from aristocracy to monarchy to democracy_hoppe_text 2014

8/10/2019 From Aristocracy to Monarchy to Democracy_Hoppe_Text 2014

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M I S E S I N S T I T U T EAUBURN, ALABAMA

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Published 2014 by the Mises Institute and publishedunder the Creative Commons Attribution NonCom-mercial-NoDerivs 4.0 Interntional License.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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Introductionby David Gordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

From Aristocracy to Monarchyto Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

5


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H -H H a master o theo-retical history. He tells us that

it is not my purpose here to engage in stan-dard history, i.e., history as it is written byhistorians, but to offer a logical or socio-logical reconstruction o history, in ormedby actual historical events, but motivatedmore undamentally by theoretical phil-osophical and economic concerns.

Te work o Carl Menger and Ludwig vonMises on the commodity origin o money isa prime example o what Hoppe has in mind.

In carrying out his illuminating project,Hoppe nds himsel in opposition to thedominant way o looking at the evolution ogovernment. According to this perspective,

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government has over the centuries becomeever more democratic. Rule by the peopleis the nal orm o government; once it hasbeen reached, history, at least as ar as gov-ernment is concerned, has ended. 1 Tis his-torical movement, urther, is a good thing.It is the triumph o reedom. History is thestory o progress.

Hoppe is not a complete pessimist likethe Gloomy Dean W.R. Inge, who, in his

amous Romanes Lecture o 1920, denounced

the superstition o progress. o the con-trary, Hoppe thinks that in economic li e, theIndustrial Revolution enabled mankind toachieve an unprecedented level o prosperity.

In government, though, matters areentirely different, and here Hoppe is a rmopponent o progressive orthodoxy. For him,rather, history in this area is a tale o a all not rom the Garden o Eden but rather roma reasonable way o settling disputes.

1Francis Fukuyama, Te End o History and theLast Man (Free Press, 2006), is a classic statemento the progressive doctrine o the evolution ogovernment to democracy.


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How would real, rational, peace-seekingpeople have solved the problem o socialcon ict? ... What people would most likelyaccept as a solution, then, is this: Everyoneis, rst off or prima acie, presumed to beowner endowed with the right o exclu-sive control o all those goods he already,in act, and so ar undisputed, controls andpossesses. Tis is the starting point. Astheir possessor, he has, prima acie, a betterclaim to the things in question than any-one else who does not possess these goods and consequently, i someone else inter-

eres with the possessors control o suchgoods, then this person is prima acie inthe wrong and the burden o proo , that isto show otherwise, is on him. However, asthe last quali cation already shows, pres-ent possession is not suffi cient to be in the

right.Hoppe assumes that everyone agrees on

the appropriate principles or settling prop-erty disputes:

Te criteria, the principles, employed in

deciding between a present controller andpossessor o something and the claims oanother person are clear then, and it canbe sa ely assumed that universal agreement


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among real people will be reached regard-ing them.

o reiterate, Hoppe sees property asantecedent to the state; people in a state onature will rationally agree on the appropri-ate principles. 2

Te act that people agree in this way doesnot solve all problems. Principles must stillbe applied to concrete issues; and here arisesthe likelihood o disputes. I people disputeproperty titles, what is to be done? Hoppesuggests that people would gravitate towardcertain natural leaders deemed trustworthyto decide cases in an unbiased way:

In order to settle their con icts and to havethe settlement lastingly recognized andrespected by others, they will turn to natu-

ral authorities, to members o the naturalaristocracy, to nobles and kings. What Imean ... is simply this: In every society osome minimal degree o complexity, a ewindividuals acquire the status o a natu-ral elite. Due to superior achievements o

2Anthony de Jasay has made similar claims. See,e.g., his Against Politics (London: Routledge,1997).


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wealth, wisdom, bravery, or a combinationthereo , some individuals come to possessmore authority than others and their opin-ion and judgment commands widespreadrespect.

Hoppe here shows himsel to be a true Je -

ersonian. In a letter to John Adams, writtenon October 28, 1813, Jefferson said:

I agree with you that there is a natural aris-tocracy among men. Te grounds o thisare virtue and talents. ... Te natural aris-tocracy I consider as the most precious gifo nature, or the instruction, the trusts,and government o society. And indeed, itwould have been inconsistent in creationto have ormed man or the social state,and not to have provided virtue and wis-dom enough to manage the concerns o the

society.3

Is the process Hoppe has set orwardmore than just speculation? Hoppe looks to

eudal Europe or con rmation o his line othought.

3For Jeffersons letter, see http://www.greatbooks.org/resources/publications/guides00/the-natu-ral-aristocracy-by-thomas-jefferson/


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Feudal lords could only tax with the con-sent o the taxed, and on his own land, everyree man was as much o a sovereign, i.e., the

ultimate decision maker, as the eudal kingwas on his. ... Te king was below and sub-ordinate to the law. ... Tis law was consid-ered ancient and eternal. New laws wereroutinely rejected as not laws at all. Te sole

unction o the medieval king was that oapplying and protecting good old law.

An obvious objection is likely to occurto readers, but Hoppe is ready or it: WhatHoppe has described is a Utopia that neverwas, on sea or land. Te Middle Ages were in

act a period o large scale oppression. Hoppereplies,

I only claim that this [ eudal] orderapproached a natural order through (a)

the supremacy o and the subordination oeveryone under one law, (b) the absence oany law-making power, and (c) the lack oany legal monopoly o judgeship and con-

ict arbitration. And I would claim thatthis system could have been per ected andretained virtually unchanged through theinclusion o ser s into the system.

Un ortunately, matters did not develop inthis happy way. Instead, kings seized more


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and more power. Tey claimed to have nalauthority, rejecting appeals to competingauthority within the territories they con-trolled. Hoppe nds it easy to understandwhy kings might endeavor to arrogate suchpower to themselves, but another question

is at rst puzzling. How were the kings ableto succeed in their grasp or absolute power?Why did not the partisans o the old aristo-cratic order thwart them?

Hoppe offers a two-part answer to thismystery. First, the king allied with the people

against the aristocracy.He appealed to the always and every-where popular sentiment o envy amongthe underprivileged against their ownbetters and superiors, their lords. Heoffered to ree them o their contractual

obligations vis--vis their lords, to makethem owners rather than tenants o theirholdings, or instance, or to orgive theirdebts to their creditors, and could so cor-rupt the public sense o justice suffi cientlyto render the aristocratic resistance againsthis coup utile.

In this grasp or power, the king had theaid o the court intellectuals. Tey propa-gandized on behal o the king, supporting


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the thesis that the king represented the peo-ple.Te demand or intellectual services istypically low, and intellectuals, almost con-genitally, suffer rom a greatly in ated sel -image and hence are always prone to and

become easily avid promoters o envy. Teking offered them a secure position as courtintellectuals and they returned the avor andproduced the necessary ideological support

or the kings position as absolute ruler.

How did the court intellectuals carry outtheir malign mission? Tey did so by pro-moting a two old myth. Society began in awar o all against all. o escape this condi-tion, people voluntarily contracted with anabsolute ruler. In that way, they could escapechaotic disorder.

