general distribution ocde/gd(97)14international telecommunication market structure are providing...
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General Distribution OCDE/GD(97)14
COMMITTEE FOR INFORMATION, COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ACCOUNTING RATE SYSTEM
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Paris 1997
Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine
Complete document available on OLIS in its original format
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Copyright OECD, 1997
Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or part of this material should be made to:
Head of Publications Service, OECD, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD............................................................................................................................................ 5
MAIN POINTS......................................................................................................................................... 6
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 9
Background........................................................................................................................................... 9Structure of the Paper...........................................................................................................................11
SECTION 2: THE CURRENT SITUATION ..........................................................................................12
Trends in Collection Charges...............................................................................................................12Asymmetric Collection Charges...........................................................................................................15Trends in Accounting Rates.................................................................................................................17
SECTION 3: ALTERNATIVE CALLING PROCEDURES: CALL-BACK SERVICES AND REFILE .24
Current status of call-back services......................................................................................................24Impact on Collection Charge................................................................................................................26Implications for Accounting Rates.......................................................................................................31Refile...................................................................................................................................................32
SECTION 4: ALTERNATIVE CALLING PROCEDURES: INTERNATIONAL SIMPLE RESALE ANDNEW SERVICES ....................................................................................................................................35
New services and cost structures.........................................................................................................35Resale..................................................................................................................................................36Arbitrage and International Simple Resale............................................................................................37ISR impact on accounting rates............................................................................................................38Internet Telephony...............................................................................................................................39
NOTES....................................................................................................................................................41
ANNEX...................................................................................................................................................42
Figure 1. Average OECD trend in one minute collection charge.............................................................13
Figure 2. Outgoing traffic from OECD countries.....................................................................................13
Figure 3. Accounting rate Trend..............................................................................................................17
Figure 4. Trend in Accounting rates by regions.......................................................................................21
Figure 5. Traffic flow of call-back services.............................................................................................30
Figure 6. Traffic flow of Refile...............................................................................................................34
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Figure 7. Utilisation of Submarine Fibre-optic cables..............................................................................36
Table 1. OECD Trends in Collection Charges .........................................................................................14
Table 2. Relative Collection Charges in OECD.......................................................................................16
Table 3. Comparison of 1991-1995 IDD accounting rate of the UK.........................................................18
Table 4. Accounting Rates for IDD Service of US carriers (in SDR).......................................................19
Table 5. Accounting Rate Reductions for Selected OECD countries, 1991-94.........................................20
Table 6. Call Terminating Rate and Half Accounting Rate in Selected OECD Countries.........................23
Table 7. An example of a call-back operator’s tariff compared to standard PTO tariffs.........................28
Table 8. Relation between collection charge and accounting rate.............................................................29
Table 9. Collection Charges and Settlement for Different Services..........................................................35
Table 10. Arbitrage opportunities provided through International Simple Resale.....................................37
Table 11. Changes in UK IDD Accounting Rate for Relations Allowing ISR..........................................39
Table 12. Global Mobile Satellite Systems..............................................................................................40
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FOREWORD
This report, prepared at the request of the Committee for Information, Computer andCommunications Policy (ICCP), was submitted to the Ad hoc Group of Experts on InternationalTelecommunication Charging Practices and Procedures in February 1996. The ICCP Committe examinedthe report in September 1996 and recommended its derestriction.
The report, which is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General, was preparedby Yuji Kato and Dimitri Ypsilanti from the Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry.
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MAIN POINTS
The purpose of this paper is to examine and highlight policy implications of developments takingplace in new technologies which are impacting on international telecommunication prices and theaccounting rate and settlements system, used by telecommunication operators to compensate each other forterminating international telecommunications traffic. Although downward adjustments have taken place inthe price of international calls and in accounting rates, these changes have been insufficient given thesignificant extent to which these prices diverge from costs, and the important reduction which has beentaken place in costs themselves. The pace in introducing competition in international telecommunicationmarkets and the reform of these markets is slow, and there is an apparent reluctance in many cases bygovernments to accelerate reform in this area. It therefore cannot be expected that significant changes inprices (collection charges) and accounting rates will take place given present attitudes and policyframeworks.
The main reasons for distortions in international telecommunications prices are the differencesbetween different countries in the degree of competition and the level of accounting rates which exceed thecosts of terminating traffic. Lack of significant progress in pricing structures and levels has negativeimplications for the development and diffusion of new network-based applications, and trade in theseservices. In a competitive environment governments are well advised to leave pricing matters to marketparticipants. In the international telecommunication market the lack of competition, except on a fewroutes, requires vigorous government involvement in these issues. This has for the most part been lacking,even in international fora where many governments still allow operators to represent national interests.
The emergence of new technologies which provide alternate calling procedures using publicswitched networks or by-passing these networks provide one means of accelerating change and increasingcompetition in international communication markets. Governments, however, should be aware that anumber of new service developments may cause abrupt changes through unregulated transition to newservice structures. National operators would be in a better competitive position if they were subject on thebasis of rapid regulatory transition to cost-related accounting rates and collection changes. Refusal to dothis will only accelerate new entry by alternate calling procedures and will provide an incentive forcountries and operators trying to improve international telecommunication competition to do so outsidethe formal international frameworks.
