THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 119243.April 17, 1997]BREW MASTER INTERNATIONAL INC.,petitioner, vs.NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), ANTONIO D. ESTRADA and HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division),respondents.D E C I S I O NDAVIDE, JR.,J.:This is a special civil action forcertiorariseeking the reversal of the 7 October 1994 decision[1]of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 00-06-04136-93 (CA No. L-007370-94), which modified the 11 July 1994 decision[2]of the Labor Arbiter by directing the reinstatement of private respondent Antonio D. Estrada, the complainant, without loss of seniority rights and benefits.Private respondent National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), a co-complainant in the labor case, is a labor union of which complainant is a member.The factual and procedural antecedents are summarized in the decision of the Labor Arbiter which we quote verbatim:Complainant was first employed by respondent on 16 September 1991 as route helper with the latest daily wage ofP119.00.From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a period of one (1) month, complainant went on absent without permission (AWOP).On 20 May 1993, respondent thru Mr. Rodolfo Valentin, sent a Memo to complainant, to wit:Please explain in writing within 24 hours of your receipt of this memo why no disciplinary action should be taken against you for the following offense:You were absent since April 19, 1993 up to May 19, 1993.For your strict compliance.In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo [sic] dahil inuwi ko ang mga anak ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa ko ay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak ko.Kaya naman hindi ako naka long distance or telegrama dahil wala akong pera at ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa.Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, on 16 June 1993, respondent thru its Sales Manager, Mr. Henry A. Chongco issued a Notice of Termination which reads:We received your letter of explanation dated May 21, 1993 but we regret to inform you that we do not consider it valid.You are aware of the company Rules and Regulations that absence without permission for six (6) consecutive working days is considered abandonment of work.In view of the foregoing, the company has decided to terminate your employment effective June 17, 1993 for abandonment of work.Hence, this complaint.Complainants contend that individual complainants dismissal was done without just cause; that it was not sufficiently established that individual complainants absence from April 19, 1993 to June 16, 1993 are unjustified; that the penalty of dismissal for such violation is too severe; that in imposing such penalty, respondent should have taken into consideration complainants length of service and as a first offender, a penalty less punitive will suffice such as suspension for a definite period, (Position Paper, complainants).Upon the other hand, respondent contends that individual complainant was dismissed for cause allowed by the company Rules and Regulations and the Labor Code; that the act of complainant in absenting from work for one (1) month without official leave is deleterious to the business of respondent; that it will result to stoppage of production which will not only destructive to respondents interests but also to the interest of its employees in general; that the dismissal of complainant from the service is legal, (Position Paper, respondent).[3]The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing the principle of managerial control, which recognizes the employers prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees.The principle allows the imposition of disciplinary measures which are necessary for the efficiency of both the employer and the employees.In complainant's case, he persisted in not reporting for work until 16 June 1993 notwithstanding his receipt of the memorandum requiring him to explain his absence without approval.The Labor Arbiter, relying onShoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC,[4]thus concluded:Verily, it is crystal clear that individual complainant has indeed abandoned his work.The filing of the complaint on 25 June 1993 or almost two (2) months from the date complainant failed to report for work affirms the findings of this Office and therefore, under the law and jurisprudence which upholds the right of an employer to discharge an employee who incurs frequent, prolonged and unexplained absences as being grossly remiss in his duties to the employer and is therefore, dismissed for cause, (Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC, 176 SCRA 385).An employee is deemed to have abandoned his position or to have resigned from the same, whenever he has been absent therefrom without previous permission of the employer for three consecutive days or more.This justification is the obvious harm to employers interest, resulting from[sic]the non-availability of the workers services, (Supra).(underscoring supplied)[5]and ruled that complainants termination from his employment was legal, the same with just or authorized cause and due process.[6]Complainant appealed to the NLRC, alleging that the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal verily indicated that he never intended to abandon his work, then citedPolicarpio v. Vicente Dy Sun, Jr.,[7]where the NLRC ruled that prolonged absence does not, by itself, necessarily mean abandonment.Accordingly, there must be a concurrence of intention and overt acts from which it can be inferred that the employee is no longer interested in working.Complainant likewise invoked compassion in the application of sanctions, as dismissal from employment brings untold hardship and sorrows on the dependents of the wage earners.In his case, a penalty less punitive than dismissal could have sufficed.In the assailed decision[8]of 7 October 1994, the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's decision and held that complainants dismissal was invalid for the following reasons:Complainant-appellants prolonged absences, although unauthorized, may not amount to gross neglect or abandonment of work to warrant outright termination of employment.Dismissal is too severe a penalty.For one, the mere fact that complainant-appellant is afirst offendermust be considered in his favor.Besides, it is generally impossible for an employee to anticipate when he would be ill or compelled to attend to some family problems or emergency like in the case at bar.Reliance on the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart Inc. vs. National Labor Relations, 176 SCRA 385, is quite misplaced because of the obvious dissimilarities of the attendant circumstances in the said case vis-a-vis those obtaining in the case at bar.Unlike in the aforecited Shoemart Case, herein complainant-appellant was not dismissed for unauthorized absences and eventually reinstated anterior to his second dismissal for the same offense nor was he given a second chance which he could have ignored.Otherwise stated, the difference between the two cases greatly lies [in] the fact that complainant in the Shoemart Case in the language of the Supreme Court was an inveterate absentee who does not deserve reinstatement compared to herein complainant-appellant who is afirstoffender[9]The NLRC then decreed as follows:PREMISES CONSIDERED, and [sic] the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 11 July 1994 is hereby MODIFIED, by directing the reinstatement of complainant-appellant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, but without backwages.The other findings in the appealed decision stand AFFIRMED.[10]Petitioners motion for the reconsideration[11]was denied by the NLRC in its 7 December 1994 resolution.[12]Petitioner thus filed this special civil action contending thatthe NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering complainant's reinstatement, which in effect countenances the reinstatement of an employee who is found guilty of excessive absences without prior approval.It further argued that the NLRC failed to consider the rationale behind petitioners Rules and Regulations; that it was deprived of its prerogative to enforce them; and that complainant's reinstatement would adversely affect its business and send the wrong signals to its employees.In its comment[13]for public respondent NLRC, the Office of the Solicitor General maintained that dismissal from employment was too severe a penalty for a first time offender like complainant.Although he violated petitioners rules and regulations, his absences were justified:he had to bring his children to Samar, his home province, as his wife deserted him.While that by itself might not excuse the failure to seek permission, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted, however, that it would be at [sic] the height of callousness if one, considering his plight under the circumstance[s], would not give due consideration to [complainants] explanation.There has to be an exception.