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From 2002-2017, to What Extent Has Turkish Security Policy Been Effective?
A Monograph
by
COL William Robert Lynch CBE British Army
School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2017
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Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT This monograph examines Turkish foreign and domestic security policy since 2002 in order to understand how the effective delivery of policy has been influenced by changing Turkish perceptions of the role of religion, history, geography, the military and key political figures. Turkey has gradually undergone a transformation away from its secular roots as envisaged by the founder of the modern Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The role of religion, so long repressed as Turkey sought to create a secular state, has re-emerged as a powerful force in Turkish politics, and eventually brought the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) Islamist leaning party to power in 2002. Turkish perceptions of its history and central geographic position, particularly as it relates to the Ottoman Empire period, has also become a key driver in policymaking. The role of the Turkish military has undergone a fundamental transformation with its traditional role as the ‘guarantors of the state’ in the Kemalist tradition challenged and ultimately broken by the AKP leadership. The cult of personality has once again come to the fore, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, first as Prime Minister and now the incumbent President, dominating Turkish politics in a way not seen since Atatürk in the 1920s-1930s. 15. SUBJECT TERMS Turkey, Security Policy, Middle East, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Russia, United States, ISIL, Cyprus.
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Name of Candidate: COL William Robert Lynch CBE
Monograph Title: From 2002-2017, to What Extent Has Turkish Security Policy Been Effective?
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iii
ABSTRACT
From 2002-2017, to What Extent Has Turkish Security Policy Been Effective? By Colonel William Robert Lynch CBE, British Army, 63pp.
This monograph examines Turkish foreign and domestic security policy since 2002 in order to understand how the effective delivery of policy has been influenced by changing Turkish perceptions of the role of religion, history, geography, the military and key political figures. Turkey has gradually undergone a transformation away from its secular roots as envisaged by the founder of the modern Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The role of religion, so long repressed as Turkey sought to create a secular state, has re-emerged as a powerful force in Turkish politics, and eventually brought the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) Islamist leaning party to power in 2002. Turkish perceptions of its history and central geographic position, particularly as it relates to the Ottoman Empire period, has also become a key driver in policymaking. The role of the Turkish military has undergone a fundamental transformation with its traditional role as the ‘guarantors of the state’ in the Kemalist tradition challenged and ultimately broken by the AKP leadership. The cult of personality has once again come to the fore, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, first as Prime Minister and now the incumbent President, dominating Turkish politics in a way not seen since Atatürk in the 1920s-1930s. Turkey’s perception of regional and major actors such as the U.S. and Russia has also fundamentally changed, with Turkey adopting a more aggressive policy internally and externally in response to changing security threats. As a result of the complex interaction of these varying factors, this paper concludes that the effectiveness of Turkey’s security policymaking has declined to the point where it has become reactive and therefore generally ineffective in realizing Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy goals.
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CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................................... vi
ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................ vii
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1
METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................................... 1 LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................... 2
COMMON INFLUENCES ON TURKISH SECURITY POLICY ................................................. 4
DEMOGRAPHICS ..................................................................................................................... 4 GREAT POWER INFLUENCES ............................................................................................... 5 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE LEGACY ....................................................................................... 6 THE LEGACY OF MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATÜRK .............................................................. 7 THE CREATION OF TURKISH IDENTITY ............................................................................ 8 TURKISH POLITICS ................................................................................................................. 9 KEY PLAYERS ........................................................................................................................ 11 MILITARY INFLUENCE ........................................................................................................ 11
ANALYSIS OF TURKISH DOMESTIC SECURITY POLICY 2002-2017 ................................ 13
OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................. 13 PKK ORIGINS ......................................................................................................................... 13 ENDING SUPPORT FOR THE PKK ...................................................................................... 15 CHANGES IN POLICY ........................................................................................................... 15 KOBANÎ AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PKK INSURGENCY ............................................... 16 THE IMPACT OF THE 15 JULY 2016 COUP........................................................................ 17 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ................................................................................................... 19 RESULT OF THE COUP ......................................................................................................... 21
TURKISH FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY 2002-2017 .............................................................. 23
THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC DEPTH ............................................................................. 23 IMPLEMENTING ‘STRATEGIC DEPTH’-PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE .......... 26 THE EXPORT OF TURKISH SOFT POWER ........................................................................ 28 REGIONAL ACTORS ............................................................................................................. 31 IRAQ 2002-2017 ...................................................................................................................... 31 SYRIA 2002-2017 .................................................................................................................... 35 COUNTER DAESH ACTIVITY 2014-2017 ........................................................................... 37 ISRAEL 2002-2017 .................................................................................................................. 39 IRAN 2002-2017 ...................................................................................................................... 41 US FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKEY 2002-2017 ................................. 42 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IMPACT ON TURKEY 2002-2017...................................... 44 TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2002-2017 .......................................................... 47
v
NATO AND TURKEY 2002-2017 .......................................................................................... 51
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................ 54
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 58
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This monograph has been a continuation of my desire to further understand the dynamics
that drive Turkish policy choices. This interest was first piqued in Cyprus while serving opposite
Turkish forces while on a tour with the United Nations in 2002 and again while serving with
many Turkish colleagues in the Middle East throughout 2015 in the fight against Daesh. I owe a
debt of gratitude to my monograph Director, Robert T. Davis II PhD, who continually challenged
my analysis throughout to ensure that I explored the nuances of Turkish policy choices. I have
also been fortunate to be able to draw on a wealth of critical journalism of the current state of
play in Turkey, which has been unflinching in its analysis of the situation inside Turkey, no
matter the risk to the individuals responsible. Finally, I also owe a huge amount to my long-
suffering wife Deborah who has put up with the highs and lows of writing such a tome with
characteristic good humor and minimal sympathy where required.
vii
ACRONYMS
AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and Development Party
EHCR: European Court of Human Rights
FMS: Foreign Military Sales
PKK: Kurdistan Workers Party
KRI: Kurdistan Region of Iraq
KRG: Kurdish Regional Government
PYD: Kurdish Democratic Union Party
IIP: Iraqi Islamic Muslim Party
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IDF: Israeli Defense Forces
ISI: Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
MHP: Nationalist Movement Party
MGK: National Security Council
NUC: National Unity Committee
MFA: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MEK: Mojahedin-e Khalq
HDP: The Peoples’ Democratic Party
CHP: Republican People’s Party
RoC: Republic of Cyprus
TIKA: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
YPG: Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units
VEOs: Violent Extremist Organizations
1
INTRODUCTION
This monograph analyzes the success and failures of Turkish foreign and domestic security
policy from 2002 to the present day. It does so by analyzing Turkish demographics, geography,
history, and contemporary affairs. Once this context has been laid out for the reader, an in-depth
analysis of the formulation of domestic security policy followed by foreign security policy are then
undertaken separately. This is a deliberate choice as although Turkish domestic security policy
influences foreign security policy and vice versa, the actors involved are sufficiently different to
warrant separate analysis.
The analysis of domestic policy focuses on the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and
Development Parties (AKP) approach to dealing with the Kurdish issue, the impact of the 15 July
2016 coup and internal politics and how this has influenced the development of policy. The study of
foreign security policy first examines Turkish approaches to the use of soft power, before
conducting an analysis of Turkish relationships with regional actors. Policy towards the main
influences on Turkey are then examined, starting with the U.S., followed by Russia, NATO and the
European Union (EU). This framework was chosen as I judged that these states and institutions
have the most influence on Turkey, and thus provide the best scope for analysis of Turkish policy
choices.
METHODOLOGY
2002 was chosen as the start point for this study as this represents a watershed in Turkish
politics as the AKP was the first Islamic leaning party to be elected since the formation of the
Turkish state in 1923. This period also represents a fundamental shift in Turkish politics with one
party having a clear majority, without the need for coalitions that have characterised Turkish
politics for decades. It provided a good place to start.
2
LITERATURE REVIEW
William Hale’s updated 2013 third edition of his Turkish foreign policy, 1774-2000 is the
starting point for understanding how Turkish security policy has been historically been formulated.
This provides essential context to understand pre-2002 decision making. In seeking to understand
Turkish historical and political context pre-2002, there are a wealth of other sources available.
David Fromkin’s 2009 work A Peace to end all Peace: The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the
creation of the modern Middle East provides essential context to understand the impact of Britain
and France’s post WW1 political maneuvering on modern Turkey.1 Bernard Lewis’s 1968 analysis
The Emergence of Modern Turkey provides essential context for understanding Turkey’s position
post WW2.2 Hugh and Nicole Pope’s Turkey Unveiled provides a candid and comprehensive
overview of Turkey, replete with nuanced insights into Turkey’s internal dynamics up to 2011. In
seeking to understand Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Kinross’s 1965 study Atatürk and Andrew Mango’s
2000 more up to date study Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey provide
essential political context and are a must read to gain an understanding of this central figure in
Turkey’s history.3 Kinross’s study, although older, is the more balanced and informative account.
Bernard Lewis’s other work What Went Wrong?: The Clash between Islam and Modernity
in the Middle East provides a more up to date analysis and is useful for understanding post 2002
politics and the increasing role of Islam.4 In conducting a study of contemporary Turkish foreign
policy, it rapidly became apparent that the major sources available are rapidly becoming overtaken
by events, given the pace of change in Turkish politics. Of those available that cover this period,
1 William Hale, Turkish foreign policy, 1774-2000. 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2013). 2 David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, 20th anniversary ed. (New York, NY: H. Holt and Co., 2009). 3 Andrew Mango, Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (New York: Overlook, 2000); Patrick Balfour Kinross, Atatürk: A biography of Mustafa Kemal, father of modern Turkey (New York: Morrow, 1965). 4 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Perennial, 2003).
3
Aaron Stein of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies (RUSI) October 2014 study
Turkey's new foreign policy: Davutoglu, the AKP and the pursuit of regional order provides a
useful analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy decision making, however; even this work has been
rapidly overtaken by events with the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS,
hereafter referred to as Daesh).5 Increasingly, the best sources of up to date policy analysis come
from online resources such as the Turkish Insight Turkey and Hürriyet Daily News or from other
avenues such as online media like Foreign Affairs, The Washington Post, The Times of London, The
BBC and Al Jazeera.
In seeking to understand the Kurdish dimension to Turkish politics, unbiased accounts are
hard to find. The most informative and unbiased source found was Bill Park and The International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 2005 analysis: Turkey’s policy towards northern Iraq:
Problems and Perspectives.6 This does well to place the Kurdish issue in Turkey and Iraq into
context without the hyperbole of most Turkish source publications.
5 Aaron Stein and Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, Turkey's new foreign policy: Davutoğlu, the AKP and the pursuit of regional order. V.83, (London: Routledge, 2014). 6 Bill Park and International Institute for Strategic Studies, Turkey’s policy towards northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). Park does well to synthesize the competing political narratives in the region to provide the reader with a cogent understanding of the shifting dynamics of Turkish, Kurdish and US policymaking. Turkish or Kurdish publications seem to be unable to provide an unbiased argument, given their recent history.
4
COMMON INFLUENCES ON TURKISH SECURITY POLICY
DEMOGRAPHICS
Turkey, a country of some eighty million persons, is ethnically diverse and has a patchwork
of different ethnic groupings that influence Turkish security policy. The CIA World Factbook
estimated that in 2008, the ethnic breakdown of Turkey was 70-75% Turkish, 18% Kurdish and
other minorities 7-12%. Within these minority groupings are ancient peoples such as Alevis and
Yazidis as well as trace elements of remaining Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Christian
communities.7 After World War One (WW1), Turkish demographics were fundamentally altered
with the mass exodus of the Armenian and Greek populations; indeed there is still much
controversy in Turkey over the Turkish role in what is generally referred to as the ‘Armenian
Genocide’, where upwards of 1.5 million Armenians are thought to have perished.8 On 30 January
1923, after the conclusion of the Greco/Turkish war that had lasted nearly three years, the two
governments signed a convention at Lausanne that resulted in almost two million people moving
throughout the region. Around 1.2 million Orthodox Christians left Turkey for (mainly) Greece and
around 350,000 Muslims migrated from Greece to Turkey This mass population exchange had a
profound impact on Turkey’s demographics and continues to be a policy issue for Turkey to the
present day.9
Although ethnically diverse, the Factbook estimated that the population is 99.8% Sunni
Muslim, with 0.2% of the population still being considered Jewish/Christian. Although upwards of
7 Minority Rights Group International, accessed 14 Dec 16, http://minorityrights.org/minorities/alevis/. Alevi is the term used for many heterodox Muslim Shi’a communities with different characteristics. Thus, Alevis constitute the largest religious minority in Turkey, Ezidis (also referred to as Yezidis) adhere to a non-monotheist religion of ancient origin in the Middle East. While they are ethnic Kurds, Ezidis emphasize their distinct religious identity. The number of Ezidis remaining in Turkey is unknown. 8 Raymond Kevorkian, The Armenian genocide: A Complete History (London: IB Tauris, 2011), 807-811. 9 Renee Hirschon, Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 13-20.
5
18% of the population identifies itself as being ethnically Kurdish, the overwhelming majority still
identify as Sunni Muslims.10 This fact is important as one of the main aims of the Turkish state
since its inception in 1923 has been to inculcate a sense of ‘Turkishness’ amongst the population,
underpinned by a secular interpretation of Sunni Muslim faith. This interpretation of Islam aimed to
prevent religion from becoming a dominant facet in the new Turkey.11 The demographics of
modern Turkey have thus conspired to create a significant minority (the Kurds) who are artificially
separated from other Kurdish populations in Iraq, Syria and Iran and who have forcibly been
required to become ‘Turkish.’ Turkish state attempts at forced assimilation has therefore driven
Kurdish separatist demands since 1923.
