Future Expeditionary MindsetThe Marine Corps in the 21st Century

Second Lieutenant David F. Chang

Fifth Platoon, Company D, The Basic School

November 21, 2016

It is early morning on November 27, 1950 and Private Hector Cafferata is cursing out

loud. Whatever reason that made him decide to exchange his hometown in beautiful New Jersey

for the frozen hell-hole known as the Chosin Reservoir in Korea, he could not recall. Private

Cafferata would also not be able to tell you that tomorrow he would single-handedly hold off a

regimental sized enemy force of the Chinese 9th Army Group currently encircling US forces and

personally kill 125 Chinese soldiers, or that in two years’ time he would be receiving the Medal

of Honor from President Harry S. Truman at the White House. Right now, he is solely focused

on trying not to freeze to death. With his hands clenched up into a fist and his reliable M1

Garand by his side, he stays in the prone while on watch, daring any enemy to come his way.

The date is September 11, 2001. It is currently 10:15PM in Darwin, Australia and

Lieutenant Nathaniel Fick has just finished talking to his dad on the phone outside a local bar. In

three minutes, he will be informed that terrorists have hijacked commercial planes and flown

them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In four minutes, while still in shock, he will

come to terms that he is headed to war (Fick, 2005). The training he received at The Basic

School and Infantry Officer Course provided him with an extensive knowledge of military tactics

but he knows he will soon be facing a living and breathing enemy that is intent on killing him

and his Marines. Exhaling a deep breath, he pauses and then proceeds to head back to the USS

Dubuque.

Both Private Hector Cafferata and Lieutenant Nathaniel Fick represent the strong culture

of the United States Marine Corps and the dedication that each Marine has for duty and country,

regardless of time. As present Marines, we must continue that legacy and lineage of service.

With an ever-changing global security climate, Marines must train on new doctrines and

concepts in order to face emerging threats in the 21st century.

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To be called a United States Marine is one of the greatest honors someone can receive in

life. But one cannot just be called a Marine; they have to earn it. From the Recruit Depots at

Parris Island and San Diego to an officer’s commissioning, Marines are proud and rightfully so.

“Training provides all Marines a common experience, a proud heritage, a set of values and a

common bond of comradeship” (MCDP 1, 1997). Initial Marine Corps training such as Officer

Candidate School and Recruit Training prepares all Marines equally while the Military

Occupational Specialty schools for officers and enlisted service members provide the technical

skills and education to provide effective and efficient training during peacetime. The demands of

the Marine Corps for the next decades might be far different from the past and the need for

getting the technology, manpower and training right is stronger than ever.

Marines in the 21st century are unique due to our ability to balance tradition with

accepting geo-political and societal changes impacting our future expeditionary mindset and how

we train for combat. The “Marine Corps Operating Concept” (MOC) is the current guideline

dictating how the Marine Corps will operate, fight and win in 2025 and beyond. MOC is

necessary because the current “Marine Corps could be better organized, trained and equipped to

meet the demands of a future operating environment characterized by complex terrain,

technology proliferation, information warfare, the need to shield and exploit signatures, and an

increasingly non-permissive maritime domain” (USMC, 2016).

Marines know well enough the need to provide the quality leadership and dedication of

the Marine Corps to uphold the high standards that is expected of this organization. There has to

be a renewed focus on the concept of every Marine being a rifleman, and every Marine officer as

a mentally and professionally fit provisional rifle platoon commander. The Marine Corps is only

good as the people in it and by empowering Marines to think effectively under adverse

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conditions and uncertainty, allows for the improvement and refinement of competency and

initiative of each individual Marine. Currently, inadequate funding in training and the lack of

equipment and manpower have limited the Marine Corps ability to address these issues

concerning how we will operate in the future and if we are preparing for the right things.

Fifteen years of prolonged fighting in the Middle East have not only taken a toll on the

development and planning of new strategies and doctrines for the Marine Corps, but also on the

individual Marines as well. Being continuously involved in both major combat and crisis

response missions have allowed our adversaries to observe and learn how we train and operate.

Because of this, our future enemies will use that knowledge to level the playing field in terms of

technology and tactics in future conflicts.

The increase of crowded and lawless areas, particularly around littoral areas in the world

have created complex terrains that will force Marines to fight in dense urban environments,

while keeping peace and providing humanitarian assistance. Many adversaries including non-

state actors now have the capability to produce specialized weapons including intelligent

explosive devices and precision-guided munitions to challenge our forces. Along with that, a

globally connected network now allows our adversaries to influence and promote their ideologies

to the mass public and collect information on our forces concurrently. Through sensors and

spies, valuable information can be spread quickly through social media while avoiding detection,

limiting our counter-intelligence capabilities and operations.

While the United States Navy and Marine Corps remain powerful and influential at sea

and in the regions where our forces are located, we are now being tested by countries like China

and Russia for control of the global ocean. Russia’s submarine force has risen almost fifty

percent over the past year and Russian warships with forward operating forces have been moving

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towards the Mediterranean and Black Sea (Schmitt, 2016). In the South China Sea, manmade

airstrips have been created as bases for the Chinese Navy and rising tensions in contested

waterways and islands in the Pacific have become heated discussions with countries surrounding

that area. These potential conflict zones in open waters require the Marine Corps to focus back

on its amphibious roots, a concept that has been largely neglected the past fifteen years.