[14]ApplyingItogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC,[15]the Office of the Solicitor General recommended complainants reinstatement, which would be more harmonious to the dictates of social justice and equity.It further emphasized that the reinstatement should not be considered a condonation of complainants irresponsible behavior, rather, it must be viewed as a mitigation of the severity of the penalty of dismissal.Accordingly, it prays that this petition be dismissed.In its reply,[16]petitioner disputed the application of Itogon-Suyoc because: (1) the employee involved therein had been in the service for twenty-three years while complainant herein had served petitioner for only two years; and (2) the offense inItogon-Suyocwas limited to a single act of high grading while complainant herein committed a series ofunexcused absences.We gave due course to the petition and dispensed with complainants comment.The sole issue to be resolved is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter.The answer must be in the negative.A scrutiny of the facts discloses that complainants absence was precipitated by a grave family problem as his wife unexpectedly deserted him and abandoned the family.Considering that he had a full-time job, there was no one to whom he could entrust the children and he was thus compelled to bring them to the province.It would have been extremely difficult for him to have been husband and wife/father and mother at the same time to the children in the metropolis.He was then under emotional, psychological, spiritual and physical stress and strain.The reason for his absence is, under these circumstances, justified.While his failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an omission which must be corrected and chastised, he did not merit the severest penalty of dismissal from the service.Petitioners finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is misplaced. Abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment.Two elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.The second element is the more determinative factor and must be evinced by overt acts.[17]Likewise, the burden of proof is on the employer to show the employees clear and deliberate intent to discontinue his employment without any intention of returning,[18]mere absence is not sufficient.[19]These elements are not present here.First, as held above, complainant's absence was justified under the circumstances.As to the second requisite, we are not convinced that complainant ever intended to sever the employer-employee relationship.Complainant immediately complied with the memo requiring him to explain his absence, and upon knowledge of his termination, immediately sued for illegal dismissal.These plainly refuted any claim that he was no longer interested in returning to work.[20]Without doubt, the intention is lacking.Moreover, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof that complainant was guilty of abandonment.No evidence other than complainants letter explaining his absence was presented.Needless to state, the letter did not indicate, in the least, that complainant was no longer interested in returning to work.On the contrary, complainant sought petitioners understanding.In declaring him guilty of abandonment, petitioner merely relied on its Rules and Regulations which limited its application to a six-day continuous absence, contrary to the purpose of the law.While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable.It must be underscored that no less than our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy,[21]but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights,[22]thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater safeguards.Verily, relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual.They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.[23]We then conclude that complainants "prolonged" absence without approvaldoes not fall within the definition of abandonment and that his dismissal was unjustified.While we do not decide here the validity of petitioner's Rules and Regulations on continuous, unauthorized absences, what is plain is that it was wielded with undue haste resulting in a deprivation of due process, thus not allowing for a determination of just cause or abandonment.In this light, petitioner's dismissal was illegal.This is not to say that his absence should go unpunished, as impliedly noted by the NLRC in declining to award back wages.In the absence of the appropriate offense which defines complainants infraction in the companys Rules and Regulations, equity dictates that a penalty commensurate to the infraction be imposed.WHEREFORE,the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. 06-04136-93 is hereby AFFIRMED.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

271 SCRA 670 Labor Law Labor Standards Abandonment of Work Loss of ConfidenceNorma Mabeza was an employee hired by Hotel Supreme in Baguio City. In 1991, an inspection was made by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at Hotel Supreme and the DOLE inspectors discovered several violations by the hotel management. Immediately, the owner of the hotel, Peter Ng, directed his employees to execute an affidavit which would purport that they have no complaints whatsoever against Hotel Supreme. Mabeza signed the affidavit but she refused to certify it with the prosecutors office. Later, when she reported to work, she was not allowed to take her shift. She then asked for a leave but was not granted yet shes not being allowed to work. In May 1991, she then sued Peter Ng for illegal dismissal. Peter Ng, in his defense, said that Mabeza abandoned her work. In July 1991, Peter Ng also filed a criminal complaint against Mabeza as he alleged that she had stolen a blanket and some other stuff from the hotel. Peter Ng went on to amend his reply in the labor case to make it appear that the reason why he dismissed Mabeza was because of his loss of confidence by reason of the theft allegedly committed by Mabeza. The labor arbiter who handled the case, a certain Felipe Pati, ruled in favor of Peter Ng.ISSUE:Whether or not there is abandonment in the case at bar. Whether or not loss of confidence as ground for dismissal applies in the case at bar.HELD:No. The side of Peter Ng is bereft of merit so is the decision of the Labor Arbiter which was unfortunately affirmed by the NLRC.AbandonmentAbandonment is not present. Mabeza returned several times to inquire about the status of her work or her employment status. She even asked for a leave but was not granted. Her asking for leave is a clear indication that she has no intention to abandon her work with the hotel. Even the employer knows that his purported reason of dismissing her due to abandonment will not fly so he amended his reply to indicate that it is actually loss of confidence that led to Mabezas dismissal.Loss of ConfidenceIt is true that loss of confidence is a valid ground to dismiss an employee. But this is ideally only applied to workers whose positions require a certain level or degree of trust particularly those who are members of the managerial staff. Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other hotel property from the property custodian each day and who has to account for each and every towel or bedsheet utilized by the hotels guests at the end of her shift would not fall under any of these two classes of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence, would normally apply. Further, the suspicious filing by Peter Ng of a criminal case against Mabeza long after she initiated her labor complaint against him hardly warrants serious consideration of loss of confidence as a ground of Mabezas dismissal.

