Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts

FUTURE ARMY EXPERIMENT

Operations in the Urban Battlespace

Fort FrontenacKingstonMay 2002

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Experiment Objectives•Experiment 01(Spring 01):To measure differences in capability between evolutionary and revolutionary battle forces operating in the expanded battlespace circa 2020

DLSC EXPERIMENT01

Operations in theExpanded Battlespace

•Experiment 02 (Spring 02):To measure differences in capability between current, evolutionary and revolutionary battle forces operating in the urban battlespace circa 2025

DLSC EXPERIMENTDLSC EXPERIMENT0202

Operations in the Operations in the UrbanUrban BattlespaceBattlespace

Two Views Of Future Conflict (NATO)

View 1 View 2Conventional conflict between national entities

Asymmetric conflict between state and armed bodies that may not be organized armed forces

1 High End View 2 refers to conflict against a sophisticated well-armed, non-state enemy. An example would be theChechen Wars.

PREFACEThe Chief of the Land Staff (CLS), having

been briefed by Director of Land Strategic Concepts(DLSC) on the results of DLSC Experiment 01duringthe spring of 2001, directed DLSC to exploreanticipated challenges for a Future Army conductingHigh End View 2 operations1 in urban terrain.

Recalling experiences and insights gainedduring Experiment 01, and using conditions andrequirements set out in DLSC’s publications—TheFuture Security Environment (August 1999) andFuture Army Capability Requirements (January2001)—DLSC set out to build upon insights gainedfrom the Canadian Urban Operations Working Group,NATO Urban Studies, the United States Marine CorpsProject Metropolis and ongoing studies within militaryand civilian research organizations of our Allies.

DLSC Experiment 02, Exercise URBANCHALLENGE, examined operations in an urbanbattlespace by three Experimental Forces (EXFOR):EXFOR A, utilizing evolutionary advances; EXFORB incorporating more revolutionary advances; andEXFOR C, representing the current Main ContingencyForce with minor, incremental improvements.

The experiment used a seminar wargameapproach to examine the action, reaction and counter-reaction of forces engaged in urban operations in orderthat three different sets of capabilities could becompared and contrasted. The results of related studieswere made available to assist in deliberations.

The aim of this summary report is to highlightinitial judgements and insights from a preliminaryanalysis of the experiment. In some cases thesejudgements and insights build upon those of DLSCExperiment 01; in other cases, they are unique toDLSC Experiment 02. A more comprehensiveoperational research report will be issued at a later date.

BACKGROUNDExperiment 01—Operations in the ExpandedBattlespace

DLSC Experiment 01 assessed the ability oftwo force constructs—EXFORs A and B—in an open,expanded battlespace to counter a traditional militaryforce structured in a conventional manner and equippedwith the typical array of weapons found in a GENFORMotor Rifle Division. EXFOR A’s assets andcapabilities reflected an evolutionary approach to theFuture Army model, whereas EXFOR B’s weapon,communication, sensor and command supporttechnologies represented a quantum leap forward.EXFOR A had three Battle Groups (BGs); but tocontrast its inherent advances the more technologicallysophisticated EXFOR B was given only two BGs.

Both EXFORs achieved success in shaping;however, EXFOR B was better able to exploit its long-range assets, compensating for the fact that it had fewersoldiers than EXFOR A. Whether or not these assetswould be as dominant in a complex battlespace wasan issue to be examined in Experiment 02.

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General

Global urbanization over the next 20 years willcreate an increasingly demanding operationalenvironment for military forces. Military and para-military forces posing threats to national or regionalorder and stability may choose to fight in urban areasto offset the tactical superiority of the more sophisticatedmilitary forces. Unable to avoid urban areas,commanders and soldiers will have to confront andtake decisive action against hostile forces operating ina multi-dimensional battlespace characterized by thepresence of non-combatants and complexinfrastructures. Any Army that cannot operateeffectively in both urban and open battlespaces will beof limited utility. This assessment has significantimplications for modern military forces given that mostarmies are currently structured for operations in theopen, expanded battlespace.

Technology

The challenge for today’s Science &Technology (S&T) community is to predict “technologywinners” of the future, i.e. those technologies that willbest support operations in this era of “Revolution inMilitary Affairs” (RMA). However, technologicaladvances alone, will not be sufficient to ensure successin an urban, or any other type of operational setting.New technologies must be incorporated within newprocesses and executed by new organisationalstructures, to optimize the advantages they bring andensure success in military operations.

From an extensive list of improved urban warfighting capability concepts, a subset of ten conceptswas selected for examination during URBANCHALLENGE. These concepts, with rudimentaryprototypes already being studied, included tacticalUnmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), micro-UAVs,expendable micro-sensor networks, UnmannedGround Vehicles (UGVs), multi-range multi-effectsprecision munitions, Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW),intelligent barrier area denial systems, future soldiersystems including combat identification, and a DataFusion Command Centre (DFCC).

During the experiment, each EXFOR wasequipped with different levels of technologicaldevelopment and integration: low (EXFOR C), medium(EXFOR A) and high (EXFOR B). Differences werebased on levels of autonomy and collaboration,connectivity, size, weight and/or quantity of individualtechnologies.

Why Urban?Why Urban?

• Global Urbanization• By 2025, 57% of the population of the

developing world will live in urban areas• Cities are often Centres of Gravity

• The urban battlespace is the most complex of complex terrain • Asymmetric opposition sees a battle between the

dinosaurs and the rats in urban jungle• “Most Likely” and “Most Dangerous” Enemy

Course of Action

Most nations are responding to this new realityby pursuing initiatives in doctrine, technology, trainingand capability so that urban operations can beconducted in such manner that casualties can beminimized, collateral damage avoided, and operationssuccessfully completed without unnecessarilycomplicating post-conflict, peace-restoration activities.To this end, the Canadian Army participated in a NATOUrban Operations Working Group and established itsown Urban Operations Working Group, andExperiment 02 built on that body of work.

• Cordon and bypass• When urban fight is inevitable we attempt to

relive Ortona: – Firepower emphasis– Focused on seizing territory

• House to house, block by block fighting• Close combat is unavoidable

– Manpower intensive – Focus on low level tactics

Historically high casualties and collateral damage

Traditional Urban Approaches

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EXFOR A technologies were evolutionary innature and in keeping with the current state of worldwidetechnology investment. EXFOR A concepts requireda “soldier-in-the-loop” to analyse data and re-tasksystems to meet changing situations.

EXFOR B technologies allowed for a highdegree of autonomy and collaboration between andamong various systems and components. Generally,EXFOR B technological components had greaterendurance, range and resolution, and were smaller,lighter, cheaper and more abundant than those ofEXFORs A or C. If EXFOR A technological conceptscould be described as “surrogates for the soldier’seyes,” EXFOR B concepts could be described as“surrogates for the soldier’s brain.”

EXFOR C technologies were representativeof those found in the Army of Today, with minorimprovements. EXFOR C information gathering andprocessing technologies, and Situational Awareness(SA) sharing abilities, were less sophisticated than thosefound in the other two EXFORs.

Change Opportunities• Application of Manoeuvre Warfare concepts to Urban

Operations• Emerging key technologies

Tenets of a New Approach• Change how we apply our strengths

– Effects vice Firepower– Develop methods to defeat enemy that avoid block

by block fighting focused on seizing territory– Focus use of limited soldier resources

• Reduce close combat risk by providing soldier overmatch

USECTThe acronym “USECT”—Understand,

Shape, Engage, Consolidate, and Transition—a moreuniversal battlespace model than Find, Fix, andStrike—was first introduced by the US Departmentof Defense in a joint doctrinal publication on operationsin an urban environment.2 The USECT frameworkwas used during URBAN CHALLENGE in keepingwith NATO’s Research and Technology Organisation(RTO) study on urban operations recommendations.

System ConceptsEXFOR A versus EXFOR B

• EXFOR A– Man-in-the-loop– Vertical Connection– Components

• Larger• Heavier• Fewer

– Surrogate for the Soldier’s Eyes

– Evolutionary advances based on existing technology developing at a relatively steady pace

– Concepts and prototypes now exist

• EXFOR B– Autonomous– Collaborative– Horizontal Connectivity– Components

• Smaller• Lighter• More of them

– Surrogate for the Soldier’s Brain

– Revolutionary advances that may be possible with considerable additional R&D investment

– Some technology breakthroughs needed

ShieldShield

Act

How the Joint Force Fights

FIND FIX

TRANSITION

Sustain

CONSOLIDATE

SHAPE DEFEAT EXPLOIT

U S E C T

Understand Shape Engage Consolidate Transition

STRIKE

Sense Act

Shield Sustain

Command

Sense Act

Shield

Command

Sustain

Sense

Shield

Command

Sense Act

Sustain

Command

Act

Sustain

Sense

Command

2 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Staff. Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations. Joint Publication-3-06. 2nd Draft,October, 2000.

