October, 2011

Air Force Association

Future Investment Strategies For the US Military

1

Budget Realities Require Reduced Federal Spending

2Sources: President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2012; Eurostat

Administration Projection

Potential

Casualties are a Key Strategic Issue

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Aug-5

0Se

p-50

Oct-5

0No

v-50

Dec-

50Ja

n-51

Feb-

51M

ar-5

1Apr

-51

May

-51

Jun-

51Ju

l-51

Aug-5

1Se

p-51

Oct-5

1No

v-51

Dec-

51Ja

n-52

Feb-

51M

ar-5

1Apr

-52

May

-52

Jun-

52

Per

cent

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Cum

ulat

ive

Casu

altie

s in

Tho

usan

ds

CORRELATION OF U.S. CASUALTIES IN KOREAWITH PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS U.S. INVOLVEMENT

NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER:DO YOU THINK THE U.S. WAS RIGHT TO SEND TROOPS TO STOP THE COMUNIST INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA (YES)

GALLUP POLL:DO YOU THINK THE U.S. MADE A MISTAKE IN GOING TO WAR IN KOREA (NO)

U.S. ARMY-MARINE CASUALTIES

George Ball Briefing Chart to President Johnson and NSC, July 21, 1965

Source: M. Lorell, et. al., Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War, RAND, 1986

Casualty Concerns Remain A Significant US Strategic Vulnerability

George BallUndersecretary of State

1961-1966

Adversaries Strategy….Inflict More Pain Than US Population Can Bear

4

"You will kill ten of us, we will kill one of you, but in the end, you will tire of it first."

— Ho Chi Minh

“We had patience in our fighting with the Soviet Union with simple weapons for 10 years. We exhausted their economy, so they disappeared. We will not abandon our fight until the weapons run out.”

— Osama Bin Laden

Adversaries Attempt to Prolong Fighting and Impose Casualties

“Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle."

— Saddam Hussein

“You are not willing to sacrifice lives to achieve our surrender. But we are willing to die to defend our rights as an independent sovereign nation”

— Slobodan Milosevic

Global Proliferation of Improvised Explosives

5

Widespread Effect for Minimal Cost

Combatants Cost

One GCV ~$10-15 M = Cost of an Estate in DC

One IED~$200 = Cost of an Iphone*

*w/2 yr contract

US is Losing Precision Weapons Monopoly

6

What Happens When the Bad Guys Don’t Miss…..

What if…….This Guy Could Hit This

5 Km

From Anywhere in Here

Precision Guided Weapons Will be Coming to a Battlefield Near You……

Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) 120mm Guided Mortar

Ground Forces Sustain Majority of Casualties

7

Ground Forces

Naval Forces

Air Forces

Korea 135,705 2,233 1,920Vietnam 201,266 6,744 3,517Persian Gulf War 738 68 44Iraq 35,385 740 504Afghanistan 14,165 353 365Major Conflicts 387,259 10,138 6,350

Casualties (Killed and Wounded)

US Ground Engagements Are Unpopular and Unlikely in the Near Future

8

“…In this effort, the United States is prepared to act as part of an international coalition. … The United States is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal.”

President Barack Obama March 18, 2011

Future Presidents Could Be Reluctant to Engage Ground Troops

The Libyan Intervention

9

March 2011

September 2011

Libya Demonstrated That Without Control of the Air a Large Army was Defeated by a Militia

Airstrikes Most Efficient Tool Against Al Qaeda

10

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Person

nel D

eployed

Number of CAPs estimated based on the proportion of total deployed forces in Afghanistan.

9

Senior Al QaedaKilled/Captured

63

Afghanistan

Predator/Reaper Personnel

Scorecard of How the US Chooses to Fight…..

• Operation El Dorado Canyon• The first (decisive) 90 percent of

Operation Desert Storm• Operation Southern Watch• Operation Provide Comfort• Operation Northern Watch• Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia)• Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia

1995)• Operation Desert Fox (Iraq 1998)• Operation Allied Force (Kosovo 1999)

• The “take down” phase of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan 2001)

• Unified Protector (Libya 2011)• Ongoing Drone Strikes in Pakistan,

Yemen and the Horn of Africa

11

Successful (Most Objectives Met/Low Casualties)

Unsuccessful (Most Objectives NOT Met/High Casualties)

Prim

arily

Air

Ope

ratio

nsP

rimar

ily G

roun

d O

pera

tions

• Vietnam• Beirut 1983• Somalia 1993• Afghanistan post-2001?• Iraq post-2003?

• Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada 1983)• Operation Just Cause (Panama 1989)• Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti

1994)

• Operation Eagle Claw (1980 Iran Hostage Rescue)

• Operation Infinite Reach (Strikes in response to Africa Embassy Bombings)

A N A L Y S I S C E N T E R

Aerial Robot Armies

• What if the US could intervene with little or no cost in casualties or treasury• Air armadas could decisively determine the winners and losers of conflicts• Airpower has the ability to strike anyone, anywhere……• Unmanned airpower is the most cost effective way to influence world events*

12*CSBA Report: Changing the Business of Defense, Oct2011

See the EnemyFrom 60,000 ft

Kill the EnemyIn Benign Threat Environment

Or Kill the EnemyWhen He Doesn’t Know You are Here

UAVs “Go Out There and Die for Their Country -- and We Don't Mourn.”General Michael Ryan, CSAF, Feb 1999.

The Post-Cold War Drawdown

13

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Army Divisions Carriers Tactical Fighter Wings

FY90

FY97

-29%

-20%

-28%

Congressional Budget Office 1997

Largely Equal Share Reductions Across the Services

Future National Security Strategy

• Technology has disproportionally effected each of the services– Air Power is much more effective and US holds a distinct advantage– Ground Power is becoming increasingly vulnerable

• Given the history of conflicts over the last 20 years would an “equal cut” result in giving the President the best options to deal with future conflict?

14

US 1940s US 2010s US 2030s ?

Backup……

15

High Threat ConflictLong Range Airpower is the Only Way to Deal with China….

1616

“Europe is a landscape; East Asia is a seascape. Therein lies a crucial difference between the 20th

and 21st centuries.” Robert D. Kaplan

Medium Threat Conflict:Airpower Offers Cost Effective Containment

$0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

$800

$900

$13 billion

$806 billion$B FY12

Operations Northern and Southern Watch with Limited Strikes

1993 - 2002 2003 - 2012Operations Iraqi Freedom

and New Dawn

A N A L Y S I S C E N T E R

In a Constrained Environment…..What is The Future of Modern Warfare?

18

Air-CentricPower Projection, Range, Limited Vulnerability

Limited Ground Engagements

Ground-CentricDefeat, Hold, Win Hearts and Minds

Large Land Army, Enabling Air and Naval Power

What Should the US Choose When it Can’t Afford to Do Both?

Decline of the Post-WWII International Order

• International trade, financial, security and political institutions founded by the US and close allies in wake of WWII under increasing strain

• Distribution of economic, military and financial power vastly different with change accelerating

• US and traditional allies increasingly lack resources to stabilize established systems

• Rising powers expect changes to international system in accord with their values and increasing capabilities

ChinaIndonesia

NigeriaColombia

AlgeriaRussia

IndiaAustralia

USAJordan

Mexico

LebanonUK

Philippines

TunisiaTaiwan

Israel

JapanFrance

Germany Italy

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, In Constant $ 2009

Real Growth in International Military SpendingFrom 2000 to 2010