Hoppe rmly rejects both parts o thisstory, as should by now be abundantly evi-dent. Society begins, not in a Hobbesian stateo nature, but rather with peoples mutualrecognition o rights; and there was no con-

tract giving power to the king.With help o the court intellectuals, mon-archs in Europe gained the absolute powerthey sought; but the appeal to the people


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eventually proved their undoing. Te mytho the contract helped to trans orm the abso-lute monarchy into a constitutional one; andthis transition Hoppe by no means regards asprogress. Constitutions ormalized and cod-i ed the kings right to legislate and to tax.

Constitutional monarchy eventuallyceased to satis y the intellectuals.Ironically, the very orces that elevated the

eudal king rst to the position o absoluteand then o constitutional king: the appealto egalitarian sentiments and the envy othe common man against his betters ... alsohelped bring about the kings own down alland paved the way to another, even greater

olly; the transition rom monarchy todemocracy.

When the kings promises o better and

cheaper justice turned out to be empty andthe intellectuals were still dissatis ed withtheir social rank and position, as was tobe predicted, the intellectuals turned thesame egalitarian sentiments that the kinghad previously courted in his battle againsthis aristocratic competitors against themonarchical ruler himsel .

With the help o the intellectuals, rule bythe people came to replace monarchy; and,


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Hoppe amously argues, this transition is byno means to be celebrated.o the contrary. Rather than being

restricted to princes and nobles, underdemocracy, privileges come into the reacho everyone: everyone can participate

in thef and live off stolen loot i only hebecomes a public offi cial.

Democracy then does not end the depre-dations o absolute monarchy but in actincreases them.

Yet a king, because he owns the monop-oly and may sell and bequeath his realm toa successor o his choosing, his heir, willcare about the repercussions o his actionson capital values.

Here it is necessary to avert a misunder-

standing. Hoppe is not a de ender o abso-lute monarchy ar rom it. He argues onlythat democracy as it is today understoodis worse than monarchy. But, as is never tobe orgotten, monarchy ranks ar below thebest system, one o private property rights in

which respected members o the elite settledisputes.Tis essay, thus, is a veritable tour de

orce. It accepts the standard account o the


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evolution o government rom eudal aristoc-racy to monarchy to democracy but preciselyreverses the standard valorization o this pro-cess.

I Hoppe is no exponent o progress here,though, he does not leave us with a counsel

o despair. Te democratic States renziednance cannot continue inde nitely; and

he nds grounds or hope in a movementtoward smaller, decentralized governments.

Economic crisis hits, and an impending

meltdown will stimulate decentralizingtendencies, separatist and secessionistmovements, and lead to the breakup oempire.

In this way the growth toward Leviathan maybe reversed.

Tis essay provides an ideal introduction toHans Hoppes extended account o his politicalthought in his great work Democracy: Te GodTat Failed. 4 Hoppe is one o the most origi-nal and important social theorists o our time,

4See my review in Te Mises Review (Spring2002). http://mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=199


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and readers will gain a clear understanding othe essence o his ideas about the growth ogovernment.

David GordonLos Angeles, Cali ornia

August 2014


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I I want to brie y describe

a historical puzzle or riddle that I will thentry to solve and answer in some detail.But be ore that, it is necessary to make a

ew brie general theoretical observations.

Men do not live in per ect harmony with eachother. Rather, again and again con icts arisebetween them. And the source o these con-

icts is always the same: the scarcity o goods.I want to do X with a given good G and youwant to do simultaneously Y with the verysame good. Because it is impossible or youand me to do simultaneously X and Y withG, you and I must clash. I a superabundance

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o goods existed, i.e., i , or instance,G wereavailable in unlimited supply, our con ictcould be avoided. We could both simultane-ously do our thing with G. But most goodsdo not exist in superabundance. Ever sincemankind lef the Garden o Eden, there has

been and always will be scarcity all-aroundus.Absent a per ect harmony o all human

interests and given the permanent humancondition o scarcity, then, interpersonalcon icts are an inescapable part o human li eand a constant threat to peace.

Con ronted with con icts concerningscarce goods, but also endowed with reasonor more precisely with the ability to com-municate, to discuss and to argue with oneanother, as the very mani estation o humanreason, then, mankind has been and oreverwill be aced with the question o how to pos-sibly avoid such con icts and how to peace-

ully resolve them should they occur.1

1Teoretically, all con icts regarding the use o anygood can be avoided, i only every good is alwaysand continuously privately owned, i.e., exclusivelycontrolled, by some speci ed individual(s) and


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Assume now a group o people aware othe reality o interpersonal con icts and insearch o a way out o this predicament. Andassume that I then propose the ollowing as asolution: In every case o con ict, includingcon icts in which I mysel am involved, I will

have the last and nal word. I will be the ulti-mate judge as to who owns what and whenand who is accordingly right or wrong inany dispute regarding scarce resources. Tis

it is always clear which thing is owned, and bywhom, and which is not. Te interests and ideaso different individuals may then be as differ-ent as can be, and yet no con ict arises, inso aras their interests and ideas are concerned alwaysand exclusively with their own, separate property.Con icts, then, are always con icts regarding the

answer to the question as to who is or is not theprivate (exclusive) owner o any given good atany given time. And in order to avoid all con icts

rom the beginning o mankind on, it must beurther always clear how private property is origi-

nally established (and here the obvious answer is:by original and thus undisputed appropriation opreviously un-owned resources) and how prop-erty then can or cannot be trans erred rom oneperson to another (obviously: by mutual consentand trading rather than unilateral robbery).


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way, all con icts can be avoided or smoothlyresolved.What would be my chances o nding your

or anyone elses agreement to this proposal?My guess is that my chances would be vir-

tually zero, nil. In act, you and most peoplewill think o this proposal as ridiculous andlikely consider me crazy, a case or psychiat-ric treatment. For you will immediately real-ize that under this proposal you must literally

ear or your li e and property. Because thissolution would allow me to cause or provoke acon ict with you and then decide this con ictin my own avor. Indeed, under this proposalyou would essentially give up your right to li eand property or even any pretense to such aright. You have a right to li e and property onlyinso ar as I grant you such a right, i.e., as longas I decide to let you live and keep whateveryou consider yours. Ultimately, only I havea right to li e and I am the owner o all goods.

And yet and here is the puzzle thisobviously crazy solution is the reality . Wher-

ever you look, it has been put into effect inthe orm o the institution o a State. Te Stateis the ultimate judge in every case o con-

ict. Tere is no appeal beyond its verdicts.


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I you get into con icts with the State, withits agents, it is the State and its agents whodecide who is right and who is wrong. TeState has the right to tax you. Tereby, it isthe State that makes the decision how mucho your property you are allowed to keep

that is, your property is only at property.And the State can make laws, legislate thatis, your entire li e is at the mercy o the State.It can even order that you be killed not inde ense o your own li e and property but inthe de ense o the State or whatever the Stateconsiders de ense o its state-property.

