329G.E. MOORE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ORGANIC UNITYThe Journal of Value Inquiry 37: 329–339, 2003.© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

G.E. Moore and the Principle of Organic Unity

JULIE ALLENDepartment of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M3J 1P3

1. The Principle of Organic Unity

This article presents a dilemma concerning the truth or falsity of a familiarMoorean principle and invites reflection upon what appears to be a genuinepuzzle. The principle in question is G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity.The puzzle is genuine because the principle generates a problem for whichthere is no obviously adequate solution. The article concludes by exploringthe implications the principle of organic unity has for the analysis of the valueof an intentional human act.

The question at issue is easily stated: “Is the value of a whole equal to thevalue of the sum of the values of its parts?” It is impossible to prove that, forall cases, the value of a whole is equal to the value of the sum of the values ofits parts. Nonetheless, the question can be clarified if we begin with the as-sumption that the value of a whole is not equal to the sum of the values of itsparts. From a practical standpoint, this assumption undermines the possibil-ity of answering the most fundamental question in ethics: “What should I do?”

The issue arises within the context of Moore’s Principia Ethica and Eth-ics. Imbedded within the rich texture of Moore’s analysis of goodness andthe good lies the principle of organic unity. Throughout his works, Moorecondemns a wide range of foundational theories, including hedonism, natu-ralism, and metaphysical ethics. Moore rejects such theories because theirproponents either commit the naturalistic fallacy or neglect the principle oforganic relations. We will consider the significance of the principle of organicrelations by tracking its implications in connection with the central question:“Which things, if any, are intrinsically good?”

The principle of organic unity grounds Moore’s critique of common an-swers to that fundamental question. This principle has further troubling conse-quences which Moore acknowledges but fails to appreciate fully. In particular,if the principle of organic unity is granted and the strategy which flows di-rectly from this principle is adopted, practically significant value judgmentsbecome theoretically ungrounded.

One of the first questions of axiology should be: “Is the principle of or-ganic unity true or false?” The answer to this question is crucial on three counts.First, assuming we want to know which things are good or worth promoting,

330 JULIE ALLEN

we will need to establish an appropriate method of inquiry. Second, if we hopeto argue that certain particular things are good and therefore worth promot-ing, then the possibility of formulating non-question-begging arguments tothis effect must remain an open one. Finally, if knowing, in principle, whichthings are good is to be practically significant, then this knowledge must beat least potentially applicable to judgments concerning genuine options in thereal world of practical affairs.

Moore sets the stage for the paradox of organic relations by distinguishingthree classes into which all things may, in principle, be divided. “There is. . .a vast number of different things, each of which has intrinsic value; there arealso very many which are positively bad; and there is a still larger class ofthings, which appear to be indifferent.”1 In Moore’s view, the primary objec-tive of developing value theory is to determine to which class any given thingproperly belongs. Furthermore, since things from each class may occur as partsof some whole and the wholes constructed from such parts will, in turn, ei-ther have positive or negative value, or be largely indifferent, our theory shouldalso give an account of such assessments. Given that wholes may be com-posed of such simpler parts, Moore sets forth the principle of organic unity,according to which: “The value of such an organic whole bears no regularproportion to (in other words, is not necessarily equal to) the sum of the val-ues of its parts.”2 Moore’s use of the term “organic” denotes only this fact.3

We should be mindful of his claim that the term “organic” does not imply thatthe value of the part is itself somehow improved through membership in thewhole.4 In Moore's words:

the part of a valuable whole retains exactly the same value when it is, aswhen it is not, a part of that whole. If it had value under other circumstances,its value is not any greater, when it is part of a far more valuable whole;and if it had no value by itself, it has none still, however great be that ofthe whole of which it now forms a part.5

While Moore borrows the Hegelian term “organic,” he is keen to distinguishhis use of this term from its then current idealist connotations. First, let usnote that his use of “organic unity” neither requires nor excludes the exist-ence of a causal relation between the parts of a whole.6 For Moore, a whole isnot called organic in virtue of including parts which have a relation of mutualcausal dependence on one another. Moore also rejects the inference that theparts of an organic whole have no meaning or significance apart from thewhole. In fact, Moore thinks this supposition is self-contradictory. To claimthat a whole is organic in this sense is to make a senseless claim.7 Finally, letus note that the term “organic” is not supposed to imply that the parts of anorganic whole are inconceivable except as parts of the whole. Moore needsto accept this claim to justify his use of the method of absolute isolation. In

331G.E. MOORE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ORGANIC UNITY

sum, a whole is organic if and only if the value of the whole bears no regularproportion to the sum of the values of its parts, and a whole is non-organic ifand only if the value of the whole is equal to the sum of the values of its parts.

