gendered divisions of labour and the intergenerational transmission of inequality jonathan gershuny...
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Gendered divisions of labour and the intergenerational transmission of inequality
Jonathan Gershuny
Centre for Time Use Research
Department of Sociology
University of Oxford
For GENET Conference, December 2009
This Talk• Proposition:
– National systems of regulation of access to work have effects on life chances which differ markedly by gender and class-of origin.
• Based on two unpublished papers: – Man-Yee Kan, Oriel Sullivan, JG; “Gender Convergence
in Domestic Work” (2009)– JG; “Dynamics of Social Position” (2008)
Kan, Sullivan and Gershuny are in the Sociology Department and Centre for Time Use Research, University of Oxford.
Definitions• Portable or Embodied (vs Fixed) capitals:
• “human” (Becker, Mincer) or• (1) “economic”, (2) social, (3) cultural (Bourdieu)
• Embodied capitals formed: – In household of origin…– …then through the formal educational system…– …and recursively through practices of daily life.
• time-use gives empirical estimates of practices
• Embodied capital dynamics life chances• Good/bad outcomes result from current capitals• Capitals indicate advantages and outcomes• Hence, new approach to intergenerational social mobility.
The day and the lifecourse
Theoretical intuition:
Daily choices among paid work, unpaid work, leisure/consumption
capitals form at differential rates
differentiate individual life-chancesconsequences for transmission of
position to children
Two steps (two data sources)
• STEP 1 (Multinational Time Use Study)– Typologies of national systems of work
regulation and gender ideologies…– …are strongly associated with different
historical changes in work patterns
• STEP 2 (British Household Panel Study) – Lifecourse changes in gender work-sharing…– …polarise class mobility and life-chances
The Multinational Time Use Study @ December 2009 N of Days 1970 -74 1975 -84 1985 -89 1990 -94 1995 -99 2000 -04 total
Canada 2138 2682 9618 8936 10726 34100 Denmark 4173 3584 7757
France 2898 4633 14631 22162 Netherlands 4019 3263 3158 3227 11851 25518 Norway 6516 6068 6129 7904 26617 UK 9292 14898 9206 1962 17248 52606 USA 2021 7010 4935 9386 1151 20340 44843 Finland 11908 15219 8354 1686 37167
Italy 37764 51206 88970 Australia 1491 3181 13937 14315 32924 Israel 3126 3126 Sweden 7065 7747 14812 Germany 3687 22554 35813 62054 Austria 25162 25162
South Africa 14217 14217 Slovenia 12273 12273 Spain 46774 46774 Column total 22071 14778 46585 86770 99453 54366 227059 551082 N of surveys 5 4 6 8 9 7 11 50
all unpaid work, men 20-59
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1961-69 1970-74 1975-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
mins per day
Canada
Denmark
France
Netherlands
Norway
UK
USA
Finland
Italy
Australia
Israel
Sweden
Germany
Austria
South Africa
Slovenia
Spain
all unpaid work, women 20-59
200
250
300
350
400
450
1961-69 1970-74 1975-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
mins per day
Canada
Denmark
France
Netherlands
Norway
UK
USA
Finland
Italy
Australia
Israel
Sweden
Germany
Austria
South Africa
Slovenia
Spain
Welfare Regimes and Gender Ideologies• liberal market regimes:
– UK, the USA, Canada and Australia – modified breadwinner gender ideology, women both paid
work & caring roles
• social democratic nordic regimes: – Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden – dual earner family model, high employment rate of both
women and men
• conservative/corporatist regimes: – Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria– weak familist gender ideology, men primary breadwinners,
women carers
• southern regime: (later addition to typology) – Spain, Italy and Israel– traditional familist gender ideology, stronger emphasis on
women’s family role
Women’s proportion of all unpaid work (men and women age d 20-59)
a. Nordic women's proportions of
all unpaid work
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
1961-69 1970-
74
1975-
84
1985-
89
1990-
94
1995-
99
2000-
04
%
Denmark
Norway
Finland
Sweden
modelednordic
ew
b. Liberal women's proportions of all unpaid work
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
1961-
69
1970-
74
1975-
84
1985-
89
1990-
94
1995-
99
2000-
04
%
Canada
UK
USA
Australia
modeledliberal
e
c. Corporatist women's prop. of all unpaid work
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
1961-
69
1970-
74
1975-
84
1985-
89
1990-
94
1995-
99
2000-
04
%
France
Netherlands
Germany
Austria
Slovenia
modeledcorporatist
d. Southern women's prop. of all unpaid work
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
1961-
69
1970-
74
1975-
84
1985-
89
1990-
94
1995-
99
2000-
04
%
Italy
Spain
modeledsouthern
Step 1. Public regulation matters
Note:– corporatist, liberal and nordic groups all start
out rather similar in the 1960s– Gender equality in total work (“isowork”)
Implications:
1. Public policy has a real effect on gendered balance between paid and unpaid work
2. Gender differentials in rates of accumulation of economic capital affected by regime choices.
Human capital: the “Essex Score”Data from British Household Panel Study
– 5000 UK households, 1991—present
Variables in the model:• Age, age squared, Education dummies• MOW scores (mean occupational wage, 2 digit
categories, standardised to 0-100)• Work, family care months over past 4 years• Dummies for top MOW decile and deciles 7 to 9 • Product of MOW dummies and age, age squared• Sex only in selection equation
Kan and Gershuny ISER WP 2006-03
BHPS longitudinal evidence
all couples, human capital before and after first birth
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
before
2 4 6 8 10
human capital score
woman
man
Contrasting “leavers” and “stayers”
• Consider all women in employment at time of BHPS interview before first birth:
– “leavers”—women not in employment the year after first birth.
– “stayers”—women in employment at all of six subsequent annual interviews.
– Note third intermediate category: non-leavers with various other post-birth strategies.
(details of regression modelling available on request)
Alternative household work strategies
all couples, w ife not in employment year after first birth
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
before
2 4 6 8 10
human capital score
woman
man
all couples, w ife employed first 6 years after first birth
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
before
2 4 6 8 10
human capital score
woman
man
all women, parents in top human capital quintile
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
before
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
years before/after first childbirth
human capital score
born in1920sborn in1930sborn in1940sborn in1950s
all women, parents in bottom human capital quintile
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
before
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
years before/after first childbirth
humasn capital score
born in 1920s
born in 1930s
born in 1940s
born in 1950s
top parental human capital quintiles: stayers vs leavers
stayer 1950s
leaver 1950s
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
beforeafter
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
years before/after birth of first child
modelled human capital score
stayer 1950s
leaver 1950s
top parental human capital quintiles: stayers vs leavers
stayer 1920s
leaver 1920s
stayer 1930s
leaver 1930s
stayer 1940s
leaver 1940s
stayer 1950s
leaver 1950s
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
beforeafter2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
years before/after birth of first child
modelled human capital score
stayer 1920s
leaver 1920s
stayer 1930s
leaver 1930s
stayer 1940s
leaver 1940s
stayer 1950s
leaver 1950s
top parental human capital quintiles: stayers vs leavers
stayer 1920s
leaver 1920s
stayer 1930s
leaver 1930s
stayer 1940s
stayer 1950s
leaver 1950s
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
beforeafter2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
years before/after birth of first child
modelled human capital score
stayer 1920s
leaver 1920s
stayer 1930s
leaver 1930s
stayer 1940s
leaver 1940s
stayer 1950s
leaver 1950s
bottom parental human capital quintiles, stayers vs leavers
stayer 1920s
leaver 1920s
stayer 1930s
leaver 1930s
stayer 1940s
leaver 1940s
stayer 1950s
leaver 1950s
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
before after2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
years before and after first birth
modelled human capital score
stayer 1920s
leaver 1920s
stayer 1930s
leaver 1930s
stayer 1940s
leaver 1940s
stayer 1950s
leaver 1950s
Leaving-vs-staying penalties,women with parents in the top human capital quintile
born in 1920s
born in 1930s
born in 1940s
born in 1950s
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
year after
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
years after first childbirth
stayer hc/leaver hc -1
born in1920sborn in1930sborn in1940sborn in1950s
Leaving-vs-staying penalties, women with parents in the bottom human capital quintile
born in 1920s
born in 1930s
born in 1940s
born in 1950s
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
year after
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
years after first birth
stayer hc/leaver hc -1
born in 1920s
born in 1930s
born in 1940s
born in 1950s
Step 2. Gender balance matters
UK as example of liberal regime lacking strong childcare & paternity leave regulations:
• For women with parents in top quintile: – Income (humcap) penalties falling from the
1930s to 1950s birth cohorts, to around 20%.• For women with parents in bottom quintile:
– penalties rising from 1920s to 1950s birth cohorts, from 40% to 70% 7 yrs after birth.
L/S penalties interact with parents’ class situation and regimes
Conclude: gendered polarisation
in intergen. transmission of life chances…
• … results from choices made under constraints of national system of regulation
• …and this effect is intensified by concurrent rise in marital dissolution:
• He leaves with the human capital• She’s left with the baby…• …and another child grows up in poverty.