from here to there - mississippi state university...storage may not be practical in some areas...
TRANSCRIPT
Robert W. CummingsNERC Senior Director of Engineering and Reliability Initiativesi-PCGRID27 March 2019
From Here to ThereGrid Reliability in the Grid of the Future
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Smart Grid Defined (2009 version)
Defined from a Reliability Perspective Two-way flow of energy and communications enabling
new technologies to supply, deliver and consume electricity.
Functions • Enhanced flexibility and control• Balancing variable demand & resources• Demand Response• Large deployment of sensor & automation technologies • etc.
Caution of the time – Smart Grid Integration must be Done Intelligently!
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Questions• What will it look like?• Will we have 100% renewable resources?• Will all resources be connected through power electronics?• What will the load look like?• Will we still a grid and transmission lines?• How will micro grids interact?Transition issues• Transition to higher penetrations of inverter‐coupled renewables may be painful…not without surprises
• Reductions in inertia and synchronizing torque will make the
Grid of the Future
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• Transition to higher penetrations of inverter‐coupled renewables may be painful…not without surprises Higher levels of inverter‐based resources could be more stable Reductions in inertia and synchronizing torque will make the grid more brittle
Behavior of inverters has to be understood
• Reduced levels of fault current provided by inverters How do you melt steel in an arc furnace? System protection redesigns will be necessary in some areas
• Transportation of renewables from source to consumption Wind and solar resources are abundant in areas far from demand centers
o Not all areas can locally support their loads from renewables – NYC
Storage may not be practical in some areas Co‐locating renewables and storage is essential to minimize additional system connections
Grid of the Future – Transition Issues
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• Load composition changing Electric vehicle charging LED lighting Variable speed drive motors
• Distributed Energy Resources Inverter‐based resources
o Roof‐top solar panelso Micro turbineso Small wind turbines
Inverter‐based resources on sub‐transmission systems
• Micro‐Grids• Load becoming schizophrenic Load models no longer adequate for simulations
Changing Load
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Changing Dispatch Mix• Higher penetration of renewables – variability of resources• Minimum generation levels on conventional units• Ramping needs increase for load followingRetirement of large fossil‐fired generation plants• Loss of dynamic reactive support for voltage control• Possible reduced system inertia• Lower levels of synchronizing torqueChanging System Inertia• Lower inertia impacts on Primary Frequency Response• Inertia‐les system?Behavior of Inverter‐Based Resources
Changing Resources
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Brayton Point Power Plant – 1,535 MW
Built between 1960 and 1972 Units 1 & 2 – Early cross‐compound coal‐fired@ 245 MW Unit 3 – 612 MW coal‐fired Unit 4 – 435 MW Grade C bunker residual oil Closed in May 2017
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Brayton Point Demolition
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Where Were You?
5:16:11 pm 9:29 pm 3:48 pm 3:05:41 pm 12:32:44 pm 5:14:54 am 1:09:08 pm 11:45:06 am
1965 Northeast Blackout 1977 New York Blackout 1996 Western Blackout 2003 Northeast Blackout 2005 Los Angeles Blackout 2007 Saskatchewan Blackout 2008 South Florida Blackout 2016 Blue Cut Fire Disturbance
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System Frequency during Disturbances
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Inverter-Based Disturbances –Identified by RoCoF
• Typical Western Interconnection• RoCoF ranges from 25 to 50 mHz/Sec• Nadir reached in about 9 seconds
• Inverter‐based events• RoCoF is above 120 mHz/Sec• Nadir reached in about 4 seconds
• NERC Bulk Power Situational Awareness detects using FNet• Event size typically determined using SCADA (4 second scan rate)• Momentary loss determined from Interconnection inertia
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• Continuous Operation – Actively injecting current into the grid • Momentary Cessation – Momentarily cease injecting active current into the grid, but remain electrically connected Triggered by abnormal system voltages (< 0.9 or > 1.1 per unit)
• Trip Mode (Cease to Energize) – Ceased injecting current and will delay returning to service. (typically 5 minute delay) May also mechanically disconnect from the grid
• Modeling is a real issue – Little of this is modeled in conventional powerflow and dynamics simulations
PV Inverter Operating Modes
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Full Analyses of Four IBR-Related Events
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August 16, 2016 Faults
Blue Cut fire caused• Thirteen 500 kV line faults• Two 287 kV line faults11:45:06 PDT Fault• 500 kV line‐to‐line fault• Cleared normally in 2.5 cycles (41.7 milliseconds)• PV resources impacted – 1,178 MW
• 26 different solar developments• All utility scale – connected at 500kV or 230kV• 10 different inverter manufacturers• No PV site system protection relays/breakers operated• All action was by on‐board inverter controls
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Blue Cut and Canyon 2 Disturbances
Blue Cut Fire Disturbance – August 16, 2016 Line‐to‐Line 500 kV fault normally cleared in 2.5 cycles 1,200 MW loss back‐calculated to ~2,500 MW from interconnection inertia Published disturbance report in June 2017
• Key Findings: Use of momentary cessation Frequency‐related tripping
Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance – October 9, 2017 Normally cleared 220 kV phase‐to‐phase fault followed by a normally cleared 500 kV phase‐to‐phase fault
900 MW loss back‐calculated to ~1,500 MW from interconnection inertia Published disturbance report in February 2018
• Key Findings: No frequency‐related tripping but continued use of momentary cessation Transient overvoltage‐related tripping
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Angeles Forest and Palmdale Roost Disturbances
Angeles Forest Disturbance – 10 April 2018 • 500 kV “bolted” line‐to‐line fault – cleared in 2.6 cycles
– Line is mixed 500 kV underground/overhead
• Lopsided RLC line parameters – unbalanced line shunt reactors used to compensate.
• Involved ~1,100 MW of BPS‐connected PV• 200 MW gas turbine loss/associated steam reduction• Evidence of jump in CAISO Net Load – DER lossPalmdale Roost Disturbance – 11 May 2018 • Fault on short 500 kV line – cleared in 3.6 cycles• Involved ~900 MW of BPS‐connected PV
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CAISO BPS-Connected Solar and Net Load
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Palmdale Roost Disturbance – CAISO BPS-Connected Solar and Net Load
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Modeling Notification: Momentary Cessation
• Existing models largely DO NOT accurately represent installed resource performance Identified issue that must be addressed for models in planning and operations studies
Developed notification to help industry in modeling efforts
Guidance provided as part of second NERC Alert
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Joint NERC-IEEE Paper on Impacts
• How do we deal with lower short circuit current?
• What are the dynamics issues?
• Several Working Groups and Task Teams of IEEE PSRC are working on the System Protection issues
• Other IEEE Committees are
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Inverter-Based ResourceReliability Guideline
• BPS‐connected inverter‐based resource performance
• Guideline based on findings and recommendations of NERC disturbance reports
• Intended as cornerstone document for industry moving forward
• Approved by NERC Operating Committeehttps://www.nerc.com/comm/Pages/Reliability‐and‐Security‐Guidelines.aspx
• Basis for IEEE P2800 Inverter‐Based Resources – Connected above Distribution
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