gallagher.thewillanditsacts

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The Ethics ofAq.rinasStephenJ. Pope,Editor

GeorgetownUniversitypressWashington,D.C.


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The Will and fts Acts (Ia ffae, qq. 6-17)DavidM. Gallagher

4, t the heart of Aquinas'sethics ies theA *iU.Moral actsarewilled acts, or as/v \Thomas teaches t the very beginning\-of his treatiseon the moral life, mo-ralactsare denticalwith humanacts-actswhichpro-ceed rom intellectandwill (Ia IIae, q. l, ai. i,3).Wherethewill doesnor operate, ition hasno moralqualitywhatsoevernd allsback ntothe categoryof mere natural activity (Ia IIae,g.6, ?.7, a'd3;a ae, q. 10,a. 3).And evennmoralactions,externalcts havea moralqual-ity only becausehey havebeencommandedby thewill (Ia Iae,q.20, aa.l-3).Thusmoralgoodnesss located irst and foremost n thewill.Indedd, for Thomasa person s said o beBgodor-badsimply, .e., mbrally,on the basisof hiswill, for it ii ihrough ttrewitt thatevery-thing else n the personls usedwell or badiy(Ia,q. 48,a. 6). n sum,moralaction s willeiactionandmorallygoodactionarisesrom agoedwill (a IIae,q. 56 ,a. 3).tThis centralityof the wiil is evidentwhenThomaspresenis is description f the sub-ject matter of moral philoiophy at the be-gnning of his commentaryon AristotlebNi-comacbeantbics. n this work, he maintainsthat everybranchof philosophy featsa cer-tain order; logic, for ixampli, ieals with theorderwhich reason uts nto its own actsofthinking. Moral phiiosophy,he says, reatsthe order. hat is iound in ,rolrrnt"ryacrions,an dconsequentlyt considers,humanopera-uons nsofaras they are ordered o one an_other and to the end.,'By ,,humanopera-tions," Thomas Efoes on to sav, areunderstood hose actions ,,rvhichproceedfrom the will according o the ordei of rea-son."He concludeshal ,,thesubjectof moralphilosophy s human operationordered tothe end,or evenman takenasvoluntarilyact_

ing for the end." Hence,willedaaion,or thepersonas the sourceof willed action. is thesubjectof study in ethics.2It comesasno surprise, hen, that Thomasshoulddevotean extendeddiscussiono thewill and willed action(Ia IIae, qq. G-17).Noris it .surprising qo ind the will appearingprominendy n all the other maior aipectsoThis moral theory. n the treatiseon happiness,he maintains hat rectitude of the witt-tt "proper ordination to God-is a prerequisitefor beatitude; n fact, one might ionsider hisethics o be nothing more than an accountofhow one achieveshat rectitude (Ia IIae, q. 4,_a. ). The moral significanceof the passionslies in their relatioriship o the will, iith"t "tinclining the will to aceftainkind of choiceoras being_the_mselvesncited or repressedbythe will (Ia IIae,q. 24,a. l). In the treatmentof the virtues,Thomasexplainshat the moralvirtuesare ocatedonly in the will or in pow-erswhoseactscanbe commanded y the will(Ia IIae, q. 56,a.3). So oo, sin occuriprimar-ily in thewill itselfandonlyderivativelvn theactsof the other powers nsofar ,, th.y ,r.commanded y the will; there s no sinwherethere sn9 will (Ia Iae,q.74, aa.l-3).Finally,Thomas!.q"1his treatrnent f law,claimingthat law,by definition, s a principleof humanacts,hat s,actshat proceedrom the will (IaIIae,q. 90,a. ; SCG II, chap. l4).For aclearunderstandinef Thomas's th-ics, then, it is necessa.yJ h"rr. an accurategraspof the will and its functions. In whatfollows. rvill nttenrpr o rrchievchi sby e.r-aminingAquinas's ndersranding f dre willin general; n what ways he will is free andin what ways necessitatedn its action, athemeThomasdealswith ar great ength; hevariousactsof the will as they are de-scribed


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DavidM. Gallagherin Ia IIae, qq. 6-17; and finally, how love isthe first affectionof the will and the implica-tions of this point for understandingthemoral life.THE NATIIRE OF THE WILL

In one way, the will may be understoodsimply as thai power or facuity of the-soul bywhiili a human agent is in control of his ac-(ons. For Aquinas, properly human- actionsare those actions over which a person hascon-nol (daminiam; lt llae, g. 1, a. l)' To havecontrol means that when the person acts, t ispossible to act otherwise or not to act at all.This mode of acting is contrasted to the modeof nature in whichln agent is determined toact in only one way a.tdc*not do otherwisethan it dois, asoccurs n the instinctual behav-ior of animals. fu Thomas says, "the will isdistinzuished from nature as one cause fromanothEr; some things are done naturally andsome voluntarily. The mode of causing of thewill which is master (dominus)of its acts isother than that of nature which is determinedto one" (Ia IIae, q. 10, a' 1, ad 1).1The will here is taken, we might say, asthe source of the voluntariness of all volun-tary action. There are many voluntary ac-tions, actions in the control of the agent,which are acts of powers other than the will.When a person walks or eats these are actsnot of ttri witt but of the body; so too, if aperson thinls, remembers, or imagines theseare respectivelyacts of the intellect, of thememory or of the imagination, all powersdistinct from the will. Nevertheless,such ac-tions can be voluntary and these powers donot themselves account for the voluntarinessof their own actions; he imagination, for ex-ample, do.esnot account for the fact thatsomeone can control whether or not he willuse his imagination nor do the bodily P!w91salone account fo r the ability he has to decideto walk. One accounts fbr this control by ,p-pealing to another power, a power whosepropei act it is to choose ither to imlgin:.ortrot^to imagine, to walk or not to walk. Thispower is the will. Thomas often presents thewill in this way, taking it as the source ofvoluntarinesr. To to u.r'derstandthe will is totake it as free-will (liberurn arbitrium), theterm he assigns to the will when it is con-

sideredpreciselyas he sourceof freeor fullynoluntary action (a, q. 83, 7a. -34)-aThomas presentsthe will, however,- otonly as ree-will, but more fundamentally. srational apbetite.Hence, to understandhistheory of the will, we mustplace t within thelargei contextof his general heoryof appeti-tioi. For Aquinaseverybeinghas-adetermi-nate appetift corresponding o the kind ofbeingthat it is. He baseshis doctrineon theempiricalobservationhat each-kindof thinghas tvpical motions and restsalongwith therecos;ition that the sourceof thesemotionsand ess is internal to the thing. To takethesimplestexample, tonesgenerally all towardthe'middle of th. earth,ind if they actuallyarrive at that point they will tend to-stay orrest there.Stonesor any heavybody haveanintemalsourcefmotion owardsomedetermi-natecondition-in which, when it is achieved,thevwill rest. Suchbodiesmay move n otherdirictions, but only if they are moved fromoutside (violent motion); their motio! homthe internal source s toward some definiteplace.This internalsourceof motion, this n-iernal tending or inclining, is exacdywhatThomasunderstands y aPPetite.'Thomasdistinguisheshree levelsof appe-tite. The first, of the sort just described, p-erateswithout any cognition on the part ofthe beinEwhich has he inclination.Thomascalls his-"natural nclination" or "naturalap-oetite. This kind of appetite s found in allLeingsnot endowedwith cognition;.$. {i-recti-onof the appetite s determinedby- hethins'snatural form. The secondevel of ap-oetiii is found in beingsendowedwith senseiognition. In such beings-the- brute ani-malls-there is a tending or inclination thatfollows upon cognitiott;-th" animals espondappetitively o stimuli received hrough thesensesinciuding he nternalsenses).quinascalls his kind oI appetite sensitiveappetite'It is here at the level of the senseappetitedratThornas irst posrulates distinctappe-titive power of the soul,for the inclinatit'rnortendencyexperiencedby th9 anin-rals notsimply he resultof its natural orm but ratheraris'es'uponhe apprehension f someobject(Ia, q. 8b, ea. -2). Just how the appetite e-iponit to the apprehendedbjectdepends,nth. ""t. of animals,on their natural nstincts,what Aquinasrefers to as the "natural judg-

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The Will and a Acts(Ia IIde, qq. 6-17) 7 l

ment" (iad.iciamnaturale) of the "estimativeDower" a, q. 83 ,a. l).6^ The third levelof appetites"rationalappe-tite," that found in beingsendowed-with.rea-,on. fu in the previous *o levels, here s aninternal ,oorceof motion, a tending or incli-nation,but here he goodcanbeapprghendedat the level of intellect-grasped under someuniversal formality of goodness--andso theagentcan tend toward-thegood by meansofai appetite distinct from sensitiveappetite'Thomas nicelv summarizeshe three levelswhile discussinghe angelicwill:

Somehingsncline owardhegoodwithonlya natural Elationshipo it andwithoutcogm-tion, as s t-he asewith plantsand nanimatebodies.Suchan inclinationis called

"naturalappetite."Some hings,however,ncline to-*"td the goodwith a cenain cognition,notsuch hat f,eyknow he ntelligibiliry(ratrd t-selfof thegood,but theyknowsomeParucularEood.ike-thepowerofsensewhichknows hei*""i thitte *d th" white thing or somethingof thissortlThe inclinationwhichfollows hiscognition s called"sensitiveappetite."Somethi'ngsncline towardthe goodytth. L9og-ni-don-bywhichtheyknow he ntelligibility (ra-ab) itielf of the good, and this is proper toiniellea.And heie hings endmostperfectlytoward he good,not aJif merely-directedyanother toiard the good like those thingswhich ackcognition,or onlytowardpanicu-lar soods ikJ those hings in which there isonlir.rrr" coqnition,but-asf inclined owardthe'universalood itself.And this nclination scalled will."' fla,q. 59,a. )The nature of the will as a rational appetitecan be clarified through comparison with. th.esensitiveappetite.The two appentesare slrru-lar in that, first, both follow upon apprehen-sion and, second,both are distinct powers ofthe soul as opposed to natural inclinationwhich simply Tollo*s upon a natural form'Third, botit "re appetitei of the whole beingand not sirnply ,r i one part' In an objectionagainst positrng any distinct appetitive pow-ers, Thomas entertains the argument that.rr.ry po*"t of the soul already has a.naturalrpp"tii" for its own object: hearing forsoonds. sisht for colors, the intellect fortmth, and io ott. Hence it seemssuperfluousto posit, over and above .these Pgwer:' al-othlr appetitive power whose object is the