GREAT POWER INFLUENCES
The First World War (WW1) was disastrous for Turkey and resulted in the dissolution of
the Ottoman Empire and the near eclipse of Turkey as a fledgling nation state. The Treaty of Sèvres
was proposed by France and Great Britain as the peace agreement between the victorious Allies and
the Ottoman Empire at the end of WW1. The provisions of the treaty aimed to dismember the
Ottoman Empire, and proposed allocating large portions to Allied control and creating zones of
Armenian and Kurdish autonomy. This proposed reduction of Ottoman territorial integrity coupled
with Turkish victories over the Greeks in 1921/1922 created a surge of Turkish nationalist
sentiment and as a result encouraged continued resistance.12 The Turks were eventually able to
defeat the Greek Army at Smyrna in September 1922 and prevent the Allied powers from imposing
10 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, accessed 07 December 16, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html. 11 Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, Turkey unveiled: A history of Modern Turkey (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press 2011), 11-13. 12 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 252.
6
the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres. In 1922, the un-ratified Treaty of Sèvres was replaced with
the more comprehensive Treaty of Lausanne which recognized the modern Turkish state.13
The profound impact of the Treaty of Sèvres continues to resonate and influence Turkish
domestic security thinking to the present day. Commentators have referred to a Turkish Treaty of
Sèvres ‘psychosis,’ with populist conspiracy theories continuing to abound in Turkey over former
Great Powers (i.e. Britain and France) and U.S. machinations to weaken or even dismember the
Turkish state.14 Indeed, many Turks believe that the U.S., Britain, and the EU actively want to
weaken Turkey by seeking the creation of a separate Kurdish state.15
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE LEGACY
Three enduring legacies of the Ottoman Empire continue to impact decision making in
modern Turkey. The Ottoman legacy created a modern Turkish political system that 1) has a
perceived need for strong central control, 2) uses Islam as a control mechanism, and 3) has
historically (until the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and Development Party (AKP) rose to
power in 2002) accepted the primacy of the military in political affairs. The most enduring (and
important) part of the Ottoman Empire legacy was the relation of the military to the state. From the
Janissary Corps to the Committee on Unity and Progress (CUP) formed during WW1, the military
has long been the arbiter of political power. 16
13 David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, 20th anniversary ed. (New York, NY: H. Holt and Co., 2009), 559. 14 Bill Park and International Institute for Strategic Studies, Turkey’s policy towards northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), 13. 15 Ibid. 16 Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled (New York: Overlook, 2011), 30-34. The Janissaries were introduced in the fourteenth century as a permanent cadre in the Ottoman Army, which otherwise generally consisted of feudal levies. Initially they consisted of Christian captives but later, given their military prowess, Muslim families began to encourage their sons to join. Famed for their discipline, the Janissaries were highly effective through the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. Because of their prowess, they began to meddle directly in Ottoman politics and even overthrew Sultan Selim II. They were eventually confronted and destroyed by Sultan Mahmut II in 1826. The CUP was formed by a group of Turkish exiles in Paris in 1908 and became collectively known as the ‘Young Turks’ who later overthrew Sultan Abdüllhamit in January 1913.
7
The Ottoman Empire era in terms of history, geography and architecture continues to exert
a powerful influence on Turkish policymakers today, as it does on other formal colonial powers
such as Great Britain, France, and Italy. The Ottoman period is regarded with some nostalgia, and
the notion of harnessing Islam as a unifying force particularly appeals to Turkish government
policymakers.17 The systemic integration of the military in determining policymaking, so prevalent
since the formation of modern Turkey, has begun to wane as the military’s power base is severely
weakened when compared to its heyday in the 1960s-1990s.
THE LEGACY OF MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATÜRK
No discussion of Turkish security policy is complete without understanding the legacy of
the “father of the Turks” - Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk, an iron-willed autocrat, was the most
successful Turkish military figure of WW1 and the subsequent fight for independence.18 His legacy
was, in part, captured in what has become known as ‘Kemalism.’ This was articulated in his six
principles of “Kemalism:” 1) republicanism, 2) secularism, 3) nationalism, 4) populism, 5) statism
and 6) revolutionism. These principles formed the core of Turkish political ideology and until at
least the late 1990s were the lens through which most Turkish policymakers saw themselves.19 An
important attribute (not explicitly iterated by Atatürk), and subsequently enshrined in later
constitutions, was the assertion that “the military has both the right and the responsibility to
intervene in affairs of state, when absolutely necessary in order to guarantee the system’s
continuance.”20
17 Ibid., 353. 18 Mustafa Kemal was bestowed with the name Atatürk on 24 November 1934. This was decreed in a special law passed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). However, for the purposes of this monograph he will be referred to as Atatürk throughout for consistency. Biography.com Editors, accessed 5 March 2017, http://www.biography.com/people/mustafa-kemal-ataturk-20968109. 19 Patrick Balfour Kinross, Atatürk: A biography of Mustafa Kemal, father of modern Turkey (New York: Morrow, 1965), 518. 20 Paul J. White, Primitive rebels or revolutionary modernizers? The Kurdish national movement in Turkey (New York: Zed Books, 2000), 130.
8
Atatürk’s own brand of nationalism and associated military tradition was a consequence
and continuation of Ottoman reforms that sought to move the Turkish population into the modern
age.21 Atatürk’s central doctrine emphasized the need to keep the Turkish state within balance. He
advocated a system and associated policy choices that retained nationalist identity, while
simultaneously supporting efforts to Westernize and modernize, but kept Turkey’s Islamic customs
in equilibrium. Atatürk was clear that failure to maintain this delicate balance could result in the
fledgling Turkish republic dissolving as the Ottoman Empire had. Atatürk was determined to adopt
a more secular approach to maintain the delicate balance between these competing entities.
THE CREATION OF TURKISH IDENTITY
In his 1923 work ‘The Principles of Turkism,’ Islamic scholar Ziya Gokalp devised the
intellectual theory to support Atatürk’s secularization agenda. This was driven by a sense that the
Ottoman Empire had eventually failed as it did not regulate the impact of religion on politics, which
ultimately constrained thinking and led to the Empire’s denouement. Gokalp advanced the
hypothesis that the Quran and teachings of Mohammed were specifically relevant to the social
context of when they were written (from 609 CE). Gokalp hypothesized that the rules as defined in
the Quran were derived during the days of Mohammed and therefore needed to be updated to meet
the realities of the early 20th century.22 One of Atatürk’s first steps (in 1924) to reduce the impact of
Islam on Turkish society was the creation of the Department of Religious Affairs, which exists
today as the Presidency of Religious Affairs or Diyanet. The Diyanet is the single government
agency with the responsibility to incorporate Islam into the functions of the Turkish state. Atatürk
subsequently disbanded state sponsored religious schools and forbade religiously based political
parties, although this trend is being steadily reversed by the AKP.
21 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the future of Turkey (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 6. 22 C. H. Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey (Northgate: Eothen Press, 1979), 81.
9
The Turkish state, through the Diyanet, allowed and encouraged Islamic theological
assemblies to function, but its total control of the output of these assemblies removed their ability to
participate fully in political affairs. The Turkish state perceived itself as being entrusted with the
considerable task of incorporating the Ottoman era interpretation of Islam within the new doctrine
of Kemalism. This resulted in the Kemalist vision of Islam as one that did not voice opinions or
criticize the state vision of Islam without concurrently de-legitimizing its own existence. This
notion of “bureaucratized” Islam was central to the Kemalist vision of subordinating the concept of
identity derived from Islam to one derived from the Turkish nation.23 This left no room for other
ethnic identities such as the Kurds to practice their form of Islam, which inevitably led to conflict.
TURKISH POLITICS
An enduring feature of Turkish policymaking is the fragmented political situation in
Turkey. Islamist oriented parties were also banned until the election of the AKP in 2002. The
current political system in Turkey was established following the September 1980 coup, with no
single party holding a majority from 1980 to push through policy until the rise of the AKP in 2002.
Party ideologies swing from far left to far-right extremes, with ethnic minorities such as the Kurds
generally unable to decisively influence policymaking in the Turkish parliament.
The main party since 2002 is the AKP. The AKP currently holds 317 seats in the 550-seat
parliament since the 2015 general election, enough to form a simple majority, single party
government. The AKP’s main opposition is the Republican People’s Party (CHP), a social-
democratic political party, formed by Atatürk in 1923. The CHP is Turkey’s oldest party and
currently the main opposition in the Turkish parliament, where it holds 134 seats. The center-left
CHP stresses its close ties to the era of Turkey’s first president, Atatürk, and aims to defend the
fundamental Kemalist values of republicanism and secularism.
23 Christopher Houston, Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2001), 90.
10
The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) was established in 2012 as the political wing of the
Peoples’ Democratic Congress, a union of left-leaning Kurdish political organizations. The
People’s Democratic Party is situated on the left of the Turkish political scene and the party
represents in particular the interests of Turkey’s Kurdish minority. This is of note as until 1990,
Kurdish political parties were banned.24 The HDP currently has fifty nine seats in the parliament
but has generally been unable to form coalitions with the CHP or AKP to influence policymaking,
given their differing ideologies. The final party of note is the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
The MHP does not support Turkey’s possible membership in the European Union, is vehemently
opposed to Kurdish demands for further autonomy and opposes the peace process between the
Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The MHP currently has forty seats
in the Turkish parliament.25
The chaotic Turkish political system, which has historically required an array of coalitions
to be formed to get policy passed into law, has resulted in a system where consensus for
formulating common policy has been lacking. In a proposed fundamental change to the Turkish
Constitution, the current Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is proposing changes that
would scrap the office of prime minister to prevent leadership conflicts and unwieldy coalition
governments of the sort that have paralyzed political activity in the past.26 This would remove some
checks and balances on the president and give Erdoğan greatly expanded powers.
24 “History of Kurdish political parties in Turkey,” HDP Europe, accessed 13 February 2017, http://en.hdpeurope.com/?page_id=537. 25 “Turkey’s Political Parties,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 13 February 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/26/turkey-s-political-parties-pub-61743. 26 “Turkey’s constitutional overhaul,” The Economist, accessed 13 February 2017, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/12/economist-explains-16?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07. The referendum on the proposed changes will be held on 16 April 2017 and is expected to be very close.
11
KEY PLAYERS
Since 2002, two key players are central to the development of a more assertive and less
isolationist Turkish foreign policy: Ahmet Davutoğlu and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Davutoğlu, a
former professor of international relations and Turkey’s foreign minister until May 2014 and Prime
Minister until May 2016, has been the architect of Turkey’s shift from a more secular, isolationist
approach to a more assertive based foreign policy, which recognizes Turkey’s historical and
geographic importance to the region.27 Erdoğan, Prime Minister from 2003 to 2014 and the
incumbent President, has been the other key player in the development of a more assertive Turkish
foreign security policy. Often thought of as a rather difficult character, Erdoğan, with strong
Islamist credentials, has sought to move Turkey away from the more secular, irreligious path set by
Kemalists in Turkey since the birth of the Republic in 1923. This has domestically placed him on a
collision course with elements of the Turkish military and political establishment.
MILITARY INFLUENCE
In 1960, the National Unity Committee (NUC), led by the Army, took control of Turkey.
The NUC went on to draft a new Constitution and, in so doing, cemented the military’s central role
in the Turkish government for several decades. Principle among these constitutional changes was
subordination of the Chief of the General Staff only to the Prime Minister (vice the Minister of
Defense) and creation of the National Security Council (known as the MGK). The MGK, despite
recent upheavals, remains as a civilian and military body comprised of cabinet officials, the Chief
27 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring,” April 2012, accessed 4 November 2016, http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/vision_paper_TFP2.pdf. Davutoğlu graduated from İstanbul Erkek Lisesi, which is a Deutsche Auslandsschule (German International School) and studied at the Department of Economics and Political Science of the Boğaziçi University, İstanbul. He holds a master's degree in Public Administration and a PhD degree in Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi University. Between 1993 and 1999 Davutoğlu worked at Marmara University and became a full professor in 1999. He was the chairman of the Department of International Relations at Beykent University in Istanbul.
12
of the General Staff, and other serving force commanders. Its primary focus is on national security
issues, but the MGK is also granted wide authority on economic and social policy and until recently
was given virtual veto authority on all government policy. This enshrined the role of the military in
deciding the course of national security policy for several decades.28 This trend continued with
subsequent coups in 1971, 1980 and 1997 which continually reasserted the role of the Turkish
military as the guarantors of the Kemalist vision of Turkey.29 The Turkish military’s view was that
only through a strong central authority could political process be confined within acceptable limits
as defined by the MGK.30
The mechanism for enforcement of these boundaries has traditionally been the Army.
Intervention by the Army in politics is enshrined in public law and until recently generally accepted
as part and parcel of Turkish politics. Civilian politicians and administrators, until the election of
the AKP, were continually faced with the challenge of keeping dialogue and policy within the
allowed tolerances as defined by the Army. The promotion and protection of the enshrined secular
Kemalist ideology by the Army has thus limited policy options and defined how national security
policy objectives were to be met.
28 Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled (New York: Overlook, 2011), 92-96. 29 “Timeline: A history of Turkish coups,” Al Jazeera, accessed 09 February 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html. 30 Dietrich Jung and Wolfgang Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads (London and New York: Zed Books, 2001), 62.
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ANALYSIS OF TURKISH DOMESTIC SECURITY POLICY 2002-2017
OVERVIEW
One overarching aim has driven Turkish domestic security policy since 2002 - preventing
the establishment of a separate Kurdish state either within Turkey or in Iraq (after 2003) and more
recently Syria.31 However, as with many issues in modern Turkey, history, demographics and
religion continue to exercise a strong influence on the formation of Turkish domestic policy as
previously outlined. There is no discernible doctrine driving AKP domestic security policy other
than preventing Kurdish autonomy, although Ahmet Davutoğlu probably came closest when he
articulated the idea in 2012 that Turkey must establish a lasting “security/freedom balance…by
liberalizing its political system and abandoning its erroneous habits of the past, when viewing
society as a potential enemy sucked its energy in vicious internal discussions.”32
PKK ORIGINS
Historically, Turkish state neglect of Kurdish regions has further deepened the social and
economic divide between traditional Kurdish regions in southeastern Turkey and the much more
prosperous western Turkish regions.33 Combined with a turbulent cycle of political unrest and
military coups, it is surprising that it took until 1978 for the Marxist inspired (and primarily Syrian
Ba'athist supported) PKK to officially be formed and for a determined insurgency to take hold. Led
by the charismatic Abdullah Öcalan, in 1984 the insurgency, stoked by heavy handed Turkish
31 Especially since U.S. support for the YPG (the armed wing of the Democratic Union Party (Kurdish: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD; a left-wing Kurdish political party established in 2003 by Kurdish activists in northern Syria) has continued unabated despite vehement Turkish opposition for what the Turkish security apparatus considers ‘terrorists’. 32 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Centre for Strategic Research (SAM): Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring,” accessed 13 February 2017, http://sam.gov.tr/principles-of-turkish-foreign-policy-and-regional-political-structuring/. 33 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A political dilemma (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 12. The so-called Ararat rebellion (1927-30) was the largest and best known, but there was continual unrest until 1937, with circa 30 Kurdish rebellions of various scales and severity taking place.
