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The recurring crises in Afghan-Pakistani rela-tions since the partition of British India in 1947have usually involved conflicts over the stat~s ofpeoples divided by the "Duzand Line. " The Britishestablished the Duzand Line by treaty with theruler of Afghanistan in 1S93 as a "demarcation ofspheres of influence"; it has since come to begenerally recognized as the international boundarybetween Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Duzand Line bisects the Pathan* ethnichomeland —that azea termed "Pushtunistan" byethnic nationalists (see Map I) . Periodic Afghanefforts to reunite the divided tribes in somefashion have repeatedly been zejected by Pakistanin squabbles that have come to be known as thePushtunistan dispute.

The Afghans formerly ruled much of the tezri-tory that, since 1947, has constituted Pakistan'sNorthwest Frontier Province. Current Afghan feel-ings on the issue are based on irredentist ambi-tions on the part. of some Afghans, a rejection ofthe Durand Line treaties which Afghans say wereforced on a weak Afghan ruler, an extreme sensi-tivity to' the political power of the Pathans inAfghanistan, and indignation at perceived mis-treatment, of the minority Pathans in Pakistan.

By zejecting the legitimacy of the line, theAfghan Government hopes somehow to foster theindependence oz autonomy of ethnic kinsmen inPakistan and thereby win the favor of its ownmajority Pathan tribesmen. The Pakistanis have

so known as Pushtun or Pakhtoon.

WANNINOKKNKITIVK INTK&&IQKNCK KOIIACKK

ANO MKTNOOK INVO&VKOReport No. 1066October 3, 1978

rejected the Afghan position as interference in theirinternal affairs. The resulting dispute, which has flaredup at least five times in the past 30 years, has beenmarked by hostile propaganda, border closuzes, economicdisruptions, militazy skirmishes, and severance of diplo-matic relations.

The crises have nearly always been precipitated by anAfghan perception that Pakistan is mistreating the Pathanswithin its borders. Pakistan's moves to exert counter-pressure on Afghanistan by shutting off the vital traderoutes through Karachi to landlocked Afghanistan have usuallyresulted in Kabul's turning to Yxscow. The Soviets promptlydeliver aid, thereby strengthening their influence inAfghanistan.

The US publicly recognized the Duzand Line as Pakistan'sinternational boundary in 1956 and has privately taken thesame position with the Pakistani and Afghan Governments in1950, 1960, and 1978. US policy has been one of encouragingbilateral discussions between the two countries in theinterests of regional harmony and stability.

Contents

Summazy.

Histozy of the Area Prior to 1947' The Pathan Homeland: Inaccessible, Ungovernable. .... 1

Afghan Empires Extend Over "Greater Pushtunistan".

British Strategic Interest in Creating a Boundary. ... 3

Drawing Up the Duzand Line. .....Political History of Afghan-Pakistani Disputes:

1947-Present

Partition and the Accession of Tribal Territoriesto Pakistan.

The Afghan Position. 6

The Pakistani Position

Periods of Stress: 1950-51I 1955I 1960 61,1973, 1978

The US Position. . 15

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Histo of the Area Prior to 1947

The Pathan Homeland: Inaccessible, Un oveznable. Oneither' sx o e A g anxstan- xstan or ez xes a moun-tainous, undeveloped area inhabited by the Pathans (seeNap 1, opposite), a group of tribes speaking a common lan-guage called Pushtu oz Pukhtu. As frontier dwellers sincethe Achaemenid empire in the sixth century B.C. , Pathanshave historically ignored boundaries and continued theirtraditional patterns of migration, trade, and warfare.