Changes which have taken place to date have to a large extent reflected adjustments of theexisting system of payments rather than the fundamental restructuring it requires. OECD governmentsmay need co-ordinated action to reform the system of international telecommunication payments based onthe principles of non-discrimination. Perhaps the best way to stimulate such action is for a group ofinterested countries to agree on a cost-related accounting system, based on transparency and non-discrimination, for relations between this group of countries. Similar to the acceptance of internationalsimple resale policies this would serve to accelerate reform of the present accounting and charging system
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and accelerate participation by other countries, taking into account the specific situation in a country.Some countries argue that, to facilitate the transition to cost-based accounting rates, their nationalregulatory measures against alternate calling procedures need to be respected by other governments, inparticular because loss of outgoing traffic and collection charge revenue may induce some operators tomaintain high accounting rates.
The new technologies which are impacting on collection charges and accounting rates should besupported by governments in that they provide users with lower prices, help improve competitiveconditions in international telecommunication markets and by so doing increase the efficiency ofestablished public telecommunication operators.
The paper argues in favour of :
• allowing, if not encouraging, alternate calling procedures to develop (except for call-backmethods which clearly damage network quality);
• stimulating wider diffusion of international simple resale;
• providing positive regulatory signals to encourage new services which do not rely on theexisting international PSTN to develop, except call-back methods which clearly damagenetwork quality;
• action by a group of interested countries to adopt a cost-related system of settlement forcorrespondence within this group of countries and other countries which wish to participate;
• renewed emphasis on obtaining transparency of accounting rates and non-discrimination.
The above requirements are necessary to prevent carriers with a dominant position from takingadvantage of their market power. International collection charges and accounting rate policies havespillover effects on other markets and carriers so that They cannot be viewed as being solely a nationalmatter; international co-ordination among governments is necessary in this area to set down the generalframework. The ultimate goal of governments should be to introduce fully competitive internationalmarkets so as to ensure the maximum benefit to end-users and the economy as whole. At present we are ina transition period where it is important to have transparent accounting rates and non-discrimination. It is,however, necessary to examine appropriate regulatory measures for an internationally competitive marketalong with the appropriate transitional measures.
It is important in order to obtain global consensus on structural reform of accounting ratepractices and procedures to examine how to reduce the impact of changes on the developing economies.Accounting rates are a price for the termination of traffic; they should not be viewed as either a source offoreign exchange or as a transfer of capital to invest in infrastructure. In viewing accounting rates in thislight, developing countries will distort prices, undermine their long run efficiency and penalise theirindustry and residential users. Nevertheless, it is important to reduce any rupture which abrupt structuralreform may have on this revenue source and to implement new assistance schemes outside of the paymentssystem, given the reliance some countries have placed on the foreign exchange earned from accountingrate revenue.
The analysis shows that considerable effort is required by operators to attain the cost-relatedprice levels that have become a government policy requirement in most OECD countries. Further it is clearthat, given the low costs for termination that can be attained, users in many counties are being exploited
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through the considerably high collection charges. This monopoly rent is impacting adversely on smallerbusiness users and residential users in particular, who cannot use alternate calling facilities availablethrough private networks or closed users groups. Long-term strategy by operators, if they wish to maintaintheir viability would argue for lower, more competitive prices which would serve as well to slow down thedevelopment and diffusion of alternate calling procedures. The quest for short term gains is blinding manyoperators to the threat of longer theorem competition.
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
Background
Issues relating to the international telecommunication tariff and charging system have been onthe international telecommunication policy agenda for over five years. Evidence of significant above costpricing for international telecommunication prices, and the underlying costs for terminating internationaltelephone calls (accounting rates and settlements), and the serious concerns this has raised, has not resultedin significant reform of the underlying problem -- that is, the lack of effective international competition inthe provision of international telecommunication services. Nevertheless, during this period some importantchanges have taken place, and both prices for international telecommunication service and accounting rateshave declined significantly. Changes have also taken place in the appropriate internationalrecommendations of the ITU for intercontinental telephony (D. 150) and regional frameworks (theTEUREM Recommendations). Yet, despite these changes, there is still concern that the level of pricesdiverge significantly from cost, and that the existing structure of the payments system betweeninternational operators causes distortions and economic inefficiencies.
There remains a conflict of interest within the ITU in that for many countries, especially non-OECD countries, operators are involved in representing national interests and are involved in internationalregulation setting. The commercial interests of operators are sometimes contrary to reform inititatives.
The market structure for the provision of international telecommunication services, and inparticular telephony, using the public switched telecommunication networks, has remained fairly static.Because of this and based on technological developments important peripheral markets have been createdwhich are placing pressure on these main market structures. Technological developments are also changingconventional concepts on the provision of telephony services. Linked to this is the increasing liberalisationof national market structures which are slowly opening international markets. The cracks in theinternational telecommunication market structure are providing some openings which can be used by newtechnologies, and are thus also stimulating the diffusion of new ways to provide international telephony.
It can be expected that, as the process of transition from closed to competitive markets takesplace, new entrants will take advantage of opportunities offered by price differences in different markets,and will use new available technologies to exploit arbitrage opportunities. However, developments takingplace in international telecommunication markets must not be viewed as purely transitory servicesexploiting arbitrage opportunities. Many of the new services are meeting longer term market demand, andmany of the new technologies may play a role in the drastic restructuring of the way internationaltelephony has been traditionally offered.