desirable aken generally (appetibilen cant-mun). fb this objection, Thomas -respondsthat while it is indeed tlre casethat eachDower.beins a certainform or nature,hasatr.tot"t incli-nationo its own object,there isstill the needfor an appetite ollowing uponapprehension y which the animal tendsto-#ard obiectsnoi iustassuitable o aparticularDower.but assuitable o theaninaal imp\ or asiwbok Oa,q. 80 ,a. 1, ad3).8It now becbmes vident hat both the sensi-tive appetiteand the rationalappetite,as.dis-tinct appetitivepowers'are Powers y whichthe beiris that iossesseshem tends towardthatwhic'h sgood or thatbeingassuch; heseappetitesare-appetites f the whole and notsiriplv of anyo^tt" "tt. In the case f the will,this point impliei that whenever a personwills, one wills that which is good (at leastaoparently)or oneselfasa whole.Even f thesila *iltla is the obiectof anotherpoweras'ior example,when someonewills-to acquiresome ruth, that object s willed asbeinggoodnot iust for that otfier po*et but asgood forthe whole person.In willing to pursuethistruth, the person s implicidy sayllg *."t.olthe *hole, he or shewili bebetteroffwith thistruth thanwithout it. The will, then, o itsaerynatureasanappetite,s ordained o the perfec-tion of the p"itott in which it is found, ust asthe sensitivl appetite s ordained o-the per-fection of the animal n which it is found' Infact, t is mpossibleo will a-nything t all thatis not taken o be a part of or means o theperfection f thewilling Person. While similar. he will and he sensitive p-oetite are nevertheless ifferent in important*avs. Thesedifferencesollow from the basicdifierencen the ypesofapprehension' enseknowledge,or Aquinas,s always t stngulars- assuch.5n the otherhand t isproper o intel-Iectualknowledgeo graspuniver-salsnd tosrasD nvsinzuli'r hinEunder heformalityofi uttiueti"l,ai "dog,"oi as cat,"or as warm,"or as "friendll',"ind so on. Thus, rvhile hesensitivc "pp.tit"t tend toward particularthitgt that aie perceived-!y F. s.enseso ber.trtlbly pleasanior painful, the will tends o-*ard things nsofaras hey areseenat the ra-tional levil to be good;whateveris willed istakenasgood, s al-lingunderthe formality ofthe eood-asuchandusuallyundersomemorespec"ificormalitysuchas he honestgood, he


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DavidM. Gallagherpleasant ood,or the usefulgood.eu a resultof this differencebetween-theapprehensivepow_ers,,aersoncanwill a goodwhich cannotbe the-object f a sense ower,as or example,in willing to understand the pythrgor^.*Theorem.It also s possiblehat the saireob-ject, takenmaterially,be he objectof both thesense ppetites nd the will. But here he for-malityunderwhichtis desiredsnotthesamefor the rwo appetites.For example, may de-sire to eat an appleat the senseevel simplybecause t the iense evel it appears ensiLlypleasant. ut at the evelofrational appetite.canwill to eat he applebecause understandit.to be he{thy or as a way to pleasea friendwho hasoffered t to me. In theJeatter cases.I will to eat he apple,but undersomentellec-tually graspedormality suchas"healthy" orfnleqing to my friend" (I", q. 80,a.2, ;d 2).For Thomas,as will demonstrate,t is alsothis r"""s"nly universalaspectof the willedobject that underlies the will,s freedom ofchoice,a freedomnot found in the sensitiveappettes.This universalaspectof the will's object,especiallyhe univeisalgood (bonumnirrr-sale;bonumn commune),ilso nableshe willto be the appetite f the wholeperson,whatwe mightcalla "personalappetite."Whateverthe will wills, t willsasbeingsomehow ood,in technicalerns, as allingunder he foimal-ity of good (subatione ori. Anvand all eoodsof the person,even f they are first obie"cts fother powers, hus becomeobiectsof tirewill.The will, consequcndy, laysan integrativerole with r.spect to the actsof all the"otherpowersof the soul. All the soods that areobjectsof the other powers- for example,truth,sensibleleasures,odilymotions) ied.to be integrated nto the overallgood of theperson. he will carries ut this nleqration vcommandinghe actsof the other o*e.s. itis by will thata person ecides hetheror norto ensagen those ct s tall,and fso, o vuhat

extent.when.where, tc. Ia IIae,q. q, a. l).Of course, his conrol is not absolute: hereare somepowers for example,he vegetativepowersof growth and nutririon) outJide hewill's control, and others, ike the sensitiveappetites, ave motions of their own aDartfrom beingcommanded y the will. Never-theless, vin the latter cannotbring aboutac-tionsofthe personassuchexcept5y the per-

missionof the will (Ia, q. 81, a. 3). It is there-f95e.byhe will that a glven person ntegratesall the partial human goodi into his o:verallgood. It follows. as an imm"diate conse-ood. It follows, as an immediate conse-

appecontrtite cacan scapacson-fperfeNATTWILU

As precicalledpossqueslengtmanswise oit is thingcloseencethat sing thin thedenyphy: "movedelibishmthingsWhatof melogicacal.Tamonphy, oparticmattehe deexist,analyappeis thisbetwAmple onthat aactiondelibyet ththe e

quence,hat the personasa whole ssaid o begoodor evilon the basis f thewill; one s saidto be good simply (sinpticiterlmorallygood-when one's will is properly orientedtoward he good la, q. 48, . O).to'Thomas's octrine hat the will always eeksthe goodor perfectionof the willer *d int.-gratesall partial goods nto that larger goodryay lead to a certain misunderstanaing. sdiscussed bove,an appetitivepower ii di-rected o thegoodor perfectionof thebeing nwhich it is found,and so onemight infer iratall beings,and especiallyhuman beings,arenaturallyegoisticandseekalways nd n-every-thing exclusivelyheir own individualgood. tmay evenseem hat it is impossible o tendtowardany good exceptone'sown good,andthat every good that is willed is willed asdi-rected o one'sown ndividualgood.But this snot, in fact, Thomas'sview,for he maintainsthat one'sgood s not limited to one's ndivid-ual good but can include the good of otherbeingsoutsideoneself.t is ndeed rue for himthateachhing seeksts own ndividualperfec-tion, but it seeksevenmore the good of itsspecies, ndyet more rhegood ofthe wholeuniverse. or example,when the motherex-poses erselftodanger or the sake fher off-springas s commonamong he animals,t isclear hat he preservationfthe speciesakesprecedence ver the good of the individual.And sinceeachspeciei s for the sakeof theuniverseas a whole, the individual seekshecommongood of the universeaboveall else.Individualbeingsare all parts of the largerwhole thar is the universi and as such tfrevnaturally hould ind their perfectionro, p.i-marily n theirown ndividualgoodbut ratherin-the erfection f thatwhole Ia,q.60,a.5,ad 3; Ia IIae,q. 109,a. 3).Thus, o sal, ha t]ppetiteisnecessarilyirectedo a being's er-tectiondoesnot meanat all thatbeings, spe-ciallyhumanbeings, reself-seekingndividu-alisti. This poini is crucial for"Thomas'sunderstanding f appetite n generaland thewill in particu-lar.In sum, the will is rhe power by which arationalbeing ends oward ts propergoodorperfection. n this sense,he will is iational


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The Will and ts Acts(Ia IIae, qq. 6-17) t )

appetite.But insofar as rational beingshavec^ontrol ver their actions, he rationalappe-tite canalsobe takenas reechoice.And sowecansuccincdydefine he will-as he poweror. caoaciw bv which a rational being-a per-ron-fr."Iv directshis actions o his good orperiecflon.NATTIRE AND FREEDOM IN THEWILL?S ACTS

fu I have shown, when the will is takennreciselvas the sourceof free choices t iscalledfree-wl/.Whether or nothuman agentspott"tt the power to choose reely is not aouestion that Thomas treats at any greatlength,sincehe considerst obvious hat hu-mansengagen actions hey could do other-wiseor tioido at all. fu he saysn De aeritate,it is manifest thae man freely choosesonething and rejectsanotfierQ^, q'?4, a. 1)' TheclosJstThomas comes o proving the exist-enceof free acts s to defend hem negatively,' that s, to point out the consequencesf deny-inE heir existence. o deny reeaction,actionin-the power of the agent' is tantamount odenvinemoralitv itselflnd all moral philoso-phvi "tT there s'nothing free n us but we are-o"ed necessarilyo will, then we destroydeliberation,exhortation,preceptsand pun-ishments, and praise and blame, the ver.ythines ittt *ttiitt moralphilosophy eals'"rrWha't s more,we alsoremove he possibilityof merit and demerit,so that from the theo-logical ointoFview uch positions hereti-.^i. Tho*tt classeshe denialof free actionamong he "extraneousopinions"of..philoso-phv, Jpinions hat deny-the possibilityof abtiti"nlrt science y denlng its verysubiect-atter.l2Thomas'.ssual oncern,hen,whenhe dealswith freeactions,s not whether heyexist,but rather how they exist.That is, heanalyzeshe structure of- the cognitive andtpp"titin. powers equired or suchactions' tis ifrt analysishat leads o dre distinctionbetweenhe will's reeactsand ts naturalacts'Amons the free acs of the will, the princi-ple one s choice electio),or it is by choice^th"t" p.ttott actuallycommitshimselfto oneaction'or another.B'eforehe choice, here sdeliberationaboutwhat is to be donebut notvet the doingof the act;afterchoice,here sthe e*ec.ttio-n f the chosenact. Only in the

act of choice itself does a person effectivelydetermine himself to the pursuit of some par-ticular good. But choicg for Aquinas, has adetermi*nate structure. Following Aristode'sanalvsis,Thomas holds that choice is alwaysof-."it, io an end. In the light of an end to beachieved,a person choosesamong at least twooossible -.*t' Thus reference to an end islssential to the stnrcture of choice, since it isonlv in lieht of an end that one can choosebetween fre possible means; the means cho-sen is that wfich somehow promises better toachieve the given end. Hence, choice alwayshas these thiee elements: a given end to beachieved and (at least) two possible means oachieve it. The rwo possible means may betwo different acts (r;diation versus chemo-therapy to treat a cancer), or may simply bethe options of acting versus not acting (q.""ting the cancer lr.rsris not treating it at all; IaI Iae.q. 13,a. 3) .In tire act of choice, the person who choosesis actuallv willins both the chosen means andthe end for the Jake of which it is chosen' fuwe shall seebelow, Thomas calls the willing ofthe end "intention.t' Every act of choice, con--sequendy, necessarily presupposes an act otintLntion. How, then, does it happen that aDerson comes to will the particular end heintends in a given choice? It is this-questionthat leads to -the will's natural acts' It may bethat the end now intended is being intendedbecauseof a previous choice. Someone maynow be chooiing between the train and theairplane because fa previous choice. o gotoChicaeo. Here again,ho*"lner, there had to besome ind that influenced the choice to go toChicaeo. On what basis is that further endintenied? It may be a yet earlier choice,but itouicklv becomesclear hat this processcannotso o.t infinitely. There must be some end thati' o"rron wills, not as the result of any choicebut prior to al l choices(Ia IIae, q' l, aa'4-6;a . 1 3 . . ) .' Th e lc t of thc ri ' i l l th.rtprccedesnd rrnder-iies al l choices s, accurding tu Thomas, thcwill's "natural appetite" or "natural inclina-tion." Just as n the demonstrations of scienceth..e -murt be some first principles to whichthe intellect nanrrally assents'so too amongthe acts of the will there must be some act(s)in which the will is moved naturally and not inthe mode of free-will, that is, actswherein the


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74 DavidM. Gallagherwill has no power to act otherwise Ia, q. 82,a. l, ad 3; Ia IIae, g. 1, a. 5; q. 10, a. l).

