unite for children

What a little cash can do: Gender in the Transfer Project

Amber Peterman, Social Policy Specialist, Innocenti

On behalf of the Innocenti Transfer Project team: Ashu Handa, Tia Palermo, Jacobus de Hoop, Lisa Hjelm, Leah Principe, Richard de Groot, Audrey Pereira, Luisa Natali, Frank Otchere & Michelle Mills

March 10th, 2016: University of Zurich

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The rise of ‘cash’ in sub-Saharan Africa . . .

• Explosion of Social Cash Transfers (SCTs): 718 million people enrolled in SCTs globally (Honorati et al. 2015) Approximately half (21) SSA countries had an unconditional

cash transfer (UCT) in 2010 -- this doubled (40) by 2014

• Programs are ‘home-grown’: Target on poverty and vulnerability; greater role of community Unconditional or ‘soft conditions’ Larger evidence base on impacts than any other region: more

countries, more topics

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Coverage of select Government programs

Nigeria

Zimba

bwe

Rwanda

Ghana

Leso

tho

Malawi

Botswan

a

Zambia

Namibi

a

Mozam

bique

Kenya

Tanza

nia

Ethiop

ia0

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

1200000

64000 69000 80000150000 163000 170000 182000 190000

250000310000

455000

1100000 1125000

Not included (due to scale): CSG in South Africa (>11 million recipients)

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Cash transfers: What’s gender got to do with it?

1. Programs often target women as a means to achieve positive outcomes (particularly for children) – women are perceived as spending cash in a more ‘family friendly’ way

We agree, however literature supporting this claim is dated, taken mostly from studies on intra-household consumption/expenditure – rather than gender-randomized experiments of SCTs

Where rigorous studies of SCTs exist, findings are mixed (Yoong et al. 2012)

2. Programs often assume that under conditions of (1), STCs will ‘empower’ women beneficiaries

We see large potential in this possibility – but current evidence is mixed Part of the lack of consensus stems from multitude of indicators utilized,

as well as large variation in gendered context which plays a critical role in conclusions

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Review: Programming and impacts on women’s empowerment in LMIC

• “While many development initiatives seem to target women specifically, or have women’s empowerment as one of their objectives, no sufficient body of evidence overwhelmingly points to success … (p. 29, van den Bold et al. 2013)”

Intervention Quantitative evidence

Qualitative evidence

Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) +/- +

Unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) +/- More needed Micro-finance +/- +/-

Agricultural interventions +/- More needed

+/- More needed

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But still. . . cash inflow (labor force participation) lower in all parts of the world for females

Is there a role for STCs to change to whom and how resources accrue—and are invested—at the margin for poor households?

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators: http://tinyurl.com/hvtuomk

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The Transfer Project

• Who: Community of research, donor and implementing partners – focus on coordination in efforts and uptake of results

UNICEF, FAO, UNC, Save the Children, National Governments• Mission: Provide rigorous evidence on of government-run large-scale

(largely unconditional) SCTs • Motivation:

Income poverty has highly damaging impacts on human development

Cash empowers people living in poverty to make their own decisions on how to improve their lives

• Where: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe

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The (Innocenti) Transfer Project Team

Amber Peterman [Gender/youth]

Jacob de Hoop[Education/child

labor]

Sudhanshu (Ashu) Handa

[Basically everything]

Lisa Hjelm[Food security/

poverty & stress]

Tia Palermo[Gender/youth]

Michelle Mills[Research

dissemination]

Luisa Natali[Zambia/labor]

Leah Principe[Zambia/ECD]

Audrey Pereira [violence/

maternal health]

Richard de Groot[Education &

nutrition/Ghana]

** Missing in action: Frank Otchere[Resilience/poverty]

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Gender in the Transfer Project

1. Targeting (who gets benefits)2. Program moderators (explaining heterogenous impacts)3. Program impacts (how program impacts intra-household indicators,

both for adults and for youth – boys/girls).

