from myth to matter - a creation story

8/3/2019 From Myth to Matter - A Creation Story

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In endless space countless luminous spheres, round each

of which some dozen smaller illuminated ones revolve, hotat the core and covered over with a hard cold crust; on this

crust a mouldy film has produced living and knowing beings:this is empirical truth, the real, the world. (Schopenhauer)

At first blush it might appear like quite a stretch to compare Plato’s Timaeus with Arthur

Schopenhauer’s philosophical system. This is understandable. Prior to this investigation I never

considered Schopenhauer’s magnum opus The World as Will and Representation a creation-

story. It is quite clear that the Timaeus is indeed a creation-story, but yet, How is it that

Schopenhauer’s philosophy could be viewed from such an angle? Schopenhauer did in fact view

The World as Will and Representation as a complete philosophical system and after numerous

readings I too am convinced that his system is indeed complete, that is not to say it doesn’t need

to be brought up to date with contemporary physics. However, it is the completeness of this

system that persuades me to think that in a certain sense it does in fact fit the criteria of a

creation-story. Nevertheless, The World as Will and Representation is not in any way

whatsoever, a creation-story in the same sense as the Timaeus, on the grounds that Schopenhauer

based all his observations and conclusions on empirical observation, right down to his discovery

of the mysterious and illusive “will” and the means through which he described this subject

matter is undoubtedly philosophical to the core. Yet, it fits the criteria in the sense that in its

completeness it deals with time, space, the origin and development of matter, cosmos, and

mankind, in short many of the aspects of creation found in the Timaeus; however, without the

loose ends and obscurities that commonly surround Plato’s cosmology.

For the sake of this essay, I plan to bring to light several debatable points that arise in the

Timaeus and then proceed to explain how Schopenhauer worked his way around these crucial

problems with his brilliant discovery of “the complex of reality” and the will, as the thing-in-

itself. Time, chōra (trans. space, “room to move”) and matter, are three areas of Plato’s

cosmology subject to the most speculation. Schopenhauer’s account of these three areas proves

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to be a much more concise and likely alternative to Plato’s and, in effect the different path

Schopenhauer takes puts him in a position to steer away from many of the philosophical pitfalls

brought forth by the text.

One possible defense on Plato’s behalf is that the Timaeus is a myth and many of the

sources of confusion are due to the reader’s inability to get passed a literal interpretation of the

text. Therefore, before proceeding to the current investigation it is imperative to determine

whether or not the Timaeus should be treated as a myth. The importance of this question was

inspired by a reading of Gregory Vlastos’ essay “Disorderly Motion in Plato’s Timaeus” and so,

it made its way into the series of questions I am to address concerning this issue.

In addition, it is nearly impossible to form the necessary links between Plato and

Schopenhauer without taking a position on the mythical status of the story. There are grave

consequences that pivot on the mythical status. For instance, it would be fruitless to compare the

Timaeus as a myth with Schopenhauer’s philosophical system. The former would constitute a

metaphorical interpretation and the latter would constitute an exegetic examination. A

metaphorical interpretation allows for too much leeway to be compared and contrasted with a

purely philosophical text such as The World as Will and Representation.

§1 IS THE T IMAEUS A MYTH?

Ultimately, this depends on how one defines myth. The Merriam-Webster dictionary

definition of myth is:

n 1: a usu. legendary narrative that presents parts of the beliefs of a people or explains a practice

or natural phenomenon 2: an imaginary or unverifiable person or thing.

For renowned mythologist Joseph Campbell, the myth takes on a completely different meaning

than the standard dictionary definition, and for that matter even Gregory Vlastos’ definition.

Campbell has a unique kaleidoscopic vision of the myth and defines myths as “reflections of

spiritual depth potentiality, public dreams”.1 From what I gather, Vlastos accepts the definition

1 Bill Moyers, interview with Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth

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of the myth Plato puts forth in the Phaedo: a “story” and “whether the story is a myth or natural

history depends on what kind of story it is”. From these very brief definitions it is completely

obvious that both men would disagree as to the mythical status of the Timaeus. The former

understands the myth as an inherent and timeless spiritual expression and the latter sees the myth

as a “story” intent on explaining a belief or natural phenomenon. More importantly this shows

the protean nature of the myth and its imperviousness to linguistic pigeon holing.

This issue was of profound importance to Gregory Vlastos and the subject of many of his

essays. In “Disorderly Motion in Plato’s Timaeus”, he approaches this question with the

intention of disavowing his contemporaries opinions that the Timaeus is a myth and therefore

immune to certain contradictions and inconsistencies concerning the notion of “disorderly

motion”.2 He attacks this problem on four fronts:

I. “That the Timaeus is a myth”;II. “The testimony of the Academy”;

III. “That motion could not antecede the creation of time”;IV. “That motion could not antecede the creation of soul”.

Sections I & III are the only ones that take on the Timaeus as a whole rather than in relation to

“disorderly motion” and therefore the only two relevant to this essay. First, Vlastos calls into

question the nature of the speaker. He concludes that Timaeus serves as an unlikely mouthpiece

for a myth taking into consideration his reputation as “astronomikōtatos” and the high regard,

which Plato places, on the speaker’s scientific and philosophical insight. Moreover, Vlastos feels

the tone that Timaeus uses to address such a dialogue is dry, clear-cut, and free of the poetic

allusions commonly woven into the myths. Thirdly, he interprets the absence of poetic allusions

as a literary tool in the Timaeus as indicative of the level of “scientific probability” Plato placed

on the dialogue. In short, poetic allusions jeopardize and take away from “scientific probability”.