Of an estimated 11 million Pathans at the time of par-tition in 1947, about 5 million lived in undivided India,mainly in the Northwest Pzontiex Province (&FAFP) in Settled("Administered" ) Districts or in Political Agencies (alsocalled Tzibal Territories) close to the border. UnderBritish zule, the tribes in the Political Agencies were sub-ject to the political control of the Provincial Governor butgenerally managed their own internal affairs and stronglyresisted British efforts to change the hill country into a"settled" area. The British used allowances to obtain theloyalty of tribal chieftains, fought endless skirmishes,and stationed up to 40, 000 regular troops in the NWFP.Despite these efforts, some areas in the Political Agencieswere always off limits to British officials and essentiallyimpervious to British law.

The tribes on the Afghanistan side of the Durand Linehave been ecpxally difficult to govern. Afghan goveznments,like theiz British (and Pakistani) countezparts, have alsoresorted to subsidies for tribal allegiance; intrigues andrebellions have been commonplace.

Afghan Em izes Extend Over "Greater Pushtunistan. "Afghan xnterest xn us tun areas ates zom e t century,probably because the Amirs of Afghanistan were Pushtuns.(Although the Pushtuns constituted a minority of the popula-tion, the other tzibal groups —Taj iks, Uzbeks, Turkomans, andHasaras —were so fragmented that the Pushtun plurality wasable to retain its authority. ) The Pushtun Amizs actuallyruled the NWPP from 1747 to 1834. es awar was exr wxn rca 1 a an xtal o the us uns

a ans (Kabul itself lies in a persian-speaking area) . Thelast King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, and the late President.

Nohammad Daoud were descendants of the last. Afghan governozof Peshawar.

Bven after the Pathan homeland was divided, Pathans onthe British side of the Durand Line retained influence inAfghanistan. For instance, in 1929 a Pushtun/Pathan armedexpedition removed an unpopular Afghan Amir and put its owncandidate on the throne. (President Hur Yuhammad Taraki isalso a Pushtun but not. of the royal clan. )

British Strate ic Interest in Czeatin a Bounda . TheUK foug t two wars wz A q an&stan 8-4 an -80) inau. attempt to counter Russian designs on the area. From1843 to 1896, through a series of military excuzsions,tzeaties, and annexations, the British gradually seized con-trol of what is now Pakistan and established the %4FP in1895. By the end of the period, the anti-British intriguesof the Amiz of Afghanistan with the frontier tribesmen hadled the UK to seek demarcation of spheres of influence intribal tezzitory.

The British wanted to:—facilitate the governing of the border regions;—stop the raiding parties and "outrages" of Afghan

tribes;—establish control over the mountain passes into British

India; and

—create a stable buffer state between British dominionsand tsazist Russia.

Accordingly, in 1893 Abdur Rahman Khan, an Afghan Amirwho was anxious to stop British expansion into tribal areasand whose position had been weakened by internal revolt,accepted a treaty demarcating British and Afghan "spheres ofinfluence. " The treaty provided that a boundary line sur-veyed-by a British mission undez Sir Ben'ry 5Mrtimer Durandwould constitute "the frontier of His Highness's dominions"and that neither government would, "exercise interference"in territories on the other side of the line.

Drawin U the Duzand Line. Attempting to follow theinaccurate map t. at accompanie the agreement, mixed commis-sions demarcated the line in some places and surveyed it inothers in 1894, 1895, and 1896. This boundary, about 1,420miles lonq and stretching from Iran to China, for much of

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its length follows the water divide atoptains subsidiary to the main Hindu Kush.1932, almost 100 border adjustments wereBritish India and Afghanistan. (See Map

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made between2, opposite. )

So many inaccuracies were found in the original mapsand subsequent adjustments that the line was later calledthe "a azent boundary between British India and Afghani-stan. ' T e Afghans vaguely reaffirmed the original agree-ment in treaties with the British in 1905 and 1919, andin the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 (j.tself reaffirmed in1930). A supplementary British 1:tter to the Treaty of1921 did, however, recognize the interest of the AfghanGovernment in the "conditions" of frontier tribes, and eachgovernment agreed to inform the other before mounting mili-tary expeditions in the area. (K,&ul has since pointed tothis letter as an admission of Afghanistan's rights. )

