6 August 2014 | Vol. 5, № 28.

From the Editor’s Desk

Dear FDI supporters,

Welcome to the Strategic Weekly

Analysis.

We begin our coverage this week in

Indonesia with an analysis of the role that

the Indonesian parliament may play in

both the latest challenge launched by

defeated presidential contender Prabowo

Subianto and in the presidency of Joko

Widodo.

In South Asia, we analyse the operation

launched by Pakistan against the Islamic

Movement of Uzbekistan and the

implications that it may have for

Afghanistan. Staying in that region, we

evaluate the visit to Nepal by Indian Prime

Minister Narendra Modi, as he sets about

boosting ties between the two countries.

Next, we report on the serious food

shortages gripping Somalia. Our article

considers the dire circumstances in that

country as drought and instability collide

once again.

In our next article, we look to Qatar. We

examine the potential implications that

the country’s foreign policy direction and

global energy developments may hold for

the longer term prosperity of the Middle

East’s most wealthy and stable country.

We conclude this week’s edition by

considering the possible ramifications –

intended or otherwise – of new

counterterrorism legislation to be

introduced in the United Arab Emirates.

I trust you will enjoy this edition of the

Strategic Weekly Analysis.

Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International

*****

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Prabowo’s Latest Challenge Signals Difficult Times Ahead for

Indonesian Parliament

The latest challenge by defeated presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto could signal

difficult times ahead for Indonesia’s parliament, especially if opposition members try to

undermine president-elect Joko Widodo.

Background

Having earlier lodged a challenge in the Constitutional Court, defeated presidential hopeful,

Prabowo Subianto, now looks set to contest the result in parliament, too. Members of his

coalition, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Golkar party, are preparing to

launch a special committee, or pansus, in the House of Representatives (DPR), the Jakarta

Globe has reported. The group will stage inquiries into the 9 July election, which Prabowo

claims was plagued by massive fraud and cheating. Although it will not change the overall

election result, the formation of the pansus offers a sobering hint of the difficulties that Joko

Widodo will face when he takes office in October.

Comment

With Indonesia’s Constitutional Court not expected to reach a verdict until 22 August, a full

month after the election results were announced, former presidential candidate Prabowo

Subianto has decided to raise the case in the legislature. His broad-based coalition, which

controls 63 per cent of the DPR, says it will set up a committee to investigate allegations of

electoral fraud. The move is unprecedented, given that such committees are usually set up

to settle unresolved issues. The co-ordinator of the Indonesian Voter Committee (KPI), Jerry

Samampau, explains that, ‘a pansus is formed when something can’t be explained. So far,

everything that has occurred [during the election] can be explained.

Prabowo’s latest strategy is unlikely to work, however. Unlike the Constitutional Court,

which began its hearing into the recent election today, the pansus will have no authority to

rule on electoral issues. Its findings, therefore, cannot alter the election result. As Lucius

Karus, a researcher with the Parliament Watch Forum, said, ‘If lawmakers hold evidence of

cheating, they should hand over that information to the legal team of the camp disputing

the case at the Constitutional Court, to support the trial.’ Prabowo, no doubt, will bring

some evidence of cheating and fraud to the Court’s attention when it begins its hearing on 6

August, but that will not be enough to overturn the result, especially given the margin of

victory, which is believed to be about eight million votes.

Though the challenges will fall flat, the establishment of the pansus offers a harbinger of the

problems that Mr Widodo, known as Jokowi, will soon face as president. His party, the

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), performed poorly in the April legislative

elections, claiming less than 20 per cent of the popular vote. Unwilling to grant significant

concessions to potential partners, the PDI-P was unable to gain the support of any major

political party. Consequently, although it formed an alliance large enough to nominate

Jokowi for the presidency, the PDI-P coalition will control less than 40 per cent of the

parliamentary seats once members are sworn in on 1 October.

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Facing them will be Prabowo’s broad-based coalition, which looks set to control the

remainder of the parliamentary seats. Jokowi’s efforts to pass vital legislature, though, may

not be as futile as they initially appear: some parties will side with the PDI-P, at least on

certain issues. Yet, he will certainly be up against it. Unlike other parliaments around the

world, the DPR, for the most part, does not vote on proposed legislature. Key decisions are

generally made in committees, each of which has its own internal balance of power. That

means securing a majority within a committee before a law can be passed.

