from maliki to abadi: the challenge of being iraq’s prime minister

7/26/2019 From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of Being Iraqs Prime Minister

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From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of

Being Iraqs Prime MinisterHarith Hasan Al-Qarawee

On April 30 and May 20, 2016, protesters, includingsupporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, breached the heavilyfortied Green Zone in Baghdad that houses Iraqs Parliamentas well as the prime ministers ofce. Challenging the Iraqprime minister, Haider al-Abadi, and demanding reforms

the protesters were eventually confronted by security forcesleaving several dead.1

Haider al-Abadi headed the new government that was voted into power by theparliament in September 2014. This new government was hailed by the UnitedStates; by Iraqs most powerful Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; by theprominent cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and by most Kurdish and Sunni parties. Theonly voiced objections came from the former prime minister, Nouri al-Malikiand his associates. Ending Malikis prime ministership became a necessity forall those parties, who saw him as a divisive gure with a legacy of exclusivistand authoritarian policies. The United States had played an important role

in forcing Maliki out of ofce despite his sweeping victory in the April 2014general election.2 U.S. ofcials, including President Obama, had criticizedMaliki for following policies that undermined the achievements of 2008, whencooperation between U.S. forces, the Iraqi government, and local Sunni ghtershelped create a proper framework to undercut al-Qaeda in Iraq. LikewiseIraqi parties that had been critical of Malikis authoritarian tendencies hopedthat Abadi would abide by power-sharing agreements and govern in a moreinclusive mode. The new prime minister promised to do so in his governmentalprogram, announcing ambitious plans for national reconciliation, for improvingrelations between Iraqi communities, and for reforming state institutions.June 2016

No. 100

Judith and Sidney Swartz Directorand Professor of PoliticsShai Feldman

Associate DirectorKristina Cherniahivsky

Charles (Corky) Goodman Professorof Middle East History andAssociate Director for ResearchNaghmeh Sohrabi

Senior FellowAbdel Monem Said Aly, PhD

Goldman Senior FellowKhalil Shikaki, PhD

Myra and Robert Kraft Professorof Arab Politics

Eva Bellin

Henry J. Leir Professor of theEconomics of the Middle EastNader Habibi

Sylvia K. Hassenfeld Professorof Islamic and Middle Eastern StudiesKanan Makiya

Rene and Lester Crown Professorof Modern Middle East StudiesPascal Menoret

Neubauer Junior Research FellowRichard A. Nielsen, PhD

Junior Research FellowsHarith Hasan Al-Qarawee, PhDHikmet Kocamaner, PhDDavid Siddhartha Patel, PhDJean-Louis Romanet Perroux


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Dr. Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee is a JuniorResearch Fellow at theCrown Center where he isworking on a book titledShiism and State in Iraq:Authority, Identity and

Politics.

The opinions and ndings expressedin this Brief belong to the authorexclusively and do not reect those of theCrown Center or Brandeis University.

This Brief reviews Abadis premiership so far and seeks to answer the followingquestions: How much has Abadis governance differed fromor resembledMalikis? And has the transition from Maliki to Abadi led to any signicantchange in Iraqs political dynamics? The Brief argues that, despite improvementsin his style of governing, Abadi could not make a signicant alterationregarding major political issues, especially those pertaining to relations withthe Kurish and the Sunni groups, constitutional reforms and political andsecurity arrangements in the war against ISIS. The necessary conclusion is thatIraqs main problems are systemic and related to the way the whole politicalsystem is structured. A Shia prime minister like Abadi needs to command abroad constituency that is loyal to and supportive of him in order to make theconcessions and compromises that a new political compact would requireAbadi, although armed with good intentions and the desire to make a differencelacks such a constituency and, as a result, has not been able to make thosechanges.

The Dawa Party and Intra-Shia Rivalries

To understand why Abadi has not yet been able to deliver the changes hepromised, one needs rst to look at the dynamics shaping intra-Shia politicsAs a result of those dynamics, Abadi lost the support of his electoral bloc, Stateof Law (SOL), without securing genuine support from alternative Shia forcesConsequently, the main challenge to his prime ministership came from withinhis Shia base, leaving him in a weak position from which he was unlikely to beable to institute essential reforms at the national level.

