. S.B.F. Yayınları,1987), 81–84; Mehmet Gonlubol and Cem Sar, Ataturk ve Turkiye’nin Dıs Politikası (Ankara: Milli EgitimBasımevi, 1973), 76–79; Kamuran Gurun, Savasan Dunya ve Turkiye (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi, 1997),178–81, 356–59.

4See Ennio Di Nolfo, Mussolini e La Politica Estera Italiana (1919–1933) (Padua: Cedam, 1960), 153–59;Alan Cassels, “Was There a Fascist Foreign Policy? Tradition and Novelty,” International History Review 2(1983): 255–68; R. J. B. Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World 1860–1960 (London: Routledge, 1996), 36–57;H. James Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period 1918–1940 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997);and H. Stuart Hughes, “The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism, 1922–1932”, in The Diplomats, 1919–1939,ed. Gordon A. Graig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981).

5Cassels, “Fascist Foreign Policy,” 262.6Marco Rimanelli, Italy between Europe and the Mediterranean: Diplomacy and Naval Strategy from

Unification to NATO, 1800s–2000 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1997), 528.7Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Levant/Turquie, vol. 616, no. 316, 27 April 1935, 49–51. “Amiadver-

sion” defined a relationship that includes elements of both friendship and adversity.8A British diplomat described the evaluation of Italian–Turkish relations by 1934 in stages of “warmth,”

“cooling off,” and “frost”: Public Record Office (PRO) FO 371/19039, E 1213/1213/44, 10 February 1935.9Mevlut Celebi, Milli Mucadele Doneminde Turk-Italyan Iliskileri (Ankara: Dısisleri Bakanlıgı Stratejik

Arastırmalar Merkezi, 1999); Fabio L. Grassi, L’Italia e la Questione Turca (1919–1923) (Turin: SilvioZamaroni Editore, 1996).

10Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, 55.11Bosworth, Wider World, 41.12Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, 24–27.13Hughes, “Early Diplomacy,” 219.14Mussolini’s seizure of Fiume was against the Rapallo Treaty that Conte Sforza had signed with the

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1920.15In 1922, the year Mussolini came to power, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,

and Slovenes established the Little Entente with the support of France: Eliza Campus, The Little Entente andthe Balkan Alliance (Bucharest: Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1978), 13–17.

16Bosworth, Wider World, 44.17Martin Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy (London: Routledge, 1994), 26.18Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 153.19Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereafter, ASMAE), Pacco 1704/7859, 29 August

1924; ibid., Pacco 1714/7889, 21 January 1925.20These treaties were in fact signed as a response to the occupation of the Ruhr region by France and

Belgium: William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 123;and Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984),220–21.

21Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, 35.22Hughes, “Early Diplomacy,” 221.23Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, 42; Hughes, “Early Diplomacy,” 223.24Smith, Mussolini, 154.25Campus, Little Entente, 27.26Ibid., 23.27Bosworth, Wider World, 44.28Amid the Mosul crisis, some scholars argue, London also kept in close contact with different ethnic

groups in the region that were potential threats to the new Republic of Turkey: Mim Kemal Oke, MusulMeselesi Kronolojisi (1918–1926) (Istanbul: Turk Dunyası Arastırmaları Vakfı, 1991), 112–40. Others saythat there is no proof to show a direct link between the rebellions and London: Omer Kurkcuoglu, Turk-IngilizIliskileri 1919–1926 (Ankara: A.U. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayınları, 1978), 314.

29Soysal claims that Turkey preferred instead to receive 500,000 pounds sterling up front from Britaininstead of annual shares: Ismail Soysal, Turkiye’nin Siyasal Andlasmaları, Vol. 1: (1920–1945) (Ankara:Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1983), 307. Ulugbay’s detailed study of Turkish budgets, however, reveals that Turkey

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actually received a total of 3.5 million pounds sterling until 1958 in annual installments: Hikmet Ulugbay,Imparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Petropolitik (Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1995), 263.

30ASMAE, Pacco 1714/7889, 21 January 1925.31Rıfat Ucarol, Siyasi Tarih (Ankara: Havacılık Basın ve Nesriyat Mudurlugu, 1979), 426.32Ayın Tarihi 55 (1928): 3889.33ASMAE, Pacco 1714/7890, 10 April 1925.34Ibid., 7 April 1925.35Ibid., Pacco 4171/584, 9 June 1927.36Ibid.37Haluk Ulman, “Turk Dıs Politikasına Yon Veren Etkenler I,” A.U. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi 26,

3 (1968): 244.38ASMAE, Pacco 1719/7938, 19 February 1927.39Not until 1936 at Montreux would the Straits question be resolved to the advantage of Turkey: Feridun

Cemal Erkin, Les Relations Turco-Sovietiques et la Question des Detroits (Ankara: Basnur Matbaasi, 1968),62–65; and Seha L. Meray, Lozan Barıs Konferansı, Tutanaklar-Belgeler (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları,1993), 1:131–80.