Moore asserts that there are wholes which are organic in the sense just out-lined. He also insists that:

the relation of an organic whole to its parts is one of the most importantwhich Ethics has to recognize. A chief part of that science should be occu-pied in comparing the relative values of various goods; and the grossesterrors will be committed in such comparison if it be assumed that when-ever two things form a whole, the value of that whole is merely the sum ofthe values of those two things.8

Though limited in number, his examples of such wholes are certainly broadin scope. Things which count as organic wholes include consciousness of abeautiful object, enjoyment of beauty, the human body, personal affection,cruelty, compassion, courage, an effect, a set of effects, the universe, and thetotal state of things.9 These examples indicate that the range of things whichcount as organic may very well include every complex thing. To complicatematters further, organic wholes, themselves, may be complex and consist ofparts which are also organic wholes. For example, a set of effects may consti-tute a particular state of affairs, an organic whole, which in turn is part of thetotal state of things, another organic whole.

Moore provides an illustration of what he means by an organic relation.He suggests that consciousness of a beautiful object is a whole which has somehigh degree of positive intrinsic value. The whole is comprised of two parts:the beautiful object and being conscious. Moore insists that the object, takenalone, certainly has little or no value if no person is conscious of it. Objectshave little or no value in themselves. At the same time, being conscious ispart of a wide variety of wholes each of which diverge in value.10 This claimcan be illustrated by comparing consciousness of an exquisite orchid, whichhas some positive degree of value, with consciousness of a lump of coal, whichhas little or no intrinsic value. Being conscious is a part common to both.Whatever value may be attributed to being conscious will be the same in bothcases. Yet, the two wholes diverge in value. Moore insists that we cannot al-ways attribute the slightness of the value of the one to a demerit in the object;we cannot explain the slight value of consciousness of a lump of coal in com-parison with consciousness of an orchid, strictly in terms of the coal's lack ofvalue or the orchid’s possession of value.11 Taken by itself, the orchid has lit-tle or no value. Moore concludes that the element of being conscious doesnot always give the whole a value proportionate to the sum of the value ofbeing conscious and the value of the object.12 What we are conscious of makesa difference to the value of the experience but the value is not completely

332 JULIE ALLEN

determined by what we are conscious of. The value of the whole experiencesomehow transcends the value of the object computed with the value of ourbeing conscious of it. In fact, it seems to me that the value of organic wholesturns out to be mysterious. This constitutes Moore’s entire argument for theprinciple of organic unity and this principle ultimately grounds his negativeanswer to the question: “Is the value of a whole, generally, equal to the valueof the sum of the values of its parts?”

2. The Implications of the Truth of the Principle of Organic Unity

For the moment, let us simply grant the principle of organic relations andexplore its implications. Moore insists that this principle certainly entails thefollowing six conclusions: Two good things may form a whole of greater in-trinsic value than the sum of the values of those good parts. A good thing andan indifferent thing may form a whole of greater value than the value of thegood thing alone. Two bad things may form a whole much worse than thesum of the negative values. Two indifferent things alone may form a wholewhich is intrinsically valuable or positively evil.13 A bad thing added to agood whole may increase the positive value of the whole. Two bad thingsmay form a whole having positive value.14 Moore is concerned that the lasttwo conclusions may seem more doubtful than the first four. However,strictly speaking, the last two implications are as surely entailed as the firstfour, since the principle dictates that the value of a whole is independent ofthe values of its parts.

There are some further implications which must be acknowledged. Giventhat a bad thing added to a good whole may increase the positive value of thewhole, by parity of reasoning it follows that a good thing added to a bad thingmay form a whole having greater negative value than the negative value ofthe bad thing alone. Similarly, given that two bad things may form a wholehaving positive value, we may also conclude that two good things may forma whole which is evil or indifferent. The principle of organic unity has all ofthese implications. What consequences does this insight have for projectswhich are aimed at perspicacious evaluations of things and states?