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The continuous need to UNDERSTAND thebattlespace includes a requirement to: gain and processinformation about hostile forces, the physicalenvironment and non-combatants; anticipate second-and third-order effects of actions; and analyze geo-political, cultural and demographic aspects of the areaof operations. To SHAPE through actions taken onthe physical and moral planes3 is to set conditions andthe environment for subsequent action. ENGAGEactions include combat, humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief efforts applied at decisive points affectinghostile force centres of gravity. Having achievedprogress or objectives, commanders thenCONSOLIDATE to protect what has been gainedand retain the initiative for subsequent activities, beforecontrol is passed to local authorities/internationalorganisations during the final, TRANSITION phase.

The USECT framework when applied in anurban operation setting promotes unity of purpose,assists in military and non-military organisationcoordination, and aids in understanding the complexitiesof urban operations.

THE EXPERIMENTAim and Objectives

The aim of URBAN CHALLENGE was toprovide the CLS and the Army staff with a basis forconsidering long-term capability requirements throughtesting of urban operations future concepts. Majorobjectives of the experiment were as follows:

To explore new concepts and technologies thatwill create or strengthen Army capabilities to fightand win in the urban battlespace.

To gather insights and observations for FutureArmy concept development.

To provide information that will assist in guidingtechnological investigation and research anddevelopment initiatives.

Hypothesis

The URBAN CHALLENGE hypothesis, linkeddirectly to Experiment 01, read as follows: “A forceoptimized for the open, expanded battlespace can beeffective in operations in a complex, specifically urban,environment.” This hypothesis was to be proved, ordisproved, by employing the EXFORs fromExperiment 01, significantly optimized for open battlespacewarfare and testing them in a challenging urban scenario.

Use of Operational Functions and MajorQuestions

Research work on the Future Army focuseson five operational functions: Sense, Act, Shield andSustain, with Command as the nexus. Together theyaddress the integrated capabilities of the futurebattlespace in the physical and moral planes. Thesefive operational functions were used as the frameworkto develop major questions (Annex A) that guided datacollection in Experiment 02.

Evaluation Methodology

URBAN CHALLENGE used a combinationof professional military judgement and quantitativeformulas to determine outcomes of engagements.Unlike many other experiments conducted, it did notseek to determine the outcome of combat through

Operational FunctionsOperational Functions

Enablers = Freedom of ActionEnablers = Freedom of Action

Effects = Actions Striking EnemyEffects = Actions Striking Enemy

Sense Act

Shield Sustain

Command

3 The physical plane includes subsets such as the electromagnetic, cyber and any activity, matter or material thatrelates to the laws of physics or nature. The moral plane is the opposite, relating to those forces of psychological ormental nature such as the intangibles of will and national resolve. In this view, DLSC differs from others authors whosee electromagnetic and cyber planes as not part of the physical plane.

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personnel and equipment loss ratios, or to find clearwinners and losers. Rather, evaluations of individualinteractions were used to promote discussion andchallenge participants to identify advantages anddisadvantages arising from technologies and conceptsemployed. Following each round of game play, anAfter Action Review (AAR) captured initial insights.

Four Excel spreadsheets were prepared toassist in game board interaction evaluation. Thesedealt with force-on-force combat at platoon level,casualties sustained in building clearance operations,casualties to indirect fire in open urban areas, andlosses to small-scale sniper and ambush attacks. Useof simple Excel formulas enabled exerciseparticipants to maintain exercise momentum whileproviding a mechanism to capture interaction results.

Other evaluation methodologies, includingparticipant questionnaires, AAR records, andcontrol staff synopses, were employed to developfindings. Although a seminar wargame is not suitablefor traditional quantitative analysis, it proved to bean excellent forum to discuss concepts, tools andintuition during URBAN CHALLENGE.

Participants

Students graduating from the TransitionCommand and Staff Course conducted by the CanadianLand Forces Command and Staff College served ascommanders and staff of the EXFORs. Trained to applythe Operational Planning Process (OPP) in a variety ofsettings, they provided unbiased insights on futureconcepts, structures and capabilities of significance toFuture Army development. Other participants came froma variety of agencies, both national and international,civilian and military, including the following: United StatesArmy, United States Marine Corps, United StatesDepartment of Defense, Australian Army, British Army,International Committee of the Red Cross, RANDCorporation, Royal Military College of Canada, andvarious Canadian military staff directorates and schools(Annex C). Total participation exceeded 130 personnel.

Game Organisation

URBAN CHALLENGE consisted of threesimultaneous seminar wargames. Participants wereassigned command and staff appointments at bothformation and BG level, or in one of three competingarmed Opposing Force (OPFOR) factions.Participants staffing White Cell positions representedlocal civilian and police department officials, internationaland non-governmental organisation authorities, and staffmembers of pertinent offices of the United Nations.Higher Control (HICON) input was provided fromcells representing NATO, Canadian national HQ, JointTask Force (JTF) HQ, flanking formations/units, andspecialist advisors. An Exercise Control (EXCON)staff consisting of the exercise director, exerciseco-ordinator, game board controllers and AARco-ordinators oversaw exercise conduct and lessongathering. Operational research staff members, subjectmatter experts, observers and support staff also madesignificant contributions throughout the exercise.

Scenario

Set in 2025, the scenario was based on aNATO Coalition response to threats to peace andstability posed by well-armed groups of guerrillas andmilitary deserters in Batumi Province—a disputedterritory of a NATO member in the region (Annex C).The NATO contingent’s mission was to restore order,disarm factions and bring about conditions for a peacefulpolitical transition as directed by United Nations

EXFOR A

EXFOR B

Armed factionBLB/BFF

Armed factionZLF

Armed factionDeserters

Wargame A

Wargame C

Wargame B

EXFOR C

Operation Planning Process

HICON

MethodThree Simultaneous Wargames

OPFOR

White Cell

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Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Within theCoalition’s campaign plan, the Canadian Contingent’sArea of Operations (AO) included a portion of thetroubled region’s capital.

Vehicles (CEV), and sub-units with Sense, Shield andSustain assets. The MMEV, essentially a LightArmoured Vehicle (LAV) armed with a105 mm electro-thermal chemical gun and Low LevelAir Defence (LLAD) missiles for anti-tank or VeryShort-Range Air Defence (VSHORAD) tasks,represented the evolution of the tank. The CEV, aLAV variant armed with a 25 mm gun, a general-purpose machine gun, an automatic grenade launcherand four LLAD missiles, represented a future infantryvehicle. EXFOR A, with its three FAV BGs, couldgenerate 576 soldiers, not including vehicle crews, fordismounted operations.

Vignettes

Three separate vignettes, not connected in timeor sequence, provided the experiment framework. Thefirst vignette was a Crisis Response situation requiringthe development of a formation level concept ofoperations for initial EXFOR deployment inside thecapital. The second and third vignettes respectivelywere defensive and offensive operations that includedBG level concepts of operations. Each vignette sharedthe same socio-political and geographical setting;however, they were not interrelated in terms ofexperimentation conduct and flow (Annex C).

EXFOR CONSTRUCTSEXFOR A—Evolutionary Design

A brigade-sized formation of approximately5,200 personnel, EXFOR A possessed moderatelyevolved technology. Sense and Command functionsachieved a considerable leap forward in providing anintegrated network able to fuse information from a varietyof sources. EXFOR A had a high level of SA thatincluded “soldier-in-the-loop” sensor systems.