In terms of international telecommunication policy the most important need is to openinternational markets to competition. This requires, in effect, that national markets are opened, that is, thatthe structure whereby there is a single national provider of telecommunication service includinginternational service, is abolished. Most OECD countries are moving toward that objective. Linked with
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this, there is a necessity to obtain broad international consensus on how the existing charging systembetween telecommunication operators should evolve in order to meet the requirements of economicefficiency and non-discrimination.
In this context new technologies which are emerging or are being applied to internationaltelecommunication services are having an important role in determining both the structure of new marketsas well as new pricing structures. For these reasons it is important to review their role and impact.
It is not the purpose of this paper to make recommendations per se for a reduction in accountingrates or collection charges, or in the structure of the international accounting rate system. This case hasalready been made a number of times in work by the OECD (see in particular, ICCP 36, InternationalTelecommunication Pricing Practices and Principles, A Progress Review). However, it is worth repeatingthe main recommendations which have been made since they are clearly relevant to the issue of newtechnologies and the international accounting rate system.
The recommendations made are based on the principles of transparency, non-discrimination andnational treatment. It has been recommended by the OECD that countries adopt a system based on theconcept of an international traffic terminating fee (an interconnection charge). This fee would reflect thecost of handling international traffic from an international gateway and terminating this traffic within thenational network. The fee charged would be the same for all foreign international operators, irrespective ofthe origin of the traffic. This international access or interconnection charge would be transparent, that is,published; this charge would also be non-discriminatory, that is, the same charge would apply to anyoperator terminating a call within a country, as long as the termination of that call did not incur additionalcharges than the termination of other calls.
These recommendations are also compatible with recommendations made in the context of workon interconnection which stressed the requirement that national and international interconnectionframeworks should be based on the same principles. Although the recommendation for an internationaltraffic termination fee stressed the need for this fee to be cost-based, it was recognised that an adjustmentperiod would be necessary, and that competition would be the best structure to bring prices in line withcosts.
Recommendations made at the OECD with respect to changing the international charging andaccounting rate system have not been explicitly accepted. Areas which have been emphasised in discussionwere in increasing transparency, and in examining concepts of non-discrimination. Nevertheless, therecommendations have been echoed elsewhere: in the context of TEUREM discussions operators areexamining the concept of an access charge, and in the context of the WTO’s Negotiations on BasicTelecommunication Services the Australian delegation has put forward a proposal for consideration ontermination services modelled on the OECD proposals. On the basis of a recent press statement made byTelia (Sweden), they have also supported the notion of a terminating fee. The US government has alsomentioned the concept of a termination fee for international traffic using the same concept as domesticinterconnection in the absence of market power or any distortion.
All OECD countries have accepted the principle of cost-oriented tariffs, and at the OECD andelsewhere, governments have also accepted this principle of accounting rates and collection charges. Whatthey have not done is to impose this requirement on their telecommunication operators. It is important forMember countries to recognise that there are wider macroeconomic implications of high internationalprices, especially in that many national service industries are becoming network-based and their globalcompetitiveness will depend on pricing structures. The issue of telecommunication pricing must be lookedat in this broader context rather than as a narrow telecommunication issue.
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Accounting rates, or interconnection charges, do not need to be determined by governmentintervention in a fully competitive market. However, in the present stage of transition, it is provingdifficult for countries wishing to introduce competition in the provision of internationaltelecommunication services to co-exist with carriers operating in monopoly markets. Thus, it is importantat this stage for governments to be actively involved in the reform of accounting rate structures andprocedures including pricing issues.
Structure of the Paper
The historical and current situation with respect to collection charges and accounting rates isdescribed in Section 2 of this paper as a background in understanding new developments in services andtechnologies. There are essentially two types of technologies, and services based on these technologies,which are being used to offer international telecommunication services: the first group of alternate callingprocedures1 are those which are working within the existing accounting rate system. Section 3 examinesthese and their impact. The second group of alternate calling procedures are developing independent of theexisting international charging and payments system. These are examined in Section 4. An Annexprovides detailed data on the trend of average collection charges and accounting rates, leased line prices, amatrix of cross-country collection charge data for a number of years, and other data which have been usedin the paper.
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SECTION 2: THE CURRENT SITUATION
Trends in Collection Charges
The overall trend in international telephone tariffs for OECD countries is shown in Figure 1. Thesimple average charge for an average one minute call from an OECD country to all other OECD countrieshas decreased since 1991 from US$ 1.34 to US$ 1.01 during peak periods and from $ 1.07 to $ 0.75during off-peak periods. These reductions of 16 per cent and 19 per cent (average reduction in localcurrency, excluding Turkey) respectively are not significant, given that prices were in 1990 well abovecosts, and that switching and transmission costs have also declined significantly during this period withincreased digitalisation. As well, many operators only began to offer off-peak prices in the early 1990s sothe reduction in average off-peak prices reflects to a large extent the introduction of off-peak pricing.