Outline for remaining presentation:4. Quick overview (and gender targeting)5. Case study on Zambia’s Child Grant Programme (CGP) and

women’s empowerment6. Few examples from youth/other gendered analyses7. So what? and where to next?

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Overview of programs & evaluations

• All programs unconditional, with exception of Tanzania (schooling, health)• Longitudinal qualitative studies in Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe

Country (program)Targeting

(in addition to poverty, ultra-poor)

Transfer size (% of baseline consumption)

Methodology Years of data collection

Ghana (LEAP) Elderly, disabled or OVC ~7 Longitudinal PSM 2010, 2012

Ghana (LEAP 1000) Pregnant women, child<2 16 RDD 2015, 2017

Kenya (CT-OVC) OVC 22 RCT 2007, 2009, 2011

Malawi (SCTP) Labour-constrained 18 RCT 2011, 2013, 2015

Tanzania (PSSN) Food poor ~ RCT 2015, 2017

Zambia (CGP) Child 0-5 27 RCT 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014

Zambia (MCTG) Female, elderly, disabled, OVC 21 RCT 2011, 2013, 2014

Zimbabwe (HSCT) Food poor, labour- constrained 20 Longitudinal matched

case-control 2013, 2014, 2016

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ProgramFemale

beneficiaries (%)

Female-headed

households (%)

Ghana LEAP 44 60

Ghana LEAP 1000 100 11

Kenya CT-OVC 85 85

Malawi SCTP 84 84

Zambia CGP 99 -

Zambia MCT 75 -

Zimbabwe HSCT 68 68

And three of five beneficiary HH are female-headed

Overall, approximately two-thirds of beneficiaries

are female

Figures for female-headed households may reflect evaluation sample, rather than beneficiary sample. Zambia studies did not collect information on headship.

Gender targeting

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Zambia Child Grant Programme (CGP)

• Implemented by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) starting in 2010

• Geographically targeted to households with child under 5 years in three districts (Kalabo, Shangombo, and Kaputa)

• Unconditional transfer: 60 Kwacha per month (12 USD) per household

• Six stated program goals: 1) income, 2) food security, 3) productive assets, 4) reduce child malnutrition, 3) primary school enrollment and attendance, 6) reduce under 5 child mortality and morbidity

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Evaluation design

• Randomized Control Trial with 90 clusters (45 treatment, 45 control)

• Baseline (2010), 24-month (2012), 36-month (2013) and 48-month (2014)

• Baseline sample: 2,500 households• Attrition low over panel period – and not differential (2-9%)• Good baseline balance in outcomes and background

characteristics• Difference-in-Difference/ANCOVA models, clustering SE• Adjusted models control for: women’s age, highest grade

completed, marital status, household demographics, vector of community-level characteristics and district fixed effects.

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Total consumption pcFood consumption pcNon-food consumption pc

Food security scale (HFIAS)Does not worry about foodDoes not go to sleep hungry at nightDoes not go whole day w/o eating

Domestic asset indexLivestock indexProductive asset index

Does not consider hh very poorHh better off compared to 12 months agoLife will be better in the future (women only)

ShoesTwo sets of clothesBlanket

Currently enrolledDays in attendance prior week

Not stuntedNot wastedNot underweight

Consumption

Food security

Assets

Relative Poverty

Material needs (children 5-17)

Schooling (children 11-17)

Nutrition (Young children 0-59m)

-.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2Effect size in SDs of the control group

Intent-to-Treat effects (CGP, 48-months)

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Impact on intra-household decision-making

• Question: “Who in your household typically decides XX”

• Code indicator = 1 if women reports sole and/or joint decision-making

• Impacts on 5 out of 9 domains – child schooling, own income, partners income, children’s cloths and shoes, family visits

• No impact on child health, major or daily purchases and own health

• BUT total is qualitatively small (0.34 additional decisions)

Source: Bonilla et al. 2016

Count of sole/joint decisions0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

6.966.34

Treat Control

0.34 impact***

Note: Results from adjusted ANCOVA OLS models*10% significance, **5% significance; ***1%

significance.

