from model to bystander and how to bounce back: turkey, the middle east, and the transatlantic...

7/28/2019 From Model to Bystander and How to Bounce Back: Turkey, the Middle East, and the Transatlantic Alliance

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FOREIGN POLICY PAPERS

FROM MODEL TO BYSTANDER

AND HOW TO BOUNCE BACK

Turkey, the Middle East, and the Transatlantic Alliance

NORA FISHER ONAR


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About the Asmus Policy Entrepreneurs Fellowship

Tis paper is the nal product o the authors Asmus Policy Entrepreneurs Fellowship. Te German Marshall Fund o theUnited States launched this program in 2011 to honor Ronald D. Asmus, GMF Brussels oce executive director and direc-

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On the cover: urkish tiles achiartistul
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From Model to Bystanderand How to Bounce Back

Turkey, the Middle East, and the Transatlantic Alliance

Foreign Policy Papers

July 2013

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From Model to Bystander and How to Bounce Back 1

Introduction

1

The perception of Turkey as a model for theMiddle East appears to have been fleeting.For the time being, the story has petered

out because Turkey, like its allies and rivals, hasproven unable to shape outcomes after the Arabrevolutions, especially in Syria. The model narrativehas been called further into question by a perceivedslide toward authoritarianism within the country,exemplified in the eyes of many domestic andinternational observers by the governments heavy-handed response to recent nation-wide protests.Yet, Turkeys economic and political trajectory

continues to have much resonance for its region

and added-value for the transatlantic alliance. Tobridge the gap between long-term salience andimmediate purchase, Turkey must predicate policieson the two principles that drove the ruling Justiceand Development Party (AKP) success in earlieryears:pragmatism and inclusivityfor democraticdepth at home and abroad. After all, what theregion needs most is a success story an exampleof how to live together in diversity under an openrather than closed regime. If Turkey fails to riseto this challenge, domestic and regional upheavalcould derail Turkeys hitherto impressive rise.


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Mind the Gap: Turkey between

Resonance and Capability2

The Arab revolution

unleashed not only

hopes for national

regional rejuvenati

but also grievances

that authoritarian

governments had kunder wraps.

In the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring,Turkey was seen by many as a model forthe Middle East and a bridge between the

vital, troubled region and the West. This wasa story favored by, among others, the Obamaadministration and the international businesscommunity. It was bolstered by the clear aspirationsto regional leadership of Turkeys prime minister,Recep Tayyip Erdoan, though many Turkishdiplomats opted for more modest phraseology,arguing that Turkeys experience had inspirationaldimensions. Pundits across the Arab world also

chimed in, widely viewing Turkey as a significantplayer due to its relatively more stable democracy,growing economy, and proactive foreign policy.1Atthe same time, some Arabs expressed ambivalenceabout the relevance of Turkeys experiencebecause of its non-Arab identity, its long historyof Westernism in terms of both geopoliticalorientation and secularism, and its Ottomanimperial past (which appeals to some Islamistgroups nostalgic for the caliphate, but which alsocan grate upon the nationalist nerves of religious,liberal, and leftist Arab nationalists alike).

But the model narrative lost much of its tractionwithin two short years. The Arab revolutionsunleashed not only hopes for national and regionalrejuvenation, but also grievances that authoritariangovernments had kept under wraps (the U.S.invasion and withdrawal had a similar effect onIraq). The upshot has been deep polarizationwithin societies divided along ideological, ethnic,and sectarian lines. Today, even the apparentsuccess stories Tunisia and Egypt are grippedby political deadlock and escalating violence, as

bloodshed in Syria spills over into neighboringcountries, including Turkey.

In this increasingly complicated and dangerousregional environment, neither Turkish leaders

1 Ibrahim Kalin, Turkey and the Arab Spring, Project Syndi-cate, March 23, 2011

nor their U.S. and European, or Iranian,Russian, and Chinese counterparts have beenable to broker political settlements or staunchthe bloodshed. Yet, because the model story hadraised expectations, many international observersprojected their frustration on Ankara, chargingTurkey with hubristic wishful thinking aboutits capacity to lead the region. Comeuppance deserved or otherwise came in the now almostclichd inversion of Turkish Foreign MinisterAhmet Davutolus once lauded foreign policymotto, zero problems with neighbors, which

had underpinned Turkeys activism toward theregion up until the Arab Spring; in the transformedenvironment, it is widely suggested that Turkeystands zero chance for zero problems with itsneighbors.

Meanwhile, a shadow has been cast over Turkeysimage by the recent confrontations betweengovernment forces and protestors in some 70 citiesacross the country. Catalyzed by disproportionatepolice response to plans to demolish an Istanbulpark, many in the country demand to be

heard when it comes to the rapid developmentand transformation of their country and itsinfrastructure.

The Gezi Park demonstrations displayed featuresof both the Occupy movements in advancedindustrial economies, and the Arab uprisingsagainst authoritarianism (in 2011) and Islamistelectoral majoritarianism (in 2013). On the Occupyside of the equation, the protests reflected growingunease among urban middle classes with theexcesses of neoliberal restructuring. Many of them

benefitted from Turkeys transformation underthe Justice and Development Party (AKP) andnow question the trade-off between sustainabilityand development. On the Arab Spring side, theyentailed a refusal to bow before an oppressivesecurity apparatus (epitomized in Tahrir Squarein 2011), and concern over the winner-takes-all


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The German Marshall Fund of the United States4

reading of democracy (epitomized in Tahrir Squarein 2013), which prevails in government circlesdespite Turkeys serious shortcomings in all theareas intended to protect minorities from beingtrampled on by the majority: freedom of speechand the press, judicial independence, check andbalances, and the rule of law.

