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Meanwhile Lockwood's 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, had runinto more serious trouble anothermile down the road. Davis' 1stBattalion, up in the hills, could seethe enemy; Lockwood's battalion,on the road itself, could not. FoxCompany, with some help fromDog-Easy Company and the Armymini-battalions under Anderson,pushed through at about 1500.Davis' battalion continued to playcompany-sized hopscotch fromhilltop to hilltop on the right of theroad. By dark, lead elements ofRCT-7 were about three milessouth of Hagaru-ri. Enemy resis-tance stiffened and air reconnais-sance spoke of Chinese columnscoming in from the east, butLitzenberg decided to push on.After two more miles of advance,Lockwood's battalion was stoppedin what Drysdale had called HellFire Valley by what seemed to be asolitary Chinese machine gun firingfrom the left. An Army tank solved

that problem. Another half-miledown the road a blown bridgehalted the column. The engineersdid their job, the march resumed,hut then there was another blownbridge. At dawn on Thursdaythings got better. Air came over-head, and 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines, had no more trouble as itmarched the last few miles intoKoto-ri. Through all of thisLockwood, sick with severe bron-chitis, had sat numbly in his jeep.Early that morning his executiveofficer, Major Sawyer, had beenwounded in the leg by a mortar

Col Litzenberg's 7th Marines led off the march south fromHagaru-ri on 6 December. Here one of his units pauses atthe roadblock held by Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 1st

Photo by Sgt Frank c. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A5464

Marines, before exiting the town to watch a drop of napalmby a Marine Corsair against a camp abandoned by Armyengineers, now infested with Chinese.

Coming out of Hagaru-ri, Col Litzenberg used ItCol Lockwood's 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, reinforced with tanks as his advance guard. Here a hearty machine gunsquad rests by the side of the road while a M-26 Pershing medium tank trundlesby. The M-26 mounted apoweifulfiat-trajectory 90mm gun.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A5469

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fragment and was out of action.Major James F. Lawrence, Jr., 32,University of North Carolina 1941,the battalion S-3, had become thede facto commander.

Things were going even lesswell on the left flank and rear of thecolumn. The Army provisional bat-talion, fragile to begin with, hadfought itself out and was replacedby Harris' 3d Battalion, 7thMarines. By 2100 the Chinese hadcome down to within hand-grenade range of the trucks on theroad. Harris deployed his Georgeand Item Companies to push themback. Sometime before dawn,Lieutenant Colonel William Harris,son of Major General Field Harris,disappeared. He was last seenwalking down the road with tworifles slung over his shoulder. Asearch for him found no body andit was presumed he had beentaken prisoner. Major WarrenMorris, the executive officer of the1st Battalion, took over commandof the 3d Battalion and it reached

were identified as being from the76th and 77th Divisions of 26thCCF Army.

For Almond, most of Wednes-day, 6 December, was absorbedwith a visit by General J. LawtonCollins, the Army chief of staff.Collins and Almond dropped in atthe command posts of the Army's7th and 3d Infantry Divisions, but"weather precluded flying to Koto-ri" for a visit with Smith. Collinsleft at nightfall for Tokyo. The visithad gone well and Almond notedcontentedly in his diary: "Gen.Collins seemed completely satis-fied with the operation of X Corpsand apparently was much relievedin finding the situation well inhand."

First Lieutenant Leo R. Ryan, theof the 2d Battalion, 7thalarmed by Lieutenant

Colonel Lockwood's apathy,pressed the battalion surgeon andassistant surgeon, Lieutenants (jg)

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of 1)efense Photo (USMC) A5428

Marching, encumbered with weapons, packs, and winter clothing, on the roadfrom Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri was heavy work even without Chinese interference.This unit of the 7th Marines, taking advantage of a halt, manages a quick nap.Most of thefighting was on the high ground on both sides of the MSR, but occa-sionally the Chinese reached the road.

Koto-ri at about 0700 on Thursdaymorning.

Chinese prisoners taken alongthe road from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri

adjutantMarines,

The role of the rfle companies in the breakout from Hagaru-ri on 6 Decemberwas to take the high ground on both sides of the road. Much fought over "EastHill" dominated the exit from Hagaru-ri. It was never completely taken, but theChinese were pushed back far enough to permit the relatively sqfe passage of thedivision trains of vehicles.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5465

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Soldiers, readily recognizable as such in their short parkas,march in single file on 6 December along the MSR south ofHagaru-ri. RCT-31, badly mauled east of the reservoir and

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5466

reduced in combat effectives to a small provisional battal-ion commanded by LtCol Beny K. Anderson, USA, wasattached to the 7th Ma rifles for the breakout.

Laverne F. Peiffer and Stanley I.Wolf, to examine him. Neitherdoctor was a psychiatrist, but theycame to the conclusion thatLockwood was suffering from aneurosis that made him unfit forcommand. This was communicatedto Colonel Litzenberg who con-firmed Major Lawrence as the act-ing commander.

In mid-morning, Thursday, 7December, to ease the passage ofthe division train, both the 2d and3d Battalions, 7th Marines, wereordered to face about, move northagain, and set up blocking posi-tions on both sides of the roadbetween Koto-ri and Hill 1182. Onthe way the 2d Battalion pickedup 22 Royal Marine survivors whohad been laagerecl up in a Koreanhouse ever since Task Force

Drysdale had passed that way. AVMO-6 pilot had spotted themthree days earlier by the letters "H-E-L-P" stamped in the snow andhad dropped rations and medicalsupplies.