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Qualitative findings support the story

• CGP has not led to massive change in relations or dynamics:

“Even in the laws of Zambia, a woman is like a steering wheel, and us (the men) are the ones to drive them in everything.” ~Male, age 53 (beneficiary)

• Yet, there is subtle change: transfer income is under control of women, and women equate empowerment = financial standing:

“I am very happy because I don’t have to wait for him to make enough money as he puts it. I am able to suggest anything for the children now. He is in charge, but at least the money is in my hands.” ~Female, married, age 24 (beneficiary)

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Examining financial standing directly?:Savings and non-farm enterprises (NFE)

Evidence from LAC of CCTs on savings/investment mixed Evidence on UCTs in SSA scant, but promising Micro-credit and other savings programs have not delivered

impacts as strongly as previously assumed – special issue of AEJ: Applied (Banerjee et al. 2015)

Measures:• Savings: if woman is currently saving in cash• Non-farm enterprises: if the household has operated any

non-farm enterprises (NFE) or provided any services (store, transport, home brewing, trade, or others) in the last 12 months

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Any savings (24-months)

Any savings (36-months)

Operates NFE (24-months)

Operates NFE (36-months)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50% 47%

36%

47% 45%

22% 23%

30% 31%

Treat Control

10 pp impact**23 pp impact**

Impacts on saving and small businesses

17 pp impact**

15 pp impact**

Impacts greater for women with low (below-the-mean) decision-making at baseline Increase in savings does not seem to crowd out other forms of household savings

(livestock, assets)

Source: Natali et al. 2016

Note: Results from multivariate adjusted models difference-in-difference LPM*10% significance, **5% significance; ***1% significance.

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So has the CGP ‘empowered’ women? Yes, women have more capital

(cash) in their control – and are using it for income generation

However, few meaningful impacts on classic ‘bargaining power’ measures (decision-making)

Entrenched gender norms limit transformative shifts (even in medium term – 4 years)

Important, as CGP had no specific gender components (beyond targeting)Zambia, credit: Amber Peterman

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• Interviewer: “What does it mean to you to be empowered? For example, if you were to describe a woman in your community who is empowered, what would she be like?”

• Respondent: “Yes, there is a certain woman called Mary. She buys fish and sells . . . before that she never used to do anything. She was also receiving the CWAC money. Her husband had two wives . . .he never paid attention to the CWAC money. She saved some money and started buying fish and give her friends to sell for her in Mansa. She was giving her friends because she didn’t have enough money for transport costs. . . she made some good money and started going to sell herself. She has changed; her children look very clean and they eat well. She buys new clothes for herself and she looks nice.” ~female beneficiary (Kaputa district)

In their own words. . .

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Myth busting: No fertility incentives!

All Girls Boys All Girls Boys All Girls BoysZambia CGP 48 Months Malawi SCTP Kenya CT-OVC

-15-10-505

10152025

2.30.0 4.0

18.0 4.720.4

5.5-9.8 -5.1

Difference-in-differences estimates show no impact on total number of children 0-1 years old living in treatment households (as compared to controls)

Source: Palermo et a. 2015

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Malawi, credit: Angeli Kirk

Safe transitions to adulthood Youth modules

Age 13 – 28 (varies) Administered through 1-1 same sex

interviews in privacy Kenya, Malawi, Zambia MCTG,

Tanzania, Zimbabwe

Innovative content Mental health, hope, aspirations Sexual behavior, HIV risk, partner

characteristics, transactional sex Violence (physical, sexual) Patience, risk preference, logical

reasoning Fertility, marriage, schooling, labor

and health (HH survey)

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Kenya (N=1,443) Malawi (N=1684) Zimbabwe (N=787) South Africa, girls (N = 440)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

36%

27%

17%

11%

44%

32%28%

Treat Control

-6 pp impact**

-7 pp impact**

Note: Results from multivariate adjusted models (ages of youth vary by country),Kenya results (Handa et al. 2014), SA results using dosage models, mean is overall sample (Heinrich et al. 2015)

*10% significance, **5% significance; ***1% significance.

