from discourse to practice: the circulation of norms

ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access

From discourse to practice: the circulationof norms, ideas and practices of migrationmanagement through the implementationof the mobility partnerships in Moldovaand GeorgiaMartine Brouillette

Correspondence:[email protected] Laboratory, University ofPoitiers, Maison des Sciences del’Homme et de la Société, Bât. A5, 5rue Théodore Lefebvre, 86073Poitiers Cedex 9, France

Abstract

This research wishes to contribute to the understanding of the migration policy regimeof the European Union (EU), by considering an analytical perspective that privileges thestandpoint of the countries of its neighbourhood. As an entry point, we have focusedour analysis on the Mobility Partnership, a policy instrument of soft power, representativeof the emblematic network governance privileged by the EU in its current politicalframework, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). Applying an“instrument approach”, our research raises the question of the role played by theMobility Partnership in the circulation of norms, ideas and practices related to the“good governance” of international migration, and whether these are internalizedby the partner third countries. We present the results of a comparative analysis oftwo study-cases, Moldova and Georgia, countries considered by the EuropeanCommission as the “best pupils” in the implementation of their Mobility Partnerships, withthe ambition to interrogate whether this instrument leads to a “common understanding”between the EU and the national actors that may lead to a translation of the Europeanobjectives in the field of migration into the registries of practices in the countries of theEastern neighbourhood. Lastly, we will discuss the strategic “usage” of this instrument fromthe partner third countries, that can lead to different results, from complete absorption ofthe objectives, to resistance in their implementation.

Keywords: Mobility partnership, Global approach to migration and mobility, Externaldimension of EU’s migration policies, Eastern Neighbourhood, Georgia, Moldova,Migration management, Europeanization, Policy instrument

IntroductionAccording to the European Commission, the Global Approach to Migration, which

came into force in 2005, represents the transition from a previously security-oriented

migration policy to a more transparent and exhaustive strategy, that would be driven

by a better understanding of all aspects related to migration, and considering mobility

as a positive force for development (European Commission, 2008). This approach, de-

fined by the European Commission as the external dimension of the European Union’s

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Brouillette Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:5 DOI 10.1186/s40878-017-0066-y

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(EU) migration policy, contributes to the relocation of the attention paid by the EU in

the field of migration management to the beginning of the migratory chain.

Under the framework of the Global Approach to Migration, the main instrument of

cooperation with third countries is the Mobility Partnership. Taking the form of a polit-

ical declaration between the partner third country, the European Commission and the

participating member states, the Mobility Partnership is presented as an instrument

elaborated to better manage circulation between the EU and the partner countries, by

addressing the facilitation of legal migration, the fight against irregular migration, the

enhancement of the link between migration and development and the development of

the external dimension of asylum.

Previous analyses on the external dimension of EU’s migration policy often refer to

third countries as the “fields of the externalization of European policies” (Guiraudon &

Lahav, 2000; Guild, Carrera, & Balzacq, 2008; Bigo & Guild, 2010), implying that the

EU is exporting its internal affairs concerns into its foreign relations with the countries

of its neighbourhood. Over the years, the European Union has woven a web of relations

with its neighbours through intersecting policy instruments, aiming at prescribing its

norms of migration management, more specifically with regards to restrictive migration

control. As Ian Manners has argued, the EU would be a normative power in the sense

that it repeatedly attempts to “shape conceptions of the normal” through practices of

“diffusion” of its best practices and its effort of capacity building in third countries

(Manner, 2002). For some, the EU’s external action can be perceived as a form of “soft

imperialism” (Longo, 2011), since even without resorting to “hard power”, the EU is

able to impose its interest through its various platforms for dialogues and through the

use of conditionality. The Mobility Partnership is embedded in the “global policy dis-

course” of migration management put forward by the EU, depoliticizing the issue of mi-

gration and adopting instead a more neutral technocratic mode of external governance

(Kunz, Lavenex, & Panizzon, 2011) focused on the setting of rules, norms, procedures

and best practices that become measurable through benchmarking methods or progress

reports. As argued by Geiger and Pécoud, this performative discourse on what migra-

tion is and how it should be managed legitimizes the migration management activities

and gradually transforms the way it is perceived by local actors, notably in the countries

of origin (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010). The literature on the external governance of the

EU’s migration policy has shed a light on the dynamics and motivations behind EU’s

projection of rules and policies (Lavenex, 2010) often portraying the EU as a homoge-

neous and rational actor, unilaterally exporting its “European interest”.

Instead of reinforcing the perception of third countries as simple receiving units of

European policies, we choose to focus on the agency of the local actors and the feed-

back effects involved in the negotiations for the implementation of migration policies,

that may lead, or not, to a translation of the European objectives into the registries of

practices of the partner countries. Inspired by the work of researchers focusing on the

neighbourhood of the European Union in the study of the its migration policy regime,

such as El Qadim (2015), Michalon (2015, 2009, 2007) and Boubakri (2016, 2013,

2008), we have adopted an angle of analysis that moves away from a Eurocentric

approach and that instead perceives the external dimension of EU’s migration policy as

“a conjunction of the ideas formulated by the actors from the member states and the

European agencies, and that takes into account the claims of the third countries”.

Brouillette Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:5 of 21

(El-Qadim, 2015, p. 311) Based on this postulate, our research raises the following

question: What is the role of the instrument of the Mobility Partnership in the cir-

culation of norms, ideas and practices related to the “good governance” of inter-

national migrations and are these internalized by the partner countries?

In order to answer our research questions, we will present the results of a comparative

analysis of selected countries of the Eastern neighbourhood benefitting from a Mobility

Partnership. We have adopted an “instrument approach” to our analysis, inspired by the

work of French social scientists Pierre Lascoumes, Patrick Le Galès, Bruno Palier, Sabine

Saurugger and Yves Surel. As defined by Le Galès and Lacousmes, a policy instrument is

“a device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between

the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it

carries” (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2004, p. 5). Defining the policy instrument as an institu-

tion, these authors argue that a device is rarely neutral, but rather is made up of represen-

tations of social issues that are diffused through its operationalization. The policy

instrument rests on cognitive and normative frameworks, meaning that it determines the

“ways actors will behave, creates uncertainties on the effects of power relations, favours

certain actors allocating them new resources, while excluding others” (Saurugger & Surel,

2006, p. 201). With this analytical framework in mind, we attempt to understand the

dynamics guiding the Mobility Partnership from its negotiation to its implementation and

how it participates in the diffusion of ideas and practices related to the management of

migration, linking this approach with the literature on Europeanization.