40See, for instance, Ayın Tarihi 48 (1928): 3336.41PRO FO 371/13085, E 3218/43/44, 25 June 1928.42According to Mango, Ataturk’s diplomatic tactic was, as ever, to split the Allies’ ranks. A compromise

in Mosul would satisfy Britain. It would then be easier to resist the economic demands of the French and theItalians: Andrew Mango, Ataturk (London: John Murray, 1999), 378.

43Nettuno would have guaranteed the rights of Italians living in Dalmatia: Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy,42.

44Smith, Mussolini, 151–58.45ASMAE, Pacco 1719, 15 November 1927. Inonu asked Orsini whether the alliance contained military

obligations.46Ibid., Pacco 1719/7938, 25 March 1927.47The Ottoman debt problem dated back to the time of the Crimean War (1854–56), during which the

Ottoman Empire had borrowed money from abroad, mainly from France. In 1881, the Administration ofthe Ottoman Public Debt was instituted along with its executive committee, the council. By the signing of theSevres Treaty in 1920, the council was reorganized to include only the delegates of the British, French, andItalian bond holders and the representative of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. During the Lausanne Conference,the council decided that the Republic of Turkey was responsible for 67 percent of the annuity of the pre-wardebt, but the question of how payment was to be made was not resolved until 1928: Emine Kıray, Osmanlı’daEkonomik Yapı ve Dıs Borclar (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayınları, 1993), 23–40, 203–21.

48ASMAE, Pacco 1724/7965, 15 June 1928.49The choice of Milan over Rome can be taken as a manifestation of what tono fascista amounted to in

Italian foreign policy. Milan had a special significance for the fascists, especially for Mussolini. In March1919, when the inaugural meeting of the Fasci di Combatti was held in Milan under Ferruccio Vecchi, theaudience cheered the speeches of Mussolini and adopted the program that Mussolini had drawn up for the neworganization. In fact, the first fascio was formed in Milan: Jasper Ridley, Mussolini (New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1997), 91. According to Morgan, early fascism’s activist style could be seen most clearly in the highprofile in the Milan fascio: Philip Morgan, Italian Fascism 1919–1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995),14. And on 20 October 1922, Mussolini came to Rome from Milan to accept the prime ministership fromVictor Emmmanuel III: Bosworth, Wider World, 34.

50Ayın Tarihi 48 (1928): 3331.51Ibid., 3338.52Ibid., 3336.53Ibid., 3340.54The Greek newspaper Politika wrote that the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers, Poulus and Aras,

would travel together from Italy to Greece to exchange views on the Milan meeting: as quoted in Ayın Tarihi48 (1928): 3335.

55As quoted in Tomaso Sillani, L’Italia E Il Levante (Roma: La Rassegna Italiana, 1934), 205.56Smith, Mussolini, 101.57Ibid., 157.

Friends or Foes? 251

58Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, 60.59Morgan, Italian Fascism, 139.60Blinkhorn, Mussolini, 44.61Morgan, Italian Fascism, 132.62Ibid., 139.63ASMAE, Pacco 1729/7993, 11 February 1929; ibid., 1728/2319, 29 March 1929.64Afif Buyuktugrul, “Osmanlı (Turk)-Yunan Deniz Silahlanma Yarısı,” Belleten 39, 156, (1975): 749.65Tevfik Rustu Aras, Goruslerim (Istanbul: Tan Basımevi, 1945), 52.66ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7948, 21 July 1927.67PRO FO 371/13085, E 3218/43/44, 25 June 1928.68Ibid.69Ibid., E 6167/43/44, 31 December 1928. When the Italian–Turkish Treaty was being signed in Rome,

a Turkish delegation in Paris was trying to come to an agreement with the French on the debt issue. Finally,in June 1928, Turkey signed a treaty with the Ottoman Debt Council and agreed to pay 67 percent of theOttoman debt, which amounted to 107.5 million Turkish liras in gold: Faruk Yılmaz, Devlet Borclanması veOsmanlıdan Cumhuriyete Dıs Borclar (Istanbul: Birlesik Yayıncılık, 1996), 228. Again in June, the Italiandiplomats were commenting that the common economic interests had prompted the two countries (Italy andTurkey), “bathing in the same sea,” to conclude a treaty: ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7981, 25 June 1928.

70PRO FO 371/14351, C 9143/3519/62, 8 December 1930. In addition to the unresolved Ottoman debtissue mainly with France, Ankara would be very much disappointed with the French foot-dragging in ratifyingthe French–Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Reconciliation, and Arbitration of 1930.

71ASMAE, Pacco 17271/7975, 9 December 1928.72Ibid., 17 December 1928.73Cumhuriyet, 24 May 1929.74ASMAE, Pacco 1731/8003, 25 May 1929.75Ibid., Pacco 1728/2319, 3 June 1929.76Afif Buyuktugrul, Cumhuriyet Donanması (1923–1960) (Istanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 1967), 53–54. In

June 1929, four Italian destroyers and a squadron of thirty-five Italian seaplanes visited Istanbul. The seaplanesquadron was led by Italy’s famous aviation hero Air Minister Italo Balbo: Cumhuriyet, 7 June 1929. Aroundthe same time, the Turkish ambassador in Rome, Suat Davaz, was in Turkey. In his comments to Cumhuriyet,he stated that a large number of Turkish civil servants were in training in Italy. He also announced that a groupof Turkish scouts were to visit Italy in September: Cumhuriyet, 8 June 1929.