Vlastos links the notion of “scientific probability” with eikos, which he defines in this context as

“the metaphysical contrast of the eternal forms and their perishing copy [that] determines the

2 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition, ed. Daniel W. Graham (New Jersey: Princeton UniversityPress, 1995) 247.

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epistemological contrast of certainty and probability”.3 Eikos is a very important word and in this

context it is the key that turns all the locks when determining the importance Plato places on

“scientific probability”, viz ., science. If it is true as Plato claims that the physical world, that

which is always becoming is fleeting and always in flux then in this light, science is a matter of

“verisimilitude”. However, as Vlastos notes – “verisimilitude does not imply falsity”. It

expresses the importance of probability. Since, the Timaeus deals with the sculpting of the

visible world it must necessarily imply that since it is visible it is also probable. By dealing with

the probable and not the “fanciful” the creation-story of the Timaeus remains a matter of

“scientific probability” and not “fanciful mythology”.

On the other hand, if the Timaeus assumes a mythical form, it is always possible that this

whether intentional or not is the very result of Plato’s method of dealing with matters that reach

beyond the empirical or cognizable and so, the “story” form or myth is inherent to such

discussions. Perhaps, Plato uses the myth as a vehicle to explain the creation-story, so as to

demonstrate the natural limitations of reason and the shadowlike vision one has of the empirical

world. The linguistic inadequacies and failure of speech to pin down that, which is, might also be

another factor that explains Plato’s choice to use the myth as a literary tool. However, this means

Plato intentionally introduces confusion into the text something, which is non-licet in any

genuine philosophical investigation. It is foolish to charge Plato with this crime.

Vlastos fails to mention the consequences of demythologizing the Timaeus, probably to

avoid the grim reality that the only hope in saving Plato’s cosmology represented in the Timaeus

is to preserve the mythical status of the text; otherwise it lends itself to a demythologized reading

cum grānō salis. If one eliminates the mythical content from the Timaeus it is rendered impotent

and completely useless as a creation-story against the backdrop of contemporary physics, and in

effect it would necessarily collapse in on itself. Unfortunately, the evidence supporting the

3 Ibid., 250.

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mythical content of the Timaeus is not nearly as strong as the evidence denying the mythical

content from the text.

This particular issue has been a source of debate for many years and at times it seems like

an impassable wall. The question remains, Are the Timaeus’ inspirational powers cryptically

enveloped behind this impassable wall? The debate itself is impassable, this is why one has to

come to terms on a decision without any outside sources, or secondary literature, and only then

begin to gather evidence supporting their findings. Now that we have negotiated this obstacle we

could move onto some of the debatable issues introduced in the text and then explain

Schopenhauer’s solutions to the problems.

§2 Chaos and Order – Motion and Time

The notion of time is one of the greatest sources of confusion in the text and indeed it is

one of the most important constituents of the creation-story, or for that matter any creation-story.

Chronologically, the insertion of time into Plato’s creation-story happens fairly early on in the

text (37c6-38b5); it follows a series of postulates dealing with the union and composition of the

world’s soul and the world’s body.

For Plato, time has a beginning and motion is eternal. To the philosophically attuned ear

the concept of time “before time” sounds contradictory but in this case there is indeed a period

“before time”. This was a period marked by disorder, chaos and irregular motion. Time is

second to arrive on the scene after motion, and comes to be once the Maker sets the heavenly

bodies in order. In this case the order set to the heavenly bodies is key to understanding Plato’s

notion of time. Time is only time when it could be measured. This implies that there was a

period when motion could not be measured. As far as measurement is concerned, the planets

play the role of “markers”; in that, time is cyclical in nature and measured via completion

according to a single revolution back to a “marked” planet. The cyclical notion of time is not to

be misinterpreted as a form of “eternal recurrence” that one finds in Nietzsche’s work or

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metempsychosis the migration of the soul and release from the samsara familiar to the Hindu

and Buddhist traditions. On the contrary, the Platonic notion of cyclical time is similar to the

Jungian interpretation of the circle: “The circle is the center, from which you came and

represents that to which you go”. Emerson eloquently describes the circle as “the highest

emblem in the cipher of the world”.4 As we can see, even after demythologizing the text it is

hard to get around the mythical explanation of the cyclical nature of time because of its

practicality as an efficient pedagogical tool. In short the heavens are used as measuring devices.

It becomes obvious that without order, there can be no time that is if one makes measurement a

necessary constituent of time. So, in one sense time is something outside the individual and on

the other hand the individual is part of time. Of course, this completely goes against the Kantian

and Schopenhauerian tradition, as we will soon see.

The distinction between chaotic immeasurable time and orderly measurable time was of

supreme interest to Gregory Vlastos. Vlastos approaches this topic in the same essay mentioned

in the previous section, “Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus”. He claims that at one period

scholars resorted to labeling “disorderly motion” a mythical symbol just to get around some of

the supposed contradictions a literal interpretation introduced into the text. Luckily, Vlastos was

not one to be wearied by contradiction. He tackles this problem head-on and the results he finds

are astonishing and clear up the confusion that surrounds the possibility of time “before time”.

Yet, it is interesting to note that even Vlastos issues a disclaimer at the beginning of the essay:

Shall we assume that Plato’s philosophy is immune from contradiction? This would be wishful

thinking…Plato himself has warned us of rough sailing…his physics must have a fringe of inconsistency… (253)

In part III of the essay he addresses the question which we are currently grappling with “How is

it that motion antecedes the creation of time?” In response to this question he quotes A.E.

