From East to West:AFRICAN COASTAL PIRACY

2013

Odysseas Pampakas

PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED IN PART REQUIREMENT OFTHE BSc in MARITIME STUDIES

OFTHE FREDERICK UNIVERSITY, CYPRUS

JANUARY 2014

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Nicholas

Berketis for his time and assistance in order to complete the project. Also for

the excellent cooperation we had and for all his support and efforts invested in

the development of this project, as my research was enlightened to a great

level with valuable information and data provided by him.

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ABSTRACT

The primary objective of this research is to investigate piracy in East and West

Africa and to outline the types of threats that may be encountered in the two

areas, describing the character of these criminal acts alongside the practical

ways of mitigating the threat. This study also adds to the existing knowledge

about piracy activities in the two areas, in particular the Coast of Somalia and

Nigeria. To address the research questions, the study establishes information

provided by experts as well as qualitative information provided by piracy reports

in the two areas.

The results of this research are that, up until now, little attention has been paid

to combating piracy in Nigeria. There has been significant focus on securing

the ships that pass through Somali waters but Nigeria is a different approach.

Therefore, co-operation among the coastal states in the West African region is

the way forward and urgently needed to make these waters safer for both

seafarers and vessels,

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgments 2Abstract 3Table of Contents 4Chapter 1: Introduction 51.0 Introduction to Piracy 5

1.1 Research aims and objectives 6

Chapter 2: Literature Review 72.0 Introduction 7

2.1 History 7

2.2 Prime cause 9

2.3 Attack method and target selection 11

2.4 Cost and effects 13

2.5 Ways to prevent 14

2.6 Where is the world heading to 18

Chapter 3: Methodology 203.0 Introduction 20

3.1 Research Methodology 20

3.2 Description of Data 20

3.3 Limitations 21

Chapter 4: Data Analysis, Results and discussion 224.0 Introduction 22

4.1 The Threat Continues 22

4.2 Comparing Latest Attack Numbers 23

4.3 Type of Attacks 29

4.4 Some important differences 33

4.5 Amounts of ransom claimed 36

4.6 Maritime piracy forecast for 2014 38

Chapter 5: Conclusion 39List of References 40

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Piracy is a term used to describe malicious acts against ships, acts of armed

robbery and hijacking upon ships in international waters. Pirates capture ships

and crew in order to steal valuables, extort cash from ship owners and other

third party interests by holding the ship and crew for ransom.

This is the second oldest profession on the high seas, just behind seafarers,

who derive their living from the sea and from commerce over the waves. Since

humans were first put to sea, piracy, maritime terrorism, and smuggling have

been tools that affected what happens on the land, sometimes profoundly.

Maritime piracy has been a challenge for mariners as long as ships have gone

to sea. The word piracy brings to mind pirates of the Caribbean, pictures of

peg-legged men and damsels in distress with earrings, long beards and

drinking rum. However, the age of piracy did not stop at the eighteenth century,

it continues to thrive in today‘s modern world. Although the pirates of today do

not have eye patches or carry swords, they have machine guns and rocket

launchers besides strong motives; they are a threat to society and exist in all

corners of the world.

Piracy and maritime terrorism endure because of the richness and

attractiveness of the vessels’ cargoes and due to the poorness of the people

committing these piracy acts who seem to have limited options of having a

better quality life. Like piracy centuries ago, piracy and other malicious activities

today, have emerged as the premier challenge to our current conventional

capabilities. The modern pirate's skilled tactics, just like those of pirates’

centuries ago, can out-maneuver and avoid the kinetic wrath of sophisticated

navies. There will always be an absolute need for conventional military power.

However, the sophistication of our enemies in the irregular warfare dimension

will challenge. As the methods and instruments of piracy and waterborne

terrorism have changed, the motivations for piracy and inflicting terror in the

maritime domain have remained constant over the centuries. Some of these

motives are money, public attention, or influence over governments.

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Maritime pirate attacks are booming in Africa and up until recently they used to

be concentrated in the East, primarily Somalia, but they are not limited to this

region, West Africa has some of the most volatile and dangerous seas in the

world as well. Pirates are getting quite audacious with increasing levels of

violence and not targeting primarily for ransoms but for vessel’s cargo,

especially oil. This problem has become a major issue for the shipping industry

and it is reaching dangerous proportions as the risks of shifting goods by sea

around that large and unsecured area are growing every year with the pirates’

being more brutal than other areas. Piracy has the ability to influence the

economic and political landscape of the entire world. Maritime attacks are

becoming increasingly violent as criminal gangs exploit governments inability to

police their coastlines by venturing further afield from their traditional home

waters reminding us the Greek proverb: “Where there is a sea there are

pirates”.

1.1 Research Aims and Objectives

This study has a thorough examination of the modern history of piracy and

maritime terrorism. A further investigation will be made into the growing

problem of piracy in Africa, particularly in the highly dangerous waters of East

and West Africa. While heavily armed pirates move across the water with

impunity, taking hostages for ransom and stealing oil, robbing oil workers and

installations on behalf of shadowy syndicates. The study examines why

authorities have not been able to deal with this problem after such a long time

of existence. Which area should be a bigger concern for us these days, what

are the reasons behind the attacks and what are the differences in the methods

applied. Moreover, it investigates the driving forces of this phenomenon and

how this negatively impacts the flow of foreign direct investment and trade,

what are the consequences on global economic activity and what protection

measures could be implemented to maximize the security of assets in this high

risk region.

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Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

This chapter outlines several approaches and opinions from various security

experts, focusing on the difficulties which they are facing in fighting piracy.

2.1 History

Piracy causes national and international turmoil, action, and expenditure.

Navies came into existence because of piracy. Governments have appeared

unable to face maritime terrorism. Legislatures, parliaments, and congresses

have discussed these events intensively and industry and the public are asking

for solutions, and what actions must be taken in order to confront and resolve

terror in the high seas. It is however more than clear that now is the time for

governments to move a step further beyond discussions in order to face the

issue that has been for years infesting world trade. Serious actions must be

taken and lessons must be learned through our past.

People depend on trade. The amount of international commerce that occurs via

shipping is very large with 90% of world trade being transported by sea, so one

can comprehend that the amount of international commerce occurring via

shipping is massive. Ships in the open seas are easily sustainable to pray by

pirates. Due both to the high percentage of trade made by sea and the high

level of piracy incidents, a huge inflationary problem was created which we just

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cannot afford not to do anything. The international community was set up in

such a way that it is treating piracy almost as an acceptable symptom that we

can live with. If these piracy practices were happening on land no reasonable

man would have let it slip by. Maritime piracy should be treated the same as

any other crime of this magnitude.

The lack of a centralized power in Europe during the Middle ages was the

reason that the Vikings raid across the continent at that time. Today, the

international community still faces many problems in bringing modern pirates to

justice. Therefore, gaining a greater understanding of the strategic challenges

related to piracy will give us the necessary means to fight the increasing

number of pirate attacks around the world.

Modern pirates favour small boats, but they also use large vessels to supply

the smaller attack vessels, taking advantage of the unstable societies on shore

and narrow waters, where ships must reduce their cruising speed in order to

allow safe navigation and traffic control. In addition, the small number of crew

onboard a commercial cargo vessel makes these vessels vulnerable to be

persuaded and captured by pirates. [1] The authors in the book refer to the

past, in order to justify the current situation. Other factors have to be taken into

consideration, such as technology, flow of money through international banking

and international assistance (e.g. EUNAVFOR).

African maritime insecurity, particularly in connection with acts of piracy, has

been an important field of study for security researchers in recent years. It also

led frequently to global media headlines and even a film waits to be released in

October 2013, about the true story of Cpt. Richard Phillips and his US-flagged

M/V "Maersk Alabama" hijacked by Somali pirates in 2009. A BBC documentary

also exists about the trouble with the pirates in Somalia.