How, then, and this is the question I wantto address at some length now, could such awondrous, indeed crazy institution come intoexistence? Obviously, it could not have devel-oped ab ovo, spontaneously, as the outcomeo rational human deliberation. In act, his-torically, it took centuries or this to happen.In the ollowing I want to reconstruct thisdevelopment in a step-by-step ashion: romthe beginnings o a natural, aristocratic social

order as it was approached, or instance,although still riddled with many imper ec-tions, during the early European Middle Ageso eudal kings and lords, to and through its


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successive displacement by rst absolute andthen constitutional kings and classic monar-chies, which took historic stage rom aboutthe seventeenth century on until the earlytwentieth century, and lastly to and throughthe successive displacement and nal replace-

ment o classic monarchies by democracies(parliamentary republics or monarchies),beginning with the French Revolution andcoming into ull swing with the end o WorldWar I, since 1918.

While we have learned in school to regardthis entire development as progress no won-der, because history is always written by its vic-tors I will reconstruct it here as a tale o pro-gressive olly and decay. And to immediatelyanswer a question that will invariably arise in view o this, my revisionist account o history:Yes, the present world is richer than peoplewere in the Middle Ages and the ollowingmonarchical age. But that does not show thatit is richer because o this development. As amatter o act, as I will demonstrate indirectly

in the ollowing, the increase in social wealthand general standards o living that mankindhas experienced during this time occurred inspite o this development, and the increase o


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wealth and living standards would have beenar greater i the development in question hadnot taken place.

Again, then: How would real, rational, peace-seeking people have solved the problem o

social con ict? And let me emphasize theword real here. Te people I have in mind,deliberating on this question, are not zombies.Tey do not sit behind a veil o ignorance, la Rawls, unconstrained by scarcity and time.(No wonder Rawls reached the most perverse

conclusions rom such a premise!) Tey standin the middle o li e, so to speak, when theybegin their deliberations. Tey are only too

amiliar with the inescapable act o scarcityand o time-constraints. Tey already workand produce. Tey interact with other work-

ers and producers, and they have alreadymany goods appropriated and put under theirphysical control, i.e., taken into possession.Indeed, their disputes are invariably disputesabout previously undisputed possessions:whether these are to be urther respected and

the possessor is to be regarded their right ulowner or not.What people would most likely accept as

a solution, then, I suggest, is this: Everyone


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is, rst-off or prima acie, presumed to be theowner endowed with the right o exclusivecontrol o all those goods that he already,in act, and so ar undisputed, controls andpossesses. Tis is the starting point. As theirpossessor, he has, prima acie, a better claim

to the things in question than anyone elsewho does not control and does not possessthese goods and consequently, i some-one else inter eres with the possessors con-trol o such goods, then this person is prima

acie in the wrong and the burden o proo ,

that is to show otherwise, is on him. How-ever, as this last quali cation already shows,present possession is not suffi cient to be inthe right. Tere is a presumption in avor othe rst, actual possessor, and the demonstra-tion o who has actual control or who took

rst control o something stands always at thebeginning o an attempt at con ict resolu-tion (because, to reiterate, every con ict is acon ict between someone who already con-trols something and someone else who wantsto do so instead). But there are exceptions to

this rule. Te actual possessor o a good is notits right ul owner, i someone else can dem-onstrate that the good in question had beenpreviously controlled by him and was taken


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away rom him against his will and consent that it was stolen or robbed rom him bythe current possessor. I he can demonstratethis, then ownership reverts back to him andin the con ict between him and the actualpossessor he is judged to be in the right. And

the current possessor o some thing is like-wise not its owner, i he has only rented thething in question rom someone else or sometime and under some stated conditions andthis other person can demonstrate this act bypresenting, or instance, a prior rental con-tract or agreement. And the current possessoro a thing is also not its owner i he workedon behal o someone else, as his employee, touse or produce the good in question and theemployer can demonstrate this to be the act

by, or instance, presenting an employmentcontract. 2

2It should be noted that the logical requirementsor permanent peace, or the potential avoidance

o all con icts, are met precisely with this solu-tion. It is always clear who provisionally ownswhat and what to do i rival claims regardingscarce resources exist.


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Te criteria, the principles, employed indeciding a con ict between a present con-troller and possessor o something and therival claims o another person to control thesame thing are clear then, and it can be sa elyassumed that universal agreement among

real people can and will be reached regardingthem. What is lacking in actual con icts, then,is not the absence o law, lawlessness, but onlythe absence o an agreement on the acts. Andthe need or judges and con ict arbitrators,then, is not a need or law-making, but a need

or act- nding and the application o givenlaw to individual cases and speci c situations.Put somewhat differently: the deliberationswill result in the insight that laws are not tobe made but given to be discovered, and thatthe task o the judge is only and exclusivelythat o applying given law to established or tobe established acts.

Assuming then a demand on the part ocon icting parties or specialized judges,arbitrators, and peacemakers, not to make law

but to apply given law, to whom will peopleturn to satis y this demand? Obviously, theywill not turn to just anyone, because mostpeople do not have the intellectual ability or


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the character necessary to make or a quality- judge and most peoples words, then, have noauthority and little i any chance o being lis-tened to, respected and en orced. Instead, inorder to settle their con icts and to have thesettlement lastingly recognized and respected

by others, they will turn to natural authori-ties, to members o the natural aristocracy, tonobles and kings.

What I mean by natural aristocrats, noblesand kings here is simply this: In every societyo some minimum degree o complexity, a ewindividuals acquire the status o a natural elite.Due to superior achievements o wealth, wis-dom, bravery, or a combination thereo , someindividuals come to possess more authoritythan others and their opinion and judgmentcommands widespread respect. Moreover,because o selective mating and the lawso civil and genetic inheritance, positions onatural authority are ofen passed on within a

ew noble amilies. It is to the heads o suchamilies with established records o superior

achievement, arsightedness and exemplaryconduct that men typically turn with their con-icts and complaints against each other. It is

the leaders o the noble amilies, who generally


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instead o just applying it, or i he is ound tocommit errors in the application o law, i.e.,i he misconstrues, misrepresents, or alsi esthe acts o a given case, his judgment standsopen to be challenged in another noble courto justice, and he himsel can there be held

liable or his misjudgment. In short, the kingmay look like the head o a State, but he de -nitely is not a State but instead part o a natu-ral, vertically and hierarchically structuredand strati ed social order: an aristocracy.