Conflicts have become unpredictable and irregular in nature, stretching through multiple

continents with varying terrain and rules of engagement, and the Marine Corps must be able to

adapt to it. “An expeditionary force is like the expeditionary warriors that man it…they are

comfortable with uncertainty and capable of handling adversity” (Wilhelm, 1995). Our nation

and our citizens expect the Marine Corps to be agile, effective and lethal on winning our

country’s battles.

Two years after the “Expeditionary Force 21” was presented by then Commandant of the

Marine Corps, General James E. Amos, “Marine Corps Operating Concept” superseded it due

to emerging threats and new adversaries. The MOC reflects the current Commandant, General

Robert E. Neller’s plan to leverage and fully use the capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary

Force (MEF). This new guideline emphasized preparing for the future to better support the

Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and joint operations while integrating our maneuver

warfare by applying information and cyber warfare into our combined arms doctrine. While it

will be a challenge for the Marine Corps to adjust quickly to this concept, it is something that

will have to be implemented as soon as possible. (USMC, 2014).

The new MAGTF goal is to allow the Marine Corps to simultaneously employ a MEF in

sustained operations and up to two MEB’s (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) in preparation to

perform large-scale forcible entries by sea. This concept will be an ambitious undertaking given

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the Marine Corps’ current limited resources and manpower, but enhancing the MAGTF into a

more capable combined arms concept and improving its ability to maneuver and be a force in

readiness will allow us to maintain control of the seas through power projection.

Combined amphibious operations will be the cornerstone which encompasses the next

generation of amphibious maneuver warfare for the Marine Corps. From figure ten of the

Department of the Navy’s fiscal budget and the President’s Budget for 2017, the Marine Corps’

active duty end strength is expected to be maintained at 182,000. “That end strength leaves

roughly a fifth of the service deployed at any given time. Currently, 30,800 Marines are forward

deployed and another 4,570 are at sea” (Schogol, 2016).

Training Marines to work with their Navy counterparts to be proficient in littoral warfare

by deploying from naval ships directly onto shores through amphibious units and vehicles such

as the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and the Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC), will play a

key role in how combined arms in the Marine Corps will conduct future naval and amphibious

operations (USMC, 2009). While a Landing Craft Utility only covers about 12% of the world’s

shores, an LCAC covers roughly 70% and can transport roughly 80 Marines with full combat

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loads. Because of this, the future MAGTF operating force and the amphibious ships that enable

the units to operate in the littorals should be priority investments.

With China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/D2) strategy of employing anti-ship cruise

missiles and ballistic missile system capabilities on their man-made islands, it makes it

problematic for our unarmed LCAC and SSC’s to deliver massive amounts of equipment and

personnel in contested waters without risking high amounts of casualties (Kazianis, 2013). By

combining the capabilities of the MAGTF with naval gunfire and close air support to gain access

to the shores and objectives on land, our ability to project our forces will not be hindered. The

nation more than ever requires the Marine Corps to be an expeditionary force in readiness that

can adjust accordingly to be the right force in the right place, and at the right time.

In order to win our nation’s battles, we must first start and win from within. What

separates the Marine Corps from the Joint Force is our proficiency in training that makes all

Marines a rifleman first and foremost. Our organization must continue to produce qualified and

capable men and women of professional character and dedication to answer the nation’s call to

lead our country’s battles. “Expeditionary Force 21” outlined the issues of aligning future

concepts and capability roadmaps over a ten-year period and the MOC provided the actual

concept to produce the future force in readiness and how to reach that goal. While the “Marine

Corps Operating Concept” is a starting point for change and direction, it does not provide an

answer to every problem the Marine Corps is currently facing.

We must never forget the sacrifices of those who came before us and continue to develop

and uphold the traditions and high standards of the Marine Corps. It is now our duty as Marines

to enable professional discussions about our future challenges and find out ways to solve them

together.

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Selected Bibliography:

[1] Fick, Nathaniel. One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer. Houghton Mifflin, 2005.

[2] United States Marine Corps. MCDP 1 – Warfighting. United States Marine Corps, 1997.

[3] United States Marine Corps. Marine Corps Operating Concept. United States Marine Corps, September, 2016.

[4] Schmitt, Eric. Russia Bolsters Its Submarine Fleet, and Tensions with U.S Rise. NY Times, 2016.

[5] Wilhelm, Charles. Expeditionary Warfare. United States Marine Corps, 1995.

[6] United States Marine Corps. Expeditionary Force 21. United States Marine Corps, 2014.

[7] Schogol, Jeff. “Marines’ 2017 Budget Signals End of Drawdown”. MarineCorpsTimes. February 9, 2016.

[8] Department of the Navy. “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2017 Budget: Figure 10 – Active Marine Corps End Strength Trend”. United States Navy, 2016.

[9] United States Marine Corps. Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025. United States Marine Corps, 2009.

[10] Kaziamis, Harry. “America’s AirSea Battle vs. China’s A2/AD: Who Wins?” The Diplomat, 2013.

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