It tells how pirates have been able to attack big ships with their small boats and

how the pirates in that region were pushing this all the way. Since 2008, when

they realized they could demand even more, they were no longer asking sums

between $300,000 and $500,000 to release both vessel and her crew, they

started demanding for one or in some cases up to three millions dollars. It is

important to state here that, even though these reports are critical in letting the

world get more familiar with this crucial problem, it does not give

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recommendations or solutions to the problem and no reference is made

regarding the rising phenomenon of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

In a more positive view of the issue, it must be mentioned that, due to the

United Nations and different nations' efforts the pirate attacks are steadily

decreasing in the Horn of Africa.

However, the problem seems to be shifting to other areas rather than

diminishing. Attacks on ships nowadays are rising in West Africa and all around

Gulf of Guinea and, despite all the measures taken by the United Nations,

individual nations and other organizations, piracy in that area continues to rise.

From the islands of the South Pacific, to the coastal states of West Africa, the

pirates, who claim their profits in Asian and European ports, are getting millions

of dollars.

The complexity and the evolution of maritime crimes in West Africa have many

differences than in Somalia. This makes it very difficult to predict in what ways

we can reasonably expect 2013 to be different from the past in Africa since as

Vice Adm. Mark I. Fox, the Navy's deputy chief for operations, plans and

strategy said, "Pirates are very adaptable, and very flexible." [10] Maybe it is

time for governments to be more flexible as well, be proactive instead of

reactive for a change.

IMO (the International Maritime Organisation) listed the West African coast in

its Annual Report in 2012, among the top ten piracy hotspots in the world since

2009. It is now known as one of the most volatile and dangerous seas in Africa.

However, piracy, kidnapping, and oil theft are not new to the region and as a

multitude of criminal factors have parasitically operated in the Nigerian littoral

since the country's oil boom in the 1970s; it is more accurate to say that the

country has re-emerged as an epicentre of maritime crime. Only in 2007,

Somali waters became more prone to piracy than those of Nigeria did.

2.2 Prime cause

In Somalia, it is argued that the main reason that led people to piracy was their

inability to earn a living, especially the fishermen. The dumping of toxic waste

from foreign vessels and the destruction of their fishing grounds caused this.

This phenomenon started in an effort to support and defend the country's

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territorial waters, with the pirates believing that they can protect their fishing

grounds and extract both justice and compensation for the marine resources

stolen.

Some reports have suggested that, after the outbreak of the civil war in

Somalia and the subsequent disintegration of the armed forces and in the

absence of an effective national coast guard, local fishermen formed organized

groups in order to protect their waters.

Jackson Timiyan, the leader of a national youth group in the Niger Delta said,

that young men turn to piracy because they are unemployed and poor and with

most of the Niger Delta's 30 million people living on less than a dollar a day the

prime causes of maritime piracy are low standards of life and piracy, "the only

way they can survive" (J. T.). [3]

Piracy became the most popular solution for people living in these poor

countries. It is their oasis in the desert, which they live in. The aforementioned

can make one wonder… "What if the money spent on confronting violence with

violence were actually spent on the root of the problem, by for instance

investing in tourism, education, creation of job opportunities for the youth etc.".

This could lead people away from piracy and towards a more civilized way of

living.

The foundations of piracy in West Africa were building upon the absence of law

enforcement on the seas, resentment of commercially successful vessels like

the coasts of parts of West Africa, excessive poverty, as well as political and

economic instability. As mentioned above the only way to stop crime off the

coast of Nigeria, is to provide Nigerians with other opportunities. The problem

has to be confronting in all levels from bottom to top, from political and

economic to cultural and criminal level.

Another aspect that contributes in the aggravation of the maritime piracy

phenomenon is the direct access pirates have on weaponry on which let them

to act in a much more sophisticated and destructive level. Weapons including

from pistols to rocket propelled grenades come from a variety of sources in

Asia, Europe and Africa. These weapons are easily available, transferable and

relatively inexpensive.

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Experts consider that the entire process involves collusion with Nigerian

authorities. It is argued that the stolen cargoes (oil in particular) are housed and

protected at some gasoline station forecourts in Nigeria. Another major factor

contributing to the rise of piracy is that many pirate attacks go unreported,

which lowers the potential risks for pirates. Many ship owners are reluctant to

report attacks out of fear that it will result in increased marine insurance

premiums as well as extensive, lengthy post-incident investigations that will

take their ships out of service for quite some time. Often, the reluctance of

corrupted governments to contribute for solving this major issue has proven to

be the most important obstacle in the fight against piracy.

2.3 Attack Method and Target Selection

In East Africa the Somali Pirates were hijacking ships and crew for ransom,

where as in the West, pirates have come up with an evolution in maritime

crime, as incidents of this region relate to violent criminal acts connected with

the movement of oil. [9] The primary target of this kind of piracy became

tankers travelling in the Gulf of Guinea region, with pirates carrying increasingly

sophisticated operations that focus on fewer but higher valued targets [6]

Researchers suggest that the majority of pirates originate from countries,

where corrupt law enforcement allows criminality to thrive and there is a

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bustling black market for stolen crude oil. These intelligent operations have

become increasingly multinational with a few well-organized gangs based in

Nigeria planning attacks off the coasts of Benin, Togo, and Cote d'Ivoire and

targeting small oil tankers that operate in the Gulf of Guinea, where Nigeria and

its neighbours have oil fields. This operation takes normally about seven to ten

days, which is long enough to steal the cargo. Then both the ship and her crew

are released.

The procedure of hijacking and stealing ships is usually very complicated and

organized and in order to steal the cargo after they hijack the ship, they take it

to a predetermined location, where a smaller tanker is waiting and the cargo is

transferred from the hijacked tanker to the smaller vessel. The cargoes then

end up sold on the black market in Nigerian ports such as Lagos, where oil

brokers are willing to buy the stolen oil at a steep discount. This preference for

tankers from the pirates is a matter of simple economics as they can quickly

sell a cargo of refined petroleum that worth's about $5 million to the black

market of the regional oil mafia insiders. Moreover, when on the books oil

companies can make $62 million a day in profits, it is no surprise that

unguarded oil tankers within a short distance of illegal refining facilities are

attempting targets.

In this case, it makes you wonder why oil companies of the magnitude of BP,

Shell, etc could not find ways to prevent the selling of oil in the black market by

the Nigerian pirates. They should be able to identify the branches selling the

stolen cargo and block them from their clientele. By this way, their illegal

operations will stop and leave no reason for pirates, with the markets closed, to

steal the oil.

While committing a robbery on small boats is considered to be a relatively low-

tech and low-engineered affair, hijacking a tanker and stealing vast quantities of

fuel can take several days and needs a high degree of organization and

sophistication. Moreover, it can be argued that pirates do not act solely. In

contrast, they need people in high posts to offer protection, as well as advance

information about the cargoes route and security details about the ships that

have been targeted so this makes us believe a testimony saying that, the

Nigerian syndicates are sponsored by government officials and oil industry

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executives.

2.4 Cost and Effects

East African pirates routinely hold seized vessels by often asking millions of

dollars in order to release them. Commercial shipping officials say that

hijackers in Somalia alone cause an additional $5 billion a year in expenses for

insurance and security, plus the piracy in other regions, which adds billions

more to the cost. Moreover, the nation of Nigeria claims losses of

approximately $5 billion a year from oil theft, a statistic that highlights the

profitable nature of this barbaric act. [8] Pirates have been illegally operating in

the expense of the wider global economy, including the loss of goods that

meant to trade between countries. This does not only harm the countries

themselves, but also makes companies motiveless on shipping goods across

the international waters, with consequent effects on global economic activity. As

we have seen in the case of Somalia, piracy can actively obstruct international

economic development and reduce the benefits of globalization for both

developing and undeveloped countries. Piracy has been in the focus of interest

for many years despite the aforementioned direct consequences, it sustains the

foundation of a number of subsidiary effects and consequences that indirectly

affect, among others, the political stability, as well as the domestic and

international economies.