As I already indicated be ore, somethinglike this, something resembling an aristocraticnatural order had come into existence, orinstance, during the early European MiddleAges, during the much-maligned eudal age.Since it is not my purpose here to engage instandard history, i.e., history as it is written byhistorians, but to offer a logical or sociologicalreconstruction o history, in ormed by actualhistorical events, but motivated more unda-mentally by theoretical philosophical andeconomic concerns, I will not spend much

time to prove this thesis. I simply re er sum-marily to a book on this subject by Fritz Kern,Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages (origi-nally published in German in 1914), and to


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numerous other re erences given to this effectin my book Democracy: Te God Tat Failed .Only this much on the allegedly dark age o

eudalism and in support o my assertion thatthe Middle Ages can serve as a rough histori-cal example o what I have just described as a

natural order.Feudal lords and kings could only tax

with the consent o the taxed, and on his ownland, every ree man was as much o a sov-ereign, i.e., the ultimate decision maker, asthe eudal king was on his. Without consent,taxation was considered sequestration, i.e.,unlaw ul expropriation. Te king was belowand subordinate to the law. Te king mightbe a noble, even the noblest person o all, butthere were other nobles and not-so-nobles,and all o them, every noble and every reeman no less or more than the king himselwas subordinate to the same law and boundto protect and uphold this law. Tis law wasconsidered ancient and eternal. New lawswere routinely rejected as not laws at all. Te

sole unction o the medieval king was thato applying and protecting good old law.Te idea o kingship by birthright was absentduring early medieval times. o become


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king required the consent o those doing thechoosing, and every member and every sec-tion o the community o electors was ree toresist the king i it deemed his actions unlaw-

ul. In that case, people were ree to abandonthe king and seek out a new one.

Tis brie description o the eudal orderor more speci cally allodial eudalism shallsuffi ce or my purpose. Let me only add this.I do not claim here that this order was per-

ect, a true natural order, as I have character-ized it be ore. In act, it was marred by many

imper ections, most notably the existence,at many places, o the institution o ser -dom (although the burden imposed on ser sthen was mild compared to that imposedon todays modern tax-ser s). I only claimthat this order approached a natural order

through (a) the supremacy o and the subor-dination o everyone under one law, (b) theabsence o any law-making power, and (c) thelack o any legalmonopoly o judgeship andcon ict arbitration. And I would claim thatthis system could have been per ected and

retained virtually unchanged through theinclusion o ser s into the system.


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to nal royal review, then, is no less than acoup, with momentous consequences. Asalready indicated be ore, with the monopoli-zation o the unction o ultimate judge, theking had become a State and private propertyhad been essentially abolished and replaced

by at property, i.e., by property granted bythe king to his subjects. Te king could nowtax private property instead o having to askprivate property owners or subsidies, andhe could make laws instead o being boundby unchangeable pre-existing laws. Con-sequently, slowly but surely law and law-en orcement became more expensive: insteado being offered ree o charge or or a vol-untary payment, they were nanced withthe help o a compulsory tax. At the sametime, the quality o law deteriorated: Insteado upholding pre-existing law and applyinguniversal and immutable principles o jus-tice, the king, as a monopolistic judge whodid not have to ear losing clients as a resulto being less than impartial in his judgments,

did successively alter the existing law to hisown advantage.Moreover, a new level and quality o vio-

lence was introduced into society. o be sure,


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violence had characterized the relationshipbetween men rom the beginning o history.But violence, aggression, is costly, and untilthe development o the institution o a State,an aggressor had to bear the ull cost associ-ated with aggression himsel . Now, however,

with a state-king in place, the costs o aggres-sion could be externalized onto third parties(tax-payers and drafees) and accordinglyaggression, or more speci cally imperialism,i.e., attempts o aggressively, through war andconquest, enlarging ones territory and onessubject population, increased correspond-ingly.

Yet how was such a development possible,predictable as its consequences are? Whileit is not diffi cult to understand why a eudalking might want to become an absolute king,i.e., the head o a State: or who, except angels,would not like to be in the position where hecan decide all con icts including con ictsinvolving himsel ? It is ar more diffi cult tounderstand how the king, even i he is the

most noble o noble people, can get away withsuch a coup. Obviously, any would-be-Stateking would run into immediate opposition,most likely and most erociously rom other


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nobles, since they are the ones who typicallyown more and have larger estates and hencewould have to ear the most rom the kingspower to tax and legislate.

Te answer to this question is actuallyquite simple and we are essentially amiliar

with it to this day. Te king aligned himselwith the people or the common man. Heappealed to the always and everywhere pop-ular sentiment o envy among the under-privileged against their own betters andsuperiors, their lords. He offered to reethem o their contractual obligations vis--vis their lords, to make them owners ratherthan tenants o their holdings, or instance,or to orgive their debts to their creditors,and could so corrupt the public sense o justice suffi ciently to render the aristocraticresistance against his coup utile. And to con-sole the aristocracy over its loss o power andthus reduce their resistance, the king urtheroffered them posts in his much enlarged andexpanded royal courts.

Moreover, to achieve his goal o absolutepower the king also aligned himsel with theintellectuals. Te demand or intellectual services is typically low, and intellectuals, almost


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congenitally, suffer rom a greatly in atedsel -image and hence are always prone to andbecome easily avid promoters o envy. Teking offered them a secure position as courtintellectuals and they then returned the avorand produced the necessary ideological sup-

port or the kings position as absolute ruler.Tey did this through the creation o a two-old myth: On the one hand they portrayed

the history be ore the arrival o the absoluteking in the worst possible light, as a cease- lessstruggle o all against all, with one man beinganother mans wol contrary to the actualhistory o a prior natural aristocratic order.And on the other hand, they portrayed thekings assumption o absolute power as theresult o some sort o contractual agreementby his subjects, presumably reached rationally,based on the myth o the otherwise threaten-ing return to the bellum omnia contra omnes .

I have already shown that no such contractis conceivable, and that the notion o anysuch contract is sheer myth. No person in his

right mind would sign such a contract. But asI hardly need emphasize, this idea, i.e., thatthe power o the State as a territorial monop-olist o ultimate decision-making is grounded


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and ounded in some sort o contract holdssway in the heads o the populace to this day.Absurd as it is, then, the court intellectualswere remarkably success ul in their work.

As the result o the intellectuals ideologi-cal work o promoting this two old myth: opresenting the rise o absolute monarchs asthe result o a contract , the kings absolutemonarchy was turned into a constitutionalmonarchy. In schoolbooks and the offi cial,orthodox historiography this transition romabsolute to constitutional monarchy is typi-cally presented as a great step orward inhuman history, as progress. In act, however,it represented another olly and initiated still

urther decay. For whereas the position o theabsolute king was at best a tenuous one, as thememory o his actual rise to absolute powerthrough an act o usurpation still lingeredon and thus effectively limited his absolutepower, the introduction o a constitutionactually ormalized and codi ed his powerto tax and to legislate. Te constitution was

not something that protected the people romthe king, but it protected the king rom thepeople. It was a State-constitution, which pre-supposed what was ormerly still considered


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with greatest suspicion, namely the right totax without consent and to make laws. Teconstitutional king, in subjecting himsel to a

ew ormalities and procedural routines, wasthus enabled to expand his powers and enrichhimsel ar beyond anything possible or him

as an absolute monarch.

Ironically, the very orces that elevated theeudal king rst to the position o absolute

and then o constitutional king: the appealto egalitarian sentiments and the envy othe common man against his betters and theenlistment o the intellectuals, also helpedbring about the kings own down all andpaved the way to another, even greater olly:the transition rom monarchy to democracy.

