future of indian politics a book by m n roy

8/3/2019 Future of Indian Politics a Book by M N Roy

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THE FUTUREOF INDIANPOLITICSBy M. N.,ROY

PubHihed by R. Bishop7 Blomfield CrescentLondon W. 2


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THE FUTURE OFINDIAN POLITICS


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THE FUTUREOF INDIANPOLITICSBy M. N. ROY

V'

Jl^Published by R. Bishop7 Blomfield CrescentLondon W. 2


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Other Works by M. N. Roy:d.

An Open Letter to the Rt. Hon. J. R.MacDoNALD TOOne Year of Non-Co-operation i oThe Aftermath of Non-Co-operation ... i 6Other Works referring to India:

Empire Socialism. R. Palme Dutt ... 02A Manifesto to the All-India NationalCongress, 1926. Communist Party ofIndia ... ... ... ... ... 02Modern India. R. Palme Dutt. (Appear-ing shortly) 26

All the above are obtainable from 16 King Street,Covent Garden, London, W.C.2.

{Please send postage with all mail orders.)


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v nHgv^CONTENTS

PART I. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPROMISEChapter Page

I. The Social Basis of Imperialism 9II. Dividing the Spoils 14

III. The New Economic Policy of Imperialism 19IV. India Adopts Protection 27V. The Cotton Excise and Foreign Trade ... 36

PART II. THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISEVI. The Rise of the Swaraj Party 45VII. The Fiasco of the National Demand ... 54

VIII. C. R. Das Climbs Down 58IX. The Faridpur Speech 67X. The Evolution of the Swaraj Party 73

XI. The Cawnpur Congress and After 83PART III. A REAL NATIONALIST MOVEMENTXII. The New Basis of the National Struggle ... 90XIII. The Labour Party 100XIV. Conditions for a Labour Party 107XV. The People's Party and the Proletariat ... 114

855


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Uniform with this volume:Imperiausm. N. Lenin j 5o ^ Cloth bound ^ oState and Revolution. N. Lenin i 5Theory and Practice of Leninism

J. btalm J ^Bolshevism : Some Questions AnsweredJ. StalinLenin as A Marxist. N. BukharinBuilding Up Socialism. N. Bukharin .."

All the above are obtainable from 16 King StreetCovent Garden^ London, W.C.2.(Please send postage with all mail orders.)

I oI oI o


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PREFACEIN this book the historic necessity for a People'sParty in India is dealt with. The question of

the party of the proletariat is purposely leftout. The role of the proletariat in the strugglefor national freedom and democratisation of thecountry is defined only in broad outlines. Politicalorganisation of the proletariat, its structure andprogramme, do not enter into the purview of thebook. The proletariat is considered as a componentpart of the Nationalist forces. By the omission ofthe question, the importance of the party of theproletariat is not in the least minimised. Neitheris the People's Party meant to be a substitute forthe party of the proletariat. The object of thisbook is to show a way to the revolutionaryNationalist forces ; to point out the causes of thedecline of bourgeois Nationalism ; to expose thetendency of compromise underneath the verbalradicalism of the upper middle class ; to indicatethe historic necessity for the fight for freedomand to enunciate in general the programme andorganisational form the fight is bound to assumein its coming phases. Although the proletariat isdestined to act as the lever of the struggle fornational liberation, there are other social classesimmensely more numerous than the proletariatwhose importance in the fight for democraticnational freedom cannot be minimised. The futureof Indian politics will still be dominated by theinterests of these classesintellectuals, artisans,small traders and peasantry. How to organisethese forces of national revolution in a democratic


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PKEFACEparty is the immediate problem before the Indianrevolutionaries. The proletariat being the revolu-tionary vanguard must help to solve this problem,ihe hegemony of the proletariat in the strugHetor national freedom should be so exercised as notto circumscribe, but to intensify the fullest displayof the energy of the forces of national revolution,ihis will be done through the People's Party asdemonstrated in the following pages.

THE AUTHOR.


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THE FUTUREOF

INDIAN POLITICSPART I

THE ECONOMICS OF COMPROMISEChapter I. The Social Basis of ImperialismBourgeois Nationalism in India has ended ina complete compromise with imperialism, as waspredicted years ago by those who judged the situa-tion with Marxian realism. Side by side withnational antagonism, class antagonism developed-during the post-war period of the Indian Nationalistmovement. Gradually the latter antagonism be-came predominant over the former. The processof class differentiation inside the Nationalist rankscaused constant political regrouping. The pre-


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lo THE FUTURE OFdominating tendency was toward the formation ofa bourgeois bloc of constitutional opposition. Im-perialism helped this tendency very cleverly andsuccessfully with the policy of " Economic Conces-sion and Political Repression''economic conces-sion to Indian capitalism to draw the Nationalistbourgeoisie closer to the British Government, thusisolating the middle class Nationalists, whose com-paratively radical political activities were dealt withby the firm hand of repressive laws. The move tothe Righttowards compromise with imperialismwas marked b}^ two very distinct stages : first, di-vorce of the bourgeois Nationalist movement fromthe most revolutionary social forcesworkers andpeasants ; second, the schism between the big bour-geoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. The first wasaccomplished in 1923 when the revolutionary^ pro-gramme of mass passive resistance to imperialistautocracy was abandoned in favour of constitutionalparliamentary obstruction. The organisation of theSwaraj Party marked the separation of the Nation-alist movement from revolutionary mass action.By the end of 1925 the schism between the bigbourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie became wide

enough to split the Swaraj Party, which for twoyears had served the purpose of a bridge betweenthe constitutionalism of the big bourgeoisie and therevolutionary inclinations of the petty bourgeoisie.*The split in the Swaraj Party means the burning

of that bridge. The big bourgeoisie have decided* Since this was written, the defection of the Mahratta

Responsivists has culminated in a complete split of the SwarajParty on the lines of class interests of the big bourgeoisie andof the lower middle class.


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INDIAN POLITICS iito shake off the encumbrance of the petty bour-geois political vagaries, notwithstanding the factthat the latter have served their purpose. The splitin the Swaraj Party removes the last obstacle to ahappy compromise between the Indian bourgeoisieand British imperialism, of course under thehegemony of the latter.The desire for this compromise is not one-sided.

British imperialism is very desirous of stabilisingthe economical and political situation in India. Ithas long been recognised by far-seeing imperialiststatesmen that a country like India cannot be keptlong in subjugation without the active and willingsupport of an influential section of the native popu-lation. In other words, imperialism must have asocial basis in India. Until the earlier years of thetwentieth century, British imperialism in India re-lied upon two native factors : one positive, the othernegative. The first was the loyalty of the reaction-ary landed aristocracy which had been partlycreated and partly bolstered up by the British con-querors. The second was the passivity of themasses. Relying on these two factors, Britishimperialism could afford to ignore the feeble de-mands of the rising bourgeoisie and the revolution-ary dissatisfaction growing among the pettyintellectuals. Besides, until the World \\^ar, theeconomics of imperialism demanded that India (aswell as other colonial countries) should be held ina state of industrial backwardness in order to sup-ply a market and raw materials for the metropolitanindustries. Consequently the relation betweenimperialism and the colonial bourgeoisie was thatof antagonism. This antagonism found its ex-


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12 THE FUTURE OFpression in the Nationalist movement. But therewas another economic consideration which made theNationalism of the Indian bourgeoisie weak andcompromising even in those days. Owing to theforced industrial backwardness of the country, theIndian bourgeoisie were mostly engaged in distri-buting trade which was dependent on British im-perialism both politically and economically.Politically, because security and expansion of traderequired a stable government and order in thecountry, conditions which had been fulfilled by theBritish. Economically, because both the exportand import trade being practically a Britishmonopoly, the Indians engaged in it were economicvassals of imperialism. The Nationalist move-ment inspired and headed b\ such a weak socialclass did not disturb imperialism. The terroristsecret societies, through which the growing dis-content of the unemployed and unemployable pettyintellectuals was spasmodically expressed, could bedealt with successfully by brutal repression.The situation remained more or less like this tillthe eve of the World War. Soon after the out-break of the world conflagration, it became evidentthat British domination in India could no longerbe maintained on the old narrow social basis. The

social basis of British rule could be widened anddeepened only by drawing at least the upper strataof the Nationalist bourgeoisie within the economicorbit of imperialism. This necessitated a changein the economic policy of imperialism. Still an-other factor contributed to that change, and pre-cipitated it. The exigencies of war obliged Britainto relax her grip on the economic life of India.


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INDIAN POLITICS 13Thus began the new era when imperialist interestswere so changed as to render an agreement withthe Indian bourgeoisie desirable and profitable.