Taylor:

4 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen E. Whicher (Boston: HoughtonMifflin Company, 1957) 168.

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No sane man could be meant to be understood literally in maintaining at once that time and the

world began together (38b6), and also that there was a state of things, which he proceeds to

describe, before there was any world.5

However, Vlastos demonstrates that Taylor failed to think his way around this contradiction.

The answer lies in the notion of time according to order and circular movements, and as Vlastos

notes this is a red thread that runs throughout most of Greek thought. He brings Aristotle into his

argument, noting that Aristotle was a sane man, as far as we know, and established both of the

supposed contradictory propositions mentioned in the Taylor quote. According to Aristotelian

physics, there is no other uniform circular movement aside from that of the heavenly spheres. So

therefore, the uniform circular movement of the spheres is the only uniform movement. This

point of view necessarily incorporates measurement and number in time. In a long but powerful

quote Vlastos states:

So long as there is only irregular motion, there would be no time in this strict sense of the word. It

is only when the regular motion of the heavenly bodies comes into being that time begins. This is

in fact the hypothesis of the Timaeus.6

Following this proposition, time must necessarily suggest “periodic motion”, on the grounds that

without “periodic motion” there is no time. Vlastos takes this a step further and claims that time

is the “finished product”7 of the ordering of the cosmos. The image of time as a “finished

product” introduces an array of problems into his description, which in this case deserves an

examination.

It is quite a perplexing task to imagine the simultaneous coming to be of time and the

ordering of the heavens. Vlastos describes time as a “finished product”, and to a certain extent he

is correct, however he fails to place emphasis on the fact that time and the heavens are not

inextricably linked, but rather time is linked with order and the heavens are summoned as the

means to bring order to the cosmos and, in effect time developed in direct proportion to the

5 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition, ed. Daniel W. Graham (New Jersey: Princeton University

Press, 1995) 247.6 Ibid., 2547 Ibid., 273

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progression from disorder to order. Are we to think of order as a radical (έξαίοης) or progressive

change? I would have to say progressive on the grounds that order is introduced as an unfolding

of proportions directed to the good. As the heavens became progressively more ordered, also did

the nature of time. When it reached the “finished product” stage it was then ready for division

into the motions of becoming. Time is always standing in the shadow of order, and it grows and

develops at the same rate as the progression to the final order. This is still unclear. Perhaps it’s a

good time for a metaphor. 8

There is one apparent benefit to this approach to Plato’s notion of time: It bypasses all the

propositions concerning time, “before time”, scholars have for ages deemed either contradictory

8 And so we call in the music of the spheres.

There is a genre of music characterized by free-form improvisation. In the simplest terms, all the rules of

conventional musical composition go out the window – no score, no key signature, and no specific time. This form

of music was introduced by John Cage with the advent of the avant-garde movement, shortly afterwards making its

way into the world of jazz via Miles Davis and John Coltrane, and then to be revived in a new shape in the mid-

sixties with the birth of the legendary band the Grateful Dead. [From this time on I will refer to the Grateful Dead as

GD.] How is this relevant to the Timaeus? Trying to form a mental picture of the role of time as the “finished product” of the ordered cosmos, and yet also begotten coterminous as the heavens is enough material to fill any

mental canvas. Free-form improvisation represents a unique metaphorical relationship to the nature of time, order,and the heavens put forth in the Timaeus. The individual notes represent the heavens. The shift from free-form to

form represents the shift from disorder to order. The shift from free form to form also represents the developing of

time into a “finished product”, in direct proportion to the ordering of the heavens.

The GD incorporated free-form improvisation into traditional songs that were written in a specific key and

time signature. So, in effect, these improvisational interludes would take a song with the usual duration of 5 minutes

and stretch it to often as long as 30 minutes. (There is a version of the song “Dark Star” that reached the 40-minute

mark.) During a personal correspondence with Tom Constanten, former Harvard professor of music and keyboard

player for the GD during the sixties described the song thusly:Dark Star, for example, is quite another situation, where after the opening ritornel and lead in to

the jam, nearly anything could happen. A given night would reveal events unique to that

performance…but that’s not so much a definition as a symptom. Throughout the songs there are distinct shifts from free-form to form. The shift from free-form to form is the image

that I want to zero in on. When the band is in free-form mode, they are not playing according to any set time-signature or set-score – it’s chaotic, and disorderly, yet an interpersonal experience for the musicians and the band as

a whole, just as the sun, moon, and stars had to cooperate to form, time. This is much like the state the cosmos were

in prior to being set to order by the Maker. There was no time, only motion. This shift from free-form to formhappens progressively not radically, just as time came to be with the progressive ordering of the cosmos. During the

shift from free-form to form, time begins to come together and develop in proportion to order; sonically this

translates into, the bass falls into a time signature, guitar slips in on the time signature, the keyboards find there way

in between the guitar and bass, and the drums supply the rhythm or speed of which they all come back together. Can

we say the band is in time only when they bring the song to form. Is time, inherent to the process itself? I think so.

Time was in the process of coming to be throughout the transformation from free-form to form. And with the final

order, or when the song train comes back on the tracks, time is only then in the “finished product” stage - the

heavens are finally in harmony with their dance. This digression was necessary. The idea of time as a “finished product” might not be as precise an explanation as Vlastos believed it to be.

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or a problem for the church. For instance, St. Augustine worked with this problem and felt that

he found a solution by proposing the idea that God simultaneously created matter and time.

After centuries of debate, the question remains that if the world is modeled after an

eternal and timeless form, How is it that change is introduced into the image? Having considered

this question, Vlastos introduces the distinction between “raw genesis” and “created chronos”.