Moore correctly insists that the truth of the principle completely underminesone strategy for identifying intrinsically good things. We cannot assume thatwhenever two or more things form a whole, the value of that whole is merelythe sum of the values of the components. Consequently, we are immediatelybarred from employing what may be called a deconstructivist strategy. On thisstrategy, we would judge that a given whole has intrinsic value, identify theparts or factors which constitute that whole, establish that all but one of itsparts are not intrinsically valuable, and conclude that the remaining part isthe source of the intrinsic value of the whole.

333G.E. MOORE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ORGANIC UNITY

Moore’s principle eliminates the deconstructivist strategy and this is thebasis of his objection to Henry Sidgwick’s account of intrinsic value.15 Thisissue also underlies his general criticism of utilitarianism.16 In Moore’s view,Sidgwick’s most crucial argument for the claim that pleasure is the solegood, even if this is understood as consciousness of pleasure, employs adeconstructivist strategy. Sidgwick argues that the goodness associated withvirtuous action, contemplation of truth, and contemplation of beauty is en-tirely derived from the consciousness of pleasure which accompanies each ofthem.17 Moore complains that Sidgwick only establishes that enjoyment ofbeauty consists of two parts, the mere contemplation of beauty and conscious-ness of pleasure. Sidgwick insists that sober judgment would lead us to con-clude that there is no value in the mere contemplation of beauty. Contemplationof beauty will not amount to enjoyment of beauty unless the agent “appreci-ates the beauty” or “takes pleasure in its contemplation.” Sidgwick mistak-enly assumes that once it is established that there is no value in one of theparts, the mere contemplation of beauty, the value of the whole, enjoyment ofbeauty, is derived wholly from the second part, consciousness of pleasure. Autilitarian may conclude that pleasure is the sole underlying value. However,in light of the principle of organic unity, Moore contends that it is logicallypossible that consciousness of pleasure has no value in itself. More impor-tantly, Moore contends, pleasure alone, without accompanying consciousness,would not be judged good.18 If neither pleasure alone nor consciousness alonehave value in themselves, then it is clearly possible that the whole, conscious-ness of pleasure, has no value in itself. Moore takes this as sufficient groundsfor rejecting Sidgwick’s analysis of the good. Sidgwick uses a deconstructiviststrategy and thereby fails to provide a positive account of the value of con-sciousness of pleasure considered in itself.

Similarly, in Ethics, Moore argues that the utilitarian supposition that onewhole is intrinsically better than another if and only if it contains more pleas-ure, derives from a line of argument which requires that the value of a givenwhole is proportionate to the value of its parts. Moore suspects that propo-nents of the view that intrinsic value is always proportionate to quantity ofpleasure assume that, “where a whole consists of two factors A and B, theamount by which its intrinsic value exceeds that of one of these two factorsmust always be equal to that of the other factor.”19 Moore, as we might ex-pect, argues that this assumption is not only not self-evident, but is, withoutdoubt, false. Moore makes his case by appealing to the principle of organicunity.20 Thus, the supposed truth of the principle of organic unity is a vitalpart of Moore’s critique of rival theories. Moore makes the further generalpoint that neglect of the principle of organic unity has often misled philoso-phers into the supposition that:

334 JULIE ALLEN

if all valuable wholes could be seen to have one and only one commonproperty, the wholes must be valuable solely because they possess this prop-erty, and the illusion is greatly strengthened, if the common property inquestion seems to have more value than the other parts of such wholes.21

Consequently, the principle of organic unity undermines what has historicallybeen the most standard and natural approach to value theory.

Moore’s own doctrine employs the only method judged to be compatiblewith the principle of organic unity, the method of absolute isolation.22 On thismethod we decide which things are intrinsically valuable by consideringwhether their existence would be judged good if they existed by themselvesin absolute isolation. Things are isolated by imagining a world in which theyand nothing else exist. If we were to use this method and reconsider the ex-ample of consciousness of an orchid we would find, first, that being consciousconsidered in absolute isolation is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsicallybad, and second, that the existence of an orchid considered in absolute isola-tion is at most only slightly valuable. But we may also consider the whole,being conscious of an orchid, in absolute isolation. This is an organic wholewhich has somewhat more value than either of its parts taken in isolation, butit is in turn merely a part of what is without doubt a great unmixed good,namely, the enjoyment of beauty.