But if Turkeys star seems to be falling, the countryhas indeed undergone a dramatic and empoweringtransformation. At a time when observers arewondering whether a number of Arab states will

even survive, Turkey has made great progresstoward stabilization, especially in macroeconomicterms. This is evident in strong trade andinvestment-driven growth over the past decade(between 4 and 11 percent, for an average of 6-7percent)2 an economic transformation that hasenabled millions to embrace middle class lifestyles,transformed the infrastructure of the Anatolianheartland, and restored Istanbul as a global city.Economic growth has underwritten politicalstabilization (if not full liberalization) under theAKP. It has translated, too, into an increased global

presence attested to by membership of the G20.This overall experience entails a powerful message,which Turkeys leaders have broadcast across theregion: empowerment in an era of globalizationneed not come at the cost of cultural integrity

2 Sena Eken and Susan Schadler, Turkey 2000-2010: A Decade ofTransition Discussions among Experts, DEIK 2012.

(which the AKP associates with an invigoratedMuslim identity).

In a nutshell, there is a gap between the long andthe short term when it comes to Turkeys influence between the image it seeks to project on onehand, and its capacity and political will on theother.3 AKP-led Turkey could bridge this gap byreturning to the two principles that underwroteits success in the first place:pragmatism andinclusivity. After all, in the early to mid-2000s,it was AKP willingness to broker coalitions with

domestic partners and a positive-sum approachto diverse players across the region that gaveTurkey legitimacy and leverage in a deeply dividedcorner of the world. Its very success, however,bred complacency, as the Turkish leadership tookincreasingly ideological and exclusionary positionsalienating diverse constituencies at home andacross the region. By recalibrating on the basis ofpragmatic inclusivity, this paper argues, Turkey canachieve democratic as opposed to mere strategicdepth.4

3 Interviews in Ankara, December 2012; zdem Sanberk, TrkD Politikasnda Zorlu Bir Yl: 2013 ngrleri, Analist, USAKJanuary 2013.4 For a full discussion of this concept, see Nora Fisher Onar,Democratic Depth: The Missing Ingredient in TurkeysDomestic/Foreign Policy Nexus? in Kerem Oktem, A. Kadogluand Mehmet Karli,Another Empire?: Turkish Foreign Policyin a Changing World(Istanbul: Bilgi UP, 2012). The volume iscurrently being translated into Arabic.


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The Domestic Challenge

3

If Turkey is to reach

goal of joining the c

of leading economi

by 2023, it must se

cheaper alternative

its present reliance

oil and gas importsRussia, Azerbaijan,

Iran.

Economic Consolidation

To realize its potential requires, first andforemost, consolidating Turkeys ownunfinished project of economic and political

modernization. After all, momentum for changeacross the region emanates from demands for socialand political justice. And if in the 2000s, Turkeymade remarkable strides in these arenas, today it isbacktracking.

First, there are signs of sclerosis in the economy, thebasis for its regional and global influence. A debt-

driven consumer culture means domestic savingsare low and the current account deficit is persistentand high (though now falling). This imbalance hasbeen fueled by credit growth, and both balance ofpayments financing through vulnerable portfoliosand corporate balance sheets are exposed togrowing risk.5

Energy a prime source of the current accountdeficit also figures centrally to Turkeysaspirations to join the club of leading economies by2023. The country must secure cheaper alternatives

to its present reliance on oil and gas imports fromRussia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. The logical partnerswhen it comes to natural gas are northern Iraq,Cyprus, and Israel, though a number of politicalobstacles still need to be overcome. By engagingsuch interlocutors on a pragmatic basis, as Ankarahas done with the Kurdistan Regional Authority,Turkey can gain access to cheaper energy and,as a transit country, strengthen Europes energysecurity.6

5

Nora Fisher Onar and Max Watson, Crisis or Opportunity:Turkey, Greece, and the Political Economy of South EasternEurope in the 2010s,Journal of South East European and BlackSea Studies, Vol.13, No.3, 2013.

6 See Nora Fisher Onar and David Koryani, Europes Energyand Security Depends on Turkish Democracy, EuropeanCouncil on Foreign Relations, June 11, 2013, http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/europes_energy_security_depends_upon_turkish_democ-racy

This, in turn, would help expand Turkeysmanufacturing sector, which, while a pillar ofgrowth in the past decade, is in need of strategicinnovation to increase the added-value of Turkishexports. For, despite the increase and diversificationof trade, particularly with the Middle East,Turkeys exports to the region are overwhelmingly(62.7 percent) made up of products with low ormoderate added-value.7 Further progress requiresa more transparent business culture and legalinfrastructure conducive to long-term investments.A lack of transparency in the awarding of tenders

in areas from urban renewal to nuclear energyis an obstacle to larger flows of foreign directinvestment. A case in point is Erdoans recentmove to torpedo a $5.7 billion privatization schemeinvolving the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund,sending a discouraging message to Asian investors.8Following an improved rating from credit agencieslike Fitch, Turkey could have obtained a better pricefor the package. But the move may have dampenedthe confidence of risk-adverse investors like theJapanese.9 Ankara needs to implement overduereforms in areas like the legal framework as well

as taxation and education, which would fostertransparency and innovation. The slow-down in theEU-Turkey accession process has reduced externalleverage in favor of such reforms.