EXFOR A had three Future Armour Vehicle(FAV) BGs. Each FAV BG contained two sub-unitsequipped with Multi-Mission Effects Vehicles(MMEV), two sub-units equipped with Close Effects

INDIRECT FIRE(492)

BGIFS(113)

AVIATION(332)

OIO(111)

3FAV

ISTAR(518)

ENGR AD DIO NBC SUPPLY MEDICAL

FAVBG

(857)

MAINT

SHIELD (414) SUSTAIN (414)

HQ(190)

24 x MIFS30 x LV3 x CV

11 x CVV

16 x BGIFS1 x CV16 x LV

14 x CEV4 x CVV

24 x MMEV 24 x CEV 4 x ADEV 4 x CBRV25 x SV

10 x CSEV12 x CV

14 x CVV12 x HSSV

74 x LV

4 x CEV13 x SV

22 x CVV74 x LV

12 x ADEV ; 4 x CBRV; 1 x CV7 x CVV; 12 x SV

21 x CSEV; 15 x LV

16 x HSSV; 100 x LV1 x CV; 5 x CVV

Total Personnel: 5155

16 x Armd Griffons8 x Utility Griffons

1 x CV14 x CVV68 x LV

1 x HSSV

EXFOR A

…

4 x CV; 16 x CVV1 x SV; 17 x LV

EXFOR A was supported by 155 mm tubeartillery firing Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) witha 40 kilometre range, 120 mm mortars that could firePGMs to a range of 15 kilometres, and armed aviationconsisting of two flights of Griffon helicopters. Thesehelicopters had an Electro-optical Reconnaissance,Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ERSTA) suite,8-16 Hellfire missiles with an 8 kilometre range, and38 laser guided Canadian Rocket Vehicle (CRV)7 rockets with a 7 kilometre range.

Specific additions for the Sense functionincluded formation and unit level UAVs that includedmicro-UAVs down to the sub-unit level. UGVs andan expendable micro-sensor network feedinginformation into the Effects Coordination Cell (ECC)/DFCC, were also incorporated into BG Sensecapabilities to enhance SA and provide a unified viewof the battlespace for mission planning.

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NLWs, with area denial and anti-personnelcapabilities, were deliverable by individual soldiers orthrough munitions effects. Intelligent barriers deliveredby artillery, UAVs, UGVs, vehicles or soldiers couldcontrol personnel and vehicle movement. Stand-off,scalable PGMs, surface- or air-launched, and eitherdirectly or indirectly fired, provided a means of deliveringprecision effects.

EXFOR B—Revolutionary Design

A brigade-size formation with approximately4,500 personnel, EXFOR B was the mosttechnologically advanced of the three EXFORconstructs. In designing EXFOR B, advantage wastaken of emerging technologies and their full potentialcapability. EXFOR B contained numerousimprovements to the system concepts present inEXFOR A, including improved extended rangeassets in artillery rocket systems and attack aviation.Its Sense capabilities had greater endurance, rangeand resolution, and were smaller, lighter and moreabundant. Soldier systems were fully integrated withhuman ergonomics and were linked to the sensorsystem for improved SA. Many Sense andCommand systems had a higher degree of autonomyand collaboration technology, and did not rely heavilyon human involvement and interface to analyse dataand re-task systems. These Sense and Commandsystems provided an integrated network able to fuseinformation from multiple sources, ranging fromindividual soldier to satellite imagery.

In terms of unit structure, EXFOR B hadonly two FAV BGs, relying on unparalleled levels ofSA and a common operating picture down to sectionand soldier level to compensate for its numericallyfewer troops. EXFOR B was structured todetermine whether technology could not onlyenhance human performance but replace it inselected areas. The four manoeuvre sub-units ofthe two BGs, not including vehicle crews, couldgenerate a total of 384 soldiers available fordismounted operations.

Individual soldiers possessed a soldierlevel SA system that included fully integratedcommunications, indoor/outdoor GlobalPositioning Navigation (GPS), combatidentification and mission coordination functionsincorporated in a heads-up display format.Protection was enhanced by NBC/ industrial toxicmaterial detection and a medical vital signs monitorincluded in the overall systems concept.

Supporting EXFOR B were two flightsof Commanche helicopters able to process up to200 targets and kill T-90 main battle tanks at arange of 8 kilometres. EXFOR B commanderscould also call upon the fire support of the USArmy-style High Mobility Artillery Rocket System(HIMARS) with a range extended to100 kilometres. Mortars, howitzers and rocketsfired PGMs, most of which were scaleable. Asin EXFOR A, a variety of scaleable effects,including both area and individual NLW systemsand intelligent barriers, were available.

EXFOR C—Current Main ContingencyForce

A brigade-sized formation of just over5,500 personnel, EXFOR C was based on thecurrent Main Contingency Force (MCF)construct.

INDIRECT FIRE(596)

BGIFS(113)

AVIATION(332)

OIO(111)

FAVISTAR(518)

ENGR AD DIO NBC SUPPLY MEDICAL

FAVBG

(857)

MAINT

SHIELD (414) SUSTAIN (414)

HQ(190)

12 x MIFS36 x ERIFS

30 x LV3 x CV

11 x CVV

16 x BGIFS1 x CV16 x LV

14 x CEV4 x CVV

24 x MMEV 24 x CEV 4 x ADEV 4 x CBRV25 x SV

10 x CSEV12 x CV

14 x CVV12 x HSSV

74 x LV

4 x CEV13 x SV

22 x CVV74 x LV

12 x ADEV ; 4 x CBRV; 1 x CV7 x CVV; 12 x SV

21 x CSEV; 15 x LV

16 x HSSV; 100 x LV1 x CV; 5 x CVV

Total Personnel: 4402

16 x Commanche8 x Utility 1 x CV

14 x CVV68 x LV

1 x HSSV

EXFOR B

…

4 x CV; 16 x CVV1 x SV; 17 x LV

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EXFOR C

MP PL(33)

TAC HEL

44 x Leopard 7 x LAV III3 x Bison

9 x Grizzly36 x M11323 x Coyote

3 x ARV Taurus

14 x Grizzly

58 x LAV III11 x Bison

7 x Coyote

18 x How Med Sp20 x LAV III30 x Bison7 x Grizzly48 x M113

4 x MRV/How Sp Med

4 x AEV Med36 x LAV III10 x Bison3 x Grizzly29 x M113

4 x MAV Bridge Laying

1 x LAV 32 x Bison

11 x Grizzly15 x M113

1 x ARV Taurus4 x Grizzly3 x M113

16 x Bison 16 x Recce Griffon8 x Utility Griffon

1 x Bison17 x LAV III/CP/ISCTotal Total Personnel: 5515: 5515

CER(586)

ARMD REGT(595)

ARTYREGT(753)

SHORAD BTY(250)

SQN(150)

HQ(317)

FD AMB(249)

SVC BN(536)

…

3FAVMECH INF

BN(682)

EXFOR C was based on present daystructures of three infantry battalions, an armouredregiment, an artillery regiment, and a field engineerregiment supported by an aviation squadron and acombat service support unit. EXFOR C wasincorporated in the experiment to serve, as a baselineto help determine if additional capabilities provided toEXFORs A and B were significant combat multipliers.The three infantry battalions provided a total of864 soldiers available for dismounted operations. Theinformation flow into EXFOR C’s all source centreand the information processing were less sophisticatedthan in the other EXFORs.

FINDINGS

Command

General. The USECT framework wasuseful for commanders visualizing major activities,efforts, and battlespace understanding, shaping andengaging in an urban setting. During the experiment,Consolidation and Transition activities were not fullyexplored; they were, however, recognized as valuablein framing gateways to end-states. The simplicity andbroad application of the USECT concept were usefulfor co-ordinating joint, interagency and CIMIC activity.

Exercise of Command. Widespreadpresence of high-technology support throughoutEXFORs A and B provided the individual soldier withheightened SA and a significant role to play in the

overall sensor system. Commanders, capable ofgaining quick access to detailed information on eventsor developments affecting any part of their AO, wereconfronted with a Command choice: devolvecommand decisions downward or exert directivecontrol. Alternative means of taking advantage ofthe intrinsic strengths of a mission command philosophywere debated, but the issue was not resolved.Consensus was reached on the need for the Army’sprofessional military education system to keep pacewith developments in Command capability andapplication in an urban environment. The possibilitythat heightened SA at sub-unit level would permitflattening of the command hierarchy, throughelimination of platoon or troop headquarters, andstreamlining of information passage was deemed tobe worthy of further investigation.

Decision Support. EXFOR A and B sensorsystems presented true order of magnitudeimprovement opportunities over those of EXFOR C.It was agreed that improved SA information at all levels,however, will not free commanders from a continuingneed to rely on their experience, judgement, intuition,and an understanding of technology limitations to makesound decisions.

Physical and Moral Planes. For swiftdecisions and appropriate action, it was found thatunderstanding based on accurate data and assessmentson armed factions, non-combatants and the physicalnature of the urban area must be sound. Within the

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physical plane, sensors will be able to provideinformation concerning physical events and activities;however, the intangibles of the moral plane, i.e. humanintent and perceptions, will continue to prove moredifficult to discern.