Moore argues that the method of isolation ultimately leads us to the con-clusion that personal affections, such as love and friendship, and aestheticenjoyments in arts or nature, have intrinsic value. They are organic wholeswhich have great intrinsic value, yet their constituent parts have comparativelylittle or no value, taken in isolation.23 They then are the ultimate ends of hu-man action. Moore insists, “that it is only for the sake of these things – inorder that as much of them as possible may at some time exist – that any onecan be justified in performing any public or private duty – these complexwholes themselves, and not any constituent or character of them – are therational end of human action and the sole criterion of social progress.”24

Whether or not only these two things will survive the rigor of Moore’s method,difficulties with the method itself and certain problems would exist no matterwhich things were picked out by employing the method. At most, Moore hasestablished that personal affection and aesthetic enjoyment have intrinsic valueconsidered in absolute isolation. The great evils of the world, according toMoore, are also complex wholes. This category includes love of what is evilor ugly, and hatred of what is good or beautiful and consciousness of pain.They have negative value considered in absolute isolation. There are also avariety of mixed goods. This category contains the virtues such as courageand compassion, which are mixed goods because they essentially involve anelement which is evil. The proper object of compassion is pain and the properattitude of compassion is pity. Each of these conclusions comes from Moore’s

335G.E. MOORE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ORGANIC UNITY

employment of his method of absolute isolation. The key question becomes:“What does Moore, or anyone else who uses this method, propose to do withthe results?” There are, after all, two fundamental questions in ethics: “Whatthings are intrinsically good, evil or indifferent?” and “What ought we to do?”In order to harvest an answer to the second question from an answer to thefirst question, with his positive doctrine Moore must utilize one of two possi-ble strategies, which may be called a constructivist strategy and a holist strat-egy. We might take the information obtained through the method of absoluteisolation and use a constructivist strategy to envisage highly complex wholessuch as real states of affairs, whose parts include the simpler organic wholesidentified in isolation. The idea would be that if we take two things which areintrinsically good, or an intrinsically good thing and a number of intrinsicallyindifferent things, the complex whole resulting from their combination willbe intrinsically good also. Voluntary human actions would be right actionsprovided they were aimed at or produced states of affairs which include agreater balance of personal affections or aesthetic enjoyments as comparedwith the total effects of possible alternative courses of action.

Generally, a constructivist strategy would have us identify a whole, whethersimple or complex. Where the whole is complex, a constructivist strategywould have us identify its parts, determine the independent values of eachsimple thing by utilizing the method of absolute isolation, and calculate thevalue of any complex wholes comprised of the simple things. This strategydoes not require that the bearer of value within a valuable whole can be iden-tified by eliminating valueless parts. However, it does require that once wehave determined the positive, negative, or indifferent values of each part, con-sidered in isolation, we can re-assemble wholes, or envisage larger or newwholes whose value is determinate.

However, in light of Moore’s principle, the assumption underlying theconstructivist strategy is unwarranted. We cannot assume that complex thingswhich are good can be constructed from simple things which are good. Wecannot assume that the negative value of state of affairs which includes con-sciousness of pain will be diminished by the introduction of an equal or greatergood. The possibility that a good thing added to a bad thing may form a wholehaving greater negative value than the negative value of the bad thing aloneis a logical consequence of the principle of organic unity.

The constructivist strategy would be salvageable only if we could intro-duce something like a principle of minimum value. Such a principle might beformulated as follows: a whole formed of constituents which are either sim-ple things or organic wholes themselves necessarily has a value greater thanor equal to the value of its most valuable part. However, this addition is itselfincompatible with the principle of organic unity. Moore declines to make aparallel assumption concerning negative value. Moore explicitly admits thattwo great evils may, as parts of a whole, be less evil than either part taken

336 JULIE ALLEN

singly. Consider the case of retributive punishment. Among its parts are in-cluded wickedness and pain. While retributive punishment may not be goodas a whole, it is less evil than either part taken singly. Therefore, Moore in-sists: “it may, supposing one evil exists already, be worthwhile to create an-other, since by the mere creation of this second, there may be constituted awhole less bad than if the original evil had been left to exist by itself.”25 Ifone evil added to another can yield a whole which is less evil, then it is pos-sible that adding one great evil after another will eventually diminish the evilof the whole so that the whole is indifferent or even good, as a whole. ThusMoore rejects what may be called the principle of minimum negative value:a whole formed of two evil parts has a negative value greater than or equal tothe negative value of its worst part.