When the kings promises o better andcheaper justice turned out to be empty andthe intellectuals were still dissatis ed withtheir social rank and position, as was to bepredicted, the intellectuals turned the sameegalitarian sentiments that the king had pre-

viously courted in his battle against his aris-tocratic competitors against the monarchicalruler himsel . Afer all, the king himsel wasa member o the nobility, and as a result o


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the exclusion o all other nobles as potential judges, his position had become only moreelevated and elitist and his conduct evenmore arrogant. Accordingly, it appeared onlylogical that the king, too, should be broughtdown and that the egalitarian policies, which

the king had initiated, be carried through totheir ultimate conclusion: the control o the judiciary by the common man, which to theintellectuals meant by themselves, as, as they viewed it, the natural spokesmen o the peo-ple.

Te intellectual criticism directed againstthe king was not a criticism o the institutiono a legal monopoly o ultimate decision-making, however, which, as I have explained,constitutes the ultimate moral and economic

olly and the root o all evil. Te critics did notwant to return to a natural aristocratic order,in which they themselves would play only aminor albeit important role. But they did, intheir criticism, make a super cial appeal tothe old and ineradicable notion o the equal-

ity o everyone be ore the law or the superi-ority o law above all. Tus, they argued thatmonarchy rested on personal privilege andthat such a privilege was incompatible with


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equality be ore the law. And they suggestedthat by opening participation and entry intoState government to everyone on equal terms that is, by replacing a monarchy with ademocracy the principle o the equality oall be ore the law was satis ed.

Appealing as this argument might at rstappear, it is undamentally wrong, however.Because democratic equality be ore the law issomething entirely different rom and incom-patible with the old idea o one universal law,equally applicable to everyone, everywhereand at all times. Under democracy, everyoneis equal inso ar as entry into state governmentis open to all on equal terms. Everyone canbecome king, so to say, not only a privilegedcircle o people, i.e., the king and whomeverhe in his absolute or constitutional powersdesignates as his successor. Tus, in a democ-racy no personal privilege or privileged per-sons exist. However, unctional privilegesand privileged unctions exist. State agents,i.e., so-called public offi cials, as long as they

act in an offi cial capacity, are governed andprotected by public law and occupy therebya privileged position vis--vis persons actingunder the mere authority o private law.


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For one, public offi cials are, just like anyabsolute or constitutional king, permittedto nance or subsidize their own activitiesthrough taxes. Tat is, they do not, as everyprivate-law citizen must, earn their incomethrough the production and subsequent sale

o goods and services to voluntarily buyingor not-buying consumers. Rather, as pub-lic offi cials they are permitted to engage in,and live off, what in private dealings, betweenprivate-law subjects, is considered robbery,thef, and stolen loot. Tus, privilege and

legal discrimination and the distinctionbetween rulers and subjects do not dis-appear under democracy. o the contrary.Rather than being restricted to princes andnobles, under democracy, privileges comeinto the reach o everyone: Everyone can par-

ticipate in thef and live off stolen loot i onlyhe becomes a public offi cial. Likewise, demo-cratically elected parliaments are, just like anyabsolute or constitutional king, not boundby any superior, natural law, i.e., by law noto their own making (such as and including

so-called constitutional law), but they canlegislate, i.e., they can make and change laws.Only: While a king legislates in his own avor,under democracy everyone is ree to promote


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and try to put into effect legislation in his ownavor, provided only that he nds entry intoparliament or government.

Predictably, then, under democratic con-ditions the tendency o every monopoly oultimate decision-making to increase the

price o justice and to lower its quality is notdiminished but aggravated.Teoretically speaking, the transition

rom monarchy to democracy involves nomore (or less) than the replacement o a per-manent, hereditary monopoly owner theking by temporary and interchangeablecaretakers by presidents, prime min-isters, and members o parliament. Both,kings and presidents, will produce bads,i.e., they tax and they legislate. Yet a king,because he owns the monopoly and may selland bequeath his realm to a successor o hischoosing, his heir, will care about the reper-cussions o his actions on capital values.

As the owner o the capital stock onhis territory, the king will be compara-

tively uture-oriented. In order to preserveor enhance the value o his property, hisexploitation will be comparatively moder-ate and calculating. In contrast, a temporary


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and interchangeable democratic caretakerdoes not own the country, but as long as heis in offi ce he is permitted to use it to hisown advantage. He owns its current use butnot its capital stock. Tis does not eliminateexploitation. Instead, it makes exploitation

shortsighted, present-oriented, and uncalcu-lating, i.e., carried out with no or little regardor the value o the capital stock. In short, it

promotes capital consumption.Nor is it an advantage o democracy that

ree entry into every state position exists(whereas under monarchy entry is restrictedto the kings discretion). o the contrary, onlycompetition in the production o goods is agood thing. Competition in the production obads, such as taxation and legislation, is notgood. In act, it is worse than bad. It is sheerevil. Kings, coming into their position by vir-tue o birth, might be harmless dilettantes ordecent men (and i they are madmen theywill be quickly restrained or, i need be, killedby close relatives concerned with the pos-

sessions o the royal amily, the dynasty). Insharp contrast, the selection o state rulers bymeans o popular elections makes it essen-tially impossible or a harmless or decent


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person to ever rise to the top. Presidents andprime ministers come into their position notowing to their status as natural aristocrats, as

eudal kings once did, i.e., based on the rec-ognition o their economic independence,outstanding pro essional achievement, mor-

ally impeccable personal li e, wisdom andsuperior judgment and taste, but as a result otheir capacity as morally uninhibited dema-gogues. Hence, democracy virtually assuresthat only dangerous men will rise to the topo state government.

In addition: Under democracy the distinc-tion between the rulers and the ruled becomesblurred. Te illusion even arises that the dis-tinction no longer exists: that with demo-cratic government no one is ruled by anyone,but everyone instead rules himsel . Accord-ingly, public resistance against governmentpower is systematically weakened. Whileexploitation and expropriation taxationand legislation be ore might have appearedplainly oppressive and evil to the public, they

seem much less so, mankind being what itis, once anyone can reely enter the ranks othose who are at the receiving end, and con-sequently there will be more o it.


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Worse: Under democracy the social char-acter and personality structure o the entirepopulation will be changed systematically.All o society will be thoroughly politicized.During the monarchical age, the ancientaristocratic order had still remained some-

what intact. Only the king and, indirectly, themembers o his (exclusive) court could enrichthemselves by means o taxation and leg-islation at other peoples and their proper-ties expense. Everyone else had to stand onhis own eet, so to say, and owed his posi-tion in society, his wealth and his income, tosome sort o value-productive efforts. Underdemocracy, the incentive structure is system-atically changed. Egalitarian sentiments andenvy are given ree reign. Everyone, not justthe king, is now allowed to participate in theexploitation via legislation or taxation oeveryone else. Everyone is ree to express anycon scatory demands whatsoever. Nothing,no demand, is off limits. In Bastiats words,under democracy the State becomes the great

ction by which everyone seeks to live at theexpense o everyone else. Every person andhis personal property come within reach oand are up or grabs by everyone else.