Critics lament that such a system gives major parties, including Prabowo’s Gerindra party, an

inordinate amount of power to block key pieces of legislature or to play a spoiler role.

Stephen Sherlock, a consultant on governance and politics and Visiting Fellow in the

Department of Political and Social Change at the Australian National University, explains:

‘the problem is that there are more and more veto players in a consensus-based system

needing to be persuaded or demanding to be paid off’. Not surprisingly, the parliament has a

poor record of getting things done. Last year, it blocked much-needed cuts to fuel subsidies,

undermining outgoing president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Almost every year, the DPR

passes only a fraction of the Bills before it.

With the establishment of the pansus there are fears that things could yet get worse,

especially if Prabowo tries to utilise the parliamentary system to undercut Jokowi. He is not

a member of parliament, but he could still use his political connections and coalition

partners to make parliament as difficult as possible for Jokowi, in the hope creating a public

backlash against him. That is no certainty of course: having exhausted his legal options, the

62-year old may finally concede defeat later this month. But, so far at least, he shows no

signs of letting up.

Andrew Manners Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme amanners@futuredirections.org.au

*****

Pakistan: Operation Zarb-e-Azb May Further Destabilise

Afghanistan

The continued destabilisation of neighbouring Afghanistan is the most likely outcome of

the Zarb-e-Azb military operation launched by Pakistan against the Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan, in retaliation for its attack on Karachi Airport.

Background

Both the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TPP) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

claimed responsibility for the attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi on 8 June

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2014. Another attack on 23 June, targeting a plane approaching the international airport in

Peshawar, was also attributed to the IMU. In its statement, the IMU claimed that the attacks

were a response to the 21 May military air strikes in Pakistani tribal areas, more specifically

the North Waziristan agency.

Comment

Adolat (Justice), the radical Salafi organisation that became the IMU, was formed in the early

1990s in the Fergana Valley region of Uzbekistan. As the organisation grew, it adopted the

aim of establishing Sharia law throughout the secular, post-Soviet country. After being

outlawed, it worked towards the overthrow of the government of the Uzbek leader, Islam

Karimov, and demanded the creation of an Islamic state. The IMU was officially established

later in the decade, when its operations in Uzbekistan came under increased pressure from

state counterinsurgency measures. It also found its support among the Uzbek population

dwindling. By 1998, the movement had shifted its operations to Afghanistan, where it was

able to launch incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The movement fought alongside

the Taliban in 2001, leading to a crisis within the organisation as a large portion of its

membership was killed in the conflict. The remaining members moved into the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, establishing bases mainly in the North

Waziristan agency, near the border with Afghanistan.

Pakistan has, in the past, been accused of supporting militant organisations, through the

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. This occurs when the aims of such groups align with

Pakistani foreign policy goals. There is evidence to suggest that leaders of the IMU have

received funding from the Pakistani spy-agency in the past. Tohir Yoldashev, co-founder of

the IMU, sought assistance from the ISI to fund operations within Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

during the Tajik civil war in 1992.

Even though its leaders may have been supported by the ISI in the past, the IMU has long

been opposed to the Pakistani Government. It developed close links to the TTP, the main

jihadi threat to the Pakistani state, after establishing bases in North Waziristan. These links

have made the IMU a major target of the Pakistani military. Since 2006, IMU militants have

carried out attacks on Pakistani civilian and military targets. In 2008, Yoldashev appeared in

a video with an al-Qaida linked terrorist, Abdul Khaliq Haqqani, vowing to wage jihad against

the Pakistani Government in a struggle to seize control of the country.

Pakistan has embarked upon a large-scale military offensive to clear the tribal areas of

militant organisations. Officially, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched on 15 June, aims to clear

North Waziristan of all terrorist organisations, regardless of whether they are helpful to

Pakistan’s foreign policy goals or not. Domestically, the operation is popular, with a majority

of the population supporting the military response to domestic terrorism. The operation has

been touted as a military success, with 500 militants killed in the course of six weeks of

fighting. No senior TTP leaders have been encountered yet, leading to suggestions that they

may have managed to cross the border into Afghanistan.