14
security force tactics, began in earnest. The PKK also enjoyed the support of other regional powers
such as the Ba'athist regimes in Syria and Iraq and the Islamic regime in Iran, who used the PKK as
means to counter Turkish ambitions in the wider trans-Asian region.
The details of the Turkish campaign against the PKK are not recounted here. The
underlying policy choices that have fueled continued unrest are examined in detail.34 The Turkish
government has generally approached the issue of defeating the Kurdish insurgency as a military
problem. Political negotiations have been given some opportunity to deliver tangible results, but
temporary ceasefires and the policy choices leading up to making such decisions have never sought
to answer the underlying social, economic and security challenges that have created the conditions
for the PKK to flourish in southeastern Turkey. Indeed, there are striking similarities to the way that
Israel has sought to tackle the ongoing insurgency in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the use of
force as a primary response is also usually the means of choice.35
An insight into the Turkish view of the Kurds at the highest level was provided by the then
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, who in 2001 linked backwardness, ‘Kurdishness’ and the PKK
terrorist activities implicitly together in a monologue:
On the other hand, the link between separatist terror and the backward feudal structures in South-East Turkey should be taken into consideration. Separatist terror draws its strength mainly from feudal landlords of Kurdish origin. At first glance this may seem as a contradiction. One might wonder what these extremely wealthy feudal landlords who own tens of villages and exploit landless peasants have in common with separatists and terrorists. However, sharing the same values and concepts, the feudal system and the separatist terror organization have become de facto allies. To maintain their existence, both must protect, preserve and promote feudal values such as “race”, “kinship”, and “tribal links.” The terrorist movement is based on the principle of race. It is a racist movement; racist, just like the feudal system, like the guardians, beneficiaries of this system.36
34 For a detailed account of the formation of the PKK and the ensuing insurgency (up to 2007) see Åsa Lundgren, The Unwelcome Neighbour: Turkey’s Kurdish policy (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007). 74-79. 35 Aaron David Miller, “A history of sustainable violence,” Foreign Policy, 18 May 2016, accessed 5 March 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/19/a-history-of-sustainable-violence-israel-palestinian-authority-john-kerry-peace/. 36 İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century (Mersin: Rustem Bookshop, 2001), 115.
15
Even reading this some sixteen years after it was uttered, one gets a strong sense of the underlying
sense of dislike, hatred even, of Kurds by those in power in the central Turkish state. There is a
strong sentiment that Kurdish backwardness, tribalism, superstition and clinging to ‘the old ways’ is
responsible for the prolonged Kurdish insurgency, despite attempts to convince ethnic Kurds that
remaining a part of Turkey is in their best interests.
ENDING SUPPORT FOR THE PKK
The breakthrough that ended the prolonged insurgency of the 1980s/1990s came about in
October 1998. After several high-profile attacks by the PKK inside Turkey, staged from Syria,
Turkey demanded that Syria stop supporting Öcalan and the PKK and threatened a full-scale
invasion of northern Syria to clear the region of PKK camps and infrastructure. The Syrian
leadership, at the time led by Hafez al-Assad, was keen to normalize relations with Turkey to
increase trade links, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Assad compromised,
agreed to cease all aid to the PKK and expelled Öcalan. Öcalan was subsequently captured in
Kenya in 1999 and a ceasefire was declared between the Turkish state and the PKK. The state of
emergency that had been in place since 1987 was lifted in the last southeastern provinces in
November 2002. This improvement in the domestic security situation finally persuaded the
European Union to grant Turkey EU candidate status, thus fulfilling a long held Turkish ambition.
CHANGES IN POLICY
The next major catalyst for change in Turkish domestic security policy towards the Kurds
was the rapid ascension to power of the AKP in November 2002. The AKP, having campaigned as
an anti-establishment party, appealed to many Kurds as its leadership (Erdoğan and his close
advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu) campaigned on a platform of opposing the official Turkish secular (i.e.
anti-Kurd and anti-Islamic) policies that had been enshrined by the Kemalists of the CHP since the
inception of the Turkish state. As soon as the AKP came to power, it began an ambitious program
16
of reform to meet the requirements of EU accession with many of the conditions for this aligned
with greater political recognition of the Kurds. These reform efforts by Erdoğan and the AKP
leadership led to some progress on the diplomatic front with the PKK and a more lasting ceasefire
was agreed that lasted until 2004. However, in 2004, the PKK once again resumed operations inside
Turkey due to alleged breaches of the agreement by the Turkish military and it was not until 2012
that another lasting ceasefire came into effect.37
The years 2012-2014 saw an uneasy truce hold. Turkish foreign and domestic security
policy then collided in late 2014 with profound consequences for the internal security situation in
Turkey. The so-called Islamic State (hereafter referred to as Daesh) group swept all before it in the
summer of 2014, defeating the Iraqi Security Forces in detail, seizing Mosul and at one stage
threatening Baghdad itself. In Syria, the Kurdish Peshmerga were soundly defeated on a number of
occasions; it was only the decision by US President Barrack Obama on 8 August 2014 to authorize
strikes on Daesh that enabled the Peshmerga to halt the group.38
KOBANÎ AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PKK INSURGENCY
A hitherto insignificant town on the border between Turkey and Syria called Kobanî
became symbolic of the Kurdish Peshmerga’s struggle against Daesh. Kobanî also highlighted the
Turkish government’s apathy to providing support to Kurds, whether they be Turkish, Syrian or
Iraqi. With the help of US airpower, the Peshmerga were eventually able to halt Daesh’s advance
on Kobanî and were then able to push Daesh out of the Kobanî canton altogether. The media
images of Turkish Army units passively watching the fighting from inside Turkey, while Turkish
officials prevented Kurdish refugees from fleeing into Turkey to escape the fighting enraged many
37 “Kurdish Group to Pull Armed Units from Turkey,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 April 2013, accessed 12 December 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324743704578444630691252760. 38 “Obama authorises Iraq air strikes on Islamist fighters,” BBC News, 08 August 2014, accessed 15 Dec 16, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28699832.
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Kurds. The then Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, in an October 2014 interview with the British
Daily Telegraph outlined Turkey’s conditions for ‘assisting’ in Kobanî: “Equip and train the Free
Syrian Army so that if the Islamic State leaves, PKK terrorists should not come…if they don't want
to send their ground troops [i.e. US/British and maybe French], how can they expect Turkey to send
Turkish ground troops with the same risks on our border?”39
The lack of a coherent Turkish military response to ease the plight of Kurds in Kobanî
resulted in widespread rioting by Kurds in south-eastern Turkey and mistrust between Kurdish
politicians and the population of the Turkish state reaching its nadir. Inevitably, this led to the PKK
ending its ceasefire with the Turkish state and in June 2015, the PKK resumed military operations
against Turkish military and civilian targets. This renewed insurgency has already claimed the lives
of many civilians and Turkish military personnel.40 Erdoğan’s response was to order increasingly
harsher measures to deal with the renewed insurgency, setting Turkish policy back into its familiar
framework of military force being used as the primary option. There has been no sign that this
pattern will be alleviated by political dialogue.
THE IMPACT OF THE 15 JULY 2016 COUP
The coup on 15 July 2016 was perhaps not unexpected, however, its impact on internal
security policy in Turkey has been momentous. Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP under
Erdoğan steadily reduced the military’s influence on Turkish politics with the result that the once
all powerful Turkish armed forces ability to influence politics was fundamentally eroded.41 To meet
39 Ahmet Davutoglu, interview by Colin Freeman, “Turkey sets conditions for helping West in Kobanî crisis in Syria. Interview with Prime Minister,” British Daily Telegraph, 28 Oct 2014, accessed 15 December 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11193995/Turkey-sets-conditions-for-helping-West-in-Kobane-crisis-in-Syria.html. 40 The International Crisis Group (ICG), “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: The Rising Toll,” accessed 10 January 17, http://www.crisisgroup.be/interactives/turkey/. The ICG, a respected international agency, puts the combined Turkish/Kurdish civilian and military death toll at 2,301, since July 2015. This is a rate double that of the last major bout of violence, from July 2011-December 2012, when less than 1,000 people were killed. 41 Gonul Tol, “Turkey’s Next Military Coup,” Foreign Affairs, 30 May 2016, accessed 15 January 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-05-30/turkeys-next-military-coup.
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EU accession criteria, Erdoğan also implemented measures to bring the military within civilian
control, reducing the power of the MGK. Legislation was passed that limited the jurisdiction of
military courts in favor of civilian courts, and Erdoğan played a prominent role in the appointment
of top military commanders. A further reduction in the Turkish military’s standing occurred in
April 2007. The Turkish military, echoing it’s so called ‘coup by memorandum’ of 1997, posted to
its website an ultimatum (later called the “e-coup”) to warn the AKP and Erdoğan against backing
Abdullah Gul, who previously belonged to an Islamist party and whose wife wore a hijab
(headscarf), for the Turkish presidency. Most of the population and the AKP leadership rejected
this ultimatum, and Gul was duly confirmed. The military’s attempt to intervene against such a
popular party as the AKP dealt a serious blow to its standing in many sections of Turkish society. In
an early election held right after the “e-coup” attempt, the AKP increased its vote share by 13
percent.42
Interestingly, given that the so-called Gülenists (an Islamic movement linked to the U.S.-
based cleric Fethullah Gülen) were blamed for the coup by Erdoğan, the AKP’s then allies in the
judiciary, the same Gülenists, launched several criminal investigations of military officers in
support of Erdoğan. Under the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer prosecutions, which alleged a
military conspiracy to overthrow the AKP government, scores of high ranking officers were
imprisoned and hundreds of retired military officers detained.43 The conflict between the AKP and
42 Izgi Gungor, “From Landmark Success to Closure: AKP’s Journey,” Hurriyet Daily News, 7 July 2008, accessed 12 January 2017, http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-634073. The share of the seats AKP occupied in the Parliament decreased because of a change in electoral laws. AKP’s victory was sweeping by the standards of Turkey, which was historically accustomed to rule by coalition governments. The July 2007 general elections handed AKP a considerable electoral victory. AKP won 46.6 percent of the vote—unseen in Turkey since the 1950s—and 341 out of the 550 seats in Parliament. 43 Guney Yildiz, “Ergenekon: The court case that changed Turkey,” BBC News Turkish, 5 April 2013, accessed 15 January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23581891. The Ergenekon case was one of the biggest in recent Turkish history, pitting Erdogan's supporters in the Islamist-rooted AK Party against the secularist military establishment; the trial and the legal reforms around it have ended the Kemalist model of checks and balances between different pillars of authority within Turkey. Verdicts were handed down on 15 April 2013 against 30 high ranking Turkish military officers including the Chief of Defense and the Chiefs of the Army and Air Force.
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the military culminated in the mass resignation of Turkey’s military high command in late July
2011.44 This breaking of the military’s power over politics was a pivotal point in Turkish civil-
military relations.45 These actions in support of the AKP and Erdoğan were backed by Gülenist
linked members of the Turkish judiciary.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The breakdown in the relationship between the Gülenists and Erdoğan’s AKP was brought
about by conflict of interests over several years. The Gülenists had supported the AKP when it was
founded on a pro-European and business-friendly platform in the wake of a 1997 coup. Gülenists
and the AKP found common cause in seeking to oppose the military and the more authoritarian
style of Turkish rule it represented. Since 2007, the relationship has steadily declined. Both sides
accused each other of wanting to consolidate power. Drawing on grassroots support, the Gülenists
continued to dominate the judiciary and police forces with followers loyal to the movement.46 The
breakdown of this relationship of convenience was brought about in December 2013, when a wide-
ranging investigation launched by Gülenist associated judiciary members into corruption in
Erdoğan’s inner circle led to the resignations of several ministers and the arrest of many of their
associates. Erdoğan declared that the investigation was an outright attempt at a judicial “coup” by a
parallel authority within the state.47
44 “Generallerin Yuzde 10’u Hapiste [Ten Percent of Generals Jailed],” Hurriyet Daily News, 15 February 2011, accessed 17 Jan 2017, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/17024835.asp. 30 of the 301 Generals and Admirals serving in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were arrested. This constitutes about 10 percent of the Generals and Admirals in the TSK. 45 Marc Champion, “Top Soldier's Retirement Shocks Turkey,” Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition, 30 July 2011, A8. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, accessed 15 January 2017. Gen. Isik Kosaner, Turkey's Chief of the General Staff, retired a year ahead of schedule. His resignation came as a shock in Turkey. 46 Kareem Shaheen, “Erdoğan vs. the Gülenists: from political allies to Turkey's bitter rivals”, The Guardian online, 19 July 2016, accessed 15 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/19/thousands-detained-as-turkey-vows-to-smoke-out-gulen-supporters. 47 Ibid.
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An uneasy truce existed between the two parties for the following two and a half years.