The former refers to the “primordial soup” or archē from which the cosmos were created and the

finished product is represented by “created chronos”. This distinction proves that this notion of

time is not in opposition to the eternal model, rather it is a necessary constituent of the imaging

process. “Periodic motion” represents the “likeness” of the eternal model. The state of

“likeness” represents the completed model or “created chronos”. Vlastos brings to light a factor I

previously glossed over and that is often overlooked in the Timaeus. The Demiurge did not

create motion; he had to contend with it. And since order is better than disorder – the world was

thus transformed from chaos to order. It had to be so, in order to introduce time into the cosmos

via “periodic motion”.

§3 Space and Matter

There is another issue of great importance that because of its puzzling nature often gets

swept under the rug. Puzzling does not do any justice in trying to explain the confusion that

surrounds this part of the creation-story; it is enough to drive any serious student of philosophy

absolutely insane. All the cards are against anything that resembles a concrete understanding of

this problem. It is plagued with translation problems and Plato’s relentless obscurities. In fact, I

am filled with fear and contempt just thinking about the task of unraveling this tangled line of

reasoning. All one can do is square off with the text one-on-one, the reader and the Timaeus.

The confusion begins with section (48e3) and continues to (53b8), and then slips into in

my opinion total lunacy with the explanation of stoicheia and the ultimate geometric constituents

of matter. In (48e3) Timaeus reverts back to the beginning of the creation-story and states that

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the original explanation in the prologue outlining the duality of “that which always is and has no

becoming”, is inadequate and for the sake of clarity a “third” part is necessary. “The new starting

point in my account of the universe needs to be more complex than the earlier one. Then we

distinguished two kinds, but now we must specify a third, one of a different sort.” 9 The

infamous “third” part sets the stage for a festival of philosophical head butting and linguistic

acrobatics.

Plato recounts his bipartite ontology of the world made up of the eternal forms and their

copies, for a “tripartite ontology” that consists of an additional counterpart he describes as the

“wetnurse of all becoming”. For ages, scholars have debated the interpretation of the third part.

Two of the more popular translations describe the “wetnurse of all becoming” as “chōra”

(space, “room to move around”) or “stuff”.

During the course, “chōra” was the preferred translation and the subject of much

classroom and post-lecture discussion. In this context, the “wetnurse of all becoming” was

characterized as that which always is and always becoming, the scene of dynamic reactions, the

reflection of an eidos consumed in a diaphanous haze. One could imagine this particular reading

as probable on the grounds that Plato does in fact describe this mysterious third part as space

(chōra) which provides a “fixed site” for all things that come to be (53a5), “one that receives all

things” (51b), “receptacle of all becoming” (49a7). From Plato’s description all the arrows seem

to point to “chōra” as the most exact translation.

However, why is it that space and becoming are listed separately in Plato’s ontology and

also described as “distinct entities”? It would seem commonsensical to view space and becoming

under the same category if the “receptacle” is to be considered the location of all becoming. This

implies the false conclusion that space is the cause of the “agitating” motion that jostles the

elements of air, earth, water, and fire. This is clearly nonsensical, How is it that space could

9 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2000) 37.

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initiation motion, if all that moves, moves in space? “Now as the wetnurse of becoming turns…”

It seems likely that if one translates the third part as “chōra ” then by necessity it follows that

“chōra” is inextricably linked to motion. The closest we come to any hint of such a notion is in

Plato’s explanation of health as a state of accord between internal and external motions. (88d)

Zeyl brings to light another crucial problem in translating the “wetnurse of all becoming”

as “chōra”, opposed to “stuff”. Simply put, if we are to think of it as “chōra” (trans. space,

“room to move”) then the locations of the different parts must be described by spatial

coordinates, therefore making it impossible by logical necessity for the parts to remain the same

character and travel through space. “Anything moving through the Receptacle from one place to

another could not be identified as the same part of it throughout.”10 This contradicts the “stuff”

translation that interprets the identification of an object in space as possible only against the

backdrop of a “material substratum”. Nevertheless, Zeyl is correct to assert the interplay between

both of these translations and even claims to have found a solution to the problems one

encounters in both translations. Before we proceed to Zeyl’s solution, let us examine the “stuff”

translation.

This alternative translation of “wetnurse of all becoming” as “stuff” closely resembles

one of the earliest forms of materialism commonly characterized by concept of prote hule,

“ prime matter”. There are just as many reasons to believe this interpretation of the text, and yet,

it also brings its own problems into the mix.

The first indication in the text that supports this translation is in section (49b9) when

Plato calls into question the status of the four elements – air, earth, water, fire and whether or not

one could actually say with epistemic certainty that this is fire, earth, etc. The many changes the

elements go through make it difficult, if not impossible to say what something “is”. Rainwater

10 Donald Zeyl, introduction, Timaeus, by Plato (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2000) lxiii

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disappears, snow melts, and fire turns to ash – how can one say with any certainty, what

something really “is” if it is always in flux? At the outset, Plato appears to be drawing a

distinction between form and matter. The forms are always changing and yet in order to

guarantee epistemic certainty one needs a substratum from which all forms and qualities come to

be. From this particular reading, matter or “prime matter”, in the Aristotelian sense represents

the substratum needed to support the forms. Plato’s description in this passage shows the

possibility of such an interpretation:

Now the same accounts holds also for that nature which receives all bodies. We must always refer

to it by the same term, for it does not depart from its own character in anyway. Not only does it

receive all things, it has never in any way

whatever taken on the characteristic similar to any of these things…it is modified, shaped, andreshaped…things that enter it and leave it are imitations of those things… (50b9)

How would one read prime matter into this passage? By referring to it as the “same term” and

that which remains the same “character” implies that matter is indeed a “fixed site” for all

becoming and yet remains “neutral” throughout the many changes. In contemporary

philosophical language, the substance changes and matter is permanent and that which always

stays the same. How is it that matter, “receives all things”? In answering this, Plato was right to

claim that matter is always ready for the impressions and “reshaping” left behind by the eternal

forms. In essence, the forms leave impressions on substance, thus changing its substance, but

leaving prime matter untouched. Form and quality are merely “mediums of expression” that

stand in to create the toiouton of the impression.