Price reductions have taken place at the same time as the total outgoing traffic of OECDcountries has been growing. Although the few studies available of elasticity of demand for internationalcalling with respect to price indicate a demand elasticity greater than one, the growth in outgoing traffic islinked especially to the expansion of the market resulting from new services, increased world trade andother factors related to increasing globalisation of economies. Figure 2 shows that OECD outgoing trafficon the public switched telephone networks (PSTN) increased by about 44 per cent between 1990 to 1993.The North American OECD countries showed the highest growth in traffic during the period, 57 per cent,while European OECD countries had a 37 per cent increase in traffic and OECD Asia-Pacific countries 41per cent. International traffic flows were significantly higher than this, since with liberalisation of accessto and use of leased circuits many companies have developed private networks carrying data, andincreasingly voice traffic. In addition growth in data networks expanded significantly.
Collection charges decreased for all OECD countries during 1991-95 (Table 1) in terms ofnational currencies, except for the United States, Japan and Turkey. For the United States the earlierintroduction of competition in the mid- to late 1980s had an impact on prices, but by the 1990scompetition was more evident in the introduction of discounting rather than in the reduction of standardinternational tariffs, which, in fact, began increasing in 1994. However, when the trends in collectioncharges are viewed in terms of US dollars, the average reductions are in a number of cases significantlygreater during the period.
In examining the relative levels of collection charges it is important to recall that the level of thischarge has historically been influenced by the geographic location of countries, even though it should beexpected that in the future the relative weight of distances in telecommunication charges are likely todiminish to a large extent. However, because of the distance component collection charges from countriessuch as Australia, Canada, Iceland and Japan to OECD countries appear on an average basis as relativelymore expensive than countries which have a number of close OECD neighbouring countries (such as inEurope).
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Figure 1. Average OECD trend in one minute collection chargeFigure 2. Outgoing traffic from OECD countries
Fig. 1 Average one minute collection chareg trend of OECD countries
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.4019
91
1992
1993
1994
1995
US
$
Peak One MinuteRate
Off-Peak
Fig. 2 Outgoing traffic from OECD countries
Europe
North A
A. Pacific
0
5000
10000
1500020000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1990 1991 1992 1993
Mill
ion
Min
utes A. Pacific
North A
Europe
1. The average of a one minute tariff based on (1 initial minute + 3 additional minutes)/42. The traffic is outgoing traffic from OECD countries to all ITU members.
Source: OECD, ITU
It is too early to judge whether countries with competitive markets performed better than thosewith monopoly markets in regard to collection charges over the last five years. 14 countries reduced theircollection charges less than the average rate of reduction in local currency terms (16 per cent) and amongthese 6 countries have competition for international telephone service. This means that of the 7 OECDcountries with competitive markets only the UK reduced collection charges more than the OECD average.However, competitive countries have usually introduced discounted tariffs.
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Table 1. OECD Trends in Collection Charges(Average of peak one minute to OECD countries, expressed in US$.)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 ’91-’95 ’91-’95Ex. Rates Local Cur.
Australia (Telstra) 1.38 1.37 1.30 1.12 1.25 -9.67% -7.24%Austria 1.23 1.20 1.28 1.18 0.94 -23.88% -23.58%Belgium 1.13 1.10 1.12 0.76 0.77 -31.54% -26.33%Canada 1.37 1.29 1.22 1.00 0.94 -31.41% -21.63%Denmark (Tele Den.) 0.80 0.74 0.82 0.77 0.69 -13.92% -5.60%Finland (Telecom Fin.) 0.99 0.93 0.69 0.63 0.63 -36.66% 18.05%France 1.14 1.13 1.02 0.88 0.81 -29.12% -33.52%Germany 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.93 -7.00% -14.07%Greece 1.36 1.18 0.97 0.81 0.78 -42.78% -10.14%Iceland 1.54 1.52 1.35 1.09 1.25 -18.76% -10.35%Ireland 1.43 1.30 1.37 0.79 0.81 -43.63% -39.39%Italy 1.44 1.36 1.37 0.87 0.77 -46.73% -27.69%Japan (KDD) 2.19 2.36 2.51 2.85 2.77 26.37% -14.73%Luxembourg 1.26 1.04 0.97 0.96 0.81 -35.80% -23.88%Mexico N/A N/A N/A 2.96 2.78 -5.86%* -4.00%*Netherlands 1.01 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.89 -12.30% -8.76%New Zealand (TCNZ) 1.66 1.54 1.36 1.38 1.48 -10.50% -9.79%Norway 0.93 0.72 0.71 0.58 0.55 -41.11% -24.85%Portugal 1.39 1.37 1.56 1.25 1.14 -17.94% -10.37%Spain 1.77 1.73 1.57 1.25 1.03 -41.53% -29.29%Sweden (Telia) 1.06 1.04 1.08 0.80 0.70 -34.42% -11.57%Switzerland 1.17 1.14 1.00 0.90 0.94 -19.90% -14.40%Turkey 2.74 2.11 2.35 1.78 1.28 -53.28% 498.39%United Kingdom (BT) 0.89 0.79 0.78 0.66 0.59 -33.78% -20.17%United States (AT&T) 1.34 1.33 1.33 1.40 1.42 5.70% 0.49%
OECD Simple Average 1.34 1.26 1.24 1.06 1.01 -25.15% -16.04%
Competitive Markets 1.48 1.48 1.46 1.26 1.26 -13.28% -6.42%Non-Competitive Markets 1.32 1.20 1.18 0.98 0.90 -30.04% -20.24%
1. The average of a one minute tariff based on (1 initial minute + 3 additional minutes)/42. All calculations are in exchange rates 1990 - 1994, except for the last column.3. Mexico is excluded from the OECD average to maintain consistency.4. Mexico is not calculated as a destination country for OECD countries.5. Rate change of Mexico is for 1994-1995.6. Average in last column is average of the reduction rate of each country.7. All averages in local currency exclude Turkey.8. The competitive countries: From 1991 - Japan, UK, US. From 1992 - NZ, Australia. From 1994 - Finland, Sweden.