Elsewhere on Thursday, 7December, X Corps and EighthArmy had received orders fromGHQ Tokyo to plan to withdraw, insuccessive positions if necessary,to the Pusan area. Eighth Armywas to hold on to the Inchon-Seoul area as long as possible. XCorps was to withdraw throughHungnam and eventually to pass tothe command of Eighth Army.

Almond visited Smith at Koto-riand assured him that Soule's 3dInfantry Division would providemaximum protection from Chin-hung-ni on into Hamhung. Smith

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LtCol William F. Harris, commandingofficer of the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, and son of MajGen FieldHarris, disappeared on the marchfrom Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri. He was lastseen moving down the road with tworifles slung over his shoulder. Hisexact/ate remains a mystery.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A45353

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National Archives Photo (USA) ii1-SC354254

General J. Lawton Collins, the Armychief of staff le/i, visited X 6orps on 6December and warmly praisedMajGen Almond, righl Jbr his con-duct of the battle. Collins got to thecommand posts of the 3d and 7thInfantry Divisions, but bad weatherkept him from seeing MajGen Smithand the command post of the 1stMarine Division at Koto-ri.

was concerned over the coorclina-tion of artillery fire by the 3dDivision. Almond promised that itwould be under Marine control.He spoke briefly with Puller andLitzenberg and noted that night inhis diary, "Morale is high in theMarine Division."

All elements of RCT-7 hadclosed into Koto-ri by 1700 on theevening of 7 December; butDivision Train No. 1, which theywere to have shepherded, did notget out of Hagaru-ri until 1600 onthe 6th. A little more than a mile outof Hagaru-ri the Chinese camedown on the column. They mighthave thought the train would beeasy pickings; if so, they werewrong. They hit Major Francis"Fox" Parry's 3d Battalion, 11thMarines. The artillerymen, fightingas infantry, held them off. Another

mile down the road and theprocess was repeated. This timethe gunners got to use their how-itzers, firing at pointblank range,and happily, if optimistically,guessed that they had killed orwounded all but about 50 of theestimated 500 to 800 attackers.

As the night wore on there wasmore fighting along the road. Thedivision headquarters had a stiffscuffle sometime after midnight.The members of the division bandwere given the opportunity todemonstrate their skills asmachine gunners. The MilitaryPolice Company was bringing out abag of 160 able-bodied prisoners ofwar. The prisoners got caughtbetween Chinese and Americanfires and most were killed. Nighthecklers from David Wolfe'sVMF(N)-513 helped and at dawnthe omnipresent Corsairs fromFrank Cole's VMF-312 came onstation and resolved the situation.The column moved through thestark debris—there were still bod-ies lying about and many brokenvehicles—of Hell Fire Valley andby 1000 on 7 December DivisionTrain No. 1, after an all-nightmarch, was in Koto-ri.

Eleven miles away in Hagaru,Division Train No. 2, unable tomove onto the road until DivisionTrain No. 1 had cleared, did notget started until well after dark on6 December. At midnight, the headof the train was still barely out ofthe town. Lieutenant ColonelMilne, the train commander, askedfor infantry help. Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, wasdetailed to the job. Taplett movedforward with two companies.Nothing much happened untildawn on 7 December when thecolumn was able to continue onunder air cover.

In Hagaru-ri engineers and ord-nance men were busy blowing upeverything that could be blown up

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and burning the rest. Stevens' 1stBattalion, 5th Marines; Ridge's 3dBattalion, 1st Marines; andDrysdale's 41 Commando stoodpoised to leave but could not getout of town until Thursday morn-ing, 7 December, after some fight-ing in Hagaru-ri itself, because ofthe clogged roads. Roise's 2c1

Battalion, 5th Marines, came offEast Hill and fell in behind them asrear guard at about 1000. TheChinese once again seemed moreinterested in looting what was leftof the town than in further fighting.After some light interference onthe road, all elements of RCT-5were safely tucked into the Koto-riperimeter before midnight on the7th.

A number of units—includingRoise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines;Ridge's 3d Battalion, 1st Marines;and Drake's 31st Tank Company—assert that they provided the rearpoint coming out of Hagaru-ri.Able Company engineers, however,busy with last-minute dernolitions inthe already burning town, probablyhave the best claim. In round fig-ures, 10,000 Marines and soldiers,shepherding 1,000 vehicles, hadmarched 11 miles in 38 hours.Marine losses were 103 dead, 7missing, and 506 wounded.

Marine engineers, arguably thegreatest heroes of the campaign,had widened and improved theairstrip at Koto-ri so that it couldhandle World War II TBMs, nolonger used as torpedo bombers,but now stripped-down utility air-craft that could bring in a few pas-sengers—as many as nine—andlift out a corresponding number ofwounded. The TBMs, plus thelight aircraft and helicopters fromVMO-6, took out about 200 casual-ties on 7 December and 225 moreon the 8th. Most of the TBMs werepiloted, not by squadron pilots,but by otherwise desk-bound avia-tors on the wing and group staffs.

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There would be no rest at Koto-ri. By somebody's count 14,229men had piled into Koto-ri, includ-ing the long-waited Army's 2dBattalion, 31st Infantry, which hadarrived far too late to go forward tojoin its regiment, the shreddedRCT-31, east of the reservoir.Reidy's battalion was to continue aspart of Puller's RCT-1 in the breakout.