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Under a one-man-one-vote regime, then,a relentless machinery o wealth and incomeredistribution is set in motion. It must beexpected that majorities o have-nots willconstantly try to enrich themselves at theexpense o minorities o haves. Tis is not to

say that there will be only one class o havesand one class o have-nots, the rich and thepoor, and that the redistribution via taxa-tion and legislation will occur uni ormly

rom the rich onto the poor. o the con-trary. While the redistribution rom rich to

poor will always play a prominent role andis indeed a permanent eature and mainstayo democracy, it would be nave to assumethat it will be the sole or even the predomi-nant orm o redistribution. Afer all, the richand the poor are usually rich or poor or a

reason. Te rich are characteristically brightand industrious, and the poor typically dull,lazy or both. It is not very likely that dullards,even i they make up a majority, will system-atically outsmart and enrich themselves at theexpense o a minority o bright and energetic

individuals. Rather, most redistribution willtake place within the group o the non-poor,and it will actually be requently the betteroff who succeed in having themselves subsi-


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dized by the poor. (Just think o ree university education, whereby the working class,whose children rarely attend universities, pay

or the education o middle-class children!)Indeed, many competing parties and coali-tions will try to gain at the expense o others.

In addition, there will be a variety o chang-ing criteria de ning what it is that makes aperson a have (deserving to be looted) andanother a have-not (deserving to receive theloot) and it will be the intellectuals whoplay a major role in de ning and promot-ing these criteria (making sure, o course,that they themselves will always be classi edas have-nots in need o ever more loot). Aswell, individuals can be members o a multi-tude o groups o haves or have-nots, losingon account o one characteristic and gainingon account o another, with some individualsending up net-losers and others net-winnerso redistribution.

In any case, however, since it is invariablysomething valuable, something good that is

being redistributed property and income o which the haves supposedly have toomuch and the have-nots too little, any redis-tribution implies that the incentive to beget,


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have, or produce something o value some-thing good is systematically reduced and,mutatis mutandis , the incentive o not get-ting, having, or producing anything valuable o not being or not having anything good but relying instead on and living off redis-

tributed income and wealth is systematicallyincreased. In short, the proportion o goodpeople and good, value-productive activitiesis reduced and the proportion o bad or not-so-good people and o unproductive habits,character traits, and types o conduct willincrease, with the overall result o impover-ishing society and making li e increasinglyunpleasant.

While it is impossible to predict the exactoutcome o the permanent democratic strug-gle o all against all, except to say that it willlead to ever higher taxes, to a never ending

ood o legislation and thus increased legaluncertainty, and consequently to an increasein the rate o social time-pre erence, i.e.,increased short-term orientation (an in an-

lization o society), one outcome o thisstruggle, one result o democracy can besa ely predicted, however. Democracy pro-duces and brings about a new power elite or


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ruling class. Presidents, prime ministers, andthe leaders o parliament and political partiesare part o this power elite, and I have alreadytalked about them as essentially amoral dem-agogues. But it would be nave to assume thatthey are the most power ul and in uential

people o all. Tey are more requently onlythe agents and delegates those doing thebidding o other people standing on thesidelines and out o public view. Te truepower elite, which determines and controlswho will make it as president, prime minis-

ter, party leader, etc., are the plutocrats. Teplutocrats, as de ned by the great but largelyorgotten American sociologist William Gra-

ham Sumner, are not simply the super-rich the big bankers and the captains o bigbusiness and industry. Rather, the plutocrats

are only a subclass o the super rich. Tey arethose super rich big bankers and business-men, who have realized the enormous poten-tial o the State as an institution that can taxand legislate or their own even greater utureenrichment and who, based on this insight,

have decided to throw themselves into poli-tics. Tey realize that the State can make youar richer than you already are: whether in

subsidizing you, in awarding you with state


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contracts, or in passing laws that protectyou rom unwelcome competition or com-petitors, and they decide to use their riches tocapture the State and use politics as a meansto the end o their own urther enrichment(rather than becoming richer solely by eco-

nomic means, i.e., in better serving volun-tarily paying customers o ones products).Tey do not have to get involved in politicsthemselves. Tey have more important andlucrative things to do than wasting their timewith everyday politics. But they have the cash

and the position to buy the typically arless affl uent pro essional politicians, eitherdirectly in paying them bribes or indirectly,by agreeing to employ them later on, afertheir stint in pro essional politics, as highlypaid managers, consultants, or lobbyists, and

so manage to decisively in uence and deter-mine the course o politics in their own avor.Tey, the plutocrats, will become the ultimatewinners in the constant income and wealthredistribution struggle that is democracy. Andin between them (the real power elite staying

outside the limelight), and all those whoseincome (and wealth) depends solely or largelyon the State and its taxing power (the employ-ees o the always growing state apparatus and


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all recipients o trans er payments, its wel-are clients), the productive middle class getsincreasingly squeezed dry.

Not least, democracy has also a pro-ound effect on the conduct o war. I already

explained that kings, because they can exter-nalize the cost o their own aggression ontoothers (via taxes) tend to be more than nor-mally aggressive and war-like. However,a kings motive or war is typically an own-ership-inheritance dispute brought on by acomplex network o inter-dynastic marriagesand the irregular but always recurring extinc-tion o certain dynasties. As violent inheri-tance disputes, monarchical wars are charac-terized by limited territorial objectives. Teyare not ideologically motivated quarrels butdisputes over tangible properties. Moreover,as inter-dynastic property disputes, the pub-lic considers war essentially the kings privateaffair to be paid or by himsel and as insu -

cient reason or any urther tax increase.Further, as private con icts between differ-

ent ruling amilies the public expects, andthe kings eel compelled, to recognize a cleardistinction between combatants and non-combatants and to target their war efforts


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speci cally and exclusively against each otherand their respective personal properties.Democracy radically trans orms the lim-

ited wars o kings into total wars. In blurringthe distinction between the rulers and theruled, democracy strengthens the identi ca-tion o the public with the State. Once theState is owned by all, as democrats deceivinglypropagate, then it is only air that everyoneshould ght or their State and all economicresources o the country be mobilized or theState in its wars. And since public offi cials incharge o a democratic state cannot and donot claim to personally own oreign territory(as a king can do), the motive or war insteadbecomes an ideological one national glory,democracy, liberty, civilization, humanity.Te objectives are intangible and elusive: the victory o ideas, and the unconditional sur-render and ideological conversion o the los-ers (which, because one can never be sureabout the sincerity o the conversion, mayrequire the mass murder o civilians). As well,

the distinction between combatants and non-combatants becomes uzzy and ultimatelydisappears under democracy, and mass warinvolvement the draf and popular war ral-


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lies as well as collateral damage becomepart o war strategy.Tese tendencies will be still urther

strengthened by the rise o the new rulingelite o plutocrats. For one, the plutocratswill quickly realize the enormous pro ts tobe made by arming the State, by producingthe very weapons and equipment used in war,and in being awarded most generous tax-

unded cost-plus contracts to do so. A mili-tary-industrial complex will be built up. Andsecond, unlike most people who have merelylocal or domestic interests, the super-richplutocrats have nancial interests also in or-eign places, potentially all around the globe,and in order to promote, protect, and en orcethese oreign interests it is only natural orthem to use the military power o their ownState also to inter ere, meddle, or intervene in

oreign affairs on their behal . A business dealin oreign countries may have turned sour ora concession or license may be won there almost everything can be used as a reason to

pressure ones own State to come to their res-cue and intervene outside o its own territory.Indeed, even i this intervention requires thata oreign country be destroyed, this can be


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a boon or them, provided only they receivethe contract to rebuild the country that theirweapons had be ore destroyed.