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 118506.April 18, 1997]NORMA MABEZA,petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PETER NG/HOTEL SUPREME,respondents.D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN,J.:This petition seeking the nullification of a resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated April 28, 1994 vividly illustrates why courts should be ever vigilant in the preservation of the constitutionally enshrined rights of the working class.Without the protection accorded by our laws and the tempering of courts, the natural and historical inclination of capital to ride roughshod over the rights of labor would run unabated.The facts of the case at bar, culled from the conflicting versions of petitioner and private respondent, are illustrative.Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that around the first week of May, 1991, she and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were asked by the hotel's management to sign an instrument attesting to the latter's compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provisions of law.[1]The instrument provides:[2]JOINT AFFIDAVITWe, SYLVIA IGANA, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, EVELYN OGOY, MACARIA JUGUETA, ADELAIDA NONOG, NORMA MABEZA, JONATHAN PICART and JOSE DIZON, all of legal ages (sic), Filipinos and residents of Baguio City, under oath, depose and say:1. That we are employees of Mr. Peter L. Ng of his Hotel Supreme situated at No. 416 Magsaysay Ave., Baguio City;2. That the said Hotel is separately operated from the Ivy's Grill and Restaurant;3. That we are all (8) employees in the hotel and assigned in each respective shifts;4.That we have no complaints against the management of the Hotel Supreme as we are paid accordingly and that we are treated well.5. That we are executing this affidavit voluntarily without any force or intimidation and for the purpose of informing the authorities concerned and to dispute the alleged report of the Labor Inspector of the Department of Labor and Employment conducted on the said establishment on February 2, 1991.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this 7th day of May, 1991 at Baguio City, Philippines.(Sgd.)(Sgd.)(Sgd.)SYLVIA IGAMAHERMINIGILDO AQUINOEVELYN OGOY(Sgd)(Sgd.)(Sgd.)MACARIA JUGUETAADELAIDA NONOGNORMA MABEZA(Sgd)(Sgd.)JONATHAN PICARTJOSE DIZONSUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th day of May, 1991, at Baguio City, Philippines.Asst. City ProsecutorPetitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City Prosecutor's Office to swear to the veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management.The affidavit was nevertheless submitted on the same day to the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment in Baguio City.As gleaned from the affidavit, the same was drawn by management for the sole purpose of refuting findings of the Labor Inspector of DOLE (in an inspection of respondent's establishment on February 2, 1991) apparently adverse to the private respondent.[3]After she refused to proceed to the City Prosecutor's Office - on the same day the affidavit was submitted to the Cordillera Regional Office of DOLE - petitioner avers that she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings from the hotel premises.[4]According to her, respondent strongly chided her for refusing to proceed to the City Prosecutor's Office to attest to the affidavit.[5]She thereafter reluctantly filed a leave of absence from her job which was denied by management.When she attempted to return to work on May 10, 1991, the hotel's cashier, Margarita Choy, informed her that she should not report to work and, instead, continue with her unofficial leave of absence.Consequently, on May 13, 1991, three days after her attempt to return to work, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission - CAR Baguio City.In addition to her complaint for illegal dismissal, she alleged underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, night differential and other benefits.The complaint was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-05-0198-91 and assigned to Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati.Responding to the allegations made in support of petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal, private respondent Peter Ng alleged before Labor Arbiter Pati that petitioner "surreptitiously left (her job) without notice to the management"[6]and that she actually abandoned her work.He maintained that there was no basis for the money claims for underpayment and other benefits as these were paid in the form of facilities to petitioner and the hotel's other employees.[7]Pointing to the Affidavit of May 7, 1991, the private respondent asserted that his employees actually have no problems with management. In a supplemental answer submitted eleven (11) months after the original complaint for illegal dismissal was filed, private respondent raised a new ground, loss of confidence, which was supported by a criminal complaint for Qualified Theft he filed before the prosecutor's office of the City of Baguio against petitioner on July 4, 1991.[8]On May 14, 1993, Labor Arbiter Pati rendered a decision dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground of loss of confidence.His disquisitions in support of his conclusion read as follows:It appears from the evidence of respondent that complainant carted away or stole one (1) blanket, 1 piece bedsheet, 1 piece thermos, 2 pieces towel (Exhibits '9', '9-A,' '9-B,' '9-C' and '10' pages 12-14 TSN, December 1, 1992).In fact, this was the reason why respondent Peter Ng lodged a criminal complaint against complainant for qualified theft and perjury.The fiscal's office finding aprima facieevidence that complainant committed the crime of qualified theft issued a resolution for its filing in court but dismissing the charge of perjury (Exhibit '4' for respondent and Exhibit 'B-7' for complainant).As a consequence, complainant was charged in court for the said crime (Exhibit '5' for respondent and Exhibit 'B-6' for the complainant).With these pieces of evidence, complainant committed serious misconduct against her employer which is one of the just and valid grounds for an employer to terminate an employee (Article 282 of the Labor Code as amended).[9]On April 28, 1994, respondent NLRC promulgated its assailed Resolution[10]affirming the Labor Arbiter's decision. The resolution substantially incorporated the findings of the Labor Arbiter.[11]Unsatisfied, petitioner instituted the instant special civil action forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the following grounds:[12]1.WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED A PATENT AND PALPABLE ERROR AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ITS FAILURE TO CONSIDER THAT THE ALLEGED LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IS A FALSE CAUSE AND AN AFTERTHOUGHT ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENT-EMPLOYER TO JUSTIFY, ALBEIT ILLEGALLY, THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINANT FROM HER EMPLOYMENT;2.WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED A PATENT AND PALPABLE ERROR AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE RULING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THERE WAS NO UNDERPAYMENT OF WAGES AND BENEFITS ON THE BASIS OF EXHIBIT "8" (AN UNDATED SUMMARY OF COMPUTATION PREPARED BY ALLEGEDLY BY RESPONDENT'S EXTERNAL ACCOUNTANT) WHICH IS TOTALLY INADMISSIBLE AS AN EVIDENCE TO PROVE PAYMENT OF WAGES AND BENEFITS;3.WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED A PATENT AND PALPABLE ERROR AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITER AS CONSTITUTING UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT.The Solicitor General, in a Manifestation in lieu of Comment dated August 8, 1995 rejects private respondent's principal claims and defenses and urges this Court to set aside the public respondent's assailed resolution.[13]We agree.It is settled that in termination cases the employer bears the burden of proof to show that the dismissal is for just cause, the failure of which would mean that the dismissal is not justified and the employee is entitled to reinstatement.[14]In the case at bar, the private respondent initially claimed that petitioner abandoned her job when she failed to return to work on May 8, 1991.Additionally, in order to strengthen his contention that there existed sufficient cause for the termination of petitioner, he belatedly included a complaint for loss of confidence, supporting this with charges that petitioner had stolen a blanket, a bedsheet and two towels from the hotel.