Commander’s Critical InformationRequirements (CCIR)/IPB Shift. Linked tothe difficulty of sensing human intent is the CCIRfocus shift from “geography”—terrain and itsimpact on operations involving a heavily armedmanoeuvrable enemy force in the open, expandedbattlespace—to CCIRs related to“demography”—culture, presence and intentionsof hostile and non-hostile inhabitants exploitingor living in an urban battlespace. Analystsworking on CCIR issues will need a high level ofcultural awareness, HUMINT input, effective datafusion technology and data processing practicesto answer CCIRs. Improved IPB methods andsupporting technology are required.

Commander Influence. Not surprisingly,nearly unanimous opinion was expressed thatcommanders will need to exert personal influenceand share battlespace dangers in an urbanenvironment. Professional judgement and personalinteraction of commanders will still be important inthe era of the ECC, from which commanders canview vast amounts of information about the entireAO and deal directly with subordinates by videotele-conference technology. Commanders willrequire “on the move” SA that permits greaterflexibility to exert personal influence, retain SA andsupport subordinates actions.

Reach-Back. The viability of detachingECC elements to the rear, including out of theatre,as a reach-back system was discussed, but until areliable ECC reach-back system can be developed,use of such an approach was not consideredacceptable. Notwithstanding, the advantages ofperhaps more numerous, smaller, mobileheadquarters were recognized.

Data Fusion Command Centre. A clearrequirement for unit commanders to have a DFCCthat fully addresses mission planning needs of the urbanenvironment was noted. It was acknowledged thatthe DFCC concept was not specific to “urban”operations. What was considered essential was forthe DFCC to be able to collect and synchronizeinformation on the urban landscape and infrastructure,threats and potential threats, and non-combatantpresence from unit and sub-unit sensors, soldiers, higherlevel sensor feeds, and higher level intelligence reporting/SA development portrayal. The DFCC was viewedas a means of expediting assessment production forSA depiction on two- and three-dimensional images,supporting decision-making and wargaming, anddeveloping sensor task matrices.

Force Protection and Task PerformanceBalance. Striking the balance between forceprotection and performance of mission essential taskswas expected to remain an area in which commandersmust personally weigh risks versus gain. Potential forhigh numbers of friendly and non-combatant casualtiesin urban operations will compound this challenge, evenwith the advent of new PGMs and improved sensors.All EXFOR commanders cited physical proximity andinteraction with the population as the best means ofunderstanding the city and its people. Accordingly,they established several large camps supported by aquick reaction force within the urban area. The additionof various high-technology sensors providing real-time

Effects Coordination Cell

EFFECTS SENSORS HPTs SA

• Focal point for firepower related resources and activities• Single unified view of battle space • Near real-time visibility over all sensors• Access to full spectrum of weapons effects• Establish sensor-to-shooter links• Digital link to other services (Air, Naval)

Objectives

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information to assist in securing base camp areas, anduse of a soldier SA system, were seen as deterrentsand force protection multipliers.

Sense

General. The importance of both operatedand unattended Sense assets was examined throughoutthe experiment with a view to determine which sensorswere of most use in an urban setting, at what level theywere most useful, and how data flow should becontrolled to promote SA at all levels.

OPFOR Sense. OPFOR factions relied ona variety of concealment, deception and data floodingtechniques to avoid detection, mask presence andconceal intentions. OPFOR overt and covert Senseand counter-Sense techniques included the following:exploitation of superior OPFOR knowledge of theterrain and culture; use of civilian pattern vehicles andnormal street clothing; exploitation of routine civilianactivity patterns; use of hidden ammunition caches andsafe houses; use of small groups to conduct actions;use of Internet web-cameras and other unattendedground surveillance means to free guerrilla membersfor more active operations; exploitation of informationavailable on the Internet, in news broadcasts andgathered from commercial communication interceptdevices; use of reliable HUMINT sources; spread ofdisinformation and other PSYOPS messages; use ofgarages and lower-floor hiding areas to concealarmoured vehicles or position them for firing; use ofurban area clutter, tunnels and high-rise buildings tothwart hostile aerial surveillance; use of relatively shortranges and reaction times in urban areas to exploit delaysin the decision-making process; and exploitation ofopportunities afforded when adverse weatherconditions degraded the effectiveness of hostile Senseplatforms and/or sensors. Some OPFOR elementsopenly conducted activities, using the shielding presenceof supportive civilian crowds, refugee movement ornon-governmental organisation (NGO) facilities tofrustrate EXFOR targeting efforts and legitimize theOPFOR cause.

EXFOR Sense. All EXFOR variants weregreatly challenged by the wide range of Sense andcounter-Sense practices employed by OPFORfactions. No specific type or amount of technologyavailable to any EXFOR variant could provide real-time, deception-free, complete SA or thwart allOPFOR Sense capabilities. Notwithstanding, EXFORB with its high technology means to locate, identify,assess and react to hostile forces was best suited toreact to OPFOR Sense capabilities.

Sensor Mix and Allotment. Having a mixof sensors and platforms from formation down tosoldier level was important in all EXFOR variants, withEXFOR ability to confront OPFOR elements onEXFOR terms defined in large measure to theavailability, distribution and sophistication of EXFORSense capabilities. Sensors could not reduce thenumber of tasks requiring resource commitment, butthey were able to provide coverage in urban areaswhere insufficient troops were available to meet all tasks.Sensors, particularly those with an all-weather, 24/7,real-time download capability and supportingbandwidth, were able to provide much neededinformation as far down the chain of command asSA receiver-transmitters existed. It was recognizedthat dismounted soldiers should not be overburdenedwith sensors; nonetheless, a requirement existed forsimple, rugged sensors operable by non-specialists tobe available to soldiers at section level to promote andenhance force protection, efficient troop employmentand thorough SA development.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). UAVpresence throughout the fielded force, from formationdown to at least sub-unit level, was considered animportant force multiplier even if UAVs themselves werenot considered mission essential. With an ability todeploy UAVs quickly and enable those desiring SAdetail to tap into real-time UAV data feeds,commanders possessing UAV assets were betterpositioned to acquire more comprehensive informationthan commanders who lacked UAV assets to directagainst CCIRs. Not only could UAVs provide SA

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using a number of sensors, they could also supportattainment of objectives by serving as radio rebroadcastassets, devices to cue other sensors or reserve forces,resources to deploy micro-sensors and detection/identification “tags,” and quick-reaction precision-strikeassets. The need to employ UAVs at lower altitudesand slower speeds, making them more vulnerable todestruction and disruption, particularly during daylighthours, pointed to a preference to have numerous, small,inexpensive, single-sensor UAVs. Availability of onlya few expensive, multi-sensor UAVs in a commander’sinventory of resources was viewed as an inhibition toUAV use.

inexpensive systems to cue other sensors or elicit aresponse from a roving patrol or reserve force wasconsidered cost effective and combat power enhancing.The ability of these systems also to act as a sensorbackbone was critical in overcoming urban clutter issues.EXFOR A systems could act as a backbone; EXFORB could act as a backbone and collaborate to develop acontact within the entire sensor suite providing input intothe DFCC.

UAV

Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs).UGVs were not considered to be as multi-functionalas UAVs in an urban setting; however, they too had arole to play in future military operations. In high-risksettings where momentum was stalled or being slowed,UGVs could be deployed to assist in locating hostileforces, determine whether obstacles posed dangers toadvancing troops or civilians, or assist in disposal ofexplosives or unexploded ordnance. With the aid ofsensors, UGVs could also be positioned and cued todestroy detected high payoff targets, thereby enhancingtactical level force protection.

Expendables, Micro-sensor Networksand Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS). Thesewere viewed as mobility enablers, freeing troops fromstatic positions of observation to take more activeroles in urban operations. The ability of relatively

HUMINT. As expected, HUMINTactivity and reporting were important to the conductof successful operations in an urban setting. Asidefrom established policy, doctrine, structure andtraining, HUMINT success was dependent onlinguist and translator availability, link analysissoftware, military-community interaction success,mission legitimacy, and community contact at sectionlevel.

Aviation. Despite the significant air defencethreat expected from hostile factions in an urbansetting of 2025, aviation is expected to be able toprovide communications support, enhanced SA andprecision strike from stand-off positions. ImprovedElectro-Optical Reconnaissance, Surveillance andTarget Acquisition (ERSTA) sensors that cover awider area can eliminate the necessity for twoaviation platforms to handle any given mission.Whether vulnerable aviation resources will remainan important SA asset in the future will depend onadvances in, and acquisition of, UAV technology.

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Act

General. Across the EXFORs, therequirement for significant numbers of dismountedsoldiers, and the importance of non-lethal effects,scalable precision effects and Information Operations(IO) were highlighted.