After the failure of the negotiations between the TTP and the Pakistani Government, as well

as increasingly bold attacks upon military interests, it is likely that the Pakistani military will

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continue to actively combat hostile terrorist organisations within its borders. Pushing

militant groups into neighbouring Afghanistan may also work in the interests of Pakistan, at

least for the short-term. If Islamabad can push the terrorist threat into Afghanistan, where it

will have to struggle to gain a foothold, it will gain some much-needed respite from the

threat of domestic attacks, albeit at the price of ensuring the future instability of its

neighbour.

Mervyn Piesse Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme mpiesse@futuredirections.org.au

*****

Modi Pledges US$1 Billion To Nepal: A Foretaste Of Renewed

Indo-Nepalese Ties?

Modi’s offer of a soft loan to Kathmandu, made during his visit to Nepal, was an attempt

to improve trust in India’s commitment to Nepal’s development goals. It may also provide

an opportunity for India to secure its place as Nepal’s favoured Asian partner.

Background

Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, announced a US$1 billion line of soft credit to Nepal

during the recent Nepal-India Joint Commission Talks. The loan is to be used to develop

Nepal’s infrastructure, education facilities and hydro-power generation. Modi used the

acronym HIT to refer to Nepal’s Highways, Information Highway and power-transmission

lines. The loan is part of Modi’s efforts to renew the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship

between the two countries. It will assist Nepal in its efforts to leave behind its Least

Developed Country (LDC) status by 2022.

Comment

Modi is the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Nepal in seventeen years, since I.K. Gujral in

1997. The visit aimed to renew and revise ties with Kathmandu, as part of his larger

engagement with countries that border India. Nepalese leaders have previously referred to

the Treaty of Peace and Friendship as a “thorn in their flesh”, due to the perceived

inequalities and unreasonable demands contained within it. The Treaty, which is based on

free movement and trade, facilitates mutual investment and security. Modi impressed the

Nepalese Parliament by comparing traditional Nepal-India relations to the Ganges and by

beginning his speech in Nepalese.

Modi’s speech drew a positive response from Prachanda, the leader of the (Maoist) United

Communist Party of Nepal. He praised Modi’s confidence-building efforts and his interest in

furthering Nepal’s economic development. Prachanda dismissed questions about Modi’s

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right-wing Hindu nationalist reputation, stating that he had created a positive atmosphere in

the parliament. Modi will seek to use his new more positive reputation in Nepal as a

stepping stone to opening discussion on deeper concerns over geo-security, but he has

made it clear that India will not interfere in Nepal’s domestic affairs.

Nepal’s minimum Economic Vulnerability Index, at 27.8, marginally exceeds the United

Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs minimum of 24. This measure is a key

requirement for a country to move beyond the LDC nomenclature. To achieve this goal, total

investment in Nepal will have to increase from US$4.4 billion to US$99 billion between 2013

and 2022; this is significant given that population growth is currently under 1.4% annually.

Economic growth in Nepal has been hampered by a parliamentary deadlock over the

drafting of the Constitution, which Modi affirmed was essential to ensuring participatory

democracy in Nepal.

The Joint Commission concluded with an agreement to revisit the Treaty. The refining of

border regulations will be a potential key development. In its present form, the Treaty does

not regulate the passage of people between the two countries; only what rights are to be

accorded to people moving across the common border. This has resulted in the tacit

delegation of control over trans-border movements to customs personnel, in which has

caused increased difficulty in transporting goods across the border because of differing

understandings of policy.

Modi and Koirala witnessed the signing of three agreements relating to the supply of iodised

salt to curb goitre and other diseases related with iodine deficiency, the amendment of the

Pancheswor Multiple Project agreement, and cooperation between Nepal Television and

Doordarshan, the state-owned television stations of both the countries. The talks also

addressed improving bilateral education access and refining access routes between the two

states. Future meetings for departmental officials have been arranged and Koirala has

accepted an invitation to visit India at a later date.