Erdoğan, to counter Gülenist influence, then appeared to turn back to the Turkish military to
increase his power base and succeeded in successfully overturning a number of convictions of high
ranking military officers. This occurred on 16 April 2016, when Turkey's highest appeals court
overturned the convictions of 275 individuals, including senior military officers, accused of plotting
a coup against Erdoğan and the AKP.48
The 15 July 2016 coup could be seen as inevitable given the jockeying for power among
Turkey’s political elites, the secular (Kemalist/military) power brokers and those representing more
Islamist (AKP) viewpoints. The coup was ultimately poorly executed and easily quashed by
Erdoğan’s supporters and AKP loyalists. Erdoğan, speaking on 18 July 2016 (after the coup attempt
on Friday 15 July 2016) was clear that: “moving forward, no tolerance or compassion will be
shown to supporters of Fethullah Gülen’s terrorist group or any other terrorist
organization…without compromising democratic principles and the rule of law, we shall combat all
terrorist organizations that place the future of our nation and the state at risk.”49 In a purge after the
coup, according to the Turkish Prime Minister, Binali Yıldırım, 40,029 state employees have been
detained, of whom 20,355 have been formally arrested. Of those in detention, 4,262 are awaiting a
decision on whether they will be formally arrested or released. The overwhelming majority of those
arrested are police officers and military personnel, including 157 Army generals. To date, at least
2,131 judges and prosecutors with suspected ties to the Gülenist movement have also been
arrested.50
48 “Turkey Ergenekon: Court quashes 'coup plot' convictions,” BBC News, 21 April 2016, accessed 15 Jan 17, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36099889. 49 Kareem Shaheen, “Erdoğan vs. the Gülenists: from political allies to Turkey's bitter rivals,” The Guardian online, 19 July 2016, accessed 15 Jan 17. 50 Constanze Letsch, “Turkey's post-coup crackdown - in figures,” The Guardian online, 19 August 2016, accessed 15 Jan 17, https://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2016/aug/19/turkeys-post-coup-crackdown-in-figures.
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RESULT OF THE COUP
More so than the ongoing campaign against the PKK, the 15 July 2016 coup attempt has
fundamentally altered Turkish internal security policymaking, to the detriment of Turkish citizens.
The scale of media suppression has earned Turkey the dubious distinction of having more
journalists (126 as of October 2016) in prison than China, Iran and Egypt combined. 2,500 Turkish
writers, editors and broadcasters have also lost their jobs since the coup failed.51 The Turkish
military has been gutted and many other institutions ranging from schools to hospitals to other
associations have either been disbanded or had many of their members arrested. In a related
development, on 9 January 2017, the Turkish Parliament began debating legislation that would
effectively rewrite the Turkish Constitution, vastly expanding the powers of Erdoğan as President
and possibly allowing him to remain in power until 2029. Erdoğan has frequently argued that
Turkey needs a strong presidential system, like those in the U.S. or France, to avoid one-off weak
coalition governments and to fend off what he describes as “existential threats to the nation.”52 If
passed, the legislation would go into effect in 2019 and allow Erdoğan to pass legislation by decree.
The impact of the coup has therefore been dramatic. The effectiveness of the Turkish
government has been drastically undermined given the wholesale purges of security institutions.
Freedom of the press has been greatly undermined by the state of emergency that remains in force.
Relations with the U.S. have declined precipitously given Erdoğan’s repeated assertion that
Fethullah Gülen (who resides in Pennsylvania) and his supporters were responsible for the coup
attempt. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s claim that Turkey had achieved a “security/freedom balance” now
51 Peter Preston, “General Mayhem guides Turkey’s media repression,” The Guardian online, 16 October 2016, accessed 15 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/oct/16/turkey-media-repression-general-mayhem-erdogan. 52 Sewell Chan, “Turkey’s Parliament Starts Debate on Expansion of President’s Powers,” The New York Times, 9 January 2017, accessed 15 January 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/world/middleeast/turkeys-parliament-starts-debate-on-expansion-of-presidents-powers.html?_r=0.
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rings somewhat hollow. Marc Pierini, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels and a
former European Union ambassador to Turkey, stated that the post-coup purges in the military, the
courts and the police have, paradoxically, compromised Turkey’s ability to protect its citizens.
Pierini stated that: “as we’ve seen after the coup, the reaction is way outside of the formal rule of
law. You [Turkey] started arresting police and gendarmes, now writers, actors, journalists - so there
is no limit…when you start pulling the thread on the rule of law, the whole sweater can come off.
And that’s where we stand.”53 Erdoğan and his supporters, by reacting so strongly to the coup
attempt, have also undermined the ability of Turkey to deliver its foreign security policy as their
response has drawn harsh criticism, especially from the EU.
53 Tim Arango and Rick Gladstone, “In Turkey’s Unrest, Some See an Extreme Version of Post-9/11 America,” The New York Times, 6 January 2017, accessed 15 January 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/world/europe/turkey-terrorist-attacks-erdogan-crackdown.html?action=click&contentCollection=Middle%20East&module=RelatedCoverage®ion=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article.
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TURKISH FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY 2002-2017
THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC DEPTH
Davutoğlu with his strong international relations credentials and understanding of
associated theory, has reoriented Turkish foreign policy by articulating the need for ‘Strategic
Depth.’ With the AKP’s electoral success in 2002 and a loosening of control by the Turkish
military on Turkish political parties that were considered more Islamist leaning, Davutoğlu, while
foreign minister, defined a much different policy approach to that which had been followed
previously.54 While Turkish governments have generally paid close attention to their near abroad,
successive Kemalist inspired Turkish administrations have preferred to adopt a policy of non-
intervention and neutrality to avoid becoming entangled in wider regional affairs. Davutoğlu, as a
central figure of the AKP administration since its ascent to power in 2002, has rejected this
approach. Inspired by Davutoğlu, Turkish foreign policy has instead sought to create the conditions
for ‘Strategic Depth’ by expanding Turkey’s influence throughout the Middle East, through
articulating the advantages of Turkey’s geographical position, Ottoman Empire history, religion and
resultant experience and rising economic power. This fits with Hale’s analysis of Turkey’s position
as a so-called ‘middle power,’ where Turkey “by using its natural advantages of geography, natural
and human resources, and its economic development, especially since the 1950s” has sought to
place itself at the center of the region and to act as a bridge between eastern and western Eurasia. 55
Davutoğlu’s central thesis postulated that Turkey and it’s near abroad (the Eurasian
landmass) is central to global security, thus resulting in Turkey being at the epicenter of global
geopolitics. Davutoğlu, in his seminal work Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) is clear that the
54 Aaron Stein and Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, Turkey's new foreign policy: Davutoğlu, the AKP and the pursuit of regional order. V.83, (London: Routledge, 2014), 2. The Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP secured 34.2% of the vote in the Nov 2002 Turkish national elections and subsequently won a successful landmark case in 2008 against the Turkish state judiciary which had threatened to shut down the party for displaying “Islamist tendencies”. 55 William Hale, Turkish foreign policy, 1774-2000. 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2013), 8.
24
spread of western power into the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East will ultimately be
harmful to these regions and to Turkish national interests and therefore must be curbed.56 This is the
opposite of decades of Kemalist doctrine that has espoused a policy of deliberate westernization
and associated modernization.
Davutoğlu and Erdoğan have therefore rejected the previous western leaning approach to
foreign policy. Davutoğlu, as early as 2004 in an article in the journal Radikal, clearly stated that he
considers previous Turkish foreign policy making to have been flawed and based upon a narrow
interpretation of Turkish geography and history.57 In a sharp deviation with Kemalist doctrine,
Davutoğlu proposed that the potency of Islam should be a source of communal strength and
legitimacy, rather than something to be feared.58 Interestingly, he also drew heavily on the works of
Karl Haushofer and Friedrich Ratzel who put forward the original concept of lebensraum.59
Haushofer’s interpretation is based on the thesis that borders are not static and subject to
change, so with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey had an opportunity to redefine these
boundaries in the absence of Soviet hegemony.60 By accepting and applying a Turkish version of
lebensraum (Davutoğlu uses the Turkish phrase hayat Alani), Davutoğlu proposed that Turkey has
a natural sphere of influence in Central Asia. This logic is based on the theory that these states are
predominantly Muslim and those countries also sit astride many of the world’s key choke
points/waterways. Davutoğlu’s view was that, given that these countries are Muslim, Turkey’s
56 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), trans by Behlül Ozkan, (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001). 57 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkiye merkez ulke olmali [Turkey should be the central country],” Radikal, 26 February 2004, accessed 15 January 17, http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/turkiye_merkez_ulke_olmali-702116. 58 Behlül Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism.” Survival 56, no. 4, (2014), 119-140, accessed 5 November 2016, SocINDEX with Full Text, EBSCOhost. 59 Ibid., 119. 60 Holger H. Herwig, “Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 2/3 (1999), 218-241, accessed 5 November 2016, Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost.
25
connection to these states via the common bond of Sunni Islam provides an opportunity for Turkey
to expand its power and thus create strategic depth.
In Strategic Depth and his PhD thesis (“The Impacts of Alternative Weltanschauungs on
Political Theories”61), Davutoğlu argued that western political theories are unsuited to dealing with
the Muslim world because they assume that individual knowledge can compete with that of Allah.62
Davutoğlu also took aim at theories advanced by Huntington in his iconic “Clash of Civilizations”
article that first appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1993. Huntington’s claim was: “the fundamental
source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The
great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural…The clash
of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”63 Davutoğlu decried this theory in 1998 in the
journal Perceptions, when he stated:
Huntington ignores the hegemonic character of western civilization in the formation of the global intellectual/philosophical trends, socio-cultural codes of behavior, and the international order. This is the reason why he blames non-western civilizations for the existing crises and conflicts. He neglects the fact that the Lebensraum of these civilizations was effectively marginalized by the hegemonic paradigm of western civilization.64
Davutoğlu also blamed the Middle East’s instability at least partly on flawed western political
concepts such as ethnic nationalism, which sought to maintain the boundaries of Middle Eastern
states as originally conceived after WW1. Davutoğlu assessed that western style Middle Eastern
governments are better served by the Islamic concepts of Tawhid (oneness with, or acceptance of
Allah) and Tanzih (a belief in the purity of Allah). This, he believes, is “the paradigmatic base of
61 Oxford English Dictionary online, accessed 05 November 2016, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/Weltanschauung. A philosophy or view of life; the world view of an individual or group 62 Behlül Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism,” 119-140. 63 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, accessed 13 February 2017, 22, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations. 64 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, No.4 Volume II, December 1997-February 1998, accessed 10 February 2017, http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/AhmetDavutoglu3.pdf.
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unity among conflicting schools, sects, and traditions in Islamic history.”65 In realizing this vision,
Davutoğlu espoused a vision that Middle Eastern governments could be politically and culturally
linked to Turkey. This in turn would lessen the significance of national borders. Embracing the
concept of Tawhid could also reduce many of the regions problems as a catalyst to reduce ethnic
nationalism and sectarianism.
IMPLEMENTING ‘STRATEGIC DEPTH’-PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE
AKP Foreign policy was initially delivered in a multifaceted manner, utilizing a blend of
Davutoğlu’s ‘Strategic Depth’ mantra as well as a more realistic approach which the AKP
leadership dubbed ‘Ostpolitik’ (a nod to Federal Republic of Germany’s attempts to reach out to the
German Democratic Republic during the Cold War and probably the result of Davutoğlu’s
attendance at the German International School in Istanbul). This analysis focused on specific
aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy; however, the general pattern has been for the AKP to seek to
strengthen ties with Islamic inspired parties such as the Iraqi Islamic Muslim Party (IIP), Hamas
and affiliated Muslim Brotherhood parties. Another tactic has been for Turkey to position itself as a
neutral mediator between warring parties (e.g. Israel and Hamas) to seek to offer a neutral Islamic
view.
In 2010, Davutoğlu laid out his vision for Turkish foreign policy, by outlining six defining
guidelines in line with his earlier theories of Strategic Depth:66
• The first principle is to strike a balance between freedom and security. If security is good for one nation and for an individual, it is also good for others. We should not maintain security to the detriment of freedoms and vice-versa; therefore, we need to find an appropriate balance between them.
65 Behlül Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism,” 119-140. 66 It is probably no coincidence that in laying out his vision, Davutoğlu stated six principles, noting that Atatürk expressed his vision using a similar six principles concept. This could be interpreted as the AKP’s attempt to fundamentally roll back the Kemalist doctrine.
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• The second principle envisions an enhanced regional engagement. We pursue a policy of “zero problems” in our neighborhood. We believe that this is an achievable goal, if enough trust and confidence can be generated among the relevant parties.
• The third principle envisions an effective diplomacy towards neighboring regions. Our goal is to maximize cooperation and mutual benefits with all of our neighbors. In order to achieve that goal, we build our relations with them on the principles of “security for all,” “high-level political dialogue,” “economic interdependence” and “cultural harmony and mutual respect.”
• The fourth principle is that Turkey seeks complementarity with global actors. • Our fifth principle is the effective use of international forums and new initiatives in
order to galvanize action on matters of common concern. • The sixth and final principle of our foreign policy is to create a “new perception of
Turkey” through an increased focus on public diplomacy.67
The period 2002 to 2011 was thus marked by the AKP’s use of elements of Davutoğlu’s
Strategic Depth concept, blended with more traditional Turkish policy choices of non-interference
(i.e. what has been referred to as ‘Benign Neglect’). This was the general pattern until late 2010
with the onset of the so-called ‘Arab Spring.’ Up until 2010, Turkish regional foreign policy
towards those countries viewed as politically stable (Syria and Iran) was to strengthen economic
and political ties. These efforts are generally recognized as having been successful.68 In regions
beset with political upheaval (e.g. Palestine and Iraq), the AKP sought to shape internal politics by
backing religiously conservative political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood. This is generally
considered to have been a failure as the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt did not survive
for long and the Brotherhood has been unable to make inroads in Iraq or elsewhere in the region.
The period 2011 to the present has been marked by a much more adventurous foreign security
policy, characterised by more active involvement in regional affairs and culminating in the strategic
67 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Fostering a Culture of Harmony,” Russia in Global Affairs, 9 April 2010, accessed 19 January 2017, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_14784. 68 Aaron Stein and Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, Turkey’s new foreign policy: Davutoğlu, the AKP and the pursuit of regional order (London: Routledge, 2014), 32-33. Stein made a coherent argument that Turkey generally sought to maintain the status quo and had some notable foreign policy successes (outreach to Syria, and increase in trade with Iran) as well as some failures such as attempts at mediation in the ongoing Palestinian/Israeli conflict.