In the Niger Delta of Nigeria, pirates have been reported to fund the activities of

armed rebel groups in order to provide protection for them when needed. This

poses a direct threat to the stability of the affected countries. Moreover, the

continuous pirate attacks on tankers and merchant vessels have created a

dysphoria among the companies currently trading in the region and are already

searching for safer alternatives. [12].

It is highly recommended that the troubled countries have to efficiently manage

pirates or soon enough they will lose their economic capacity and be led to total

chaos.

All the above affect the flow of direct foreign investment and trade. According to

the British security expert John Drick, the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

has already led to a rise in oil prices. This is mainly due to the increased costs

of the companies' trading in the area. Their usual expenses relate to ship

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insurance, piracy ransoms, private armed security, re-routing and increased

speed in order to avoid pirates and the cost of the military operations of over 30

countries that use their vessels, equipment, and military forces to combat

piracy. [11]

2.5 Ways to Prevent

Preventing maritime piracy has been in discussion tables for years. The efforts

of countries governments, the United Nations, as well as the companies trading

in the region seem to be finally paying. Acts of piracy in the treacherous waters

around the Horn of Africa have fallen sharply in 2012, according to the US Navy

statistics. In both Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, only 75 attacks were reported

in 2012, compared with 237 in 2011, responsible for the 25% of worldwide

incidents. [4] The number of hijackings was halved from 46 in 2009 and 47 in

2010, to 28 in 2011 and 14 last year respectively and, as the chair of the global

group trying to combat the pirates said, this month, May 2013 will mark the one

year anniversary of the last successful hijacking by Somalia pirates since, as

the American diplomat Donna Leigh Hopkins has credited the combined efforts

of international naval forces and increased security on ships, including the use

of private armed guards. In the same aspect, the rapid growth in the use of

armed guards who were 10% of large ships in 2011 and some 70% in 2012 and

the more aggressive operations by the international anti-pirate patrol have

caused ship captures by pirates to decline by 75% in 2012. The reduction in

ransom collected by pirates has led to an economic downturn in and around of

the northern ports of Somali where the pirates were based. [7] This illustrates

the magnitude of the economy's dependence on piracy.

Donna Leigh Hopkins, who chairs the global group trying to combat Somalia

piracy, pointed out that the jailing of 1,140 Somali pirates in 21 different

countries is starting to downgrade piracy and that, even though, there are still

pirate attacks being attempted, there has not been a successful hijacking since

the last hijacking in May 2012 of the M/V "Smyrni", a Greek flagged tanker

carrying crude oil that was worth tens of millions of dollars, which was released

after 11 months of negotiations and payment of a record-breaking ransom

nearing $15 million. Donna Hopkins stated that M/V "Smyrni" is an example of

what happens to ship owners that do not employ the best management

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practices to prevent their ship from being attacked. Not a single ship employing

armed security has ever been hijacked, Donna Hopkins continued. Other

security measures that have been proven effective include combat training of

crew and posting lookouts. Moreover, the Danish ambassador Thomas Winkler

said that on 1st of May, 2013 the UN and some international organizations and

private sector representatives had scheduled a meeting to discuss combating

pirates off the Coast of Somalia.

In the same perspective, the Danish ambassador, who chairs the group

emphasized that there is no room for pirates on Somalia's northern coast and

million-dollar ransom, which continue to attract young men to piracy. They said

that prosecuting and transferring more than 1,000 pirates to notorious Somalia

prisons appeared to be having a preventive effect as the number of active

pirates is perhaps 3,000. So, with a thousand behind bars and with 300 to 400

annual deaths from hunger or drowning, we will quickly diminish the threat. [2]

All the aforementioned even though seem to be effective in facing maritime

piracy, it seems that our ‘civilized' leaders are being pirates as well, as in my

point of view confronting violence with violence is no solution and will probably

build up the foundation of new problems. As mentioned above, there was an

enormous decline in reported piracy incidents in East Africa, however in Nigeria

the threat keeps raising, particularly within the Gulf of Guinea region, where

there is an important source of trading oil, metals for world markets and cocoa.

According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), ships operating

there sustain vulnerable targets.

The U.N. agency has pointed out that Member States should take into

consideration the example of Somalia and initiate defence techniques such as

using qualified private armed guards, lookout patrols, razor wires onboard ships

and passing through pirate ‘hot' waters at maximum speed.

Even though, international campaigns involving more than 80 countries and

international organizations are currently tracking the financial flow from piracy

operations leading to the easement of maritime piracy, it is controversial if

having armed guards on ships and taking all these defensive precautions is the

way to handle this phenomenon. For some, the fact shipping is reliant on

armed security indicates wider problems which might lead in a generation of

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new and maybe worst problems. However, security experts believe that there

are lessons to be learnt from tackling piracy off Somalia, but also there are

concerns as to whether the private security model can be replicated in the Gulf

of Guinea.

In a reactive move, a training program suggested by the Opus Kidnap and

Hostage Solutions called surviving pirate kidnap, aimed for seafarers, ships

officers and executives in the oil and shipping industries gives seafarers

operating around the East and West African coast, the practical skills needed to

survive, when being taken hostage by pirates. [15]

This training will provide them with the tools, knowledge and the awareness of

how kidnappers behave, how should they react, teaches them the sort of

behaviour and ways of thinking in order to survive physically and mentally, how

to behave in ways that minimize the pirate's aggression and an all around

knowledge about Nigerian and Somali culture and religion. [5]

Now we have to wait and see how the Committee will react on this training

program. Again one must argue on that even though this is a good solution to

ease the aftermath of piracy attempt or a violent act in general it does not offer

a solution to the real problem. We seem to be continuously trying to reach the

problem, instead of trying to get in front of it.

Moreover, in a more rational coherence the Security Association for the

Maritime Industry (SAMI) has established a forum to manage maritime security

alongside Governments and international bodies in order to establish a

structure to coordinate an effective security response at sea.

SAMI is a global organisation representing companies working in the maritime

security industry and a focal point for global maritime security matters, which

brings together ideas, people and tools to keep shipping safe. SAMI members

do not focus only on guarding solutions, this is proven from the equipment,

technology and hardware used illustrating that there is much more to do in

maritime security than putting people onto ships.

The suggested solutions can be used directly by ship owners to protect their

assets, or by the Private Maritime Security Company (PMSC) members to

enhance the services they provide. More promises about a better, safer future

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in the seas are derived from both the 2nd and 3rd annual West African Maritime

Security Combating Piracy that suggested on implementing new security

measures to protect assets from maritime crime and a programme to identify

the threat levels and the regional initiatives that were brought out. The aim is to

leave the attendees with a clear understanding of what protection measures

could do in order to maximise the security of assets in this high-risk region.

It is the view of this report that the main solution to piracy is mainly inland with

the implementation and the enforcement of legislation. Order can only prevail if

people have rules to follow. By enforcing laws the pirates' heaven could at last

come to an end. This has been the best way to eliminate pirates as the

Romans did in the Mediterranean 2,000 years ago. Trying to deal piracy with

violent actions alone is not an effective solution, this can only reduce the

incidences of piracy, not totally eliminate them.