Anderson's two-battalion collec-tion of soldiers, quite separatefrom Reidy's battalion, had suf-fered additional casualties—bothbattle and from the cold—comingin from Hagaru-ri. Major Witte,one of the battalion commanders,was among the wounded.Anderson reorganized his shrinkingcommand into two companies: a31st Company under CaptainGeorge A. Rasula, a canny Finnish-American from Minnesota whoknew what cold weather was allabout, and a 32d Company underCaptain Robert J. Kitz, who had

been a company commander inReilly's 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry,in Task Force Faith. Anderson thenstepped aside from immediatecommand, giving the battalion toMajor Robert E. Jones who hadbeen Don Faith's S-i and adjutant.

As a paratrooper in World War II,Jones had jumped with the 101stAirborne Division near Eindhoven,Holland. Now, coming out ofKoto-ri, his improvised battalionremained part of Litzenberg's RCT-7.

Chinese prisoners within the Hagaru-ri perimeter wereherded into a stockade guarded by a detachment of Capt JohnH. GrfJin's Military Police Company. When the Marines

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5457

evacuated the town they left the wounded prisoners of warbehind in a compound, telling them that their comradeswould soon be down from the hills to help them.

The Marines left Hagaru-ri in flames, wanting to leave no shelter for the Chinese.Veterans still argue as to which unit was the last to leave the town. Marines fromCompany A, 1st Engineer Battalion, charged with last minute deinolitions,probably have the best claim to this honor.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5458

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The march south was to beresumed at first light on Friday, 8December. It would be a "skin-the-cat" maneuver with the riflecompanies leap-frogging along thehigh ground on each side of theroad while the heavily laden vehi-cles of the division trains madetheir way toward Funchilin Passand then down the pass toChinhung-ni. At the foot of the

pass the Marines could expect tofind elements of the Army's 3dInfantry Division manning theouter defenses of the Hamhung-I-Iungnam area. But the road wasnot yet open. Smith had beenwarned, as early as 4 December,that the Chinese had blown a crit-ical bridge halfway down the pass.Here water came out from theChangjin Reservoir through a tunnel

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into four giant pipes called "pen-stocks." The bridge had crossedover the penstocks at a pointwhere the road clung to an almostsheer cliff. If the division was to getout its tanks, artillery, and vehiclesthe 24-foot gap would somehowhave to be bridged.

Lieutenant Colonel Partridge,the division engineer, had madean aerial reconnaissance on 6December and determined that thegap could be spanned by four sec-tions of an M-2 steel "Treaciway"bridge. He had no such bridgesections, but fortuitously there wasa detachment of the TreadwayBridge Company from the Army's58th Engineer Battalion at Koto-riwith two Brockway trucks thatcould carry the bridge sections ifthey could be air-delivered. A sec-tion was test-dropped at Yonpo byan Air Force C-119 and gotsmashed up in the process. Notdiscouraged, Partridge pressed foran airdrop of eight sections—togive himself a 100 percent insur-ance factor that at least four sectionswould land in useable condition.The 2,500-pound bridge sectionsbegan their parachute drop at0930 on 7 December. One fell intothe hands of the Chinese. Anotherwas banged up beyond use. Butsix sections landed intact.Plywood center sections forwheeled traffic were also dropped.Next, the Brockway trucks wouldhave to deliver the sections to thebridge site three-and-a-half milesaway, a location likely to bedefended fiercely by the Chinese.

Partridge met with Litzenbergand it was decided that theBrockway trucks would move atthe front of the 7th Marines' regi-mental train after RCT-7 jumped-off at 0800 on 8 December. Thebridge site was dominated by Hill1081 so Lieutenant ColonelSchmuck's 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, at Chinhung-ni was

Photo by David i)ouglas Duncan

As the Marines moved south from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri they had to pass through"Hell Fire Valley," site of Tasl Force Diysdale's heaviest losses. The Chinese hadmade no attempt to salvage the abandoned vehicles, but the Marines did andlearned that some needed nothing more than a push to start them.

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Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5461

One of the vehicles salvaged by the Marines in "Hell Fire Valley" was a bullet-rid-den Army ambulance. Battered, but still in running condition, the Marinesused it to evacuate casualties incurred along the line of march. Once safely inMasan, a large number of Army vehicles were returned to the Army.

ordered to advance overland threemiles to the north to take the bill.All of this required exquisite timing.

First objective for Litzenberg's7th Marines coming out of Koto-riwas the high ground on the right ofthe road for a distance of about amile-and-a-half. Murray's 5thMarines would then pass throughthe 7th Marines and take and holdthe high ground for the next mile.Puller's 1st Marines was to stay inKoto-ri until the division and regi-mental trains had cleared and thenwas to relieve the 5th and 7thMarines on their high ground posi-tions so the trains could pass on toFunchilin Pass. The 5th and 7thMarines, relieved by the 1st, wouldthen move on down the passtoward Hamhung. The 11thMarines artillery would displacefrom batteiy firing position to bat-tery firing position but for much ofthe time would be limbered upand on the road. Heavy reliancefor fire support would be placed on

tank blocking the road.Task Force Dog, under

Brigadier General Mead and con-sisting of the 3d Battalion, 7thInfantry, liberally reinforced withtanks and artillery, had startednorth on 7 December, passedthrough Su-dong, and by lateafternoon had reached Chinhung-ni. Schmuck's 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, after being relieved byTask Force Dog, moved into anassembly area several miles north ofChinhung-ni.