Since the formation of Iraqs transitional government led by Ibrahim al-Jaafariin 2005, Dawa, a Shia party, has occupied the prime ministership. The earlydecision to award this position to Dawa was a compromise between the thentwo largest Shia groups, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by

the Hakim family, and the Muqtada al-Sadr movement. The two groups andtheir leading families had ercely competed and clashed both politically andmilitarily. This led various Shia groups to conclude that selecting a Dawamember as prime minister was the minimum requirement for securing unity inthe Shia alliance, given that the party was the smallest among the three groupscontesting for power in Iraq. Similar calculations led to the appointment ofMaliki to the position in 2006, especially after the Kurdish alliance refusedto agree to a new full term for Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who was accused of havingengaged in a unilateral style of leadership.

During his rst two years in ofce, Maliki appeared to be very weak and waslargely ineffective. His constituency in the parliament comprised only a handful

of Dawa MPs. He was constantly complaining that he had no real powerover his government and that ministers and other state ofcials followed theinstructions of their parties rather than his directives. In this context, Malikiseems to have concluded that his survival required a loyal political bloc ratherthan a deal between ISCI, Sadrists, the Kurdish alliance, and the Sunni coalitionnone of whom had any interest in empowering him.

The political scene began to change signicantly in 2008, especially followingthe Maliki-led military operation in Basra, which forced Sadrs militia towithdraw from Iraqs only port city and the source of about 70 percent of its oilproduction.


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Additionally, the formation of the Awakening Groups,which helped downgrade al-Qaeda in Sunni areas andreduced sectarian violence in Baghdad, had furtherstrengthened Maliki and reconstructed his image as astrong and determined leader.

Building on those successes, Maliki formed State of Law(SOL), a Dawa-led coalition which emerged as the largestand most popular Shia coalition in both the provincialelection of 2009 and the general election of 2010. Hesubsequently became more condent in making his owndecisions, pursuing a more aggressive approach, andacting in a more authoritarian way, in particular seekingto consolidate his personal power over state institutions.Although he could not acquire full control, he was headingin that direction, especially after his sweeping victory inthe general election of April 2014.

This explains why the Muqtada al-Sadr movement andISCI decided to overcome their history of hostility and

work together to counter the threat caused by Malikisincreasing popularity and his consolidation of power.But it was only when Mosul, the second largest Iraqi city,fell to ISIS, and several units of the Iraqi army collapsed,that new conditions for challenging Maliki began tomaterialize. The United States blamed Maliki and hispolicies for intensifying the sectarian divide that hadcreated a suitable environment for ISIS to recruit andmobilize and to acquire territory. U.S. ofcials concludedthat it was necessary to have a less divisive prime ministerin order to advance the war against ISIS.3

The most powerful Shia cleric in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, alsofavored removing Maliki. Additionally, several seniorDawa members, including Abadi, thought that Malikisinsistence on staying in ofce for a third term wouldjeopardize the partys chances of maintaining the primeministership. At the end, Maliki was left with only onemajor backer: Iran. Despite Irans backing, however, theparty could not ignore Sistanis will. In the end, Sistanisposition and the United States desire to see a new primeminister put enough pressure on Iran so that it withdrewits support for Maliki.4

Shia religious authorities and major groups, particularlythe Sadr movement and ISCI, hoped that Abadi would beless authoritarian and more willing to share power. Theirlong-term objective was to undermine Malikis inuencewithin state institutions and the military, which, as primeminister and commander-in-chief, he had managed tosolidify by appointing his loyalists to key senior positions.In the end, Dawa and other State of Law (SOL) leaderswere emboldened to propose a new candidate for theposition.

In August 2014, the Shia Alliance accepted the nominationof Abadi to be the new prime minister, and the Iraqipresident, Fuad Masum, asked him to form a newgovernment, notwithstanding Malikis objections.