In support of the aforementioned statement, Commodore Simon Ancona of the

British Navy and a deputy commander of Combined Maritime Forces said that

‘'piracy is an ancient disease that should not exist in this modern world" [14]

and the cure is difficult and requires the disruption of pirate actions, building law

and order and livelihoods ashore, and making the merchant prey less

vulnerable and that even though there are signs of remission, it looks like that

the medicine will take a while to come.

The approach of shipboard protection even though effective finds this report

against it and sustains a hard proof that the industry has not innovated, in the

contrast it tried to confront violence with violence. In response, there is an

increasing call for more technological solutions and sophisticated options such

as tracking devices, citadels and camera systems to support governmental

work and subsequently law enforcement. It is vital to comprehend that without

prosecutions, active coast guard and realistic solutions, the pirates will continue

to thrive and cargoes will still be hijacked either in in Somalia or in Nigeria. It is

as simple as a mathematical equation, without protection and deterrent,

shipping is left without hope.

2.6 Where Is The World Heading To

Somalia and now Nigeria teach us that "The most ambitious pirates just go out

further, and take crazier risks that the locals will not dare to take, and those

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risks are accompanied by out of proportion return on investments," as Mr. Frodl

said. Piracy is spreading further offshore, as Nigerian pirates use hijacked and

other chartered vessels as staging platforms, to attack other ships far away

from the near land and with the highest attack record in Niger Delta since the

beginning of the systematic collection of data in January 2007. There were 10

attacks being recorded in April 2013 and a new record for offshore reach of

pirates in the Bight Bonny since most of this attacks took place 20-30 miles off

Bayelsa and Rivers state. Another 3 occurred far out at sea confirming a trend

that has been developing in Nigeria and the wider Gulf of Guinea over the past

few years.

It has long been known that the Bay of Bengal is a hot spot for smash-and-grab

style robberies, but, since attacks have been localised and the area was not a

major threat to shipping, because no commercial shipping channels run

through the bay, since the nearest port is Chittagong, where there is a large

breaking yard which rarely attracts high-valued vessels or cargoes.

One insurance expert said he felt there was a credible threat from Bangladeshi

pirates to commercial shipping. People dismissed the threat because they

focused on the Bay of Bengal and did not consider the pirate gangs' hunger

and capability to attack further a field using mother ships. The International

Maritime Bureau (I.M.B.) has also consistently reported problems at

Bangladeshi anchorages, revealing nothing to suggest that the pattern of

attacks has spread beyond fixed targets inshore as underwriting senior

executive Neil Roberts said with Mr.Frodl confirming that, "Bangladesh will

show us that too, and soon." Although some may find Mr Frodl's arguments far-

fetched, while others agree that Bangladeshi pirates may learn from both

Somali and Nigerian pirate groups and as it looks, in the following years they

will pose a real threat to global shipping. [13] Piracy in Somalia or Nigeria

showed that localised preying on local fishermen or merchant vessels coming

into port, if left unpunished by local authorities, graduates into attacks against

shipping, as ambitious and effective gangs seek to corner a market out of reach

to amateur rivals.

But, a year ago, when piracy in the Gulf of Guinea started to gain mass media

attention, a sharp contrast was drawn between what the industry deemed

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piracy in the Gulf of Aden and hijackings of product tankers for their cargo off

West Africa. In addition, observers claimed there were no similarities between

pirates operating at opposite ends of the African continent. Clear comparisons

are now being made between what were once seen as different models as

West Africa pirate groups are also developing a worrying taste for kidnap and

ransom. This may involve ex-militants who do not have the connections to sell

the oil afterwards, but still want a piece of the pie, Trade-disruption experts had

started to monitor the situation as they suspected that recent developments

could impact supply and exports, and therefore insurance. However, pirate

attacks in the Gulf of Aden continue to fall and West African piracy shows no

sign of recession.

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Chapter 3: Methodology

3.0 Introduction

The following chapter is separated into three sections. The first section

contains the basic methodological approach and a brief analysis of the main

aims and objectives. It will also contain certain information on the data that

have been collected, such as what data was collected. Section two will contain

the sources, sites and books we have used to locate the different information.

The final part of the chapter, section three, emphasizes the limitations found in

the methods and techniques used.

3.1 Research Methodology

The basic methodological approach used in the project is completed through

extensive literature review and a comparative view of piracy both in East and

West Africa as we will see in detail the differences in the characteristics and the

attack methods used in each region. We shall also focus on the different

approaches used by the governments in the two regions and to how

international states are trying to combat piracy. The certain data have been

collected in order to gain and provide the reader with a greater understanding

as to how and why Somali piracy has been dropped, whereas in Nigeria we are

witnessing an evolution and a current piracy crisis. By this time, the project will

provide the reader the ability to understand and find out what are the most

effective ways to fight terror in the coast of West Africa and what are the

lessons learned from fighting piracy in the East, since the methods used there

were effective.

3.2 Description of Data

The primary sources that have been used to find data, include books,

magazine articles, as well as articles published by reliable organizations such

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as the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the International Chamber of

Commerce (ICC), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), regular

reports from private military and security companies (PMSCs), United Nations

(UN) and of course the help of my supervisor Dr. Nicholas Berketis who

provided me with valuable data and kept me updated about the situation in

Africa. The data were collected from publications and articles in websites, eg.

(reuters.com, Lloyds list and gCaptain.com) in order to keep the project

updated daily from the different sources while trying to gather all points of view.

3.3 Limitations

The main limitation is that the phenomenon in West Africa, which the project is

focusing on, is relatively recent and with some incomplete figures or no

measurements at all since most pirate attacks go un-reported, in order to avoid

higher insurance premium, while some others, which are reported are not even

included in the official IMB statistics. Moreover, the complexity and the

evolution of maritime crime in West Africa that is pointed out in the project

make it very different from those already known and this is what makes this

research very important.

21

Chapter 4: Data Analysis, Results and discussion

4.0 Introduction

In this chapter, my research will examine piracy in Somalia and Nigeria in

regards to the second half of the year 2013, comparing attack numbers, types

of attack in the two areas and amounts of ransom claimed. In addition, the

research will investigate further on the differences of the two areas and unveil

numerous pros and cons of paying ransoms to pirates.

4.1 The Threat Continues

With incidents in the Indian Ocean dropping to almost nothing and with Somali

piracy falling to its lowest levels since 2006, attention is focused on violent

piracy and armed robbery off the coast of West Africa, where there has been an

increase in hijackings and Extended Duration Robberies, involving attack on

vessels and the theft of oil cargoes. And according to a report released by the

IMB in mid 2013, West Africa has now overtaken Somalia as the world's piracy

hot-spot with 966 sailors attacked last year compared with 851 in Somalia.

Thus, piracy and terrorism remain a thorn in the side of modern shipping.

Gulf of Guinea is becoming one of the most dangerous maritime areas in the

world and piracy and sea robbery seems to be advancing to a whole different

level. The criminal gangs are taking advantage the states failure to collaborate

at the operational and tactical levels. Therefore, “They commit offence in

territorial waters of one country and then move to another country for

protection." said Ghana's Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Geofrey Biekro, at

a recent conference on maritime security in Africa. [16]

The Gulf of Guinea sustains the coastal zone stretching from Senegal to

Angola and has a crucial economic importance to West African countries

22

because of its strategic importance to the rest of the world. Nigeria and Angola

are among the world's 10 biggest crude oil exporters and safe passage to ports

in the region is very important. In June 2013 the annual Human Cost of

Maritime Piracy report noted that more seafarers were attacked in West African

waters than off Somalia's coast in 2012. The International Maritime

Organization (IMO), has followed the situation in the Gulf of Guinea for years,

however the UN has only given adequate attention to the matter after the

appeals made by the president of Benin for assistance in combating maritime

crime and drug-trafficking.