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decision by the Turkish leadership to intervene in Syria in August 2016, despite having avoided
becoming embroiled in the Syrian civil war for five years.
THE EXPORT OF TURKISH SOFT POWER
Turkey has made extensive use of its economic power to enable the delivery of foreign
security policy. The Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı/Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency (TIKA) was created in 1992, primarily as “a technical aid organization under
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to respond to the restructuring, adaptation and development needs
of the Turkic (Turkish-speaking) Republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.”69 This
approach clearly pre-dates the rise to power of the AKP and has been a key pillar of Turkish foreign
policy that has survived relatively unscathed despite changes in the Turkish political scene. The size
and scale of the export of Turkish soft power is considerable. The TIKA annual report for 2014
stated that “projects are undertaken by 50 Program Coordination Offices and also in 150 countries
ranging from Central Asia and the Balkans to the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the
Pacific Islands.”70
Despite this type of activity pre-dating the AKP, the rapid expansion of TIKA activities can
be explained by the subsequent adoption of Davutoğlu’s concept of ‘Strategic Depth’ which in
principle number six sought to create a “new perception of Turkey.” As a result, Turkey is
increasingly turning towards its neighboring regions in order to export influence and Turkish
values. Against this policy aim, overseas development cooperation serves as a means for pursuing
complementary foreign policy goals. Most of all, increasing foreign aid is intended to convey a
positive image of Turkey to foreign populations. As a result, from 2003 to 2012 Turkish aid rose
69 TIKA website, accessed 19 January 17, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en. 70 TIKA Annual Report 2014, accessed 19 January 2017, http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/FAAL%C4%B0YET%20RAPORLARI/PDFLER/FR2014_ENG.pdf.
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from $67 million to $2.53 billion USD, a near fortyfold increase; Turkey’s strong focus on bilateral
aid is now a central pillar of delivering foreign security policy outcomes.71
Turkey’s increased development assistance should be understood within the context of its
foreign policy approach. Turkey’s increased development assistance corresponded to the
foreign policy principle of public diplomacy as formulated by Davutoğlu that is intended
to convey a positive image of the country to the foreign public.72 Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs explicitly set the creation of a more peaceful and more stable environment in its neighboring
regions as an over-arching goal of its own development cooperation meaning that development
cooperation directly serves the implementation of the ‘Zero Problems Policy.’ Poverty reduction
and the promotion of sustainable development are viewed as a means for moving closer to the goals
of peace and stability and so aid the delivery of foreign security policy is aligned with overseas aid.
A good example of Turkey’s move to align foreign security goals with development activity is
provided by Turkey’s extensive involvement in Somalia. Turkey has a large footprint in the country
and is building schools, providing scholarships, refurbishing government buildings, and rendering
budget support of approximately $4.5 million USD a month.73 Turkey’s expanding role in Somalia
is viewed as a success story by the Somalis, who have both recognized the benefits that Turkish
investment has brought.74 Then President of Somalia, Hassan Sheik Mahmoud was clear about the
value of Turkish aid when he stated in 2013:
The Turkish model in Somalia is very, very clear… They said we want to do this thing in Somalia, and they do it. They are there. They come there, starting from their top leadership, the prime minister of the country with his family, the rest, deputy prime minister, ministries… They are building or implementing projects that are really tangible ones…
71 Jeannine Hausmann, “Turkey as a Donor Country and Potential Partner in Triangular Cooperation,” German Development Institute, December 2014, accessed 19 January 2017, http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5599/pdf/DP_14.2014.pdf. 72 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001), 128. 73 Ahmed Ali, “Turkish aid in Somalia: the irresistible appeal of boots on the ground,” Guardian online, 30 September 2013, accessed 19 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/sep/30/turkey-aid-somalia-aid-effectiveness. 74 Laura Pitel, “Somalia reaps rewards of Ankara’s investment,” Financial Times online, 24 May 2016, accessed 19 January 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/bae31b04-fa6f-11e5-8f41-df5bda8beb40.
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They are doing the work there. They are driving their own cars. They are moving the city. They are building. They are teaching. They are – and there are a number of clinics that provide a free service to the people in Mogadishu alone. They are doing the same thing – they started doing the same thing in Puntland and Somaliland… Today Mogadishu is cleaner because of the support of the Turkish. They provided the garbage collection trucks and everything and the city is cleaner today.75 In line with the AKP’s vision of using Islam as a unifying factor among Muslim countries,
Turkey has also sponsored an extensive mosque building program in several countries. Starting in
March 2015, Turkey began building 18 large mosques, including one in Tirana, Albania, that will
hold more than 4,000 worshippers. Mosques are also being built in the United States, Russia,
Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the Palestinian Territories and Somalia.76 The
Diyanet, Turkey’s religious affairs ministry, has also become an important means of enabling
foreign security policy. Since 2006, the Diyanet budget has increased fourfold, to 5.4 billion lira
(just over $2 billion USD). The Diyanet’s share of Turkish government spending has increased by
about a third and its staff has doubled, to nearly 150,000. Its budget allocation in 2015 was 40
percent more than the Ministry of the Interior’s and equal to those of the Foreign, Energy, and
Culture and Tourism ministries combined.77
Turkey’s use of overseas aid, export of its version of Sunni Islam and a powerful sense of
its place in the world driven by the memory of Ottoman history are proving an effective means to
influence Muslim states far from Turkey. Western states such as the United States and Germany
have therefore expressed an opinion that they can rely on Turkey to act as a counterweight to other
nation states such as The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is exporting a version of Sunni Islam
(based on Wahhabi interpretations) which is not in line with western security goals.
75 Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, Speech delivered at CSIS “The Future of Governance in Somalia,” 17 January 2013, accessed 6 March 2017, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/130117_HassanSheikhMahamud_transcript.pdf, 18-19. 76 David Lepeska, “Turkey Casts the Diyanet,” Foreign Affairs, 17 May 2015, accessed 19 January 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-05-17/turkey-casts-diyanet. 77 Ibid.
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REGIONAL ACTORS
Turkey’s immediate neighbors of Iran, Syria and Iraq all have vested and interconnected
interests with the execution of Turkish foreign policy. Through direct support of organizations such
as the Kurdistan Workers Party (i.e. PKK) and by offering means such as direct financing and the
provision of sanctuary, the PKK has acted as the proxy of other regional powers (Syria and Iran)
who have all sought to further their own regional interests at the expense of Turkey. Syria, Iran and
Iraq are also concerned with their own Kurdish populations and what Kurdish autonomy inside
Turkey could mean for them. Maintaining a local balance of power in their favor, and containing
pro-western influences evident in the Turkish state has been to their historical advantage.
IRAQ 2002-2017
Turkish interests in Iraq are multifaceted, but are primarily driven by the desire to improve
economic ties, ensure that Kurdish groups do not gain too much power and autonomy and for ethnic
Turkmens to be protected inside Iraq. The prospect of a Kurdish nation—the Kurdistan Region of
Iraq (KRI)—emerging as an autonomous region within Iraq and possibly an independent state is
viewed as an existential threat to the unitary nature of the Republic of Turkey.78 This is because it
could encourage the PKK to once again press for autonomy or outright independence from Turkey,
a claim that was previously renounced by Öcalan in 1999.
Turkey is intensely interested in the treatment of the Turkmen ethnic group, with the
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) website stating: “Turkey continuously communicates
with Iraqi authorities regarding the problems faced by Iraqi Turkmens. Turkey always reiterates
that, Iraqi Turkmens, who are inseparable part of the Iraqi society, should be represented more in
78 Bill Park, and International Institute for Strategic Studies, Turkey’s policy towards northern Iraq: Problems and perspectives (New York; London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), 12.
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their country’s governing bodies.”79 Having a significant Turkmens minority inside Iraq is of
course convenient for Turkey, as it provides an excuse, in the name of ‘protecting’ Turkemens, for
Turkey to intervene in the KRI. Turkey’s involvement in the KRI is also somewhat hypocritical in
light of Davutoğlu’s repeated criticism of western powers use of the concept of ethnic nationalism
to maintain borders in the region. Turkey is content to use the presence of Turkmens in northern
Iraq to curb Kurdish territorial ambitions, while securing its own borders, by harnessing the very
same ethnic nationalism to further its own ends. The Turkish Army’s ongoing deployment to
Baashiqa (near Mosul), a unilateral deployment outside of the US—led Operation Inherent Resolve
coalition, remains a major point of contention between Turkey and Iraq and is a classic example of
this type of Turkish behavior. Turkey’s relationship with the Massoud Barzani led Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG) is very strong, but the presence of a 2,000 strong Turkish Army
contingent in Baashiqa in the KRG in northern Iraq where they are purportedly training local militia
to combat Daesh has caused continuing friction between the two governments. Iraq maintains that
the Turkish presence is illegal, while Turkey maintains that their forces are there at the behest of
KRG authority.80
This crisis came to a head in October 2016, when Iraq threatened military action against
Turkish forces, with Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi calling the Turkish troops “an occupying
force...risking a regional war.” The Barzani led KRG had agreed to the Turkish troops’ presence,
but not the central Baghdad government.81 However, from the Turkish point of view, a strong
79 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relations between Turkey-Iraq,” undated, acessed 19 January 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-iraq.en.mfa. 80 “Turkish PM Yildirim visits Iraq to mend relations,” Al Jazeera, 8 January 2017, accessed 19 January 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/turkish-pm-yildirim-visits-iraq-mend-relations-170108111350047.html. 81 Mark Lowen, “Battle for Mosul: A row between Turkey and Iraq could derail the offensive,” BBC Turkey, 13 October 2016, accessed 19 January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37629577.
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presence in northern Iraq, it’s near abroad, is an essential part of its security strategy to counter the
PKK and allied groups.
Economic ties are also a vital security interest to Turkey. In 2015, Iraq was the third largest
export partner of Turkey with a share of 5.9% ($8.56 billion USD) of total exports. Given the
faltering Turkish economy, strong economic links and exports with Iraq remains a top priority.82
Excluding the oil sector, Turkey is the largest commercial investor in Iraq. Turkey’s Trade Ministry
estimates that the trade volume between Turkey and Iraq exceeded $6 billion USD in 2010, up from
only $940 million USD in 2003, boosting Iraq’s position from Turkey’s tenth largest trade partner
to the fifth largest. Ceyhan, on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast of Turkey, is the terminus for a
pipeline that transports crude oil from fields around Kirkuk in northern Iraq, which accounts for
about a third of Iraq’s total crude exports.83 Turkey’s economic ties with the KRG are even closer,
with Turkey exporting circa $8 billion USD in goods and services to the region in 2013, or 67% of
total revenue.84
The continuing battle for Mosul is of critical interest to Turkish foreign policy. Turkey is
determined not to lose its influence over Mosul, which has a large ethnic Turkmen population.
Erdoğan has had difficult relations with the Shia-led government of Haider Al-Abadi and has taken
umbrage at the prospect that Shia militias could play a larger role in the ongoing Mosul offensive.
The Turkish prime minister, Binali Yıldırım has also warned against “any forceful change in the
demographic composition of the region.”85
82 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relations between Turkey-Iraq,” 2011, accessed 19 January 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-iraq.en.mfa. 83 Hasan Turunc, “Turkey and Iraq,” London School of Economics, May 2011, accessed 19 January 2017, http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR007.aspx. 84 Soner Çağaptay, Christina Bache Fidan, and Ege Cansu Saçıkara, “Turkey and the KRG signs of booming economic ties,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2015, accessed 19 January 2017, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/infographics/TurkeyKRGSignsofBoomingEconomicTies2.pdf. 85 Mark Lowen, “Battle for Mosul: A row between Turkey and Iraq could derail the offensive”, BBC Turkey, 13 October 2016, accessed 19 January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37629577.
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The major security issue for Turkey in Iraq relates to the alignment of Kurdish militias.
Turkey sees the PKK in Turkey and the YPG PKK offshoot in Syria as terrorists. As a counter,
Turkey has strong relations with the KRG government, and has facilitated oil exports from the
KRG through Turkey. Turkey is therefore determined to keep any Kurdish militia forces allied to
the PKK out of the ongoing operation to liberate Mosul. Metin Gurcan, a military analyst and
columnist for Al-Monitor sums up Turkey’s policy choices in Iraq succinctly: “Ankara is trying to
create a Sunni power center in northern Iraq—a sort of ‘Sunnistan’—through the KRG and Sunni
tribes…fighting for local dominance with sub-national armed actors. But it’s playing in a room full
of glass and with two elephants: the United States and Russia. Turkey must work with the U.S. as a
NATO member. But on a political and diplomatic level, it’s trying to align with Russia—and that
creates a dangerous split.”86
Iraq is therefore of vital interest to the delivery of Turkish security policy and the overall
Turkish economy. Turkey, which considers northern Iraq as part of its natural hinterland, finds
itself engaged in a delicate balancing act between the central Baghdad government, the Barzani led
KRG and the ambitions of other Kurdish groups who have aligned themselves with PKK affiliated
groups such as the YPG. Turkey has achieved notable successes in the KRG by aligning with the
Barzanis, however; this is at the risk of fracturing its relationship with the Abadi led government.
By backing the KRG and focusing on trade, while simultaneously ensuring that the Turkmen
minority is protected via the deployment of a sizable Turkish military contingent, Turkey is
engaged in delivering a difficult set of security policy choices, but has no other realistic alternatives
given the complicated nature of Iraq.
86 Ibid.
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SYRIA 2002-2017
Until the Syrian civil war broke out in March 2011, maintaining cordial relations with Syria
was a top priority of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. However, Turkey’s relationship
with Syria has historically been difficult. Syria’s close relationship with the Soviet Union and then
Russia has always provoked apathy from Turkey’s leadership. Syrian support for the PKK until
1998 further strained relations, with Turkey blaming the Syrian regime for the deaths of many
Turkish soldiers in the protracted fight against the PKK. In 1998, the Syrian regime of Hafez Al-
Assad determined that its relationship with Turkey was more important than any leverage gained by
supporting the PKK, so decided on a policy of political rapprochement with Turkey. This
culminated in the signing of the Adana accords on 20 October 1998.87
The election of the AKP in 2002 ensured that improving relations with Syria became a
priority, given the economic interdependence between the two nations. This was an interesting
Turkish policy choice given that the Syrian Ba’athist ideology at the time favored secular Arab
nationalism, rather than Islam as the bulwark of political legitimacy. The unlikely rapprochement
with the Ba’athist’s was, however, perfectly rational given Davutoğlu’s concept of Strategic Depth.