In order to maintain our “decentralized” angle to the analysis of the implementation

of a European policy instrument of “soft law” in third countries, the definitions of

Europeanization addressing the cognitive component of this process are best suited to

our research. Most scholars have defined Europeanization as the institutionalization

at the domestic level of European policies and politics (Featherstone & Radaelli,

2003, p. 30). In that line of thoughts, Europeanization can be understood as a

process through which objectives, methods, rules and instruments, to ways of do-

ings, shared beliefs and values are assimilated at the local level. Following Baisnée

and Pasquier’s idea of using Europeanization as a working tool, we propose to look

at the Mobility Partnership as a vector for the Europeanization of third country’s

migration policies. Even if the Mobility Partnership is an instrument of soft power,

without legally binding constraints, it still serves as a vehicle for diffusing a certain

vision of the world and can transform the knowledge and the know-how of local

actors based on the European game (Baisnée & Pasquier, 2007, p. 218). Most

scholars working on the Mobility Partnerships have demonstrated its persistence in

pursuing the traditional security-oriented objectives of the EU in third countries

(Carrera & Hernandez i Sagrera, 2009). We hope to add a layer of analysis into

this field of study by observing the pedagogical capacity of the Mobility Partner-

ships (Kunz & Maisenbacher, 2013) in orienting the Europeanization of the migra-

tion policies in third countries.

According to Lascoumes and Le Galès, the research design in the analysis of a policy

instrument needs to retrace its history, unveil its normative and cognitive frameworks,

look into the network of actors it contributes to put in place and the effects it produces

(Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2004, pp. 363-364) Through field studies in Moldova and

Georgia, countries considered by the European Commission as the “best pupils” in the


implementation of their Mobility Partnerships, we interviewed the institutional and

non-institutional actors involved in these Mobility Partnerships, with the ambition to

interrogate whether this instrument leads to a “common understanding” between the

EU and the national actors, that would translate in the “formulation of policies and

conformation of practices in the field of migrations” (Channac, 2006, p. 400). Sixty-one

qualitative interviews were conducted with the actors susceptible to cover the entire

field of actions of the Mobility Partnerships for these study-cases. The following table

shows the repartition of the interviews conducted across countries and the occupation

of the interviewees:

Role of actors by country Moldova Georgia Brussels Total

National governmental institutions 9 8 17

Local project coordinators - civil society 8 5 13

European Delegations - Policy Officers 2 1 3

European Commission - Policy Officers 6 6

Local representations of Member States 2 1 3

European Experts 4 4

International Organizations 6 7 2 15

Thus, we will first retrace the origins of this policy instrument in the context of the

evolution of the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy and in the local context

of our two main study-cases, Moldova and Georgia. We will then discuss our findings

based on our interviews with the “intermediate” actors responsible for the negotiation and

the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships.

Tracing the origins of the mobility partnershipsSince the reformulation of the Global Approach to Migration in 2011, the focus of the

external dimension of the European migration policy has strategically moved from the

Eastern border to the South of the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2011) and

the Mobility Partnership seems to have gained in importance to become a key

mechanism of cooperation for the European Commission. Tracing the origins of this

political instrument allows us to grasp the representations, values and principles at the

heart of its foundation, marking a rupture from the previous measures undertaken by

the EU to deal with this social issue.

The emergence of the need for a balanced approach to migration management

From the Tampere Summit held in 1999, the government heads of the EU recognized

the importance of cooperating through partnerships with third countries in order to

achieve their migration control objectives (Tampere European Council, Presidency

Conclusions, 1999). Migration control objectives increasingly became intertwined to

the larger framework of cooperation with the EU and appeared in economic

agreements as well as in the field of development aid. Developing migrants’ countries

of origin is increasingly understood as providing an alternative to emigration and the

European Commission has since 1994 pushed for enhanced synergies between

migration and development with the aim to reduce migratory pressures (European

Commission, 2002, p. 7). The global discourse on migration within the sphere of the


European Union is gradually changing, acknowledging the failures of previous

restrictive policies. As stated by the European Commission in a communication from

2000: “it is clear from an analysis of the economic and demographic context of the

Union and of countries of origin, that there is a growing recognition that the “zero”

immigration policies of the past 30 years are no longer appropriate (…). In this

situation, a choice must be made between maintaining the view that the Union can

continue to resist migratory pressures and accepting that immigration will continue

and should be properly regulated and working together to try to maximise its positive

effects on the Union, for the migrants themselves and for the countries of origin”

(European Commission, 2000, p. 3).

Even though restrictive policies of migration control remain dominant in the external

dimension of the European migration policy, those new principles emerged, guiding its

evolution: migration can and must be managed to profit the EU, the countries of origin

and the migrants themselves, cooperation with third countries is essential to reduce

migratory pressures and development in the migrants’ countries of origin can provide

an alternative to migration. The following cooperation frameworks proposed by the EU

reflect this new posture and impose these principles as self-evidence. With the object-

ive to develop closer relations with its neighbours following the 2004 enlargement, the

EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission, 2003),

which further contributed to the transfer of the European “best practices” in the field

of migration management. Paradoxically, the evolution of the cooperation between the

EU and third countries in the field of migration also seems to indicate the increasing

role attributed to third countries in the formation and consolidation of the internal

security strategy of the Union (Gabrielli, 2007; Guiraudon, 2010).

The highly mediatized events of Ceuta and Melilla that occurred in 2005, along with the

proliferation of international forums addressing through a new angle migration-related

issues (the Bern Initiative and the United Nations Global Commission on International

Migration, among others) prompted the European heads of government to convene and

propose an alternative solution to the management of migration. Following the European

Council in Hampton Court in October 2005 (Brussels European Council, Presidency

Conclusions, 2005), the guidelines for a “Global Approach to Migration” were laid.