A well-known British surveyor observed in 1901 that the.Durand Line was "at one point at least seventy miles southof the position assigned to it by the Kabul Agreement.Concession was the ruling spirit of the demarcation. " Not-withstanding this British spirit of "concession, " the DurandLine defied ethnic and ~strategic logic. It crudely divideda whole people, splitti'ng clans, tribes, and subtribes, thuscalling into question any status it might otherwise havegained as a national frontier. The tribesmen felt —andfeel —loyalty to fellow clan members on the other side of theDurand Line, not to non-Pushtun ethnic groups in distant loca-tions in what is ostensibly their nation.

Over time, however, the Durand Line has come to con-stitute the international boundary between Pakistan andAfghanistan and ' nized a herthan Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

Political Histor of Af han- &stan& Dis utes: 1947-Present

Partition and the Accession of Tribal Territories to9k*t . 9 t *g t*zaE pl A 1947 t tt t*g f tt Afgt -M' t. i df. p tas well as for the more violent 1ndian-pakistani differences.The troubles began with, a British-conducted plebiscite thatgave the peoples of British India the choice of accessionto either India or Pakistan.

The plebiscite was 'held in Kashmir and in the Adminis-tered Districts of the %9)ppf but not in the Tribal Terri-tories. The British hei'd that the Tribal Territories were

part of India, but not. part of British India, that Britishcontrol over those territories wouOO cease with Britishwithdrawal, and that control would not pass to any othergovernment. The position of these territories was analogous

that of the Indian princely states. essentially castadrift by partition, they were free to accede to india,Pakistan, or a third state (Afghanistan) or to remainindependent.

Both before and after Independence Day in August 1947,Pakis'tani leaders quietly wooed the tribes by promisingcontinuance of British subsidies. Within three months afterassuming powez, the Pakistani authorities conducted a seriesof jizgcs (council meetings) at which all the tribal leaders,on behalf of their peoples, signed documents declaring: "Weare part of Pakistan. ... The internal management of ourtribes will remain as before. " During the same period, therulers of the princely states of the NWPP signed formaltreaties of accession to Pakistan.

Afghanistan, which invited several tribal leaders toKabul, apparently obtained no pledges of allegiance. Atthe time, the Pathans were preoccupied with aiding theinvasion of Kashmir, which put Pakistan in possession ofthe portion of Kashmir which it still occupies. There waslittle discontent with the accession to Pakistan. Whilethe pushtunistan idea was seriously pursued by some indi-viduals, no tribe appears to have committed itself as a unitto the concept.

The plebiscite for the Pathans living in the Adminis-tered Districts offered a choice of accession to eitherPakistan or India. Frontier advocates of, at a minimum, agreater degree of self-rule for the region (the "RedShirts, " led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) called for a boy-cott of the plebiscite as a protest against its limitedterms. When the results were tallied, they showed that51 percent of those eligible had voted and that 99 percentof them had voted for Pakistan. Although the AfghanGovernment protested that the light vote meant thatPathans were dissatisfied, a provincial election held theprevious year in more favorable weather had drawn only60 percent of the voters. The effectiveness of the boycotthas thus been held to have been trifling.

The Afghan Position: "Concern for Pathan welfare. "Afghanistan as contrnue to oo upon t.e Duran Lane asan intolerable border forcibly imposed on the country by

the British. There are several additional reasons, however,why Kabul keeps pushing the issue to lengths that oftenappear inexplicable to outsiders.

First, the ruling Pushtuns are convinced that they needthe goocCvxll of trans-Durand pathans to retain power.Although the Pushtuns are estimated to outnumber the otherethnic groups of the country, the edge is very slight. Afulfillment of the most extreme Pushtun aspiration--theannexation of the Pathan areas of Pakistan —would add 5 to7 million Pathans to Pushtun ranks and ensure their domi-nance in Afghanistan.