OPFOR Act. OPFOR elements had a rangeof lethal and non-lethal Act options open to them,including the following:

Covert Actions. Movement and stockpiling ofarms and explosives, safe house operation,sabotage, subversion, espionage, black marketactivities, recruitment, training, wire-tapping/eavesdropping, inter-faction cooperation/assistance, political influence, and cyber attack.

Overt Actions. Sniping, booby-trapping andmining, obstacle and strongpoint fortification work,road blocks, crowd rallying and marshalling,refugee movement interference, ethnic cleansing,neighbourhood control (e.g. identification checking,taxation, guarding), assassination, thermobaricround launching, fuel-air explosive use(flamethrower), bombing, hostage-taking, looting,tire burning, arson, rock throwing, mortar attack,small group attack, suicide attack, utility disruption/destruction, chemical/ biological attacks and attackthreats, and casualty infliction.

Although OPFOR elements were lessrestrained in their choice of Act options, they wererestrained by the need to maintain popular support intheir respective communities and avoid decisiveconfrontations with the much more militarily powerfulEXFOR in their midst.

EXFOR Act. Guided by Rules ofEngagement (ROE) constraints based on principles ofmilitary necessity, humanity, proportionality anddiscrimination, EXFOR commanders and troops reliedto a great extent on superior technology and training toovercome OPFOR shielding strategies and defeatOPFOR actions.

Priorities/Manpower Limitations. AllEXFOR variants, in particular EXFOR B, lackedsufficient dismounted soldiers for urban operations.Consequently, EXFOR commanders were requiredto determine which tasks required troop presence andwhich could be handled by reserve forces cued bySense monitors. For many perimeter and vital pointguard duties, Sense assets rather than troops werededicated to detect trouble, intruders or other threats.For crowd control and cordon-search operations,EXFOR variants with the flexibility to deploy troopsinto a trouble area were the best equipped to takeadvantage of SA and respond effectively. It wasdetermined that units and sub-units require a reasonablemass to accomplish tasks and maintain flexibilitybecause of the density of non combatants and thephysical environment.

Non-lethal Effects. Each unit in all of theEXFORs had a critical requirement to possessindividual and collective NLW or effects, and specificROE for their use. With these, commanders couldseparate hostile factions from non-combatants and havean escalatory means of dealing with individuals orcrowds while minimizing casualties and retainingflexibility in task execution.

Information Operations. The importance ofa comprehensive IO campaign that featured PSYOPScapabilities came to the fore. OPFOR factions andEXFOR expected attempts by all parties involved in theconflict and its resolution to use the media as part of a

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PSYOPS campaign. All factions recognized that futuremedia capabilities could include privately controlledUAVs with live video feeds and other real-time meansthat pose both security risks and opportunities that couldbe harnessed. The need to influence local populationsand world opinion, while denying hostile factions use ofsafe havens either locally or globally, was deemed criticalto EXFOR success. This was acknowledged to be astrategic responsibility that had implications andapplication at formation and unit level.

Cyber Operations4. Judicious attack againstspecific hostile computer and communication systemsof the armed factions, their supporting agencies, andpossibly sponsoring nations was identified as arequirement deserving strategic level attention.

Freedom of Movement/Manoeuvre.EXFOR freedom of movement and manoeuvre wereaffected by urban congestion, transportation grid patterns,civilian traffic, obstacles established by armed factions,communication hub targeting, sniping threats, and refugeemovement. Where freedom of movement/manoeuvreproblems existed, EXFOR variants with lethal and non-lethal PGMs, long-range strike capabilities, and aerialor aviation support were best equipped to respondquickly against identified hostile elements. EXFORs Aand B used their enhanced SA capability to manoeuvre,re-route forces, infiltrate areas and avoid choke pointsto reduce risk, while EXFOR C was unable to achievethe same degree of mobility.

Dismounted Troops. Separation ofsoldiers from armoured vehicles is expected toremain a characteristic of urban operations infuture warfare. Soldiers rely on vehicle platformsto provide protection, SA and data fusionsupport, communications, first aid support,firepower, manoeuvrability, mobility and rapidextraction/evacuation; separation from thevehicles diminishes or eliminates many of thesesoldier support systems. For dismounted soldiersto be truly effective, specific improvement thatallows for robust SA and weapons/designatorsystems to target and guide effects in the closebattle must occur. Tactical overmatch must bethe aim to defeat and deter hostile elements in thedismounted battle.

Soldier SA. Critical to achievingovermatch in close battle is SA down to soldierlevel. Soldiers require a robust SA system withsufficient bandwidth to select and pull detailed,accurate and timely information pertinent tospecific, immediate interests. It is essential thatthis system not push non-essential information,and that confidence in information accuracyremains high. Disabling features on informationpassage/reception are aspects that must beexplored as the Army moves to reliance on digitalinformation gathering, processing, disseminationand sharing throughout its force structure.

SoldierSub-System Requirements

HEADVISION

HEARING RESPIRATORY

SPEECH

ProtectionThermal ComfortPhysical ComfortFit/AdjustabilityPower/DataDetectors

ProtectionVentilation

Voice CommsSpeech Input

ProtectionLocal AwarenessAuditory DisplaysEnhanced Hearing

ProtectionLocal AwarenessVisual DisplaysEnhanced Vision

Future Soldier SystemCommand• Indoor/Outdoor Communication via relays• Indoor/Outdoor 3D navigation• 3D situational awareness to 1 metre• Information display for ease of understanding• Information aggregated for each level of commandSense• Fused II/TI/video images• Sensors provide an ISTAR node• Combat IDAct• Modular weapon system with HE, blast, AP, KE

and non-lethal ammunition• Integrated fire control systemShield• Advanced body armour and smart uniform• NBC/TIMS/LWR/Sniper warning devicesSustain• Physiological monitoring• Self-sufficient for 3 days

This is a modular man-portable system providing:

3D situational awareness inside buildingsat tactical and operational-level command

4 Cyber Operations is a subset of IO that involves military actions relating to electronic communications networks andvirtual reality. Source: Directorate of Army Doctrine

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CIMIC. Interaction with, and cooperationfrom, NGOs and international organisations willcontinue to be important when dealing with a host oflocal issues, from refugee control to food distribution.All EXFORs exhibited a need for a permanent CIMICorganisation, staffed by professional engineers,technicians, logisticians, legal experts, and socialscientists. In addition, dedicated CIMIC experts willbe able to assist Future Army commanders understandthe battlespace and help prepare for Consolidation andTransition stages of operations.

OPFOR Shield. OPFOR elements selectedthe urban area as the battlespace given its inherentshielding elements: the presence of physical structures,civilians, refugees, cultural landmarks, media, Internetcommunication access, and “urban clutter.”Underground tunnels and sewage systems, interiorspaces of buildings, and the height of vertical structuresall posed physical barriers and impediments to manyEXFOR Sense and firepower assets. Camouflagingmany OPFOR members and actions was the cloakingprovided by daily urban activities of ordinary civilians,refugees and traffic. If detecting and identifyingOPFOR presence was made difficult by these aspects,the ready availability of secure communications andundetected Internet usage shielded OPFORinformation passage and made difficult EXFOR attemptsto decipher OPFOR intentions, forecast OPFORtimings, and interrupt or prevent OPFOR exploitationof mass media or Internet communication access.

OPFOR elements often effectively exploitedthese conditions, making use of political agitators,crowds, refugee movement, NGO/internationalorganisation presence, and proximity to vital points orcultural landmarks to shield OPFOR elements fromEXFOR detection and/or targeting. ComplicatingEXFOR attempts to bypass these Shield efforts wasconcern among EXFOR commanders that anyEXFOR action or collateral damage that could beinterpreted as excessive by the mass media or otherobservers would draw international attention andthreaten support for EXFOR domestically,internationally and within the AO. For EXFOR,judicious use of PGMs, selection of appropriatePSYOPS messages, and use of non-lethal means ofpersuasion were viewed as important in the fight againstOPFOR shielding tactics.

EXFOR Shield. EXFOR, too, relied onvarious Shield schemes and technologies to protect itsforces and achieve mission success.

Physical Shielding. Inescapably linked toShield is Sense, given the close association betweensensor system warning and target cueing for

Confrontation—Crowds. Physical separationof hostile communities required troop presence, intelligentbarriers, or other non-lethal means. Intelligent barriersworked in static locations, but where crowds could formspontaneously barriers were no substitute for mobile, armedsoldiers cued by Sense assets.