Aspiring to move away from the previous security-oriented approach to the manage-

ment of migration, unpopular with the countries of origin, this new political framework

aims to equilibrate the relationship with the partner third countries through new

instruments of cooperation such as the Mobility Partnership. At the heart of this

approach is the willingness to provide “winning” solutions to all parties involved in the

migration phenomenon. Divided into three, then later four pillars, the Mobility Partner-

ship is expected to evenly address the facilitation of legal migration unto the territory

of the EU, the enhancement of the link between migration and development, the fight

against irregular migration and the international protection of migrants. Hence, the

political instrument of the Mobility Partnership surfaces within the context of emerging

global discourses on migration management and on the migration and development

nexus. The usage of the term “partnership” to refer to the cooperation with third coun-

tries emphasizes the engagement to be taken by the parties involved to share the

responsibilities related to an “efficient” governance of migration and the willingness of

the EU to work collaboratively with third countries. The determination of the pillar


structure of the Mobility Partnership translates into actions the ascending discourses of

the EU on the management of migration flows: mobility must be facilitated for certain

categories of individuals, while migration and border control must be reinforced to pre-

vent unwanted migrants to reach Europe; development cooperation should be enhanced

to refrain potential migrants from leaving their home countries and the national protec-

tion systems in third countries need to be consolidated so that asylum-seekers can obtain

the refugee status in the neighbouring countries of the EU.

The introduction of the Mobility Partnership in the external dimension of EU’s

migration policy corresponds to the three reasons enumerated by Lascoumes and Le

Galès on their analysis of innovation in policy instruments (Lascoumes & Le Galès,

2004, p. 358). A new instrument is a political act that signals both a rupture with the

anterior actions and a quest for efficiency. Additionally, new instruments carry values

meant to renew public action. In the context of the Mobility Partnership, its

introduction comes at a time when the European Union realized that its previous

measures aiming to stop migration flows were not only inefficient, but also heavily

criticized. With the launch of the Global Approach to Migration, considering migration

as a multifaceted phenomenon that must be addressed with a balanced approach, the

EU adopted a novel posture that differs significantly from its previous stance on

migration. The Mobility Partnership was the instrument thought to contribute to a

paradigmatic change that would (re-) produce representations and meanings related to

migration, thus operationalizing the “theory” behind the Global Approach to Migration.

The third country selection process for the mobility partnership

The first communications of the European Commission on the Global Approach

to Migration in 2007 prioritized Africa and the region of the Southern

Mediterranean as the geographical zone where the attention and the first actions

should be directed, perceived by the member states as more “problematic”.

Nonetheless, the Working group on Migration and Asylum first selected countries

from the Eastern Neighbourhood to participate in the first generation of Mobility

Partnerships (Interview Policy Officer DG-Home, 2016). The intention behind this

geographical redirection of attention was to experiment this new policy instru-

ment on countries that did not present significant migration-related issues for the

member states, in order to exploit the demonstrative potential of the Mobility

Partnership, and use it on future negotiations with countries coinciding more

closely with their strategic interests.

The Mobility Partnership is, in the case of the Eastern neighbours, the first

instrument of cooperation proposed by the EU to deal exclusively with migration and

border issues, placing for the first time these questions on their national political

agenda. The previous forms of cooperation designed for the Post-Soviet countries, the

TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) program

and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements were multidimensional, with initia-

tives thought to facilitate the transition towards a democratic regime, the state of law

and a market-based economy. The Mobility Partnership thus represents the first bilat-

eral form of cooperation on migration for these countries, most of which did not bene-

ficiate from any bilateral relations with member states on this issue.


In order to be considered for a Mobility Partnership, the candidate third country must

consent to a number of engagements, including its willingness to open negotiations for an

EU readmission agreement, to fight irregular migration, to cooperate with Frontex, to

exchange information with the competent authorities of the member states and to

encourage return and reintegration of their emigrants (European Commission, 2007). In

return, the European Commission and the member states agree to consider legal

migration possibilities, to assist third countries by building their capacities to manage

migration flows, to encourage measures to counteract brain drain and finally, to facilitate

the procedures for the Schengen visas. Even if the Mobility Partnership is presented as a

legally non-binding declaration, with an informal and flexible framework, the negotiations

for the conclusion of this instrument rest on a top-down approach, meaning that potential

partner countries must first agree to certain engagements mostly related to the fight

against irregular migration in order to be considered as a partner for cooperation.

Strongly encouraged by the local branch of the International Organization for

Migration (IOM) (Interview Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016), the

Moldovan authorities seized the opportunity to open a dialogue with the EU on the

conclusion of a Mobility Partnership, and submitted proposals for cooperation through

a series of “non-papers”. The Moldovan propositions insisted on their engagement to

reduce the number of emigrants traveling towards the EU and to collaborate alongside

the EU and its agencies on the fight against irregular migration and border

management, corresponding to the will of the member states and the European

Commission. The national authorities admitted not being in a position enabling them

to formulate their cooperation requirements since they were mostly satisfied with the

opening of an exclusive dialogue with the EU. Georgia quickly followed Moldova’s

example and launched the negotiations for a Mobility Partnership shortly after the end

of the war with Russia in August 2008. The conclusion of this Mobility Partnership was

interpreted in this context as a form of support from the European Community to this

small nation threatened by a powerful neighbour. In this case, the Office of the State

Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Georgian government led

the negotiations. While the mandate of this political body is to pave the way for an

ever-increasing integration into the EU, it clearly is not concerned with the migration-

related issues facing Georgia.

The selection process of a partner country for the conclusion of a Mobility Partnership

demonstrates the asymmetry inherent in this instrument from its beginning. Moldova and

Georgia, both inexperienced in migration management, willing to enforce migration control

objectives and prioritizing closer relations with the EU in their respective political agendas,

agreed on the terms of the Mobility Partnership, without much negotiation. Unlike countries

of the Southern neighbourhood, familiar with bilateral agreements concluded with different

EU member states to cooperate in the field of migrations, Moldova and Georgia, driven by

their European aspirations, took on the role of subordinates in this new form of cooperation,

requiring a certain number of constraining engagements on their behalf.