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M THE FUTURE OFChapter IL Dividing the SpoilsAll along the grievance of the Indian bourgeoisiehad been that the British Government impeded th'industrial devebpment of India Th^ tplanks of the Nationalist pi^n wl'/fiS aT

lor nscal autonomy grew energetic in proportion *nhe accumulation of capital in the hands of theBrS ^r^^''-i\ ^^"^ phenomenal growth ofo1S^rarThtdia^--=^^Sowtrorindl'%

'''^'"T"^ ^^"^ l^- thegrowth of India s foreign trade in the 40 years nre-cedmg the World War which caused a revoluUonin Britain's economic relations with IndiaForeign Trade(In millions of rupees.)quinqdennialAverage

1874-79 .1879-84 .1884-80 .1889-94 1894-99 1899-04 .,1904-09 ..Annual1909-10 ..1910-II ..1911-12 ..,1912-13 ..,T913-14 ...

Export630790880

1,0401,0701,2201,4401,8802,0902,2802,4602,490

Import380610710740850

1,0301,2201,3301,4401,6601,910

ExcessExport250200270330330370410660760840800580


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INDIAN POLITICS 15It will be noticed that the characteristic of this

large volume of trade has always been a consider-able excess of export over import. In countriesin a normal economic (capitalist) condition, sucha continual favourable balance of trade indicatesa state of ''national prosperity." But in India it wasnot the case. " National wealth" does not belongto the nation. It is the property of that socialclass which controls the economic life of the nation.The economic life of India not being controlled bythe native bourgeoisie, the accumulated wealth pro-duced b}^ the people (workers and peasants) did notcontribute to the capitalist development of thecountry.The portion of the commodities exported, thatwas not covered by imports, did not go to createcredit in favour of India. The surplus Indianexport represented mostly the tribute to imperial-ism ; nevertheless a part was appropriated by thenative trading bourgeoisie in a manner to be ex-plained presently.Even now nearly 70 per cent, of India's exportsare raw materials and foodstuff. During the periodcovered by the above table the proportion was stillgreater. By far the largest portion of the rawmaterials exported were produced by the small peas-antry, there being very little large-scale farmingin India, except the tea plantations. The unpaidexcess export, therefore, indicated a terrible ex-ploitation of the peasantry. Imports were and stillare mostly manufactured goods. The comparativesmallness of their volume shows the correspondinglimitedness of the buying capacity of the Indianmasses. The latter produced and were obligedto give up much more than they could get in return.The proceeds of the exploitation of the Indian


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i6 THE FUTURE OF

ports was paid up by the import of gold and sil-.'

Ihe following table shows how the value of evr^ceexport was divided up till the war '"'Division of Excess Export Value.(In millions of rupees )Quinquennial - -r /Average1874-791879-841884-891889-941894-991899-041904-09Annual1909-101910-III911-121912-131913-14

EXCESLExport250200270330330370410660760840800580

TreasureImported*100120130140So140220310320490510370

To LlQUIDATBObligations t15080

140190250230190350440350290210


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INDIAN POLITICS 17Thus the portion of the surplus value extracted

from the Indian masses only through the unj)aidamount of raw produce exported, during the period1874-1914, in terms of money amounted to 14,440million rupees, of which 6,650 million fell to theshare of the Indian bourgeoisie. This wealth couldnot be converted into capital sufficiently profitabl}^by investment in land and tradetwo main avenuesof exploitation open to the Indian bourgeoisie. Thesearch for a more lucrative industrial outlet becameever more persistent and crystallised in the Nation-alist demand for protection to native industry andfiscal autonomy. Nationalist economists complainedbitterh' against the "drain" of wealth from India,because the major portion of the surplus value pro-duced by the masses of the population was misappro-priated by foreign capitalists. According to thetheory of bourgeois economics, the entire booty be-longed legitimately to the native possessing classes.In that case, it w^ould represent "national wealth"indicating prosperity of the nation, although itssource just the same would be the exploitation ofthe producing classes. The complaint was notagainst the system that took away from the peasan-try and other producing classes 1,444 crores ofrupees in 40 years without giving anything in re-turn. The complaint was that the entire or majorpart of the sum did not go into the pockets of thenative bourgeoisie, and that what did fall to theshare of the native bourgeoisie might be more profit-ably invested. Development of Indian capitalismwas obstructed in the interest of British imperial-ism.The programme of Nationalism as expressed bythe National Congress was not based upon the irre-concilable antagonism between the foreign exploiter

B


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i8 THE FUTURE OFand the robbed Indian masses. It represented afeeble protest against the "unfair" distribution ofthe booty. It is remarkableand therein lay thegerm of subsequent compromise with imperialismthat the political plank of the Nationalist platformwas not half as strong as the economic one of fiscalautonomy.What is meant by fiscal autonom3^ ? It meansthat India should be autonomous (of Britain) inher financial and trade operations. It is evidentthat the autonomy in financial and commercialspheres cannot be effective without a simultaneouspolitical autonomy. So long as Britain remainsthe dominating political forcethe State powerin India, she will not permit the Indian bourgeoisieto readjust the financial and trade relations in away harmful to British interest. But significantlyenough, the Nationalism of the Indian bourgeoisienever demanded political freedomit does not do soeven now.By fiscal autonomy the Indian bourgeoisie meanta wider latitude to exploit Indian labour by con-verting their accumulated wealth into industrialcapital. However, in course of time, they realisedthe impossibility of winning even that much econo-mic freedom without some political power. In1926, as condition for India's full support to Brit-ain in carrying on the war to victory, the National-ist bourgeoisie demanded self-government (withinthe Empire) and an immediate grant of fiscal auto-nomy. Imperialism could no longer remain indiffer-ent to that demand made in a very critical moment.The first step towards agreement was taken, to befollowed by others in quick succession.


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INDIAN ;POLITICS 19

Chapter III. The New Economic Policy ofImperialismThe demands of the Indian bourgeoisie coincided

and even had been preceded by additional and un-expected events giving rise among the imperialiststatesmen to a tendency towards an agreement withthe Indian bourgeoisie even before the latter defin-itely formulated their attitude in 191 6. The thenViceroy, Lord Hardinge, in a despatch to the Sec-retary of State for India, in the latter part of 1915,had recommended the policy of fostering the indus-trial growth of India. He said :

" It is becoming increasingly clear that adefinite and self-conscious policy of improv-ing the industrial capabilities of India willhave to be pursued after the war, unlessshe is to become more and more a dumpingground for the manufactures of othernations. . . The attitude of the Indian publictowards this important question is unanim-ous, and cannot be left out of account. . . .After the war, India will consider herselfentitled to demand the utmost help which hergovernment can afford to enable her to takeher place, so far as circumstances permit, asa manufacturing country." (Lord Har-dinge' s despatch to the Secretary for India,in 1915.)

Acting on this recommendation of the Viceroyand in order to meet the demands of the Nationalistbourgeoisie, the British Government set up the In-dian Industrial Commission " to examine and report


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20 THE FUTURE OF ^upon the possibilities of further industrial develop-ment in India." A Nationalist leader and threeforemost Indian capitalists sat on the Commissionwith representatives of imperialism. After twojyears of exhaustive investigation into the sources!of capital, ravv^ material, market and labour, the!Commission recommended among other subsidiary!things

1. That in future the Government must play an;,active part in the industrial development of^the country.

2. That India produces all the raw materials!necessary for the requirements of a modern

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community, but is unable to manufacture manyj

of the articles and materials essential alike in!times of peace and war. Therefore, it is vital

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for the Government to ensure the establshment ";in India of those industries whose absence ex-;poses us to grave danger in the event of war.;

3. That modern methods should be introduced iin agriculture so that labour now wastefuUy;employed would be set free for industries.

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4. That the policy of " laissez faire" in industrial]affairs, to which the Government clung so long, jshould be abandoned. :

5. That the establishment of Industrial Banks;should be encouraged by means of Govern-!ment financing, if necessary.

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6. That the necessity for securing the economic]

safety of the country, and the inability of the ;people to secure it without the co-operation of;the Government, are apparent. Therefore,!the Government must adopt a policy of ener-]getic intervention in industrial affairs.

While the Commission was still carrying on its!investigation, practical effect was given to the re-:


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INDIAN POLITICS 21commendations that it made subsequently. In 191the Indian Munitions Board was created " to developIndian resources to meet the necessities of war andthe situation created b}^ the war." The (English)chairman of the Industrial Commission, who had al-ways been an advocate of the point of view thatindustrial development of India would strengthenthe basis of imperialism, became the head of thatnewly created State organ which gave a tremendousimpetus to Indian industry. The Munitions Boardworked on the following lines :

1. Direct purchase in India of articles andmaterials of all kinds needed for the arm3^, thecivil departments and railways.

2. The diversion of all orders for articles andmaterials from the United Kingdom and else-where to the mianufacturers in India.

3. The giving of assistance to individuals andfirms in order to stabilise new industries ordevelop old ones.

The result was reflected in the increased shareof manufactured articles in export trade from 24per cent, to 31 per cent., reached in two years.Moreover, orders for large transport and militarysupplies were placed with Indian manufacturerswho were given State aid to fulfil the orders. Thegrowth of the Tata Iron and Steel Company is in-dicative of the situation in general.

The Tata Iron and Steel Production{In tons.)