Abadis Prime Ministership:Undoing Maliki

Despite the broad support that existed for replacingMaliki, Iraqi political parties have been less interested ininstalling an effective prime minister and enabling him tosucceed. Undoing Maliki was the main objective, even ifthe price was to move back to the 2006 conditions, witha weak prime minister amidst a chaotic political scene.Abadi had to choose between ghting the inuentialnetworks that Maliki had embedded within stateinstitutions, or allying with the latter in order to securethe support of SOL, which was still led by the previousprime minister. The conict between Abadis need to bedifferent from Maliki and his desire not to be at the mercyof other political groups helps explain his hesitation andindecisiveness, as well as some of his political ventures.

When Abadi came to ofce, the main challenge he facedwas to prove that he was different from Maliki. He spenthis rst months in ofce trying to distance himself fromthe latters legacy by adopting a more institutionallybased and inclusive style of leadership, building betterrelations with Parliament and exhibiting a higher levelof administrative professionalism. Specically, Abadi

took three signicant steps toward reversing Malikisleadership style. The rst was to eliminate the position ofcommander in chief, which Maliki had used to circumventthe Ministry of Defense and make military decisions inisolation from the formal chain of command. This wasseen as a necessary step toward restructuring the Iraqiarmy according to professional standards, especiallyas it was followed by replacing most of the militarycommanders that had served under Maliki with newones.5

Secondly, Abadis government agreed on the cabinet by-

law: a set of rules governing the meetings of the Councilof Ministers in such a way as to organize its decision-making process. Non-Dawa parties had often argued thatthe absence of this by-law had helped Maliki concentratethe governments powers in his ofce. This measure wasintended, at least theoretically, to make the operationsof the government a collective responsibility, rather thanconcentrating it in Abadis own person.6


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Thirdly, Abadi reversed his predecessors policiesby accepting more decentralization. He withdrewMalikis objection to a parliamentary amendment thattransferred some of the federal governments authorityto the provinces.7 He further extended this policy whenhe declared his rst reforms package on August 9, 2015,abolishing four ministries and transferring their authorityeither to other ministries or to the provinces.8

What Abadi could not signicantly change, however, wasthe dysfunctionality of Iraqi institutions in addressingmajor political issues. It is important to note thatAbadis government was established as a national unitygovernment, based on a political agreement amongmajor Iraqi parties. The agreement stipulated that thegovernment should be based on a real partnership andshould seek to achieve national reconciliation. Accordingly,the government was to work within six months topropose an amnesty law, to reform the de-Baathicationlaw (ofcially called the Accountability and Justice Law),

to amend Iraqs anti-terrorism law, and to expedite theprocessing of detainees cases. (These were mostly Sunnidemands.)

Moreover, the agreement stated that likewise withinsix months, the government would ban any militaryformations outside the state (this was referringparticularly to the powerful Shia militias); restructureIraqi military forces by making them more professionaland inclusive; regulate the operation of anti-terrorismunits and intelligence bodies; and establish new securityframeworks for the provinces. Additionally, within threemonths, the government would complete the formation ofthe National Guards: an arrangement initially proposedby the U.S. to integrate Sunni tribal and local ghters inthe security apparatus and give them more responsibilityfor defending their areas. The agreement also includedother provisions instructing the government to reformthe administration, activate anti-corruption measures,decentralize governance, and resolve disputes with theKurdistan Regional Government (KRG).9

None of these deadlines have been met, however; once in

ofce, Abadi lacked the leverage to establish the consensusneeded to legislate and implement them. The Shia allianceitself was deeply divided. Maliki and his allies, mostlyIranian-backed groups such as the Badr organization andAsaib Ahl al-Hak (AAH), did not trust Abadi, therebydepriving him of the support of his own coalition, SOL.Sadr, Hakim, and other groups that had supportedremoving Maliki wanted Abadi to focus on dismantlingMalikis network of inuence within state institutionsand were less interested in enabling him to be an effectiveleader.