Defining the content of the mobility partnership

The communications of the European Commission on the Mobility Partnerships have

done little to demystify what the latter would contain. At the time of its first


implementation, the Mobility Partnership still appeared as a nebulous instrument to all

participating parties, from the member states to the partner country, and even to the

Policy Officers from the European Commission themselves (Interview Policy Officers,

DG Home Affairs, 2012-2016). A European team of experts is deployed in the partner

country to provide recommendations that will, along with the stated priorities of the

local authorities, form the content of the Mobility Partnership. In the case of Moldova,

the national authorities formulated the return of their nationals and their subsequent

economic and social reintegration as their main priorities. For Georgia, the reintegra-

tion of their nationals and the management of their borders were stated as the main

objectives to be achieved. Both countries’ priorities coincided largely with the interests

of the participating member states. The institutional actors in charge of the negotia-

tions of the Mobility Partnership on the Moldovan side admitted being fully conscious

that the objectives that landed on their partnership reflected more closely the priorities

wanted by the EU, but did not perceive it as an anomaly since it proved their commit-

ment to adhere to EU rules.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that in all of the Mobility Partnerships with the

countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, the initial projects were elaborated without a

clear understanding of the migratory situation, since no reliable statistical data or

researches were available. Rather, general principles on migration guided the design of

the projects, considering migrants in that sense as a homogeneous group without

particularities, presuming that successful initiatives from different areas of the world

could simply be geographically transposed and obtain similar results. The projects

emerging from Mobility Partnerships correspond inevitably to the political will of the

participating member states, as they will only contribute, financially and operationally,

to the projects reflective of their national imperatives. Without clear membership

perspective for either country, the promise of visa-free travel to the EU for Georgian

and Moldovan nationals, holders of biometric passports, has been the strongest incen-

tive to proceed with the implementation of the measures under the Mobility Partner-

ship (Interviews with institutional actors Moldova and Georgia, 2014-2016).

It is under the framework of the Mobility Partnership that countries like Georgia and

Moldova have started coordinating their actions in the field of migration management,

by reuniting on a regular basis all of the actors involved at the national level to

collectively debate about migration-related issues, accompanied by representatives from

the European Commission, the member states and from selected International Organi-

zations. The European Commission has insisted for the inclusion of local civil society

organizations in these regular coordination meetings and has encouraged them to join

in the national efforts by providing substantial funding for their activities, which has, at

times, turned them into valuable sources of expertise for the national authorities. The

creation of “local platforms of cooperation” in the case of Moldova or of a State Com-

mission on migration issues in Georgia have played a crucial role in the socialization of

the actors relevant to the field of migration in each country and have formed closely-

knitted networks that now share common vocabulary and conceptions on the

phenomenon of migration. It is within these circles that new priorities for future

cooperation are elaborated and draft laws discussed. Our observation of meetings held

under these frameworks revealed that English is often the language of communication

and that the national institutional actors have come to master the formulas related to


the “global migration governance” discourse, rarely interrogating their foundations.

Certain institutions have taken a prominent role (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry

of Interior, Ministry of Justice in the case of Georgia) while others appear excluded

from the process. Surprisingly, it is often the state agencies working specifically on

migration related issues that seemed left out from these networks.

The pilot Mobility Partnerships concluded with the countries of the Eastern

Neighbourhood ambitioned to exploit the demonstrative potential of this new instrument.

The EU has played a significant role in setting migration-related issues onto the national

political agendas of the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood. For Moldova and

Georgia, the cooperation with the EU in the field of migration management, although

asymmetrical, corresponds to their objective of facilitating the access to the territory of

the EU for their citizens and more globally, to their aspirations of eventually integrating

the Union. Vertical and horizontal processes of Europeanization appear to be intertwined

in the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships. Although it remains a non-binding

political instrument, it follows a top-down approach by constraining the partner third

countries to accept a number of engagements in order to advance in the cooperation pro-

posed by the EU. On the other hand, the socialization of the actors through the setting of

cooperation platforms involving representatives from the national authorities as well as

from the European Commission, the member states and the International Organizations

creates networks that facilitate the learning processes and the dissemination of principles,

norms and practices related to the “good” governance of migration.

Beyond the discourse, an overview of the implemented initiativesHaving looked at the way the first Mobility Partnerships were elaborated and with the

objective to interrogate how the guiding principles on migration management of the

Global Approach to Migration are diffused through this instrument, we now propose

to take a deeper look at the implementation of the initiatives falling under this

framework of cooperation. Through the interviews conducted with the relevant actors,

along with the examination of the “scoreboards” detailing the projects for each partner

country, we observe an unequal repartition of the efforts through the pillar structure of

the Mobility Partnerships.

A mix of horizontal and vertical processes of Europeanization to transform the

management of migration in third countries

The model of migration control proposed by the EU through the Mobility Partnership to

the Eastern Neighbourhood countries coincides for the most part with their stated

national interests (Interviews with Georgian public servants, 2014). Before the conclusion

of Mobility Partnerships, Moldova and Georgia did not have clearly defined national

migration strategies or policies. Under the Saakhashvili government (2004-2013), Georgia

had a “laissez-faire” approach to the management of migration that, in its view, was

beneficial for its tourism industry and to attract foreign investors. Citizens from 118

countries could enter Georgia without visas, stay up to 360 days, find employment

without work permits, and leave the country for a day in order to renew their stay

(Chumburidze et al., 2015). The European Commission, along with the local branch of

the IOM, pressured the Georgian government to review its migration-related policies.


Georgia only adopted its first migration policy in 2013 (Law on the Legal Status of Aliens

and Stateless Persons) (Makaryan, 2013), reducing the list of countries exempted of visas

and allowing foreigners to stay 90 out of 180 days, in order to be in line with the require-

ments of the Visa liberalization action plan. It was reported that following the introduc-

tion of this law, tourism went down by over 40,000 arrivals within a few months,

prompting the chairman of the International Chamber of Commerce of Georgia to call

for a review of this legislation “poisoning the life of foreigners and affecting investors’ con-

fidence” (Financial Times, March 26th 2015).

Meanwhile, the emigration of Moldovan nationals, estimated by the IOM, the World

Bank and the National Border Police at about a quarter of its work force, was not given

much attention by the State administrations. It is through the instrument of the

Mobility Partnership that migration policies were structured in both of our case

studies. Looking at the national migration strategies for both countries for the current

period, the influence of the European Union is obvious and the priorities enumerated

in each document reflect the framework of the Global Approach to Migration. In both

papers’ introduction, it is stated that the approximation of their policies to the EU

norms and standards in the field is in line with their objective of eventually integrating

the Union and the priorities are often closely linked to current projects funded by the

EU. However, as argued by Makaryan (2013), “borrowing” elements from the EU

(mostly immigrant-receiving countries), can lead to a disconnection with the reality of

these countries (emigrant-sending). The driving principles of the Global Approach to

Migration are diffused in these contexts as norms to be adopted, “understood as a

standard of appropriate behaviour for actors” (Trauner & Wolff, 2014, p. 15).