Source: OECD
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Much of the focus in international discussion of accounting rates has been on the intercontinentalaccounting rate system as opposed to regional accounting rate systems. In the case of the OECD regionthe intra-European accounting rate system, the TEUREM group (Tariff Group for Europe and theMediterranean Basin) plays a significant role. Cross-border traffic within Europe accounts for about 35 percent of world international telecommunications traffic2. TEUREM tariffs are not only important to theextent that they impact on European OECD counties and their traffic flows, but they indirectly impactother traffic flows in that they influence refiling of traffic and other alternate calling procedures, as well asthe overall structure of European collection charges. The future of TEUREM is uncertain because of theshift from monopoly to multi-carrier market structures which should occur through liberalisation ofEuropean Union telecommunications markets in 1998. As a result, the geographic proximity of Europeancountries, and the differences in the degree of liberalisation means that more open markets can be used as abase for traffic refile and other alternate call procedures. Second the growth of trans-European roaming formobile communications also is bringing pressure on TEUREM.
Asymmetric Collection Charges
The development of alternate calling procedures is stimulated more by asymmetry in collectioncharges than in the level of collection charges. Asymmetry provides an opportunity to arbitrage prices.Digitalisation of networks and new technologies have enabled new service providers, as discussed inSection 3, to take advantage of asymmetric collection charges. In the past with national monopoly marketstructures for the provision of telecommunication services in all OECD countries, and analoguetechnology, it was relatively easy for countries to maintain high international charges relative tocorresponding countries even though the Regulations of the International Telecommunication Uniondiscourage asymmetry.
It is now recognised that the level and structure of collection charges is not only a national mattersince differences in the prices of calls influence both the volume of calls originating in a country and thedirection of traffic. High international telecommunication charges in one country also have a direct impacton the revenue flow of recipient countries either through discouraging demand, or through the impact onthe direction of traffic flow.
Since 1991 there has been a movement toward more symmetry in bilateral collection chargesbetween OECD countries (Table 2). Within national borders the price of calls in the two directions isidentical so an index of asymmetry would be zero. For bilateral international calls between OECDcountries the overall index of asymmetry declined from 34 to 22 over the 1991-95 period. On a countryby country basis perfect symmetry with charges of corresponding countries would produce an index of100, but as Table 2 shows, there is still relatively wide divergence between countries. In the annex;matrices for peak and off-peak bilateral collection charges show for 1995 that important differences existeven for regional relations within Europe. For example, to call France from Germany is 44 per cent moreexpensive than calling from Norway, and to call Switzerland from its neighbour, Austria, is 50 per centmore expensive than from the UK.
However, even though standard collection charges may be converging, the fact that manytelecommunication operators, especially in competitive markets, have begun offering discount schemes totheir customers, has in many instances maintained the gap between bilateral calling prices. For example,although US collection charges have become relatively more expensive than collection charges with otherOECD bilateral correspondents, a large percentage of the customers of the internationaltelecommunication operators subscribe to customer discount schemes.
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Perfect symmetry is, of course, not a goal and is unlikely to be attained. There are a number offactors which will result in differences in prices between two countries even in a highly competitiveenvironment. These differences could include exchange rate fluctuations, differences in relative costs, etc.Time zone differences can also play a role in creating differences in bilateral calling charges during aparticular time period when one country charges peak rates and another off-peak rates. The imposition ofvalue-added taxes on the price of telephone calls is also providing an opportunity for foreign-based call-back service providers to arbitrage price difference, especially given that these taxes are in the region of15-20 per cent.
Table 2. Relative Collection Charges in OECDOutbound collection charge compared to the charge applicablein the opposite direction of the same relation as a percentage
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Australia (Telstra) 63.8 69.6 70.3 73.7 87.7Austria 113.1 117.9 129.6 140.4 110.5Belgium 109.2 110.4 116.9 94.5 93.6Canada 84.6 84.0 89.7 85.4 85.2Denmark (Tele Denmark) 78.5 77.7 88.4 95.4 88.3Finland (Telecom Finland) 92.1 91.8 68.1 72.2 72.1France 109.3 113.8 110.0 111.0 99.6Germany 99.8 102.5 107.2 118.5 118.0Greece 124.3 109.5 90.7 85.1 78.6Iceland 123.1 128.5 116.8 103.2 118.8Ireland 139.9 130.3 140.9 94.7 94.7Italy 133.6 129.8 134.8 99.5 86.8Japan (KDD) 88.6 102.6 114.9 161.1 164.0Luxembourg 109.5 97.1 93.2 106.6 92.1Mexico N/A N/A N/A N/A N/ANetherlands 100.9 102.8 107.1 116.4 112.7New Zealand (TCNZ) 68.7 72.7 65.2 78.6 87.4Norway 83.1 70.4 71.1 70.0 68.0Portugal 125.5 127.6 157.3 142.9 125.6Spain 159.7 161.3 150.5 134.0 106.4Sweden (Telia) 94.7 98.7 105.3 91.5 83.7Switzerland 118.2 119.9 108.2 113.3 116.9Turkey 232.2 186.3 202.7 180.4 124.8United Kingdom (BT) 87.8 81.9 83.4 87.0 79.6United States (AT&T) 87.6 91.3 100.8 126.9 135.9
Asymmetry Index 34.1 27.5 31.5 27.9 22.2
1. If the index exceeds 100, this means that the country has a relatively high collection charge compared to charges in theopposite direction.