Modi has followed through on his goal to be Nepal’s primary investment partner. The Joint

Commission Talks and Modi’s meeting with Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala, however, may

not change the course of Nepal’s ties with Beijing, which have developed over eleven

ministerial and royal meetings between Beijing and Kathmandu. Fears of a renewed Maoist

insurgency in India and, perhaps, a lack of confidence in its regional standing, may have

hastened Modi’s visit to Nepal. It is evident now, however, that India will be taking a more

pro-active approach to Nepal in the near future.

Michael Petrut Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

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Food Crisis in Somalia to Reach Emergency Phase

Somalia faces an acute food crisis. Ongoing drought, along with civil war and instability,

are leading to serious food shortages across the country.

Background

According to the Foreign Policy Fragile States Index, Somalia is ranked as the second most

fragile state in the world, behind South Sudan. Conflict in Somalia has been ongoing for the

past four years, as government forces continue to clash with several extremist Islamist

groups. In 2011, the country suffered from a deadly famine and its population remains

vulnerable. Malnutrition and mortality thresholds have been exceeded on the Integrated

Food Security Phase Classification (IPC scale) and the food crisis in Somalia now qualifies as

an emergency.

Comment

More than one million people are internally displaced in Somalia and another million have

sought refuge in neighbouring countries. At least two million Somalis are food insecure.

UNICEF has warned that as many as 50,000 children under the age of five are at risk of death

due to malnutrition. During the 2011 famine, 250,000 people died from hunger and

malnutrition; half of them were children. There are fears that a repeat of the 2011 famine is

likely, as lower than expected rainfall and ongoing violence continue to threaten food

security.

Rainfall in Somalia for the March to June period this year was 50% lower than average.

Harvests are expected to be below average August as a result. Prices for basic foodstuffs

have increased dramatically, creating increased pressure on household food security. The

price of grains went up 60%, while prices for imported foods, including rice, sugar, wheat

flour and vegetable oil, increased between 40 and 50 per cent. The increase in the price of

fuel has reached 300% in some areas.

Ongoing civil war has disrupted markets and economic viability. A trade embargo was

implemented in South and Central Somalia, causing inflation and shortages across the

region. Most of the roads are blocked and insecurity has slowed down food production

across the country, leading to a significant shortage of food.

The FAO has warned that the situation could rapidly deteriorate. The impacts of ongoing

malnutrition and hunger could be deadly, with the risk of disease outbreaks increased.

Outbreaks of cholera have been reported and current conditions increase the risk of a

measles outbreak, which has the potential to kill thousands of children.

Humanitarian aid agencies are facing growing difficulties in accessing some parts of Somalia,

especially in the south. In its May 2014 humanitarian report, the UN Office for the Co-

ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) said it still managed to reach 850,000 people

despite the difficulties. A lack of resources also impedes further action. An appeal was

launched by the UN, but at present only 25% of the target is funded. Another US$700 million

is still needed to address the risks and mitigate a potential crisis.

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Somalia is often considered a failed state. Its food security could worsen rapidly, threatening

the lives of thousands of people, particularly children who are often the most vulnerable in

food crises. Long-term recovery is difficult to envision under current circumstances, but

serious efforts are needed immediately to stabilise the situation. Addressing acute food

insecurity to ensure that the risk of famine does not escalate is critical if further vulnerability

is to be prevented. Increased funding for food aid and humanitarian assistance is vital for the

Somalian people and for the future of their country.

Soazic Heslot Research Assistant Global Food and Water Crisis Research Programme

*****

Qatar: Short-Term Political Decisions and Long-Term

Economic Prosperity

The Qatari economy is currently on solid ground, but its foreign policy, especially in light of

its differences with Saudi and US foreign policy, could have a negative bearing on its

economy.

Background

A recent report in the Gulf Times of 3 August suggests that Qatar’s ratio of external debt to

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will continue to decline as GDP growth begins to outstrip the

country’s external liabilities. This economic growth continues to occur despite the ongoing

moratorium on additional natural gas development projects in its North Field. As outlined in

the Qatar National Vision 2030 document produced by the General Secretariat for

Development Planning in 2008, the country is attempting to use its vast natural resource

wealth to fund the diversification of its economy and ensure its stability in the face of

increasing international competition.