Recalling that the last dynasty of Afghan kings wasenthroned with the aid of Pathans from across the border,political analysts gen'erally agree that. prolonged tribalopposition —especially if supported by Pakistani Pathans-could eventually topple any government in Kabul. Theimplicit dependence of, Afghan governments on tribal goodwillnecessitates constant professions of anxious concern fortribal well-being. Thus, Afghan regimes usually woo thetribes on both sides of the Durand Line by emphasising thatAfghanistan is the Pathan homeland. Conversely, Pakistan,whose tribesmen constitute only around 10 percent of thepopulation, seeks to play down the differences betweenPathans, Punjabis, Baluch, and Sindhis in the interest ofnational unity.

Second, the Pushtuns are concerned with the welfareand status of tribal culture and perceive indifference oranimosity toward it from Pakistani rulers.

Third, Kabul has pursued the ploy of trying to obtainmateria ienefits by playing off Great Powers against eachother.

Afghan irredentist urges are documented in such state-ments as that of Afghan Chief of Staff Ghani on February 15,

~ 1950 (obtained clandestinely): "Sind is our border and wemust have it. " Similarly, in May 1978, the new AfghanMinister for Frontier Regions asserted that Afghanistan'seastern boundary was the River Indus. Map 1 shows themaximum Afghan claim for the "independent state ofPakhtoonistan" as including the NWFP and Baluchistan. (TheBaluch are not ethnic Pathans, but. the fact that somePathans live in Baluchistan, coupled with the tribal natureof inhabitants of Baluchistan, has led Kabul to includeBaluchistan routinely in its claims for Pushtunistan. )

Afghanistan has made at least two diplomatic attemptsto restore its influence over all tzibal territory aroundthe Durand Line. In the early 1940's, the Afghans askedthe British for the return of the Frontier territory or,as an alternative, full autonomy for the area if India weregranted independence. The British consistently refused toact on such requests. Soon after the British announcedthat paztition was imminent, the Afghans again asked to beconsulted over the future of the tribal areas. The Britishresponded that neither they nor the Government of Indiacould set up a special regime in any territory east of theDurand Line.

Piqued at this rebuff, Afghanistan was the only countzyto vote against Pakistan's admission to the UN in 1947.(However, the Afghan delegation later explained that it hadacted without instructions and withdrew its vote. )

The treatment that the ruling Muslim League government(long identified with the British) was meting out to Pathanleader Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Red Shirts also alarmedKabul. When Ghaffar Khan was secretly arrested in April1948, the Red Shirts defied a ban on public assembly togather at Babra, a village in tribal territory near Charsadda,to discuss the arrest. Pakistani authorities reacted bysending in troops, who opened fire, killing more than 40 ofthe Red Shirts. ' The following year, Pakistani aircraft wenton punitive expeditions against the rebel Faqiz of Ipi.(The Faqir, around whom opposition to the creation of Paki-stan had centered, was probably in Afghan pay. ) The planesviolated Afghan airspace and bombed Moghol Gi village (seeMap 1), killing 23.

Both incidents prompted loud outbursts of mutual abuse.On July 26@ 1949) the Afghan Parliament —for the first ofmany times —officially repudiated the Durand Line asembodied in treaties concluded with Britain.

Then and now, the question of what Afghanistan actuallyexpects to achieve by repudiating the Durand Line andespousing "self-determination" in Pushtunistan has been thesubject of much debate. Kabul's demands have ranged fromcomplete politi. cal independence for the Pakistani tribesmen(although not for Afghan tribesmen) to merely a more inde-pendent voice for Pathans within the Pakistani politicalframework. All the while, Afghanistan has been quick tocomplain about any Pakistani intrusion into its territoryover the Durand Line, although it repudiates that same line.