This discussion draws upon Moore's distinction between the value of some-thing as a whole and its value on the whole. The value of any thing on thewhole is equivalent to the sum of the value of that thing as a whole plus theintrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts.26 Thus, everything elsebeing equal, the negative value of retributive punishment on the whole isgreater than the negative value of retributive punishment as a whole owing tothe addition of the negative values of pain and wickedness. Similarly, there isnothing to prevent the possibility that two great goods may, as parts of a whole,be less good than either part taken singly. This possibility bars the assump-tion that the combination of even great intrinsic goods will always yield awhole which is intrinsically good. Thus we are forced to conclude that theconstructivist strategy cannot legitimately be rescued by a principle of mini-mum value. Therefore, the constructivist strategy is eliminated.

The holist strategy is the third and final option. On this approach, we wouldidentify a thing, such as a simple thing like a part, a non-simple organic whole,or even an extremely complex organic whole, and determine the value of thething considered as a whole. If this is the only strategy that is not eliminatedby the principle of organic unity, then it follows that every assessment of thevalue of a whole must be an assessment of the whole. But this is not a satis-factory conclusion.

There are problems with defining the limits of an organic whole and prob-lems concerning the epistemological barriers to assessing the value of highlycomplex things. How do we know when we have reached the highest level ofcomplexity required for an action-guiding judgement of value? Analysis al-lows us to simplify complex things or states of affairs and break them downinto manageable chunks. If we must determine the value of things consideredon the whole, then since organic wholes may in turn be parts of more com-plex organic wholes and these in turn may be parts of an even more complexorganic whole, we must determine how we know when the relevant organicwhole has been identified and the results of employing the method of abso-lute isolation is of any practical significance.

337G.E. MOORE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ORGANIC UNITY

Suppose we imagine a world or state of affairs in which only personal af-fection plus one other thing exist in absolute isolation from everything else.In order to determine the value of the whole, we must consider it as a whole.The fact that one of the only two things that Moore thinks has intrinsic valueis part of the whole is irrelevant. The value of personal affections cannot fixthe value of a whole which includes personal affection. If Moore cannot con-fidently add one thing to his imagined world in which personal affection isjudged to have intrinsic value and be certain, in advance, of the positive valueof the whole, then we cannot remove personal affections from their shelteredexistence in abstraction and hope to know anything about the value of actualor possible states of affairs which will include personal affection. In the natu-ral course of human affairs, personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments donot exist in absolute isolation. Thus, we might ask how the knowledge thatpersonal affections and aesthetic enjoyments are intrinsically good, consid-ered on the whole, in absolute isolation, can serve any agent in determiningwhat should be aimed at or what should be done. Choices are not made inMoore’s clutter free universe; actions are not performed in absolute isolation.

If the principle of organic unity entails that every assessment of intrinsicvalue must be an assessment of the whole considered on the whole, then themethod of absolute isolation may be philosophically edifying, but in the end,practically pointless. There seems to be no way to avoid reaching the pointwhere we have to take everything as a whole and imagine that everything asa whole exists and nothing else exists and consider whether the existence ofeverything as a whole would be judged good if everything existed by itself.These assessments will be future orientated when we come to weigh the valueof the various states of affairs which could be the consequence of the variouscourses of action open to us. The state of affairs resulting from some proposedaction of mine will be sufficiently complex that although we may distinguishits elements, it is not at all clear that we could grasp it as a whole, whateverits value as a whole. The conclusion that the value of any state or possiblestate of the world will have to be judged from a perspective outside of theuniverse seems to be unhappily forced upon us. The usual consequentialistdistinction between the immediate and the more remote consequences of anact is not effective in this case. The epistemological problem here is not oneof assessing the total state of things over time. The state of the universe at aninstant is an organic whole. Thus, the practical problem is one of assessingthe immediate consequences of alternative courses of action within the con-text of different possible worlds. Consequently, the method of isolation orholist strategy fails to generate the kind of practical guidance required by eth-ics.

If the constructivist strategy, the deconstructivist strategy, and the holiststrategy constitute an exhaustive set of general approaches to value inquiry,then Moore’s principle of organic unity leaves us with no viable approach.