In short, Turkeys economic rise is not guaranteed,nor unrelated to political developments. Tellingly,the stock market plunged with each hardlinestatement made by the prime minister in responseto the Gezi Park demonstrations. Similarly, theimages of massive deployment of tear gas

7 Osman Bahadir Dincer and Mustafa Kutlay, Turkeys PowerCapacity in the Middle East: Limits of the Possible: An EmpiricalAnalysis, USAK Reports, June 2012, No.12/04.8 Daniel Dombey and Jeremy Grant, Turkish PM Casts Doubtson Roads Deal, Financial Times, February 4, 2013.

9 Even the Saudis who, for all the proclamations of Muslimfraternity between Riyadh and Ankara, have yet to channelsignificant sovereign wealth resources to Turkey.
http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/europes_energy_security_depends_upon_turkish_democracyhttp://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/europes_energy_security_depends_upon_turkish_democracyhttp://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/europes_energy_security_depends_upon_turkish_democracyhttp://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/europes_energy_security_depends_upon_turkish_democracyhttp://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/europes_energy_security_depends_upon_turkish_democracyhttp://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/europes_energy_security_depends_upon_turkish_democracy


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and reports of police using tear gas canisters aspoint-blank projectiles makes it likely that theinternational Olympic Committee will pass overTurkeys bid to host the next games despite thecountry being an early favorite in the race. Attemptsby government officials to blame these market andinternational responses and indeed the Geziupheavals in general on foreign elementsand a murkily defined interest rate lobby area throwback to the conspiracy theory-riddenpopulism of Turkeys bad old days when it attractedminimal investment and inspired little confidence

either regionally or internationally.

Political Consolidation

Investors will remain wary of a Turkey that inrecent years has prefered stability over freedom.The Economic Intelligence Unit has recentlydowngraded it from flawed democracy to hybridregime.10 In index after index, Turkey comesclose to the bottom in areas from human rightsprotection to gender equality, but topping the listfor court cases at the European Court of HumanRights. Particularly troubling is press freedom,where Turkey outstrips China and Russia as thecountry with the greatest number of imprisoned

journalists.11 Under pressure, private mediaconglomerates also discipline their journalists.This, in turn, prompts self-censorship, attested toby the conspicuous silence of mainstream mediaoutlets during the first few days of the Gezi Parkdemonstrations. Meanwhile the internet and socialmedia described by some as the last arena left for

10 For a survey, see Hugh Pope, EU Romance Rekindled:

Turkeys Tentative EU Springtime,Majallah, March 4, 2013.11 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) Turkeys PressFreedom in CrisisThe Dark Days of Jailing Journalists andCriminalizing Dissent (Special Report: New York Committeeto Protect Journalists, October 2012). 81 percent of imprisoned

journalists are held in relation to two politicized cases involvingthe military and the Kurdish question. See Mark Pierini withMarkus Mayr, Press Freedoms in Turkey, Carnegie Papers, TheCarnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2013.

critical discussion12

but recently demonized by theprime minister face increasing censure.

Such suppression hardly presents a beacon fordemocratization movements across a region thatTurkey claims to champion. It also reinforcesWestern clichs about the despotic DNA ofIslamist political movements the very imagethe AKP so refreshingly undermined during itsfirst years in power and that amplified its power ofattraction across the Arab and Muslim worlds.13The government has done itself no favors in this

regard through its heavy-handed management ofthe Gezi Park demonstrations. Ultimately, what theprotestors and a new generation of economicallycomfortable, politically dissatisfied citizens demand is the upgrading of the countrysdemocracy, including full respect for freedom ofexpression and the diversity that is Turkeys de factoreality.

The Kurdish Dimension

There have been far-reaching recent changes inthe governments policies toward the countrys

Kurdish population. These began in the mid-2000spropelled by the EU reform process. This ledErdoan to acknowledge the Kurdish problemas such. Doing so required considerable politicalwill and was followed by the assertion that Turksand Kurds shared a common (Muslim) supra-identity but can and should celebrate their (ethnic)sub-identities. This appealed to religious Kurdsbut did not really capture the imagination of thesecular, left-leaning, nationalist Kurds who form

12 Interview, Ankara, December 2012.13 As one international observer put it after an Istanbulcourt handed a world-renowned Turkish pianist a 10-monthsuspended prison sentence for tweets deemed to belittle religionthese days writing about freedom of expression in Turkeyrequires a conscious effort to avoid [Orientalist] clichs.Firdevs Robinson, Turkeys Unruly Rule of Law, opendemoc-racy, April 17, 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/firdevs-robinson/turkeys-unruly-rule-of-law

Ultimately, what the

protestors demand is

the upgrading of the

countrys democracy,

cluding full respect for

freedom of expression

nd the diversity that isurkeys de facto reality.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/firdevs-robinson/turkey%E2%B3%ADunruly-rule-of-lawhttp://www.opendemocracy.net/firdevs-robinson/turkey%E2%B3%ADunruly-rule-of-lawhttp://www.opendemocracy.net/firdevs-robinson/turkey%E2%B3%ADunruly-rule-of-lawhttp://www.opendemocracy.net/firdevs-robinson/turkey%E2%B3%ADunruly-rule-of-law


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Ordinary Turks have

become weary of

conflict with the Ku

and open to new

initiatives.

the backbone of the Kurdish movement (and themilitant Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK).