In both of our study-cases, legislation on migration was first introduced through the

cooperation platforms with the EU and with the help of international organizations

such as the IOM and the UNHCR. Local branches of international organizations and

European experts are invited to participate in the working groups responsible for elab-

orating new laws and are quite active in the process, sometimes even proposing the

first draft. High-level European experts are often deployed for long-term missions in

various national ministries to provide their assistance in reforms and in the formulation

of new laws, as it has been the case with the Bureau for Migration and Asylum in

Moldova and in the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs in Georgia. At times,

the delays for a new law on migration are imposed by the European Commission,

which may lead to the adoption of fast-track legislation that may require amendments

at a later time. As expressed by a Moldovan civil servant interviewed: “Most of the time,

we use French legislation which was also put in practice in Romania, and for us, with

the language facility, we are very inspired by French or Romanian legislation, even if

they are not adjusted to the reforms we just accepted and because of deadlines from

the EU, we are afraid not to please the European Commission…” (Moldovan public

servant, 2012).

We must underline the role of “driving belt” played by the local branches of

international organizations in the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships.

Perceived as a “necessary tactical step providing more legitimacy to EU’s demands and

actions in relation with its partners” (Hernandez i Sagrera & Korneev, 2012, p. 9),

international organizations often act as intermediary between the EU and the partner

countries, providing their expertise and know-how to the inexperienced state


institutions responsible for implementing elements of the Mobility Partnership. Essen-

tial agents of the diffusion of the “global migration governance” discourse, they can be

both “executers” of the European migration policy, while at the same time, active in the

representation of the partner country (El Qadim, 2015, p. 294). Because of their privi-

leged position on the field and with Brussels, they play an active part in the

socialization processes of the local actors part of the network of migration governance

and in the Europeanization of norms and standards related to migration management.

Most of the larger scale projects falling under both Mobility Partnerships have been

implemented by an international organization with the help of member states and the

relevant national authorities. If we look at the case of the IOM in Moldova, their

involvement in the Mobility partnership goes back to the negotiation phase, where they

assisted the Moldovan government in formulating their priorities for cooperation. Con-

sequently, they have supported both the European Commission and the local author-

ities in designing projects that would fall under this new framework of cooperation and

were then in a privileged position to successfully answer the calls for projects. Working

closely with the national authorities, the local branches of the ICMPD and the IOM

diffuse beliefs, principles and values related to migration management through the im-

plementation of projects related to mainstreaming migration into development, reinfor-

cing migration and border controls, building the capacities of state authorities and

facilitating the return and reintegration of migrants into their home countries. Their

influence in the circulation of norms and practices related to the perception of efficient

migration management is undeniable in both contexts and has contributed to the

development of a “common understanding” on those issues among the local actors.

Adopting a restrictive posture on immigration was, in both of the case studies, a

highly popular alternative to the vacuity that previously existed, since it demonstrated

that the national authorities were conforming to European norms of migration

control, that they “cared” about their nationals migrating abroad and appeased the

public opinion, worried about potential influx of foreigners onto their territory

(Interviews with civil servants in Moldova and Georgia, 2014-2016). Numerous local

political discourses concur with this idea, insisting that the modernization of their

country will happen through the European model, rather than the Russian alternative,

and that by doing so, will become increasingly attractive destination or transit states

for potential migrants. In that line of thoughts, adopting restrictive measures on

immigration is necessary to proactively address this eventuality (Wunderlich, 2013).

This “tough” stance on migration from the Eastern partners can be found in the co-

operation on border-related issues and readmission. The EU has engaged in consider-

able efforts in the region to consolidate the capacities of their border regime,

supporting a border assistance mission between Ukraine and Moldova,1 as well as the

border authorities in the South Caucasus.2 These measures are appreciated by the

partner countries, hoping to strengthen their position from their threatening neigh-

bours,3 but can also be seen as a great help for countries like Georgia, in their route

toward NATO accession. By perpetuating discourses now internalized on the need to

reinforce border and migration control with the assistance of the EU, national author-

ities are signalling that they share common issues with the European political

community and that they are conforming to the dominant scheme of thoughts on

the issue.


Thus, it is with no surprise that the initiatives that received the most attention so far

under the Mobility Partnership for both countries are those centred on the fight

against irregular migration and border management. The willingness of the partner

countries to adopt migration control measures, led by the belief that their

rapprochement with the EU will inevitably lead to an increase number of immigrants

into their land, coincides with the strategic interests of the EU in its cooperation with

third countries.

The external action of the EU functions under the principle of positive conditionality,

meaning that more reforms done by the governments of partner countries to transform

their management of migration to the model of EU’s best practices will lead to more

funds, to a closer cooperation with the EU, to a visa liberalization action plan or to an

Association Agreement.4 Although the Mobility Partnership is portrayed as a non-

binding and flexible instrument, the principle of positive conditionality seems to have

played a significant role in the parallel opening of the dialogues on visa liberalization in

both cases. According to a policy officer of the DG HOME that we interviewed, the

Mobility Partnership is “a framework for political dialogue and cooperation. And within

this frame, in the area, it worked really well, they have many more things happening in

the area than before.” To understand how this instrument of soft power obeys to the

principle of positive conditionality, he adds: “And also in the case of Moldova, it’s been

quite important in the context of visa dialogue, because by engaging this Mobility Part-

nership and starting this sort of regular dialogue and coordination, there was sort of

trust built, which made it easier to engage on the visa dialogue when it came time to”.

Through the use of positive conditionality, the Mobility Partnership can be perceived

as a soft power policy instrument preparing the field for the conclusion of more

legally-binding agreements. Hence, the Mobility Partnership can be used as a stepping-

stone by partner countries to engage in deeper cooperation frameworks with the EU,

while allowing the European interests to descend in their registries of practices through

mechanisms of positive conditionality. In that context, the political instrument of the

Mobility Partnership did not receive much resistance in the implementation of initia-

tives falling under the migration control pillar of its structure since both Georgia and

Moldova were keen on adopting reforms in that domain, while at the same time seizing

the opportunity offered by the European Union for increased cooperation.

What about the mobility Partnership’s “winning” solutions for migrants?

Only one complete evaluation of the Mobility Partnership has so far been conducted.