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The Pakistani Position: "It's None of Your Business. "Pakistan c a&ms soverorgnty over e dispute area ongrounds that Pakistan inherited the British administeredterritories and that the unadministered tribes and princelystates of the NWFP joined the nation voluntarily by writtentreaty and instruments of accession. However, successivePakistani governments have greatly irritated Kabul by refus-ing to acknowledge that any problem has existed. They alsohave charged Kabul with interference in pakistan's internalaffairs, arrested Pathan leaders for sedition, mountedmilitary actions against tribesmen in Baluchistan and theNWFP, and closed the Afghan transit links through Karachiand Quetta.

In the process, the Government of Pakistan probablyhas worsened its relations with its own tribesmen in theNWFP and Baluchistan. While some Pathans espoused the for-mation of a Pushtu-speaking administrative division within.Pakistan, more often it was heavyhanded government adminis-tration that exacerbated tribal restiveness. UnderlyingPakistan's refusal to tolerate Afghanistan's interest inthe welfare of ethnic kinsmen in Pakistan (a riqht Pakistanclaims for itself in the case of Kashmir) was a fear thatSoviet or Afghan-supported tribal unrest could break upPakis tan.

Periods of Stress: 1950-51 1955 1960-61 1973 1978.The Pus tunrstan issue as never ecome comp ete y qures-cent. Except for a period of relative calm in the 1960's,it has flared up every five years since 1950.

The proximate causes of the 1950-51 eriod of stressincluded a series of Afghan grievances over not exng con-sulted about the political destiny of Afqhan kinsmen inPakistan and over the Pakistani "massacres" at Babra andMoghol Gi. The period was marked by themes that would becomea familiar pattern over the years:

—Tzcxns~t fnherf'ez ence: In January 1950, Pakistan barredborder transit of gasoline and diesel fuel, allegingsafety regulation violations by Afghan truckers.(The Afghans then turned to the USSR, signed a tradetreaty in July 1950, and impozted gasoline from theSoviets. )

--Propaganda: Much of the "war" was fouqht with qovern-ment-controlled media. Kabul began referring to theNWFp and, Baluchistan as "Northern and Southern

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Pushtunistan. " Kabul newspapers carried accounts ofthe formation of Pushtunistan "state assemblies" inPakistan. The Faqir of Zpi was proclaimed as thePresident of Pushtunistan, and the "Waziristan Assem-bly" as the central government. Pakistani retortscompared Af ghan neglect of "backward" Pushtunswith benefits that Pathans enjoyed owing toKarachi 's munificence. Both sides banned each othez'snewspapers.

—Farboring of f'ugitives: Besides the usual agent buy-ing and cross-bor'der intrigue, Pakistan allowedex-King Amanullah's brother, Amin Jan, to reside inWaziristan for seven years. The proximity of thispretender to the throne irritated the Afghan rulerand brought sharp protests.

—Military movements and skirmiskss: Zn October 1950,an Afghan Lcshkar (expeditionary force of tribesmenor irregulars) sallied into Pakistani Baluchistan inwhat was said to be an effort to capture the Boghrapass leading to Quetta. The expedition was repulsed.Pakistan, which had moved most of its troops out ofNWFP at independence to show that the Frontier was anintegzal part of Pakistan, moved some regulars backinto the Khyber area.

—Harassment of diplomate: Pakistani diplomats in Kabulcomplained of the hostile pubLic attitude and therestrictions on their movements.

The 1955 crisis was also precipitated by heightenedAzghan concern over. the political status of the Pathans inPakistan. On March 27, the Government of Pakistan announcedits intention to institute "One-Unit" rule, whereby the fourprovinces of West Pakistan would be amalgamated into one (tobalance the more populous Province of East Pakistan). TheAfghan Government perceived this as a disinheritance ofthe minority Pathans —who would lose the bargaining powerand leverage of a separate province —and a threat to theircultural identity. Afghan Prime Minister Daoud warned onMarch 28 that. there would be "grave consequences" if theOne-Unit plan were effected.