Davutoğlu in his earlier thesis had argued that the Cold War’s bipolar order was one of the reasons
for the successful spread of the Ba’athist ideology in Syria, as the United States and Soviet Union
encouraged proxies to serve their wider interests in the Middle East. With the end of the Cold War
and its governing framework, Davutoğlu postulated that there was an opportunity for
rapprochement using shared Islamic values and associated political and economic ties to regulate
Syrian behavior.88
87 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relations between Turkey–Syria,” 2011, accessed 19 January 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey%E2%80%93syria.en.mfa. 88 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001), 362-363.
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Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria, driven in many ways by recognition that there were
limits to Turkish political, economic and military power, therefore sought to focus on improving
relations with the Assad regime. In doing so, Turkish policymakers aimed to garner political
moderation and mutual benefit from Assad as a byproduct.89 Davutoğlu clearly assessed that
improved Turkish political and economic ties with Syria would reconnect Turkish businesses in
southern Anatolia with its natural and historical hinterland in and around Aleppo province.90 A key
shared interest of Turkey and Syria remained to prevent the establishment of an independent
Kurdish state in Iraq at any costs, given the impact this could have on restive Kurdish populations
in both Turkey and Syria. This was especially the case after the successful US invasion of Iraq in
2003, given the close ties established between the KRG and the United States.
Despite these intense efforts, Turkey’s rapprochement with Syria ultimately failed. When
protests began against the Assad regime in 2011, Erdoğan urged Assad to adopt a more moderate
approach to avoid conflict. Assad chose to ignore his advice and launched a campaign of increasing
brutality that quickly escalated into a full blown civil war. Erdoğan was outraged when Syrian air
defenses shot down a Turkish Air Force RF4-E Phantom II reconnaissance aircraft on 22 June
2012. As a result, Turkey rapidly cut all diplomatic ties and ever since has stridently called for
Assad’s removal as a pre-condition for any peace settlement. Despite the effort that Turkish
policymakers expended on improving relationships with Syria, the Assad regime looked to other
countries for support (Russia and Iran) with the result that Turkey’s influence became minimal.
Turkey’s security goals have thus not been realized and the Syrian conflict is now in its sixth year.
89 Owen Mathews, “Davutoğlu: Inside Turkey’s new foreign policy,” Newsweek, 28 November 2009, accessed 20 January 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/davutoglu-inside-turkeys-new-foreign-policy-76677. 90 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, 372.
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COUNTER DAESH ACTIVITY 2014-2017
US support for the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (Kurdish: Yekîneyên Parastina
Gel, popularly known as the YPG) in the counter-Daesh fight in Syria has placed US policymakers
at odds with their Turkish counterparts. Turkey has always been most concerned in Syria that the
Syrian Kurds would seek to carve out an independent Kurdish autonomous region—Rojava as it is
commonly referred to—with serious consequences for the internal security situation inside Turkey.
Turkey continues to fight a protracted insurgency against the PKK, so Turkish policymakers have
every right to be concerned at this prospect, given the acknowledged close links between the YPG
and PKK.91 To halt the seemingly unstoppable march of Daesh in late 2014, US policymakers
sought to encourage Turkey to enter the fray to bring its considerable military resources to bear
against the group.92 However, as the siege of Kobanî in late summer 2014 aptly demonstrated,
Turkish policymakers, including Erdoğan, refused to commit Turkish military power to further
Kurdish aims in their quest for establishing Rojava.
Turkish policy towards Daesh has been opaque, with persistent intelligence surfacing that
Turkey has provided a degree of at least tacit support to the group to act as a counterbalance to the
US supported YPG. In many ways, Turkish support for Daesh as a proxy to counter the YPG
mirrors the Pakistani approach, where the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) has allegedly
supported the Afghan Taliban to maintain balance in the region.93 The journalist Patrick Cockburn
has gone on record that there is “strong evidence for a degree of collaboration” between the Turkish
91 Former Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Select Committee, testimony on Counter-ISIL (Islamic State Of Iraq and The Levant) Operations and Middle East Strategy, 114th Cong, 2d session, 28 April 2016, accessed 01 April 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/16-51_04-28-16.pdf, 99. During this testimony, then Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter admitted to Senator Lindsey Graham (R—South Carolina) that the YPG and PKK have close ties. 92 Steven A. Cook, “Between Ankara and Rojava,” Foreign Affairs, 14 March 2016, accessed December 14 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-03-14/between-ankara-and-rojava. 93 BBC News, “Pakistani agents ‘funding and training Afghan Taliban’” 13 June 2010, accessed 4 March 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/10302946.
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intelligence services and Daesh, although the “exact nature of the relationship ... remains cloudy.”94
There have also been corroborated reports by Daesh fighters that the Turkish military has provided
logistical and medical support and allowed free movement across the Turkish/Syria border, at least
until the Paris attacks in November 2015. Daesh fighters have stated that they were essentially
given free rein by the Turkish security forces: “ISIS commanders told us to fear nothing at all
because there was full cooperation with the Turks…ISIS saw the Turkish army as its ally especially
when it came to attacking the Kurds in Syria.”95 There has also been persistent evidence that
Turkey has allowed foreign fighters free passage to travel through Turkey to join Daesh and other
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) inside Syria.
The US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, when asked during a
Congressional hearing in March 2015 if he was optimistic that Turkey would do more in the fight
against the Daesh stated: “No, I’m not…I think Turkey has other priorities and other interests.”
Clapper went on to state during the same testimony that public opinion polls in Turkey show that
Turks do not see Daesh as a primary threat; polls consistently show that Kurdish terrorism is the
population’s main concern.96 Clapper’s analysis concluded with his belief that Turkey is more
concerned with opposing Kurdish autonomy within Syria than in fighting Daesh.97 Some 18 months
later, even after the Turkish intervention into northern Syria to purportedly defeat Daesh, this trend
has continued.
94 Patrick Cockburn, “Whose side is Turkey on?” London Review of Books, 36 (21): 8–10, (6 November 2014), accessed 11 Jan 17, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n21/patrick-cockburn/whose-side-is-turkey-on. 95 “ISIS Sees Turkey as Its Ally: Former Islamic State Member Reveals Turkish Army Cooperation,” Newsweek, 7 November 2014, accessed 11 January 17, http://www.newsweek.com/isis-and-turkey-cooperate-destroy-kurds-former-isis-member-reveals-turkish-282920?rx=us. 96 Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), “Public Opinion Surveys of Turkish Foreign Policy 2013/3, accessed 6 March 2017, http://www.edam.org.tr/en/File?id=85. 97 Tim Arango and Eric Schmitt, “A Path to ISIS, through a Porous Turkish Border,” New York Times, 9 March 2015, accessed 11 January 17, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/europe/despite-crackdown-path-to-join-isis-often-winds-through-porous-turkish-border.html?_r=1.
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In a major departure from previous Turkish foreign security policy and perhaps driven by
the July 2016 coup attempt, Turkish security forces launched Operation EUPHRATES SHIELD on
24 August 2016. Turkey declared it was exercising its right of self-defense, as codified under the
UN Charter Article 51, to justify the launch of the operation. The intervention into Syria caught
many observers by surprise, although the operation had been in the offing for upwards of twelve
months, but continually delayed due to concerns with the quality of Free Syrian Army forces that
were scheduled to take part. In comparison to the previous reluctance to intervene militarily in the
region, the operation is a stark departure from previous Turkish foreign policy. However, after the
15 July 2016 coup attempt, it seems clear that Erdoğan is determined to exercise greater control
over the military, who were reportedly strongly opposed to the Syrian incursion.98
The operation has not gone as planned. Although rapid gains were made with the key towns
of Jarabulus and Dabiq captured before late December 2016, progress since then towards the key
intermediate objective of Al-Bab has been slow. Daesh has put up stiff resistance and up to
February 2017, 65 Turkish soldiers have been killed. In addition, Turkish forces are operating in
close proximity to Russian, Syrian Army and Syrian government allied militias, which despite
claims of close cooperation between Turkey and Russia for the operation, has resulted in a number
of casualties due to so called ‘friendly fire.’99 It would seem that Erdoğan is now committed to see
the operation through to its conclusion, however long this may take.
ISRAEL 2002-2017
Israel has generally proved to be a key ally for Turkey. Given their similar security
outlooks, both states have generally worked together to forge a political and military cooperative in
98 Tim Arango, “With Operation in Syria, Erdogan Shows His New Power over Turkey’s Military,” New York Times, 25 August 2016, accessed 11 January 17, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/europe/turkey-tanks-syria.html. 99 “Syria war: Russian ‘friendly fire’ kills Turkish soldiers,” BBC News, 9 February 2017, accessed 13 February 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38919426.
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the region. For Turkey, Israel has been a reliable supplier of weapons that did not ask too many
questions about how they were used. Israel certainly did not tie sales of these weapons to improving
human rights as the United States and other European nations did. Middle East scholar Efraim Inbar
noted “This partnership is characteristic of two satisfied (non-revisionist) powers cooperating
primarily to preserve the regional status quo and to fend off common threats.”100
With the seemingly successful renewing of ties with Syria in 1998, this prompted the AKP
led government in 2002 to attempt to mediate in other more pressing regional conflicts such as the
perpetual Israeli—Palestinian stalemate and the wider competition for scarce resources in the
region such as water rights. By seeking to mediate as an honest Islamic state broker, Davutoğlu and
the AKP led foreign policy establishment sought to place Turkey at the geopolitical center of the
region, in line with Davutoğlu’s wider foreign policy vision.
This policy of Turkish facilitated mediation failed. Despite strenuous efforts by then Prime
Minister Erdoğan, ultimately mediation between Syria and Israel was unsuccessful. Several key
summits between Israel and Syria over the Palestinian issue made some progress. However, a surge
in violence in the Gaza strip in December 2008 resulted in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
launching Operation CAST LEAD to defeat Hamas in situ. Erdoğan, despite having good relations
with the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, felt slighted by the IDF’s incursion into Gaza,
despite his pleas not to do so. Erdoğan, incensed at what had been construed as implicit Turkish
involvement with the IDF incursion into Gaza stated “today, I was planning to call Israeli Prime
Minister Olmert regarding Syria-Israeli talks but I cancelled it. I am not calling because it is also
disrespectful [the IDF incursion into Gaza] to us. We are a country which has been working for
100 Afrain Inbar, “Turkey’s New Strategic Partner Israel,” in Dangerous Neighborhood, ed. Michael Radu (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2003), 171.
41
peace.”101 On 28 December 2008, Syria suspended its involvement in further peace talks with
Israel.
Israeli/Turkish relations suffered a near fatal blow after the Mavi Mara flotilla incident on
31 May 2010 when Israeli naval commandos from the elite unit Shayetet 13 killed ten Turkish
activists on board a Turkish civilian registered ship that was part of an aid flotilla attempting to
breach the blockade of Gaza. In the immediate aftermath of the raid, Turkey withdrew its
ambassador from Tel Aviv and then Prime Minister Erdoğan called for Israel to be punished for its
“bloody massacre.” Joint military exercises were also cancelled. It took until June 2016 for Turkey
and Israel to normalize relations, after both sides agreed to compromise on compensation and
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized to Turkey.102
IRAN 2002-2017
Iranian interests have historically centered on keeping Turkish ambitions in the Trans-
Caucuses in check, preventing the expansion of destabilizing “western ways” deeper into the
Middle East and Iran’s sphere of influence and to prevent the emergence of another Sunni power
(in addition to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 placed
Turkey and Iran in competition to win influence in the newly independent Caucuses, resulting in
both sides backing insurgent movements to balance each other. Both the PKK and Iraqi Kurds
benefited greatly from Iranian support at the height of the PKK insurgency in the 1990s along with
Iranian financial support and provision of critically needed materiel to prosecute their insurgency.
Believing that Turkey was instrumental in funding the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a paramilitary
movement residing in Iraqi territory committed to re-establishing a non-fundamentalist regime in
101 Paul Schemm, “Arab World Condemns Israeli Attack on Gaza”, Associated Press, 27 December 2008. 102 “Mavi Marmara: Why did Israel stop the Gaza flotilla?” BBC News, 27 June 2016, accessed 14 February 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/10203726.
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Iran, supporting the PKK acted as a form of retribution.103 Iranian policies towards these ends were
not without contradictions. Seeking to keep its own Kurdish population firmly in check, full
Kurdish independence within Turkey was not Iran’s objective. The aim of Iranian support to the
PKK was essentially a negative one. Though not desirous of a PKK victory, internal agitation
would keep the Turkish state off-balance and focused away from Iranian interests.104
Trade continues to be of vital importance to both nations. In 2015, it accounted for $3.62
billion USD of Turkish trade or 9.77% of the total; however, it should be noted that this is
significantly down from 2011 when it accounted for $3.59 billion USD or 16.05%. Despite this fall,
Turkey has played a significant part in providing the Iranian exchequer sorely needed foreign
currency, especially while western sanctions were in place that were designed to curb Iranian
nuclear ambitions.105
Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Turkish and Iranian interests have sharply diverged.
Iran has backed the Assad regime with every means at its disposal and has co-opted Lebanese
Hezbollah into supporting the Assad regime. Erdoğan, by stridently calling for Assad’s removal,
has essentially limited his negotiation space and relations with Iran have suffered accordingly.
Despite this, trade between the two countries remains a vital interest and likely acts as a moderating
influence on foreign policy.
US FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKEY 2002-2017
The United States has long been a staunch supporter of Turkey, despite the political
upheavals and long standing military dominance of Turkish government from the 1940s to the late
1990s. Turkey is viewed as an essential ally in the region and has risen in importance given the
103 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, 95. 104 Ibid. 105 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Economic and Commercial Relations with Iran,” undated, accessed 6 March 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/economic-and-commercial-relations-with-iran.en.mfa.