Initiated by the IOM, the European Commission and the government of Moldova, the

2012 evaluation of the Moldovan Mobility Partnership revealed some of its lacunae as

perceived by the stakeholders. The facilitation of legal migration and the international

protection pillars of the Mobility Partnership received insufficient attention according to

those surveyed. Moldovans admitted being disappointed by the limited mobility

opportunities offered to their nationals. Just by its title, the “Mobility” Partnership holds

the premise of offering greater mobility perspectives to the nationals of the participating

third countries. Even though the concept of circular migration appears as a top priority

from the partner countries in all of the Mobility Partnerships, the member states have

been reticent, to say the least, to propose such schemes. Taking a closer look at the


projects implemented in both the Moldovan and the Georgian Mobility Partnerships, one

can notice the broad and vague meaning of the “facilitation of legal migration and

mobility” category under which they fall. Most of their objectives are focused towards the

return of migrants and their social and economic reintegration, the reinforcement of the

national employment services capacities and the diffusion of information on the

possibilities to legally migrate to the EU and of the risks of irregular migration. It appears

from the evaluation that Moldovans did not share the same understanding of “mobility”

than their European counterparts. In the context of the Mobility Partnership, even

though circular migration schemes were initially identified as one of the benefits from this

cooperation, only the short-term mobility of selected categories of individuals (students,

tourists, researchers and business people) has been included in the framework, notably

through the visa facilitation agreement linked to the conclusion of the community-wide

readmission agreement. The pursuit of the long-term objective of rapprochement to the

Union and of the opening of further frameworks of cooperation with the EU have pre-

vented the local authorities from Moldova and Georgia to be more assertive with their

demands for short-term mobility opportunities for their nationals through their Mobility

Partnership.

As for the international protection pillar, by looking at the matrix of initiatives in all

of our study cases, we can only notice the weak support towards this dimension of

migration management. In the case of Moldova, there has been so far very few

initiatives (four in total led by two member states and ICMPD) aiming to “reinforce the

capacities” of the national institutions in their ability to provide protection to asylum-

seekers, that mostly took the form of discussions between experts. Through the entire

region of the South Caucasus, only one project was directed towards international

protection, and consisted in a quality analysis of the national asylum systems for all

three countries. The lack of interest from the European Commission and the member

states in the international protection pillar contradicts an argument often heard in the

literature on the external dimension of EU’s migration policy. Strengthening the asylum

systems in the neighbouring countries of the EU should be part of the Union’s strategy

to “externalize” its policies of control and should be encouraged in order to reduce the

number of individuals seeking asylum in the member states. However, this logic does

not seem to be reflected in the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, as shown by

the weak support to projects related to the international protection pillar of the

Mobility Partnerships.

Taking a deeper look into the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships relativizes the

discourses conveyed by the European Commission on this policy instrument. Since

member states will only financially and operationally participate in the initiatives that

correspond to their own interests, the proposed “balanced” structure of the partnership is

undermined. When overviewing the implementation of the legal migration and

international protection pillars of these policy instruments, one can wonder what place is

left for the actual migrants. As coined by Stefan Rother, the Mobility Partnership resembles

a case of “global migration governance without migrants” (Rother, 2013), since most of the

initiatives are centred on the state and its administration and on diffusing ideas and

practices related to the “good” management of migration. To quote a Moldovan public

servant interviewed: “the biggest projects are on the capacity-building with migration

management […] nothing with the support going directly to asylum-seekers or to people […]”.


Interestingly, the migration and development pillar has led to significant developments

in both of our study-cases, demonstrating the internalization of the migration and devel-

opment discourse among the local actors. The migration and development nexus stems

from a consensus between policy-makers, consolidated over the years in the numerous

trans-governmental forums on migration, that perceives migrants as central actors for the

development of their country of origin. Moldova has persistently been depicted as the

“good student” in the implementation of the “migration and development” pillar of the

Mobility Partnership and as an example to follow for other partner countries. Most of our

Moldovan interviewees have enthusiastically recalled that representatives from this coun-

try have been invited on numerous occasions to share their experience, notably in the

Global Forum on Migration and Development. Most of the initiatives in both of these

countries mainly focus on the involvement of the diaspora in the development of the

country through support for the creation of start-up businesses, job-matching, skills

development, recognition of qualifications and the simplification of procedures for the

sending of remittances. The IOM has been mandated to design projects aiming at

“strengthening the development component of the Mobility Partnership” in Moldova and

Georgia, initiatives that have again mainly consisted in building the capacities of the

national policy-makers, in identifying “best practices” and encouraging the mobilization of

the diaspora. Attempts to reach out to the diaspora of both countries have taken many

forms, including through the importation of the “co-development” concept and through

the creation of national agencies responsible for diaspora issues.

The annual participation of Moldova at the Global Forum on Migration and

Development and the regular interactions between local actors, international

organizations and European experts have facilitated the internalization among the

policy-makers of the belief that greater development in the migrants’ countries of origin

will reduce emigration and of the migrants’ central role in this dynamic. However, our

interviews with the local actors revealed that the difficulties in the implementation of

the projects related to migration and development were, according to their opinion, to

be attributed to a lack of consideration of the local context, to insufficient attention

paid to the needs expressed by the migrants themselves and to frequent misunder-

standing with the government and local officials on the objectives of each initiative. As

expressed by a Moldovan project officer interviewed: “How can you say to a migrant

who left the country to survive to give money for the reconstruction of a school. I mean

this is ridiculous! He’s surviving and thinking about how to save enough to buy a flat

when he comes back, pay the studies for his son and now you talk about… I mean for

Moldova, it is not feasible yet, the co-development concept […]”.

The impacts of the Mobility Partnerships’ initiatives are rarely evaluated in the sense

of their actual consequences on migrants and/or nationals. Projects are discussed at the

local cooperation platforms reuniting the network of governance on migration issues in

rather vague terms. Accordingly, their success or failure is not based on factual

measurements of their outcomes, but rather seems to be determined by the level of

“ideational convergence” (Radaelli & Pasquier, 2008, p. 38) they have led to. The

regular interactions among the actors, the implementation of projects designed in

Brussels or in the member states of the Union, the presence of European experts in the

national ministries, along with the prominent role played by international organizations

on the field are all elements contributing to the learning processes of the national


authorities on the know-how and the development of knowledge related to the perception

of efficient migration management. While we can attest of top-down Europeanization

processes through mechanisms of conditionality and through the imposition of reforms

related to border and migration management in the partner countries, it also appears that

more subtle forms of transfers are at play. Socialization and learning mechanisms are put

in place to diffuse ideas, knowledge, norms and practices related to migration and their

internalization is made visible through the discourses relayed on those issues by local

policy-makers.