The next day, an Afghan mob ransacked the PakistaniEmbassy in Kabul, desecrated the Pakistani flag, and raisedthe Pushtunistan flag over the Embassy. On the followingday, a mob attacked the Pakistani Consulate in Jalalabad.

11—

Pakistan retaliated unoffic'ally with a mob attack on theAfghan Consulate in Peshawar and officially by closing allits consulates and asking Afghanistan to do the same.(Embassies remained open. ) Normal diplomatic relationsbetween the two countries were not resumed until 1957.

Besides the diplomatic harassment, the crisis wasmarked by:

—Transit interference: Pakistan closed Afghan tradeagencies in border areas, partially blocking Afghani-stan's trade routes. Once again the Soviets steppedin, and another Afghan-Soviet transit agreement wassigned in June 1955. The dispute was settled inSeptember, but by that time the Afghans had shiftedmuch of their trade to other routes.

—Mi Iitary slcirmishes: After the closure of its tradeagencies, the Afghan Government mobilized troops andcalled up reserves. An Afghan raiding party fired onsome Pakistani militia in Zhob, Baluchistan, prompt-ing the Pakistanis to bomb raider hideouts inAfghanis tan.

—Third-country mediation: A new element in this crisiswas the extensive involvement of third countries. InMay 1955, both sides accepted the mediation of fiveArab nations. led by Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi pro-posals were rejected in June. King Zahir then wroteto President Eisenhower asking for his intervention;the President declined and suggested bilateral talksto work out differences. In December, Khrushchev andBulganin paid a three-day visit to Kabul and announceda large loan, trade agreements, and (for the firsttime) political support for the Afghan position onPushtunistan.

--Propaganda: The level of radio invective heightened.In November 1955, an Afghan Loya Jirgah (a nationalcouncil) called for a plebiscite and refused torecognize Pakistani sovereignty over "PuShtunistan. "

In the late 1950's, President Ayub (newly come to power)tried to integrate the tribal areas more fully into Pakistan,rekindling Afghan concerns about the status of the Pathans.At the same time, prime Minister Daoud ran into oppositionfrom his own tribesmen for his efforts to strengthen centralcontrol over the tribes through such measures as conscrip-

tion, taxation, and transpoztatiqn develooment. Relationsagain deteriorated.

A real crisis loomed after the failure of talks betweenPresident Ayub and Afghan Foreign Minister Maim in Karachiin January 1960. Maim indicated that Kabul would be satis-fied merely "to hear that the Pathans were happy, " but hedid not specify what that meant. Ayub responded bydenouncing Afghan interventionism . (insulting Naim's Afghanpride). The result was a resumption of vigorous Afghanpropaganda, returned in full by Pakistan.

The familiar pattern emerged:

—Pzopcgcnda: During this period, Naim injected a newextreme in hard-line irredentist statements by declar-ing that Afghans had been deprived of their homelandby British and Pakistani "colonialists. " He demandedself-determination for the Pushtuns. Kabul radioattacked the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization(SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).

—Mi IiZazp ccHoxe: The most serious military actionbetween the two countries in 30 years occurred inSeptember 1960 in Bajaur, a virtual no-man's land ofunadministered territory comprising several princelystates. Both countries had been maneuvering foradvantage, and several skirmishes had taken placebetween pro-Afghan and pro-Pakistani princes. Afghan-istan moved troops to the frontier and then sent about6, 000 armed tribesmen into Pakistan to "negotiate" adispute over roadbuilding i,n the area. The Pakistanisambushed the force, killing 400-600 Afghans. Theincident was a serious loss of face for Kabul andallowed Pakistan to remove a pro-Afghan nabab (pzince)and improve its control of the area.

—Diplomatfc harassment: In March 1960, Kabul put Paki-stani diplomats under heavy surveillance and arrestedsome local employees of the embassy. In August 1961,after publishing a white paper on the harassment anddifficulties facing its diplomats, Pakistan withdrewthem from Afghanistan.