. Moreover,as he above ine of reisoning im-plies, he first objectof the will, as irst, mustbe the end to which the obiectsof all otheractsof the will aredirected'(Ia,q. 60,a. 2).This object s, according o Thomas,the lastend (finis ubirnus) or beatitude (beatiwlo).Whateyer a person may choose,he or shenecessarilyhoosest assomehowcontribut-lng to his or her goodness r perfection,andbeatitude s t}re name given to that state nwhicha personpossesseier or his goodcom-pletelyor perfectly, he staten whiJhno gooddue to her or his narure is lacking at d noinclinationof the will is unsatisfieda IIae, q.l , a.6) .13That the objectof the will'snaturalappetiteor inclinationshouldbe the good that consti-tutes hat person's erfection s perfecdycon-sistentwith the norion of the will asan appe-titive power. t belongp, s saidearlier, o lhenatureof appetite o be directed o the goodor perfectionof the being in which it eiists.Accordingly, he most baslc nclinationof thelPpetite is toward the completegood or per-fectionof that being.But the facithat the willis rationalappetiteaddsanotherdimension othis natural nclination,viz.. that the inclina-tion'sobject s not any specific orm of beati-tude,but simplybeatitude n general Ia IIae,g. l, a. 7; q. 5, a. 8). u I pointedout earlier,the mark of rational cosnirion is that it cangrasp universals, nd, -asa natural conse-q.uence,ationalappetite s directed o gener-alities,especially he good in general nd toparticulargoodsas falling under the desiredgenerality.n the case t hand, he will'snatu-ral inclination s direcred oward he ultimateend or beatituden general: thereis put intoman an appetite oi his last end in'general(appetins ltimifnis sai n commun),hat s,henaturally desires o be complete in good-ncss."ll lhether a person eeLs is beautudetn someparticulargoodsuchasbodily pleas-ure, lnoiledge, or"God is " -"tt r'of fr..choice. By his natural inclination a personwills.simply o befulfilled or happy:all people"wish to have heir perfection tithtted-wtrictris the intelligibility (ratio)of the lastend" (IaIIae, . l , a.7) .ts_ t is important to emphasize ere that theobject of the will's natural inclination is not

some specific good but a general formality,since his fact provides he ultimate basis orthe will's freedom. n thisvein, Thomasraisesan nterestingobjection n the contextof dis-cussinghe will's natural nclination.Accord-ing to the objection, he will cannothaveanynatural motion since nature-what occursal-ryaysor for the most part-is determined toone (dcterwintta od unurn), while the will isopen o oppositesse abet d opposita).Toh*ea natural motion, then, would seem to beagainst he very nature of the will. Thomasreplies hat nature s indeedalwap ordered osome one thing, but that that one thing isproportionate o the nature n question.Sincethe will is a rational appetiteand reason sopen to universalsor generalities,t followsthat the one o which the will is determinednits natural motion is alsosomethinggeneral(aliquod nurn cammune).his sometfii-ig gen-eral s nothing other than the good n general.But a universalof this sort can contain withinit manyparticulars;hereare manyparticulargoods hat fit within the good taken n gen-eral. And so, Thomas concludes, he will,while naturally determined to the good ingeneral,s not determinedby nanre to any ofthe particulargoods.With respect o them itremainsree q. 10,a. 1,ad 3).This is Thomas's most fundamentaiexplanationor the will's freedomand its ba-sis n the natural nclination.Becausehe willtends oward beatitude n generalor towardthe perfectgood in genera-l,t remains reewith respecto anyspecific orm of beatitudeor good. Each person must choose whatspecific good will be, for him, his ukimateend, and preciselyhis choice s the most fun-damental f all moral choices q. 89, a. 6).Al l subsequenthoicesmade n light of theultimateend havea similarstr,r.trire; here-fore, they too are free. In eachcase he will(as ationalappetite) s directed irst to somegeneraliryand then, by deliberation, eelstie instantiation hat best its that generality.In De mah, Thomas presents his reasoningin its clearest orm:

anunderstoodorm isa universal nderwhichmany hing;s anbecomprehended. nd sinceacs takeplaceamongsingulars,n which thereisnothingthatisadequateo auniversal ower,the inclination of the will remainsundeter-

minearchsallyarecing ahous

ThomarepresTheregeneraselectethe dewisheslooks fodesiresChicagwa1n,huniversbest toThis goelemeners,butcompleby delibest emgivesclewillingwill tendesirabness r uor thatreasonThe osarily intrue, hocordingrally towthe nfluvisionoin seeinperfectgble goonaturalosentedwq. 62,a.ent life,this fashone'sgothereforCod (q.jects,beessence


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The Will and ts Acts(Ia trae,qq. 6-17) 75mined with respect o many, ust as'when anarchitectconceiveshe form ofa houseuniver-sally,underwhich differentshapes f housesare ontained. hiswill can ncline towardmak-ing a square ouseor towardmakinga roundho:use r ahouseof anothershape.t6

Thomas's example can, it seems,be taken asrepresentative of how choices are made-Tfrere is some good that is desired under ageneral formality; a particular good is henselected which best instantiates or embodresthe desired good. So, for example, a womanwishes to tra:vel o Chicago, and consequendylooks for a means to do so. At this point, shedesires a general good: a-way-to-travel-to-Chicago. "After inlestigating- the possible*"yt, Ih"t is, the particulars that fit under thisuniversal. she chooses that one which seemsbest to instantiate the good she is seeking.This good may be complex, including manyelemens such ascost' ease,speed,among otlt-err, bnt it remains the case hat she wills thiscomolex eood first in general and then finds,bv d'elibe"ration,the p-atticular instance thatblst embodies that comple* good' Thomasgives clear expression o this understandingofi"ittittg when-he says, n De oeritnte, that thewiil tJnds direcdy toward the reason for thedesirability (ratio appetibilitatis)such as good-nessor utiiity and only secondarily toward ttrisor that thing insofar'as it participatesin thereason or the desirability.t'The only object, then, that the will n-eces-sarily intends is beatitude in general. This istrue, ho*eveg only in the present life' Ac-cording to Thomas, the will also moves natu-rally toward God when, in the next life, underthe'influence of grace, t is presentedwith thevision of God's eisence.His reasoning is tlat,in seeing God, the will is presentedwith theperfect good, the good that contains all possr-bl" qood.t.ts. Since the universal good is thenanial obiect of the will, the will, when pre-sented with it, moves toward it naturally Qa,q. 62 , a.8). Under the condirionsof dr c pres-ent lif'e, however, one does not grasp God inthis fashion. It is possible then to think thatone's good is to be found outside of God;therefore, it is also possible not to will (love)God (q. 82, a. 2). Other than these two ob-jects,beatitude in general and God seen n Hisessence,all objects are willed freely, that is,

they must be chosen. Thomas refers to these"other" objects as particular goods, that is,soods that'do not iontain in themselvesal lIoodness. He also refers to them as means toihe end (eaquae unt adfnem), becausea per-son wills any such good as a way or means toachieve his beatitude. Thus Thomas com-monly states hat the will necessarilywills theeood'in general or beatitude and has freedom6f "hoi.I with respect to particular goodlorthe means o the end (Ia IIae, q' 13, a. 6).'oThe analysis of free action does not endwith showine how the will's free actsare basedon its natura-lact. Thomas goes a step furtherand within the free act describes rwo distinctways in which necessity or lack of necessity"rtt b" present: in the "exercise" of the act andin its "specification."

The^distinction

between"exercise" and"specification,t' one that Thomas used ncreas-inelv over the course ofhis career, s not pecu-liai io the will.re It actually appliesto almostany power of the souf especially in rationalbeings, who possessother powers that can beexeriised by the will. Generally speaking,exer-cise refers io the fact that a power is actuallyeliciting an act; to take the power of sight, forexampli, to say he power is exercised s to saythere^isan act of seeing.Specification,on theother hand, refers to the act'sbeing directed toone obiect or another. n the act ofseeing, theseeins'will be directed to this object or that

objecl. "specification" is usedbecause homasbeiieves that actions are the kind of actionsthey are-are specified-by the objects atwhich thevaim.This distinctionbetweenexer-cise and specification should not be under-stood as one between two different acts thatcould occur separatelyor even wo acts hat arealways ogether; rathlr, they are two aspectsofa sinqle ict. The act of the power is at onceexercised nd specified Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1) .What interestsThomas in this distinction isthe difference in the sources or causesof anact's xercise nd of its specification.The specl-ficad


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DavidM. Gallagher76 DavidMwe haveseen, s the good in generalwhichcontains, o o speak, ll particulargoods.Theactsof all powersare particular goodsand assuch all within thewill's all-embracing bject.Consequendy,he will has he capacityo exer-ciseor not exercisehe actsof the otherpowers(ibid.).This is thebasis or the will's ntesrativefunction.One will also ind this distinction betweenexercise nd specification ocated n the willitself. The will's act is specifiedby its object.And since the urill is a raional appetite, tsobject is supplied to it by reason. Conse-quendy,Thomas sap that the will's act isspecifiedby the intellect. n this way,by pro-viding it with its object, he intellect s said omove hewill. This "movement"occurs n theorderof formal causality ibid.).On the otherhand, n the line of exercise-efficientcausal-ity-the will moves tself.Apart from the will'sfirst naturalact, which comes rom God, thewill exercisests own act, ustas t exercisesheacts of the other powers.Whether or notthere will be anact of the will with respect oany particularobject ies with thewill iself (IaIIae, q. 9, aa.3-6). This power of the will tomove tself is crucial to Thomas'saccountofthe will's freedom, or it provides he basis ora person's apacityo refuse o will any good.It is now possibleo describeThomas'sun-derstanding f the interrelationshipof the in-tellect and the will, another pivotal point forundersunding Thomas's heory of the will.The intellect s said o move he will in that itspecifieshe will'sactby providing he will itsobject Ia IIae, Q.9, a. l).20The will, on theother hand, is able to move the intellect byexercising he intellect'sact; that a personthinksat all or even hinls aboutoneobjectoranother this s calledconsideration)enendsupon hewill. At anypoint, he will ..rrlr-,o.,,ethe ntellect o think aboutsorneobjector tostop thinking about it altogether.Still, thespecificationf the intellect's ct comes romdre object; herefore,whar one concludes srue abouta partrcular b.lect henone con-siders t might not be dependenton the will.In the case of the intellect's assent o firstprinciples and the conclusionsof scientificdemonstrations,or example,f there s willedconsiderationof thesepropositions, here isnaturalassent Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 6).21Thispowerof the will to exercisehe intellect'sact