What future for the mobility partnership? Discussion on the outcomes andlimits of this instrumentFrom our fieldwork experience in the Eastern neighbourhood countries that have agreed

to sign up for Mobility Partnerships, some conclusions can be drawn on this new form of

cooperation. Even though the EU has pursued a combination of traditionally restrictive

objectives, the partner countries have demonstrated in their implementation of this policy

instrument a capacity of action and have been “able to use European policy as an

opportunity rather than responding to a pressure” (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, p. 46).

The concept of the “usage of Europe” coined by Jacquot and Woll (2003) can help us

understand how Europe can represent a resource for local actors, and leads us to question

the assumption of a unilateral transfer of norms (Hernandez i Sagrera & Korneev, 2012)

that would operate through the implementation of a policy instrument.

On the positive outcomes of the mobility partnership

Reflecting on the realizations achieved through the Mobility Partnership, we must

highlight the role it has played in placing the issue of migration onto the national

political agendas of the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood. According to their

own words, the Moldovan and Georgian officials have “come to realize” the amplitude

of this phenomenon and the need for action, demonstrating the progressive

construction of a “common understanding” on migration issues and how they should

be addressed (Channac, 2006, p. 13). In both Moldova and Georgia, the State

institutions had until then provided little administrative support to their migrants. The

reflection around this topic has led to the formulation of development projects that, for

example, addressed the question of the recognition of qualifications acquired abroad,

the care for the children and the elderly left behind and the outreach to the diaspora.

Numerous studies have been conducted under the framework of the Mobility

Partnership, in order to understand the characteristics of the migration flows emerging

from this area, to interrogate migrants on their needs and to provide recommendations

to the local administrations.

The interviews have revealed that the main reason explaining why migration took

such an important place on their respective national political agendas, particularly in

Moldova and Georgia, is not because of the gravity of the issues related to this

phenomenon nor because of a sudden realization of what must be done to address the

concerns of their citizens residing abroad, but because it is one of EU’s top priorities

and linked to strong incentives for their respective governments. To quote one of the

interviewees from the Georgian civil society: “People don’t do migration management


and control for migration management and control but for visa-free regime and to do

good in EU cooperation”. Unlike the Visa liberalization action plan, the Mobility

Partnership, as a non-binding instrument of soft power, does not have an end result

that serves as a strong incentive. Rather, it has been perceived by the Georgian and

Moldovan authorities as a stepping-stone to engage with the EU on the dialogue for a

visa-free regime and for closer cooperation. Nonetheless, even if these strategic

interests motivated the Moldovan and Georgian authorities to embark on this new

cooperation framework, the preferences of the actors have been gradually transformed

according to those of the EU.

For countries like Moldova, presenting a priori little interest for deepened relations

with the member states, the Mobility Partnership has represented a truly unique

opportunity to gain more visibility and to open a privileged dialogue with the EU. Both

countries have achieved one of their top national objectives through their

implementation of the Mobility Partnership, the liberalization of the Schengen visa for

their citizens. The Mobility Partnerships, entangled in the web of cooperation deployed

by the EU and its member states in the region, cannot be analysed separately from the

other instruments of cooperation. Nonetheless, its implementation, when deemed

satisfactory by the European Commission, can deepen the relations, leading to an ever-

increasing approximation of the national policies and practices to the EU norms and

standards.

On the limits of the mobility partnership

The experiences of the Mobility Partnerships in the Eastern neighbourhood present

numerous limits. First and foremost, the analysis of the existing partnerships reveals

that it is after all an empty shell, and that its content will inevitably depend from the

level of interest and engagement of the participating member states, the European

Commission and the third country. For those reasons, we can question whether it has

been used as an entryway to push for the conclusion of more constraining agreements,

such as the community-wide readmission agreements.

Member states have also demonstrated incoherence in their support for the Mobility

Partnerships. As an example, even though Georgia’s Mobility Partnership is the one

that received the most signatures from member states (16), it did not translate into a

strong commitment from them, and very few projects emerged if we compare to

Moldova (26 projects in Georgia and over 85 in Moldova). Consequently, 3-day study

visits of detention centres in a member state for a handful of civil servants from the

partner country could symbolize the engagement of a signatory member state into this

instrument of cooperation. This example illustrates in our opinion the gap between the

rhetoric surrounding this framework of cooperation, its stated objective of coherence

and comprehensive action, and its actual implementation.

Most of the Moldovan and Georgian officials interviewed have agreed on the lack of

visibility and comprehension of this instrument, unsure at times of its purpose or added

value besides leading to some proximity with the EU and paving the way for the Visa

Facilitation and readmission agreements. For those reasons mainly, these countries have

been more “reactive” to their Mobility Partnerships, unable to elaborate a long-term strategy

of their objectives and priorities under this framework of cooperation. They have also


attributed the implementation gaps of the Mobility Partnership to an insufficient consider-

ation of the local context in the conception of the programs of action. Both countries appear

after all to have little ownership over their migration policies, mainly influenced by the

direction imposed by the EU. Since both countries were previously inexperienced in the

field of migration management and acknowledged that migration is a priority issue for the

EU in its foreign relations, the governments of Moldova and Georgia have welcomed the

opportunity represented by the Mobility Partnership, and have strived to perform with this

policy instrument.

In the end, implementation gaps reveal the lack of attention paid by the initiators of

the projects to their outcomes and the lack of comprehension of the local context

when designing initiatives. The consequences of the Mobility Partnerships’ projects are

rarely at the centre of the discussions during the local cooperation platforms since the

focus is usually on the dissemination of knowledge and “good practices” in handling

the phenomenon of migration. Intersecting mechanisms of Europeanization are

involved through the implementation of the Mobility Partnership. Cognitive

Europeanization is achieved through socialization and the learning of new knowledge

made possible through the network of governance set up by this political instrument.

At the same time, more coercive measures are taken by the EU to ensure that the

national legislation of the partner countries is aligned to its acquis and border and

migration control objectives are conform to the European interests. In this sense, our

overview of the political instrument of the Mobility Partnership demonstrates, as

Lascoumes and Le Galès have stated, that, far from being neutral, it serves as a vehicle

for the dissemination of meanings, representations, ideas and values that lead to a

convergence in the ways to apprehend the phenomenon of international migrations.