In response, the AKP continued to displaypragmatism and heighten its inclusive approach.This was evident in its launch of a series ofdemocratic openings couched in the languageof civic and cultural rights, while passinggroundbreaking measures regarding Kurdishlanguage rights and broadcasting and secondaryand higher education.

If this partially desecuritized the Kurdish question,

progress was held back by the AKP turn to hardlinerhetoric before the 2011 elections. Some arguethat this shift occurred because the party inpower for almost a decade had internalized theethno-nationalist orientation and institutions ofa Turkish state that long denied the pluralism ofTurkish society.14 Others read it as circumstantial a tactical bid for right-wing nationalist votes toprevent the ultranationalist opposition party fromentering parliament. Regardless of its source, theresult was government repression of moderate aswell as hardline Kurdish dissent. This was pursuedthrough a sweeping crackdown on the PKKsurban guerilla wing and its alleged affiliates, whichled to some 8,000 detentions, 3,500 arrests, andprolonged, pre-trial incarceration of hundreds,including journalists, intellectuals, and students.

The new stance was accompanied by intensifiedPKK mobilization, which resulted in 900 deaths in18 months.15 By upping the ante, the PKK soughtto prove it could pose a sustained challenge to the

14 Ilter Turan, Turkeys Second Kurdish Opening: Light at the

End of the Tunnel or another Failed Attempt, German MarshallFund, April 12, 2013, http://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkeys-second-opening-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-or-another-failed-attempt/15 Hugh Pope, Turkey and its Rebel Kurds may want Peace thisTime International Crisis Group, January 16, 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-and-its-rebel-kurds-may-want-peace-this-time.aspx

Turkish state and security apparatus. It was aidedby the increasingly fluid situation in Syria whichgave armed Kurds room for maneuver at a timewhen the Turkish armys chain of command hadbeen thrown into disarray by the imprisonment ofhundreds of officers 64 generals, 273 officers,and 60 non-commissioned officers as part of theAKPs taming of the countrys military.16

Thus, persistent low intensity conflict was seen aspreferable to a peace process. But the deterioratingsituation in Syria and changes in the regional

balance of power sparked recognition that TurkeysKurdish problem harmed its international imageand undermined its stability at a time when Turkeyotherwise stood out as an island of calm in aturbulent region. Meanwhile, ordinary Turks havebecome weary of conflict with the Kurds and opento new initiatives. Even moderates associated withrival camps including opposition leader KemalKldarolu are willing to put peace before partypolitics, having broadly accepted the legitimacy ofKurdish demands for cultural rights.

As such, only two months after proposing tostrip Kurdish politicians of their parliamentaryimmunity for association with the PKK, Erdoanbegan a dialogue with the imprisoned Kurdishleader Abdullah calan in his island prison. Today,despite a deep lack of trust, a peace process isunfolding. The first step involves a ceasefire, tobe followed up by withdrawal of PKK fighters tonorthern Iraq by the autumn.

The sequel to this is a series of substantivemeasures to address Kurdish demands regardingidentity and cultural rights. To gather ideas for thissecond phase, an ad hoc group of wise men (and

16 Murat Onur, Turkeys Jailed Officers, Foreign Policy Blog,March 27, 2013, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/27/turkeys-jailed-officers/
http://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkeys-second-opening-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-or-another-failed-attempt/http://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkeys-second-opening-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-or-another-failed-attempt/http://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkeys-second-opening-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-or-another-failed-attempt/http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-and-its-rebel-kurds-may-want-peace-this-time.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-and-its-rebel-kurds-may-want-peace-this-time.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-and-its-rebel-kurds-may-want-peace-this-time.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-and-its-rebel-kurds-may-want-peace-this-time.aspxhttp://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/27/turkeys-jailed-officers/http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/27/turkeys-jailed-officers/http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/27/turkeys-jailed-officers/http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/03/27/turkeys-jailed-officers/http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-and-its-rebel-kurds-may-want-peace-this-time.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-and-its-rebel-kurds-may-want-peace-this-time.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-and-its-rebel-kurds-may-want-peace-this-time.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-and-its-rebel-kurds-may-want-peace-this-time.aspxhttp://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkeys-second-opening-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-or-another-failed-attempt/http://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkeys-second-opening-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-or-another-failed-attempt/http://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkeys-second-opening-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-or-another-failed-attempt/


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De facto Kurdish

autonomy in return for

an even more top-

heavy Turkish state is a

contradiction in terms

and time bomb waiting

to go off.

a handful of women17

) appointed by the primeminister have toured the country to debate thesubstance of an eventual solution. Their findingsshould contribute to the content of a settlement,which to date remains opaque. There is thusa danger of putting the cart before the horse,privileging theatrics over substance while failing toaddress the concerns of potential spoilers.

A third and final stage may entail disarmamentand an amnesty. What is certain is that theprocess and the passage of a new constitution,

which may accompany its culmination offersa golden opportunity to redefine the criterion forbelonging to the Turkish nation along pragmaticand inclusive lines for immediate as well as lastingdomestic, regional, and international resonance.

Prior to the Gezi Park protests, there was awidespread expectation that such a constitutionwould be linked to quid pro quo Kurdish supportfor a presidential system with increased powers,enabling Erdoan to further amplify his role as thedriver of Turkish politics.