[15]Appended to his last complaint was a suit for qualified theft filed with the Baguio City prosecutor's office.From the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the circumstances upon which private respondent anchored his claim that petitioner "abandoned" her job were not enough to constitute just cause to sanction the termination of her services under Article 283 of the Labor Code.For abandonment to arise, there must be concurrence of two things: 1) lack of intention to work;[16]and 2) the presence of overt acts signifying the employee's intention not to work.[17]In the instant case, respondent does not dispute the fact that petitioner tried to file a leave of absence when she learned that the hotel management was displeased with her refusal to attest to the affidavit.The fact that she made this attempt clearly indicates not an intention to abandon but an intention to return to work after the period of her leave of absence, had it been granted, shall have expired.Furthermore, while absence from work for a prolonged period may suggest abandonment in certain instances, mere absence of one or two days would not be enough to sustain such a claim.The overt act (absence) ought to unerringly point to the fact that the employee has no intention to return to work,[18]which is patently not the case here.In fact, several days after she had been advised to take an informal leave, petitioner tried to resume working with the hotel, to no avail.It was only after she had been repeatedly rebuffed that she filed a case for illegal dismissal.These acts militate against the private respondent's claim that petitioner abandoned her job.As the Solicitor General in his manifestation observed:Petitioner's absence on that day should not be construed as abandonment of her job.She did not report because the cashier told her not to report anymore, and that private respondent Ng did not want to see her in the hotel premises.But two days later or on the 10th of May, after realizing that she had to clarify her employment status, she again reported for work.However, she was prevented from working by private respondents.[19]We now come to the second cause raised by private respondent to support his contention that petitioner was validly dismissed from her job.Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal was never intended to provide employers with a blank check for terminating their employees.Such a vague, all-encompassing pretext as loss of confidence, if unqualifiedly given the seal of approval by this Court, could readily reduce to barren form the words of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.Having this in mind, loss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property.To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other hotel property from the property custodian each day and who has to account for each and every towel or bedsheet utilized by the hotel's guests at the end of her shift would not fall under any of these two classes of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence, would normally apply.Illustrating this distinction, this Court, inMarina Port Services, Inc. vs. NLRC,[20]has stated that:To be sure, every employee must enjoy some degree of trust and confidence from the employer as that is one reason why he was employed in the first place. One certainly does not employ a person he distrusts.Indeed, even the lowly janitor must enjoy that trust and confidence in some measure if only because he is the one who opens the office in the morning and closes it at night and in this sense is entrusted with the care or protection of the employer's property.The keys he holds are the symbol of that trust and confidence.By the same token, the security guard must also be considered as enjoying the trust and confidence of his employer, whose property he is safeguarding.Like the janitor, he has access to this property.He too, is charged with its care and protection.Notably, however, and like the janitor again, he is entrusted only with thephysicaltask of protecting that property.The employer's trust and confidence in him is limited to that ministerial function.He is not entrusted, in the Labor Arbiter's words, 'with the duties of safekeeping and safeguarding company policies, management instructions, and company secrets such as operation devices.'He is not privy to these confidential matters, which are shared only in the higher echelons of management.It is the persons on such levels who, because they discharge these sensitive duties, may be considered holding positions of trust and confidence.The security guard does not belong in such category.[21]More importantly, we have repeatedly held that loss of confidence should not be simulated in order to justify what would otherwise be, under the provisions of law, an illegal dismissal."It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper and unjustified.It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith."[22]In the case at bar, the suspicious delay in private respondent's filing of qualified theft charges against petitioner long after the latter exposed the hotel's scheme (to avoid its obligations as employer under the Labor Code) by her act of filing illegal dismissal charges against the private respondent would hardly warrant serious consideration of loss of confidence as a valid ground for dismissal.Notably, the Solicitor General has himself taken a position opposite the public respondent and has observed that:If petitioner had really committed theactscharged against her by private respondents (stealing supplies of respondent hotel), private respondents should have confronted her before dismissing her on that ground.Private respondents did not do so.In fact, private respondent Ng did not raise the matter when petitioner went to see him on May 9, 1991, and handed him her application for leave.It took private respondents 52 days or up to July 4, 1991 before finally deciding to file a criminal complaint against petitioner, in an obvious attempt to build a case against her.The manipulations of private respondents should not be countenanced.[23]Clearly, the efforts to justify petitioner's dismissal - on top of the private respondent's scheme of inducing his employees to sign an affidavit absolving him from possible violations of the Labor Code - taints with evident bad faith and deliberate malice petitioner's summary termination from employment.Having said this, we turn to the important question of whether or not the dismissal by the private respondent of petitioner constitutes an unfair labor practice.The answer in this case must inevitably be in the affirmative.The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employee's right to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment.Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme constitutes unfair labor practice.The first act clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers to seek better terms and conditions of employment through concerted action.We agree with the Solicitor General's observation in his manifestation that "[t]his actuation... is analogous to the situation envisaged in paragraph (f) of Article 248 of the Labor Code"[24]which distinctly makes it an unfair labor practice "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony"[25]under the Labor Code.For in not giving positive testimony in favor of her employer, petitioner had reserved not only her right to dispute the claim and proffer evidence in support thereof but also to work for better terms and conditions of employment.For refusing to cooperate with the private respondent's scheme, petitioner was obviously held up as an example to all of the hotel's employees, that they could only cause trouble to management at great personal inconvenience.Implicit in the act of petitioner's termination and the subsequent filing of charges against her was the warning that they would not only be deprived of their means of livelihood, but also possibly, their personal liberty.This Court does not normally overturn findings and conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies when the same are ably supported by the evidence on record.However, where such conclusions are based on a misperception of facts or where they patently fly in the face of reason and logic, we will not hesitate to set aside those conclusions.Going into the issue of petitioner's money claims, we find one more salient reason in this case to set things right: the labor arbiter's evaluation of the money claims in this case incredibly ignores existing law and jurisprudence on the matter.Its blatant one-sidedness simply raises the suspicion that something more than the facts, the law and jurisprudence may have influenced the decision at the level of the Arbiter.Labor Arbiter Pati accepted hook, line and sinker the private respondent's bare claim that the reason the monetary benefits received by petitioner between 1981 to 1987 were less than minimum wage was because petitioner did not factor in the meals, lodging, electric consumption and water she received during the period in her computations.