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ongoing conflict versus Daesh. The US Embassy mission in Turkey is stated as:
The goal is to promote the objectives and protect the interests of the United States and its citizens in the Republic of Turkey. We strive to represent the United States in a way that will make the American taxpayer proud…in addition, the U.S. speaks out in Turkey for enhanced democracy and for the protection of human rights. We work for better relations between Turkey and Greece and for a just and durable settlement of the Cyprus question. The United States and Turkey also work together to fight terrorism; to pursue peace in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus; to fight drug trafficking and money laundering; to bring Caspian basin oil and gas to world markets via pipelines through Turkey; and to maintain close defense cooperation.106 Analysis of this mission statement provides some interesting contrasts. The U.S. has been
Turkey’s main supporter on three core foreign policy issues over the last thirty years: EU
membership, the Caspian oil pipeline, and the campaign against the PKK.107 Since 2001, Turkey is
supported as a main line of defense against Islamic extremism and at least prior to the latest coup
attempt in July 2016, held up as a model for what a democratic state might have looked like pre-
Arab Spring. Turkey has continued to demonstrate its value to the United States by its strong
support against trans-regional terrorism of all hues and has been rewarded with extensive Foreign
Military Sales (FMS).108 Turkey was also the only Islamic nation to join the US operation in
Afghanistan under NATO. Though Turkish public opinion was 80% against committing Turkish
forces, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit justified his government’s decision: “by noting that having
fought terrorism for so long [against the PKK], Turkey would have denied itself if it chose to opt
out of this war.”109 Maintaining a close relationship with the United States has somewhat mitigated
the effects of continuing problems experienced with the EU regarding accession. Masking the
campaign against the PKK under the auspices of the ongoing fight against Islamic inspired Violent
106 US Embassy Turkey website, accessed 14 December 16, https://tr.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulates/ankara/mission/. 107 Stephen F. Larrabee, “U.S. and European Policy Towards Turkey and the Caspian Basin,” in Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, eds R.D. Blackwill and M. Sturmer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 152. 108 Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DCSA). Turkey homepage, accessed 14 February 2017, http://www.dsca.mil/tags/turkey. 109 Birol A. Yesilada, “Turkish-U.S. Relations,” in Dangerous Neighborhood, ed. Michael S. Radu (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2003), 193.
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Extremist Organisations has also provided the Turkish government with an added degree of
legitimacy to its efforts.
US policy has so far been ineffective in realizing an enduring solution to the Cyprus issue.
With the rejection of the last settlement proposals in 2015, further negotiations between Mustafa
Akinci, elected President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in April 2016 and Greek
Cypriot leader Nicos Anastisiades have yet to yield tangible results.110 While familiar issues remain
such as restoration of Greek Cypriot property rights predating the Turkish intervention in 1974, new
issues such as ownership of energy rights and Turkish mainland provision of electricity and water
to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have now come to the fore. Ongoing disagreements
over energy exploration in the region threatens to completely undermine U.S. efforts to broker a
lasting settlement as in the latest round of licensing for off shore oil and gas fields, Turkey has
already claimed that several of the blocks auctioned by the Republic of Cyprus lie within Turkey’s
Exclusive Economic Zone.111 These issues, plus a continued AKP sponsored program to export
Turkey’s specific brand of Sunni Islam via an extensive mosque building program in the inherently
secular Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, promise more friction in the coming years.
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IMPACT ON TURKEY 2002-2017
Russian foreign policy towards Turkey has generally been cooperative since the rise of
Erdoğan and the AKP to power, although there is a long history of antagonism driven by
competition for resources in the region.112 Turkey’s relationship with Russia has, over the past
fifteen years, been built on economic cooperation, shared distrust of the western-dominated
international order, and the personal chemistry of Vladimir Putin and Erdoğan. However, this
110 Jonathan Gorvett, “One Cyprus?” Foreign Affairs, 27 October 2016, accessed 14 December 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2016-10-27/one-cyprus. 111 Ibid. 112 Jeffrey Mankoff, “Why Russia and Turkey Fight,” Foreign Affairs, 24 February 2016, accessed 17 January 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-02-24/why-russia-and-turkey-fight.
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fifteen year Russo-Turkish entente is in many ways an historical anomaly.113
Since 2002, and born of strategic necessity, both countries have focused on deepening
economic cooperation. As a result, Russia refused asylum to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and
cancelled the sale of the S-300 air defense systems to Greek Cyprus, a red line for Turkey. A 2001
agreement addressed the tensions between the countries over the Caucasus and Central Asia. Under
a January 2002 agreement, Russia withdrew support for the PKK while Turkey adopted a harder
line on Chechen and other North Caucasus terrorist groups operating from Turkey.
With these strategic tensions eased, economic links between Russia and Turkey
dramatically increased. By 2008, Russia was Turkey’s single largest trading partner. Energy
imports have been the most important component of this strengthened economic relationship.
Turkey has few oil reserves and imported more than 60% of its oil from Russia in 2009 (although
this number has since drastically reduced). Russia still supplies Turkey with about 57 percent of its
natural gas. Economic ties also extended to nuclear power, construction, tourism, and other sectors
as well.114
Enabling this Russo-Turkish reconciliation was growing estrangement from the West and
the strong personal rapport between Putin and Erdoğan, who both opposed the US—led invasion of
Iraq. For Russia, renewed NATO expansion and the so-called color revolutions in Georgia and
Ukraine revived fears that the West (i.e. the United States) was seeking to reduce Russian influence
in Russia’s natural hinterland. For Turkey, the stalling of EU accession talks, coupled with the
admission into the EU of Greek Cyprus (i.e. the Republic of Cyprus) despite its rejection of a UN-
sponsored peace plan deepened Turkey’s angst. Turkey and Russia also sought to position
113 Bülent Gökay, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey, and Communism (Routledge: London and New York, 2006), 11. Gökay provides a good analysis of the dynamics between the fledgling Turkish and Russian states. The period 1919-1923 was marked by good relations between the two countries as they struggled for independence, however, once both states secured their positions, competition for influence and power with the region saw their interests to diverge. 114 Mankoff, “Why Russia and Turkey Fight.”
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themselves as intermediaries between the West and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear program. Finally,
Turkey also took a relatively accommodating stance over Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia.115
Since 2011, the Russian-Turkish marriage of convenience has faltered as geopolitics and
differing foreign security policy aims have collided. Conflicts in the Caucasus, Ukraine, and the
Middle East have all left Russia and Turkey at loggerheads, reducing Turkey’s security and margin
for action. Russia’s annexation of Crimea has fundamentally altered the balance of power in and
around the Black Sea, with Russia since bolstering its maritime and anti-access/area denial
capabilities around the Crimea peninsula. Thus, Turkey now faces the prospect of strategic
encirclement by an updated and operationally experienced Russian Black Sea Fleet. In addition,
mounting tensions along the Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact (LoC) and the Armenia–
Azerbaijan border threatens to pull Russia and Turkey into a proxy conflict. Russia’s efforts to
move Azerbaijan away from its energy-driven alignment with Turkey and the European Union have
increased tensions.116
By far the biggest rift with Russia has been caused by the ongoing civil war in Syria. For
Turkey, Syria has turned into a prolonged proxy war. From the outset, Turkey has sought to remove
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and to achieve this has supported Sunni rebel groups that Russia
has labeled terrorists. This has proved problematic given the weakness of the Syrian opposition,
meaning that Turkish support has not been translated into meaningful military or political gains.
Turkey has been unable to articulate a sensible vision for what a post-Assad Syria might look like.
Russia (along with Iran) has provided the Syrian regime with generous support, including via the
115 Bulent Aliriza, “Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 9 September 2008, accessed 6 March 2017, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/080909_aliriza_caucuses.pdf. On 2 September 2008, in a clear piece of realpolitik, Erdoğan (Prime Minister at the time) stated: “It would not be right for Turkey to be pushed toward any side. Certain circles want to push Turkey into a corner either with the United States or Russia after the Georgian incident. One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important trade volume. We would act in line with what Turkey’s national interests require.” 116 Ibid.
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direct military intervention launched on 30 September 2015, which has proved to be a decisive
turning point in the conflict. Turkey’s policy towards Syria has generally been viewed as an abject
failure, with the PKK-linked Democratic Union Party (PYD) establishing a Kurdish proto-state on
Turkey’s southern border, even as the war with the PKK inside Turkey has been renewed with
increased ferocity.
There is little chance of Turkish-Russian relationships returning to their pre-Syrian civil
war level of consensus, despite the recent Turkey/Russia brokered ceasefire in Syria in January
2017 and reported wider cooperation. Russian and Turkish interests increasingly diverge in the
Caucasus, the Black Sea, and the Middle East. The annexation of Crimea dramatically escalates the
threat Turkey faces from the Black Sea, while the Syrian and Kurdish conflicts have created an
unparalleled refugee problem and the opportunity for the Syrian Kurds to establish an autonomous
region right on Turkey’s southern border. This can but inflame the conflict with the PKK inside
Turkey, especially with Russia providing direct support to the PKK aligned PYD.
TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2002-2017
EU integration has long been a goal for Turkish policymakers of the Kemalist stable.
Stephen Larrabee concluded that “Ankara has seen full membership in the EU as a symbol of the
successful completion of the Atatürk revolution.”117 The drive to make this a reality has, in the past,
caused the Turkish government to make substantial compromises and EU policies had a direct
impact on Turkish governance and human rights legislation, including the methods it has used to
prosecute the war against the PKK. However, Turkey’s strategic positioning has not been enough to
convince EU member states that Turkey should be admitted. Turkish unique selling points have
included portraying itself as a stabilizing force on Europe’s periphery and as the corridor for energy
117 Stephen F. Larrabee, U.S. and European Policy Towards Turkey and the Caspian Basin, 159.
48
resources flowing into Europe from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.118 The EU’s focus, however,
is not on security or economics, but rather on human rights and how they were applied to its
Kurdish minority.
Since 2001, Turkey implemented seven reform packages or “Harmonization Laws” to meet
EU demands. To establish the baseline for EU human rights requirements, Turkey became a party
to several human rights conventions. Most notable of these was the European Convention of
Human Rights which incorporates the European Court of Human Rights (EHCR) as a binding
judicial body on municipal law. Despite promising progress, Turkey-EU relations have remained
fraught. During the period 2004-2007, a period when relations between the two entities were at a
high point, Turkey’s candidacy was still put on hold, due to the election of Angela Merkel in
Germany, Nicolas Sarkozy in France and the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004. During 2007-
2011, negotiations did not progress as quickly as Turkey had hoped, resulting in rising frustration
among Turkish policymakers. This was not helped by the RoC refusing to allow a number of
important chapters on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, Energy and Education, in retaliation for
Turkey’s refusal to formally recognize the RoC.119 Since 2011, the refugee crisis emanating from
Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and large swathes of North Africa has been a driving factor in Turkey-EU
relations.
The migration deal signed between Turkey and the EU appeared to be a seminal moment
that might have ultimately pave the way for accession talks to get under way again in earnest. The
deal, agreed on 18 March 2016, proposed: “to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU
and replace it instead with legal channels of resettlement of refugees to the European Union. The
118 Inbar, “Turkey’s New Strategic Partner: Israel,” in Dangerous Neighborhood, ed. Michael S. Radu (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2003), 167. 119 Nicolas Watt, “David Cameron warns EU not to shut Turkey out,” The Guardian Online, 26 July 2010, accessed 6 March 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/jul/27/david-cameron-turkey-european-union.
49
aim is to replace disorganized, chaotic, irregular and dangerous migratory flows by organized, safe
and legal pathways to Europe for those entitled to international protection in line with EU and
international law.”120 The scale of the problem, which President of the EU Jean-Claude Juncker
described as a “Herculean task,” aims to return migrants who have illegally crossed into Greece
from Turkey, in return for the EU lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by
the end of June 2016; this has still not occurred.121 The number of migrants crossing into Greece
from Turkey in the latter parts of 2015 was unsustainable, which prompted the deal.122 The efficacy
of the agreement has been repeatedly questioned and analysis of the statistics shows that the decline
in the number of arrivals into Greece predates the EU-Turkey agreement; if the agreement had any
effect, it was in fact to achieve an interruption of the decline of those seeking to gain entry to the
EU as there was a spike in those trying to gain access before the deal was agreed.123
The migrant deal has offered Turkey a powerful bargaining tool in its delivery of foreign
policy in the region. In response to a non-binding vote by the European Parliament to freeze talks
on EU membership for Turkey given the AKP government’s severe crackdown after the 15 July
2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan, on 25 November 2016, accused the EU of breaking its promises. As
part of the March 2016 deal, Turkey was promised aid (€3 billion), visa-free travel for Turkish
citizens and accelerated EU membership talks. Erdoğan, in a direct threat to EU policy makers
stated, “Listen to me: these border gates will be opened if you go any further.”124 Erdoğan, by
120 “Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement - Questions and Answers,” European Commission - Fact Sheet, 15 June 2016, accessed 17 January 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_en.htm. 121 Chris Morris, “EU-Turkey migrant deal: A Herculean task,” BBC News, 18 Mar 2016, accessed 17 Jan 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-35848181. 122 “Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers,” European Commission - Fact Sheet. The total numbers of irregular arrivals from Turkey to Greece in September, October, November, December 2015, January and February 2016 were respectively 147,639, 214,792, 154,381, 104,399, 61,602 and 56,335 persons. 123 Thomas Spijkerboer, “Fact Check: Did the EU-Turkey Deal Bring Down the Number of Migrants and of Border Deaths”? 28 Sep 2016, accessed 18 January 2017, University of Oxford Faculty of Law, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/09/fact-check-did-eu. 124 “Migrant crisis: Turkey threatens EU with new surge,” BBC News online, 25 November 2016, accessed 18
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resorting to such direct rhetoric, clearly aimed to make it clear that he would countenance reneging
on the migrant deal, which would then flood Europe with migrants again. The migration deal is of
vital importance to the EU and in particular Germany, which accepted nearly 1 million migrants in
2015. The acceptance of so many migrants has placed particularly heavy pressure on the Merkel
led Christian Democrat Party (CDP) ruling coalition, to the point that Merkel may lose the
chancellorship in the next round of state elections in July 2017.125
Turkey currently hosts almost three million migrants and refugees, mostly from Syria,
although the exact ethnic breakdown is difficult to ascertain. In 2015, more than one million
migrants made their way to Europe, mainly via Turkey. Under the March 2016 agreement, migrants
arriving in Greece are now sent back to Turkey if they do not apply for asylum or their claim is
rejected. For each Syrian migrant returned to Turkey, the EU takes in another Syrian who has made
a legitimate request. The deal to gain visa-free travel for Turkish citizens stalled when Turkey
refused to change its anti-terror laws; many in Europe have also criticized Turkey's severe reaction
to the failed July 2016 coup. These included High Representative Federica Mogherini and
Commissioner Johannes Hahn who stated they were “concerned” by Turkey’s decision to declare a
state of emergency and that the measures imposed were “unacceptable.”126
On 24 November 2016, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly (479 votes in favor
and 37 against, with 107 abstentions) to suspend Turkey’s EU membership talks because of the
Turkish government’s crackdown since the coup attempt in July 2016. President Erdoğan,
somewhat predictably stated that “Turkey should feel relaxed about the EU and not be fixated about
January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38103375. 125 Jenny Hill, “Could this man be the next chancellor of Germany?” BBC Berlin, 24 February 2017, accessed 6 March 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39067413?intlink_from_url=http://www.bbc.com/news/topics/bf922d40-1842-479d-a4bf-2ce36bdf1f94/german-federal-elections-2017&link_location=live-reporting-story. This story refers to Herr Martin Schulz (currently a Member of the European Parliament (MEP)). He is running neck and neck with the current German Chancellor, Angela Merkel for the post in the summer elections. 126 “Turkey attempted coup: EU says measures ‘unacceptable’” BBC News Europe, 21 July 2016, accessed 18 January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36861154.