United Nation Security Council Resolution 2039 calls on international partners

to give support. Countries including France, Spain, United Kingdom, the United

States and Brazil have contributed to two-sided partnerships. A strategy for the

Gulf of Guinea is being formed and is going to be released by the EU in the

near future. Furthermore, the area has been included in the analysis of

organized crime in West Africa compiled by the Office on Drugs and Crime and

INTERPOL. This international attention to West Africa acknowledges that

maritime threats in West Africa exist as a component of transnational crime and

like Somalia, have a collateral effect in the rest of the region.

There are a lot of differences between maritime insecurity of Africa's east and

west coasts, but the Gulf of Guinea's littoral states can draw valuable lessons

from the experience of combating Somali piracy to help shape their responses

to West Africa's maritime threats.

So, while the piracy problem has migrated west, it appears the solution remains

the same, international and regional cooperation. Instead, some commentators

have pointed to a significant increase in maritime crime in the area, leading to a

perception that we are seeing an explosion in piracy and criminality in the

region. The region has a long history of crimes against seafarers, from simple

low-level robberies of cargoes to complex hijacks.

4.2 Comparing latest attack numbers

After eight years and nearly 150 hijackings, which may cost the global economy

$18 billion a year as the World Bank says, Somalia piracy is now assumed to

being brought under control. Cargoes are now protected by the world's

23

mightiest navies, security firms and robust tactics were employed by shipping

companies to protect their cargoes in the region of Somalia. To support the

above argument ‘The Human Cost of Piracy 2012’ report, released by the

International Maritime Bureau, the Oceans Beyond Piracy project and the

Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Program, major news distributors

such as the BBC and the New York Times have reported that in the last 12

months, West African pirates have been more successful than Somali ones.

This significant decrease in Somalia piracy has turned the spotlights of

maritime media on West Africa, in particular to the Gulf of Guinea, the

champion of piracy activity. Meanwhile the changes are hard to come as piracy

incidents still occur in fast pace. Armed pirates in the Gulf of Guinea took 56

sailors hostage and were responsible for all 30 crew kidnappings reported so

far in 2013. There were 31 incidents in West Africa waters and 28 crew

kidnappings of which 22 were attacks off Nigeria.

Piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea (Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Gabon, Sierra

Leone and Ivory Coast) are on the increase and together account for 72% of

the 50 reported piracy incidents of Africa so far in 2013. On the other hand in

Somalia, only 8 piracy incidents including two hijackings were recorded in the

first six months of 2013, with 34 seafarers taken hostage so far this year. IMB

attributes this significant drop in the frequency and range of attacks by Somali

pirates, to the preventive measures of the merchant vessels like the

deployment of privately contracted armed guards and thanks to actions from

the international navies.

More than 100,000 barrels of oil are stolen in land and sea in Nigeria every day.

The Gulf of Guinea has been the scene of intense pirate and criminal activity,

which has reached as far as the Ivory Cost. There have been at least 93 tanker

attacks reported in the Gulf of Guinea between December 2010 and May 2013,

30 were successfully hijacked and 960 seafarers were attacked.

However, Risk Intelligence chief analyst Nis Leerskov claims that the reason

which Western African attacks, have being highlighted is because of the

significant drop in Somali pirate activity. [17]

24

Up until May 2013 UN officials noted that there had been no successful

hijacking in the Indian Ocean for a year, however Somali piracy is not over

entirely. On the 5th of June 2013, Somali pirates did successfully hijack an

Indian flagged dhow and its 14 crew members near the northern coast.

However, the dhow was abandoned by the pirates following intervention by EU

naval forces.

As the military said, the situation is permissive. The fact is that the situation in

Somalia has not changed significantly. If we have learned anything, it is that

the Somalia pirates are very patient. They will wait for the allied forces to be

pulled back to home waters and act again.

The events on the 5th of June clearly illustrate that although the numbers of

attacks have decreased significantly since 2012, the Somali piracy threat still

exists and must be confronted effectively. The navy continues to have a key

role here, especially due to the effective implementation of defense measures

and the use of armed guards.

Concerning this matter Mr. Pottengal Mukundan, director of IMB stated that,

"The navies continue to play a vital role in ensuring this threat is kept under

control. Two vessels that have been hijacked were recovered by naval action

before the pirates could take them to Somalia. Only the navies can take such

remedial action after a hijack. Denying the pirates any success is essential to a

sustained solution to this crime. Pirates are known to be operating in these

waters. Despite the temporary protection provided by the southwest monsoon

in some parts of the Arabian Sea, the threat remains and vessels are advised

to be vigilant and comply with the industry's Best Management Practices as

they transit this area." [18]

The escalation of piracy is top security concern and it is the greatest future

threat to shipping, according to the results of Lloyd's List's annual maritime

security survey, a survey that was conducted online for 4 weeks and 53% of

respondents said they considered an escalation of piracy as an ongoing

concern. Activity in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean had been at an all

time low, so much that the UN monitoring group on Somalia's most recent

25

report stated that the piracy's heyday was over. However, recent attempted

attacks prove that the infrastructure to facilitate attacks still exists and that

pirates are becoming increasingly familiar with armed guards' modus operandi

and rules for the use of force. In all, 70% of respondents said they felt that

there was still a significant risk posed by Somali pirates.

While the escalation of piracy was a concern in the Indian Ocean, 63% of

respondents said that West Africa was the area they were most concerned

about and 28% said their security needs were not being met in the region. Just

over half of respondents (51%) said that sharing of maritime intelligence should

be encouraged since under-reporting of piratical incidents is commonplace.

In regards to whether they currently employ armed guards for Indian Ocean

transits, 39% of the respondents’ said yes. One said that the decision

depended on the type of ship, the countermeasures employed and seasonality,

but he also added that this will vary from a prudent ship owner with corporate

social responsibility all the way up to a charterer who is under pressure to turn

a profit on a trip. Overall the surveys finding illustrate that Somali piracy

appeared to trouble the majority.

Bergen Risk Solutions has recorded 55 incidents so far in 2013 targeting

international interests off Nigeria. Some 36 were recorded from January 1 to

July 1, nearly equaling the 38 incidents that the intelligence firm recorded for

the whole of 2012. There have been 19 incidents in the second half of 2013.

Bergen said this may be due to the decisions made at the meeting, at Oporoza,

Delta State on June 13, which was called by Tompolo, a former rebel

commander. Bergen's report said hijackings were often carried out with help

from insiders. Several advices were issued. It called for vessels to keep

communications with external parties to the minimum, with close attention on

organizing safe meeting points and waiting positions. Moreover, the report

recommends vessels to avoid waiting or slowing steaming, also, offering

several alternatives rendezvous points and changing them at the last minute.

This research indicates that the number of pirate attacks in West Africa could

double next year if governments do not act to protect their offshore assets. This

view is also supported by the Paramount Group, Africa's largest privately-

owned defense and aerospace business. This means that we could see an

26

average of two attacks for every day of the year and a rise to over 700

incidents in 2014 since there have been over than 360 attacks on merchant

shipping this year.

James Fisher, CEO of Paramount Naval Systems said, "The solution is not

seeking international help to solve these African problems, but to build African

solutions for them. The development of a strong African shipbuilding industry

means it is possible for African nations to find African solutions to the threat of

piracy." Paramount Naval Systems is developing a fleet of multi-role patrol

vessels in response to the growing demand from the sovereign governments

across Africa. Paramount's ships are ideal for a wide range of operations in

coastal waters. The speed and flexibility they have can help prevent illegal

activity, protect assets and territory.

Tabulated Data for Horn of Africa Activity:

Tabulated Data for Gulf of Guinea Activity:

Table 1 & 2 are a summary of piracy events that have occurred in the third and

27

fourth week of November, of current and prior years. The above statistics do

not include regional dhows/fishing vessels that were hijacked. Hijacked fishing

vessels are frequently used as mother ships by pirates and released without a

ransom being paid. [30]

This map shows all the piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during 2013.