is important for the question of whetherThomas's "intellectualist" understanding ofthe will falls into the trap of intellectual deter-minism. Precisely because he will can controlwhether or not a possible act will be consid-ered or even from which point of view it willbe considered, the presentation of the intel-lectually understood object to the will be-comes self a volunarymaner (Ia IIae, q. 6, a.7 , ad3 ; q . 10 ,aa . 2 -3 ) .I will return now to the question of freedomand necessity in the will's acs. Thomas dis-cusses his question both in terms of the willexercising its act and in terms of the specifica-tion of that act. What sort of necessity s tlere,then, with respect to the exerciseof the will'sact? Is there any act that the will must neces-sarily exercise?fb this, Thomas says no. Itmay seem that for a given object, there mustnecessarilybe some act either toward or awayfrom it, and, in this sense, he will must exer-cise its act. But since the will's act dependsupon the intellect's presentation of the object,and because he will can command the act ofthe intellect, it is possible, for any given pro-posed act, simply to will to cease thinkingabout the object and so to obviate all acts n isregard.2zThis can occur, saysThomas, even ifthe obiect is beatitude tself. Since the act ofthinking about beatitude is only a particulargood, it is possible or the will to choose notto engage n it, that is, not to command thethinking, and then there will simply be no actof the will in regard to beatitude. In this way,then. the will remains free with resDecto theexercise fany of i ts acts a IIae, q. tO, r. Z;.With regard to specification, the issue ismore complicated. The sort of necessity nquestion here is the following: for a givenobject of the will, can it be either approved(i.e. oved, desired, ejoiced n) or disapproved(hated, rejected, sorrowed over), or rnust itnecessarily e only one of these?For example,with an objectsuch asan act of adultery it maybe dcsiredasbeingpleasant, et it may alsoberejected as being contrary to the law of God.So too, the good work of a colleague may because or rejoicing because t helps the wholefirm or may be cause or sorrow because hatcolleague might receive more honor than I. Insuch cases, homas argues, here is no neces-sity present in the way in which the will's actis specified. The same object can be willed in

vaisobpowilothcaselaseporepoacdedi(athbeanthgoanGalbetaotthintoacanandecethnataticthseatgoThth


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The Will and a Aca (Ia flae, qq. 6-17) 77variouswaysdependingupon how the objectis considered. f there were, howevel someobject that was good and desirable rom allpoina ofview, then twould notbe possibleowill that object in just any way, but only tolove,desire, r rejoice n it.Thomas points to two such objects.First,there is beatitude consideredn general.Be-cause he very conceptofbeatitude is to pos-sess ll the goodof which one s capablewhilelacking no good, such an object cannot beseen n any way other than asgood. It is notpossibleo think ofbeatitudeandnot desireorreioice in it. It is of course,as I have said,possiblenot to think ofit and so exercise oact n its regard,but if one hinls of it one willdesire t. Second, here is God seen n thedivine essence s occurs n the beatificvision(aisiobeatifica). ere again, t will be evidentthat all good that is to be found anywherebesidesGod is found'more perfecdy n God;and, that all possiblegoodnesss to be foundthere.The willerthus seeshat his or her totalgood s to be found n God andnowhereelse,and so there is no possible eason o rejectGod. Apart from these wo objects,however,all objectscanpossiblybe seenasevil, fonlybecause ursuing them conflicts with the at-tainment of some other good. Thus, for allother objecs, there is no necessityn willingthem either from the point of view of exercis-ing the will's act in their regard, or tendingtoward or away rom them if there s suchanact(ibid.;De malo, .6).Before leaving the topic of the will's fieeand natural acts, t is necessaryo take upanother set of actsof the will which Thomasdescribes sbeing natural.There are, he says,certainobjectsof the will besides eatitudeorthe good in general toward which the willnanrrally ends, n some ases venwith a cer-tain necessity.hesearegoodswhich arepar-ticular n the sense f not being themselvesthe good which wholly beatifies,but they areseen o havea necessaryonnectionwith be-autude. 'l-he ciearestdescription of thesegoods comes n the Prima serundae,n whichThomas delineates he obiects which movethe will naturally:

This [whats willednaturally]s thegood ngeneral toward which the will naturally tendsjust like any power toward its own object; and

also the final end itself which standsamongappetibleobjecs in the sameway as he firstprinciples of demonstration among intelligi-bles; and universally all those hings whicharesuitable to the willer according to his nature.For we desireby our will not only those hingsthat perain to the power of thewill, but eventhose which perain to the individual powersand o the man asa whole.Whencemannatu-rally wills not only the object of the will, butalso other objects which are suiable to theother powers,such as the knowledgeof thetruth, and existingand iving and other thingsof this sort that have o do with one'snaturalwell being. All these hingp are comprehendedunder the object of the will asso manyparticu-lar goods.2ra IIae, q. 10,a. l)The general principle here is that a person

naturally wills whatever is suitable (conamiens)to human nature. Human nature being com-plex, many distinct goods are included. Thefirst are the objeca of all the other powersbesides the will. Each power naturally tendstoward its object, as for example,the intellectnaturally tends toward the tmth, and thesense appetites toward what is sensiblypleas-ant. fu objects of these powers and of thepowers' natural inclinations, such things arenaturally seen as perfective and as contribut-ing to t}re general good or beatrtude of theperson. Thus upon their being apprehended,there spontaneously arisesin the will an ap-proving stance, either joy if the good is pres-ent or desire if it is absent. For example,whensomeone becomes aware of one'sown igno-rance of some point of knowledge,he or shespontaneously desires to have that knowl-edge.This doesnot necessarilymean that onewill actively seek to acquire the knowledge,but only that there is a spontaneous motion ofthe will toward it that is not an act offree-will.Second, any good that is good for the personas a whole and seen as such will be naturallywilled. Thomas givesas examplesexisting andliving. Another might be something likehealth, which is not the object of a particularpower but a condition of well-being for theperson as a whole. These too are sponane-ously approved by the will either by an actofjoy if it is present or desire if it is absent.One way to express the natural quality ofthis motion is to say that it is not an act offree-will, that is, the will doesnot move in these


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78 David M. Gallagher

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cases ecauset has chosen o do so. Thesethingsarewillednaturallyin the sensehat thewill spontaneouslymoves oward them upontheir being apprehended. o ong asa thing isseen o peftain to one'sbeatitudeor one'sper-fection, there will be a movementof the wil^toward t (IIIa q. 18,aa.3-6).The necessityfthis movementhas o do with the connectionagoodhaswith beatitude. f the good sseen obe necessaryor beatitude for example, xist-ing), then it will be willed necessarily. one-theless,he kind of necessiwwith which suchgoodsarewilled is not the i"*" "r the neces-sitywith whichbeatitude s willed. Beatitudesnecessarily r absolutelywilled becauset be-longs o the very structureof the will; the de-sirearisesmmediately rom the verynatureofthe will. Theseother goods,by contrast,arewilled on the basisof ihe prioi willing of theend,beatitude.Their necessitys, n Thomas'slanguage,he "necessityof thL end" (necessitasfinis), the hnd of necessity thing haswhen tis a meanswithout which an end cannot beachieved. f the end s desired. t is necessarythat this meansbe desired.And sohere.sincbbeatitudes necessarily illed, whatevers seenas required for beatitudewill be willed withthenecessityfthe end Ia,q. 82,a. 1).Does t then ollow hat all suchobjects renecessarilyursued y the willer?This is notthe case.n order to seewhv. will discusshevariousactsof the will. Having clarified heseaccordingo Thomas's escriptions, will bein a position o explainmore completely henaturalwilling of particular oods.THE ACTS OF THE WILL

For Thomas,a persondoes ot achieve e-atitude y asingleact;collsequentlyhe rnorallife consists f manyactsof the rvill togetherwith the externalactsarising rom them.WithGod and heangels,t i s otlerwise.For God,beatitudes dentical ith essencendno fur-ther actualizationf a potenry hat s,no op-eration srequired n order to attainbeatitude.For the angels, n the other hand, ust one actis required n which the angel'swill is suitablydisposedowardbeatitude.For humanbeings,however,manyactsover a period of time arerequired(Ia IIae, 9. 5, a. 7). Moreover, heseacts differ not only numerically but also inkind. In rhePrimasecundae,q.8-17, Thomas

presentsa very highly developed theory ofthevarious kinds of will-acts, an understanding ofwhich is necessary f one is to grasp his pictureof the moral life. All these acts, as actsof thewill, are appetitive motions of the person as awhole; they are the strivings, aversions, rests,and so on of the person. It is precisely throughthese appetitive motions, especially those thatare free, that each person determines himselfwith respect to goods and evils.There are many distinctions to be drawnamong these acts of the will. The mostprominent in Thomas's treatrnent is that be-tween acts ordered to ends (ti*ph willing, in-tention, and, enjoymenr) and those ordered tomeans (cboice, onsent,and ure).24 here is, inaddition, a distinction between the acts thatare deliberate and free, arising from free-will,and those that are natural or spontaneous andnot the result of deliberate choice (IIIa, q. 18,aa. 34} There is also a distinction betweenacts of the will directed to goods not yet pos-sessedand acts directed to possessedgoods.This distinction should not be overlooked.for it means that "willing" refers not just toacts directed to the acquisition or achieve-ment of goods or bringing about states of af-fairs that do not yet obtain, but also rejoicingin goods or being sad about evils.25Finally,some of the acts occur in what Thomas callsthe order of intention, the affective tendingtoward goods in which ends precede means,while others occur in the order of execution,the willing of the exterior acts by which thedesired good is actually achievedor possessedwherein means precedeends (Ia IIae, q. 1, a.4; q. 16, a. 4).Aquinas's understanding of the will-acts isnot properly seenby taking isolatedactsofthewill, but radrer by seeing each act in its rela-tion to severalother acts. n general,Aquinassees he relationships of these several acts ofthe will as parallel to the relationship amongtheir objects. Those objects, qoods of onekind or another (o r evils to be avoided),ar erelated to one another as means and ends.These means and ends are grouped togetherinto what I will call "chains' of ends; lowerlinla of the chain are goods sought as meansfor the sake of higher links, which in their turnare sought as means to yet higher ends QaIIae, q. 12, a.2).If we start at a given point onthe chain we can go "op" the chain toward

somtheto obleSthacomwommovirnmoothherIIaetudingsheherlovtheThifrieityGotudtheconIftofordecto dthistheperachpriaexttheOnsonbeeWmachohav(anfriehavthathemeaup