ConclusionOverall, the cooperation initiatives launched by the EU following the change in the

rhetoric on the management of migration have mainly attempted to proceed to a

“system-export of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice governance mechanisms”

(Longo, 2011) through the transfer of knowledge and best practices, and has rarely

diverted from the traditional security-oriented logic of action. The principle of condi-

tionality is fundamental, ensuring that even with soft-power instruments, the question

of migration is addressed in order to unlock further dialogues related to trade, develop-

ment and so forth.

Despite the European Commission’s cooperation narrative found in the guiding

principles of the Global Approach to Migration, the analysis of the existing Mobility

Partnerships challenges the stated ambition of a balanced pillar structure. Instead, few

and vaguely formulated development objectives and legal migration possibilities have

emerged and appear diluted when compared to the control-oriented measures. This

reality exposes the gaps that subsist between the hegemonic security-oriented vision

shared by the authors of this policy and the illusion of a transparent and harmonious

collaboration proposed to third countries. Through its implementation, the Mobility

Partnership implies an exercise of socialization between local actors and European

experts, “contributing to the diffusion of knowledge and technologies related to migra-

tion management into the registries of practices of the partner countries.” (Featherstone

& Radaelli, 2003, p. 46), that has been conducive to the internalization of the “global


migration governance” discourse at the local level. The national migration strategies of

both countries, with principles closely similar to those of the Global Approach to

Migration of the EU, reflect the “accepted and normalized way of thinking and acting

about international migration” (Kunz & Maisenbacher, 2013, p. 207) that has emerged

over these issues. In that sense, it appears that the Mobility Partnership, rather than

bringing solutions to existing problems, participates instead in the construction of

representations on a particular issue, in this case, the “efficient” management of the

migration phenomenon.

Altogether, the interviews with the Moldovan and Georgian actors of the Mobility

Partnership have revealed the progressive appropriation of a European belief system

related to the good governance of migration through processes of Europeanization and

have also informed of the strategic use that partner third countries can pull from this

cooperation to pursue their own political objectives of getting closer to the economic

and political community of the Union. In the context of these former communist

states, the model of governance proposed by the EU is perceived as legitimate and as

argued by Delpeuch, has great chance of being imitated “even with a mythologized and

a vague understanding of the practice taken for model and of the added value its

importation is susceptible to bring to their activity” (Delpeuch, 2008, p. 12). The

Moldovan and Georgian governments have transformed their legislative framework in

order to approximate their laws in the field of migration to those of the European

Union and have adopted into their registries of practices the measures of migration-

control requested by the EU through its various policy instruments.

Although we argue against the unilateral transfer of norms often assumed in the

literature on Europeanization and in the study of the external dimension of the EU

(Hernandez i Sagrera & Korneev, 2012), both Moldova and Georgia have made a

“usage of Europe” that coincide with the interests of the Union. Furthermore, the

approximation to EU norms and standards has a “moral background” (El Qadim, 2015)

that serves to reinforce the standing of both countries in the international community,

allowing Moldova and Georgia to claim: “I am one of you” (Makaryan, 2013b). Even

though the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships has at times been a complex

task, with local implementers unsure about the purpose of the projects and their

coherence with the local reality, in both cases, the European Commission perceives

them as achievements, even if no proper evaluation mechanisms have been set to

monitor their consequences. Surprisingly, the results from the ‘“pilot” Mobility

Partnerships concluded with the countries from the Eastern Neighbourhood have not

been highlighted in order to learn lessons from these past experiences and share

information on their successes and failures, from the viewpoint of the local actors. It is

with the objective to fill this informational vacuum that we have attempted to

summarize the outcomes of the Mobility Partnerships concluded with the Republic of

Moldova and Georgia.

Endnotes1The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine was

launched in 2005, following the request of the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities to

the EU and the signature of a « Memorandum of Understanding » between the three

parties. It is a technical and consultative mission, whose principal objective is to


improve the capacities of the border services from both countries. The mission also

provides guidance for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, in line with the

European Neighbourhood Policy’s objectives. According to the EUBAM official

webpage, it counts 196 agents, from which 80 are experts from 13 Member States of

the EU.2There is a myriad of projects related to border management financed by the EU in

the region implemented through different policy instruments, such as the « Support to

the Integrated Border Management Systems in the South Caucasus », « Reinforcing the

Capacities of the government of Georgia on Border and Migration Management » and

the « Eastern Partnership Pilot Project on better coordination of the protection of land

border between Azerbaijan and Georgia » initiatives. The Frontex agency also manages

the targeted project of the Eastern Partnership on Integrated Border Management

Capacity Building in the region.3There are numerous territorial conflicts in the region – Moldova-Transnistria,

Georgia-Russia, Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey, impairing the process of

border demarcation between the countries.4Moldova and Georgia both signed their respective Association Agreement with the

EU in June 2014.

AbbreviationsDG: Directorate-General (European Commission); EU: European Union; Frontex: European Border and Coast GuardAgency; GAM: Global Approach to Migration; GAMM: Global Approach to Migration and Mobility; ICMPD: InternationalCentre for Migration Policy Development; IOM: International Organization for Migration; NATO: North Atlantic TreatyOrganization; TACIS: Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States; UNDP: United NationsDevelopment Programme; UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank Olivier Clochard (CR. CNRS, MIGRINTER, Université de Poitiers) and HélènePellerin (Prof., Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa) for their feedback and proofreading this article.The author is also grateful to the MIGRINTER laboratory and the Fondation Poitiers Université for their grantsallowing the field research to be conducted.

FundingThe author is grateful to the MIGRINTER laboratory and the Fondation Poitiers Université for their grants allowing thefield research to be conducted.

Availability of data and materialsThe data set supporting the results of this article is available upon request to the author, to preserve the anonymityof the interviewees.

Authors’ contributionsThis study was designed and directed by Martine Brouillette as part of her PhD Thesis. The author also conducted theinterviews, analysed the data and wrote the manuscript. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Ethics approval and consent to participateNot applicable.

Consent for publicationNot applicable.

Competing interestsThe author declares that she has no competing interests.

Publisher’s NoteSpringer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.


Received: 23 February 2017 Accepted: 5 December 2017

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from discourse to practice: the circulation of norms

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