(Last update 25 November 2013)

= Attempted Attack = Boarded = Fired upon = Hijacked = Suspicious vessel

Somali related incidents 2013: 13 reported incidents including 2 hijacking. Nigeria related incidents 2013: 30 reported incidents including 2 hijacking.

WEST AFRICA

28

4.3 Types of attacks

The next aspect examined in this report relates to the types of attacks the

pirates most commonly employ to attack vessels in the region.

Pirates off the coast of West Africa are mainly interested in the ships' cargo,

and are not targeting people as potential hostages. This does not necessarily

mean that the crews on ships sailing in the region are any safer, says

researcher and Ph.d. Lars Bangert Struwe, Centre for Military Studies at the

University of Copenhagen.

Concerning Somalia, Mr. Lars stated that due to the fact that there is no police

authority, the pirates can operate freely. They are boarding the ships with the

intention of hijacking both ships and crew, in order to ransom them for money.

In West Africa, where the biggest focus is Nigeria, some police authority is

present. This does not restrain pirates of committing armed robberies to steal

the cargo of vessels and anything of value, in some cases even the ships. The

pirates are less concerned with the crewmembers and taking ransoms, which

can most times involve greater risks. They are not interested in human lives.

This means that the piracy threat off West Africa is in many ways more violent

and more brutal than Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. [20]

While Somalia's piracy is associated with kidnap and ransom that could stretch

for months or even years, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea favor to steal cargo,

29

especially refined oil products like gasoline and diesel that can be sold

elsewhere. So, with the pirates seeing little value in the crew it should be of no

surprise that the level of violence is on the increase and the tactics employed

against Somali pirates may no longer be applicable to this new situation, as the

number of security contractors killed recently in the area is on the rise. This

means that they are an even greater threat to seafarers than off the coast of

Somalia.

The growing importance of oil has led to a remarkable specialization among the

pirates in the West. As the Federal Police of Germany (Bundespolizei)

revealed, some gangs now focus exclusively on hijacking tankers. Their latest

Bundespolizei report on piracy said that "Over the course of a hijacking that

lasts several days, all or part of the oil is pumped into other vessels," and that

the attacks share a "great propensity toward violence on the part of the

aggressors." [19]

The attacks also often follow a similar pattern. The pirates approach in

speedboats, they capture the ship and then take it to a prearranged meeting

point where they unload the fuel, move it to land and sell it to black market.

Government sources of the United States say that they lost one-fifth of the oil

that was imported from Nigeria.

West Africa is a very different environment to operate in comparison to the

Indian Ocean because armed security can only be provided by the National

Armed Forces of each country in their own territorial waters. It is very

unfortunate that there is not a coordinated anti-piracy force in operation to

combat this threat and therefore ships passing through the area must provide

their own security.

However, it is illegal for Private Maritime Security Companies to carry firearms

in any of the West African territorial waters; Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo and

Cameroon. The only armed security personnel inside any of these countries

territorial waters must be serving members of the National Armed Forces. The

National Armed Forces of the respective countries will not carry liability

insurance for their personnel whilst they are on board commercial ships.

In many cases the National Armed Forces have not been specifically trained in

30

counter-piracy operations to support commercial vessels. The GUARDCON

standard form has not been designed for use in West Africa and requires

amendments. An appropriately amended contract needs to address the

subcontracting of obligations to Local National Armed Forces. Ambrey Risk has

experience of cooperating with P&I Clubs to ensure that the relevant insurance

and liability considerations are taken into account and covered by the contract.

Until recently, Ivory Coast's maritime surveillance brigade, which is the

equivalent of the coast guard, barely managed to keep a lid on crime in the

waters around one of Africa's busiest ports. But the Nigerian gangs, which have

expanded hundreds of miles beyond their home waters in the last three years,

have reached West Africa in October.

Oceans Beyond Piracy's report says that both costs and industry practices are

very similar in east and West Africa.

However, Beazley K&R underwriter Michael Sharp disagrees with this and

stated that, "In terms of the cost of piracy, it is a fraction of the cost compared

to the Gulf of Aden as there is no need to reroute, probably the biggest cost for

ship owners. Vessels are held for years in the Indian Ocean whereas the

longest they have been held off the coast of West Africa is a couple of weeks."

Moreover, Mr Sharp added that pirate activity is widespread in the Gulf of

Guinea and projected that a couple of piracy-related incidents occur on a

weekly basis. Concerning the above, Thomas Horn Hansen, Risk Intelligence

senior analyst, said that there has been a rise in piracy, but it had come in

terms of innovation and effectiveness of attacks. He also supported that the

attackers in West Africa tended to be much more diverse and less predictable

than those off Somalia. [21]

Thus in order for shipping companies to be aware and be able to mitigate and if

possible to eliminate the risks, a vast majority of shipping companies have

introduced Best Management Practices, which means that ships sailing in

pirate-infested waters are constantly aware of the threats. "They don't sleep,"

as Thomas Hons Hansen said.

This process along with military presence in the waters could help in

31

significantly reducing the vulnerability of the ships. Best Management Practices

include training the crews to be aware of risks and dangers and act in a more

proactive way rather than a reactive one. In addition to that shipping companies

operate with armed guards on board the ships.

The latter sustain one of the most controversial matters in the political scenery

of the examined regions. Nigeria does not allow foreign-armed guards on ships

sailing in the country's waters. But still the available Nigerian guards that are to

be employed to protect foreign vessels are often insufficiently trained,

constituting a poor and risky alternative for ship owners.

Chief analyst Nis Leerskov Mathiesen of Risk Intelligence stated that the

political situation in West Africa means that a potential effort to improve the

current status of the region would be a long term operation, In support of this

view Lars Bangert Struwe mentioned that ships off West Africa are not just

passing through the waters, but that they are in fact calling in the region's ports,

means that a prospective military presence would operate much closer to the

coast than was the case with Somalia. The ships would have to patrol through

several territorial waters.

Moreover Lars Bangert Struwe supporting this perspective stated that even

though Nigeria has a police authority in place, the widespread poverty in the

country indicates that Nigeria is infected by corruption, which in turn gives the

pirates a certain degree of freedom. This is another place in which an EU effort

would be effective, combined with an operation under UN mandate.

And as the decline in Somali piracy has been achieved by containment and

deterrence tactics and with piracy moving from Somalia to the Gulf of Guinea

and further offshore, the strategies of pirates are now changing and as Nodland

said, "Nigerian pirates are using some of the same methods as the Somalia

pirates". [23]

In the beginning there was a change in the way the pirates operate, but there

was also a change in their choice of targets. As "Initially they were interested in

holding the ships, stealing the cargo, taking this ship-crew's possessions and

money and leaving," said the director at the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian

Response Programme Roy Paul. "This year, we've seen an increase in taking

hostages". [28]

32

According to the International Maritime Bureau, this year, piracy has spread

through the region from Nigeria and ships are being attacked farther offshore

with attacks been reported off Togo, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

The deployment of warships and the use of armed guards which have resulted

in a declining on the number of incidents of Somalia may be less effective in

the Gulf of Guinea because the pirates are more violent, said Jan Fritz Hansen,

who chairs the piracy task force at the European Community Ship-owners'

Associations. Hansen said that pirates are becoming more organized and that

"You can't really rely on private armed guards. It should be a more strong force

from governments. The criminals down there are a bit better equipped and

armed." [29]

4.4 Some important differences

Nigeria is not Somalia.