Confrontation—Armed Factions. EXFORvariants able to detect armed factions presence, identifytheir locations, and quickly assess their intentions wereable to respond rapidly with an appropriate counter.EXFORs A and B had the flexibility to continuemonitoring, deploying troops or engaging with scalablePGMs or effects; EXFOR C could not achieve the samesuccess due to a lack of sensors and effects options.The capability of delivering precise scalable effects thatreduced collateral damage was assessed as important.

Shield

General. The importance of Shield issues toboth OPFOR and EXFOR was clearly evident.

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engagement. Across the EXFORs, combat andCombat Service Support (CSS) vehicles operating inforward areas needed improved protection fromfragmentation rounds, sniper fire, rocket-propelledgrenades, thermobaric rounds, fuel-air explosives, mine-blasts, and NBC/industrial toxic material threats.Combat troops benefited from having devices such asUAVs and UGVs that could warn of NBCcontamination, scout dangerous routes and areas, clearobstacles and mines, and enter rooms suspected ofhousing hostile faction elements. Non-lethal barrierswere assessed to be an effective way of controllingcrowds and detecting intruders. All soldiers benefitedfrom having advanced protective clothing and vaccinesto ward off threats to health posed by ballistic roundsand fragments, chemical agents and biological viruses.Use of stand-off distances, video recording, remoteobstacle deployment systems, and advanced PGMsshielded EXFOR personnel from encounters withhostile forces equipped for a close-in fight andaccusations of inaccurate targeting practices. Of note,CSS units also required significant protection to movethrough insecure, urban areas. SA, comparable to thatavailable to combat force elements, is required withinthe sustainment system to ensure that the system doesnot become the Achilles heel of a fast moving,technologically advanced combat force.

Issues pertaining to provision of forceprotection against those piloting crop dusters and othersmall aircraft, determination of appropriate levels ofcamp “fortification,” and assessment of needs forHUMINT, counter-intelligence, field engineer,communications security, and military police personnelwere discussed. Across the EXFORs the need at alllevels to shield information collection, processing anddissemination hardware, software and communicationlines was determined to be vitally important. WithinEXFORs A and B it was assessed to be a criticalvulnerability.

Availability of innovative camp shelter materialsand construction methods that protect camps andenhance survivability, without giving a “defendedfortress” appearance that can be exploited by hostile

PSYOPS, was determined to be another innovativemethod of shielding a force from undue criticism.

Shielding against hostile attack on computer andcommunication systems of military forces, supportingagencies, and civilian infrastructure networks—both intheatre and in homelands—was identified as arequirement deserving strategic level attention.

Shield

Moral Shielding. As part of the EXFORIO approach, a robust counter-PSYOPS/IOprogramme, a strong CIMIC effort, and pro-activemedia relations campaign were needed to counterOPFOR efforts to discredit EXFOR. Sound OPSECprocedures, adherence to ROE, and ethical behaviourby all members of the force made it more difficult forOPFOR to challenge EXFOR legitimacy. Use of non-lethal effects that could modify behaviour was viewedas one measure that could assist in achieving andmaintaining moral high ground.

Related to shielding is the critical aspect ofshielding a soldier’s morale. Soldier morale and espritde corps are built upon strong leadership, comradeship,sound training, maintenance of standards, good materialsupport, and knowledge that family members at homeare shielded from harm while receiving support fromthe extended military community. Safeguarding moralewill remain difficult with hostile forces conspiring toerode it through hostile PSYOPS or physical actions.Active consideration of all aspects of shielding moralemust be considered.

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Sustain

General. Sustain issues were of greatconsequence to the EXFORs while of relatively minorsignificance to the OPFORs.

Replenishment. The nature of the threat andurban environment made it difficult to move soft-skinnedvehicles without an extensive security force. Even then, theload, propulsion system and drivers of supply vehicles wereat significant risk. One option considered was to have aBG sub-unit secure the replenishment operation for theremainder of the EXFOR. The complexity and difficultyinvolved in securing portions of even a relatively small urbanarea, coupled with the impact on tactical operations,however, precluded assignment of combat forces to sucha role, either on a permanent or temporary basis.

Use of aviation resources was also consideredas a replenishment approach option, but one that had twomain problems. Neither the threat to low-flying helicoptersfrom difficult to detect man-portable air defence weaponsnor the limited lift capacity of medium weight helicopterscould be overlooked. During URBAN CHALLENGE,this was particularly true for EXFORs A and C, which hadCH 146/Griffon helicopter lift limitations; EXFOR B hadUH-60/BlackHawk lift availability and technology forGPS-guided, parachute airdrop delivery. Despite lowerdemands for many supplies while conducting operations ina confined urban AO, particularly by relatively static forcesrelying on sophisticated sensors to gather information andPGMs to strike targets with minimum ammunitionexpenditure, consumption quantities remained considerable.

Although ground movement of supplies posedproblems, it was deemed to be a continuing requirement.Utilisation of a family of armed, armoured logistic vehicles,with a common chassis and modular variants to handle thefull range of combat and other supplies, was the preferredreplenishment approach option.

Medical Evacuation. Lack of both dedicatedair ambulances and secure, land-based lines ofcommunication for casualty evacuation proved to beproblems during URBAN CHALLENGE. Air evacuationresources and casualty suits/bags to improve a woundedsoldier’s survival chances were selected as importantevacuation aids to be developed and acquired. Finding away to evacuate a soldier safely without dedicating two tofour soldiers to support the effort was also assessed asbeing an important issue to be studied.Another approach, the one on which EXFORs

A and B were structured, was to allocate sufficientsustainment resources to the BG to satisfy a given missionrequirement and then either undertake a full replenishmentor withdraw the force. It was recognized that having anincreased amount of sustainment resources deployed greatlyincreased the security requirement within the AO of theBG and that the security environment could make this anunrealistic option. This problem might be reduced if unitswere self-sustaining for shorter periods and then withdrawnfor refit and rearm activity. But this again presented seriousconcerns related to resupply vehicle movement throughinsecure areas. New concepts for resupply delivery andpackaging are required to resolve this problem.

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Recovery and Maintenance. Powerneeds, new system complexity, and special resourcerequirements for urban area conflict will bring to theurban battlespace service support provider a newdimension of maintenance and serviceabilitychallenges. Recovery and maintenance issues forthe Future Army operating in an urban battlespaceinclude the following:

Non-disposable UAV and UGV maintenanceand power management concerns.

Training and deployment problems, whetherhighly skilled technician/soldiers are used orcivilian contractors are employed.

Protected and expedient recovery capabilityneeds, for both personnel and vehicle casualties.

Self-analysis and self-repair technology, whichmust be embedded within future weapon andvehicle systems if the teeth to tail ratio is not tobe negatively affected.

Major Judgements and Insights

General. Initial analysis of the findings hasenabled DLSC to make the following judgementsregarding urban operations of the future. These willbe carried forward and examined comparatively withobservations and data from other urban operationscombat development work.

Technology, Troop Strength and ForceConstruct. Technology will enhance individualand collective force capabilities, but will notreplace the need for significant numbers ofsoldiers in complex terrain. Operations inURBAN CHALLENGE exposed numerousdeficiencies in the EXFOR constructs, includingthe following:

All EXFORs, but especially EXFOR B (withonly two BGs), required additional dismountedtroops to meet the troops-to-tasks challenge.

EXFOR A and B units had the wrong balanceof capabilities for urban terrain. Instead of twoMMEV and two CEV sub-units, a BG in anurban operation would have been better servedwith one MMEV and three CEV sub-units.

EXFOR C was forced to park major weaponsystems (which in themselves were of limitedutility because of the lack of PGM capability)in order to create additional mounted anddismounted patrols.

SA, Information Gathering and InformationSharing

Use of UAVs, UGVs, UGS, expendable micro-sensor networks, soldier SA systems, datafusion technology and advanced disseminationmeans down to the lowest levels of commandwill significantly contribute to operationaleffectiveness.

The ability to determine (Sense) intentions andperceptions of civilian populations will beessential for operations in any urbanenvironment and merits R&D.

Dismounted Soldier Capabilities. Soldiersoperating in complex terrain will often be separatedfrom their vehicles and require portable systemsthat provide them with both SA and the means tocoordinate fires or effects.

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Sense

There will be a desire to control, but not havedependency upon, full electro-magneticspectrum dominance; and to deny the sameto the enemy.

Systems (surveillance and TA) will berequired that reduce hostile force Shieldadvantages in the urban battlespace.