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The Will and ts Acts(a IIae, qq. 6-17) 79

someend sought or its own sakeor "down"the chain owardgoodssoughtonly asmeansto other ends. n neither direction s it possi-ble to proceed o infinity (Ia IIae, q. l, a' 4).Suppose,or example,hat a woman earnsthat her elderly mother in Chicagohas be-come ill and needs o be looked-after.Thewoman decides chooses)o go and help hermotherrecovef.What end s shepursuing?Byvirnre of the oveof friendshipshehas or hermother, she considersher mother to be an-othor self, and, consequentially,heconsidersher mother'swelfare o be part of her own (IaIIae,q. 28,a.2).Thus,her own goodor beati-tude includes he health and generalwell-be-ing of her motler. On Aquinas's iew, then,shemay havea yet further end.Shemay oveher mother with supernatural harity and solove her mother as ordered to God who isthen the ultimate end loved by the woman.This is Aquinas'sdoctrine that all humanfriendships anbe ordered o the ove of char-ity (IIa IIae, q. 26, u 7). The woman loves-God as he ultimate end in which her beati-tude s to be ound. Thesesituations epresentthe "higher" linla of the chain,all of whichconcernbeatitude. he ultimate end.If we go downwardsrom the decisiono goto Chicago, the woman must decide whatform oftransportation o take.Supposing hedecideso fly, shemustnow choose n airline;to do this, she must call her travel agent; orthis, shemust find the telephonenumber andthen actuallymakethe call. At eachstep thepersondeliberates boutwhat s necessaryoachievehe good and hen chooseshe appro-priate means ntil reaching he point at whichexterior action s possible.Up to this point allthe willins occurs n the order of intention.Once hispoint s reached,oweveqhe per-son besins o executehe choices hat havebeen iade Ia Iae, .16,a.4).We shouldalso note that in fact tlere aremany other chains descending rom thechoice o go to Chicago.The womanmayhave to prepare many things for her f-amily(anotherset of persons he oveswith love offriendship) o provide or her absence;hewillhave o pack her luggagewith all the choicesthat entails;shewill have o makeher way tothe airport, requiring yet another chain ofmeans nd ends.Eachpersons alwalscaughtup in any number of suchchains,so that at

times the same act may serve as a means tomore than one end or what serves one endmay hinder another (a IIae, q. 12, a' 3). It isin this larger context that aperson chooses hevarious means and ends.Aquinas, however, intreating the different acts of the will (and ingenerally analyzing moral action) tends toIimplifr'matt.ir, aid, for the sake of analyticclarity, often looks at choices or other acts ofthe will without describing the whole contextin which they take place. It is always imporantto keep this fact in mind, for otherwise thereis a danger of taking Aquinas's teaching tooabstracdy.At the heart of Thomas's scheme ies the actof choice. From the moral point of view, themost significant acts are those in which thewill, taken as free-will, exercises dominionover its own act, Such acts are proper to thewill aswill (q. 10, a. 1, ad l). Thomas also saysthat what one wills in the mode of free-will onewills simpliciter(IlIa, q.2L, a.4). Choice, as heactof frie-will, is the most significant act fromthe moral point of view, and, as such' it is thefirst act to consider.Choice (Electio)

Choice, as we have seen, has the followingstnrcture. A person must determine himself toone of t'wo (or more) possible actions. He sodetermines himself in the light of some encfor the sake of which one or the other of theprospectiveactions s chosen Ia IIae, q. 13, a.3) . Following Aristode, Thomas maintainsthat the object of choice is always some possi-ble action. It is possible or at least taken aspossible, or no one chooseswhat one knowsto be impossible (a IIae, q. 13, a. 5). It is anaction (an agibile) for whenever one choosessomething other than an action, one is in factchoosing to have or to usethat thing by meansof an action (Ia IIae, q. 13, a.4). So, for exam-ple, if one chooses o eat apples instead oforallgcs, one is choosing dre eating cl f drefbrmer over the eating of the latter; if onechoosesa car, one is choosing to drive that car;if one votes for an individual or body to exer-cise authority, one is choosing to obey thatperson or body.The chosen action is, as have said,a meansto an end. That end is, first, the good imme-diatelv above it on the chain of means and


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80 DavidM. Gallagher

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ends, but it also includes all ends up to andincluding beatitude. At any given stage on tllechain, the meansneededto achieve he higherstages are chosen. But if tlese means them-selves require some other means for theirachievement, then a further choice at the nextlower level is required. This series of choicesproceeds until a point is reached at which allthe means are decided upon and only execu-tion is required. Therefore, choice occursanlrtime the means to achieve an end (ultimateor mediate) are not yet fixed. In order to fixthese means, there is, prior to each choice, adeliberation, a process of thinking about thepossible means and judging their relative ad-vantages and disadvantages Ia trae, q. 14).At each point on the chain, a person is de-termining him or herself, and, with eachchoice, the person becomes affectively com-mitted to some good. This commitrnent to agood occurs in the order of intention, whichis distinct from the order of execution. Thesetwo orders work in different directions. In theorder of intention, what is first is the last end,and the higher an end is on the chain of ends,the more priority it has. n the order of execu-tion, by contrast, what is lower is what is firstaccomplished and only at the end of the activ-ity is the ultimate goal achieved.An importantconsequence of this distinction between the

two orders is that, in temporal tenns, a choiceis very often made quite some time before it isfinally executed. The woman makes thechoice to so to Chicaeo several days beforeshe actualli goes. This io", ttot mean that thechoice is not real; it simply means that a per-son can determine oneself to an action longbefore actually carrying it out (for example,scheduling a doctor's appointrnent). The gapbetween making a choice and executing theaction chosen does allow that a person canretract a choice before (or even while) carry-ing it out. This occurs whenever a personceeseso rvil l the previously vil ledaction.Intention (Intentio)

Unlike choice. intention is directed to endsand not to means. It is, however, intimatelylinked to choice. for wherever there is choicethere is also intention. The reason for this isthat, in any choice, there is a concomitantwilling of the end. And in tlis case, he end is

being willed precisely as that which is to beachieved by the chosen means.This is exacdyhow Thomas defines intention: the act of thewill directed to an end taken as the terminusof tlre means ordered to it (Ia IIae, q. L2, a. l,ad 3). So, to return to the earlier example, inbuyrng her ticket, tfie woman is intending toso to Chicago." If one ttrinls of the chain of means andends, it should be clear that at any link in thechain, all the goods above it are intended.When t}re woman buys her ticket, she is in-tending not just to go to Chicago, but also tocare for her mother, to have her mother onceagain healthy, and ultimately her happiness. tsf,ould also be clear that any given link, whileitself a chosen act, becomes an intended endwith respect to the further choices made inorder to achieve t. Ifone considers the choiceto call the travel agent, buying the ticket nowbecomes the intended end. So, the notions ofend and means and the corresponding notionsof intention andchoice are fluid; the willing ofan action is a choice when seen n relation towhat is above t, but is an intention when seenin relation to what is below it. In this case,there arenot two distinct actsof willing to buythe ticket; rather, there is only one act, but itis vierved rom different angles q. 12, a.2).It should also be clear that acts of intentionare the result of a choice. It is because thewoman chooses to buy the ticket that buyingthe ticket becomes the intended end of herchoice to call the travel agent. And this is howit nonnally occurs in one's voluntary actions:one choosessome action and then proceedstochoose means to accomplish it. It is only theultimate end, beatitude in general, that is in-tendedwithout having first been chosen. u Ihave shcrwn, all


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The Will and ts Acts(Ia IIae, qq. 6-17) 8 l

bachelor's egreentends hat end for at leastfour vears.niakins during that time a multi-t"de bf choices o:ward hlt end.During thatperiod.however,he person s only occasion-.tlv tttittt ios explicitiy about the bachelor'sdecree.Ne"irthiless, the person s intendingtha'tsoal throughout the whole time; the in-tentiSnof that elttdt attim"tingmuch f not allthat the persondoes.For ttrisreason, homasdistinzuishes etweenacnrallywilling an endand .ritendinghe endhabinrally Ia IIae, q' l,a.6, ad,3). lris distinction s important, or itallows one to recognize that intentions canpersist or long periodsof time (for example,hd.fiw to onetspouse); t alsodemonstrateshow ii is possible-that person'while willingonly one'thing ^t ^ 'ilne actually,ca1 h.avemanv simult"titont willings. All the choicesthat'apersonmakes ndwlich havenot beencompletelyexecuted xist n the willer in thehabitualform. Here again,one encountersacomplexiw n the life of the will thatThomasor,rrilu leavesaside or the sakeof analyticsimplicity.Simple Willittg (Simplex uoluntas)

A secondact of the will that is directed othe end is what Thomascalls"will" or "will-ing" (uoluntasr aelle).u he pointsout,-thew6rdaoluntasefersboth to the power of thewill and to a specificact of the will, the actwhich he refers to as "simple willing'" Apower,Thomas says, eceivests name fromim -ott proper act,and that act is the onedirected o th" power'smost proper object'Now the objectbf tn . will is the good,and,the means einggoodonly by their. elation othe end; the eid'has more'the character fsood than the means'The act called"will" isiherefore that of simply willing the end (al lae.q. 8, a.2) .2;H"* it this act differentfrorlr the act ofintention?The difference ies in the fact thatintention is not "simple." Intention is not di-rected o the endsinipl',but rather o theendus httt whiJ: witl be citic'-ed ymcans'Oq ex-pressedess ormally, in intending an end ap"ttott is committed to actuallycarryingoutthe actionsneeded o achieve hat end' Sim-ole willine. on the other hand, s simply the*ittitte oflome good asperfectiveof me (orthose"unitedo rie by love)without anynec-

essarvreference to whether I intend actuallyto ..toir. that good. To take an example, forvears'I *"y *ittt-taken as something thatwould be gbod for me-to go see Paris' Dur-ine those-years, I never do anything aboutaoruallv eoins there. This is simple willingBut supfose -that I finally decide actually toso: I am now ibso acto commftted to employ-ins all the meani necessary for this trip' Attlris point, I intend to go to Paris' Clearly,simnie willins precedes intention, since one*oold not in;e;d an end if one did not firsthave this simple desire to possesst'-But at thesame time, to will an end by intending it sig-nifies a much greater personal comrnitrnent; aDersonwho intends an end is personally com--itted to its achievement.This is not the casewith simple willings (Ia IIae, q. 12, a' l, ad4).28The simple willings include-the spontane-o,rr, ,ratoral willingi I described earlier insoeakins of the willts natural acts.These will-irlEr. "t"*. saw,are directed first to beatitudean?'second to al l the other things which aperson spontaneously grasp.sas.suitable (conueniens\ o his nature and thereby contnDut-ine to beatitude.2eA spontaneous willing"rir., ,rpon the apprehension of some suitablegood; hence' to say that a simple willing isiatural doesnot mean that al l personshave tnor that a given person always has it' Forexample,accordingto Thomas, parentsnatu-rallv iove their c[ildren-have a desire forwhat is good for them-while children natu-rallv lov"e heir parents @a IIae, q' 26, a 9) 'However, beforb being parents they clearly,Jo tnt cxperiencc this-nitural desire for thewell-beine of their children; nor is everyoneaparent. Siinilarly, Thomas speaksof a nanrraliorre or God, but also recognizes hat a per-son does not have such a love until she or hehas sotne klowledge of God. Thus, an in-stanccof a person who doesnot know or loveGod does not invalidate his theory of a natu-ra l love for God.30It seemsalso that whenThomas speaksof nanrral inclinations, as hedoes in the well-known text on the preceptsof the natural law (Ia IIae, q. 94, a' 2) , theseinclinations fit into the catigory of naturalwillines. They are not merely movements ofthe se"nse ppbtite (for example, the desire fortruth), ttof ".. they the result of deliberatechoice; rather, they arise spontaneously' This