Comment

Qatar’s rise to regional prominence began in 1995 when Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani

came to power. Since then, Sheikh Hamad has successfully turned Qatar into a significant

world energy player. In the 2010s, it has been Qatari foreign policy to position itself at the

forefront of political activity, regionally and beyond.

Despite stable economic growth, Qatar faces serious political challenges on the domestic

front. Sheikh Hamad abdicated in 2013 handing power to his son, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad

al-Thani. Since taking control, Tamim has undertaken a re-organisation of government

agencies to make the running of the government more efficient. In doing that, however, he

risks angering members of the élite who may feel that their interests are being affected. This

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could lead to internal divisions and dissent. Already, several members of the al-Thani family

have been imprisoned and others exiled. While very little information has been released, it

can be assumed that political machinations have played a role in these events. There is every

possibility that external powers, in particular Saudi Arabia, could exploit these internal

divisions to restrict Tamim’s policy options. In the coming years, it will be crucial for Tamim

to get his house in order if he wishes to avoid challenges to his rule and possible instability

within his country.

Developments in the geo-political landscape of the Middle East over the last several years

have placed Qatar in a difficult position. A key component of Qatari foreign policy has been

to offer itself as an alternative to Saudi Arabia as a partner for the West. Its strong security

relationship with the United States, including the hosting of US military assets at the al-

Udeid air base, and its vast natural gas reserves have provided Qatar with the confidence to

project more influence than its geographic size would suggest in the international arena.

These factors have enabled Qatar to carve out a foreign policy that is independent from –

and sometimes at odds with – its larger Gulf neighbours, in particular Saudi Arabia. As a

consequence, Qatar has supported regional Islamist groups. For example, at the start of the

Arab Spring in 2011, Qatar publicly backed the Muslim Brotherhood as it believed that the

Brotherhood would be a prominent force in the Arab world. Qatar was also the largest

financial backer of former Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi, provided millions of dollars

of aid, military training and weapons in the fight against Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, and

supported Islamist factions in Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. These policies have brought it into

direct competition with Saudi Arabia, which has banned the Muslim Brotherhood from

operating there, and Egypt, after the overthrow of the Morsi Government. Qatar’s policies

have also forced it to walk a fine line between continuing its support for these groups and

maintaining its relationship with the US, which, like Saudi Arabia, has proscribed the Muslim

Brotherhood.

Despite its wealth, Qatar does face economic challenges. The recent signing of a US$400

billion gas deal between China and Russia, as well as the shale gas boom in the United

States, brings into question Qatar’s ability to remain immune to increasing competition.

While its economy is diversifying, 60 per cent of its GDP still derived from the sale of natural

gas. While there is little risk in the short term – many of Qatar’s contracts are long-term –

changes to the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market in the medium-term could present

several challenges. The LNG market will become increasingly competitive in the coming

years, posing a potential threat to continued economic growth and its ability to maintain its

current political policies. Qatar may find that it needs to rethink its current pricing strategies

in order to re-sign and guarantee ongoing contracts with crucial markets such as China and

India.

Qatar’s image, domestically and internationally, has been negatively affected by recent

events in Iraq and Syria, and its relationship with some of the militant groups fighting in

those countries. The decision to provide sanctuary to the leader of Hamas, for instance, has

been denounced by Israel and the US. If Qatar wishes to maintain its regional influence and

avoid alienation by the US and Gulf States, Tamim and the Qatari leadership may need to

reassess their foreign policy and move towards mending ties with Saudi Arabia. If not, they

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may find that Qatar risks losing political credibility while its dominance in the natural gas

sector comes under threat from growing competition.

Danielle Yow Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

United Arab Emirates Proposes Tough New Counter-Terrorism

Laws

Proposed new counter-terrorism legislation in the United Arab Emirates widens the

definition of terrorism and terrorists. The lack of significant terrorism and security concerns

within the UAE, however, has raised concerns that the Bill may also be used to counter

genuine domestic discontent.