Meanwhile, the Dawa Party was split between Abadisand Malikis allies and was therefore not in a positionto develop an active approach to confronting all thesechallenges.

The Difculty of Making a Difference

Politicians in a weak position cannot make strong andsustainable dealsand this is an important lesson that canbe learned from the Iraqi experience. Lacking a broad andcommitted constituency, Abadi could not reform relationswith other communities, nor set forth a clear vision forpost-ISIS Iraq.

The KurdsRelations with the Kurds have continued to beproblematic since Malikis second term and seem headedin the direction of more tension. Baghdad and Erbil, thecapital of Kurdistan, disagreed on the share of the Iraqi

budget and on how to manage Iraqs and Kurdistansoil resources. The KRG has been complaining since therise of tension with Malikis government, particularlyduring his second term (2010-2014), that it has not beenreceiving the stipulated 17 percent of the federal budgetincluding expenditures on the regions security forcesthe Peshmerga.10 This percentage was established by theinterim government of Ayad Allawi and was meant toreect the population of areas under the KRG, althoughmany Arab politicians questioned the accuracy of thispercentage, given that Iraq had not conducted a reliable

census since 1987 and that a considerable number of Kurdslive outside such areas controlled by the KRG, includingKirkuk and Diyala. For its part, Baghdad protested againstthe contracts that the KRG had unilaterally signed withinternational oil companies (IOCs) to invest in its oilelds and export production without the approval ofthe federal government. The two sides offered differentinterpretations of the constitutional provisions addressingthe management and exportation of oil and whether thatwas an exclusive authority of the federal government orone shared withor that could be unilaterally assumedbythe region.11

Abadi and his minister of oil, Adil Abd al-Mahdi, triedto negotiate a new deal to resolve those disputes withthe KRG. In November 2014, the two sides reached atemporary agreement, albeit one that could not stand fora long time, especially once oil prices plummeted and thetwo sides started to look for ways to compensate for theirshrinking resources. Currently, there is no functionalarrangement governing relations between Baghdad andErbil.


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Currently, the government plans to integrate somethirty to forty thousand Sunni ghters in the PMFs, andintends to propose a law organizing them as a militarybody composed of about one hundred twenty thousandmembers and afliated with the Ministry of Defense.1

There is a common belief, however, that the PMFs stillargely function as an autonomous force and that Abadiscontrol over their actions is limited if not nominal, hisability to act as an effective commander in chief therebycompromised by the presence of these powerful armedforces on the ground. In addition, many Sunni politiciansaccused PMFs of acting as a sectarian organization andcommitting crimes against Sunni civilians.16

Abadi also failed to coordinate more effectively with Sunnitribal and local forces ghting against ISIS, which was seenas a necessary step for defeating the terrorist groups andpreparing for post-ISIS challenges. But his hands were tiedby the pressure exerted by Shia parties and militias not totransfer signicant military responsibilities to untrusted

Sunni ghters. If we add to this the deep divisionswithin Sunni communities, it becomes clear that theconditions for establishing unied and inclusive securityarrangements are not yet in place. Abadis lack of leveragehere has prevented him from making a big difference even ifhe had the will to do so.

Abadis Reforming Agenda, and His Lackof a Constituency

Abadis government, like the previous governments of Iraqis a national unity government. Positions are distributedbetween different parties based on the number of eachpartys parliamentary seats. Ministers follow their partysinstructions even when it comes to micro-managementissues such as appointments and contracting.

This power-sharing arrangement is usually referred to byIraqis as muhassessa (apportionment). Its downside is thatthe prime minister cannot fully control his government ormake sure that it is united behind a specic agenda. Malikidealt with this problem by creating parallel bodies andstafng them with his loyalists, and by issuing directivesto appoint under-ministerial senior staff in an actingcapacity. He thereby created a kind of shadow state thatcircumvented constitutional limitations.17 Abadi hassometimes resorted to similar methods in order to givehimself more leeway in making decisions, but this hasinfuriated other parties, who then see him as anotherMaliki. We are not consulted, and we know about hisdecisions through media, noted one Shia ofcial.18