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82 DavidM. Gallagherseems o be exacdywhat Thomas understandsby simple willings.In contrast to-intention, a person need notact on his simple willings. That is to say'many simple willings remain- nothing morethan that and are never transformed into in-tentions. To use one of Thomas's examples,a person has a natural revulsion to having a*ound cauterized. vet for the sake of healthwills the operation'nonetheless. This revul-sion is not merely a motion of the senseap-petite, but also occurs at the level of will.The p.rsott, however, does not act upon hiswill tb flee the pain but rather intends thesood of health iilla, q. 18, a. 5).31An unin-iended simple willing such as this is calledat times by Thomai a "velleity" (uelleitqs)flI la. q.21. a.4). It is important to note the.*itt.tt.. oi th"i. velleities, for they help toexplain questions that seem difficult forThomas's-understanding of the will. For ex-ample, at times it seeris difEcult to under-tt"nd ho* a person can act against a natural'act of the will. How, for example, can a per-son commit suicide if there is a natural will-ine of life? The answer lies in recognizingthit the natural willing is an act of simplewilline and that such an act is not the sameas intention. In suicide, the person stops in-tendins to live. It does not seem' however,that tie person ceaseswilling to live alto-gether, aJ is evidenced n the interior resis-irnce to their action that such people expe-rience. So too, when Thomas claims thatrational beings nanrrally love God lnore thanself, this doeinot mean that sin is impossible.The notion of velleity also helps to explainhow a person can be tempted-experience anattraction at the level of will toward anevil-and yet not follow that temptation.i2Finallv. note that, according to Thomas,what a pLrron is said to will simply (stmpliciter)is not *hat one wills by the act of simplewilline, but rather what one wills by an actoi liie-wilt. Precisely as spontaneous andnatural, simple willings do not involve the de-g.". oi seli-determiiation that is found inihoice and intention. Jb have a simple willingis not to commit oneself to action, whereasboth intention and choice do necessarily in-volve such a commitment. Thomas distin-guishesbetween will asproducing natural acts(aoluntasut natura) and will as producing acts

bv means of rational deliberation and in thepb*.r of the one acting (uoluntasat rfltio). Itis onlv in this laner mode that a person issaid to will simply; what is willed in the modeof nature is willed only in a qualified sense(se undarn qui d). Consequendy, whrle fr ee wdependsupon the will in the mode of nature,the acts oi th. *lll that are the most signifi-cant for the moral life are those of free-will(IIIa, q. 21, a. 4).33Consent (Consensus)

The act of consent, on Aquinastsaccount, isvery close to choice, indeed at times they areidentical. Consent names the "application ofthe appetitive motion to something preexist-inq in^the power of the one applying it " (IaIIa'e.q. 15, . 3).34 o consent o something s,like'c'hoice, to be affectively related to thatthins as something actually to be done.Henie. like choice, consent has to do withmeans to the end, is directed to what is possi-ble, and follows upon deliberation. Also, likechoice, consent is an act of free-will, an act inthe conuol of the agent (ibid.)' Il out of sev-eral possiblemeans o the intended end, onlyone tpp""tt to be suitable, hen, saysThomas,consent and choice are one and the same act'Jb choose that means over the non-suitableones and to apply the appetitive motion to itare the sameact.At times, however, the two ac$ are notwholly identical. This occurs when more thanone means s suitable. t may happen that thewoman in my examplecould either fly o111kea train to Chicago, and that either possibilityis aqreeable,and even that each has its ownadvintases. t would be possiblehere to con-sent to"both as "cceptrble possibilities, butthen a further act of choicewould be requiredbv which sh e would decideupon on e as pref-eiable to the other. In this iase, the acts ofconsent and choice would not be identical,and only with. the act ti f choice u'ould theprevrous act ot consent actually yield the ac-hon. Choice, then, always implies consent,but consentneed not imply choice.lsWhat isimportant for the moral iife is the fact of self-deiermination with regard to the means toone's beatitude. and Th"omassometimesrefersto this self-determination to action asconsentand at other times as choice.

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The Will and ts Acts(Ia IIae, qq. Gl7) 83Use (Urzs)

Use is the connection between the act ofchoice and the execution of the chosen ac-tion. Simple willing, intention, consent, andchoice alfoccur in the order of intention. Byall of these acts the agent becomes affectivelyordered to various goods; these acts occurwithin the agent and make the agent be ap-petitively oiiented to the various goo{s.-Choice is the last act in this order, for bychdice a person is committed to pursuing orrejecting some good. The choice, however,must b; executed. For example, having cho-sen to go to Chicago, to fly' ?"4 to- use atrarrel {ent, t}tere lt tto n-eed for furtherchoices; rather, only execution is neces-sary-the woman must pick up the phoneand call the asent. Thus, a further act of thewill beyond ihoi". is required, one that- isfound in the order of exlcution, the orderof realizing the action (Ia IIae, q- lQ, a. 4)'The choici having been made and the time-for action having-arrived (these are not al-ways simultaneous), otler powers of the soul"ttd the body must move in order to performthe action. These motions are not instinctual,but, rather, they are guided by reason andwill. It is preciselythe willing involved herethat receivestlte name "use," for the will usesor exercises the other powers in order tocarry out the chosen action. fu discussed nthe tontext oftreating the exerciseand speci-fication of ttre will's own act' the will cancommand or exercise he acs of other pow-ers; preciselywhen it does this, its act is use(Ia I Iae, q. 16, a. 1).As an act of the will (rational appetite), usenecessarilyfollows uPon an act of reason.Thomas gives this att of reason a specialname, "command" (imperiam) (Ia IIae, q. 17,a. l). Command and use are a paiS commandnaming the rational component and use thevolitioial component of the voluntary act bywhich a power is exercised. f a person waiksin a rational way (for example, not sleep-walking), then Thomas would say that thereis both an act of command, since the walkingis being commanded by reason, and an actof use, since the will is exercising the motivepower. There is, however, only one act here,ialled command when seen from the side ofreason and called use when seen from the

side of will (a IIae, q. 17, a. 3)' So the se-quence as Thomas describes it is that acioice is made. there is then a command toexercise the appropriate powers for-the car-rying out of the chosen action, and this com-mand governs-gives formal determinationto-thJ act of uie. Illtimately there is theexterior act, such as walking, the act of theother, commanded powers.to

Enioyrnent(Fru.irto')Enjoyment s the act of the will which ap.rsotthasuponpossessingr acquiring de-siredend, for example,he joy of the womanupon her mother's ecoveryof healthor even

ubon the securingof the airplane icket' En-iovment occursa-t he end -of tne executionof the action,whenthe desiredgoodhasbeenmadepresentIa Iae,q. 11,a. 1). u Thomas,t t"r,'"Enjoyment s.e*t to belong-to tlrelove or deiight which a personhas- or thelast thing h"e hoped for,- that is, the end"(ibid.).37Thisact-of the will shouldbe seenin the lieht of Thomas'sargerunderstandingof the aF'ections f the will. The first of theseaffectionss love,which is directed o a goodsimplv. f the good s absent ndnot yet pos-..rrld th.t. aises the further affectionof de-sire; f the good s possessed-theres delightor joy (Ia ilae, q.25, a.2)-r8Enjoyment sthe' oy which is-producedin the will whenthe *illt obiect,-the good, is actuallypos-sessed.Enior.rynentn the fullest sense ccurswiththe reafpossessionf theultimateendQa Iae,q. ll, a. 3). Thomaspoins to- wo-ways.inwhich enjoymentcanbe imperfect-First, thegoodcanbe imperfectlypossesseds.occursilnhenhe good s not possessedn realitybutonlv n intention,asdesired Ia IIae,q. ll, a.4). This wouldbe the kind of enjoyrnentasso-ciatedwith hope.Second,he good desiredmaybenot the finalend,but onlysoure oodthat is a meanso the end' Sucha good,whenpossessed,ives rise to enioyment,but notenioyment n the most perfect sense.Perfect"rrioyttt.ttt occurswhen-the inal end s reallyposslssed.Obviouslyfor Thomas-enjo.y.me.ntin the fullest sense'will occur only with thepossessionf the ast end,God, in the next ife(a IIae,q. I 1,a. 3) .


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LOVE AS THE FIRST AFFECTIONOF THE WILLIn order o completeheThomistic accountof the will's role in the moral life, it is neces-sarv to touch briefly on Thomas'sdoctrineconcerning ove (arnor), speciallyhe love offriendship"(azaramiciiae),1hi+ is the firstofall the will's affectionsand the basis or all itsac$.This teachingprovides he wider contextfor understandinghe will'svariousactsasde-scribedn Ia IIae, qq. 6-17 and alsoallowsusto see hat for Thomas he moral ife is essen-tially amatterof relationships mongpersons'Thomas teaches,irst, that the primary af-fection of the appetitivepowers'both sense

and rational, is love. Love denotesan appe-tite's most basicrelationship o the good; itdenoteshe fundamental uitabilityof a beingto that which constitutes ts good. Thomasrefers to love as the proportion (proportio)that exists between a being and its good,soeakins.or example,of the suitabilityorotoootiott of a heavyobiect to the middleof the earthas ove (ia Ilae, q. 26, a' 2) ' Onthe basisof sucha proportion or suitabilirythere arise wo other affections n the appe-tite: desire desiderium),hen the lovedgoodis not vet possessed,nd delight or ioy \delec-tatio/gaudium)f the good is possessed' llfurth"erappetitivemotibns owardgoodssuchas hope bi f."t ariseon the basisof desire;all mttions toward evils (fear, angeq etc')arise rorn hate (odium)'which in turn is de-rived from love.leThe consequencef thisdoctrine s immediatelyevident:al l motionsof the appetitivepoweri arebasedon the firstand moii basicaifectionof love.In an articleaskingwhether agentsdo all that- hey dofrom'love,Thomasstates:I reply hat everyasentacts or an end. . ' . The end howeveris" he sood which is loved and desiredbyeach hing.Hence t is clear hateveryagent,whatevert may be, carriesout everyacfionfrom some ove" (Ia IIae, q. 28, a' 6)'+uSecond,Thomas distinguishesove at therational evelby referringlo it as "dilection"(dikxio) (Ia IIae, q. 26,1. 3). Moreover,hepoints o'a determinatestructure ound in alldilection, that is, in every ove of everywill'This structure s expressedy the distinctionbetweenoveof coniupiscenceamorconaqis-crntiae) nd oveof friendship nmoramicitiae)'