[26]Granting that meals and lodging were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without the employer complying first with certain legal requirements.Without satisfying these requirements, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages.First, proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade.Second, the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee.Finally, facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value.[27]These requirements were not met in the instant case. Private respondent "failed to present any company policy or guideline to show that the meal and lodging . . . (are) part of the salary;"[28]he failed to provide proof of the employee's written authorization; and, he failed to show how he arrived at the valuations.[29]Curiously, in the case at bench, the only valuations relied upon by the labor arbiter in his decision were figures furnished by the private respondent's own accountant, without corroborative evidence.On the pretext that records prior to the July 16, 1990 earthquake were lost or destroyed, respondent failed to produce payroll records, receipts and other relevant documents, where he could have, as has been pointed out in the Solicitor General's manifestation, "secured certified copies thereof from the nearest regional office of the Department of Labor, the SSS or the BIR."[30]More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water consumed by the petitioner were not facilities but supplements.A benefit or privilege granted to an employee for the convenience of the employer is not a facility.The criterion in making a distinction between the two not so much lies in the kind (food, lodging) but the purpose.[31]Considering, therefore, that hotel workers are required to work different shifts and are expected to be available at various odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such as the private respondent's hotel.It is therefore evident that petitioner is entitled to the payment of the deficiency in her wages equivalent to thefullwage applicable from May 13, 1988 up to the date of her illegal dismissal.Additionally, petitioner is entitled to payment of service incentive leave pay, emergency cost of living allowance, night differential pay, and 13th month pay for the periods alleged by the petitioner as the private respondent has never been able to adduce proof that petitioner was paid the aforestated benefits.However, the claims covering the period of October 1987 up to the time of filing the case on May 13, 1988 are barred by prescription as P.D. 442 (as amended) and its implementing rules limit all money claims arising out of employer-employee relationship to three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrues.[32]We depart from the settled rule that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work normally should be reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.Owing to the strained relations between petitioner and private respondent, allowing the former to return to her job would only subject her to possible harassment and future embarrassment.In the instant case, separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of continuous service with the private respondent would be proper, starting with her job at the Belfront Hotel.In addition to separation pay, backwages are in order.Pursuant to R.A. 6715 and our decision in Osmalik Bustamante,et al.vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[33]petitioner is entitled to full backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the date of promulgation of this decision without qualification or deduction.Finally, in dismissal cases, the law requires that the employer must furnish the employee sought to be terminated from employment with two written notices before the same may be legally effected.The first is a written notice containing a statement of the cause(s) for dismissal; the second is a notice informing the employee of the employer's decision to terminate him stating the basis of the dismissal.During the process leading to the second notice, the employer must give the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires.Given the seriousness of the second cause (qualified theft) of the petitioner's dismissal, it is noteworthy that the private respondent never even bothered to inform petitioner of the charges against her.Neither was petitioner given the opportunity to explain the loss of the articles.It was only almost two months after petitioner had filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, as an afterthought, that the loss was reported to the police and added as a supplemental answer to petitioner's complaint.Clearly, the dismissal of petitioner without the benefit of notice and hearing prior to her termination violated her constitutional right to due process.Under the circumstances, an award of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) on top of payment of the deficiency in wages and benefits for the period aforestated would be proper.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the RESOLUTION of the National Labor Relations Commission dated April 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs.For clarity, the economic benefits due the petitioner are hereby summarized as follows:1)Deficiency wages and the applicable ECOLA from May 13, 1988 up to the date of petitioner's illegal dismissal;2)Service incentive leave pay; night differential pay and 13th month pay for the same period;3)Separation pay equal to one month's salary for every year of petitioner's continuous service with the private respondent starting with her job at the Belfront Hotel;4)Full backwages,without qualification or deduction, from the date of petitioner's illegal dismissal up to the date of promulgation of this decision pursuant to our ruling in Bustamantevs.NLRC.[34]5)P1.000.00.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE),petitioner, vs.HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.,respondents.D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN,J.:Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.[1]To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School toemploy its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:a.....What is one's domicile?b.....Where is one's home economy?c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?[2]Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path-all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality afterhis term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after a long period in a foreign land.The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.[3]When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"[4]of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.[5]The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires:The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.[6]The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the present case. The international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of employment which include the employment contract.A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.Appendix C of said CBA further provides:The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.[7]We cannot agree.That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution[8]in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."International law, which springs from general principles of law,[9]likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity,[10]i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.[11]The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[12]the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,[13]the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,[14]the Convention against Discrimination in Education,[15]the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation[16]- all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.The Constitution[17]specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.The Constitution[18]also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code[19]provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.