Year Pig Iron Steel Steel Rails1915 ... 154,509 66,603 45,6391917 ... 167,870 114,027 72,6701918 ... 198,064 130,043 7T,0961919 ... 232,^68 134,061 70,969


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22 THE FUTURE OFThe net profit was as follows :

1915 ... 2,805,000 rupees.1916 ... 5,103,0001917 ... 7,927,500 ,,1918 ... 7,900,000 ,,The next step towards agreement was the scheme

of constitutional reforms prepared jointly by theSecretary of State for India, Montague, and theViceroy, Lord Chelmsford. They proposed to givethe Indian bourgeoisie and higher professionalclasses a share in the legislative and administrativeauthority of the countr^^ The main features ofthe Reforms were : (i) modification of the controlof the Indian Government by the British Parlia-ment ; (2) creation of central and provincial legis-latures with an elected majority; (3) extension ofthe franchise to include the entire bourgeoisie andthe upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie ; (4) in-crease of the number of Indian members of theViceroy's Executive Council (and appointment ofIndian Ministers to the Provincial Governors inaddition to Executive Councillors, both English andIndian) ; (5) transfer of local self-government tothe Indians ; (6) opening of the higher positions incivil services to Indians, etc., etc.These political reforms (essentially very inade-

quate) , together with the recognition of the rightof Indian capital, fully satisfied the upper strataof the Indian bourgeoisie. Three years after thedemand for full self-government (within the Em-pire) had been put forward b3^ the united National-ist Movement, the Moderate Party, representing thebig industrialist and commercial classes, acceptedin 1919 the very inadequate measure of self-govern-ment Q:ranted bv the Government of India Act.


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INDIAN POLITICS 23Economic concessions made under the pressure ofwar exigencies satisfied them. The recommenda-tions of the Industrial Commission and the stepstaken for their fulfilment meant to the big bour-geoisie, represented by the Moderate Party, morethan the reforms granted b}^ the Government ofIndia Act. The upper strata of the bourgeoisie notonly broke away from the National Congress, butfully co-operated with the Government to suppressthe post-war revolutionary m.ovement.On the economic aspect, the Montagu-ChelmsfordScheme of Constitutional Reform expressed thefollowing opinion :

" As the desirability of industrial expan-sion became clearer, the Government of Indiafully shared the desire of the Indian leadersto secure the economic advantages that wouldfollow the local manufacture of raw products.English theories as to the appropriate limitsof the State's activity are inapplicable to In-dia. We believe that this is true in case ofindustries, and that if the resources of thecountry are to be developed, the Governmentmust take action."

It is to be noted that the concessions made werenot forced by the demand of the Indian bourgeoisiealone. Two other factors of very great importanceasserted themselves on the situation. They were(i) exigencies of the war, and (2) necessity ofwidening the social basis of imj^erialism. Still an-other factor came into play subsequently. Thatwas the crisis of world capitalism caused by the war.Towards the close of the world war, the negativefactorpassivity of the massesupon which Brit-ish rule in India had mainly relied, almost disap-


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24 THE FUTURE OF]

Peared. In spite of the maturing rapprochement-geoisie the country was in a state of revolt Theinecessity of widening and deepening Ihe socialbasis of Bntish rule in India by winning over the inative bourgeoisie became imperative. The Refom IAct of 1919 was passed by the British Parliame^^to meet the situation. But the iirst great re^olu itionary expression of Indian Nationalifm could not ibe altogether suffocated by an Act of Parliament

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A few years of disturbances were to follow. The '.revolutionary upheaval of 19x9-21, however, did not ihinder the process of agreement. 'On the con rary 'he fear of revolution drove the Indian bourgeoisie iinto the arms of capitalismfori on^^fh'^"'" ^ tremendous revolutionary 'torces on the scene encouraged the petty hour- igeoisie whose position would be scarcely improved iby the reforms to oppose the reforms. Even aBu 'thet^' '"""^^r"" r'"^^ '"^^t -PpSion ^But the new imperialist policy of steady economic 'ZTTZf,'''X '.'"" bo-geoisie, in' course o :time knocked the bottom out of the opposition Iilktur r n '' ' ' ''''''"' ^ ^^^ refor'm'ed g" 'rf^r ; "^^ .'^^ "^"'^ be emphasised that the iby t'wo conT^r "^^ '^^^^ 'P" imperialismby two considerations entirely independent of the 'uTZ f-.'^u ^"^'^ bourgeoisie^ Thev were ^(1) to enlist the services of the Nationalist bour- iupriinrof th"T5' * ^"PP^^^-^ '^' revolutionary

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uprising of the Indian masses for freedom, and i(a) to overcome the post-war crisis of capitalismofcSTatr "'^^'^^'^ "^' ^^PP-^ ^"^^ --- iInd1:^ntSrial=n%-^5L:mbtr. ^^^^^^^^^^^

I'


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INDIAN POLITICS 25Government moved a resolution in the LegislativeAssembly, appointing a commission to give prac-tical shape to the recommendations of the IndianIndustrial Commission. The Resolution says :

" The most obvious and direct form ofassistance which the Government can give tothe industries of the country is by the pur-chase of supplies required for the public ser-vices so far as possible in the countr\^ itself."

This measure to advance the interests of nativecapitalism was taken immediately after the mostpowerful section of the Indian bourgeoisie hadiroken away from the Nationalist movement. Itwas obviously intended to show that it paid to co-operate with imperialism even on the basis of veryinadequate political reforms. Besides, Britishcapital invested or about to be invested in India,not as previously, but for building manufacturingindustries, was influencing the economic policy ofimperialism.

Referring to the cause and consequences of theestablishment of the Indian Stores Department, theBritish Trade Commission in India wrote in 1920

" In the first place, both the Indian andalso the non-official European members of theLegislature are determined that, in future,all purchases of stores for Government re-quirements shall be made in India and thatall tenders shall be called for in India andin rupees. These claims have been met bythe Government of India to some extent.The revised Store Rules permit the newlyorganised Indian Stor-^s Department at Delhi/Simla to purchase almost unlimited quan-


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26 THE FUTURE OF\

tities from stocks held in India or in theicourse of shipment. They also sanction pur!chases of machinery and plant from ?Wn 'dian branches of British manufacTurers or"from their technical agents Tln^r^ ? ibe little doubt thatlf^ew^ndlrsTo'r :iauTe'anTttt'n ''"'''^ ^"^'^^ '-S"! !ence .n f '^^ '^"^'^ f purchasing influ- Ience so far as important stores are concerned iwill be transferred from London to India "' 1

budget of iQ2^-o^ allnfff^r! r r^ years. ihe


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INDIAN POLITICSChapter IV. India adopts Protection

In its report the Railway Committee cited in-stances of the failure of Indian manufacturers tocompete successfully with the manufacturers ofother countries. Consequently the opinion of theCommittee was " that industries newly started inIndia for the manufacture of railway materials ofa fabricated character cannot, in the initial stage,compete without assistance against established in-dustries abroad." As a logical consequence of thisadmission, the Legislative Assembly passed a Billin June, 1924, granting bounty on the manufactureof raihvay wagons in India until the year 1929.

All these measures were heading towards Protec-tionismthe summum honum of Indian Nationalistdemand. To the dissatisfaction of the Indian bour-geoisie, the Industrial Commission of 1916 had beenprecluded from touching the tariff question.Naturally, British imperialism had been very reluc-tant to equip the Indian bourgeoisie with a weaponthat could eventually be turned against it. Butevents were moving fast. The decision to purchaserailway material, structural steel, etc., manufac-tured in India when the amount manufactured couldobviousl}^ not supply the demand, was an invitationfor British capital to build industries in India. Theconcession to the Indian bourgeoisie was incidental.The process of accumulation of capital in the in-dustries in Britain was on the decline ; should Brit-ish capital not find other sources of investmentwhich could lead to accumulation setting off thedecline at home, the post-war crisis of British im-perialism would be decidedly fatal. Further, theIndian market was rapidly ceasing to be a British


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28 THE FUTURE OFmonopoly. It was invaded from all sidesUnitedStates, Japan, Germany and Belgium taking thelead. The following tables show the situation asregards the iron and steel trade :

Steel ImportsFrom 1914 1922

Britain 59-8% 45.7% of total import.Belgium 17.0% 30.7% ,, ,,U.S.A. 2.2% 13.7% Even Germany, which had been totally elimin-

ated from the Indian market up till 1920, recoveredher position by 1922 to the extent of 12.1 per cent,of the total import.

Imports of Iron Bars and Channels(In tons.)