Effects

Sophisticated, long-range TA and PGMs willbe required in order to achieve stand-off forengagement of armed hostile forces in high-risk confrontations. These capabilities willreduce the threat of casualties to own forcesand non-combatants.

Precision scalable effects will be decisive inshaping the battlespace.

Area non-lethal effects, including IO, CIMICand cyber operations capabilities, will beessential in order to pre-empt or neutralizehostile crowds or PSYOPS means.

Force Protection

The dilemma about whether to dispersetroops to protect high value targets or toconcentrate troops in order to protect theforce will continue in future urban operation,meriting development of technological meansto support both objectives.

There will be a requirement for armouredCSS capabilities.

Sustain. Technological advances will beneeded to protect and reduce the demand forcombat supplies. Innovations for R&D studyinclude the following:

Water extraction and purification systems forindividual soldiers and vehicles.

New fuel system approaches, where two ormore stable elements can be mixed whenfuel is required, and hybrid electric drives toreduce fuel consumption.

Micro-ration packs.

USECT Framework. USECT provides a usefulframework for dealing with the complexity of urbanoperations.

Joint Doctrine. There is a requirement for jointdoctrine that includes military, government andcivilian organisation coordination (in both theplanning and execution of urban operations).

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREAREA OF STUDY

Conclusions

In determining whether a force optimized foropen, expanded battlespace operations can be effectivein operations in a complex, specifically urban,environment, it was found that the EXFORs couldoperate but with limited effectiveness. Even thetechnologically sophisticated EXFORs A and B, hadsignificant shortfalls due to their composition and thecharacteristics of urban areas. EXFOR C encounteredsevere shortcomings due to a lack of technologicaladvances and resources, particularly in the Command,Sense and Act functions.

Houses of Ypres A.Y. Jackson

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Inputs for the Future Army Model

Complex BattlespaceOperations

Open , expandedBattlespaceOperations

Future Army Model

Operations in urban terrain will proveextremely difficult for any army, no matter how wellit is equipped and organized, and no matter howadvanced its doctrine and training may be.Although further analysis is required, URBANCHALLENGE showed the value of numerousconcepts to assist in preparing a military force forone of the most likely future operatingenvironments—urban. Analysis points specificallyto the need to understand complex environmentsbetter and develop requirements related to the fiveoperational functions to achieve success.

Capability requirements, CEV/MMEV mixdesires, and differences in the relative importanceof long- and short-range assets already suggest that“one size does not fit all” when it comes to forcestructure. Optimizing a Future Army construct forcomplex terrain while making it adaptable to openterrain will require careful analysis.

Future Area of Study

URBAN CHALLENGE explored newconcepts and technology that deepened ourknowledge of requirements needed to fight and winin the urban battlespace. Findings and insights willbe used to refine Future Army concept developmentand guide R&D initiatives.

Taken together, the first two DLSCexperiments provide the background needed tofurther concept development on the Future ArmyModel. Operations in the open, expandedbattlespace (Experiment 1) were characterized bydeep battle and the value of extended range assets;operations in a complex battlespace (Experiment 2)featured close combat and the enduring value ofindividual soldiers. Balancing these capabilities andstrengths, coupled with defining an inventory ofrelated requirements to facilitate building the Armyof Tomorrow, will be the next step in the challengeto create a force optimized for complex terrain andadaptable for the open battlespace.

• Close combat• Enduring value of

the individual soldier

• Deep battle• Extended range assets

Complex Open, Expanded

4241

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3643

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Command

Where should the commander be locatedduring various phases of an urban operation?Does the urban environment restrict acommander’s ability to use a “tacticalCommand Post”?

What information or Commander’s CriticalInformation Requirements (CCIRs) doesthe commander need to track during anurban operation? How will an “effects-based” control centre be different from acurrent HQ?

How should commanders balance forceprotection issues in an urban environment?

Sense

How are UAVs best employed in an urbanenvironment? Should they be controlled atformation, BG and/or combat team level?

How important are unattended groundsensors? Should they be allocated andcontrolled at formation, BG and/or combatteam level? Can they replace standing patrolsor observation posts?

How should sensor feeds be fused? Whoshould have access to what information?

Act

How can manoeuvre be used in urban areas?How can the concepts of controlling onlynodes and critical points be best employed?

How important are non-lethal weapons? Atwhat level should they be held and controlled?

How can collateral damage be minimized?

What options are available to deal with thedeficiency of “troops-to-task” in the urbanenvironment?

How can the moral and cyber planes beattacked at brigade level? How important areCIMIC and PSYOPS?

Shield

How can EXFOR shield itself against attackon the physical, moral, cyber orelectromagnetic planes?

Sustain

How will lack of secure lines of communicationimpede replenishment and casualty evacuationoperations?

What alternate sustainment concepts might beof use in an urban environment?

ANNEX A—LIST OF MAJOR QUESTIONS

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EXCON

Col JMC Rousseau DLSCLCol S Brennan DLSCCOL J Cantwell Australian Army Land

Development CentreLCol I Hope DLSCLCol I Hunt CFB KingstonLCol A Morrow DLSCLCol S Noonan DLFSDr R Glenn Rand CorporationMaj P McAdam DADMaj M Boire RMCMr R Boyer DLSCCpl L Steele DLSC

HICON

LCol C Magee DADLCol S McLeish DADLCol R Wuerth CLFCSCLTCOL D Fraser Australian Army LOMaj J Barr DADMaj J Bradley JSGMaj K Born US Army Urban

Operations Project OfficerMaj P Fleet DADMaj R Hagerman CFLO US Aviation CenterMaj D Halpenny AJAG LFDTSMaj D Jones DADMaj J Morse CTC Infantry SchoolMaj G Vassbotn DADMaj K Whale 1 WingCapt A Butler USMC

WHITE CELL

Dr S Robertson LFDTS Strategic AnalystLTC S Murray US TRADOC LOLCol D Patterson CLFCSCLTCOL G Sanderson Australian Army Force

Development Group

OPFOR CELL

LCol R ap Probert DLSCLTCOL D Gillian Australian Army Future

Land WarfareLCol P Rutherford CLFCSCMAJ R Hamilton Australian Army Force

Development GroupDr M Hennessy RMC

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH TEAM

Mr F Cameron LFDTS ORMr R Roy LFDTS ORMs Z Bouayed LFDTS ORDr N Corbett 1 CAD HQMr P Fournier DREVMs D Maclean DGOR

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TEAM

Mr R Reshke LFDTS Scientific AdvisorMr D Smith DSTLLCol J Dick DSTLDr L Pigeon DREVMr S Gauthier DREOMr G Fournier DRDC ValcartierMr G Pageau DSTLMr D Saint DSTLMr A Bergeron DRDC Valcartier

ARMY EXPERIMENTATION CENTRE

Maj B Chapman AECCapt C MacPhail AEC

COMMAND/STAFF APPOINTMENTS

Graduating students of CLFCSC Transitional Commandand Staff Course 05

ANNEX B—PARTICIPANTS

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OPFOR Factions

The NATO Coalition was confronted with twoprincipal groups of armed factions, both led by politicalparties championing diametrically opposed end-statesfor the troubled territory. Both ethnic groups, Bowlsand Zacks, had the intent and capacity to conduct guerrillaactions, terrorist strikes and acts of defiance.

The ethnic Bowl group, supporting the politicaltransition, comprised two elements: the BatumiLiberation Brigade and the more radical BatumiFreedom Fighters. Both factions, each numberingapproximately 100 lightly armed guerrillas in the capitalcity, were routinely attacking the armed factions, citizensand institutions of the ethnic Zack people.

The ethnic Zack group, opposed to thetransition, had a similar group of lightly armedguerrillas—the Zack Loyalist Forces, and a battalion-size force of loosely knit military deserters from aneighbouring country. The deserters were armed witha modest number of sophisticated tracked and wheeledarmoured fighting vehicles, including anti-tank vehicles,air defence weaponry, tanks and a limited electronicwarfare capability. A company-size element of SpecialForces troops and several modern attack helicopterssupported the deserter faction. Both ethnic Zackfactions were conducting activities aimed at creatingdomestic instability, taking over government and securityforce roles, discrediting all who opposed them, andcleansing ethnic Bowl neighbourhoods.

Although the armed factions of each ethnicgroup were formidable, no armed faction in the Area ofOperations (AO) had the weaponry or firepower tochallenge openly the NATO Coalition. Nonetheless, allfactions were able to draw considerable combat powerfrom their ability to shield and conceal their actions by avariety of means to reduce NATO Coalitioneffectiveness and response options.