[20]Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes[21]the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:a.....Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:i.....Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;x x x.The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.[22]This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.[23]The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay."Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompensefor services performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervalsfor the rendering of services." InSongco v. National Labor Relations Commission,[24]we said that:"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensationfor services rendered.(Emphasis supplied.)While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"[25]"to afford labor full protection."[26]The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.[27]These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.[28]Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.Abargaining unitis"a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."[29]The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.[30]The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.[31]It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISIONG & M PHILIPPINES, INC.,G.R. No. 162308Petitioner,Present:PANGANIBAN,C.J.,Chairperson,-versus-YNARES-SANTIAGO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR., andCHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.ROMIL V. CUAMBOT,*Promulgated:Respondent.November 22, 2006x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64744, as well as the Resolution[2]datedFebruary 20, 2004denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.The antecedent facts are as follows:OnNovember 7, 1994, respondentRomilV.Cuambotapplied for deployment toSaudi Arabiaas a car body builder with petitioner G & MPhilippines, Inc., a duly licensed placement and recruitment agency. Respondents application was duly processed and he later signed a two-year employment contract to work at the AlWahaWorkshop inUnaizahCity,Gassim,KingdomofSaudi Arabia. He left the country onJanuary 5, 1995. However, respondent did not finish his contract and returned to thePhilippinesbarely six months later, onJuly 24, 1995. On July 26, 1995, he filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for unpaid wages, withheld salaries, refund of plane ticket and repatriation bond, later amended to include illegal dismissal, claim for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, actual, exemplary and moral damages, and attorneys fees. The complaint was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-05252-95.Respondent narrated that he began working forMohdAlMotairi,[3]the President and General Manager of the AlWahaWorkshop, onJanuary 8, 1995. Along with his Filipino co-workers, he was subjected to inhuman and unbearable working conditions, to wit:1.[He] was required to work from 7:00 oclock in the morning to 10:00 oclock in the evening everyday, except Friday, or six (6) hours overtime work daily from the usual eight (8) working hours per day.2.[He] was never paid xxxhis monthly basic salary of 1,200 [Riyals] including his overtime pay for the six (6) hours overtime work he rendered every working day during his work in Saudi Arabia except for the amount of 100 [Riyals] given every month for his meal allowance;3.[He] was subjected to serious insult by respondentMuthirieverytimehe asked or demanded for his salary; and,4.[S]omeof complainants letters that were sent by his family were not given by respondentMuthiriand/or his staff xxx.[4]When respondent askedMotairifor his salary, he was told that since a huge sum had been paid to the agency for his recruitment and deployment, he would only be paid after the said amount had already been recovered. He was also told that his salary was only 800 Saudi Riyals (SAR) per month, in contrast to the SAR1200 that was promised him under the contract.Motairiwarned that he would be sent home the next time he demanded for his salary. Due to his familys incessant letters asking for financial support, however, respondent mustered the courage to again demand for his salaries during the second week of July 1996. True to his word,Motairiordered him to pack up and leave. He was able to purchase his plane ticket only through the contributions of his fellow Filipinos.Motairieven accompanied him to the airport when he bought his plane ticket. In the meantime, his wife had been making inquiries about him.To corroborate his claims, respondent submitted the following documents: an undated letter[5]he had written addressed to the Philippine Labor Attach in Riyadh, with Arabic translation;[6]his wifes letter[7]dated June 28, 1995 addressed to the GulangcoMonteverdeAgency, Manila Head Office, asking for a favor to help [her] husband to come home as early as possible; a fax message[8]dated July 17, 1995 from a representative of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to acounterpart in Riyadh, asking for assistance to locate respondent;[9]and the

reply[10]from the Riyadh LBP representative requesting for contact numbers to facilitate communication with respondent.Respondent further claimed that his employers actuations violated Articles 83 and 103 of the Labor Code. While he was entitled to terminate his employment in accordance with Article 285 (b) due to the treatment he received, he did not exercise this right. He was nevertheless illegally dismissed by his employer when he tried to collect the salaries due him. Respondent further claimed that the reduction of his monthly salary from SAR1,200 to SAR800 and petitioners failure to furnish him a copy of the employment contract before his departure amounted to prohibited practices under Article 34 (i) and (k) of the Labor Code.Respondent prayed for the following relief:WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant most respectfully prays unto this Honorable Office that the instant complaint be given due course and that a decision be rendered in his favor and againstrespondents G & M (Phils.), Inc.,Alwaha(sic)Workshop and/orMuhamd(sic)Muthiri, as follows:(1)Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant the unpaid salaries and overtime pay in the amounts ofP61,560.00 andP66,484.80, respectively, including interests, until the same will be fully paid;(2)Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant[s] salary for the unexpired portion of the contract in the amount ofP184,680.00, including interests, until the same will be fully paid;(3)Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant[s] actual expenses which he incurred in applying for the job, including expenses in leaving for the job, including expenses in leaving for Saudi Arabia and plane ticket, as well as repatriation bond and incidental expenses in going home to the Philippines in the amounts ofP49,000.00 andP20,000.00, respectively, including interests, until the same will be fully paid;(4)Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant moral damages in the amount ofP150,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount ofP150,000.00, including interests, until the same will be fully paid;(5)Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant for and as attorneys fees in the amount ofP68,172.48 or the amount equivalent to 10% of the total amount of the foregoing claims and damages that may be awarded by the Honorable Office to the complainant.[11]In its position paper, petitioner alleged that respondent was deployed for overseas work as car body builder for its Principal Golden Wings Est. for General Services and Recruitment inSaudi Arabiafor an employment period of 24 months, with a monthly salary of US$400.00.