Background

A draft of the 70-article Bill was circulated to various media outlets on 20 July and sent to

President Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed al-Nahyan for approval. The Bill seeks to toughen the

existing counter-terrorism laws, which were introduced in 2004. It broadens the definition of

a terrorist to include anyone committing any act that is considered illegal and that will result

in terror, whether directly or indirectly. The Bill identifies various actions that it considers to

be terrorist actions, including opposition to the Emirati state or any other state or

international organisation that is working on its behalf. The definition of terrorism as

established by this Bill is thus much broader than that of the 2004 legislation, which

emphasised public safety and security.

Comment

In addition, the proposed new laws will introduce capital punishment as a sentence for

numerous offences, including: joining a terrorist organisation; coercing others to join a

terrorist organisation; manufacturing or acquiring non-traditional weapons for purposes

relating to terrorism; and holding public officials hostage to influence public authorities. The

Bill also explicitly states that criminal offenders whose offences are perceived to have a

terrorist intent, will receive much harsher penalties than those without such intent. The Bill

will also authorise the Cabinet to establish lists of designated terrorist organisations and

individuals.

The fact that there have been no recent direct terrorist or security threats in the UAE raises

questions over the timing of this Bill and suggests that the proposed new legislation may be

aimed more at controlling free speech and the media. A trend towards the restriction of

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these freedoms can be seen in the UAE Government’s clampdown on internet activism in

2012 and the imprisonment of 68 Islamists accused of attempting to seize power in 2013.

This trend has been a consequence the Arab Spring of 2011 and the challenges that it

brought to leaders throughout the Middle East.

Ahmed al-Zaabi, the head of the legislative and legal affairs committee at the Federal

National Council, attempted to clarify the timing of this Bill when he stated: ‘Today, the issue

of terrorism is important and the old 2004 law does not cover all the fields.’ Though there is

a slight shift in focus towards non-traditional terrorist weapons in this new Bill, the 2004

legislation does address their use in terrorist activities numerous times. The existing

legislation does not, however, define opposition towards the state as a terrorist activity,

reinforcing the notion that the new Bill may have motives beyond counter-terrorism.

Other possible motives for the new Bill could relate to the mounting pressures for political

reform, since the start of the Arab Spring. The new Bill forms part of the UAE Government’s

strategy to curb social unrest, through a combination of small reforms and stronger

legislation. It is a strategy that has been used before. During the earlier phases of the Arab

Spring, some members of the public began to challenge the UAE Government peacefully,

through writings and internet posts, but these expressions of discontent were met with a

firm response. In 2012, a young Emirati was arrested for “damaging national security and

social peace” after Tweeting about the Arab Spring. Others were also arrested, including the

owner of a website that discussed the problems faced by stateless persons living in the UAE.

By the end of July 2012, 54 activists were being held as political prisoners. If this new Bill is

enacted, the government will, in the future, be able to enforce harsher penalties against

such social activists by labelling them “terrorists”, under the new, broader definition of

terrorism.

The new Bill is likely to face similar criticism to the counter-terrorism laws introduced in

Saudi Arabia on 2 February, where the repercussions for political activists outweigh the

potential positive impact of curbing terrorist activity. If Sheikh Khalifa approves the

proposed counter-terrorism bill, the freedom of speech of the public and the media will be

put at risk if harsher penalties, supposedly aimed at broadly-defined “terrorists”, are used as

a tool to counter discontent among UAE nationals.

Jarryd de Haan Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

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Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. 80 Birdwood Parade, Dalkeith, WA 6009 Tel: +61 8 9389 9831 Fax: +61 8 9389 8803 E-mail: lluke@futuredirections.org.au Web: www.futuredirections.org.au

What’s Next?

The three-day US-Africa Leaders’ Summit ends in Washington, DC on 6 August.

US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel will visit India to participate in a defence dialogue on 7-9 August.

The twentieth United States-Singapore joint Co-operation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise ends on 8 August. Personnel from Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and East Timor also participated.

Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh will begin a three-day visit to Bhutan on 8 August.

The Burmese capital, Naypyidaw, will host the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum on 9-10 August. Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj will also be in attendance.

The 2014 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) will be held in Sydney on 12 August.