—2'rcneit inter)'eresce: Afghanistan reacted to thebreak in diplomatic relations by unilaterally sealingthe border on September 6, 1961, just as the Afghanfruit crop was ready for export. The Soviets stepped

in and airlifted the fruit to its destination. Traderelations between Kabul and Moscow then expandedeven further.

--2'biz d-countxy mediation: shchev visited Kabulagain in March 1960, at which time he announce thatthe SSR s sy es were (Presi-dent Exsen ower a it to Kabul inDecember 1959, but King Zahir later complained thatthe visit had brought no understanding by the West ofAfghanistan's problems. ) President Kennedy sent amission to Afghanistan in late 1961 to try to mediatea reopening of the ruptured transit facilities, butthe initiative failed. In July 1962, the Shah of Iranoffered to mediate, but his effoxts did not bear fruituntil he got both sides togethex in Tehran in Bay 1963,after Daoud resigned the prime ministership. As azesult of the negotiations, the two countries agreedto reopen their' borders and resume diplomatic rela-tions. The period was also marked by a bizarre planby President Ayub to federate Afghanistan, Pakistan,and Iran.

The 1961 border closure lasted almost two years, affect-ing the seasonal migra'tion of Pushtun herdsmen--Afghan Kuchi(also called Powindah) —who traditionally wintex' in Pakistan.Pakistan ignored established practice and refused to permitthe nomads to enter without passports and visas. For itspart, Afghanistan would not issue travel documents to thenomads because that would imply acceptance of the Durand Lineas an international boundary. The USSR again came to therescue by providing the herdsmen with clothing, food, andfodder foz their animals. (Although the passport. requirementwas not abolished, the Powindahs were again permitted toenter Pakistan without passpozts between 1963 and 1973.)

The entire issue simmered, apart from a temporaryincrease in propaganda in 1967-68, for the next 10 years.In July 1973, newly installed President Daoud raised thePushtunistan issue on the day of his takeover. His deter-mination to do so was probably intensified by PresidentBhutto's removal of populaxly elected {tribal-led) govern-ments in Baluchistan and the NWFP and by army repression inBaluchistan. The earlier themes returned:

—Propaganda: The media war escalated. Afghan diplo-mats alleged publicly and privately that Pakistanwas encouraging "provocations" against the new

regime. Afghanistan attacked Pakistan at the non-aligned summit meet'ng in Algiers in September forrepression in Baluchistan and called for a return ofall Pathans to "the fatherland. "

-«Tx'mtsit disturbances: Pakistan clamped down onPowindah movement again for a few months.

—MiZifazy actions: Afghanistan arrested and detaineda party of Pakistani Frontier Scouts which had"strayed" across the border. Pakistan deployed itsforces closer to the border, occupied camps and canton-ments abandoned since 1947, and reactivated a dormantarmy roadbuilding project close to the border.

—Fugitives: Kabul offered safe haven to Ajmal Khattak,a revolutionary Pathan poet and Secretary General ofthe National Awami Party (NAP). (He still residesthere. } The Afghans also protested Pakistan's arrestof Wali Khan and many of his fellow NAP members.

The 1973 spat was shorter and milder than previous con-tretemps. By 1976, Daoud and Bhutto, through a series ofvisits and goodwill gestures, had moved a long way towarda settlement.

On April 28, 1978, at a time when relations were hetterthan they had been~or 30 years, Daoud was overthrown. Thecoup brought to power a leftist coalition party (the People' sDemocratic Party, led by Noor )4ohammad Taraki) which hadmade pushtunistan a primazy plank of its party platform for10 years or more. The actual extent of the regime's commit-ment to Pushtunistan remains unclear. It is possible thatthe regime hopes to use the issue primarily as a distractionfrom its internal weaknesses and its "godlessness. "

In any case, events have fallen again into predictablepatterns:

—Propaganda: Radio Kabul has begun referring again to"Northern and Southern Pushtunistan. " Foreign Minis-ter Amin raised the Pushtunistan problem at thenon-aligned meeting in Havana last July, and Afghan-istan has complained of provocation and encouragementof guerrillas by Pakistan.