[12]It insisted that respondent was religiously paid his salaries as they fell due. After working for a little over seven months, respondent pleaded with his employer to be allowed to return home since there were family problems he had to settle personally. Respondent even submitted a resignation letter[13]datedJuly 23, 1995.To support its claim that respondent had been paid his salaries as they fell due, petitioner submitted in evidence copies of sevenpayslip[14]authenticated by the Philippine Labor Attach inRiyadh,Saudi Arabia. Petitioner asserted that since respondent only worked for a little over seven months and did not finish his contract, he should pay the cost of the plane ticket. It pointed out that according to the standard employment contract, the employer would provide the employee with a free plane ticket for the flight home only if the worker finishes his contract.Respondent countered that his signatures in the purportedpayslipswere forged. He denied having received his salaries for the said period, except only for the SAR100 as monthly allowance. He pointed out that the authentication of the alleged pay slips and resignation letter before the labor attach inRiyadhis immaterial, since the documents themselves were falsified.Respondent further claimed that petitioner required him to pay aP10,000.00 placement fee and that he had to borrowP2,000.00 from a relative. He was then told that the amount would be considered as an advance payment and that the balance would be deducted from his salary. He was not, however, given any receipt. He insisted that the employment contract which he signed indicated that he was supposed to receive a monthly salary of SAR1,200 for working eight hours a day, excluding overtime pay. He was repeatedly promised to be furnished a copy of the contract and was later told that it would be given to his wife,Minda. However, she was also given the run-around and was told that the contract had already been given to her husband.To counter the allegation of forgery, petitioner claimed that there was a great possibility that respondent had changed his signature while abroad so that he could file a complaint for illegal dismissal upon his return. The argument that the stroke and handwriting on thepayslipwas written by one and the same person is mere conjecture, as respondent could have requested someone, i.e., the cashier, to prepare the resignation letter for him. While it is the employer who fills up the pay slip, respondent could have asked another employee to prepare the resignation letter, particularly if he (respondent) did not know how to phrase it himself. Moreover, it could not be presumed that thepayslipand resignation letter were prepared by one and the same person, as respondent is not a handwriting expert. Petitioner further pointed out that respondent has different signatures, not only in the pleadings submitted before the Labor Arbiter, but also in respondents personal documents.OnJanuary 30, 1997, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera ruled in favor of respondent on the following ratiocination:What convinced this Arbitration Branch about the unreliability of the complainants signature in thepayslipis the close semblance of the handwritings in thepayslipsand the handwritings in the purported handwritten resignation of the complainant. It unmistakably appears to this Arbitration Branch that thepayslipsas well as the handwritten letter-resignation were prepared by one and the same person. If it were true that the handwritten letter-resignation was prepared by the complainant, it follows that he also prepared thepayslipsbecause the handwritings in both documents are exactly the same and identical. But [this] is quite unbelievable that complainant himself as the payee prepared thepayslipswith the corresponding entries therein in his own handwriting. Under the circumstances, the only logical conclusion is that both thepayslipsand the handwritten letter-resignation were prepared and signed by one and the same person definitely not the complainant.With the foregoing findings and conclusions, this Arbitration Branch is of the well-considered view that complainant was not paid his salaries fromJanuary 5, 1995up toJuly 23, 1995and that he was unjustifiably dismissed from his employment when he repeatedly demanded for his unpaid salaries. Respondents are, therefore, liable to pay the complainant his salaries fromJanuary 5, 1995up toJuly 23, 1995which amount to US$2,640.00 (US$400 x 6.6mos). Further, respondents are also liable to the complainant for the latters salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract up to the maximum of three (3) months pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, which amount to US$1,200.00. Respondents must also refund complainants plane fare for his return flight. And finally, being compelled to litigate his claims, it is but just and xxxthat complainant must be awarded attorneys fees at the rate of ten percent (10%) of the judgment award.WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents to pay complainant the aggregate sum of US$3,840.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, and to refund complainants plane fare for his return flight. Further, respondents are ordered to pay complainant attorneys fees at the rate of Ten percent (10%) of the foregoing judgment award.[15]Petitioner appealed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, alleging that the Labor Arbiter, not being a handwriting expert, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding for respondent. In its Decision[16]datedDecember 9, 1997, the NLRC upheld this contention andremandedthe case to the Arbitration Branch of origin for referral to the government agency concerned for calligraphy examination of the questioned documents.[17]The case was then re-raffled to Labor ArbiterEnricoAngelo Portillo. OnSeptember 11, 1998, the parties agreed to a resetting to enable petitioner to secure the original copies of documents from its foreign principal. However, onDecember 9, 1998, the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings and on the evidence on record.This time, the complaint wasdismissed for lack of merit.According to Labor Arbiter Portillo, aside from respondents bare allegations, he failed to substantiate his claim of poor working conditions and long hours of employment. The fact that he executed a handwritten resignation letter is enough evidence of the fact that he voluntarily resigned from work. Moreover, respondent failed to submit any evidence to refute the pay slips duly signed and authenticated by the labor attach inSaudi Arabia, inasmuch as their probative value cannot be impugned by mere self-serving allegations. The Labor Arbiter concluded that as between the oral allegations of workers that they were not paid monetary benefits and the documentary evidence presented by employer, the latter should prevail.[18]Respondent appealed the decision before the NLRC, alleging that the Labor Arbiter failed to consider the genuineness of the signature which appears in the purported resignation letter datedJuly 23, 1995, as well as those that appear in the seven pay slips. He insisted that these documents should have been endorsed to the National Bureau of Investigation Questioned Documents Division or the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for calligraphy examination.The NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in a Resolution[19]datedDecember 27, 2000. It held that the questioned documents could not be endorsed to the agency concerned since mere photocopies had been submitted in evidence. The records also revealed that petitioner had communicated to the foreign employer abroad, who sent the original copies, but there was no response from respondent. It also stressed that during the December 9, 1998 hearing, the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence on record; if respondent had wanted to have the documents endorsed to the NBI or the PNP, he should have insisted that the documents be examined by a handwriting expert of the government. Thus, respondent wasestoppedfrom assailing the Labor Arbiters ruling.Unsatisfied, respondent elevated the matter to the CA via petition forcertiorari.He pointed out that he merely acceded to the submission of the case for resolution due to the inordinate delays in the case. Moreover, the questioned documents were within petitioners control, and it was petitioner that repeatedly failed to produce the original copies.The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC. According to the appellate court, a visual examination of the questioned signatures would instantly reveal significant differences in the handwriting movement, stroke, and structure, as well as the quality of lines of the signatures; Labor Arbiter Portillo committed patent error in examining the signatures, and it is the decision of Labor Arbiter De Vera which must be upheld. The CA also pointed out the initial ruling of the NLRC (Second Division) dated December 9, 1997 which set aside the earlier decision of Labor Arbiter De Vera included a special directive to the Arbitration Branch of origin to endorse the questioned documents for calligraphy examination. However, respondentCuambotfailed to produce original copies of the documents; hence, Labor Arbiter Portillo proceeded with the case and ruled in favor of petitionerG.M.Phils. Thedispositiveportion of the CA ruling reads:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions dated27 December 2000and12 February 2001, respectively, of the NLRC Second Division are herebySET ASIDEand the Decision dated20 February 1997rendered by Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera is herebyREINSTATED.