This approach had two major flaws. The first hadto do with the gap between the short-term allureof the bargain for the two leaders and its long-term

viability. A formula of ceasefire and withdrawalin exchange for house arrest for calan, and apresidential system for Erdoan simply would notdismantle the well-established structures of Kurdishresistance and radicalism. Moreover, demolishingthe few remaining checks and balances in Turkeyspolitical system, and centralizing decision-makingunder one idiosyncratic authority would closeprecisely those democratic openings that could

17 Kurdish women have been active in both conflict andpeace-making dynamics as fighters and activists. For more onhow the present dialogue would be significantly bolstered ifwomens voices were sought and heard, see Yakin Erturk, ACall to Engender Turkeys Peace Process, April 17, 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/yakin-erturk/call-to-engender-turkeys-peace-process

address the underlying causes of Kurdish agitation.In other words, de facto Kurdish autonomy inreturn for an even more top-heavy Turkish state isa contradiction in terms and time bomb waitingto go off. The state would eventually encroach onKurdish autonomy or vice versa and the settlementwould collapse.

The prospect of Erdoan pushing the countrytoward a presidential system, however, may havebecome moot. He is unlike to find the necessarysupport for a constitutional amendment given

closed voting in parliament and the uneasethat his polarizing political style strongly inevidence during the Gezi protests has elicitedin more liberal elements of the AKP coalition,not to mention the opposition. Any move towarda presidential system would also likely to be metwith even greater unrest and resolve from theyouthful new street, whose political coming-of-age in recent weeks was in part a response to hisoverbearing political style. Kurdish interlocutorstoo, will have been reminded of the risks of puttingtheir eggs in mercurial Erdoans presidential

basket.18

A second danger with regard to the Kurdishdialogue was that any constitution that emergesfrom present negotiations must enshrine not onlyKurdish identity but those of all the other non-Turkish as well as non-Sunni, non-practicing, andnon-Muslim groups within the country. To thisend, recent rhetoric of calan and Erdoan about1,000 years of Turkish and Kurdish unity underthe banner of [Sunni] Islam may be read as astop-gap populist measure to placate public opinion

as fragile talks unfold. It must not be the basis ofan eventual settlement. Any temptation to simplyco-opt Kurds to the exclusion of others should be

18 This was attested to by the open letters that pleaded for amore reconciliatory approach penned by multiple columnists atpro-government newspapers once the wall of silence regardingthe demonstrations had been broken.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/yakin-erturk/call-to-engender-turkey%E2%B3%ADpeace-process%20http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/yakin-erturk/call-to-engender-turkey%E2%B3%ADpeace-process%20http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/yakin-erturk/call-to-engender-turkey%E2%B3%ADpeace-process%20http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/yakin-erturk/call-to-engender-turkey%E2%B3%ADpeace-process%20http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/yakin-erturk/call-to-engender-turkey%E2%B3%ADpeace-process%20http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/yakin-erturk/call-to-engender-turkey%E2%B3%ADpeace-process%20


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ruled out by a glance at a historical record strewnwith the wrecks ofad hoc alliances (e.g. betweenthe state and leftists in 1960, and the state andright-wing groups in 1980). Such a strategy, like itsantecedents, would only perpetuate the countryspresent and debilitating polarization. Today, thiswarning should be heeded most of all with regardto heterodox Alevis a community with someaffinities to the Syrian Alawites and approximately20 percent of Turkeys population who couldbe radicalized by exclusion from a constitutionalsettlement.

The constitution, nevertheless, remains a goldenopportunity to enshrine an inclusive social contract democratic depth for stability and influence.By predicating its new order on pragmaticpluralism, Turkey would also offer a concreteexample of both democraticprocess and outcometo countries in dire need of a success story on bothfronts, from Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya to Syria andIraq.


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The sectarian cleav

may have eclipsed

the Israeli-Palestini

question as the cen

of gravity of regiona

conflict.

Syria and Sectarianism

Unquestionably, the greatest challenge forthe diverse peoples of the region and theirleaders is to learn to live together under

open as well as authoritarian systems. The successor failure of transitional governments and thestaying power of states like Bahrain, which haveso far reigned in revolutionaries will depend ontheir ability to enable cohabitation among deeplydivided populations. Predominantly Sunni NorthAfrican states face their own set of challenges from Muslim-Christian, Arab-Berber, and Islamist/

liberal-leftist relations to tribal rivalries. But in theGulf and Levant, the multi-headed beast seems tobe Sunni-Shia sectarianism.

Nowhere is this more evident than in Syria, whereSunni-led rebels and Alawite-led governmentforces continue to up the ante. From mass killingsof civilians to purported use of chemical weapons,each lays the blame at the others door. Fromthe Syrian centrifuge, sectarian conflict radiatesoutwards in the form of massacres in Lebanon,clashes in Jordan, and growing insecurity on the

Golan Heights.19 Meanwhile, in Iraq, the Shiiteleadership, threatened by Al Qaeda attacks thatleave up to 100 dead a day, has turned to draconianmethods to shore up power against its own ArabSunni and Kurdish citizens.