At the rational level-the level of will-lovealwavs akesthe form of wanting a good for,o.rr.ot.; asThomasoftenstates, ppealingoAristotle,"to love sto will the good o-r ome-one."4lAccordinglydilection a]wa1s as wooUi".". the perso"n'whos lovedand he good*hi.h is *anted for that person'The will'smotion toward the person who is loved iscalled love of friendihip, while the motiondirected o the good(s)willed for that persg.nis called love -of concupiscence'Formallysoeakins.bv love of friendship a person lslo"ed aJthai for whom good s sought;by oveof concupiscenceomeihirtg s lovedas.beingeood or some erson Ia Iae,q'26,a' 4) 'Theil.ttott lovedcanbeoneselfor anotherpersox'*a tn" thine willed for the personcan bebodilv soodsuch as ood or drink or spiritualeoods uch as honor or knowledgeor eveniitnr.t. For Thomas, these wo lovesare al-wavs ound together and indeedconsdnrteasinlle act,orr.io.t not lovesomeonewithout*aiting *hat isgood or thatperson,nor doesone love goods hat are not personswlthoutlovins them for somePerson."Th"ird,within dilectibn,oveof friendship-ismore basic than love of concupiscence,orone only wantsthe good for someonef onefirst lovestltat person.Hence,Thomas saysthat love of fri-endships love in the mostperfect sense-and even speaksof love ofhiendshipas "including" love of concupis-cence.*l orreof friendstrip,hen, s-thewill'smost basic affection; all motion of the willbesins with and is basedon the love of ao.iron. Even the will's natural nclination to-ward bearitudes described y Thomasas aself-love. achpersonnaturaliyoveshimself(a love of friendship), !d so he.larurallyiants *hat is the greitestfor himself, n otherwords,desires iJeatitude (Ia' q' 60,a' 3)-What are the implications of saying hatlove of friendship s the wittt primary.affec-don or urotiou? t ureans, irst, that the af-f"ction of the will which is the most basicofall and is the sourceof all others s preciselyloaeor persons'verything-other han personsis willed for personsand only persons arewilled as being good in themselves'Every-thine in the universe hat is not a person,incl;dine even the accidentalperfectionsofDersonsnch ashealthor virtue, is willed for'th. p..rottt in which it is found' fu Thomas


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The Will and ts Acts(Ia IIae, qq. 6-17) 85succincdy states t, "The principal ends of hu-man acts are God, self, and others, since wedo whatever we do for the sake of one oftlrese' (Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 9, c.)! This view oflove mirrors Thomas's understanding of theuniverse as a whole according to which onlyrational beings-persons-exist for their ownsake;all other created beingsexist for the sakeof rational beings and find their fulfillment intheir service to those rational beingp.a5ThusThomas's moral universe is, in a certain sense,rnuch like Kant's kingdom of ends.The morallife consists primarily in loving persons: lov-ing the right persons n the proper order (ordaarnoris),and loving the proper goods for thosepersons.46Second, this doctrine means that in all actsof the will, especially in all acts of choice,what is being'chosen is some good for someperson(s). While one might speak at timesof willing something such as food or knowl-edge or "state of affairs" (in the sense that,by one's choices, one can bring about a con-dition that did not previously obtain), the ba-sic stnrcture of willing is always that of will-ing some good(s) for some person(s). Thisbasic structure is to be found in all the will'sacts: in the act of enjoyment, one rejoices inthe fact that some person has some good;when one intends an end, one is intendingsome good for some person; and, even insimple willing, some good is being willed forsome person. While the object of the will ingeneral is the good, and while one can alsomake such formal distinctions among objectsas hat between means and ends, one can alsomake a more material distinction among theobjects. This is the case when one distin-guishes between the persons for whom onewills goods and the goods one wills for thosepersons.Every object of the will fits into oneof tl'rese categfories.Hence, should one askwhat a person wills, materially speaking, wemust answer that a person wills, first, oneselfand other persons (taking them aspart of hisor her own self by nreans of thc love offriendship) and wills, second, all the goodsof those persons along with the means forachieving those goods.Finally, this understanding of the love offriendship-the affective affirmation of a per-son-as the most fundamental motion of thewill helps in understanding why Thomas's

teaching on the will's natural inclination tobeatitude s not an egotisticalone. Accordingto Thomas's eaching,eachpersonhasa natu-ral inclination n his will towardhis own good,the possession f which constituteshis beati-tude. This natural inclination is, as was saidabove,a love of friendship or oneselfwith aloveof concupiscenceor the perfectinggood.Aquinas's doctrine concerning the love offriendship shows how one can take the goodof anotherpersonas one'sown good; thus, topensup the possibility hat one'sperfectioncan be found outside oneself in anotherperson, especially n God.a7According toThomas, t belongpessentiallyo the love offriendship o take asone'sown good he goodof the beloved.Thus, one'sown good can beexpanded,o to speak"when onehasa loveoffriendship or anotherperson.One ovesone'sown goodprecisely n loving the good of theother person or that person's ake a IIae, q.28, aa.2-3). This happens speciallyn thecase f lovingGod. If a personovesGod withthe love of friendship(carins) hen the goodof God becomes is own good and his beati-tude consistsn possessing@y tht aisiobeati-fica) rJisgood(IIa IIae, q. 180,a. 1).The will'snatural nclination to beatitudedoesnot locka Derson nside himself: rather. t drawshimout of himself and into the possessionf alarger good, which, through the love offriendship,hasbecomehis own.Notes

l"et ideo quod homo actu bene agat,contingit exhoc quod homo habet bonam volunatem."2In I Etbiorum, lect. l: "Sic igitur moralis phi-losophiae, circa quam versatur praesens ntentio,proprium est considerareoperationeshumanasse-cundum quod sunt ordinatae ad nvicem et ad finem.Dico autem operationes humanas quae procedunt avoluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis;nam, si quae operationes in homine inveniunturquireno n subiacent oluntat iet r lt ioni, non dicun-rur propriac humanac scd naturales,sicut patet deoperationibus animae vegetabilis, quae nullo modocadunt sub consideratione moralis philosophiae.Sicut igitur subiectum philosophiae naturalis estmotus vel res mobilis, ita etiam subiecrum moralisphilosophiae est operatio humana ordinata in finemvel etiam homo prout estvoluntarie agenspropterfinem" (Leonine, +, 3949).


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3"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntasdi-viditur contranaturim, sicutunacausaontraaliam:quaedamenim fiunt naturaliter,et quaedamiuntvoluntarie.Est autemaliusmoduscausandi ropriusvolunati, quaeestdominasuiactus,praeter modumqui convenit naturae, quae est determinata adunum." C[ Deaeriute,g.22, a. 5,td 7 in contrar-ium: "hoc enim estproprium volunati in quantumest voluntas, quod sir domina suonrm actuum'(Leonine, 26,372-74);alsoDepotatia, 9.2, a.3,c.:"Voluntas,inquantumvolunas, cumsit libera,aiutrumlibetsehabet"(Marieni' 30).4OnThomas'suseof the term liberutnarbitrium,see also n II Smt., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3 (Mandonnet,595 98);Deaerinte,q. 24, aa. , 6(Leonine,689-92694-96).The voluntarinessn questionhere swhatThomas calls the "perfect voluntary'' (aolmtarhtmsecunduntationemperfectnn). he sort ofvoluntari-nessproper to free actions.This is contrastedwithimpe-rfeit voluntariness, the son of voluntarinessfound in brute animals, he sort of voluntariness,might add,that onefinds Aristode dgsaiping (ErD.Ni;. 3 l-2 [ l09b]0-1 I 12al7)).For this distinctionin Thomas,seeST Ia flae,q. 6, aa. -2.5It s mportant o notethatThomasuses_"appe-ate" (appeiitas)o designateboth the tending ordesiring-andhe powerby which such endingordesiringarises.6SeeDe ueritate,q. 24,a.2 (Leonine, 684-87);SCG I. chaps.47-48.T"Quaedamnim nclinanturn bonumrper so-lam naturalem habitudinem,absquecognitione,sicutplantae t corporananimata'Et talis nclinatioad bonum rrocatuiappetirusnaturalis.-Quaedamvero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione;non quidem sic quod cognoscantpsamrationemboni, sed cognoscant liquodbonum paniculare;sicut sensus,ui cognoscit ulceet albumet aliquidhuiusmodi. nclinatioautemhanc cognitionemse-quens,dicitur appetitussensitilrrs.Quaedam eroinclinanrur dbonumcumcognidone uacognos-cunt psam onirationem; uodestproprium ntel-lecrus.Et haecperfectissimenclinantur n bonum;non quidemqirasiab alio solummododirecta nbonum,sicut eaquaecognitionecarent;ne_quenbonumparriculariterantum,sicutea n quibusestsolasensitiva ognitio;sedquasi nclinata n ipsumuriversale onum.Et hacc nclinatio iciturvolu-n-tas. Unde, cum angeliper intellecrurncognoscantipsamuniversalemationemboni, manifestrunestquod n eissit voluntas."- SSeeDeaeritate, . 22,a.5, ad 3 "intellectusenimetsi habeat inclinationem in aliquid non tamennominat psam nclinationemhominis,sedvoluntasipsam nclinationemhominis nominat" (I-eonine,62+,2)8-241).9For this point, seeesp.De aeritnte,q. 25, a. I(Leonine,727-30).