[20]Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied for lack of merit in its Resolution[21]datedFebruary 20, 2004.Hence, the present petition, where petitioner claims that THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT LABOR ARBITER ENRICO PORTILLO GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE HELD THAT THE SIGNATURES APPEARING ON THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS ARE THOSE OF THE PETITIONER.[22]Petitioner points out that most of the signatures which Labor Arbiter De Vera used as standards for comparison with the signatures appearing on the questioned documents were those in the pleadings filed by the respondent long after the questioned documents had been supposedly signed by him. It claims that respondent affixed his signatures on the pleadings in question and intentionally made them different from his true signature so that he could later on conveniently impugn their authenticity. Petitioner claims that had Labor Arbiter De Vera taken pains in considering these circumstances, he could have determined that respondent may have actually intentionally given a different name and slightly changed his signature in his application, which name and signature he used when he signed the questioned letter of resignation andpayslips, only to conveniently disown the same when he came back to the country to file the present case.[23]Thus, according to petitioner, the CA clearly committed a palpable error of law when it reversed the ruling of the NLRC, which in turn affirmed Labor Arbiter Portillos decision.For his part, respondent contends that petitioners arguments were already raised in the pleadings filed before Labor Arbiter De Vera which had already been passed upon squarely in the Labor Arbiters Decision ofJanuary 30, 1997.The determinative issues in this case are essentially factual in nature - (a) whether the signatures of respondent in thepayslipsare mere forgeries, and (b) whether respondent executed the resignation letter. Generally, it is not our function to review findings of fact. However, in case of a divergence in the findings and conclusions of the NLRC on the one hand, and those of the Labor Arbiter and the CA on the other, the Court may examine the evidence presented by the parties to determine whether or not the employee was illegally dismissed or voluntarily resigned from employment.[24]The instant case thus falls within the exception.We have carefully examined the evidence on record and find that the petition must fail.In its Decision[25]datedDecember 9, 1997, the NLRC had ordered the case remanded to the Labor Arbiter precisely so that the questioned documents purportedly signed/executed by respondent could be subjected to calligraphy examination by experts. It is precisely where a judgment or ruling fails to make findings of fact that the case may be remanded to the lower tribunal to enable it to determine them.[26]However, instead of referring the questioned documents to the NBI or the PNP as mandated by the Commissions ruling, Labor Arbiter Portillo proceeded to rule in favor of petitioner, concluding that respondents signatures were not forged, and as such, respondents separation from employment was purely voluntary. In fine, then, the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion when he ruled in favor of petitioner without abiding by the Commissions directive.We note, however, that a remand of the case at this juncture would only result in unnecessary delay, especially considering that this case has been pending since 1995. Indeed, it is this Courts duty to settle, whenever possible, the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.[27]Hence, the case shall be fully resolved on its merits.We find that petitioners failure to submit the original copies of the pay slips and the resignation letter raises doubts as to the veracity of its claim that they were actually signed/penned by respondent. The failure of a party to produce the original copy of the document which is in issue has been taken against such party, and has even been considered as a mere bargaining chip, a dilatory tactic so that such party would be granted the opportunity to adducecontrovertingevidence.[28]In fact, petitioner did not even present in evidence the original copy of the employment contract, much less a machine copy, giving credence to respondents claim that he was not at all given a copy of the employment contract after he signed it. What petitioner presented was a mere photocopy of the OCW Info Sheet[29]issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration as well as the Personal Data Sheet[30]which respondent filled up. It bears stressing that the original copies of all these documents, including the employment contract, were in the possession of petitioner, or, at the very least, petitioners principal.Moreover, as correctly noted by the CA, the opinions of handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the courts.[31]As such, resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.[32]No less than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Indeed, the authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning,e.g., quantum physics or topology, or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.[33]Even a cursory perusal of the resignation letter[34]and the handwritten pay slips will readily show thatthey were written by only one person.A mere layman will immediately notice that the strokes and letters in the documents are very similar, if not identical, to one another. It is also quite apparent from a comparison of the signatures in the pay slips that they are inconsistent, irregular, with uneven and faltering strokes.We also find it unbelievable that after having waited for so long to be deployed toSaudi Arabiaand with the hopes of opportunity to earn a better living within his reach, respondent would just suddenly decide to abandon his work and go home due to family problems. At the very least, respondent could have at least specified the reason or elaborated on the details of such an urgent matter so as not to jeopardize future employment opportunities.That respondent also filed the complaint immediately gives more credence to his claim that he was illegally dismissed. He arrived in thePhilippinesonJuly 24, 1995, and immediately filed his complaint for illegal dismissal two days later, onJuly 26, 1995.We are not impervious of petitioners claim that respondent could have asked another person to execute the resignation letter for him. However, petitioner failed to present even an affidavit from a representative of its foreign principal in order to support this allegation.Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor,[35]in order to give effect to the policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers, and to assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.[36]We reiterate the following pronouncement inNicariov. National Labor Relations Commission:[37]It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the formers favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protectionof labor.Moreover, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave, and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. Thus, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged with payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.[38]Only when the debtor introduces evidence that the obligation has been extinguished does the burden shift to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why payment does not extinguish the obligation.[39]In this case, petitioner was unable to present ample evidence to prove its claim that respondent had received all his salaries and benefits in full.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the Petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64744 isAFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.