Vignette 1—Crisis Response

Vignette 1 introduced the deteriorating securitysituation within Batumigrad, as continuing violence bypara-militaries and guerrilla forces reached crisis levels.A significant increase in ethnically motivated terror attacksthroughout the disputed territory over a period of several

ANNEX C—OPFOR FACTIONS AND VIGNETTES

weeks heightened tension, fuelled unrest, and promptedmovement of internally displaced persons into Batumigrad.The assassination of the moderate Governor of Batumi,followed by the passing of a UNSCR authorizing NATOmilitary action on behalf of the Security Council, led todeployment of Canada’s EXFOR into two assembly areasnorth of Batumigrad and other NATO Coalitioncontingents elsewhere in the disputed territory. Thechallenge in Vignette 1 was to develop, within the overallcampaign plan, a formation level concept of operationsfor the AO centred on Batumigrad.

Vignette 2—Defensive Operations

Vignette 2 opened with eruption of open fightingin Batumigrad and across the province. After a weekof riots at Batumigrad University, a series of politicalassassinations heightened tension and led to all armedfactions openly engaging in small skirmishes and terrorattacks. A deliberate attack by armed ethnic Zackfactions on NATO forces deployed in the capital resultedin a significant number of NATO casualties and fear offurther attacks. The JTF commander ordered forceswithin the city to adopt a defensive posture and protectareas currently under their control while counter-moveswere organized. Vignette 2 was set at BG level; thetask was to develop and wargame a defensive conceptof operations from unit to sub-unit level.

Vignette 3—Offensive Operations

Vignette 3 began with EXFOR located in twoassembly areas outside Batumigrad, a city embroiled inopen conflict. Seizure of the Provincial LegislativeBuilding by Zack deserters in apparent collaboration withZack Loyalist Forces led to ethnic Zack control of thecity’s downtown core and approaches, riots at theuniversity main campus and the Provincial LegislativeBuildings, erection of additional street barricades, mobaction and violent reaction by Bowl guerrilla groupsagainst ethnic Zack civilians and cultural sites. NATOwas called upon to restore order in the capital and protectimportant civilian infrastructure, cultural, political andcommercial sites; EXFOR was assigned the core ofBatumigrad. The task in Vignette 3 was to develop andwargame an offensive concept of operations at bothformation and unit level that would defeat armed factionsand secure the capital.

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AAR After Action Review

ADEV Air Defence Effects Vehicle

AO Area of Operations

BG Battle Group

BGIFS Battle Group Indirect FireSupport Vehicle

CBRV Chemical, Biological andRadiological Vehicle

CCIR Commander’s Critical InformationRequirements

CEV Close Effects Vehicle

CIMIC Civilian-Military Cooperation

CSEV Combat Support Effects Vehicle

CSS Combat Service Support

CV Command Vehicle

CVV Command Variant Vehicle

DFCC Data Fusion Command Centre

ECC Effects Coordination Cell

ERIFS Extended Range Indirect FireSystem

ERSTA Electro-Optical Reconnaissance,Surveillance and Target Acquisition

EXCON Exercise Control

EXFOR Experimental Force

FAV Future Armoured Vehicle

GENFOR Generic Force

HICON Higher Control

HIMARS High Mobility Artillery RocketSystem

HSSV Health Service Support Vehicle

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IO Information Operations

IPB Intelligence Preparation of theBattlefield

IR Information Requirements

LAV Light Armoured Vehicle

LV Logistic Vehicle

MCF Main Contingency Force

MIFS Medium Indirect Fire System

MMEV Multi-mission Effects Vehicle

NBC Nuclear, Biological or Chemical

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NLW Non Lethal Weapons

OIO/DIO Offensive / DefensiveInformation Operations

OPFOR Opposing Force

OPP Operation Planning Process

PIR Priority Intelligence Requirements

PGM Precision Guided Munitions

PSYOPS Psychological Operations

SA Situational Awareness

SV Sense Vehicle

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UGS Unattended Ground Sensors

UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle

UNSCR United Nations Security CouncilResolution

USECT Understand, Shape, Engage,Consolidate and Transition

VSHORAD Very Short Range Air Defence

ANNEX D—GLOSSARY

24

1. Reuters 11/12/2001 14:33:44

2. Houston Chronicle, Photo by Marcelo Salinas, Colombianrebel

3. Andy Frazer, “San Jose Skyline 2”, Copyright 2000

4. www.spawar.navy.mil/robots/air/amgsss/mssmp.html

5. www.spawar.navy.mil/robots/air/amgsss/mssmp.html

6. Chris Brosinsky, Copyright 2000

7. Reuters 10/25/2000 16:58:42

8. AFP 01/17/2001 19:46:41

9. Reuters 11/09/2001 17:14:45

10. Reuters 11/10/2001 10:34:02

11. Reuters 12/09/2000 14:44:32

12. http://www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/fcs_oav.html, FCS OAV:Organic Air Vehicles

13. http://www.uavforum.com/library/photo/microstar.htmMicroStar BAE Systems

14. http:/ /www.uavforum.com/library/photo/guardian.htmGuardian CL-327 Bombardier Services Corp

15. http://www.uavforum.com/library/photo/blackwidow.htmBlack Widow, Aerovironment, Inc

16. http: / /www.uavforum.com/library/photo/predator.htmPredator RQ-1 General Atomics ATI

17. www.spawar.navy.mil/robots/air/amgsss/mssmp.html

18. Military Application Study on alternatives to anti-personnelmines: 22 February 2002

19. ISC98-2130 DND photo, Drvar: 24 April 1998.

20. Defence R&D Centre

21. Defence R&D Centre

22. Defence R&D Centre

23. Natick Soldier Center

24. IHD01-1048a DND photo by Sgt V.M.W. Striemer, DGPA/J5PA Combat Camera, Tito Drvar, Bosnia-Herzegovina: May3, 2001 Corporal Michael Skuce hands out “bon-bons” tolocal children while on foot patrol. Cpl Skuce is a Reservistfrom The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment currentlyserving at Camp Drvar with O Company, The Royal CanadianRegiment.

25. ISD01-1009 DND photo by Sgt Gerry Pilote, DGPA/J5PACombat Camera, Tomina, Bosnia: 09 November 2001Outside the defensive barbed-wire perimeter around theCanadian platoon house, Corporal Eric Charbonneau gives aCanadian flag pin to his new friend, local boy SamirKarabegovic.

26. ISD00-033-15A Photo by Cpl Marc Plante, Velika Kladusa:April 8, 2000Gunner from C Bty, 1 RCHA giving souvenirs to young citizensof Velika Kladusa.

27. ISD00-032-06A Photo by Cpl Marc Plante, Velika Kladusa:April 8, 2000Gunners from C Bty, 1 RCHA talking to a citizen of VelikaKladusa on election day.

28. ISD02-6016 Photo by Sgt Dennis J. Mah, DGPA/J5PA CombatCamera, 8 Wing Trenton, Ontario: January 25, 2002.The wife and children of a Canadian Forces aviation systemstechnician brace for his departure. Today, 180 Air Force andsupport personnel deployed to southwest Asia for OperationAPOLLO, Canada’s military contribution to the internationalcampaign against terrorism.

29. DND Photo

30. DND Photo

31. DND Photo

32. DND Photo

33. DND Photo

34. DND Photo

35. APD02 5284 Photo by Cpl Lou Penney, 3 PPCLI BattleGroup, Shah-i-Kot Valley, Afghanistan: April 1, 2002In the mountains east of Gardez, Corporal Dwane Russell ofthe 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry(3 PPCLI) Battle Group aims his weapon while helping tosecure a landing zone for a helicopter bringing in Canadiansoldiers to hunt for Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. The3 PPCLI Battle Group is deployed in Afghanistan onOperation APOLLO, Canada’s military contribution to theinternational campaign against terrorism.

36. DND Photo

37. ISC98-2130 DND photo, Drvar: 24 April 1998Soldiers from the 1 RCR BG take up defensive positions toprotect Bosnian Serbs during a riot by Bosnian Croats.

38. http://immc.redstone.army.mil/immcpublic/rd/olr/mlrs.gifIntegrated Material Management Center

39. ILC85-96 Photo by Sgt ReidM109 self-propelled Howitzer in firing position.

40. http://www-acala1.ria.army.mil/LC/CS/Csa/rah66003.jpgAircraft Armament and small Arms Commodity business unit

41. DND Photo

42. http://ctc.gagetown.mil.ca/infantry/gallery/photos/combat/approach/images/aprch003.jpg

43. DND Photo

PHOTO CREDITS