51
joining it.”127 He also repeated the oft stated prospect of Turkey joining Russia and China in the
Eurasian security group Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), by stating “Why shouldn’t
Turkey be in the Shanghai 5?”128 Russian-Turkey relations have been defined by such pragmatism
before, even in the face of fundamental foreign policy differences caused by ongoing conflicts such
as in Syria. The strong personal chemistry between Putin and Erdoğan has almost certainly been a
factor in ensuring that dialogue has continued between the two countries, especially on economic
issues, if nothing else to remind the west of Turkey’s importance to the region at large.
Turkey’s future accession to the EU remains in doubt. Erdoğan’s policies, ongoing post-
coup purges, European attitudes towards Turkey and the continued fight against the PKK seem to
be conspiring against Turkish membership. However, Turkey is in a very powerful position given
its pivotal ability to control migrant flows into Europe. By gaining visa free travel to the European
Schengen Zone, Erdoğan could also be able to deliver a major EU benefit to Turkish citizens
without committing to wider EU regulations, law and policy dictates. The shift toward closer
economic cooperation with Russia, despite their differing interests in Syria and elsewhere is a clear
sign of Erdoğan’s pragmatism when it comes to international relations. At present EU accession is
on hold, with no ‘chapters’ open; it is doubtful if the process will ever be completed.
NATO AND TURKEY 2002-2017
Turkey has presented both a challenge and an opportunity to NATO throughout its history,
but especially as it continues to restructure its roles, missions, and capabilities to address emerging
security challenges. Since Turkey’s accession in 1952, NATO has played a crucial role in enabling
Turkey’s security strategy in the region. During the Cold War, the Turkish government relied on
127 “Euro MPs vote to freeze Turkey EU membership talks,” BBC News Europe, 24 November 16, accessed 18 January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38090121. 128 Selin Girit, “Turkey and the EU: The end of the affair?” BBC News Turkey, 22 November 2016, accessed 18 January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38055357.
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NATO membership and its bilateral alliance with the US to guarantee Turkey’s security in the face
of the Soviet Union’s aggression. The pro-Western Kemalist leaning elite that dominated the
country’s foreign and defense policies viewed Turkey’s affiliation with NATO and ties to the US as
vital as this ensured Turkey’s status as a core member of NATO and a partner to be considered and
reckoned with. Turkey serves as NATO’s southeastern bulwark, controlling the straits between the
Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea and sharing a border with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Although the
Cold War ended in 1991, NATO’s importance to Turkey remains. However, finding an appropriate
place for Turkey in the evolving EU-NATO balance has proven exceptionally difficult given
Turkey’s continued exclusion from the EU and the ongoing dispute with the government of the
Republic of Cyprus.129
Turkish officials have waged a protracted campaign to influence EU security decisions and
compel Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus to reach a political settlement with the Turkish
Cypriot minority. In pursuit of these goals, Turkish policymakers have proved willing to block EU-
NATO cooperation on important security issues. A recurring problem is that Turkey is a member of
NATO but not the EU, whereas the RoC is a member of the EU but not NATO. The two countries
have used the consensus rules of each organization to prevent one organization from cooperating
with the other on important security issues such as energy exploration rights and the ongoing
migrant crisis. Turkish objections to the possible leaking of sensitive NATO military information to
the RoC have limited ties between the EU and NATO since the RoC joined the EU in 2004. There
is no sign of this impasse ending at present.
Despite disagreements over the RoC and information sharing with the EU, NATO remains
an indispensable partner for Turkey; the reverse is also true. NATO uses the Incirlik airbase as a
critical hub for conducting reconnaissance and strike missions against Daesh in Syria given the
129 Jonathan Gorvett, “One Cyprus?” Foreign Affairs, 27 October 2016, accessed 18 January 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2016-10-27/one-cyprus.
53
short transit time to target areas. Turkey also hosts a major component of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is designed to deal with the threat posed by Iranian short- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles to US assets, personnel, and allies in Europe.130 Turkey also
hosts NATO’s Land Command headquarters, located in Izmir and one of NATO’s six Rapid
Deployable Corps high readiness headquarters that can be quickly mobilized to lead NATO
forces on missions within or beyond NATO territory.131
The 15 July 2016 coup attempt has caused serious issues for Turkey-NATO security
cooperation and effectiveness, with some even pondering expelling Turkey from NATO.132
However, it is clear that Turkey will remain an indispensable partner in the fight against VEOs
in the region, regardless of internal politics. Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website
makes the importance of NATO to Turkey very clear: “Turkey attaches the utmost importance to
NATO’s role in maintaining security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and in providing a
forum for political-military consultations on topics of interest to its members.”133
130 Tom Z. Collina, “The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance,” Arms Control Association Washington, D.C., May 2013, accessed 18 January 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach. 131“The Rapid Deployable Corps,” NATO press release, 26 November 2012, accessed 18 January 2017, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics50088.htm. 132 Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, “Turkey coup could threaten country’s NATO membership, John Kerry suggests,” Independent online, 18 July 2016, accessed 18 January 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-coup-could-threaten-countrys-nato-membership-john-kerry-warns-a7142491.html. Kerry stated that “Turkey could fall foul of NATO’s requirement with respect to democracy if it fails to uphold the rule of law in the wake of an attempted coup.” 133 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Relations with NATO,” 2011, accessed 18 January 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa.
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CONCLUSIONS
In domestic security policy delivery, there has not been an effective framework outlined by
the AKP, other than Davutoğlu’s idea of a “security/freedom balance.” Because of this lack of a
coherent framework, Turkish domestic security policy, since 2002, has been ineffective at realizing
state security goals. The AKP, elected on a platform of opposition to traditional draconian Turkish
State security methods, has failed to capitalize on its early diplomatic successes with the PKK and
wider Kurdish population. Instead, as the AKP power base has become more secure and Erdoğan
has been granted more powers first as Prime Minister and then President, Turkish policymakers
have been swayed from using diplomacy to solve internal security issues and have reverted to using
force as the primary tool of negotiation with the Kurds. The fragile ceasefires of the period 2012
through 2015 with the PKK have been broken by both sides as the basic societal and economic
issues of the Kurds in the southeast have remained unresolved, prompting further Kurdish
resistance. Domestic freedom of speech, and the ability of opposition political parties to criticize
AKP policies have been sharply curtailed, especially since the unsuccessful 15 July 2016 coup
attempt. The purge of government officials in the military, judiciary and in the education system
has dramatically altered the balance of power in Erdoğan’s favor, with little sign of this shift
abating.
Given recent events, there is only a slim chance that the AKP government will allow a
softening of its security policies towards the Kurdish regions or to those it considers its political
opposition. All of this has resulted in a Turkish state that, driven by post-coup paranoia, is likely to
use force, repression of the media, and other more nefarious means to achieve its internal security
goals. This is likely to yield continued internal security issues with the Kurds as well as continued
unrest amongst sections of the populace that are in opposition to the AKP’s Islamist and less
Kemalist leaning secular vision for Turkey. The military, cowed by the purges after the aborted
coup attempt, is now powerless to fulfill its traditional role as guarantor of the Turkish Republic.
55
Turkey continues to formulate foreign security policy that is hindered by an overemphasis
on its imperial past and which places too much reliance on Turkey’s self-styled role as a central
actor in the region; this approach is hindering the effective delivery of security policy as the legacy
of Empire is not a helpful reference point for security policy formulation. The role of Islam and in
particular the backing of Islamic parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood has also undermined
Turkish foreign security policy delivery. However, the export of Turkish soft power has generally
been a success story and Turkey has increased its reputation in the Horn of Africa (e.g. Somalia)
and in other regions through the provision of large sums of aid. This is particularly important to the
U.S. as Turkey can act as a counterweight to other Sunni regional powers such as Saudi Arabia who
have exported a brand of Sunni Islam that has at times been counterproductive.
The impact of Ahmet Davutoğlu on Turkey’s delivery of foreign security policy has been
profound (more so than Erdoğan) and as such the ‘Davutoğlu doctrine’ that he articulated in 2010
(his six principles) provides the most appropriate means to judge the efficacy of Turkish foreign
security policy.
The first principle aimed to strike a balance between freedom and security. Turkey has
failed in achieving this balance; the Turkish State is considerably more repressive than when the
AKP came to power in 2002 and the security situation is worse in 2017 than at any time since the
1990s. The conflict with the PKK has reignited in spectacular fashion and since the coup attempt in
July 2016, Turkey has reached a new low in suppression of the media and freedom of speech. By
trying to avoid provoking Islamic extremists from targeting Turkish citizens, Turkey has
paradoxically had to commit to a costly and potentially open ended intervention in Syria, ironically
brought about by Daesh sponsored attacks inside Turkey.
The second principle envisioned an enhanced regional engagement with “Zero Problems”
in [Turkey’s] neighborhood. This policy has comprehensively failed. Turkey has many problems
with its neighbors. Turkey narrowly avoided conflict with Russia after a Russian SU24 attack
56
aircraft was shot down by a Turkish F-16 on 30 November 2015 then on 24 August 2016 it
intervened in Syria (Operation EUPHRATES SHIELD), after it became clear that without
intervening, a Kurdish proto-state would become a reality on Turkey’s southern border. Turkey’s
relationship with Israel was badly damaged after the Israeli operation to board the Palestinian relief
fleet on (the so called Mavi Marmara incident) on 31 May 2010, although relations have since
gradually normalised. Relations with the US administration have been fraught for most of the
Obama presidency. There are deep rooted schisms with Iraq over territory and Kurdish issues and it
is uncertain how Turkey will fare with the Trump administration. Turkey’s relationship with Egypt
is poor given Turkey’s unstinting support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey has no influence
with Syria given its unstinting calls for Assad to be removed.
The third principle envisioned an effective diplomacy towards neighboring regions. This
has generally been ineffective, with Turkey’s standing in the Trans-Asia and Middle East regions
being at best maintained but certainly not furthered. Turkey’s strategic choice of supporting the
Muslim Brotherhood has proved to be ill founded and its attempts to mediate in the Israel-Hamas
dispute and the Syrian civil war have been ineffective.
The fourth principle aimed to ensure that Turkey attained complementarity with global
actors. Under Erdoğan, this has not been realized. Turkey has proved to be a difficult partner for the
United States to work with in Syria and Turkey’s relationship with Russia has, on balance, not been
complimentary as it is balanced in Russia’s favor. Turkey’s efforts to leverage the Arab Gulf States
in support of its foreign security goals has also not been successful. Turkey has achieved a level of
economic cooperation with Iran out of necessity, but on the security front this has not been
beneficial given Iran’s unstinting support for the Assad regime in Syria.
The fifth principle was the effective use of international forums and new initiatives in
order to galvanize action on matters of common concern. Turkey has sought to play a much wider
role in international organization such as the UNHCR, leveraging its position in the migration crisis
57
to some effect in improving overall access for Turkish citizens into the EU. Using its burgeoning
overseas aid and religion vectored budgets has also allowed Turkey to gain a better position in
forums such as the UN. However, post the 15 July 2016 coup, relations with the EU and OSCE
remain at a low ebb and the prospects for Turkish accession into the EU remain remote.
The sixth and final principle of Turkish foreign policy was to create a “new perception of
Turkey” through an increased focus on public diplomacy. This has been more effective through the
medium of the export of Turkish soft power to outlying regions, by using aid and the Turkish vision
of Sunni Islam as a unifying force.
In 2017, Turkey finds itself with limited strategic options. Turkey’s external relations are
degraded and it finds itself at odds with its key strategic partner the United States. The relationship
with Russia is not in Turkey’s favor – Turkey needs Russia more than Russia needs Turkey to
achieve its security goals. Turkish EU accession is now more remote than ever and the intractable
Cyprus dispute drags on. Internally, the security situation post the July 2016 coup is parlous; this is
undermining Turkey’s ability to project effective external security policy. Unless Erdoğan and the
AKP change course and perhaps move back towards the Kemalist vision of Turkey, then the
prospects for stability in Turkey and it’s near abroad are grim.
58
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