77For the Italian policy of seeking political influence through supply of arms, see Dilek Barlas and SerhatGuvenc, “To Build a Navy with the Help of an Adversary, Italian–Turkish Naval Arms Trade, 1929–1932,”Middle Eastern Studies 38 (2002): 143–68.

78PRO FO 371/13648, C 7796/14/19, 7 October 1929.79Rimanelli, Between Europe and the Mediterranean, 528.80TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 25, term 3, sess. 3, meeting 28, 12 February 1931, 35–37. For a different

view, see Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “The 1930 Greek–Turkish Naval Protocol,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 9, 1(1998): 89–111.

81ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021, 3 November 1930.82Ibid., Pacco 1728/2319, 10 March 1929.83Turkiye Dıs Politikasında 50 Yıl, 278.84ASMAE, Pacco 1719, 2 November and 16 November 1927.85Ibid., Pacco 1732/8021, 4 November 1930.86The 1925 treaty was renewed in 1929: Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 60.87ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021, 17 November 1930.88Ayın Tarihi 75–78 (1930): 6430.89J. Calvitt Clarke III, Russia and Italy against Hitler (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 11.90Greece was more inclined toward France’s European union idea than toward the triple alliance of Italy,

Turkey, and Greece.91ASMAE, Busta 6, 3 October 1932–14 December 1932.92Aras expressed his feelings about France to British Ambassador George R. Clerk by saying that the French

economist Charles Rist “wanted to enclave Turkey to France and leave her without a vestige of financial andeconomic independence.” Even though Rist was sent to Turkey not by France but by the Ottoman Debt Council

252 Dilek Barlas

to write a report on Turkey’s economic situation, Aras said to Clerk that Rist was the Quai d’Orsay and that “hehimself had not been at all surprised, for the report set forth exactly the policy of France towards this countryas he had always thought it to be.” PRO FO 371/14585, E 4975/3476/44, 4 September 1930.

93The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was named Yugoslavia in 1929.94Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Levant/Turquie, vol. 609, no. 234, 25 August 1930; and ibid., no. 111,

26 November 1930.95Ibid., no. 111.96ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021, 29 December 1930.97Cumhuriyet, 6 June 1932.98Ibid., 8 June 1929.99PRO FO 371/14568, E 863/282/44; and ibid., E 950/282/44, 19 February 1930.

100In 1929, Turkey’s imports from Italy totaled 32 million Turkish lira whereas its exports amounted to33 million Turkish lira. In 1932, there was a drastic decline in the volume of trade. Imports went down to11 million Turkish lira and exports to 16 million Turkish lira: T. C. Basvekalet Istatistik Umum Mudurlugu,Harici Ticaret, Aylık Istatistik, Hususi Ticaret (1940), v.

101ASMAE, Busta 6, 30 May 1932.102Ibid., 3 October 1932.103Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,”

Middle Eastern Studies, 35 (1999): 163.104ASMAE, Busta 10, 10 and 20 February 1933; ibid., 1 and 23 March 1933; Cumhuriyet, May–July 1932;

and Aksam, 26 December 1932. The Italians decided that they would keep 17 million Turkish lira out of the30 million Turkish lira that they would give as loan. Moreover, they increased the interest to 7.5 percent.

105ASMAE, Busta 6/8, 3 October 1932 and 14 December 1932.106Ibid., 13 December 1932.107Ibid., 5 August 1932.108Cumhuriyet, 28–30 May 1932; and Vakit, 30 May 1932.109Burgywn, Italian Foreign Policy, 71.110Clarke, Russia and Italy, 60.111R. Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968),

202.112PRO FO 371/17949, E 3652/3652/44, 4 June 1934.113Cumhurbaskanlıgı Arsivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 48–49.114PRO FO 371/17964, E 3073/44, 10 May 1934.115ASMAE, Busta 11/1, 26 April 1934.116On 19 October 1939, with the signing of the Tripartite Alliance with Britain and France, Turkey pledged

help to its partners if the war spread to the Mediterranean area.117PRO FO 371/19039, E 1213/1213/44, 10 February 1935.118This would be a pact of mutual assistance among France, Italy, Spain, Britain, Greece, Yugoslavia,

and Turkey, guaranteeing only naval frontiers against any naval and air attack in the Mediterranean:Cumhurbaskanlıgı Arsivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 90-1.

119Michael Simpson, “Superhighway to the World Wide Web: The Mediterranean in British Imperial Strat-egy,” in Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future, ed. J. B. Hattendorf(London: Frank Cass, 2000), 57.