1920 1922Britain ... 77i726 17,616Germany ... 9,743 38,404Belgium ... 39,5So ii3,ti6

The textile market, which had absorbed over30 per cent, of British export to India, was alsoseriously cut into by Japan. The following figuresillustrate the situation

Pounds of Yarn ImportedBritain Japan

1922-23 ... 31,018,372 26,546,9051923-24 ... 24,789,9-^3 20,430,0251924-25 ... 20,759,078 32,324,773

In the first quarter of 1925, Japanese import was16,160,285 pounds as against 4,861,775 pounds fromEngland. As regards woven goods, particularly ofthe finer varieties, Lancashire was still resisting the


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INDIAN POLITICS 29competition. But over 60 per cent, of India's tex-tile demands consist of cheap rough stuff, owing tothe low standard of living of the people. Ever-increasing quantities of yarn of the lower counts,imported from Japan, would b(; woven in the Indianmills and drive the Lancashire cloth out of the In-dian market. The consideration of this eventualityinduced the Lancashire millowners, just recently, tocome to an agreement with the Indian manufac-turers by acquiescing in the abolition of the ExciseDuty on the Indian cotton industry.The greatest portion of the 1,500,000,000 rupeesallotted (in 1921) for the rehabilitation of railwayswas spent in England but in the teeth of persistentIndian demand that supplies for Indian railwaysshould be bought in the cheapest market. Eventu-ally Indian orders would go to other countries bythe sheer law of competition (the basic principle ofcapitalist economy) , unless Britain permitted Indiaherself to supply them.

British manufacturers were being dislodged ap-proximated' at the corresponding rate from etherEastern markets. To manufacture in India wasthe only possible way out of the impasse. Cheaplabour and raw materials and great saving on thecost of transport taken together would enable theBritish capitalists not only to hold their own in theEastern market ; the enormous profit made mightalso enable them to tide over the industrial crisis athome.

Soon after the conclusion of the war, a numberof iron and steel manufacturing companies wereregistered in India, all connected with British firms.The principal ones were :

I. Indian Iron and Steel Company, Ltd. ;Capital Rs. 5,000,000. Registered in 191S.


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3? THE FUTURE OFProjected production 180,000 tons of pig irona year. Promoted by Burn and Co., a Britishengineering and shipbuilding firm in India.

2. The United Steel Corporation of Asia, Ltd.,capital, Rs. 150,000,000. Registered in 1921.Projected annual production 300,000 tons of pigiron and 200,000 tons finished steel to be in-creased in a few years to 700,000 and 450,000tons respectively. Promoted by Cammel,Laird and Co., of Sheffield.

3. The Peninsula Locomotive Co. CapitalRs. 6,000,000, held partly by Kerr, Stuartand Co., of Stoke-on-Trent, and partly by In-dian capitalists. Will be able to produce 299locomotives a year to begin with.

The lead given by these firms was sure to befollowed by others. (It has been proved to be soby subsequent events.) Thus, tariff walls raisedby the Indian Government would no longer operateagainst British interests. They would protect theIndian key industry largely promoted and ownedby British capital, with native capital participating.There was another reason which obliged British

imperialism to accede to the Indian Nationalist de-mand for protection by a high tariff. This was anegation of the traditional policy on which Britishtrade relations with India had always been deter-mined. In the interest of the home manufacturersBritain imposed upon India the policj^ of FreeTrade. In the case of India, Free Trade meansfree exploitation by British imperialism. The Brit-ish manufacturers would not tolerate the least ob-stacle to be placed on the free import of their com-modities to India.

Financial difficulties in the post-war years had


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INDIAN POLITICS 31obliged the Indian Government to raise importduties to a height which, for practical purposes,had protectionist effects. From an average 3 percent, ad valorem levied before the war for revenuepurposes, the import duties had been raised fromII to 15 per cent. Judged from this side, whatremained to be done was to call the spade a spadecome out officially in favour of protection for Indiaand thus satisfy the traditional demand of theNationalist bourgeoisie.

In the beginning of 192 1 the following resolution,moved by Lallubhai Samaldas (an Indian merchantand financier) was passed by the LegislativeAssembly

" This Council recommends to theGovernor-General in Council that HisMajesty's Government be addressed throughthe Secretary of State with a prayer thatthe Government of India be granted fullfiscal autonomy subject to the provisions ofthe Government of India Act."

Immediately after this resolution had been passedthe Secretary of State for India in replying to adeputation from Lancashire (which had all alongbeen the sturdy opponent to India's fiscal freedom)declared the decision :

" To give to the Government of India theright to consider the interests of Indiafirst, just as we, without any complaint fromany other parts of the Empire, and the otherparts of the Empire without any complaintfrom us, have always chosen the tariff ar-rangements which they think best fitted fortheir needs, thinking of their own citizensfirst."


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32 THE FUTURE OFThis speech was followed by a despatch, dated

30th June, 1 92 1, to the Government of India, an-nouncini^ the decision of the British Governmentto accept the principle of fiscal autonomy.

In October, 1921, was appointed a Fiscal Com-mission to .examine the question of a tariff, underthe Presidency of Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoollaa greatBombay millowner. Out of the eleven members ofthe Commission, seven were Indians, all prominentin industrial, commercial and Nationalist politicalfields. One unprecedented feature of the Commis-sion was that it had only one English official on it.The divergence between the interests of British andIndian capital had been so reduced that mutual con-fidence and joint action was possible.The Fiscal Commission submitted its report atthe end of the next ^''ear. Basing itself on the con-clusions " that the industrial development of Indiahas not been commensurate with the size of thecountry, its population and its natural resources,and that a considerable development of Indian in-dustries would be very much to the advantage ofthe country as a whole," the Commission recom-mended, among other things :

1. That the Government of India adopt a policyof Protection with discrimination.

2. That a permanent Tariff Board be set up toconsider the claims of particular industries forprotection.

3. That raw materials and machinery be ad-mitted free of duty.

4. That the Excise Duty on the Indian cottonindustry be removed.

5. That no obstacle be raised to the free inflow


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INDIAN POLITICS 33of foreign capital, but that Government mono-polies or concessions be granted only to com^panies incorporated and registered in India withrupee capital, and with Indians on their direc-torates.

Five Indian members of the Commission (thePresident himself included among them) did notconsider the verdict of the Commission wideenough and supplemented the General Report witha minute of dissent. The essence of their point ofview will be interesting and useful to note, sinceit represents the demand of the most radical sectionof the Indian bourgeoisie. The dissenting minor-ity wrote

1. There should be an unqualified pronouncementthat the fiscal policy best suited to India isProtection.

2. It is a mere commonplace to say that a richIndia is a tower of strength to the Empire,while an economically weak India is a source ofweakness. . . India would have been of fargreater help to England during the war if thepolicy of protection had been adopted at leasta generation ago. . . This (revision of thetariff policy) would have been to her greatadvantage and would have been beneficial tothe Empire. . . .

India, inhabited by a fifth of the human race,can be of tremendous value, economic andpolitical, both to herself and to the Empire, ifdevelopment proceeds on lines best suited toher conditions.On the question of inflow of foreign capital, the

minority appeared to differ from the view expressedin the general report. But this is what they said :

" ^^' e are unanimous in thinking that in


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34 THE FUTURE OFthe interest not only of the consumer, butof the economic advancement of the country,it is essentially^ necessary that industrialisa-tion should proceed at a rapid pace. . . .We will, therefore, state at once, that wewould raise no objection to foreign capitalin India obtaining the benefit of protectivepolicy, provided suitable conditions are laiddown to safeguard the essential interests ofIndia."The conditions recommended by the minority,

however, are the same as stated in the generalreport, namely : incorporation of companies in In-dia with rupee capital and proportionate Indiandirectors.

In February, 1923, the Government of Indiadeclared the acceptance of the principle of dis-criminating protection recommended by the FiscalCommission as a whole. The Government reso-lution unanimously adopted by the LegislativeAssembly accepted " in principle the propositionthat the fiscal policy of the Government of Indiamay legitimately be directed towards fostering thedevelopment of industries in India."A few months later, acting upon the recommenda-tions of the Fiscal Commission, the Governmentappointed the Tariff Board consisting of threemembers, two of whom were Indians. Thus anagreement was reached between the Indian bour-geoisie and British imperialism on the vital ques-tion of economic antagonism. Without vitally in-juring imperialist monopoly, considerable satisfac-tion was given to Indian capitalism at the expenseof the masses.The Tariff Board began, of course, with the Ironand Steel industry. The Tatas immediately came


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INDIAN POLITICS 35forward with the demand for a 33.5 per cent, dutyon imported steel manufactures. On the recom-mendation of the Tariff Board, the Government inMay, 1924 brought before the Legislative Assem-bly the Steel Industry (Protection) Bill which setup a tariff varying from 20 to 25 per cent, on fabri-cated iron and steel entering the country, and alarge bounty on the production in India of railwaywagons. The Bill authorised the Government toraise the duty in case one or more of the dutiablearticles would be found to be imported into Indiaat such a price as would be likely to render in-effective the protection intended. The Bill passedthe Legislative Assembly with very little opposi-tion. The vSwaraj Party broke its vow of obstruc-tion and voted with the Government.The effect of protection on the Indian iron andsteel industry can be judged from the followingestimated growth in the production of the Tataconcern behind a tariff' wall. Total production in1923 was 121,000 tons. It will increase to 250,000335,000 and 390,000 tons in the three succeedingyears.Hardly a year after the passage of the Protec-

tion Act, the Tatas declared that the duties did notgive them enough protection and demanded their in-crease. The Government, with the sanction of theAssembly, granted the demand not by additionalduty, but by a substantial bounty on productionto guarantee a fixed margin of profit.The Tariff Board then recommended protectionfor the paper and cement industries and is at pre-sent considering the claims of the coal mining in-dustry. Since the industries, whose claims are tobe investigated, are suggested by the Government,the protection for these industries is a foregoneconclusion.