2. The asymmetry Index is the Standard Deviation of all the indices for OECD countries. If all collection charges applicablein each direction of the same relation are exactly the same for all bilateral relations between all OECD countries, the Indexequals 0.
3. Mexico is excluded from the OECD average to maintain consistency.4. Mexico is not calculated as a destination from other countries.
Source: OECD
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Trends in Accounting Rates
Earlier OECD work stressed the importance of transparency in accounting rates. The mainreasons for requiring transparency is to ensure non-discrimination and to place pressure on above costaccounting rates. Negotiation of bilateral accounting rates has traditionally not been linked with costfactors or cost developments. On the other hand new alternate calling procedures are closely linked withprice and cost factors and in fact closely depend on these for their business. Therefore, other thanproviding a service to users, the importance of these alternate calling services has been to force incumbentoperators to pay greater attention to cost and price developments for the provision of internationaltelecommunication service.
In that accounting rate data are generally not published it is difficult to discern trends. The earlierwork at the OECD succeeded in persuading Member countries and/or operators to provide aggregateinformation in graphic form on accounting rates. This information, data which are published by the FCCin the US on accounting rates between US carriers and foreign relations, and the recently publishedaccounting rate data by OFTEL in the UK are the only sources available to show trends. Given the lack oftransparency in accounting rates and the lack of adequate cost data, it is extremely difficult to show towhat extent accounting rates diverge from costs. There is, however, sufficient consensus from the industryto indicate that there remains significant scope for reduction in accounting rates.
Figure 3 shows the overall trend of accounting rate in 37 selected non-OECD countries and 9OECD countries (France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, NZ, UK and US). Non-OECDcountries reduced accounting rates by an average of 11.7 per cent while OECD countries reducedaccounting rates by an average of 29 per cent, increasing the gap between OECD and non-OECDcountries. In 1991, the accounting rate of the 9 OECD countries was 46 per cent of that of the 37 non-OECD countries, and in 1994 37 per cent. Even with a different degree of digitalisation and other factors,it is very difficult to justify this gap.
Figure 3. Accounting rate Trend
1.96 1.9 1.831.73
0.900.71 0.640.68
0.540.44
0.33
00.20.40.60.8
11.21.41.61.8
2
1991 1992 1993 1994
SDR
ITU
OECD
US - UK
Source: OECD, ITU-SG
18
The accounting rate data published by the US and the UK indicate the important variance inaccounting rates between countries. For example, BT’s international direct dial accounting rate with USoperators of 0.25 SDR is in sharp contrast to BT’s accounting rate of 0.318 SDR with Germany (Table 3)3.Similarly, BT and Mercury have an accounting rate of 0.385 SDR with Australian operators in contrast toan accounting rate of 1.0 SDR with operators from Japan. In this context it should be noted that one wouldexpect that relations between UK-Japan should be relatively more competitive given that there are threeinternational operators in Japan in contrast to a duopoly in Australia (and in the UK), and the longerhistory of competition in Japan in contrast to Australia.
Table 3. Comparison of 1991-1995 IDD accounting rate of the UK(in SDR)
1991 1995 1991- 1995Change (%)
Australia (Telstra) 0.7 0.385 -45.00%Austria 0.406 0.34 -16.26%Belgium 0.326 0.298 -8.59%Canada 0.2Denmark 0.348 0.369 6.03%Finland (Finland Tele.) 0.434 0.382 -11.98%France 0.33 0.252 -23.64%Germany 0.42 0.318 -24.29%Greece 0.478 0.424 -11.30%Iceland 0.72 0.415 -42.36%Ireland 0.193Italy 0.408 0.39 -4.41%Japan (KDD) 1.4 1 -28.57%Luxembourg 0.32 0.284 -11.25%Mexico 1.47 1.2 -18.37%Netherlands 0.334 0.292 -12.57%New Zealand (TNZL) 0.6Norway 0.392 0.28 -28.57%Portugal 0.506 0.415 -17.98%Spain 0.414 0.422 1.93%Sweden 0.401 0.23 -42.64%Switzerland 0.355 0.208 -41.41%Turkey 0.602 0.436 -27.57%US (BT - AT&T) 0.25US (Mercury - AT&T) 0.53 0.30 -43.40%
Average OECD 0.538 0.401 -21.53%
1. Data are quoted in Special Drawing Rights (SDR).Source: OFTEL
In comparing US carrier accounting rates with the UK accounting rates for similar relations it isstriking that TEUREM rates have still remained high relative to intercontinental accounting rates. Inaddition, the distance factor appears to play a relatively small role in relative levels of accounting rateswhereas distance seems a more important factor in collection charges (for example, collection chargesfrom the UK to Australia and from the UK to Austria show a 48 per cent difference, while their respectiveaccounting rates show a 13 per cent difference).