The jump-offs from both Koto-riand Chinhung-ni on the morning of8 December were made in a

swirling snowstorm. Schmuck'sMarines started the six-mile marchup the MSR to the line of departureat 0200. His plan was for CaptainRobert P. Wray's Company C totake Hill 891, the southwesternnose of Hill 1081, and hold it

while his other two rifle compa-nies passed through and contin-ued the attack. Captain Barrow'sCompany A was to attack east ofthe road and on up to the summitof Hill 1081. Captain Noren's

the Corsairs and organic mortars.Tanks would follow at the end ofthe vehicular column so therewould be no chance of a crippled

Koto-ri as it looked on 8 Decembei; the day that the march to the south contin-ued. Virtually all the combat strength of the 1st Marine Division, plus someArmy troops, had concentrated there for the breakout. The next critical terrainfeature would be Funchilin Pass where a blown bridge threatened to halt themarch. Its repair posed aproblemforMcirine engineers.

Photo by Sgt William R Keating, Department of Defense (USMC) A5354

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Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, Department ol Defense Photo (VSMC) A5361

Snow-dusted M-4A3 Sherman tanks of LtCol Harry T pointing performance with Task Force Drysdale. ThereMime's 1st Tank Battalion await the word at Koto-ri to would befurtherproblems with the tanks in Funchilin Pass.move out to the south. The tanks had turned in a disap-

Immediately outside of Koto-ri, two Chinese soldiers willingly Hagaru-ri, from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, and from Koto-ri tosurrender to members of a Marine rfle company early on 9 Chinhung-ni, showed a marked improvement in MarineDecember. Each leg of the withdrawal, from Yudam-ni to tactics to deal with the situation.

Photo by CpI Peter W. McDonald, National Archives Photo (USMC) I 27-N-A5388

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Company B would be on the leftflank, moving along the slopebetween Barrow and the road.

Wray had his objective bydawn. On it Schmuck built up abase of fire with his 81mm mortarsand an attached platoon of 4.2-inch mortars—the effective, butroad-bound "four-deuces." Alsoeffective, but tied to the road,were five Army self-propelled anti-aircraft guns—quad .50-calibersand duel 40mms—attached fromCompany B, 50th AntiaircraftArtillery (Automatic Weapons)Battalion.

Things went like clockwork.Schmuck's main attack jumped offat 1000. Barrow clambered up thehogback ridge that led to the sum-mit of Hill 1081; Noren advanced

Aerial view taken from one of VMO-6's light observationaircraft, flown by lstLt John D. Cotton, shows the powerstation, the pipes or 'enstocks"that carried o[f the water, and

photo by 5Sgt Ed Barnum, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130504

the precarious nature of the road occupying a thin shelf cutinto the preci itous slope.

A mixed group of Marines and soldiers struggle up an ice-covered slope some-where south of Koto-ri. The weather and the terrain were at least as much of anenemy as the Chinese. Marines, disdainful of the Army's performance east of thereservoir, learned in the march-out from Hagaru-ri that soldiers, properly led,were not much different from themselves.

Photo by cpl Peter W. McDonald, National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A5389

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along the wooded western slopeof the hill. Noren met scatteredresistance, was stopped momen-tarily by two enemy machineguns, which he then took out with

a tidy schoolbook solution—engaging the enemy with his ownmachine guns and 60mm mortarswhile a platoon worked around ina right hook. He then ran into a

bunker complex, took it after asavage fight, and found a kettle ofrice cooking in the largest bunker.Schmuck moved his headquartersforward and set up his commandpost in the bunker only to find itlouse-ridden. The day cost Norenthree killed and six wounded.

Barrow had gone up the ridgeagainst no enemy whatsoever,impeded only by the icy ridgeline,so narrow that he had to march ina dangerous single file. Through abreak in the snowstorm, Barrowgot a glimpse of a stronglybunkered Chinese position on aknob between his company andthe crest of the hill. He elected todo a double envelopment, sendinghis 2d Platoon around to the leftand his 1st Platoon around to theright. He went himself with the 3dPlatoon up the center in a frontalattack. It all came together in asmashing assault. Barrow's

Sketch by Sgt Ralph Schofield, USMCR

Going downhill was easier for the most part than going up, but wherever it wasthe march was single file of Marines, or at best a double file. Even stripped downto essentials, the average Marine carried 35 to 40 pounds of weapon ammu-nition, rations, and sleeping bag. Anything more, such as toilet articles, shelterhalf or poncho, was a luxury.

Fresh snow fell during the march from Koto-ri to the top ofFunchilin Pass. When the column on the road halted, as itfrequently did, the Marines tended to bunch up, making

themselves inviting targets for Chinese mortar and machinegunfire. March discipline had to be enforced by tough cor-porals and sergeants more than by orders from the top.Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5358

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Marines counted more than 60Chinese dead. They themselveslost 10 killed, 11 wounded, Thesnow ended and the night wasclear. At midnight a Chinese platoonbravely but foolishly tried to evictBarrow's Marines and lost 18killed. To Barrow's left, all wasquiet in front of Noren's position.

To their north, Litzenberg's 7th

Marines had come out of Koto—ri onschedule on the morning of 8December. Counting the Armyprovisional battalion he had fourbattalions. Two were to clear eachside of the road. One was toadvance along the MSR, to be fol-lowed by the regimental train andthe reserve battalion. Major Morrishad been assigned to take Hill

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1328 on the right of the road withhis 3d Battalion. Going was slow.By mid-morning Litzenberg grewimpatient and urged him to commithis reserve company. Morrissnapped back: "All three compa-nies are up there—50 men fromGeorge Company, 50 men fromHow, 30 men from Item. That's it."Shortly after noon, Litzenbergcommitted his regimental reserve,Lawrence's 2d Battalion, to come tothe assistance of Morris. By night-fall the two battalions had joinedbut not much more was accom-plished.