The KRG keeps accusing Baghdad of penalizing itspopulation by delaying stipend payments to Kurdishgovernment employees. The region continued exporting oilfrom its elds and from Kirkuk, which had been subjectedto the de facto control of Kurdish forces; but the resourcesgenerated from those exports are still less than what theregion secures from its share of the federal budget.12

Expressing disappointment with Baghdads attitude,KRG president Masoud Barzani threatened to organize areferendum on the independence of Kurdistan. Conversely,Baghdad accused the KRG of acting as an independentstate with its own autonomous foreign, security, andeconomic policies. The federal government argued thatit was within its exclusive powers to export oil and tomake agreements with foreign countries and companies.According to a senior Iraqi ofcial, if Kurdistan wants tosplit from Iraq, nobody will prevent it from doing so.13

Sunni Arabs

Another important issue that Abadi failed to resolve wasrelations with Sunni Arabs. Abadi was aware that hispredecessor had been repeatedly accused of pursuingexclusivist sectarian policies, and he tried to avoidsuch accusations. Indeed, the political agreement thatestablished the government made it a requirement to passnew laws and measures to address sectarian tensions.For example, the National Guards law was suggested asa mechanism whereby security apparatuses would bedecentralized and local Sunni ghters motivated to securetheir areas by giving them governmental guarantees andadding them to a sustainable formal payroll system.

Abadi could not get major parties to agree on a singleversion of this law, however. Most Shia parties, includinghis own SOL, were suspicious that the law would endup creating a Sunni military force that would be paid bythe government but whose loyalty would lie somewhereelse. Accordingly, those parties proposed formalizingthe Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs), which werepredominantly irregular Shia forces, and integrating Sunnighters into its formations. Pressure from the Shia allianceforced Abadi to go with this option.

Initially, Maliki attempted to use his leverage withinpowerful groups in the PMFs, such as Badr and AAH, toweaken Abadis authority. Before leaving ofce, he issueda decree turning the PMFs into a formal body organizedand funded by the state. Confronting that reality and inorder not to antagonize the PMFs, Abadi instructed hisministers to deal with the PMFs as an ofcial body underhis authority as commander in chief.14


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Lacking a clear vision, though, on how to proceed withhis reforms after having raised public expectations, Abadiagain started clashing with other parties. He did not havefull support even from his own coalition and thereforefound it difcult to promote his brand as a reformer whilehaving to deal with a parliament in which he had almost noconstituency. This is what impelled Abadi to declare thathe would form a government of technocrats to proceedwith his reforms and stop parties from hindering hisagenda.22

This was a dangerous gamble, however, because Abadwas intent on depriving parties of their leverage instate institutions without possessing the tools to do soconstitutionally. Unable to achieve his goal, Abadi pavedthe way for a more powerful gure, Muqtada al-Sadr, tojump in, assume the leadership of the protest movementand demand an independent government of technocratsAbadi might have thought that he could make use of Sadrsability to organize massive protests in order to place more

pressure on other partiesbut this also meant that hehimself would become a captive of Sadrs ambition todominate Shia politics.

Abadis gamble led to further instability, especially afterthe storming of the Iraqi parliament by Sadrist protestersin an attempt to force MPs to approve the technocratsgovernment.23 The political process seemed to be headingtoward a more dangerous path, with radical tendenciesgrowing among the public and institutions crumbling onaccount of political tension. In his risky attempts to createa constituency, he destabilized his government, lost thesupport of most parties and jeopardized his political career

Conclusions

Abadis experience as Iraqs prime minister teaches us animportant lesson: Changing the prime minister withoutchanging the paradigm of and formula for governance inIraq has not yielded signicant results. The ethno-sectarianparadigm now prevailing in Iraq will keep limiting theprime ministers room for maneuver, while depriving him

of the leverage necessary to initiate major reforms. Theprime ministers political effectiveness depends on hisability to create a consensus around his policies, or else toimpose his own options if a consensus cannot be achievedThis is why both Maliki and Abadi sought ways to buildautonomous political constituencies. Maliki did this byexploiting sectarianism and patronage to consolidate hissupport base within his Shia community, which in theend further polarized Iraqi politics and made it difcult tobridge the gap between communities.