19
In general for OECD countries the trend in average accounting rates for the different OECDregions has been declining as shown in figure 4. Countries which have provided data all show a decline inaccounting rates. However, relative movements in accounting rates within Europe have been much lessthan for accounting rates between Europe and North America. For Europe-North American relations theaverage accounting rate reduction has been about 42 per cent. Accounting rates with OECD Asia-Pacificcountries have also declined on average by around 36 per cent (Table 5).
Table 4. Accounting Rates for IDD Service of US carriers (in SDR)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 85 -95
Australia(Telstra) (1)
1.50 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.80 0.68 0.60 0.55 0.40 0.40 -73.33%
Austria 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.20 1.10 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.60 0.50 -61.54%Belgium 1.60 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 -50.00%Canada(Stentor) (1)
0.38 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.15 -60.53%
Denmark(Tele Denmark)
1.60 1.60 1.60 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.50 -68.75%
Finland(Telecom Finland)
1.60 1.60 1.60 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.40 -75.00%
France (1) 1.60 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.00 0.70 0.70 0.42 0.36 -77.50%Germany(Federal Republic)
1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.34 0.34 -71.67%
Greece 1.63 1.64 1.64 1.63 1.64 1.63 1.53 1.43 1.12 0.95 0.95 -41.72%Iceland 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.00 0.90 0.75 0.75 -53.13%Ireland (1) 1.64 1.47 1.06 1.11 1.14 1.05 0.89 0.80 0.67 0.55 0.40 -75.61%Italy 1.63 1.64 1.64 1.63 1.64 1.50 1.43 1.35 1.09 0.82 0.48 -70.55%Japan(KDD)
2.14 1.92 1.66 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.13 0.95 0.75 0.60 0.63 -70.56%
Luxembourg 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.70 0.50 -64.29%Mexico (3) 1.10 0.93 0.81 0.80 0.72 0.61 0.58 N/ANetherlands 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.10 1.10 0.90 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.40 -66.67%New Zealand(TCNZ)
1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.40 1.20 0.60 0.60 0.40 -77.78%
Norway 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.30 -81.25%Portugal (2) 1.63 1.64 1.64 1.63 1.63 1.31 1.22 1.20 1.08 0.95 0.81 -50.31%Spain (1) 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.70 1.60 1.60 1.50 1.50 1.30 1.20 1.20 -30.64%Sweden(Telia AB)
1.60 1.60 1.60 1.20 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 -84.38%
Switzerland 1.60 1.40 1.40 1.25 1.12 1.12 0.81 0.81 0.61 0.61 0.50 -68.75%Turkey 2.05 1.84 1.41 1.49 1.52 1.41 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.10 -46.34%United Kingdom(BT) (1)
0.97 0.87 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.75 0.68 0.54 0.44 0.33 0.25 -74.23%
OECD Average 1.52 1.45 1.40 1.29 1.22 1.14 1.01 0.90 0.75 0.63 0.54 -64.54%
1. A time of day accounting rate applied to service with these countries for some years, but all figures shown here are only therate.
2. A growth based accounting rate applied to these countries for some year, but all figures shown here are the peak rates.3. Accounting rate varies depending on the location of the originating and terminating call. The accounting rate is not
equally shared. US:Mexico = 37:634. Data are quoted in Special Drawing Rights (SDR).
Source: FCC
20
Table 5. Accounting Rate Reductions for Selected OECD countries, 1991-94
With Europe With N. America With Asia Pacific With all OECDFrom: (Weighted Avg.)France 21% 50% 33% 25%Greece 20% 21% 40% 23%Ireland 9% 43% 21% 13%Italy 8% 48% 37% 15%Japan (KDD) 33% 51% 44% 35%Netherlands 29% 58% 34% 32%NZ (TCNZ) 21% 57% 38% 26%UK (BT) 5% 36% 25% 10%US (AT&T) 37% 15% 50% 38%
Avg. of 9 countries 20% 42% 36% 24%
Euro. (6 countries) 15% 43% 32% 20%North A. (US) 37% 15% 50% 38%Asia-P.(Japan, NZ) 27% 54% 41% 31%
1. The data are simple averages of the rate of reduction with all OECD countries within the regions.2. The accounting rate data are from France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and the US.3. The data of the Netherlands, Norway and the UK are approximated from graphics.4. Bold figures are for countries with competition.5. Mexico is not included as a destination.6. US data is calculated from Table 4.
Source: OECD
The lack of transparency in accounting rates and lack of data on costs makes it difficult toascertain the extent to which accounting rates do in fact diverge from costs. Table 6 attempts to provideone comparison of the extent that accounting rates may diverge from an alternate calculation of the pricefor the termination of calls. It should be noted that this example based on the UK situation is likely toconsiderably understate the divergencies which exist between accounting rates and a proxy for callterminating cost for many other OECD countries in that UK operators have already negotiated significantreductions in accounting rates with other operators between 1991 and 1995 as shown in Table 3.