Left of the road, the provisionalArmy battalion, under Major Jones,had jumped off on time and, withthe help of two Marine tanks, hadmoved along against light resis-tance. In two jumps Jones reachedHill 1457 where his soldiers dug infor the night. Their position wasraked by Chinese automatic fire,and in a brief nasty action 12enemy were killed at a cost of onesoldier killed, four wounded.

Litzenberg's executive officer,Lieutenant Colonel FrederickDowsett, had been shot throughthe ankle the day before. Litz-enberg moved Raymond Davis upto executive officer to replace himand gave the 1st Battalion, still hisstrongest battalion, to MajorSawyer, whose wound had provedsuperficial. Sawyer's initial missionwas to move a mile down the roadand wait for the 3d Battalion tocome up on his right flank. The 1stBattalion now had it own fight.

Sawyer's lead platoon cameunder fire from Hill 1304. BakerCompany continued to moveagainst the high ground just left ofthe road while Able and CharlieCompanies moved more deeply tothe right against the hill. BakerCompany was caught in a cross-fire; the company commander,Lieutenant Kurcaba, was killed,two of his platoon leaders were

defense of a perimeter.

wounded. First Lieutenant WilliamW. "Woody" Taylor took over com-mand of the company and had hisobjective by nightfall. Able andCharlie Companies meanwhile hadtaken Hill 1304 without muchtrouble. Sawyer divided his battal-ion into two perimeters for thenight. Vehicular movement alongthe MSR was halted.

It had been nearly noon on 8December before Murray's 5thMarines, following behind the 7thMarines, moved out of Koto-ri.Stevens' 1st Battalion was in thelead. Stevens sent out his Bakerand Charlie Companies to take Hill1457. Charlie Company joined upunexpectedly with the Army's pro-visional battalion and the soldiersand Marines had the Chinese off thehigh ground by mid-afternoon.Baker and Charlie Companies,combined with the Army troops,formed a perimeter for the night.Able Company had its ownperimeter closer to the MSR.

Murray moved 41 Commando, inreserve, up behind the 1stBattalion.

Meanwhile, the 2d and 3d

Battalions of Puller's 1st Marinesheld Koto-ri itself. For the defend-ers the problem was not the scat-tered small arms fire of theChinese, but the flood of civilianrefugees coming down the roadfrom the north. They could not beadmitted into the perimeterbecause of the probability that theChinese had infiltrated them.

During the bitterly cold night, twobabies were born with the help ofNavy doctors and corpsmen. In alltheir misery these thousands ofcivilians had to wait outside thelines until Koto-ri was vacated.They then followed behind theMarines, as best they could, untilthe presumed safety of Harnhung-Hungnam might be reached.

During the day Smith, alwaysconscious of his dead, attended afuneral at Koto-ri. What had beenan artillery command post,scraped more deeply into thefrozen ground by a bulldozer,became a mass grave. A total of117 bodies, mostly Marines butsome soldiers and Royal Marines,were lowered into the hole. AProtestant and a Catholic chaplainofficiated. The bulldozer coveredthe bodies with a mound of dirt.

Sergeant Robert Gault, head ofthe Graves Registration Section ofthe 7th Marines, remembered thefuneral this way:

We had a chaplain of eachfaith, and the fellows hadmade a big hole and laid thefellows out in rows the best

Photo by Sgt Frank c. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5357

A section of two 81mm mortars set up in the snow to give fire support for a riflecompany in the attack. These high-angle medium mortars, with a shell almostas lethal as a 1 05mm howitzer round, were considered to be the infantry bat-talion commander's own "artillery. "Mortars were particularly effective in the

Task Force Dog included these self-propelled 155mm howitzers shown in firingposition covering Funchilin Pass on 10 December near Chinhung-ni. Marine155mm howitzers at this time were still tractor-drawn and some were lost com-ing out of Yudam-ni. At a greater distance an Army tank can be glimpsed.

Photo by TSgt James W. Helms, Jr., Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A156320

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to Korea, this time as "Represen-tative of Commander Naval Force,Far East, on matters relating to theMarine Corps and for consultationand advice in connection with thecontemplated amphibious opera-tions now being planned."Shepherd may have thought hehad more authority than he reallyhad. In his 1967 oral history hesaid:

we could and put ponchosover them. As soon as eachchaplain had said his little bitfor the fellows, we wouldcover them up and closethem in. Everyone wasgiven—I think under the cir-cumstances—a very fine bur-ial. It wasn't like the one backat Inchon and Hungnam. Itwasn't like the one where wehad crosses for the boyspainted white and all the pre-liminaries: flowers that wecould get for them—we'd goout and pick them. It wasn'tlike that, no. It was onewhere we were just out in afield, but it was one withmore true heart.

There was more snow duringthe night, but Saturday, 9December, dawned bright, clear,and cold. South of Funchilin Pass,Noren moved his Baker Companyto the next high ground to hisfront and Barrow had his AbleCompany test-fire their weaponsbefore beginning the assault ofHill 1081. Barrow then attacked ina column of platoons behind athunderous preparation by closeair, artillery, and mortars. Even so

his lead platoon, under FirstLieutenant William A. McClelland,was hard hit as it moved forward byrushes, stopping about 200 yardsfrom the crest. Under cover of airstrikes by four Corsairs and hisown 60mm mortars, Barrowmoved his 2d and 3d Platoons for-ward and by mid-afternoon hisMarines had the hill. The two-daybattle cost Barrow almost exactlyhalf his company. He had started upthe hill with 223 Marines; he wasnow down to 111 effectives. But530 enemy dead were countedand the Marines held the highground commanding FunchilinPass.