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36 THE FUTURE OF

Chapter V. The Cotton Excise and Foreign ,Trade I

The climax of the policy, which has transformed 'the economic relation between the Indian bourgeoisie

jand British imperialism from antagonism to co- |operation, was abolition of the 3.5% Excise Duty; ]there has been a duty of 11% on the cotton jgoods imported, which dut^^ remains in force. One of the outstanding Nationalist grievances has al-

\ways been "the strangling of India's premier in- idustry in the interest of Lancashire." The pheno- \menal growth of the Indian cotton industry does not 'justif}' this grievance. The industry, with an 1aggregate capital of Rs. 300,000,000 (in round Inumbers) made a total clear profit of Rs. 350,000,000 !in the period of three years, 1919-1921. Even when Iin Sept. 1925, the workers (150,000) employed in :the Bombay mills were locked out to enforce afurther wage cut of 11. 5 per cent (in addition to;a 20 per cent, cut in 1924) on the pretext of "ruin- :ous" trade depression, not less than half the mills 'were paying a fairly high rate of dividends. How-

jever, the abolition of the Excise Duty removed the 1last cause of friction between the Indian bourgeoisie .and Imperialism. The political effect of this step :has been to split the Nationalist movement along ;the line dividing the big bourgeoisie and the pett3^

|

bourgeoisie. The life of the Swaraj Party, whichjstood with one foot in the camp of the big bour- !

geoisie and another in the petty bourgeois camp,jis seriousl}^ threatended.

This concession again was not made in deference \to the demands of the bourgeois Nationalists. Con- '


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INDIAN POLITICS 37sideration of Britain's own economic interest wasthere, beside the subtle policy of politically isolat-ing the petty bourgeois Nationalists by showing theIndian capitalists that their economic growth wasnot only possible, but even could be promoted with-in the orbit of Imperialist economy.

In spite of the enormous growth of native pro-duction, India still imports nearty 50 per cent ofher textile requirements, w^hich until recently usedto be supplied by Lancashire. But in the last yearsthings have changed greatly. Japan has been break-ing into the Indian market with alarming rapidity.Her share in the Indian trade increased from 0.3in 1914 to 9.1 per cent, in 1924. In 1925 the pro-portion was expected to be much greater. Englandcannot possibly compete with Japanese goods pro-duced by sweated labour.

Indian mills worked by coolie labour can alonedo that ; and the British bourgeoisie can alwaysparticipate in the resulting proht by exportingcapital to India to be invested in those mills. Itis remarkable that before the abolition of the ExciseDuty was declared, the President of the BombayMillowners' Association, N. N. Wadia, visited Eng-land and had conferences with Lancashire mill-owners. In view of the stormy opposition of Lan-cashire when the duty on cotton goods importedinto India was raised from j.s per cent, to 11 percent, without a simultaneous increase in the Ex-cise Duty, the gracious acquiescence of Lancashirein the abolition of the small Excise Duty withouttouching the comparatively high import duty isremarkable. The explanation of this changed at-titude is provided by the following quotation froma statement issued by a joint meeting of the Man-chester Chamber of Commerce and Lancashire mill-


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38 THE FUTURE OFowners convened immediately after the announce-ment abolishing the Excise Duty.

"If the industrial and general situation inIndia improves in the way in which it is somuch desired, it is clear that the Lancashireindustry- may hope for better trade as a result.That there is a potential purchasing power inIndia sufficient to engage the producing powerof both Indian and Lancashire industries, can-not be doubted. ... It is to be hoped that inthe new situation now created we may findourselves moving towards a position where theneeds of the Indian market will be met to anincreasing extent by her own manufacturers intheir class of product, and by Lancashire in thetypes upon which she will naturally concen-trate. Such a state of aflairs would satisfy thelegitimate aspirations of India, whilst not do-ing injustice to the Lancashire industr3^ Ifthis situation frankh^ recognised by both par-ties, could lead to the fostering of a betterspirit of mutual sympathy, support and accom-modation, we would be prepared to accept anydifficulties which may be imposed on Lancashireby the present decision in a generous manner." (The Economist, Dec. 5th, 1925.)

The situation is obvious : Indian and Britishcapital made up their age-long quarrel and came toan agreement against the common foe, Japan. Re-ferring to the abolition of the Excise Dut3^ the" Economist" (Dec. 5th, 1925) wrote

" The fact of the matter is that times havechanged. India has now fiscal autonomy, andit is useless for Lancashire to make protestsagainst reductions in Excise Duties or in-


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INDIAN POLITICS 39crease in Import Duties. It must not be for-gotten that this action of the Indian Govern-ment will probably be a more serious matterfor Japan than for this country. Lancashirerealises more fully than ever that in the futureshe will have to concentrate her machinerymore and more on the finer makes of cloth, andleave the coarser materials to be made by themills in the East. During the last few yearsleading authorities have noticed a desire on thepart of Indian consumers of cotton cloth topurchase higher quality goods. If this ismaintained and extended as there is reason forthinking that it will be, if the purchasingpower of the natives is increased, then cottonmanufacturers in this country have nothing tofear. It is primarily desirable that a spirit offriendship and goodwill should exist betweenthe people of this country and of India."(P- 939.)

The abolition of the Excise Duty made a tre-mendous impression in India. Though reluctant tosay so openly, the Nationalists generally recognisedit as an unmistakable sign of a " change of heart"on the part of Britain ; and a " change of heart" wasall that the Nationalists wanted as the price fortheir "wholehearted and honourable co-operation"with the British Government on the basis of thereformed constitution.Another very significant event was the appoint-

ment of a committee to investigate and recommendunder what conditions foreign capital should beadmitted into India. The report of the committeeaccepts all the conditions laid down by the minor-ity of the Fiscal Commission. This means that


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40 THE FUTURE OFin the immediate future industrialisation of Indiawill be carried on jointly by Indian and Britishcapital.

It will be interesting to examine the considera-tions which induced British imperialism radically tochange its economic policy in India, as a by-productof which change the aspirations of the native bour-geoisie have been to a great extent satisfied. Thepolitical consideration has already been mentioned.It is the recognition of the fact that the struggle fornational freedom is no longer the political expres-sion of the comparatively weak capitalist and in-tellectual classes. Its social basis has been enor-mously widened to include practically the entirepopulation. Its objective programme has, there-fore, changed from constitutional agitation foreconomic concession and administrative reform toRevolution. The quarrel between imperialismand the native bourgeoisie was over the division ofthe surplus value produced b}^ the Indian masses.It will pay imperialism to lessen its lion's share totiger's share, rather than to risk the loss of every-thing. British imperialism acted according to theHindu dictum"Faced with total destruction, thewise forego half."An examination of the economic considerationwill, however, show that it will not cost imperial-ism nearly as much to buy oft' the services of theIndian bourgeoisie and even the upper stratum ofthe middle classes, as against the revolutionar3^danger coming from the masses. As a matter offact, it will cost nothing.The interest of British capitalism demands notonly a guarding of the Indian market against Japan-ese and American aggression ; a continual extensionof the market is also demanded. Markets must be


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INDIAN POLITICS 41foundcreatedfor the British manufactures con-sumed in Central and Eastern Europe before thewar. India offers great possibilities in that direc-tion. But the economic ruin of the Central Euro-pean countries greatly reduced the purchasingpower of India because the greater part of Indianexport used to be taken by those countries. Thatmeans, just at the moment when British capitalismwants a bigger market in India, there is a shrink-age in the Indian market. In spite of a rise in thevalue of the total foreign trade of India(Rs. 5,890,000,000 in 1923-24), the volume was28 per cent, less than in 1914. The reason of thisshrinkage is this. While on the average 60 percent, of India's imports come from Britain, about60 per cent, of her exports go to countries outsidethe British Empire. Since the war most of theEuropean countries, that used to consume such alarge portion of Indian exports, bought much less.The situation is illustrated by the following tableTotal Amount of RupeesExports to: 1914 1922Austria andHungary ... 99,748,000 8,355,000Belgium ... ... 120,648,000 80,032,000France 176,827,000 98,270,000Germany ... ... 263,558,000 162,777,000Italy 78,351,000 58,378,000Russia 24,542,000 35,000Germany's share went down to as little as

13,859,000 in 1920.This serious fall in her export trade naturallyreflected upon India's ability to import, ultimatelyhurting the British manufacturers, since the majorpart of her import comes from Britain. All along,


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42 THE FUTURE OFa large surplus of export over import representedthe proceeds of imperialist exploitation, because themajor portion of that surplus was absorbed toliquidate "India's obligations in Britain." In 1920the balance of Indian trade (a balance artificiallymaintained in the interests of imperialism) was up-set. Import showed an enormous (890,000,000) ex-cess o\-er exports. Next year the disparity was re-duced to 440,000,000 by a corresponding reductionin imports. The situation was extremely alarmingfor imperialism. There was a heavy deficit in theBudget. The representative of the Government ofIndia, Charles Innes, informed the ImperialEconomic Conference (London, 1923) :

" Thanks to the war and disorganisationcaused by the war, we sell less and, therefore,we buy less. This decrease of trade hits usin many ways."