The danger that Turkey is drawn into the quagmireis exacerbated by the displacement of 4 millionpeople within Syria, and some 1.5 million refugeesinto neighboring countries, including an estimated330,000 who have fled across the porous borderto Turkey. The UN estimates that country could

19 A recent United Nations Disengagement Observer Forcereport submitted to the Security Council cited the detention of21 UN personnel, fire aimed at UN targets, and carjacking ofUN vehicles. and by armed members of the Syrian opposition, aswell as provocations by the Syrian authorities. Security CouncilStatement on UNDOF / Syria. Accessed May 15, 2013, http://un-report.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/security-council-final-draft-statement.html?spref=tw

receive up to 1 million refugees by the end of theyear.20 This not only strains resources but threatensto upset the increasingly fragile balance betweenTurkeys own Turkish and Arabic-speaking Sunnicommunities, its heterodox Alevis, and its SyriacChristians. Locals, meanwhile, project theirfrustration, in turns, at Ankara, at Damascus, atthe Syrian rebels, and at the hapless refugees. Thedevastating recent bombing of the border townof Reyhanli, for which Turkish authorities havefingered Bashar al-Assads cronies and whichkilled 51 (48 Turkish and 3 Syrian citizens), deeply

aggravated sentiments on the ground. Alreadyangered by the felling of a Turkish jet, intermittentmortar attacks from across the border, and carbombs that have killed dozens, locals turned onrefugees just minutes after the Reyhanli attacks a town where the refugee population of 60,000 isalmost as large as that of the natives.

With all this tinder waiting to be ignited, eventhe Middle Easts most experienced risk-takers-cum-risk-managers Turkeys Erdoan as wellas Israels Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Iranian

leadership must act with care. While eachhave at various points proved masters of stakingstrategic claims in their turbulent environment,they are now faced with a new, not-so-cold warbetween Sunni and Shia peoples and powers. Thesectarian cleavage may have eclipsed the Israeli-Palestinian question as the center of gravity ofregional conflict. After all, Hamas and Israel arelocked into a well-worn pattern of provocation,retribution, and stubbornness. But every day bringssomething new in the maneuvers of Shia-orientedDamascus, Baghdad, and Tehran versus Sunni-

dominated Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, andeven tiny, oil-rich Bahrain. The new Middle Easteven seems to be transforming the old, with Egypts

20 UN agency warns against dramatic increase in number ofSyrians refugees in Turkey, Anadolu Agency, Turkey, April 14,2013

The Regional Challenge

4
http://un-report.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/security-council-final-draft-statement.html?spref=twhttp://un-report.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/security-council-final-draft-statement.html?spref=twhttp://un-report.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/security-council-final-draft-statement.html?spref=twhttp://un-report.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/security-council-final-draft-statement.html?spref=twhttp://un-report.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/security-council-final-draft-statement.html?spref=twhttp://un-report.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/security-council-final-draft-statement.html?spref=tw


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Only Turkey with its

wn model of imperfect

cohabitation between

majority Sunnis and

minority Alevis has a

ance to rise above the

fray.

Muslim Brotherhood, backed by Qatari money,poised to lure Hamas away from its Iranian patron,as Ankara jockeys for leverage in the equation.

In this context, Israel has little choice but to watchand wait, though it is increasingly authorizingmilitary forays whenever it worries developmentson the ground will undermine its national security.Shia Iran its revolutionary model no longer theonly alterative to pro-Western military regimes can only chafe at the rise of Sunni Islamists andcontribute to the mobilization of Shia movements

across the region.Only Turkey with its own model of imperfectcohabitation between majority Sunnis and minorityAlevis (an Anatolian sect related to Shiism) has achance to rise above the fray. Its de facto pluralismis a precious source of both domestic stability andregional influence that Ankara must not squander.This may be why many Turkish diplomats refuseto describe tensions in Sunni/Shia terms, andchastise those who do for conflict-mongering. Theyhave a point. Sunni Hamas is still close to Iran. InSyria, Sunni businessmen back Assad, and Alawitespepper the opposition. If Turkeys own ties withIran, Iraq, and Syria have deteriorated, this is afunction of NATO priorities and type-A leaders asmuch as sectarian divides. But at the end of the day,catchy slogans for real problems take on a life oftheir own. So it was with clash of civilizations, soit is with the Sunni/Shia divide.

Turkeys ability to navigate this faultline as Syriaimplodes and conflict, whether sectarian orotherwise, spills across its borders will dependon Erdoan whose personal preferences todaydictate foreign as well as domestic policy. It istherefore imperative that Turkeys firebrand primeminister recognize that while a series of polarizingpronouncements of recent years may have hadshort-term and mostly domestic benefits, theycame at the price of grand strategy. The upshot was

to forfeit Turkeys ability to mediate in many of theregions outstanding problems.

As such, when it comes to sectarian issues, Ankaramust be wary not to make the same mistake anew.Here, a series of pronouncements, most recently themove to name the new Bosphoros bridge after anOttoman sultan21 Alevis believe massacred 40,000of their brethren seem calculated to offend. If thepurpose is to galvanize Turkeys Sunni majorityin the face of wide-ranging public dissatisfactionwith Ankaras Syria policy by alienating and

demonizing the Alevi minority, the implicationsfor sectarianism both at home and regionally areominous.

To mitigate inter-communal tensions at homeand their potential for exploitation by externalforces, Erdoan must resist taking on the role ofSunni champion. Once again, for pragmatic, notto mention normative, reasons, he should project amessage of inclusion toward those in and beyondTurkey Shiites and Alevis, non-practicingSunnis, and non-Muslims who fear beingswept away in the wave of Sunni Islamism that issweeping much of the Middle East. At the sametime, he can exert his own pro-religious credentialstoward moderating the Sunni Islamist bloc.