Another interesting passage that seems to point to this translation is Plato’s description of

the relationship between mother, father, and offspring and “that which comes to be, that in which

it comes to be, and that which the thing coming to be is modeled and which is the source of its

coming to be”. In this respect, the mother could be read as matter, the father or source the idea,

and the offspring would necessarily be the sensible world of objects, the physical world. The

notion of this third kind as a “wetnurse” seems to mend perfectly with this interpretation of

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matter, Idea, and objects of perception. A “wetnurse” or nanny is usually defined as a woman

who cares for children that are not her own. In essence, matter as a mother cares for children

(forms) that are not her own; after all, she receives all and yet remains neutral to any permanent

impressions. It’s probably not unimportant to keep in mind the tendency to describe nature or the

physical world as “Mother Nature”. What a sad life this mother has caring and nurturing for that

which is not her own. However, this might explain how the “wetnurse” is the unchanging matter

from which substance, form and quality arise, but how is it that “wetnurse” cares for the other

children. This takes us headlong into Schopenhauer’s description of matter as a manifestation of

causality, and finds its place at the end of the discussion.

Even if “matter” seems to mend perfectly into the text, there is no way to deny Plato’s

incorporation of space into his discussion of form and matter; after all, he spends a great deal of

time explaining how the “agitating” motion of the “receiver” spreads the impressions throughout

“space”. The most probable solution to this problem is that Plato introduces “space” into the

discussion of form and matter to show that although both are inextricable linked to the eternal,

unchanging forms, they never make their way into space and since, they are not in space one is

often led to disbelieve their existence.

Zeyl claims to have found a solution to the problem of “chōra” and “stuff”. Ultimately,

he finds that if we view space in terms of Newtonian of Einsteinian “space”, Plato’s description

falls apart and one is never able to conjoin “chōra” and “stuff”. He reinterprets space, as we

noted before as “room to move around in” and with this reinterpretation fails to see why the

“Receptacle” can’t be both “stuff” and the “room to move around in”. He claims that, “thought

of in this way, the Receptacle is a plenum or stuff, not sheer empty space, which also provides

room for certain parts to travel through.”11 Zeyl failed to see the complete picture. This vision of

“stuff” and “room to move around” is very much in accordance with the position most

11 Ibid., lxiii.

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contemporary physicist’s take on creation theory. This is applicable to both the theories of

special relativity and string-theory. Both competing camps assume to a certain extent that space

was created coterminous with matter. The “Friedman Model” is a perfect example of the union

between space and matter. At the time of the Big Bang space was created out of the explosion of

matter at a point of singularity. In addition, the language of space within space is common to

theorists examining what they called “Calabi Yau” shapes, or for that matter the notion of

“wormholes”. This is a topic for another day, but we can clearly see how Zeyl might have been

on the right track but failed to take the claim a bit further by applying it to special relativity and

string-theory. In fact, if he had the intention of aiming in such a direction he could have easily

stated the fine line between matter and space by noting that space as we now know it is no longer

considered empty but rather filled with matter in the form of particles: There are 400 million

photons to every cubic meter of space – this is considered a universal principle.

§4 “THE COMPLEX OF R EALITY”

This brings me to my mentor, the sage of Frankfurt, Arthur Schopenhauer: the most

underrated, overlooked, and misinterpreted philosopher of all time. I have no room in this essay

to express my sincere gratitude for this great man; moreover, it is a kinship beyond explanation.

This is the first attempt ever to join Schopenhauer and Plato in such a way, I could only hope for

the best. Cazart!

Schopenhauer was very much at home in the world of empirical science and proud of the

fact that his system unites both metaphysics and empirical science. “My system therefore, far

from soaring above all reality and all experience, descends to the firm ground of actuality, where

its lessons are continued by the Physical Sciences.”12 Throughout his life he maintained an

interest in the rapidly developing world of science and was even to a certain degree an active

participant: he observed inmates in the asylum nearest his house, performed dissections of the

12 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and On the Will in Nature, trans.Mme. Karl Hillebrand (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891) 216.

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human body, and collaborated with many of the leading scientists of his time.13 It is no surprise

that Schopenhauer’s work influenced Darwin (he is even quoted in The Origin of Species) and

Schrodinger. He is accredited with anticipating Einstein’s theory of general relativity, Dawkins’

Self-Gene theory, and is well deserved of the title “father of modern psychology” through his

influence on Sigmund Freud; even though the self-important doctor was unwilling to admit his

knowledge of the philosopher’s work.

It’s paradoxical to state that Schopenhauer’s creation-story begins with the universe in

any particular state. There is no beginning to Schopenhauer’s creation-story, but because of the

linearity of time, one could trace the causal chain as far back as the empirical sciences will allow,

which to date is about 100th of a second after the Big Bang. In effect, there is no causa prima,

and he felt that both Kant and himself dealt the cosmological proof a “mortal blow”. For

Schopenhauer the causal chain reaches back ad infinitum, and he supplies proof of this by

demonstrating the a priority of space, time, and causality. His explanation is as valid for the

heavens as it is for the emergence of organic life. Yet, where does matter find its place?