Decades of political and social malfunction have left Somalia without a

functioning government or economy. Comparatively, in the Gulf of Guinea, a

very different environment exists. Pirates and maritime criminals do not have

the benefit of the un-policed haven of a failed state, but instead operate out of a

number of sovereign states with their own territorial waters (TTW) and

exclusive economic zones (EEZ). This very state of order means that the

measures adopted in the east are inappropriate in the west. There appears to

be no appetite for an international naval operation in the Gulf of Guinea, nor is

there any way that foreign armed guards can operate within the TTW of the

regional, sovereign nations and it seems that the risk reward ratio appears to

favour the criminals.

The global energy market

Somalia pirates that operate in the waters of the Horn of Africa disrupt the flow

of goods and commodities through one of the world's most important trade

gateway. The expenses of changing shipping routes, the higher insurance

premiums and the additional security measures cost the global economy

billions every year. But unlike East Africa, West Africa has a major global

energy market. Nigerian pirates steal an average of 100,000 barrels of oil per

day, costing the Nigerian government $12 billion in annual oil revenue and

33

driving up global energy prices. Therefore, Somalia piracy may disrupt the free

flow of commerce through some of the world's most important trade routes, but

the Nigerian issue directly degrades global oil supplies and disrupts the global

energy market.

Wider range of attacks

Somali pirates have an impressive range of operations, attacking ships at

distance of up to 1,000 NM offshore in the Indian Ocean. However, Somalia's

onshore contingent is limited to the pirate villages and command and control

sites within its borders. Comparatively, Nigeria's onshore contingent has gone

international. Pirates from Nigeria have expanded offshore operations to

neighboring Cameroon and Benin in search of easy and lucrative targets.

Compared to Somalia pirates, Nigerians do not have to go far to find targets.

And in response to improved force protection measures in Nigeria, pirates are

extending their operating ranges.

Nigerians are fishermen. Somalis are not

The narrative that overfishing and commercial poaching have driven Somalis to

piracy is a storyline that has won sympathy from the international community.

But Somalis do not eat fish or care about fishing. Somalis eat camel, goat,

sheep and cattle and the poor eat chicken and vegetables. Fish is a last resort.

There has never been a significant fishing industry in country because there is

no demand for fish. This is not the case for Nigerians as fishing is the second-

largest industry in Nigeria next to oil. Over the last decade, the aggregation of

environmental damage from oil spills and maritime piracy has decimated the

country's fishing economy. In addition, the frequency of attacks on fishing

vessels has caused many trawlers to sit idle. Therefore, seafood prices in

Nigeria have skyrocketed because of the scarcity of fish, putting an important

protein source out of reach for Nigerians. The billions of dollars lost by the

fishing industry have put tens of thousands of Nigerians out of work, adding

pressure to an already bleak employment picture.

Piracy is still not illegal in Nigeria

In the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, Somali pirates took advantage of the

lawless conditions of a failed state which has allowed them freedom of action to

34

mount operations, hijack vessels and return them to anchorages from where

they have negotiated ransoms for the vessels' release. They were able to do

this because of the lack of an enforced rule of law. But the risk reward ratio has

changed for Somali pirates since the international community has mounted a

29-nation naval task force to eliminate Somalia’s piracy problem. And without a

judicial system in Somalia, there was a problem of where to try suspected

pirates, and where to imprison those convicted. In response to that, a coalition

of countries has stepped in to resolve the problem. Nigeria on the other hand,

despite having a sizeable navy and functioning judicial system, has failed to

incorporate the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or to

implement piracy laws of its own. The complete absence of laws governing the

safety of marine navigation explains the nonexistent prosecution rate in Nigeria.

Until there are legal consequences to stealing ships and abducting crews, the

risk to reward ratio will be favorable for the Nigerian pirates. [27]

The threat of or actual violence is used against seafarers, either in the course

of kidnapping them for ransom or in forcing them to engage in activities such as

cargo theft. Whilst violence is a feature of Somali pirate operations, it is far

more liberally used in the Gulf of Guinea where life appears to be cheap and

the criminals are more determined. It could be argued that it is in the interest of

Somali pirates to keep those they capture in relatively good health, especially if

they are to negotiate ransoms for their release. In the Gulf of Guinea, restraint

is not a general feature and there have been some tragic instances of crew

being killed for little gain. Another way in which the violence differs from that

used in the Indian Ocean is the way that a criminal group will press home an

armed attack even when facing the use of force by a defending group on a

vessel. There are numerous instances of fire fights between criminals attacking

vessels, in particular for the purpose of kidnapping. In some of these, the

attackers have been prepared to take casualties in the course of their crime.

Nigerian piracy is not related with Somalia’s and distinct in style and tactics.

Nigerian pirates prefer the cargo rather than crew and cargoes are stolen and

re sold to fund continued activity. Nigerian pirates are gangs that climb onto

anchored or berthed ships and stealing cargo to be sold elsewhere. Their

tactics are more violent and more homicidal than piracy in Somalia regarding

ransom payments as there have been five deaths of hostages from Nigerian

35

pirates. In Somalia hostages are a more long term investment.

Piracy in Nigeria is mainly economically driven with every moving part of the

vessel sold and the crew themselves expendable since there is no

infrastructure in place to handle the negotiations and financial transfers

involved in a large long term hostage negotiations and payments. The average

life span of an incident involving hostages and Nigerian pirates is usually one to

four weeks. Somalia pirates on the other hand, take hostages in a form of

investment with payment expected in the future and time scales are

dramatically longer than Nigeria’s piracy. The average ransom payment usually

takes between 4 months to 2 years in Somalia. So, the main interest of the

Nigerian pirates is the speed at which a cargo or a hostage can be shifted in

exchange for cash.

Moreover, piracy in Nigeria involves small gangs and the financial windfalls

benefit only this small closed group rather than being shared around

communities such as occurs in Somalia. [24]

4.5 Piracy Ransom & Global Economy

Piracy is a crime, which has implications not only for its victims, but, in addition

affects the international shipping and trade routes in the region as well as the

regional and global economy. Up until recently, very little has been known

about the economy of piracy but this project has brought new insight into matter

as well as some other facts about the economics of piracy.

Mr. Mainstone Speaking at the International Union of Marine Insurance 2013

conference in London roughly calculated that piracy in the Gulf of Aden and

Indian Ocean over the last five and a half years had cost cargo insurers $5.5m

and said that within two and a half years, activity in the West Africa had cost the

market $2.5m. [25]

A recent report by the World Bank, the United Nations, and Interpol estimates

that between $339 million and $413 million has been paid in ransom to Somalia

pirates between 2005 and 2012. However, those aren't the only costs involved

since the danger has driven up insurance premiums for ships travelling around

the horn of Africa, and sailors working these ships most times are paid twice

their usual wages to work these routes. Some cargo ships have chosen to hire

36

expensive escort ships, which can cost $20,000 a day. Some other ships may

take a long detour to avoid the risks of sailing through these waters, which also

drives up costs. The study also estimated that the average ransom between

2005 and 2012 is estimated at about $2.7 million And with the need for motor

boats, GPS, weapons and even large pirate vessels called mother ships for

larger scale hijacks, the pirate economy is supported by financiers who provide

a funding usually around $80,000 and between 30 and 75 percent of the money

are going to financiers, rather than the pirates themselves. Therefore on the

average $2.7 million ransom, that ranges from $810,000 to as much as $2

million. Individual pirates receive between $30,000 and $75,000.

The average ransom for Nigerian hostage-takers was previously in the

$50,000-$100,000 range, he said, and although it was possible that previous

payouts topped $1m, such sums had not been made public. And as the

Nigerian pirates received a $2m ransom in November to release the two US

that were seized from C-Retriever, in Nigeria on October 23, security expert

says ransom payout will prompt more West Africa attacks

And now that the Nigerian pirates extended their model of hijack and included

the kidnap of crew and ransom speakers at the Security in Complex

Environments Conference held in London in October have been in conflict on

whether the shipping industry should continue to pay ransoms.