Finally, the tendency already set in motionwith the war o kings o leading to increasedpolitical centralization, toward the build-

ing o empire, is continued and acceleratedthrough democratic war.

Every State must begin territorially small.Tat makes it easy or productive people torun away to escape its taxation and legisla-tion. Obviously, a State does not like to see itsproductive people run away and tries to cap-ture them by expanding its territory. Te moreproductive people the State controls, the bet-ter off it will be. In this expansionist desire, itruns into opposition by other States. Tere canbe only one monopolist o ultimate decision-making in any given territory. Tat is, the com-petition between different States is eliminative.Either A wins and controls the territory, or B.Who wins? At least in the long run, that Statewill win and take over anothers territory or

establish hegemony over it and orce it to paytribute that can parasitically draw on a com-paratively more productive economy. Tat is,other things being the same, internally more


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liberal States, i.e., States with comparativelylow taxes and little legislative regulation, willwin over less liberal, i.e., more oppressive,States and expand their territory or their rangeo hegemonic control.

Tere is only one important element miss-

ing still in this reconstruction o the tendencytoward imperialism and political centraliza-tion: money.

As a territorial monopolist o legislation,every State, whether monarchic or democratic,immediately recognized the immense poten-tial or its own enrichment ar beyond any-thing offered by taxation provided by themonopolistic control o money. By appointingitsel as the sole producer o money, the Statecould increase and in ate the money supplythrough currency depreciation: by produc-ing an increasingly cheaper and ultimatelyworthless money, such as paper money,that could be produced at virtually zero cost,and thus enabled the State to buy real, non-monetary goods at no cost to itsel . But in an

environment o multiple, competing states,paper monies and currency areas, limitationsto this policy o expropriation through in a-tion come into play. I one State in ates more


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than another, its money tends to depreciate inthe currency market relative to other monies,and people react to these changes in sellingthe more in ationary money and buying theless in ationary one. Better money wouldtend to outcompete worse money.

Tis can be prevented only i the in a-tionary policies o all states are coordinatedand an in ation cartel is established. But anysuch cartel would be unstable. Internal andexternal economic pressures would tend toburst it. For the cartel to be stable a dominanten orcer is required which leads back tothe subject o imperialism and empire build-ing. Because a militarily dominant State,a hegemon, can and will use its position toinstitute and en orce a policy o coordinatedin ation and o monetary imperialism . Itwill order its vassal States to in ate alongwith its own in ation. It will urther pres-sure them to accept its own currency as theirreserve currency, and ultimately, to replace allother, competing currencies by a single paper

money, used worldwide and controlled byitsel , so as to expand its exploitative powerover other territories and ultimately the entireglobe even without urther war and conquest.


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But and with that I am slowly approach-ing the end o my tale o moral and economicolly and decay and have already touched

upon a possible way out imperialism andempire building also bears the seeds o its owndestruction. Te closer a State comes to the

ultimate goal o world domination and one-world government and paper money, the lessreason there is to maintain its internal liberal-ism and do instead what all States are inclinedto do anyway, i.e., to crack down and increasetheir exploitation o whatever productivepeople are still lef. Consequently, with noadditional tributaries lef and domestic pro-ductivity stagnating or alling, the empiresinternal policies o bread and circuses and its

oreign policies o war and domination canno longer be maintained. Economic crisishits, and an impending economic meltdownwill stimulate decentralizing tendencies, sep-aratist and secessionist movements, and leadto the breakup o empire.

What, then, is the morale o my story? I havetried to make the current world intelligible,to reconstruct it as the predictable result o a


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series o successive and cumulative moral andeconomic errors.We all know the results. Te price o jus-

tice has risen astronomically. Te tax loadimposed on property owners and produc-ers makes the burden imposed on slaves andser s appear moderate in comparison. Aswell, government debt has risen to breathtak-ing heights. Everywhere, democratic statesare on the verge o bankruptcy. At the sametime, the quality o law has steadily deterio-rated to the point where the idea o law as abody o universal and immutable principleso justice has disappeared rom public opin-ion and consciousness and been replaced bythe idea o law as legislation. Every detail oprivate li e, property, trade, and contract isregulated by increasingly higher mountainso paper laws. In the name o social, public,or national security, democratic caretakersprotect us rom global warming and cool-ing, the extinction o animals and plants andthe depletion o natural resources, rom hus-

bands and wives, parents and employers, pov-erty, disease, disaster, ignorance, prejudice,racism, sexism, homophobia and countlessother public enemies and dangers. Yet the


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only task government was ever supposed toassume o protecting our li e and property it does not per orm. o the contrary, thehigher the state expenditures on social, pub-lic, and national security have risen, the moreprivate property rights have been eroded,

the more property has been expropriated,con scated, destroyed, and depreciated, andthe more have people been deprived o the very oundation o all protection: o personalindependence, economic strength, and private wealth. Te more paper laws have beenproduced, the more legal uncertainty andmoral hazard has been created, and lawless-ness has displaced law and order. And whilewe have become ever more dependent, help-less, impoverished, threatened and insecure,the ruling elite o politicians and plutocratshas become increasingly richer, more corrupt,dangerously armed, and arrogant.

Likewise, we know about the internationalscene. Te once-upon-a-time comparativelyliberal USA, through a seemingly endless

series o wars wars supposed to make theworld sa e or democracy but in reality warsor US and its plutocrats world-domination

has risen to the rank o the worlds oremost


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development is concerned. Tat the ultimateerror committed, leading to these deplorableresults, was the establishment o a territorialmonopoly o ultimate decision making, i.e.,a State, and hence, that the entire history weare told and taught in schools and standard

textbooks, which presents democracy as thecrowning achievement o human civilization,is just about the opposite o the truth.

Te nal question, then, is Can we recti ythis error and go back to a natural aristocraticsocial order? I have written and spokenabout the ultimate solution: how a modernnatural order a private law society couldand would work, and I can only summarilyre er you here to these works.3 Instead, I onlywant to brie y touch here, at the very end, on

matters o political strategy: how to possiblyapproach the ultimate solution that I and oth-ers such as my great teacher Murray Rothard

3I gave a speech at the Mises Institute Brasil in2011 entitled Te Problem o Social Order. Itwas published by the Mises Institute in Auburn,Alabama, as State or Private Law Society, andis available at: mises.org/daily/5270/State-or-Pri- vateLaw-Society


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Switzerland, with its still comparatively pow-er ul small cantons vis--vis its central gov-ernment. Ideally, the decentralization shouldproceed all the way down to the level o individual communities, to ree cities and vil-lages as they once existed all over Europe. Just

think o the cities o the Hanseatic League, orinstance. In any case, even i new little Stateswill emerge there, only in small regions, dis-tricts, and communities will the stupidity,arrogance, and corruption o politicians andlocal plutocrats become almost immedi-

ately visible to the public and can possibly bequickly corrected and recti ed. And only in very small political units will it also be possi-ble or members o the natural elite, or what-ever is lef o such an elite, to regain the statuso voluntarily acknowledged con ict arbitra-

tors and judges o the peace.