The circle of blame that characterized Malikis termshas been repeated: The prime minister blames parties forfocusing on their narrow interests and thereby placinghurdles in his way; the parties, in turn, criticize him forattempting to pursue a unilateral and exclusivist policyor, alternatively, for being uncertain about what he wants.In the words of a senior Shia politician, Abadi does notknow exactly what he wants... in the morning we agreewith him on something, just to hear that he changed hismind in the evening.19

Complicating things further for Abadi is that theorganizing doctrine behind the Iraqi polity today is onebased on communal representation: Politicians are largelyseen as representatives of their communities rather thanas constituting a broader national base. They are expectedto remain loyal to their sub-national constituencies, whichextends to adopting uncompromising and unrealisticpositions with respect to relations with othercommunities.The prime minister is constrained both by the need to

secure the support of his own community and by theinexibility shown by leaders of other communities.

Abadi was not as lucky as Maliki, who ruled Iraq at atime when oil prices (which account for 95 percent of thegovernmental budget) reached unprecedented heights.Oil prices started to fall dramatically a few months afterAbadis inauguration as prime minister, and the resultingshrinking resources placed unprecedented pressure onhim. In a political culture whose alliances are largelyshaped by patronage, Abadi found it difcult to expandhis political and popular base. Maliki effectively employedpatronage to attract allies and neutralize some of hisopponents; Abadi seemed to lack both the skills and theresources to act similarly.

Moreover, besides needing to decrease unnecessaryexpenditures, the government had to deal with a wave ofpopular protests that began during the summer of 2015.Reacting to these challenges, Abadi tried to repositionhimself as a reformer. He announced three reformpackages, including one that abolished the positionsof his deputies and vice-presidents.20 Abadi may have

thought that he could exploit the pressure coming fromthe increasingly discontented public to build a supportbase and force other parties to give him more freedom.Initially, he did manage to gain some concessions fromthe parties: Stunned by the unexpected wave of protests,the parliament gave him full support to implement hisreforms, on condition that those reforms did not violate theconstitution.21


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He became the most powerful and popular Shia politician, but the price was losing credibility among Sunnis and Kurdswhile alarming his Shia rivals. Abadi tried to create a constituency by trying to be a reformer. The April 30 protestersfocused their criticism on muhassessa: power-sharing agreements that made state institutions resemble the efdomsof powerful parties. Abadi hoped that the pressure from the street might ease the parties grip over ministries andgovernmental bodies, which in turn could help him pursue his agenda more smoothly. Lacking a parliamentary bloc thatsupported him, however, Abadi relied on that pressure, and on extra-constitutional forces, such as the Shia religiousauthority and Sadrs movement, to compel parties to accept reforms that limited their powers. This put him in theawkward position of needing the support of the very forces that he sought to undermine. The outcome was contradictory

policies, and choices that lacked clarity and decisiveness.

What Abadi wanted was to be a more effective prime minister, but the means of achieving this became as problematicas those adopted by his predecessor. As the country faces the difcult economic challenge resulting from the decline inoil prices, along with a erce and costly war against ISIS, Abadis indecisiveness and lack of leverage could cost him hisofce, or at least keep him as an ineffectual leader waiting to be replaced after the next election. In the end, the primeminister has managed neither to assert his image as a reformer, nor to keep the support of major political groups, whichhe needs to facilitate his effective performance. Additionally, the storming of Parliament by Sadrist protesters left Abadiin the awkward position of not deciding where to stand. In the increasingly polarized Iraqi political climate, Abadi,indecisive and lacking the tools to implement solutions to Iraqs problems, might be the next victim of the countrysdysfunctional system.

