fuzzy vaults: toward secure client-side matching
DESCRIPTION
LABORATORIES. Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching. Ari Juels RSA Laboratories 10th CACR Information Security Workshop 8 May 2002. Fingerprint scanning. Iris scanning. Voice recognition. Face recognition. Body odor. Many types of biometric authentication. Authenticating. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching
Ari JuelsRSA Laboratories
10th CACR Information Security Workshop8 May 2002
LABORATORIES
![Page 2: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Fingerprint scanning Iris scanning Voice recognition
Many types of biometric authentication...
Many others...
Face recognition Body odor Authenticating...
![Page 3: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
A Comparison Among Biometric Architectures
![Page 4: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Registration
Template
Alice
![Page 5: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Template is stored
![Page 6: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Authentication
![Page 7: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Authentication
?
It’s Alice!
![Page 8: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
The big questions
Where is the match performed?– Determines architecture
How is the template protected?– Critical because….
![Page 9: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Limited password changes
First password
Second password
![Page 10: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Templates represent intrinsic information about
you
Alice
Theft of a template is theft of identity
![Page 11: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
An Important Note
Biometrics no more secure than PINs!– Static values– False acceptance rates imply, e.g.,
1/100,000 security (i.e., perhaps 17 bits) Thus, it is at present unwise to protect
cryptographic systems with biometrics alone
Biometrics are a good second factor, i.e., PIN replacement
![Page 12: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
The Three Architectures:Server-side, Client-side, and
On-device
![Page 13: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Server-side matching
Server
Client
![Page 14: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Server-side matching
Server
Client
“access
granted”
![Page 15: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Server-side matching: Drawbacks
Risk of template compromise en bloc – Hundreds of thousands of fingerprints make
an excellent hacker target– Privacy, liability concerns considerable
Architecturally complex Matching is CPU-intensive for server
![Page 16: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Client-side matching
Server
“It’s Alice!”“Hi, Alice!”
![Page 17: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Client-side matching
Most convenient and simple to build
Fine for, e.g., locking desktop with screen saver
Not secure for remote authentication... client can be made to lie!
![Page 18: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Client-side matching
Server
“It’s Alice!”“It’s Alice!”“Hi, Alice!”
![Page 19: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
On-device matching
SecurID
![Page 20: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
On-device matching
SecurID
![Page 21: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
On-device matching
On-device security provides full privacy and integrity
With smartcard, biometric unlocks card, thus no need for modification of client or server software
But...
![Page 22: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
On-device matching
But Alice must always have her smart card with her -- portability lost
At present, true on-device match available only with expensive (i.e., $200) units
Most “on-card” matching systems process data on PC, reducing security
![Page 23: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
“Fuzzy Vault”:A New Architecture
![Page 24: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
“password”
UNIX protection of passwords
“password” h(“password”)
“password”
![Page 25: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Template protection?
h( )
![Page 26: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Fingerprint is variable
Differing angles of presentation Differing amounts of pressure Chapped skin
Don’t have exact key!So hashing won’t work...
![Page 27: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
We want “fuzzy” vault
Differing angles of presentation Differing amounts of pressure Chapped skin
![Page 28: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
We want “fuzzy” vault
![Page 29: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
How do we do it?
Fuzzy vault is just a piece of encrypted data
Uses error-correcting codes– Technology used to eliminate “noise” in
telecommunications, CD players, etc. We make counterintuitive use of
error-correcting codes– Jettison the message space!
![Page 30: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
What do we get?
Fingerprint (features) not stored in clear
![Page 31: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Fuzzy vault
Vault can be stored in directory and unlocked on client
ClientDirectory
![Page 32: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Fuzzy vault: Caveats
Basic fuzzy vault: Does not achieve security of on-card matching Not secure against Trojan horses Still provides adequate security as second factor, e.g., PIN replacement
![Page 33: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Fuzzy vault pros Provable security characterization
– Similar (dubious) schemes lack proofs No need for biometric server No need for smart card
– Fuzzy vault can be placed on smart or dumb card for added flexibility, though Can build secure readers without crypto All the benefits of secure, client-side match!
![Page 34: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
When can I buy a fuzzy vault?
Fuzzy vault is a research concept Validated in early prototype Needs development on biometrics side RSA Labs is looking for research partner
![Page 35: Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching](https://reader036.vdocument.in/reader036/viewer/2022062309/56814d63550346895dbab2be/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
To learn more... Fuzzy vault I -- Suitable for iris?
– “A Fuzzy Commitment Scheme”, ACM CCS ‘99– Joint work with Martin Wattenberg, IBM
Fuzzy vault II -- Suitable for fingerprints?– “A Fuzzy Vault Scheme”, ISIT ‘01– Joint work with Madhu Sudan, MIT
Patents pending Papers at www.ari-juels.com Ari Juels at [email protected]