UK’s Labour Party's shadow foreign and commonwealth minister John Spellar

said he understood the strength of feeling in the shipping industry on paying

ransoms, but he reiterated the UK's refusal to pay ransoms and also, UK Prime

Minister David Cameron was clear on the "ultimate ambition" to bring an end to

ransom payments.

However, a ship owner delegate questioned whether governments had the right

to make a call on whether someone lived or died in this way, adding that

commercial companies have no choice but to pay ransoms as, prohibiting

ransom payments would have a devastating impact on shipping. Ship owners

will be forced to tell families that their loved ones will not return home because

they cannot legally meet the demands of the pirates. So, it is no surprise that

ship owners, operators and seafarers strongly support the payment of ransoms

as they face the consequences of piracy first hand.

37

The ship owner added that if we do not pay to get people back they will not

work for us and if we are not seen to be doing everything in our power to

secure their release then we are likely to be hit with a massive compensation

bill. There will be an impact on trade as seafarers would simply refuse to work

on certain routes if ship owners decide not pay ransoms. Moreover, why would

anyone agree to sail in high-risk areas when their companies would not secure

their release if they were kidnapped? Vessels would be forced to make

significant detours to avoid piracy hotspots and the costs would be passed on,

placing more pressure on shipping and world trade.

However, Mr Spellar responding to the ship owner delegate said, paying

ransoms encouraged piracy kidnap and ransom, therefore putting seafarers in

at greater risk in the long term. As Mr Spellar said "Paying will free crew sitting

there now but it will mean there could be another guy sitting there next year."

[26]

The argument to ban ransom payments may seem logical to governments

because they do not deal with the traumatic fall-out, however, shipping has a

duty to seafarers and it should ensure that everything that is possible it’s done

to protect the safety of life at sea.

4.6Maritime piracy forecast for 2014

Even with a couple of months remaining before the final analysis of the patterns

of piracy for 2013 can be finally clarified, some emerging trends are very clear.

The problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia has been temporarily solved by

a combination of measures. However, it should be understood that Somali

piracy cannot be consigned to history since the most factors that encouraged

its initial development remain in place. Somalia’s pirates could return to their

attacks at any time.

The number of maritime security teams deployed on vessels operating in the

area is decreasing, so, most of the vessels transiting the area rely on taking

other measures to avoid being boarded and hijacked and in addition, there is a

gradual withdrawal of naval forces operating in the region. The defence

budgets across the world are under pressure and the decision about whether to

continue the current deployment is important.

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Looking ahead to 2014, there are reasons for some pessimism when it comes

to predicting the future threat of piracy.

Gulf of Guinea has become the transit region for an entire continent's trade in

raw materials and the volume of gas imports from it to the European Union is

set to triple by 2025. And things there are likely to get worse despite the

introduction of new maritime security capabilities. Security in anchorages may

be improved in 2014; however, pirates will still use the wider freedom of non-

territorial waters to find their prey. Meanwhile, off the coast of Somalia it is

frankly anyone's guess as to what happens next, just one incident may provide

the impetus required for the whole problem to reignite.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

In this dissertation, the particular target is to add to the existing knowledge on

piracy activities in West and East Africa and, more specifically off the coast of

Nigeria and Somalia. This report focuses on the differences between Somalia

piracy and Gulf of Guinea’s maritime crime as they can be explained by the

different type and amount of ransom claimed. More importantly, this project has

compiled relevant data from various sources and examines why the threat

continues in Nigeria, while there was a significant decrease in Somalia’s piracy

incidents. Therefore, the report is against the above backdrop that maritime

crime continues to thrive in the Gulf of Guinea at a time when it is on the

decline in the High Risk Area of the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean. However,

some elements of the medicine that has resulted in success against Somalia

pirates are just not available as mitigation measures in the Gulf of Guinea.

Maritime threats in West Africa exist as a component of transnational crime and

like Somalia, have an impact far beyond the immediate region. However, while

the piracy problem has migrated west and pirates operating in the Gulf of

Guinea are developing a fearsome reputation for violence, the greatest

obstacle in solving the problem in the Gulf of Guinea has been the lack of

interest. Therefore, it appears that the most effective solution is international

and regional cooperation.

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List of References

[1]: Yonah Alexander (Author), Tyler B. Richardson (Author) Terror on the High

Seas: From Piracy to Strategic Challenge 2009 [Hardcover]

[2]: James Legge (Author) Huge decline in hijackings by Somali pirates

93/05/2013): www.independed.co.uk/news/world/Africa

[3]: Heather Murdock (Author). Voice of America. January 22, 2013

www.voanews.com/content/piracy-soars-off-nigerian-coast/1588631.html

[4]:www.issafrica.org Institute for Security Studies.

[5]: Surviving Pirate Kidnap. http://www.opushostagesolutions.com/

[6]: allAfrica.com/stories - Institute of Security Studies

[7]: Icc-ccs.org - Commercial Crime Services

[8]: bdlive.com.za - Dianna Games (Author) 25.2.2013

[9]: The Oil Companies International Marine Forum HOUSE OF LORDS

European Union Committee 3rd Report of Session 2012-2013.Turning the Tide

on Piracy, Building Somalia's Future.

[10]: The New York Times: www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/world/africa/piracy-

around-horn-of-africa-has-plunged-us-says.html

[11]: One Earth Future Foundation (OEF). Experts Work to Beef Up Gulf of

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Guinea Security. http://www.voanews.com/content/experts-prepare-combat-

gulf-of-guinea-pirates-piracy/1644164.html

[12]: Special Research Report: Emerging Security Threats in West Africa.

[13]: Lloyd's List 16/05/2013 C-Level Maritime Risks founder Michael Frodl.

[14]: U.S. Reports That Piracy in Africa Has Plunged

[15]: Opus Hostage and solutions: www.opushostagesolutions.com/

[16]:http://www.neptunemaritimesecurity.com/african-navies-meet-over-piracy-

in-gulf-of-guinea/

[17]:http://www.groupe-eyssautier.com/fr/actualites/revue-de-presse/somali-

piracy-levels-plummet-but-activity-in-gu.html

[18]:http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/865-imb-piracy-report-highlights-violence-in-

west-africa

[19]:http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/threat-of-pirates-grows-off-west-

coast-of-africa-a-912089.html

[20]:http://shippingwatch.com/carriers/article5797335.ece

[21]:http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/CurrentAwarenessBulletin/

Documents/CAB%20200%20June%202013.pdf

[22]:http://www.criticalthreats.org/gulf-aden-security-review/gulf-aden-security-

review-october-9-2013

[23]:http://www.maritimeprofessional.com/News/359298.aspx

[24]: The article first appeared on Neptune Maritime Security, courtesy of the

author Candyce Kelshall.

[25]:http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/ship-operations/article429687.ece

[26]: Lloyd's List article 31/10/2013

[27]: IMB Piracy Reporting Center - ICC Commercial Crime Services. Annual

IMB Piracy Reports, 2003 - 2013.

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Economic Costs of Somali Piracy 2012 Report, Ocean Beyond Piracy

The Guardian Global Development Network, Nigeria. Author Bryan Abell

[28]: http://www.mphrp.org/news_details/index.php?NewsID=170

[29]: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-21/pirates-looting-cargoes-with-

ak-47s-threaten-african-oil-energy.html

[30]: Information contained in this report is derived through direct reporting and

analysis of reports from the following agencies and commercial sources:

Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), Denmark

BBC News

EU Naval Forces (EU)

International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

Lloyd's List (LL), daily, London

Local Media (LM)

Tradewinds (TW)

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