Further on the same speaker explained the neweconomic policy of the Government of India. Hesaid :

" I am aware that it has caused some alarmin this country, but if, as we hope, the resultof this policy (of protection) is to increase thewealth and productiveness of India, then, thosewho trade with India have nothing to fear.Already that trade is considerable in volume,but it is small in comparison with the size ofthe country and the population. In India wehave 315 millions of the peopleroughly one-fifth of the human race, and if only we canraise the standard of living of these millionsand increase their capacity to consume goods,India's potentialities as a factor in internationaltrade and as a market are almost limitless."


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INDIAN POLITICvS 43In the new state of world economy, it has become

impossible for the British capitalists to extract tri-bute from India in the shape of a large unpaidsurplus of export over import. The greater part ofthe foreign market for Indian produce of rawmaterial has been ruined almost beyond repair.Therefore, imperialist plunder must find a differentexpression. To arrest the shrinkage of Britishtrade with India, caused by the reduction in thelatter' s export trade, her purchasing power shouldbe otherwise increased. This can be done by rais-ing the standard of living of the Indian people.The standard of living of the Indian people, again,cannot be raised unless the choking grip on hereconomic life is considerably^ loosened. On theother hand, since a sufficient market for Indian rawproduce cannot be found abroad, it must be createdinside the country. This again must lead to in-dustrialisation. Industrialisation of a country withsuch enormous resources of raw material, cheaplabour and potentially unlimited markets, in its turnwill open up for British capital new fields guaran-teeing the possibility of almost fabulous accumu-lation. British capital invested in India will at thesame time extend the market for the production ofhome industries.These are, then, the fundamental considerations

which induced British imperialism to adopt a newcolonial policy permitting the growth of Indiancapitalism w^ithin certain limits.To sum up, since 1916 the British Governmenthas introduced a series of economic measures thatare greatly beneficial to the Indian bourgeoisie.Consequenth^ the antagonism between imperialismand Indian capitalism has been, at least for the timebeing, almost eliminated. The political result of


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44 THE FUTURE OFthis changed economic relation has been retlected ina steady decline of the Nationalist demand, and apitiabk bankruptcy of the mainly petty bourgeoisSwaraj Party, whose programme reflected purelycapitalist interests.What are the cardinal demands of the National-ist bourgeoisie ? Impetus to the industrialisationof the country ; fiscal autonomy ; protection. Allthese have been realised incidentally, in consequenceof the attempts of British capitalism to overcomethe serious post-war crisis by means of a re-adjust-ment of the economic basis of the Empire. Thedemand for self-government was put forward onthe hypothesis that unless the native bourgeoisiepossessed some political power, the programme ofthe free development of Indian capitalism could notbe realised. Now, it is demonstrated in practicethat the economic programme of bourgeois National-ism can be realised, in spite of the imperialist oppo-sition to a rapid political change demanded by thepetty bourgeoisie.' In other words, the bourgeoisiehave been convinced that their economic develop-ment is possible within the framework of imperial-ism.


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INDIAN POLITICS 45

PART IITHE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE

Chapter VI. The Rise of the Swaraj PartyThe future of Indian politics will be determinedby the new economic situation. As a matter offact, the Nationalist movement during the last five3^ears has been greatly influenced by the c"hangingeconomic relations between imperialism and thenative bourgeoisie. Successive concessions toIndian capitalism have, since 1921, coincided witha steady decline in the Nationalist political de-mand. This process has caused a regrouping offorces on the basis of a class differentiation insidethe Nationalist ranks. This process of class differ-entiation inside the Nationalist movement reacheda climax in the split of the Swaraj Party. Forthree years the Swaraj Party maintaind a formalrelation between the bourgeoisie and the people asa whole by making the interests of native capitalthe basis of its "national demand." Now that therapprochement with imperialism is practicallycomplete, the bourgeoisie do not need the superficialpolitical radicalism of the middle class intellectuals.Therefore, the Right Wing of the Swaraj Part}-,which conscious^ represents capitalist interests,declares in favour of political peace and breaksaway to join the Liberal ranks. The majority ofthe Swaraj Party, which loudly reiterate their de-termination to keep up the parliamentary opposi-tion, have gradually tempered their politicaldemands to small measures of administrative re-form. Only the question of prestige stands in the


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46 THE FUTURE OFway. The Swaraj Party is naturally anxious tosave its face, while imperialism demands uncon-ditional surrender.Eventually, after some oratorical explosions tocover the retreat, the middle class of the SwarajParty will follow the Right Wing to the camp of aunited constitutional bourgeois opposition.* Thereis no essential diiference between " honourable co-operation" and " responsive co-operation," theirrespective slogans. Both are agreed on principlethat co-operation with the British Government isthe best practical policy. The question is how soonand on what condition the co-operation will beoffered. The split in the Swaraj Party, therefore,is more likely to be between the Right and theCentre as against the petty bourgeois Left than asit appears now, between the Right and the rest ofthe party .fThe result of this impending split will be theconclusive detachment of the bourgeoisie from theanti-imperialist struggle. Another consequence ofthe split in the Swaraj Party will be the politicalunemployment, so to say, of the lower middle classintellectuals and the politicalh' conscious section ofthe petty bourgeoisie.

* Since this was written, in the beginning of 1926, theSwarajist leader Pundit Motilal Nehru signed the pact withthe Responsivists declaring in favour of accepting Ministerialoffice. The Party refused to ratify the pact. Thus theiM-oakaway of the Responsivists became an accomplished fact,and a new schism became noticeable inside the majority.t The rejection by the AH- India Congress Committeemeeting at Ahmedabad, on May 5th, 1926, of the SabarmatiPart in favour of accepting office, indicates that the line ofdifferentiation inside the Swaraj Party does not lie between theResponsivists and the orthodox majority. If the rank and fileassert themselves, the bluff of the present orthodox leadershipwill be called, and before long Motilal Nehru may be foundcrossing the Rubicon with his retinue.


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I

INDIAN POLITICS 47Ever since the breakdown of the movement ofmass passive resistance, thanks to the counter-

revolutionary leadership of Gandhi and his fol-lowers, the Swaraj Party became the vanguard ofthe Nationalist movement. A review of its career,therefore, will help us to make a correct estimateof the situation. It will show how bourgeoisNationalism had been steadily declining until ittouched the bottom.The rise of the Swaraj Party in 1923 indicateda move to the Right. Those elements of theNational Congress which had all along been op-posed to the boycott of reforms and were againstcommitting the Nationalist movement to revolu-tionary mass action, were the organisers of theSwaraj Party. The programme of the SwarajParty brought the Nationalist movement back onits bourgeois (and even feudal) basis which hadbeen somewhat lost sight of in the hectic days of1920-21. The Swaraj Party replaced revolutionarymass action by parliamentar}^ obstruction as thetactics of Nationalist politics.The founder and leader of the Swaraj Party,Chittaranjan Das, in the beginning sentimentallytalked about the down-trodden 98 per cent, of thepopulation and denounced the desire to replace the\Miite bureaucracy by a Brown bureaucracy. Itsounded very revolutionary and attracted the pettybourgeois Nationalists, who had been thrown intoconfusion by the counter-revolutionary politicalantics of Gandhi, under the flag of the Swaraj Party.The inherent contradiction of the programme ofguarding the interests of the exploited 98 per cent,through the instrumentality of Legislatures electedby the exploiting two per cent, of the population,was not noticed in the midst of the excitement.


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48 THE FUTURE OFThe programme of the Swaraj Party was to aban-don the bo3^cott of the pseudo-parliaments set upby the Reforms, in favour of entering them inorder, as the Swarajist leader ostentatiously pro-claimed "to give battle to the enemy from closerquarters." The hypocrisy of the whole programmewas, however, evident from the beginning to thosewho were not blinded b}^ clouds of phrases. TheReforms Act had enfranchised hardly 2 per cent,of the population. For the Central Legislature thefranchise was still more limited. On the whole, il^efranchise did not go beyond the landowning classes,upper intellectuals and rich peasantry. It was tothese classes that the Swarajist candidates appealed.This being the case, they could not possibly expectto be returned as the champion of the downtroddenexploited, unfranchised 98 per cent. The enfran-chised 2 per cent, live and thrive at the expense ofthe unfranchised 98 per cent. It is worse thanUtopia to believe that the propertied classes wouldvote for candidates who showed the slightest desireto tamper with the right of vested interests. Sincethe Swaraj Party wanted to secure for its parlia-mentary candidates the votes of the landowning andcapitalist classes, its programme could not possiblycontain anything more than the demands of thoseclasses.The pioneers of the Swaraj Party appeared beforethe National Congress at Gaya (1922) with thedemand for a change in the Nationalist programme.The sudden suspension of all militant activitiesordered by Gandhi (with the approval of otherNationalist leaders including the would-be Swaraj-ists) had thrown the National Congress into astate of confusion. The Nationalist movement wasin a serious crisis when the Congress met at Gaya.