Schopenhauer describes matter and causality as one and the same thing. This will become clear

further on in the essay.

In his earliest studies, Schopenhauer introduced a wildly interesting idea: “the complex of

reality”. Time, space, and causality, form a matrix governed by the universal and necessary

formulas creating the empirical world. Schopenhauer states:

The empirical representations, belonging to the ordered and regulated complex of reality appear in

both forms simultaneously; in fact, an intimate union of the two is the condition of reality. To acertain extent, reality grows out of them as a product out of its factors. What produces this union is

the understanding which, by means of its own peculiar function, combines those heterogeneous

forms of sensibility so that from their mutual interpenetration, although only for the understanding

itself, there arises empirical reality as a general and comprehensive representation. This creates a

COMPLEX, held together by the forms of the principle of sufficient reason...14

13 Schopenhauer charged three famous scientists with plagiarizing his work. He waited for one (Dr. J. D. Brandis) of

these particular individuals to die and then went over his house and searched his library. It wasn’t a surprise to

Schopenhauer that he found The World as Will and Representation amongst the books in his library.14 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and On the Will in Nature, trans.Mme. Karl Hillebrand (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891) 32.

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Although, the objective real world exists for us in this complex, the complex, as such, is

not a single representation; it is a matrix within which there emerge the possible representations

of space, time, and causality that constitute our various real world experiences and support a

universal principle to explain the universe. For the sake of this essay, we could use the “complex

of reality” as a tool to peer into the deep past, as if looking through a telescope at the light from a

distant star billions and billions of light years away. All the necessary tools to perform such a

Herculean task are self-contained in the individual’s a priori faculties of knowledge. This is the

extent of Schopenhauer’s link with Kant. His philosophical system is fundamentally idealistic.

Schopenhauer opens his magnum opus thusly: “The world is my representation: this is a

truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being, although man only can bring it in

reflective, abstract consciousness.” If we are to use “the complex of reality” as our telescope,

then before we can peer back into time, we must first ask the question: What is knowledge?

Knowledge is mainly representation. What is representation? Schopenhauer describes

representation as a “complex physiological occurrence within an animal’s brain, creating a

mental picture thereof” 15

Knowledge divides into outer and inner sensibility. Outer sensibility is empirical reality,

the outside world of phenomena, the material and physical realm. Outer sensibility or empirical

reality must operate under the three a priori forms of knowledge: time, space, and causality. The

“complex of reality” must be present in order to create the proper environment for bringing outer

experience to fruition. If time were the only form of the phenomenal world there would be no

coexistence. There is no coexistence in time because time is linear and one-dimensional. Proof

of this is the fact that our thoughts occur one at a time, linearly and as if pushed along in a

straight line, rather than simultaneously with other thoughts. So therefore, cognition is

necessarily linear, in that it is subject to the form of time and only one representation at a time is

15 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume II, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover,1958) 191.

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possible. Yet in space, there is coexistence without succession. Linear modes of thought are

therefore chainlike in structure, in that each representation links back to previous representations.

The empirical world is therefore a slideshow, in which, the pictures change at such a fast rate as

to form a continuum. The world as we come to know as empirical reality becomes possible only

with the union of space; the primary form of the outer sense, and time, the primary form of the

inner sense.

How can the external world maintain objectivity as a subjectively conditioned series of

representations? The external world maintains its objectivity due to the law of causality and the

faculty of understanding. Following Kant, Schopenhauer makes it clear that the individual can

never reach knowledge of the thing-in-itself by using the causal law because the causal law deals

exclusively with changes in the physical world. The causal law is responsible for making

objectivity possible, and without it the empirical world would lose all objectivity. For

Schopenhauer, the empirical world is completely “intellectual”, which is why Schopenhauer

claims that the world of representation as it appears to the conscious mind is product of

perception and not of the senses.

Schopenhauer makes an important distinction between sensation and perception. The

senses supply only the “raw material” and not the finished product. In this sense, the faculty of

understanding orchestrates with assistance from the law of causality the shift from raw sensation

to refined perception. Sensations are to perceptions as the individual notes are to symphonies.

The conductor is the faculty of understanding. This conclusion further proves the ideality of

empirical reality and the many changes it undergoes before it comes to fruition in consciousness.

Schopenhauer repeatedly states that the senses merely supply the data, immediately handed over

to the faculty of understanding, and only then converted into intuitive perception.

The understanding gathers the data passed on from the senses, designates every change as

an effect and links it together with its cause. Schopenhauer says that physiologically the brain

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creates perception, but actually it is the faculty of the understanding employing the a priori

complex (space, time, and causality) that puts together empirical reality. Without the faculty of

understanding and the law of causality, the empirical world would be little more than what

Nietzsche called an “anarchy of atoms”.

Inner sensibility is of a different nature than outer sensibility in that it is only subject to

the form of time. The absence of the form of space does not imply that the inner sense is totally

separated from empirical reality. Concepts the main tool of the inner sense, borrow their content

from the world of representation: empirical reality. This leads us to the question as to how

representations lead of concepts.