On the MSR that Saturday, mov-ing south from Koto-ri, the 7thMarines resumed its attack. Therest of Hill 1304 was taken.Captain John Morris with hisCompany C and a platoon fromCompany B moved down the roadand secured the bridge site. Therest of Company B, followingbehind, overran an enemy posi-tion garrisoned by 50 Chinese sofrozen by the cold that they sur-rendered without resistance.

The old war horse, GeneralShepherd, arrived from Hawaii theday before on what was his fifth trip

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When reports came backthat the cold weather had setin and they weren't able tomake the Yalu River andthings began falling apart,Admiral Radford sent me toKorea—I think [the orders]came from the Chief of NavalOperations on the recom-mendation of Admiral Joy—that [I] was to take charge ofthe evacuation of the Marinesfrom Hungnam.

More accurately, the Chief ofNaval Operations, Admiral ForrestP. Sherman, had probably beenprompted by back-channel mes-sages to Admiral Radford to sendShepherd to the Far East "for thepurpose of advising and assistingCommander Naval Forces, Far East[Admiral Joy], with particularemphasis on Marine Corps mat-ters."

Shepherd did recognize thatthere could be a conflict of com-mand because of Almond's actualcommand of X Corps. On arrivingin Tokyo on 6 December he metwith General MacArthur and noted"General MacArthur was unquali-fied in his admiration and praisefor the effective contributionwhich Marines had made through-out the whole of the Korea fighting.His general demeanor [however]was not one of optimism."

After more conferences andmeetings in Tokyo, Shepherd left on8 December for Hungnam and on

Photo by Cpl James Lyle, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-Sc354456

A squad-sized Army patro4 led by Sgt Grant J. Miller from the 3d InfantryDivision's Task Force Dog, moves up from Chinhung-ni into Funchilin Pass on9 December. The tank at the side of the road appears to be a Soviet-built T-34knocked out a month earlier by the 7th Marines.

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arrival went immediately to theMount McKinley. Here on the nextday he attended a meeting on out-loading and naval support alsoattended by Admirals Joy, Struble,and Doyle, and General Harris. Apress conference followed.Shepherd praised the operationsof the X Corps and said that he

was there to assist GeneralAlmond. He was anxious to get upto the reservoir to see things forhimself. He made the trip in aTBM, landing at Koto-ri after cir-cling Hagaru-ri. He then met withSmith for an hour or more. Smithtold him that all casualties would beout by the end of the day.

Shepherd announced that heintended to march out with thedivision. Smith dug in his heelsand said absolutely not.

Shepherd returned to theairstrip. A number of war corre-spondents, among them "Maggie"Higgins, Keyes Beach, and thephotographer David DouglasDuncan, had wangled their way toKoto-ri. While Shepherd's planewas warming up, Colonel Pullerarrived leading Higgins by thehand. Puller said: "General Smithsays take this woman out of hishair and see that she goes out onyour plane." Shepherd turned toHiggins, whom he had met atInchon, saying, "Maggie, it's toobad. I wanted to march downtoo." The plane completed itsloading of wounded and taxied tothe end of the strip. It was dusk andas the plane took off Shepherdcould see machine gun tracer bul-lets reaching up at the underside of

Two Chinese, anxious to surrender,get a quick pat-down search forweapons by members of Company C,7th Marines, but there was no fightleft in them. Once given a cigaretteand perhaps a chocolate bar by theircaptors, they would follow alonguncomplainingly into eventual cap-tivity.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5378

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5370

Litzenberg 's 7th Marines led the way out of Koto-ri at dawn on 8 December.Murray's 5th Marines followed the 7th Marines and in turn was followed by twobattalions of Puller's 1st Marines. Infantry units, moving from hilltop to hilltopon both sides of the road covered the movement of the division trains. Some calledthe maneuver "hop-scotch, "others called it "skinning-the-cat."

As the march went on, cold-benumbed Chinese soldiers surrendered in increas-ing numbers. This group, probably the remnants of a platoon or perhaps a com-pany, surrendered to Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, south of Koto-ri on9 December.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5377

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well. Installation was done in

Photo by Cpl Peter W. McDonald, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5379

First step in evacuation of casualties, alive or dead, during the march-out wasto get them down to the road by stretcher. Here four Marines, without helmets orpacks, carry a stretcher down from the high ground somewhere south of Koto-rion 9 December. Fresh snow had fallen the previous night.

the plane. Leaning over toHiggins, the irrepressible Shep-herd said to her, "If we get hit, wewill die in each other's arms."

The column of division vehi-cles, protected on both sides bythe Marine infantry in the hills,crawled along the road south ofKoto-ri at a snail's pace and withfrequent stops. The Marines, whowatched the crawling columnfrom their perches in the hills,wondered profanely why the vehi-cles had to be piled high with tentframes, wooden doors, and otherluxuries of life.

Partridge had held back theArmy's Brockway trucks, withtheir precious cargo of bridge sec-tions, in Koto-ri until first light on9 December when he consideredthe MSR secure enough for him tomove them forward. He thenjoined Sawyer's 1st Battalion at thehead of the column. Everythingworked at the bridge site like apracticed jigsaw puzzle. Army andMarine engineers rebuilt the abut-ments with sandbags and timbers.

three hours and at 1530 Partridgedrove his jeep back to the top of thepass to tell Lieutenant ColonelBanks that he could bring DivisionTrain No. 1 down the defile. Thefirst vehicles began to cross thebridge at about 1800. Sawyer'sMarines kept the enemy at a dis-tance and captured 60 prisoners inthe process. All night long vehiclespassed over the bridge.

