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Copyright 1994-2014 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013 1

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125059. March 17, 2000.]

FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Delos Angeles Aguirre Olaguer & Sto. Domingo for petitioner.The Solicitor General for public respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. agreed to buy, on installment, fromFrancel Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit in the latter's project atBacoor, Cavite. Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued toFRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering48 monthly installments. After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRCregarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of the townhouse project.FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarialnotices to the effect that he was suspending is installment payments on the unitpending compliance with the project plans and specifications, as approved by theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Notwithstanding the notarialnotices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip's postdated checks in itspossession. Sycip sent "stop payment orders" to the bank. When FRC continued topresent the other postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bankadvised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges everytime he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks. Due to theclosure of petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdatedchecks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, theBouncing Checks Law, involving said dishonored checks. After trial, petitionerwas found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court affirmed thedecision of the trial court. The appellate court held that petitioner had no basis torely on the provision of P.D. 957 to justify the non-payment of his obligation, theclosure of his checking account and the notices sent by him to private complainantthat he will stop paying his monthly amortizations. Petitioner moved forreconsideration, but was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition. CTHDcE


The Supreme Court reversed and set-aside the decision of the Court ofAppeals and acquitted petitioner of the crime charged. The Court ruled that whileB.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system,protection must also be afforded the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No.957. A statute must be construed in relation to other laws so as to carry out thelegitimate ends and purposes intended by the legislature. Courts will not strictlyfollow the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent oflegislature and when ends are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.More so, when it will mean the contravention of another valid statute. Both lawshave to be reconciled and given due effect. In the present case, petitioner's exerciseof a statutory right to suspend installment payments granted by P.D. 957 isconsidered by the Court a valid defense against his purported violations of B.P.Blg. 22.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22; ELEMENTSOF THE CRIME; KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE ISSUER AT THETIME OF THE CHECK'S ISSUANCE THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGHFUNDS OR CREDIT IN THE BANK FOR PAYMENT THEREOF UPON ITSPRESENTMENT NOT ESTABLISHED. — Under the provisions of the BouncingChecks Law (B.P. No. 22), an offense is committed when the following elementsare present: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply foraccount or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at thetime of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bankfor the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequentdishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit ordishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, orderedthe bank to stop payment. In this case, we find that although the first element of theoffense exists, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonabledoubt. To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of theissuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds orcredit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates apresumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the firstand third elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be rebutted.If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of theissue, which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledgeof the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor ofhis checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption cannot hold if there isevidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented


evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound toprove every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttablepresumption. Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdatingsimply means that on the date indicated on its face, the check would issued onlythen. The checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contractto Sell in August 1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time saidchecks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bankwould be insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. On thecontrary, there is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of thechecks, he had P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER'S EXERCISE OF A STATUTORYRIGHT TO SUSPEND INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS GRANTED BY SECTION23 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957 IS A VALID DEFENSE AGAINSTHIS PURPORTED VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22. —While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system, itis difficult to see how conviction of the accused in this case will protect thesanctity of the financial system. Moreover, protection must also be afforded theinterest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No. 957. A statute must be construed inrelation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate ends and purposes intendedby the legislature. Courts will not strictly follow the letter of one statute when itleads away from the true intent of legislature and when ends are inconsistent withthe general purpose of the act. More so, when it will mean the contravention ofanother valid statute. Both laws have to be reconciled and given due effect. Notethat we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to suspendpayments until such time as the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligations tothe buyer. This exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments, is toour mind, a valid defense against the purported violations of B.P. Blg. 22 thatpetitioner is charged with. Given the findings of the HLURB as to incompletefeatures in the construction of petitioner's and other units of the subjectcondominium bought on installment from FRC, we are of the view that petitionerhad a valid cause to order his bank to stop payment. To say the least, the thirdelement of "subsequent dishonor of the check. . . without valid cause" appears tous not established by the prosecution. As already stated, the prosecution tried toestablish the crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22. Here thatpresumption is unavailing, in the presence of a valid cause to stop payment,thereby negating the third element of the crime. Offenses punished by a speciallaw, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the Revised Penal Code, butthe Code is supplementary to such a law. We find nothing in the text of B.P. Blg.22, which would prevent the Revised Penal Code from supplementing it.Following Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner's exercise of a rightof the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges


against him. SaETCI

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J p:

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, datedFebruary 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No. 15993, which affirmed the judgment of theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Cases Nos.Q-91-25910 to 15, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violatingB.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. dctai

The facts in this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, fromFrancel Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit in the latter's project atBacoor, Cavite.

Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC,forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48monthly installments.

After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in theunit and incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint.Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he wassuspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with theproject plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land UseRegulatory Board (HLURB). Sycip and 12 out of 14 unit buyers then filed acomplaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defects, butFRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouseproject. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the alleged defects.

Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present forencashment Sycip's postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent "stop paymentorders" to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks tothe bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking accountto avoid paying bank charges every time he made a "stop payment" order on theforthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioner's checking account, thedrawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC filed a complaint againstpetitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.


On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with theRTC of Quezon City six Informations docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25910to Q-91-25915, charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910reads: cdll

"That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in Quezon City,Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the saidaccused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make,draw and issue in favor of Francel Realty Corporation a check 813514 drawnagainst Citibank, a duly established domestic banking institution in theamount of P9,304.00 Philippine Currency dated/postdated October 30, 1990in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue thatshe/he did not have any funds in the drawee bank of (sic) the payment ofsuch check; that upon presentation of said check to said bank for payment,the same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer thereof, accusedFrancisco T. Sycip, Jr. did not have any funds therein, and despite notice ofdishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still fails and refused (sic)to redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of the saidFrancel Realty Corporation in the amount aforementioned and in such otheramount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." 1(1)

Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25911 to Q-91-25915, with Informationssimilarly worded as in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910, except for the dates, and

check numbers 2(2) were consolidated and jointly tried.

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to each of the charges.Trial then proceeded.

The prosecution's case, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by theappellate court, is as follows:

"The prosecution evidence established that on or about August 24,1989, at the office of the private complainant Francel Realty Corporation (aprivate domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business) at 822Quezon Avenue, QC, accused Francisco Sycip, Jr. drew, issued, anddelivered to private complainant Francel Realty Corporation (FRChereinafter) six checks (among a number of other checks), each forP9,304.00 and drawn pay to the order of FRC and against Francisco'saccount no. 845515 with Citibank, to wit: Check No. 813514 dated October30, 1990 (Exh. C), Check No. 813515 dated November 30, 1990 (Exh. D),Check No. 813518 dated February 28, 1991 (Exh. E), Check No. 813516


dated December 30, 1990 (Exh. F), Check No. 813517 dated January 30,1991 (Exh. G) and Check No. 813519 dated March 30, 1991 (Exh. H), asand in partial payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of thehouse and lot subject of the written contract executed and entered into byand between FRC as seller and Francisco as buyer on said date of August 24,1989 (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). The total stipulated purchase price for the houseand lot was P451,700.00, of which Francisco paid FRC in the sum ofP135,000.00 as down payment, with Francisco agreeing and committinghimself to pay the balance of P316,000.00 in 48 equal monthly installmentsof P9,304.00 (which sum already includes interest on successive monthlybalance) effective September 30, 1989 and on the 30th day of each monththereafter until the stipulated purchase price is paid in full. The said sixCitibank checks, Exhs. C thru H, as earlier indicated were drawn, issued, anddelivered by Francisco in favor of FRC as and in partial payment of the said48 equal monthly installments under their said contract (Exh. B, also Exh.1). Sometime in September 1989, the Building Official's certificate ofoccupancy for the subject house — a residential townhouse — was issued(Exh. N) and Francisco took possession and started in the use and occupancyof the subject house and lot.