Strategic Rapprochement with Israel

Another arena where inclusive pragmatism willyield fruit is in ties with Israel. The need to improverelations has acquired heightened urgency in lightof, among other things, chemical weapons usageand stockpiles in Syria. Recognition of commonends appears to have broken the three-year impasse

in Turkish-Israeli relations from the initial falloutover Operation Cast Lead in Gaza through toNetanyahus apology this March for the deaths ofTurkish citizens in theMavi Marmara debacle.Tensions were a result of both structural and

21 Yavuz Sultan Selim


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idiosyncratic factors. That is, they reflected Turkeysheightened economic and political engagement bythe end of the 2000s with a region where the vastmajority of interlocutors are hostile toward Israeland/or pay lip-service to anti-Israeli positions.At the same time, they reflected the clash ofpersonalities between Erdoan and Netanyahu, aswell as others within their government coalitions.The result was a new Eastern Mediterraneancalculus with a Turkish-Arab axis, arrayed againstan Israeli-Cyprus alliance based mostly on theprospect of exploitation and transport of major

natural gas reserves discovered in the two countriesterritorial waters.

That zero-sum arithmetic could be fading. This isbecause both the Turkish and Israeli leadership,at the urging of Washington, seem to recognizethe need for direct and indirect cooperation overcommon security challenges in the post-Arabrevolutionary era. High on this list are Syriasconflagration and Irans nuclear trajectory. In fact,it was by citing this pragmatic basis for engagementthat Netanyahu explained his move to apologize

to the Israeli public. Energy cooperation couldsweeten the deal. After all, Cypriot proposals toliquefy its own and Israels gas for transport toEuropean markets may be prohibitively expensiveat a time of economic meltdown on the island.22

22 Menelaos Hadjicostis, Cyprus to build gas plant with orwithout Israel, inAP The Big Story, April 3, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cyprus-build-gas-plant-or-without-israel.

By way of contrast, nearby Turkey is as hungryfor energy as it is keen to diversify its energydependence away from Russia and Iran. This makesit both an economically and strategically attractivedestination for the some 480 billion cubic metersof gas from Israels Leviathan field as well asCypriot energy which could be marked forexport in upcoming years.

But pragmatism alone will not persuade Israelis many of whom have come to believe that Erdoanis deeply anti-Semitic to place their golden goose

in Turkeys hands. Nor can the Turkish governmenteasily renounce the moral high ground it believes ithas staked vis--vis the Palestinian question. Thus,detent also must entail an inclusive, normativecomponent. On this front, having reestablisheddialogue with an Israeli government coalitionthat is more moderate and amenable to a two-state solution than its predecessor, Turkey couldpotentially play a constructive role vis--vis Hamas,with which it maintains good relations a cardit had previously forfeited to the Egyptian MuslimBrotherhood due to the fallout with Israel.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cyprus-build-gas-plant-or-without-israelhttp://bigstory.ap.org/article/cyprus-build-gas-plant-or-without-israelhttp://bigstory.ap.org/article/cyprus-build-gas-plant-or-without-israelhttp://bigstory.ap.org/article/cyprus-build-gas-plant-or-without-israel


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Reinvested in the Transatlantic Triangle

Relations with the EU

Pragmatism bred of regional tumult alsocould foster more mutuality in relationswith Turkeys European as well as Middle

Eastern neighbors. In fact, the spring of 2013marked renewed flirtation between Ankara andits counterparts in the European Union, albeit oneriddled with all the baggage of an old love/haterelationship. The AKP chapter in the Turkey-EUstory dates back to 2002 when the governmentembarked upon an EU accession process that

transformed the countrys political landscape,enabling, among other things, the displacement ofTurkeys illiberal if staunchly Western-oriented andsecularist establishment. Meanwhile, momentumtoward membership ground to a halt due to theskepticism of the EUs Franco-German leadership,the Cypriot veto, and the paralysis caused by theUnions own constitutional and financial crises.The result was that in the brief years between theeurozone crisis (2009) and its Syria policy debacle(2012), Turkey found itself empowered as the EUfloundered. Ankara accordingly engaged the EUin a triumphalist manner populist payback forwhat many Turks felt had been the countrys unjustearlier treatment by high-handed EU actors. Asa result of these emotional and exclusionary asopposed to pragmatic and inclusionary attitudes,the EU-Turkey relationship deteriorated (andwith it EU influence on Turkeys human rightsperformance).

By the spring of 2013, both EU and Turkishleaders seemed to be in a humbler mood as severalconjectural factors nudged the parties closer

together. For Turkeys part, the indispensabilityof its Western economic and security relationswas brought home by the situation in the MiddleEast, and Syria in particular. Erdoan accordinglyreached out to EU ambassadors in a speech at agala dinner prior to embarking on a European tour,

which was followed by visits to a series of Europeancapitals by President Abdullah Gl. If such movesare largely window-dressing, they can pave the wayfor more substantial engagement.

On the EU side, too, there may be a change of mindabout the expendability of relations with Turkey.French President FranoisHollande has not onlyrefrained from the anti-Turkish theatrics of hispredecessor, but has agreed to open at least one newaccession chapter (on regional aid). He positioneda close confidant as EU ambassador to Ankara and

is scheduled to visit Turkey in person, followingon the heels of German Chancellor Angela Merkelwho made her first trip there this February. Shouldthe new Franco-German duo prove willing tomove forward in substance as well as style an outcome to which the Irish and upcomingLithuanian presidencies may well be open theCypriots might be cajoled into making concessionson Turkeys accession process. They are, after all,enmeshed in economic crisis and led by a newpresident, who in 2004 endorsed the Annan Planapproved by Turkish but vetoed by Greek Cypriots.