At 0245 on Sunday morning, 10December, the head of the columnreached Chinhung-ni. ColonelSnedeker, the division's deputychief of staff, had positioned him-self there to direct the furthermovement of the vehicle serials.The 7th Marines followed DivisionTrain No. 1 down the pass. Up onthe plateau Ridge's 3d Battalion,1st Marines, had come out ofKoto-ri and relieved the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, on Hill1328 where it had a fight with

A Brockway truck laid the steeltreadways and plywood deck pan-els. At noon, Almond flew over-head in his "Blue Goose" to seefor himself that things were going

Frozen corpses are unloaded from a truck at Koto-ri where they will be buriedin a mass grave. A 155mm howitzer can be seen in the background. The dead,117 of them, mostly U.S. Marines but some soldiers and Royal Marines, wereinterred in a hole originally bull-dozed into the ground to serve as an artilleryfire direction center.

l'hoto by Sgt Frank c. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5366

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about 350 resurgent Chinese. At1030, General Smith closed hiscommand post at Koto-ri and flewto his rear command post atHungnam.

Puller brought out the remainderof RCT-1 from Koto-ri on the after-noon of the 10th. Milne's tanks,including the tank company fromthe 31st Infantry, followed behindthe elements of RCT-1 on the road.Ridge's 3d Battalion was alreadydeployed on the high ground onboth sides of the MSR south ofKoto-ri. The plan was for Sutter's 2c1Battalion to relieve Stevens' 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, on Hill1457.

As the last Americans left Koto-ri, the Army's 92d Field Artillery, fir-ing from Chinhung-ni, shelled thetown with its long-range 155mmguns. There was confusion at thetail of the column as Koreanrefugees pressed close. Thetankers fired warning shots tomake them stay back. Panic devel-oped as the rumor spread that theMarines were shooting the re-

fugees. The tanks passed on downthe road, protected on both sides atfirst by Ridge's Marines in the hills.But Sutter, having begun his climbup Hill 1457 and finding it a longway off and with no enemy insight, asked Puller's permission,which he received, to return to theroad.

Ridge pulled his companies offHill 1304 and the high ground onthe opposite side of the MSR atabout 2100. Ridge's battalion wasthe last major unit to descend thepass, following behind Jones' pro-visional battalion of soldiers andthe detachment of the 185thEngineers. Harry Milne's tankswere behind Ridge with noinfantry protection except thelightweight division Reconnais-sance Company mounted in jeeps.It was now about midnight.

By then both division trains, allof RCT-7, and most of the 11thMarines had reached Chinhung-ni.The 5th Marines followed the 7thMarines. Beyond Chinhung-ni,guerrillas were reported to be

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active in the vicinity of Sudong,but the division trains and boththe 5th and 7th Marines passedthrough without interference.Some time after midnight whenthe vehicles of RCT-1 reached thetown sudden swarms of Chinesecame out of the houses of the vil-lage with burp guns and grenades.Truck drivers and casuals, bothArmy and Marine, fought a wild,shapeless action. Lieutenant Colo-nel John U. D. Page, an Armyartillery officer, took charge, waskilled, and received a posthumousMedal of Honor. LieutenantColonel Waldon C. Winston, anArmy motor transport officer, tookhis place. It was dawn before theplace was cleaned up. RCT-1 lostnine trucks and a personnel carri-er; 8 men killed and 21 wounded.

Meanwhile, Milne's tanks, some40 of them, descending the nar-row, icy-slick road of FunchilinPass had run into trouble. About amile short of the Treadway bridgethe brakes of the ninth tank fromthe end of the column froze up.The tanks to its front clanked on,but the immobile ninth tankblocked the eight tanks to the rear.Close behind came the refugees.Left guarding the nine tanks wasFirst Lieutenant Ernest C. Hargett's28-man reconnaissance platoon.Five Chinese soldiers emergedfrom the mass of refugees andone, in English, called uponHargett to surrender. Hargett, cov-ered by a BAR-man, approachedthe five Chinese cautiously. TheEnglish-speaking one steppedaside and the four others pro-duced burp guns and grenades. Agrenade wounded Hargett. HisBAR-man, Corporal George A. J.Amyotte, cut the five Chinesedown, but more Chinese material-ized on the road and the steepslope of the hill. Hargett backedaway with his platoon. The lasttank in the column was lost to the

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A402841

LtGen Shepherd, right, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,arrived on 8 December on his fffth trip to Korea. Although not in the operationalchain-of-command, he had arrived to oversee the evacuation of the Marines. RAdmDoyle, left, and MajGen Harris, centei greet Shepherd. All three look glum.

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5376

The Chinese had blown a critical bridge halfway down Funchilin Pass where waterflowed downward from Changjin Reservoir and passed through four giant pzescalled 'penstocks. "As early as 4 December, MajGen Smith knew that this 24-footgap would have to be bridged if his vehicles were to reach Hungnam.

Marines from Litzenberg's regiment, along with someattached soldiers, on .9 December reached the blown bridgein Funchilin Pass, which, unless replaced, would stop any

Chinese. Meanwhile, the crew ofthe tank that blocked the road hadsucceeded in freeing the frozenbrakes and was ready to proceed.But the crews of the remainingseven tanks had departed, leavingthe hatches of their tanks open. Amember of Hargett's platoon, whohad never driven a tank, managedto bring out one tank. The night'sadventure cost Hargett two menkilled and 12 wounded.