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68 F A M D

disputes, settling o , 8 .draf, 54

economic collapse, 64economic crisis, inevi-

tability o , 17egalitarianism, 15empire, 56empire building, the

end o , 59empire, building o by

democracies, 56End o History and the

Last Man, Te, 7envy, 15, 37, 40equality be ore the

law, 41Euro (the currency),

64European Union (EU),

64exploitation and

expropriation underdemocracy, 46

eudal age, 31eudalism, 11 ., 32allodial, 33as natural order, 12

oreign countries,destruction o , 55ree university educa-tion, 49

French Revolution, 24Fukuyama, Francis, 8n

unctional privilege, 42uture orientation okings, 44

governmentevolution o , 7 .

nal orm o , 8

government debt, 60

Hanseatic League, 65haves and have-nots,

48competing groups

o , 49hegemon, 58Hobbesian state o

nature, 14, 38Hoppe as dictator, 21

imperialism, 36monetary, 58

impoverishment osociety 50

incentives, 49 .


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Industrial Revolu-tion, 8in antilization, 50in ation, results, o 58in ationary cartel, 58Inge, Dean W.R., 8intellectuals, role o ,

37 ., 40, 41, 49

Jasay, Anthony de, 10nJefferson, Tomas, 11 judges, 28 justice, price o , 60

Kern, Fritz, 31king, the

as absolute, 24, 34as monopolist judge,

30as representing the

people, 14as subordinated to

law, 31constitutional, 24, 34

eudal, 34nal authority o , 13

powers sought by, 13 selection o , 32 .

Kingship and Law inthe Middle Ages, 31

law constitutional, 43cost o , 35discovered or made,

28legislated, 43natural, 43quality o , 35, 60

Leviathan, growthtoward, 17

Lockean homestead-ing, 20n

Menger, Carl, 7Middle Ages, 12, 23,

24, 31military-industrial

complex, 55Mises, Ludwig von, 7monarchs, absolute

power sought by, 14monarchy

absolute, 15, 39classical, 24constitutional, 15, 39

money monopolistic control

o , 57origin o , 7


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70 F A M D

monopolyas owned by theking, 16

o ultimate decisionmaking, 41, 63

territorial, 34morally uninhibited

demagogues, 46

natural aristocracy, 10,11, 29

natural authorities,10, 29

natural elites, 10, 65selection o , 29natural leaders, 10new laws, role o under

eudalism, 32noble amilies, role o ,

29 .

offi cial capacity, actingin, 42

ownership, assignmento , 9

peace, permanent, 27npersonal privilege, ex-

ercised by a king, 41plutocrats, 51

power elitesmembers o , 51under democracy,

50 .private law society, 63private property, role

o , 20nprivileged unctions,

42privileges, political, 16pro essional politi-

cians, role o in serv-ing the elite, 52

progress, the supersti-tion o , 8

progressive orthodoxy,8

propertyas antecedent to the

state, 10disputes, 9disputes, inter-dy-

nastic, 53disputes, resolution

o , 25ff.

at, 35

Rawls, John, 25reason, use o , 20


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redistribution o wealthand income, 48republics, parliamen-

tary, 24right to li e and prop-

erty, lack o , 22Romanes Lectures o

1920, 8Rothbard, Murray, 63

scarcity, 20, 25ser dom, 33

smaller states, role o ,64social character o

population, changesto under democracy,47

social con ict, 9social contract, 14, 38Soviet Empire, 64standard history, 31state, the

capture o by theelite, 52

identi cation o thepublic with, 54

origins o , 23 .powers o , 23

role o in con icts, 22use o by the pluto-crats, 51

state aggression, exter-nalized, 36

state rules, selectiono under democracy45 .

Sumner, William Gra-ham, 51

taxes, role o undereudalism, 32

theoretical history, 7time pre erence, 50true power elite, lead-

ers o , 51two old myth, 38

US, international roleo , 61 .

universal agreement,28

veil o ignorance, 25

warconduct o under

democracy, 54

H -H H 71


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conduct o undermonarchy, 53motives or, 54pro ts earned rom,

55total, 54

wars, monarchical, 53World War I, 24

72 F A M D


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A A

H -H H was born on Septem-ber 2, 1949, in Peine, West Germany. He attendedthe Universitt des Saarlandes, Saarbrcken, theGoethe-Universitt, Frank urt/M, and the Uni- versity o Michigan, Ann Arbor, or studies in Phi-losophy, Sociology, History, and Economics. Heearned his Ph.D. (Philosophy, 1974) and his Ha-

bilitation (Sociology and Economics, 1981), bothrom the Goethe-Universitt, Frank urt am Main.He taught at several German universities as

well as at the Johns Hopkins University BolognaCenter or Advanced International Studies, Bolo-gna, Italy. In 1985, he moved rom Germany tothe United States, to study under Murray Roth-bard. He remained a close associate o Rothbarduntil his death in January, 1995.

An Austrian school economist and libertar-ian/anarcho-capitalist philosopher, he is cur-

rently Pro essor Emeritus o Economics at UNLV,

73


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Distinguished Fellow with the Mises Institute,ormer editor o the Journal o Libertarian Studies (20052009), and ounder and president o TeProperty and Freedom Society (2006present).

Pro essor Hoppe has written extensively,some o his publications include: Democracy: Te

God Tat Failed; Te Myth o National De ense;Te Economics and Ethics o Private Property; ATeory o Socialism and Capitalism ; Handeln undErkennen; Te Great Fiction; Kritik der kausalwis-senschaflichen Sozial orschung ; Eigentum, Anar-chie und Staat ; Wettbewerb der Gauner ; and nu-

merous articles on philosophy, economics and thesocial sciences. His writings have been translatedinto thirty languages.

He is married to economist Dr. A. GulcinImre Hoppe and resides with his wi e in Istanbul.

74 F A M D


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T HE M ISES INSTITUTE , founded in 1982, is a teach-ing and research center for the study of Austrianeconomics, libertarian and classical liberal politicaltheory, and peaceful international relations. In sup-port of the school of thought represented by Ludwig

von Mises, Murray N. Rothbard, Henry Hazlitt, andF.A. Hayek, we publish books and journals, sponsorstudent and professional conferences, and provide on-line education. Mises.org is a vast resource of free ma-terial for anyone in the world interested in these ideas.


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from aristocracy to monarchy to democracy_hoppe_text 2014

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