These fledging developments are playing out,moreover, against a backdrop in which the U.S.pivot to Asia, not to mention its recent sequester,entails a scaling back of the U.S. presence in bothEurope and the Middle East, including NATOcommitments to the security of the northern as wellas southern Mediterranean.

The moment is therefore ripe for pragmatic re-engagement between Europeans and Turks, whilea robust framework already exists for Turkeysinclusion through the accession process. It is also

worth noting that given the transformation ofboth the EU and Turkey in recent years, Turkeysparticipation in the European calculus can unfoldalong multi-speed and multi-level lines, renderingredundant counterproductive debates aboutdemoting Turkey to special relationship status.

The International Challenge

5

On the EU side ther

may be a change

of mind about the

expendability of

relations with Turke


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But for all the potential mutual gains, it remains anopen question whether there is enough interest onboth sides to reforge the trust shattered in recentyears. Turkeys recent demonstrations may play amixed role in this regard. On one hand, and in theshort run, they may have dampened the attemptto rekindle chemistry as Turkish officials bristledat EU criticism of government management of thecrisis. On the other hand, in the medium to long-term, the affinities between the Gezi protests andother youth social movements that have crystallizedacross Europe in recent years including the role

that transnational networks supported by socialmedia played in helping Turkeys demonstratorsmobilize may foster a fellow feeling amonga new generation of young and increasinglypoliticized EU and Turkish citizens.23 Suchsolidarities could facilitate eventual acceptance, viareferenda, of Turkey into the European fold aroundAnkaras target date of 2023, a time when todaysyouth will be entering their political prime.

Reinvested in the Transatlantic Triangle:

Relations with the United States

That turnaround is possible at all is attested to bythe rehabilitation of U.S.-Turkish relations after adecade of strain. Troubles began with the Turkishparliaments refusal to allow the country to serve asa base for the invasion of Iraq, enervating the Bushadministration. This bolstered U.S. policy towardKurds in the region, which, in turn, alienatedan Ankara bent on containing Kurdish regionalrecrudescence, an end it pursued in cooperation

23 For more on the opposition movement to emerge from theGezi park protests see Emiliano Alessandri, Nora Fisher Onar,

and Ozgur nlhisarckl, Trumph in Taksim Square? TheRebirth of Turkeys Opposition. Foreign Affairs, June 13, 2013.

with Damascus, Baghdad, and Syria. These newalliances fuelled the deterioration of U.S.-Turkish,as well as Turkish-Israeli relations. 2009 to 2011marked a low point, during which many pundits inWashington proclaimed that Turkey had switchedaxes to embrace an anti-Western, Islamist-cum-third-worldist identity.

The tide turned as Turkeys geopolitical currencyrose (and then fell) in the aftermath of the ArabSpring, making it apparent by 2012 that the lonewolf approach of recent years did not guard

against mounting challenges from Libya to Syria.Meanwhile, Turkey, having benefitted dramaticallyfrom its role in the reconstruction of northern Iraq,basically inversed its Kurdish policy so that today itseeks to coopt Kurds to balance the Iranian, Iraqi,and the Syrian regimes. This approach aligns withU.S. preferences. The rehabilitation of Turkey-U.S.relations also was facilitated by the personal rapporbetween Erdoan and U.S. President BarackObama. The upshot is that the slate is now clear tocooperate on numerous outstanding questions inthe region.

The trick will be to pursue these without condoningAnkaras democratic backsliding, as it is preciselyby putting its own house in order that Turkeymay finally realize its much-touted potential asa beacon of stability, prosperity, and freedom inthe region. To this end, both the United Statesand the EU wield an important carrot, namely,the accommodation of Turkish preferences andinterests as they hammer out a Transatlantic Tradeand Investment Partnership. An incentive of thismagnitude must be made conditional on Turkeys

democratic performance, which is the key to itconsolidating the model in the first place.

The affinities between

the Gezi protests and

other youth social

movements that have

crystallized across

Europe in recent years

may foster a fellowfeeling among a new

eneration of young and

increasingly politicized

U and Turkish citizens.


17/18


If Turkey plays its cards right, the confluenceof domestic, regional, and internationaldevelopments that both raised the countrys

currency between 2002 and 2011 and brought itback down several pegs in the past two years couldbe leveraged to bridge the gap between its limitedshort-term influence and its long-term resonance.To do so, Turkeys leaders must predicate their workon the two principles that drove AKP success inearlier years pragmatism and inclusivity ratherthan the ideological and exclusionary positionsincreasingly displayed toward both domestic and

international interlocutors. These principles canhelp Turkey navigate turbulent economic andpolitical waters, and address specific make-it-or-break issues like Turkeys energy aspirations, theKurdish question, and sectarianism. They can alsoempower approchement with the EU and deepenedcooperation with the United States for a fruitfultriangular relationship. Only by thus achievingdemocratic depth at the nexus of its domestic,regional, and international politics can Turkeyachieve its proverbial potential.

Conclusion

6


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from model to bystander and how to bounce back: turkey, the middle east, and the transatlantic...

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