Engineers were waiting at theTreadway bridge, ready to blow itup. They thought the two tanksand Hargett's platoon were the lastto come by. They blew the bridge,but one Marine had been leftbehind. Private First Class Robert D.DeMott from Hargett's platoon hadbeen blown off the road by aChinese explosive charge. Regain-ing consciousness, he got back onthe road and joined the refugees.

further southward movement of wheeled or tracked vehicles.Plans were already afoot to bridge the gap with a Treadwaybridge to be airdropped in sections at Koto-ri.Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense I'hoto (usMc) A5375

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Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5408

By evening on 9 December the Treadway bridge was in tance was limited to small-scale firefights and ambushes. Theplace and men and vehicles could move unimpeded down most sizable resistance would come near Sudong.the MSR through Funchilin Pass, From here on enemy resis-

The wind that blew from Manchuria and beyond, "down over wind, "said noted photographer David Douglas Duncan, "wasthe Yalu and the mountains all around. . . down into the like nothing ever known by the trapped Marines, yet they hadgorges with theirfrozen streams amd naked rocks. . . down to march through it."along the ice-capped road—now shrieking and wild—that Photo by David Douglas Duncan

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Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5372

Marines march along aparticularlyprecipitous portion of Marines from Koto-ri and the simultaneous advance of thethe road winding down through Funchilin Pass on 9 1st Battalion, lstMarines,from Chinhung-ni to take the highDecember. The day before had seen the launching of an ground controlling the pass.exquisitely timed maneuver—the exit of the 5th and 7th

He heard the detonation that blewthe bridge, but figured that hecould make his way on footthrough the gatehouse above thepenstocks. This he did as didmany of the following refugees.

Donald Schmuck, from his posi-tion on Hill 1081, watched thelights of the tanks descending thepass and at 0300 gave orders forBarrow's Company A to begin itswithdrawal. At 1300 on 11

December the last units of thedivision passed through Chin-hung-ni. By 1730 they had gonethrough Majon-dong and by 2100most had reached their Hamhung-Hungnam assembly areas. Theyfound a tent camp waiting forthem. Lieutenant Colonel Erwin F.Wann, Jr.'s 1st Amphibian Tractor

Coming down Funchilin Pass on 10 December, the Marine column was intermixedwith many Korean refugees fleeing the Chinese. Numbers were such as to inter-fere with military traffic. Behind them, Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Koto-ri wereleft as deserted ghost towns.

Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5407

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in early January 1951.

Battalion had done much of thepreparation for their arrival. Chowlines were open for the continu-ous serving of hot meals. Wann, 31and Naval Academy 1940, hadbeen an amphibian tractor officer atBougainville, Guam, and IwoJima. The weather seemed almostbalmy after the unrelieved sub-zero temperatures of the plateau.Mime's tanks continued on to theLST staging area, arriving justbefore midnight. From 8 through 11December, the division had lost 75men dead, 16 missing, and 256wounded, for a total of 347 casu-alties.

As late as Saturday, 9December, General Smith believedthat the 1st Marine Division, onceconcentrated, would be given adefensive sector to the south andsouthwest of 1-Iungnam. A day ear-lier his deputy chief of staff,Colonel Snedeker, who was run-ning his rear headquarters, issuedtentative orders for Puller's RCT-1 to

organize defensively at Chigyong,with Murray's RCT-5 andLitzenberg's RCT-7 preparing todefend Yonpo airfield.

But on that Saturday, Almondreceived his formal orders fromMacArthur to redeploy X Corps toSouth Korea and Smith learnedthat his division would be loadingout immediately on arrival. At thispoint Almond regarded the 1stMarine Division as only marginallycombat effective. He consideredthe 7th Infantry Division, exceptfor its loss of almost a completeregimental combat team, to be inbetter condition. In best condition,in his opinion, was the 3d InfantryDivision, which he visited almostdaily.

Almond therefore decided thatonce the 1st Marine Divisionpassed through the 1-Iamhung-Hungnam perimeter defense itwould be relieved from activecombat and evacuated. Secondpriority for evacuation would be

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given the 7th Infantry Division.Last out would be the 3d InfantryDivision.

The Hungnam-Hamhung defen-sive perimeter, as neatly drawn onthe situation maps in Almond'sheadquarters, consisted of a mainline of resistance (MLR) about 20miles long arcing in a semicirclefrom north of Hungnam around toinclude Yonpo. In front of the MLRwas a lightly held outpost line ofresistance. The northernmost sector,beginning at the coastline, wasgiven to Major General Kim PakIi's ROK I Corps, which, havingarrived uneventfully from Songjin,began moving into line on 8December. The lift-off fromSongjin by LSTs, merchant ships,and the attack transport USS Noble(APA 218) had been completed inthree days. Counterclockwise,next in line on the perimeter,came Barr's 7th Infantry Divisionwith two sound regiments, fol-lowed by Soule's 3d InfantryDivision. The southern anchor ofthe perimeter was held by the 1stKorean Marine Corps Regiment,which had the mission of defend-

LtCol Harry T. Mime, commandingofficer of the 1st Tank Battalion, in apost-war photograph. Tanks werevital to the Marine breakout, but theirrecord was marred by poor perfor-mance with Task Force Drysdale anc1later, in Funchilin Pass.National Archives I'hoto (USMC) 127-N-A552011

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5901

LtColJohn H. Partridge, whose engineers performed miracles, particularly in scrap-ing Out the airstrip at Hagaru-ri and installing the airdropped Treadway bridgein Funchilin Pass, received a second Bronze Starfrom MajGen Smith at Masan