l0"Et hoc ideo est quia, cum bonum simpliciterconsistat n actu,et non in potentia,ultimus autemactusest operatio, vel ususquarumcumquere-rumhabiarum; bonum hominis simpliciter considera-tur in bona operatione,vel bono usu rerum habi-tarum. Utimur autem rebus omnibus Pervoluntatem.tlnde ex bona voluntate,qua homobeneutitur rebushabitis,dicitur homo bonus;et exmala,malus."SeealsoDenulo, q. l, a' 5 (Leonine,2t:26).llDe nulo, q. 6, a. un.:"Si enim non sit liberumaliquid in nobis, sed ex necessitatemovemur acvolindum tollitur deliberatio,exhoftatio,praeceP-tum et punitio, et laus etvituperium circa-quemor-alis Pfulosophia consistit. Huiusmodi autemopiniones que destruunt principia alicuius partisphilosophie dicunrur positiones extranee,sicutnichil moneriquod destruitprincipiascientienatu-ralis" (Leonine, 148,256-{.3).SeeDeueriute,q.24,a. I (Leonine,677-84); TIa, q. 83,a. .l2De malo,g. 6, a' un.: "Hec autemopinio estheretica. bllit enim rationem meriti et demeriti inhumanisactibus:non enimvidetur essemeritoriumvel demeritoriumquodaliquissicexnecessitategitquodvitarenonpossit.Estetiamannumerandanterexffaneasphiloiophie opiniones,quia non solumcontrariatur idei,iet subvertitomniaprincipiaphi-losophiemoralis"(Leonine,148,2+8-5.6). ngthpr,,r.li""*t rt "ous opinion"namedbyThomas s theview that there is no such hing asmotion, a viewthat denieshe possibilityof physicsby denying tssubjectmattel mobile being'Theseviewsare notdeait with by the sciencei question,sincesuchsciences resupposeheir subjectmatterandgo onto demonstraie he propenies of it. Rather, thesciencewhich dealswith extraneousopinions ismetaphysics,or it falls o metaphysics-tod-efend.thefirst principlesof all the sciencesseeST Ia, q. l, a.8). fherefore, it is understandablehat Thomasdoesnot defend he existencef freeactswithin hismoral treatises.llFor this point, seealso he following texts:Deaeritate, . 22, a. 7 (Leonine, 629-30);ST Ia IIae, q.1,aa. -8; .2,aa.7-8; ' 5,a.8;q. 10, '2 ;Demalo,9.6, a. un. (Leonine,145-51).As a representativetext,STIa IIae,Q.5,a.8: sicnecessestquodomnishomo beatitudinem elit. Ratioautembeatitudiniscornmunis st ut sit bonumperfecrum. Cumautentbonuru sit obiecrumvoluntalis,perfccrumbonumestalicuiusquod otalitereiusvoluntatisat-isfacit.Unde appetelebeatitudinemnihil aliud estquamappeteret voluntas aderur."' t+Di ieritate,q. 22,a. 7:"Aliis enimrebusnditusest naturalis appetitusalicuius rei determinatae,sicut cravi quod sit deorsum,et unicuiqueetiamanimaii d quod estsibiconveniensecundum uamnaturam; sid homini inditus est appetitus ultimifinis sui in communi, ut scilicet appetatnaturaliter


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The Will and ts Acts(a trae,qq. 6-17)I87

seesse ompletumn bonitate.Sed n quoistacom-pletioconsiitat,utruln in virnrtibusvel scientiis elielecadonibusvelhuiusmodialiis,non estei deter-minatumanatura"(Leonine,630,5G60). Seealsoad6 .l5"quia ornnes apPetunt suam perfectionemadimpleri,quaeest atioultimi finis . . '"l6be mah, 9. 6, a. un.: t'setforma intellectaestuniversalis, ob qoa multa possuntcomprehendi.Unde cum acntssint n singularibus,n quibusnul-lum est quod adequetpotentiam universalis, e-martet ncirnatiovoluntatis indeterminatesehabensadmulta; sicutsi artifexconcipiatformam domus nuniversali,subquacomprehendunturdiverse iguredomus,potest voluntas eius inclinari ad hoc-quodfaciatdomum quadraamvel rotundamvel alteriusfi gure"(Leonine, +8, 287 96)'- 17 e aeritate, . 25, a. I (Leonine,727 10).l8On thispoint seealsoDeaeritate, .22, aa'54(Leonine,6tl-29); ST Ia, q. 60,a, 2; q. 82, a.2; IaIIae,q. 10,aa. -2; De nulo,9' 6, a.un' (Leonine,145-53).lgThe treatrnentof the freedomof the will's actsin termsof exercise ndspecifications to be oundin Thomas's ater works, especiallyn the Prim'asecundaend n q. 6 of Demah.Somecommentatorshave seen he introductionof this distinctionasaresponseo the condemnationof certainproposi-tions in Paris n 1270,maintainingthat Thomaswished o emphasizehe will's reedomandself-mo-tion.Fordiscussionf hese roblems eeO. Lottin,Prycbologietntorale uxKie etXIIIe iicles,2d ed',"ol. t lcembloux: J. Ducolot, 1957), 207-16'22543. O.-H. Pesch,

PhilosophieundTheologiederFreiheitbeiThomas on Aquin n quaest. isp.6 De malo," Miinchutr tbeohgiscbeeincbrift 13(1962\:1-25; and H. M' Manteau-Bonamy,Lalibert6de 'homme elonThomasd'Aquin ladata-tion de la Q. Disp. De Malo)," Arcbhtes 'bistoiredoctrinalet ineraireda moymage46 (1979):7-34,havearzued hatThomas'sesponseo the condem-,r"tions" accentuated -ouirn.ttt to be foundthrouphout iscareerowardamore voluntaristic"underitanding f choice.2oThispoint underlies he principle that themoral goodness f the will depends pon how thewill's object is presented o it by the intellect,aprinciple hat Jcentral o Thomas's iscussionsfthe moraLry of acting ol l an el'l'otlcous onsclellce(S'l ' Ia l lae, q. 19,aa.2-61.21I should note that in casesof non-necessarytnrths-contingent truths-the will plays a role notonly in consideiation but also in t}re assentor with-holding of assent.This role of the will is highlightedin Thomas's discussionof the act of faith which isnot made on the basisofnatural evidence,but by anact of the will under the influence of grace@a IIae,q .2 , a . , ad 2).

22Thisswhathappens henever personavoidshaving o makea chtice simplyby refusing o thinkabouiwhateverhe maftermight be.23"Hocautemest bonum in communi, n quodvoluntasnaturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibetpotentia n suumobiectum:et etiam pse finis ul-timus,qui hocmodosehabet n appetibilibus, icutprima irincipia demonstrationumn intelligibili-Lus:et universaliter mnia lla quaeconveniunt o-lenti secundum suam natunm. Non enim pervoluntatem appetimussolum eaquaepertinent adpotentiam oluntatis; edetiameaquaepemnentaciinzulas potentias,et ad torum hominem. Unde.t"tirttlit". homovult nonsolumobiectumvoluna-tis,sedetiamaliaquaeconveniuntaliispotentiis:utcomitionem veri, quaeconvenit ntellectui;et esse.t-rriu... et aliahuiusmodi,quae espiciuntconsis-tentiamnaturalem;quaeomniacomprehenduntursub obiectovoluntatissicut quaedamparticulariabona.tt2aThe Latin terrns are respectively, aohmtas, in-tentio, and ntiab (directed to ends) and electio,con-,*nu, ord zsar (directed toward means). I shalleenerallv use the English equivalens'" 25Th; act of enjoymentls directed to the pos-sessed ood; all otheis are directed to goods or evils,rot y"iDottessed. Sins such asdelectatiomorosa STIa Iiae,-q. 74, aa. 6-8), envy (Ia IIa9, 9. 36), orjealousy are instances of morally significant enjoy-ments and sadnesses.26Inconsidering the factors that affect the moral-iry of an action, T=homasa,vs pecialweight on theo6iect and the end (ST Ia IIae, q. I 8, aa. 5-7) which".. th. objects respectively ofchoice and intention'Thus, in evaluating the moraliry of a given action,the most importanl acts of the will are the choiceand the intention, both being actsof free-will.Thesetwo acts,saysThomas, constirute a-single willing,although ot" ."t always distinguish them on thebasisof the distinction in their objects (Ia IIae, q. I 2,^ .4) .27ForThomas's use of the tetm simpler aoluntas,se eST IIIa, q. 18, a. 4; q. 21, a. 4'ln De aeitate,Thomas referi to this act under the name of simplexuelle;seeq.22, aa. 3-14 (Leonine, 64348)'28"Adquartum dicendum quod intenrio es tacrusvoluntatiirespectu finis. Sedvoluntas respicit-finemtripliciter. Uno modo, absolute:sic dicitur voluntas,ur'rut ,bsolutc ruluntus vel slnitrtcur re l si quid,liu.l .r, huiusru.-,..li. liu rrirJu euirsiJclanu' finissecundumquod in eo quiescitur: et hoc modo fruitiorespicit finem. Grtio-modo consideratur finis se-".rndrr* quod est terminus alicuius quod -in ipsumordinaturi et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enimsolum ex hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quiavolumus eam: sed quia volumus ad eam per aliquidaliud pervenire." SeealsoDa aeritate,q- 22, aa. 3-l 5(Leonine, 64349).


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29Seen. 22 above.30In III Snt., d. 29, a. 3, ad 3 (Moos, 930). ForThomas's arguments for a natural love of God, seeIn III Sent.,d.29, a.3 (Moos, 927-30); ST Ia, q. 60,a. 5 ; Ia I Iae, q .109, . 3 ; I Ia I Iae, q . 26,a .3 .Twoexamples Thomas gives of spontaneous willingsarising are those of a person willing to be warmwhen cold (Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 5, ad 2) and ofa personnaturally being repelled when having a wound cau-teized (fIIa, q. 18,a. 5). The latter, being anegativewilling by which one tends away from an evil, canbe called anoluntas(IaIIae, q.8, a. 1, ad 1).' 3l"Similiter voluntas ut natura repudiat ea quaenaturae sunt contraria, et quae sunt secundum semala, puta mortem et alia huiusmodi. Haec tamenquandbque voluntas per modum rationis eligerepotest ex ordine ad finem: sicut etiam in aliquo purohomine sensualitaseius, et etiam voluntas absoluteconsiderata, refu git ustionem, quam voluntas secun-dum rationem elegit propter finem sanitatis'"l2When one considersThomas's undersandingof nkrasi.aincontinentia),inwhich there are two endsto which a person is attracted (pleasureversus obe-dience to the divine law, for example), t seemsclearthat the willing of the end for which the person doesnot act is a real willing but doesnot aftain the levelof intentio. In short, the notions of ooluntas andaelleitashelp to understand all the cases n whichthere seems to be a conflict within a persont ownwill. The notion is also imponant for Thomastexplanation of how a person can legitirnately willwhat God doesnotwill (STIa IIae, q. 19, a. l0; IIIa'q . 18,aa.5-6 ;q .21,aa.2 ,4) .l3"Voluntas autem simpliciter hominis estvolun-tas rationis: hoc enim absolutevolumus quod secun-dum deliberatam rationem volumus. Illud autemquod volumus secundum monlm sensualitatem,veledam secundummonrm voluntat issimplicis'quaeconsideraturut natura,non simpliciter volumus,sedsecundum quid: scilicet, si aliud non obsistat quodoer deliberationem rarionis invenitur. "- l4"consensus nominat applicationem appetitivrmotus ad aliquid praeexistensn potestateapplican-tis.l5Aquitrasuraintaius,moreover, that even whenthe two acts are identical. thev still remain distinctin terms of their intelli glbilines (rationes).When thewill's act is taken as consent t i s being understoodas simply a berng-pleasedwith the action as anacceptable action; w

gallagher.thewillanditsacts

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