-13 pp impact***

Kenya and Zimbabwe impacts driven by girls, Malawi driven by boys. Zambia no impacts!

-11 pp impact***

Impacts on sexual debut among youth

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Conclusions and what’s next?• SCTs have potential for positive gendered impacts – both on women

(particularly economic outcomes) and for girls (safe transitions, schooling)

• Cross-country comparison among multiple settings in SSA allows a more comprehensive picture (across outcomes and program design)

• Working with Government large-scale programs adds to external validity of findings

• Much more work is needed!• Still no consensus on how to measure or in what contexts cash can

‘empower women/girls’ (we can help here)• Missed opportunity?: UNICEF engaged in >100 countries on social

protection systems – including cash transfers• Next frontier: Cash ‘plus’ programming (ex. Pilot in Tanzania)

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• Transfer Project website: www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer • Briefs: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer/publications/briefs

• Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/TransferProject • Twitter: @TransferProjct• Email: Amber Peterman, apeterman@unicef.org

For more information

Ghana LEAP 1000, credit: Ricardo Pires

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Transfer Project is a multi-organizational initiative of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Save the Children-United Kingdom (SC-UK), and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) in collaboration with national governments, and other national and international researchers.

Current core funding for the Transfer Project comes from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), as well as from staff time provided by UNICEF, FAO, SC-UK and UNC-CH. Evaluation design, implementations and analysis are all funded in country by government and development partners. Top-up funds for extra survey rounds have been provided by: 3IE - International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (Ghana, Malawi, Zimbabwe); DFID - UK Department of International Development (Ghana, Lesotho, Ethiopia, Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe); EU - European Union (Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe); Irish Aid (Malawi, Zambia); KfW Development Bank (Malawi); NIH - The United States National Institute of Health (Kenya); Sida (Zimbabwe); and the SDC - Swiss Development Cooperation (Zimbabwe); USAID – United States Agency for International Development (Ghana, Malawi); US Department of Labor (Malawi, Zambia). The body of research here has benefited from the intellectual input of a large number of individuals. For full research teams by country, see: https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/

Acknowledgements

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• Banerjee et al. (2015). Six Randomized Evaluations of Microcredit: Introduction and Further Steps. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1): 1-21.

• Bonilla et al. (2016). Cash for Women’s Empowerment? A Mixed-Methods Evaluation of the Government of Zambia’s Child Grant Program. Innocenti Working Paper 2016-01.

• Handa et al. (2014). "The Government of Kenya's Cash Transfer Program Reduces the Risk of Sexual Debut among Young People Age 15-25." PloS one 9(1):e85473.

• Honorati et al. 2015. The state of social safety nets 2015. Washington, D.C. World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/07/24741765/state-social-safety-nets-2015.

• Heinrich et al. (2015). Reducing Adolescent Risky Behaviors in a High-Risk Context: The Effects of Unconditional Cash Transfers in South Africa. Working paper.

• Natali et al. (2016). Making Money Work: Unconditional cash transfers allow women to save and re-invest in rural Zambia. Innocenti Working Paper 2016-02.

• Palermo et al. (2015). Unconditional Government Social Cash Transfer in Africa does not increase Fertility. Innocenti Working Paper 2015-09.

• Van den Bold et al. (2013). Women’s empowerment and nutrition: An evidence review. IFPRI Discussion Paper 01294. Washington DC.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

• Yoong et al. (2012). The impact of economic resource transfers to women versus men: A systematic review (Technical report). London, UK: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London.

Works cited