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INDIAN POLITICS 49The deadlock could be broken only by the adoptionof a new programme. At that juncture the Com-munists put forward a programme of revolutionaryNationalism. The principal points of that pro-gramme were :

1. Complete National Independence; Separationfrom the British Empire.

2. Establishment of a Democratic Republic basedupon Universal Suffrage.

3. Abolition of Landlordism.4. Reduction of land rent and indirect taxation

higher incidence of graduated Income Tax.5. Modernisation of agriculture with State aid.6. Nationalisation of Public Utilities.7. Industrialisation of the country with State aid.8. Eight-hour day and minimum wage.Had C. R. Das, who was the President of theGaya Congress, been sincere in his previous pro-

nouncement, that he stood for " Swaraj for the 98per cent.", such a programme should have enlistedhis support. But the programme proposed by theCommunists was not even discussed in the Con-gress, although it was the dominating topic of thepress for two weeks. The Nationalist press joinedthe imperialist papers in denouncing the pro-gramme as " Bolshevist.'*

In that crisis there were two ways before theNationalist movementeither to break away fromthe deadening grip of counter-revolutionarypacifism in order to go ahead boldly in the revolu-tionary path ; or to repent the involuntary revolu-tionary deviation of the preceding two years andreturn to the good old constitutionalism. TheD


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50 THE FUTURE OFSwaraj Party appeared on the scene as the pioneerin the second path. Immediately after the inaugur-ation of the Swaraj Party, the Communists, in anopen letter to C. R. Das, again pointed out thatthere was no middle course between revolution andcompromise with imperialism. It was also pre-dicted in the same open letter that owing to theexistence in its ranks of the mutually exclusivetendencies of compromising constitutionalism andrevolutionary Nationalism, the Sw^araj Party wouldsplit before long.The Open Letter to C. R. Das concluded asfollows:"But in reality, the Deshbandhu withhis revolutionary following again finds himself inthe minority, because the majority of the new party(Swaraj) , which appears to be formed under hisleadership, subscribes much less to the socio-poli-tical views of Mr. Das than do the die-hards of the" no-change " cult, who remain in control of theCongress machinery. The result of such a com-bination can and will be either that Mr. Das willsoon have to abandon his original position in favourof *' Responsive Co-operation " of the MahrattaNationalists or that he wdll have to part companywith them in order to organise the third part}^inside the National Congressthe Party whichreflects clearly the interests of the uncompromisingrevolutionar\^ elements of our society, and whichwill infuse vigour into the national struggle bymeans of revolutionary mass action.

" This equivocal position will be cleared by asecond split in the Congress camp. To force thisinevitable separation of the revolutionary forcesfrom the embrace of the Right Wing, which willbring the Congress back practically under the in- Jfluence of Liberalism, is the task before you. Only I


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INDIAN POLITICS 51b}^ breaking away from the Right Wing, which inthe name of Nationalism has repudiated the tacticsof militant non-co-operation, your Party (Swaraj)will stand out as the vanguard of the NationalArmy."This warning given in February, 1923, proved

to be prophetic. Das went back on his own words.Notwithstanding the sentimental utterances of

its founder, the Swaraj Party became the party ofthe bourgeoisiethe Left Wing of bourgeoisNationalism. This aspect of its character wasmade clear in its programme and election manifesto.In the programme, Swaraj (self-government) wasinterpreted as "an effective control of the existingmachinery and system of Government and the rightto frame a Constitution." It is to be noted that thesame people, who but two years ago had rejectedthe reforms as inadequate, were prepared to acceptthe " machinery and S3^stem of government " setup by the reforms only on the condition that theycould have " an effective control " on them. W^hatwould be considered " effective control " was opento discussion. Another point in the programmewas " to protect private and individual propert}^,and to foster the growth of individual wealth."This should be the cardinal point in the programmeof a party that sought the vote of the propertiedclasses. The attitude of the party toward thelanded aristocracy was remarkable. The followingwas contained in the election manifesto which wasan expose of the Party programme.

*' It is to be noted with regret that the tongueof slander has of late been more than usuallybusy to estrange them (landowners) from theSwaraj Party. The Swarajya which the Partyaims at is represented as something which has


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52 THE FUTURE OFno place whatever for this ancient order, themembers of which have in the past furnishedmany a brilliant chapter to the history of thecountry, and even in these degenerate dayshave a number of ardent Nationalists amongthem. The Party can only appeal to theselatter to set at rest the doubts and misgivingsof their less enlightened brethren by explain-ing to them the obvious fact that those whodesire to help in the building up of Swarajyacannot possibly dream of such madness as toundermine the very foundations of society as ithas existed for hundreds of years in India bytrying to eliminate an important and influen-tial class from it. True it is that the Partystands for justice to the tenant, but poor indeedwill be the quality of that justice if it involvesany injustice to the landlord."

Still more : C. R. Das himself had to repudiatehis own irresponsible previous statement as regardsthe social affiliation of the Swaraj Party, in order towin the confidence of the land-owning classes. Inreply to the Secretary of the Behar Panchayet(village union) Association, he wrote :

" I do not desire any friction between land-lords and tenants. I have opposed the idea ofsuch class war from public platforms. Thequestion of the repeal of the Permanent Settle-ment is an undesirable question to raise and,in my opinion, whatever steps are taken mustbe taken after the attainment of self-govern-ment and, even then, only as a matter of agree-ment between the landlords and the tenants."

There could not be any doubt about the social


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INDIAN POLITICS 53affiliation of the Swaraj Party. By making itself therather noisy spokesman of interests that had beenreconciled to imperialist domination, the SwarajParty launched upon a life of *' bluff and bluster "(to borrow the phrase of a Liberal Nationalistjournal) which was bound to be short. The factthat the Swarajists failed to get a majority of theparliamentary seats (on the whole, less than 30 percent, of the total elected seats in the central and 8provincial legislatures) shows that the big landlordsand the upper strata of the bourgeoisie did notwelcome the voluntary services of the new party.Being essentially a somewhat radical expression ofbourgeois Nationalism, the Swaraj Party wasobliged to moderate its already sufficiently moderatepolitical demand to keep pace with the economicrapprochment between native capitalism and im-perialism. Its very social orientation had imposedupon the Swaraj Party the inevitable necessity ofthis political climb-down.


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54 THE FUTURE OFChapter VII. The Fiasco of the National,Demand

Immediately after entering the Legislative As-sembh^, the Swaraj Party turned back on theoriginal " National Demand " which was for im-mediate self-government. The " National De-mand " was watered down to win the approbation ofthe moderate bourgeois parties. The resolutionfinally moved was :

'* This Assembly recommends to theGovernor-General in Council that he be pleasedto take at a very early date the necessary steps(including, if necessary, procuring the appoint-ment of a Ro3'al Commission) for revising theGovernment of India Act so as to secure forIndia a full self-governing Dominion statuswithin the British Empire and Provincial Au-tonomy in the Provinces."

There was no '* ultimatum " in this resolutionas boastingly promised by the Swarajists during theelection campaign nearly two months before. Infact, the demand was quite within the sphere of the1919 Reform, which provides for further advanceafter a period not exceeding ten years. Theoriginal Swarajist programme was to adopt thepolicy of " uniform, continuous and consistent ob-struction to make government through Assemblyand Councils impossible," if the Government re-jected the Nationalist ultimatum. But in pledgingtheir support to the moderated '* NationalDemand," the Right Nationalist parties stipulatedthat obstruction should never be launched unless itwas an^reed to bv three-fourths of the combined


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INDIAN POLITICS 55membership of the Nationalist Party (a parliamen-tary coalition of the Swarajists and Independents).This agreement meant another long step back-wards.The dissatisfaction with the clumsiness of theadministrative machinery set up by the Reformsand the demand for their early readjustment wereprevalent among all the three Nationalist partiesnamely, Liberals, Independents and Swarajists.The latter' s attitude differed in that they challengedthe preamble of the Government of India Act,w^hich made the British Parliament the judge ofthe time and manner of India's progress towardsself-government. This radicalism, however, wassoon abandoned in practice. An amendment wasmoved by the Swarajist leader to the jointNationalist resolution. The support of all theelected Nationalist members had been assured forthe Amendment which was :

" That the following be substituted for theoriginal resolution. This Assembly recom-mends to the Governor-General in Council totake steps to have the Government of India Actrevised with a view to establish a full respon-sible government in India and for the purpose(a) to summon at an early date a representativeround table conference to recommend with dueregard to the protection of the rights and in-terests of important minorities the scheme of aconstitution for India, and (b) after dissolvingthe central Legislature to place the said schemebefore the newly-elected Indian Legislaturefor its approval and submit the same to theBritish Parliament to be embodied in astatute."