338 JULIE ALLEN

The deconstructivist and constructivist strategies are directly undermined. Theholist strategy, though not undermined, is cumbersome and will not yield gen-eral action guiding principles. We can neither step into the same river twice,nor act in the same universe twice. This leaves us in the position of specta-tors, touring about perhaps, gaining glimpses, at most, of value which is al-ready out there. If our guide book is Principia Ethica, then we are sufficientlycautioned against mistaken assumptions concerning the source of the valueunderlying the sights. Any things we may pick out, however good or evil theymay seem in themselves, may very well be elements within some organicwhole which is among the greatest goods or greatest evils which we can im-agine. Moore repeatedly emphasizes that we cannot reason from the value ofa whole to the value of its parts. If he is right, then we also cannot reason fromthe values of parts to the value of a whole. However, these are conclusions,one of which at least, those of us who do value theory must ultimately reject.

Both conclusions can be avoided if we reject the principle of organic unity.Unfortunately, we can not simply reject the principle because it has problem-atic implications. Furthermore, the principle has some plausibility. It is truethat what might physically or neurologically constitute the most intense pleas-ure would not be good, or even what we mean by pleasure, without conscious-ness and enjoyment. Thus, enjoyment of pleasure does seem to be an organicunity in Moore’s sense. When we consider something like the appreciation ofa fine work of art, an act of heroism, or even a culinary delight, the value ofthe whole does seem to transcend the sum of the values of the parts. Indeed,it also seems to be true that what is a good thing, in isolation, added to a badthing, in isolation, can yield a greater evil. On the one hand, consider enjoy-ment, which involves consciousness of an object and its qualities together withconsciousness of pleasure. Let us suppose that enjoyment is judged to havepositive intrinsic value. On the other hand, consider another person's pain.On most accounts, consciousness of pain is an evil and causing another per-son to be conscious of pain is vile. Thus we have two elements, one of whichis good and the other of which is bad, considered in absolute isolation. Cru-elty is the enjoyment of pain in other people. The vileness of cruelty is in-creased not only by an increase of the evil element, the intensity of pain, butalso by an increase in the enjoyment the cruel derive from the other’s pain.The more delight a dentist takes in the contemplation and generation of a pa-tient's pain, the worse the state of things.

The basic problem is not merely a problem which only proponents ofMoore’s doctrine, or only consequentialists, must confront. Moral theoristsmay ask: “Is the intentional doing of something, by an agent, with a certainmotive, under certain circumstances, with certain consequences, a good or bad,right or wrong, thing?” In the preface of Principia Ethica, Moore begins withthis observation:

339G.E. MOORE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ORGANIC UNITY

It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, thedifficulties and disagreements, of which its history is full, are mainly dueto a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to answer questions, withoutfirst discovering precisely what question it is which you desire to answer.27

In light of Moore’s work, the question with which we must begin is this: “Iswhat we denote by the description, ‘the intentional doing of something, by anagent, with a certain motive, under certain circumstances, with certain conse-quences,’ a complex unity, consisting of parts which may in turn be complexunities?” If it is, then we must further ask: “Are these wholes which are or-ganic, in the Moorean sense?” If the answer to this question is “yes,” thenMoore’s real legacy is the conclusion that there can be no systematic answersto the questions moral theorists ask, and thus there can be no ethics of the sortMoore envisaged.

Notes

1. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1903),p. 27.

2. Ibid., p. 28.3. Ibid., p. 34.4. Ibid., pp. 31–36.5. Ibid., p. 30.6. Ibid., p. 32.7. Ibid., p. 338. Ibid., p. 36.9. Ibid., pp. 28, 189, 32, 149; G.E. Moore, Ethics (New York: H. Holt, 1912) pp. 37–49,

101.10. See Moore, Ethics, pp. 153–154.11. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 28.12. Ibid., p. 29.13. Ibid., p. 28.14. Ibid.15. Ibid., pp. 81–87.16. Moore, Ethics, pp. 146–156.17. See Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 89–96, and Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics,

(London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1907).18. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. ix. 4; III. xiv. 4–5; and esp. III. xiv. 4–5.19. Moore, Ethics, p. 150.20. Ibid., p. 152.21. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 187.22. See Principia Ethica, p. 93 and ch. VI.23. See Principia Ethica, pp. 189–208.24. Ibid., p. 189.25. Ibid., p. 216.26. Ibid., 24 If.

340 JULIE ALLEN