"When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were presented to theCitibank for payment on their respective due dates, they were all returned toFRC dishonored and unpaid for the reason: account closed as indicated inthe drawee bank's stamped notations on the face and back of each check; infact, as indicated in the corresponding record of Francisco's account no.815515 with Citibank, said account already had a zero balance as early asSeptember 14, 1990 (Exh. 1-5). Notwithstanding the fact that FRC, first thruits executive vice president and project manager and thereafter thru itscounsel, had notified Francisco, orally and in writing, of the checks' dishonorand demanded from him the payment of the amount thereof, still Francisco

did not pay or make good any of the checks (Exhs. I thru K). . ." 3(3)

The case for the defense, as summarized also by the trial court and adoptedby the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

"The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after takingpossession and starting in the use and occupancy of the subject townhouseunit, Francisco became aware of its various construction defects; that hecalled the attention of FRC, thru its project manager, requesting thatappropriate measures be forthwith instituted, but despite his several requests,FRC did not acknowledge, much less attend to them; that Francisco thusmailed to FRC a verified letter dated June 6, 1990 (Exh. 2) in sum givingnotice that effective June 1990, he will cease and desist 'from paying mymonthly amortization of NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOUR(P9,304.00) PESOS towards the settlement of my obligation concerning mypurchase of Unit No. 14 of FRC Townhomes referred to above, unless and


until your Office satisfactorily complete(s) the construction, renovationand/or repair of my townhouses (sic) unit referred to above' and that shouldFRC 'persist in ignoring my aforesaid requests, I shall, after five (5) daysfrom your receipt of this Verified Notice, forthwith petition the [HLURB]for Declaratory Relief and Consignation to grant me provisional relief frommy obligation to pay my monthly amortization to your good Office andallow me to deposit said amortizations with [HLURB] pending yourcompletion of FRC Townhomes Unit in question'; that Francisco thrucounsel wrote FRC, its president, and its counsel notices/letters in sum to theeffect that Francisco and all other complainants in the [HLURB] case againstFRC shall cease and desist from paying their monthly amortizations unlessand until FRC satisfactorily completes the construction of their units inaccordance with the plans and specifications thereof as approved by the[HLURB] and as warranted by the FRC in their contracts and that thedishonor of the subject checks was a natural consequence of such suspensionof payments, and also advising FRC not to encash or deposit all otherpostdated checks issued by Francisco and the other complainants and still inFRC's possession (Exhs. 3 thru 5); that Francisco and the other complainantsfiled the [HLURB] case against FRC and later on a decision was handeddown therein and the same is pending appeal with the Board (Exhs. 6, 7, &12 thru 17, also Exh. 8); that as of the time of presentation of the subjectchecks for payment by the drawee bank, Francisco had at least P150,000.00cash or credit with Citibank (Exhs. 10 & 11) and, that Francisco closed hisaccount no. 845515 with Citibank conformably with the bank's customerservice officer's advice to close his said account instead of making astop-payment order for each of his more than 30 post-dated checks still inFRC's possession at the time, so as to avoid the P600.00-penalty imposed by

the bank for every check subject of a stop-payment order." 4(4)

On March 11, 1994, the trial court found petitioner guilty of violatingSection 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 in each of the six cases, disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-91-25910,Q-91-25911, Q-91-25912, Q-91-25913, Q-91-25914 and Q-91-25915, theCourt finds accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubtof a violation of Sec. 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and, accordingly, he ishereby sentenced in and for each case to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30)days and pay the costs. Further, the accused is hereby ordered to pay theoffended party, Francel Realty Corporation, as and for actual damages, thetotal sum of fifty-five thousand eight hundred twenty four pesos(P55,824.00) with interest thereon at the legal rate from date ofcommencement of these actions, that is, November 8, 1991, until fullpayment thereof. cdasia

"SO ORDERED." 5(5)


Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Hisappeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 15993. But on February 29, 1996, theappellate court ruled:

"On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so holdthat appellant has no basis to rely on the provision of PD 957 to justify thenon-payment of his obligation, the closure of his checking account and thenotices sent by him to private complainant that he will stop paying his

monthly amortizations." 6(6)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 18, 1996, but it wasdenied per Resolution dated April 22, 1996.

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:

I

"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONOF THE LOWER COURT FINDING THAT THEACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE ANY JUSTIFIABLE CAUSETO STOP OR OTHERWISE PREVENT THE PAYMENT OF THESUBJECT CHECKS BY THE DRAWEE BANK.

II

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THEACCUSED-APPELLANT MUST BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HISRIGHT TO COMPLAIN AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF THETOWNHOUSE UNIT AND THE TOWNHOUSE PROJECT.