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56 THE FUTURE OFThis means, the Swaraj Party recognised the

British Parliament as the final arbiter as regardsIndia's rights to self-government. Essentially theamendment was more moderate than the resolution.The latter demanded self-government within theEmpire ; while the former asked for '' full respon-sible government.'* The reform demanded in theresolution was qualitative : India's political statusshould be improved from a dependency ruled auto-cratically to a self-governing Dominion. Theamendment, on the contrary, asked for a merequantitative change : the present partially respon-sible government to be replaced by '' full respon-sible government." That is, if made fully respon-sible to the Legislative Assembly, the BritishViceroy and British officials could remain as therulers of the country. What was essentiallj^wanted was that Britain should rule India with thesanction and collaboration of the native bourgeoisie(the Legislature does not represent any other class)

.

Obviously by secret agreement among the National-ist parties, the more far-reaching resolution waswithdrawn in favour of the weaker amendmentwhich was passed by a majority vote.The debate revealed still more interesting andsignificant things. The Swarajist leader, MotilalNehru, who had loudly informed his trusting pettybourgeois followers that the Swaraj Party wasentering the reformed councils to " non-co-operatefrom close quartersto carry the war inside theenemy's camp," speaking in support of his amend-ment dramatically declared : " I am not asking forresponsible government to be handed over, as itwere, tied up in a bundle. We (Swarajists) havecome here to offer our co-operation. If theGovernment will receive this co-operation, they will


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INDIAN POLITICS 57find that we are their men." He concluded hisspeech by saying that the oiTer made by theNationalists should not be thrown away. " for nogood is done by a continuance of the circumstancesin which a section of the community is standingoutside the Constitution." In other words, the con-stitution (joint exploitation of the Indian massesby British imperialism and Indian Capitalism) byitself was not objectionable, only it did not makesufficient accommodation for the middle class, whichas well as the bourgeoisie declared through theSw^araj Party'Make a little more room and wewall gladly come in.' From the very beginning theSwaraj Party did not challenge imperialism, as itrepeatedh^ trumpeted for the consumption of therevolutionarily inclined petty bourgeoisie. Its planwas to draw the government into a negotiationwhich might lead to a '' gentlemen's agreement."


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58 THE FUTURE OFChapter VIII. C. R. Das Climbs Down

The budget of 1924-25 came before the Legisla-tive Assembly. Contrary to their repeated pledgeto throw out the entire budget as a retaliationagainst the refusal to grant the national demand,the Swaraj Party only availed themselves of theopportunity for a dramatic political demonstration.The Right parties, frankly and consciously repre-senting the big bourgeoisie, would not go very farwith their Swarajist allies. As a formal demon-stration, the Swarajists contented themselves wdthrejecting the first four heads of the revenue side ofthe budget with a slight majority. The bour-geoisie were already disapproving of the futilehysterics of their most energetic spokesmentactics which only prejudiced economic agreementand retarded political peace. In moving the rejec-tion, Motilal Nehru again made some significantremarks. He said : "My present motion has noth-ing to do with the wrecking or destroying policy ofthe non-co-operators ; and is in effect a perfectlyconstitutional and legitimate means of drawingattention to the grievances of the country." Markwell, ** constitutionally and legitimately drawingattention to grievances," and a few months afterdemanding immediate self-government as an ulti-matum ! Quite good progress ; only in the wrongdirection.The Finance Bill was also thrown out by a stillmore diminished majority (of 3). But in the courseof the debate Motilal Nehru declared that '' theNationalist Party, judging that they have estab-lished the principle for which they have contended,think it unnecessary to continue the same proce-


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6o THE FUTURE OFAssembly convened in May, 1924, to consider theSteel Industry (Protection) Bill, presented anamusing but significant scene. The Swarajists,who have posed as the spokesmen of the " dumbmillions " and declared their firm determination toobstruct all government measures, voted for anofficial legislation taxing the masses to gratify thegreed of the Indian steel magnates. No less than 5Swarajist members, including the leader, MotilalNehru, and even the stormy petrel, V. J. Patel,accepted seats on the Select Committee to considerthe Bill and thus willingly co-operated with thegovernment. Patel brought in two mutually in-compatible amendments, one ridiculous, theother going still further than the Bill in theadvocacy of native capitalism. The first amend-ment recommended *' nationalisation " of the pro-tected steel industry. Nationalisation of industrybefore the State was nationalised was simply aridiculous idea. But the second amendment, incontradistinction to the first, w^as amazingly busi-ness-like. It recommended the application of pro-tection only to those industries having at least two-thirds Indian capital. A clause was added to thegovernment bill embodying the principle of thePatel Amendment and a Committee was appointedto report on conditions to be imposed upon theinflow of foreign capital. The demand fornationalisation was, of course, dismissed withoutmuch ado. An amendment stipulating for a mini-mum wage in return for the advantage accruingfrom protection, failed to receive Swarajist support.

In August, 1924, the leader of the Swaraj Party,C. R. Das, made a memorable statement to thepress. The statement made by him marked adefinite stage in the development of the Swarajist


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INDIAN POLITICS 6rprogramme. He defined the demand of his partyas follows :

** The first step should be autonomy in allthe provinces, with some control in the centralgovernment, which at present might consist ofa mixed British and Indian Council. Butthere should be some control in the LegislativeAssembly, the extent of which could only bediscussed at a round table conference. . . .When a pact is concluded, as it must be soon,between Britain and India, defence arrange-ments would be part of the pact.''

The position could not be made clearer. It isto be remarked that '' effective control " of the ex-isting administrative machinery demanded in theelection manifesto is reduced to " some control;"and the extent even of the '' some control " againremains open to negotiation. In making this state-ment the Swarajist leader acted as the spokesman,not of the entire Nationalist movement, as he pre-tended, but exclusively of the native bourgeoisie.The significance of this remarkable willingness forcompromise on the part of the apparently most ir-reconcilable wing of the Nationalist ranks, lies inthe fact that it was shown immediately after thefondest desire of native capitalismprotection forthe Indian industrieshad been actually conceded.

In view of this considerable climb-down asregards the essential political demands, the parlia-mentary fireworks in the subsequent session of theLegislature could not be taken seriously. Theywere meant to hoodwink the middle class adherents,whom the Swaraj Party was betraying in the in-terests of native capitalism.

C. R. Das concluded his statement with a declara-


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62 THE FUTURE OFtion of faith and a warning to the Government. Hesaid :

" I have been a truer friend of constitutionalprogress and more against the growing ten-dency towards anarchy than the Governmentwill believe. . . There is a more serious anar-chist movement in Bengal than the authoritiesrealised. It is growing increasingly difficultto suppress it. I hope Britain and India willget together presently and come to terms on thelines I have mentioned ; for if the Swarajistmovement fails, no repression can possibly copewith the anarchy that is sure to raise its head.Violence and disorder will reign supreme.The authorities do not realise that with thefailure of the Swarajist movement, the peoplewill lose all faith in any form of constitutionalmethods. When that happens, what is left tothem but violent anarchical revolutionarymethods ?"

Taking his cue from the British police, the Swar-ajist leader called the revolutionary Nationalists"anarchists." He recognised that the economic ruinof the lower middle class, particularl}^ petty intellec-tuals, had created an objective basis for revolution-ary Nationalism, or what he was pleased to denounceas anarchism. As against this revolutionary dangerhe suggested a united front of British imperialismand the Indian bourgeoisie. The latter were nomore a friend of " anarchy" (that is, revolutionaryNationalism) than the former. Why not get to-gether ? The sooner the better. The Swarajistleader even gave a practical reason to convince theimperialist rulers who sometimes show a woeful lackof commonsense. He arguedif you strengthen our


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INDIAN POLITICS 63position by making some administrative readjust-ments, we will still be able to carry the lower middleclass and petty intellectual revolutionaries in tow,taking advantage of their political immaturity.The year 1925 began in an atmosphere surchargedwith speculations as regards the possibility of theSwarajists accepting office provided that a few modi-fications were made in the system of dyarchy.""-' Thequestion of the Swarajists' acceptance of Minister-ship arose only in two provincesBengal and theCentral Provinceswhere the Nationalists had aworking majority and the Governor, to free the ad-ministration from recurring parliamentary crises,prorogued the Legislature sine die. The rest of theprovinces, as well as the Central Government, werepractically not affected by Swarajist obstruction.Consequently, in the beginning of 1925, the centreof Swarajist politics shifted from Delhi to Calcutta.Towards the end of March, a number of MoslemSwarajists issued a statement to the press giving itto be understood that C. R. Das was willing toform a Ministry in Bengal Province. The Swarajistleader immediately issued a counter-manifesto inwhich he declared that he was " willing to co-operatewith the Government provided that the conditionswere honourable." In the course of the manifestothe Swarajist programme was once more specifiedin these words : " We are determined to secureSwaraj and political equality for Ind

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