The faculty of reason organizes the content supplied by empirical reality, just as the

faculty of understanding shapes the world of phenomena. However, when and how does

knowledge change from perception into abstract knowledge? Or put it differently, how does

knowledge pass over from immediate representations to abstract concepts? Cognition seems too

fluid and seamless to contain so many dead ends and reversals of direction. Even Schopenhauer

recognizes the peculiarity of this shift and on numerous occasions even refers to it as

“mysterious”. In a beautiful passage, he describes the shift thusly:

As from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed reflected light of the moon, so do we pass from

the immediate representation of perception, which stands by itself and is its own warrant, to

reflection, to the abstract, discursive concepts of reason, which have their whole content only fromthat knowledge of perception, and in relation to it.16

By “concept”, Schopenhauer refers to a special class of representations. Concepts do not

just emerge immediately in the conscious mind; rather concepts are merely, “representations of

representations”. Their content derives from representations belonging to the first class of the

principle of sufficient reason: intuitive, perceptive, complete, empirical representations. As

Schopenhauer says; “The abstract representation has its whole nature simply and solely in its

relation to another representation that is its ground of knowledge.” The individual’s mind would

16 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume I, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover,1958) 35.

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undergo sensory overload were it to retain every minute detail of experience. Instead, the faculty

of reason changes the form of knowledge from the empirical to the abstract. Much is lost in the

abstractification process and ultimately for very good reason. Schopenhauer describes the

abstractification process as “getting rid of unnecessary baggage, or even to working with extracts

instead of the plant species themselves, with quinine instead of bark.”17 One would never be able

to link concepts together if one were to retain every detail of every experience. In effect the

faculty of reason screens and locates the major elements of intuitive perceptions. This is why

we remember only the crucial elements of our childhood and not the meaningless events.

Matter has a unique relationship to time, space, and especially causality. Schopenhauer’s

position on matter closely resembles the “stuff” that was discussed in §3 under the title Space

and Matter. Here are some of Schopenhauer’s descriptions of matter 18:

1. There is only one matter, and all different materials are different states of it: as such it is

called substance.

2. The annihilation of matter cannot be conceived, yet the annihilation of all its forms and

qualities can.

3. Matter exists, i.e., acts in all the dimensions of space and throughout the whole length of

time, and this unites and thereby fills the two. In this consists the true nature of Matter. It is

therefore through and through causality.4. Matter has no origin or extinction, but all arising and passing away are in matter.

5. We know the laws of the substance of accidents a priori.

6. Matter is merely conceived a priori.

7. Matter is absolute…

In No. 1 Schopenhauer describes how changes in states of materials refers to changes in

substance and not matter as a whole. This is why in No. 6 he claims matter is conceivable a

priori, and not perceivable a priori, that is because our perception of the external must operate

under the forms of space and time. Time implies change and change implies causality. So

therefore, matter is one with causality since it is the receiver of all change.

17 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Illinois:

Open Court, 1995) 151.18 Arthur Schopenhauer, “Praedicabilia A Priori”, The World as Will and Representation: Volume II, trans. E.F.J.Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 48.

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The principle of sufficient reason proves that everything must have a ground and every

change can be linked back to a cause. This is the causal law. Changes refer exclusively to the

external world and the external world is by necessity a plurality, therefore changes belong not to

matter but to substance, on the grounds that matter is one and only through accident infinitely

divisible into substances. This idea resembles the classical notion of “stuff” discussed in the

previous section.

Time and space, as a priori forms of knowledge can exist without matter; yet, matter is

inextricably linked to time and space. A material object must necessary fall under the form of

space as in extension, etc., and in the form of time as in its acting. Schopenhauer designates

action as inherent to matter, in that it is the manifestation of causality and hence change. From

this point, the reasoning of No. 3 grows clear; time and space are united by causality.

Schopenhauer states:

Thus change, i.e., variation occurring according to the causal law, always concerns a particular

part of space and a particular part of time, simultaneously and in union. Consequently, causality

unites space and time.

However, causality is not applied to matter itself, but rather, matter is action in the abstract and

brought forth by causality. Therefore, matter as part of the a priori complex and because of its

bond to causality is regarded as the “indestructible basis of all that exists”.

Up to this point we considered the empirical world from merely the subjective side as

forms of knowledge and part of the a priori “complex of reality”, yet, we failed to mention the

inner nature of all that appears in consciousness and hence consciousness itself. I discussed the

world as representation produced by the “complex of reality” and yet there is another angle from

which we can reflect upon the matter: the objective side of all phenomenon, the thing-in-itself,

the essence of all nature. Schopenhauer states that the will is the inner nature of all existence,

and the force that pervades over all matter, regardless if it is organic or inorganic, and in all its

vary degrees of objectification. He states:

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That what Kant opposed the thing-in-itself to mere phenomenon – called more decidedly by me

representation – and what he held absolutely unknowable, that this thing in itself, the substratum

of all phenomena and therefore the whole of Nature, is nothing but what we know directly and

intimately and find within ourselves as will;

That accordingly, this will, far from being inseparable from, and even a mere result of, knowledge,differs radically and entirely from knowledge, which is secondary and of latter origin;

That this will, being the one and the only thing-in-itself, the sole truly real, primary, metaphysicalthing in a world in which everything else is only phenomenon – i.e., a mere representation – gives

all things, whatever they may be, the power to exist and act…19

Schopenhauer means by objectification that all matter, from the smallest particle to the largest

galaxy, from a bacterium to a man, is manifestation of one and the same will. That is because

matter, in addition to being for others, must also be being-in-itself, which Schopenhauer

designates as will. If matter were simply being-for-others, then the empirical world would lose

any sense of reality and fade away into phantasmagoria. Following this line of thought, one

easily slips headlong into a solipsistic trap.