III

"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONOF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DIDNOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS WITH THE DRAWEE BANK TOCOVER THE SUBJECT CHECKS UPON PRESENTMENT FORPAYMENT THEREOF.

IV

"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONOF THE LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTAND AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE

COMPLAINANT." 7(7)

The principal issue before us is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in


affirming the conviction of petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

Petitioner argues that the court a quo erred when it affirmed his convictionfor violation of B.P. Blg. 22, considering that he had cause to stop payment of thechecks issued to respondent. Petitioner insists that under P.D. No. 957, the buyer ofa townhouse unit has the right to suspend his amortization payments, should thesubdivision or condominium developer fail to develop or complete the project inaccordance with duly-approved plans and specifications. Given the findings of theHLURB that certain aspects of private complainant's townhouse project wereincomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his right to suspend payments shouldnot render him liable under B.P. Blg. 22.

The Solicitor General argues that since what petitioner was charged withwere violations of B.P. Blg. 22, the intent and circumstances surrounding the

issuance of a worthless check are immaterial. 8(8) The gravamen of the offensecharged is the act itself of making and issuing a worthless check or one that isdishonored upon its presentment for payment. Mere issuing of a bad check ismalum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. In his view, P.D. No.957 does not provide petitioner a sufficient defense against the charges againsthim.

Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), 9(9) anoffense is committed when the following elements are present:

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for accountor for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issuehe does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bankfor the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank forinsufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason hadnot the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop

payment. 10(10)

In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists theother elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt. cdrep

To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of theissuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds orcredit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates apresumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first

and third elements of the offense are present. 11(11) But such evidence may be


rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in

favor of the issue, which it supports. 12(12) As pointed out by the SolicitorGeneral, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally

presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." 13(13) Butsuch presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, wefind that the other party has presented evidence to contradict said presumption.Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the offensecharged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption.

Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simplymeans that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded,

not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. 14(14) The checks inthis case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time said checks wereissued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be

insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. 15(15) On the contrary,there is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, hehad P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank.

As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of petitioner's AccountNo. 845515 with Citibank was not for insufficiency of funds. It was made upon theadvice of the drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each timepetitioner issued a "stop payment" order to prevent encashment of postdated

checks in private respondent's possession. 16(16) Said evidence contradicts theprima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But it establishespetitioner's state of mind at the time said checks were issued on August 24, 1989.Petitioner definitely had no knowledge that his funds or credit would beinsufficient when the checks would be presented for encashment. He could nothave foreseen that he would be advised by his own bank in the future, to close hisaccount to avoid paying the hefty banks charges that came with each "stoppayment" order issued to prevent private respondent from encashing the 30 or sochecks in its possession. What the prosecution has established is the closure ofpetitioner's checking account. But this does not suffice to prove the second elementof the offense under B.P. Blg. 22, which explicitly requires "evidence ofknowledge of insufficient funds" by the accused at the time the check or checks arepresented for encashment.

To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did inthis case, would be to misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction underthe law. It must be stressed that every element of the offense must be provedbeyond reasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes are strictlyconstrued against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the


Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable act must come clearly within both the spirit

and letter of the statute. 17(17)

While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking

system, 18(18) it is difficult to see how conviction of the accused in this case willprotect the sanctity of the financial system. Moreover, protection must also be

afforded the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No. 957. 19(19) A statutemust be construed in relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate ends

and purposes intended by the legislature. 20(20) Courts will not strictly follow theletter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of legislature and when

ends are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 21(21) More so, when itwill mean the contravention of another valid statute . Both laws have to bereconciled and given due effect.

Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 tosuspend payments until such time as the owner or developer had fulfilled its

obligations to the buyer. 22(22) This exercise of a statutory right to suspendinstallment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against the purportedviolations of B.P. Blg. 22 that petitioner is charged with.

Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in theconstruction of petitioner's and other units of the subject condominium bought oninstallment from FRC, we are of the view that petitioner had a valid cause to orderhis bank to stop payment. To say the least, the third element of "subsequentdishonor of the check . . . without valid cause" appears to us not established by theprosecution. As already stated, the prosecution tried to establish the crime on aprima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22. Here that presumption is unavailing, inthe presence of a valid cause to stop payment, thereby negating the third element ofthe crime.

Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are notsubject to the Revised Penal Code, but the Code is supplementary to such a law.23(23) We find nothing in the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would prevent the

Revised Penal Code from supplementing it. Following Article 11 (5) 24(24) of theRevised Penal Code, petitioner's exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23 ofP.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges against him. prcd

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T.Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the charges against him under Batas Pambansa Blg.22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonabledoubt. No pronouncement as to costs.


SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Records, p. 1.2. Id. at 3-12.3. Rollo, pp. 102-103.4. Id. at 103-104.5. Supra Note 1 at 113.6. Supra Note 3 at 121.7. Id. at 16.8. Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 723, 726-727 (1993).9. The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 provide:

"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes ordraws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the timeof issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bankfor the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check issubsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit orwould have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without anyvalid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished byimprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by afine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fineshall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine andimprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficientfunds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues acheck, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the fullamount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the dateappearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company, or entity, the person orpersons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liableunder this Act.

"SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making,drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the draweebecause of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented withinninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence ofknowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawerpays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements forpayment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days afterreceiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee (Italics supplied).

10. Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656, 661 (1998).11. Magno v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 471, 480 (1992).12. People v. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8442, 8445.13. Rollo, p. 272.


14. People v. Tongko, 290 SCRA 595 (1998).15. TSN, December 1, 1993, pp. 9-14.16. Supra.17. Idos v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 194, 202-203 (1998).18. Magno v. Court of Appeals, supra.19. "SEC 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a

buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted tobuy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after duenotice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure ofthe owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium projectaccording to the approved plans and within the time limit for completing thesame. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paidincluding amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests with interestthereon at the legal rate."

20. King v. Hernaez, 114 Phil. 730, 740 (1962); Mejia v. Balolong, 81 Phil. 497, 501(1948).

21. Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, supra, Tañada v. Cuneco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1086 (1957);Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145 (1931); People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126,130 (1922); US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 90 (1910).

22. Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399, 409, 411(1987).

23. "ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses whichare or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to theprovisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless thelatter should specially provide the contrary."

24. "ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminalliability:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise ofa right or office."


Endnotes

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1. Records, p. 1.

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2. Id. at 3-12.

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3. Rollo, pp. 102-103.

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4. Id. at 103-104.

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5. Supra Note 1 at 113.

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6. Supra Note 3 at 121.

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7. Id. at 16.

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8. Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 723, 726-727 (1993).

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9. The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 provide:"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or

draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the timeof issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bankfor the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is


subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit orwould have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without anyvalid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished byimprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by afine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fineshall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine andimprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficientfunds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues acheck, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the fullamount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the dateappearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company, or entity, the person orpersons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liableunder this Act.

"SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making,drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the draweebecause of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented withinninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence ofknowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawerpays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements forpayment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days afterreceiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee (Italics supplied).

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10. Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656, 661 (1998).

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11. Magno v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 471, 480 (1992).

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12. People v. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8442, 8445.

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13. Rollo, p. 272.

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14. People v. Tongko, 290 SCRA 595 (1998).

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15. TSN, December 1, 1993, pp. 9-14.

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16. Supra.

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17. Idos v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 194, 202-203 (1998).

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18. Magno v. Court of Appeals, supra.

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19. "SEC 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by abuyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted tobuy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after duenotice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure ofthe owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium projectaccording to the approved plans and within the time limit for completing thesame. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paidincluding amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests with interestthereon at the legal rate."

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20. King v. Hernaez, 114 Phil. 730, 740 (1962); Mejia v. Balolong, 81 Phil. 497, 501(1948).

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21. Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, supra, Tañada v. Cuneco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1086 (1957); Torresv. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145 (1931); People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126, 130(1922); US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 90 (1910).


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22. Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399, 409, 411(1987).

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23. "ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses whichare or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to theprovisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless thelatter should specially provide the contrary."

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24. "ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminalliability:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise ofa right or office."

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