Endnotes1 Loveday Morris and Mustafa Salim. Iraqi Security Forces Use Live Fire to Break up Protests in Green Zone, Washington Post

May 20,2016.2 Nouri al-Maliki Forced from Post as Iraqs Political Turmoil Deepens, The Guardian, August 12, 2014.3 Jay Solomon and Carol E. Lee, U.S. Signals Iraqs Maliki Should Go, Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2014.4 On June 25, 2014, members of the Dawa leadership wrote a letter to Sistani asking his advice regarding the negotiations to form

a new government. Sistani replied in very explicit terms, reecting his status: I believe it is necessary to choose a new primeminister who has broad national acceptance and can work with political leaders of other Iraqi communities to save the countryfrom the dangers of terrorism, sectarian war and partition.Details are published on Sistanis website [in Arabic](accessed onMarch 30, 2016).

5 For further details, see Ahmed Ali, Iraqs Prime Minister Reshufes the Security Commanders, Institute for the Study of WarNovember 13, 2014, and David D. Kirkpatrick, In Shake-Up, Iraqi Premier Replaces 36 Commanders, New York Times, November

12, 2014.6 The General Secretary of Council of Ministers, The By-law of the Council of Ministers (accessed on April 4, 2016).7 Buratha News Agency, The Amendments on the Governorates Law, [in Arabic] (accessed on April 4, 2016).8 Prime Minister Ofce, the First Reforms Package Presented by the Prime Minister to the Exceptional Session of the Council of

Ministers, [in Arabic] (accessed on April 4, 2016).9 The Text of the Political agreement between Political Blocks Participating in the Government, Iraq Press, (accessed on March

30, 2016) [in Arabic].10 Kurdistan Government Blasts Baghdad Over Budget Freeze, Rudaw, March 3, 2014 (accessed by June 9, 2016).11 Ben Holland, Are Kurdistans Oil Contracts Constitutional? (Energy in the Middle East, 2012) (accessed on March 30, 2016).12 Denise Natali, How Independent Is the Iraqi-Kurdish Pipeline to Turkey? Almonitor, November 4, 2013, and Ed Butler, Iraq

Kurdistans Battle with Baghdad over Oil Revenues,BBC News, April 10, 2015.13 Authors meeting at the Atlantic Councils Future of Iraq Task Force, Iraq, March 2016.14 AIN News, The Cabinet Links PMFs to Abadis Ofce, [in Arabic] (accessed on March 30, 2016).15 Authors meeting with Iraqi senior ofcials at the Atlantic Councils Future of Iraq Task Force, Baghdad, March 2016.

16 Authors meeting with Sunni ofcials and activists at the Atlantic Councils Future of Iraq Task Force, Baghdad, March 2016.17 Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012).18 In a conversation with the author, Baghdad, March 2016.19 Authors meeting at the Atlantic Councils Future of Iraq Task Force, March 2016.20 Iraq Press Agency, Iraq Press Publishes the Package of reforms voted on by Parliament (accessed on March 30, 2016).21 Parliament Votes to Support Abadis Reforms,Al-Mashriq, November 2, 2015.22 Zalmay Khalilzad, Haider al-Abadis Dangerous Gamble, New York Times, April 12, 2016.23 Iraqi Shia Protesters Storm Baghdad Parliament, BBC News(accessed on April 30, 2016).

*Weblinks are available in the online version atwww.brandeis.edu/crown
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From Maliki to Abadi: The Challenge of BeingIraqs Prime Minister

Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee

Recent Middle East Briefs:Available on the Crown Center website: www.brandeis.edu/crown

Richard A. Nielsen, The Changing Face of Islamic Authority in the Middle East,No. 99

Abdel Monem Said Aly and Sobhy Essaila, Egypts 2015 Parliamentary Elections: APrelude to Stability?, No. 98

Khalil Shikaki, The End of the Abbas Decade: The Crumbling of the Post-IntifadaStatus Quo, No. 97

Seyedamir Hossein Mahdavi, Can the Vienna Agreement Solve Irans Problems?,No. 96

Abdel Monem Said Aly and Shai Feldman, Saving the Middle East, No. 95
http://www.brandeis.edu/crownhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown

from maliki to abadi: the challenge of being iraq’s prime minister

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