Yet the perceived object must be something in itself, and not merely something for others; for otherwise it would be positively only representation, and we should have an absolute idealism that

in the end would become theoretical egoism, in which all reality disappears, and the world

becomes a mere subjective phantasm. 20

In other words, the will (being-in-itself) is the root of all phenomena and the underlying element

of all matter. The will is real and the phenomenal world is ideal; without the real, everything

remains ideal. At bottom, Schopenhauer characterizes the will as mainly “will-to-live”, in as

much as, all matter or phenomena spring naturally towards life and existence. Kant deemed this

task fruitless, how far Schopenhauer stands above Kant in this regards.

The degrees of objectification are manifested at the lowest levels as the universal forces

of nature, which during Schopenhauer’s time was gravity, inertia, etc… Today contemporary

physics traditionally explains these forces as the nuclear force, electromagnetic force, gravity,

and the weak force. Schopenhauer reminds the reader that these universal forces are not to be

confused with the thing-in-itself, and that one must keep in mind they are merely the

manifestation of the thing-in-itself.

19 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and On the Will in Nature, trans.

Mme. Karl Hillebrand (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891) 216.20 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume I, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover,1958) 193.

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In a glissando of metaevolutionary stages, the will takes hold of matter and manipulates it

by way of different combinations of forces, wherein the lowest degrees of objectification

algorithmically gives birth to higher degrees of objectification culminating with its most

noticeable achievement, self-consciousness21. Schopenhauer often states that this was the will’s

ultimately goal. I disagree with Schopenhauer and look at self-consciousness as a stage of

metaevolution. Since the will is the eternal force that makes everything possible; and

consequently, time, space, matter, and causality, the complex from which the will is revealed to

the individual is also without beginning or end. Then ultimately one must view the universe’s

metaevolution as without beginning or end and therefore self-consciousness

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is merely a stage

along the way.

Schopenhauer sets off from the principle that the external world, the subject of creation,

is to be observed more closely from within the nature and framework of consciousness by taking

the Kantian standpoint of fundamental idealism: the empirical world is conditioned by the

subjective of our own consciousness. On the contrary, Plato’s Timaeus describes the creation of

the universe from high above the lofty peaks, and as result, Timaeus has to call upon the gods

before his exposition. Whereas, Schopenhauer uses the individual’s own cognitive power and

inner essence as all the necessary tools a narrator needs to peer as far back and forward as

possible in time. The further science takes us back on the cosmological causal chain the closer

we get to revealing different universal forces of nature, with the firm understanding that this type

of examination can never reveal the thing-in-itself, only its physical manifestation of the will in

all matter.

21 Schopenhauer considered the intellect as a “tool” for the will in its effort to reveal itself to the individual in self-

consciousness.22 For Schopenhauer, self-consciousness is the light from under which the stirrings of the will are revealed to the

individual. It is the light from within, just as nature offers signs of the manifestation of will. Previously, inner

sensibility was described in reference to the forming of concepts and its relationship to the faculty of reason, without

taking note of its twofold nature as reason and self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, or the inward observation of

our will, is different from empirical reality in that it is free from the forms of space and causality and only subject to

the form of time. Proof of this is apparent in that the monologue of our self-conscious reverie is not physicallyextended in space.

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This approach eliminates many problems that came up in the Timaeus and on the other

hand some striking similarities arise between both creation stories. Schopenhauer held Plato in

the highest regard and considered him one of the most important philosophers and a gem in the

world of philosophy.

The subjective standpoint answers many of the questions that came up under the topic of

§3 Motion and Time. Although Schopenhauer and Plato would agree that motion is eternal, they

disagree in the temporal status of time. The subjective standpoint Schopenhauer adopts bypasses

the temporal status of time. For Schopenhauer, “There is only one time, and all different times

are part of it”, “Time has no beginning of end, but all beginning and end are in time”, “Time is

without rest.” Eternal motion and time come together in the “complex of reality” and yet leave

unscathed the notion of time and its relationship to counting. Schopenhauer dedicates chapters

examining the subject of time and counting and his conclusions are many times aligned to the

concept of “periodic time” in the Timaeus. Except of course, Schopenhauer perceived time as a

line, whereas one could read a cyclical form of time into the Timaeus.

By forming an a priori bond between time, space, causality/matter, and will,

Schopenhauer was not only able to join motion and time, but also, space and matter; two areas

which we found very problematic in the Timaeus. Schopenhauer describes, the mother of all

permanence as matter, and the father as “that which is always becoming” and reliant upon

matter . Earlier in the essay, I discussed the necessary bond between matter, time, and space. In

order, for an object to exist it must come under the forms of time and space. Matter not only fills

time and space, but also unites them under the law of causality.

This is indeed a very unique approach to several different creation stories, written in

different eras, and from under a different light; yet, both are equally important. It’s quite a relief

to express my ideas on such topics. Often contemporary philosophers pay little or no attention to

many problems that once puzzled the greatest of scholars. Uncontested, science has grown so

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expansive that scholars rarely rack their minds over good old-fashioned philosophical problems.

Perhaps that is why interest in the question of space and time has fizzled out in the philosophical

world, to such an extent that students of philosophy are usually more likely to find stimulating

advanced discourse on such topics at physics forums rather than in philosophy classrooms. The

advances made in quantum physics overshadow the great philosophical systems that dealt with

the questions of space, time, and causality, notwithstanding that many philosophical issues are

still open to debate. After all, metaphysics takes up where physics ends.

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Space, Time, and the Cosmos:

The Timaeus and The World as Will and Representation.

By: Frank A. Sicoli

12/20/04

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from myth to matter - a creation story

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