—MiZitary maneuvering: There have been low-grade mili-tary alerts on both sides, and the Afghans have

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=" 1'5'

shifted some units to positions closer to Pakistanto cope with rebellious tribes in Pa};tia, Konarha,and Nangarhar (see iMap 1}. An Afghan MiG recentlylanded "accidentally" in Pakistan, but was returned.

In comparison with past Pakistani-Afghan crises, thedispute in 1978 has been more restrained and has escalatedmore slowly, in part, because the usual apparent cause fortense relations —Afghanistan's reaction to perceived threatsto Pakistani Pathans —is not present to the previous degree.A Pakistani move against the Pathans, such as military actionin the NWFP or Baluchistan, or imprisonment of triballeaders, could seriously escalate the dispute.

Recent Afghan allegations of Pakistani meddling areprobably due to continuing low-level rebellions in the tribalprovinces along the pakistan border. Although Islamabad doesnot appear to be encouraging this activity, it is probablethat some rebel Afghan Pushtuns find safe haven and aid amongPathans across the border. The Taraki government may alsosee a need to play th'e popular Pushtunistan theme to win overthe Afghan Pushtuns while tribal opposition to the newgovernment remains high.

The US Position: Reco ition of the Duzand Line as anInternatronal Boun a . Over e years, ot P &stan anA g anrstan ave attempted to enlist US support for theirdiffering claims in the Durand Line/Pushtunistan dispute.The US position has been one of encouraging the two coun-tries to settle their differences bilaterally in the inter-ests of regional harmony and stability.

In 1956 the US did, however, take a public position sup-porting Pakistan's claim to territory up to the Durand Line,largely reaction to Soviet calls in late 1955 for self-determination for us unrco S, meeting in Karachi issueda communique that stated:

"Insofar as these [Soviet] statements referred to'Pakhtoonistan' the members of the Council severallydeclared that their governments recognized that thesovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the DurandLine, the international boundary between Pakistanand Afghanistan. ..."While the US has made no other public statements on the

Durand Line, it has given several private diplomat-" c assur-ances to both Afghanistan and pakistan, telling them that

the US recognizes the Durand Line as an internationalboundary.

—November 27, 1950& Assistant Secretary of StateMcGhee told the Pakistani Ambassador to Washingtonthat a US public statement would be "inappropriate, "but that the US considered acknowledgment of Pakis-tan's international boundary "implicit" in the prompt.US recognition of Pakistan in 1947 and in the USattitude toward the dispute since that time.

—September 29, 1960: VS Ambassador Byroade told AfghanPrime Minister Daoud that the US was committed torecognition of the Durand Line and asked him to exer-cise caution in that year's flare-up. On September 30,the State Department instructed Ambassador Rountree inKarachi to inform Pakistan of Byroade's demarche.

—September 1961: President Kennedy sent AmbassadorLivingston Merchant to both countries to attempt topatch up transit links. The Merchant mission leftthe area after a three-week visit, unable to overcomethe intransigence of either party.

—November 1974: Secretary of State Kissinger remindedDaoud and Naim of the long tradition of close US-Pakistani ties and of the US commitment to Pakistan'sintegrity, The Secretary avoided direct mention ofthe Durand Line but noted that any territorial changeseemed impossible short of war. Daoud assured himthat Afghanistan had no territorial designs onPakistan.

—August 1978: US Ambassador Hummel privately reiteratedthe 1956 SEATO commitment to the Pakistani Government,noting that the US remains committed to Pakistan'sterritorial integrity.

Prepared by K. R. Longeteigx28574

Approved by W. D. Wollex28397

EXEMPT FROM DECLASSZFZCATZONSCEEDULE E.O. 11652: 5B-1, 2, 3(Classified by P. H. Stadderd)