Table 6 estimates a terminating cost (column D) and compares this with half the accounting ratebetween the UK and other OECD countries. It should be noted that the assumptions made are perhapsextremely generous (and are dictated by data availability) in that OECD countries would typically use1.5-2 Mbit/s leased circuits, instead of the 64 kbit/s circuits used in the table. The table assumes 4 voicechannels and a circuit utilisation rate of 25 per cent of capacity. The table indicates that the settlement rate(that is half the accounting rate) with the UK is on average for OECD operators nearly twice the rate ofterminating calls using leased circuits. Given the generous assumptions made it is clear that considerableeffort is required by operators to attain the cost-related price levels that have become a government policyrequirement in most OECD countries. Further it is clear that, given the low costs for termination that canbe attained, users in many countries are being exploited through the considerably high collection charges.This monopoly rent is impacting adversely on smaller business users and residential users who cannot usealternate calling facilities available through private networks or closed user groups.
21
Figure 4. Trend in Accounting rates by regions
Accounting ra tes (to Europe )
00.2
0.40.6
0.81
1.21.4
1.61.8
SD
R
1991
1993
1994
1995
1996
Accounting ra te s (to North Am e rica )
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
SD
R
1991
1993
1994
1995
1996
.../...
22
Figure 4. Trend in Accounting rates by regions (continued)
Accounting ra te s (to Asia Pacific)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
SD
R
1991
1993
1994
1995
1996
1. The data for each region is a simple average of accounting rate to each destination.2. All figures are expressed in SDR.3. Mexico is excluded as the North American destination.
Source: OECD
The fact that governments allow this situation to prevail means for the longer-term financial andeconomic loss and instability of incumbent operators by providing an incentive for uneconomic entry. Inan environment where prices were related to costs many of the alternate calling procedures may prove tobe uneconomic.
The OECD Mediterranean countries tend to have a high ratio of settlement rate to terminationrates in spite of their relatively high leased line prices. Denmark and Finland, although they have lowterminating rates, maintain relative high settlement rates with the UK. Japan, although it has reducedleased line prices in recent years, still has high settlement rates, and therefore has a high ratio of settlementrate to termination rates.
Telia, the incumbent carrier of Sweden, has compared accounting rates with domestic accesscharges. For example, the access charge of Telia is SK 0.23 (US$ 0.04) on average while the accountingrate with France is SK 1.75 ( US$ 0.26). The accounting rate is more than 6 times the average domesticaccess charge. Telia has also proposed to the UK to change the accounting rate system to nationalinterconnect rates which are much lower4. As is shown in Table 3, the accounting rate between Swedenand the UK is not relatively high. Even with this relatively low accounting rate, competitive pressure isleading operators to examine different settlement systems in order to compete more effectively forinternational traffic.
23
Table 6. Call Terminating Rate and Half Accounting Rate in Selected OECD Countries(Using Private Leased Line Example, with UK)
Half LLmonthly
price withUK
Per MinuteCost of LL
Localcharge in
eachcountry
Terminat-ing Rate
Half ARwith UK(US$)
Ratio
A B=A/44640 C D = B+C E E/D
Australia (Telstra) 5296 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.20 165%Austria 5079 0.11 0.06 0.17 0.17 100%Belgium 2197 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.15 175%Canada 2591 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.10 175%Denmark (Tele Denm.) 1467 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.19 256%Finland (Telecom Fin.) 1660 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.19 397%France 3134 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.13 119%Germany 2964 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.16 179%Greece 3663 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.22 262%Italy 2963 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.20 210%Japan (KDD) 5759 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.51 314%Netherlands 2088 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.15 186%Norway 2265 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.14 181%Portugal 2867 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.21 241%Spain 2709 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.21 286%Sweden (Telia) 1957 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.12 197%Switzerland 2864 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.11 61%Turkey 6923 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.22 130%United Kingdom (BT)United States (AT&T) 3117 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.13 116%
Average 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.18 193%
1. Leased line cost is 56 / 64 kbit/s Half international line monthly cost. It is assumed that four voice paths are available witha 25 per cent usage rate.
2. Tax is excluded both from leased line price and local call charge.3. Leased line charges are the cheapest price available at Sep. 1994. IDD collection charges are from Jan. 1995.4. UK accounting rate is Dec. 1995.5. Calculations use 1994 exchange rates.6. Bold figures are the countries with accounting rates which are more than twice the terminating cost.
Source: OECD, ITU, LYNX
24
SECTION 3: ALTERNATIVE CALLING PROCEDURES:CALL-BACK SERVICES AND REFILE
Alternate calling procedures (ACPs) are not all based on price arbitrage. In a number of casesnew technologies are leading to the introduction of value-added calling services which provide customerswith convenience. This is the case for some Home Direct Services, for example, which may be moreexpensive than using direct dial services. In other cases, new services which are emerging are takingadvantage of new features or low prices offered by new technologies, for example, telephony using theInternet. These developments imply that pressure on accounting rates is emerging from three directions:first, from the opening of public switched telecommunication markets to competition; second, from thegroup of alternate calling service providers utilising the PSTN to provide services and in some casesdepending on price arbitrage; third, from new technologies based on different infrastructures outside thePSTN, and therefore, outside the traditional accounting rate system.
This section deals mainly with those services and procedures based mainly on the existingPSTN and mainly dependent on the framework of the collection charge and accounting rate system.These services or procedures, mainly call-back and refile services, are aimed at by-passing expensiveroutes and put pressure on high accounting rates either directly or indirectly through collection charge,while the services such as ISR and Internet voice, which are outside the accounting rate system, impactdirectly on accounting rates. This section reviews policies for call-back services and refile and analysestheir implications for the present pricing and charging system.
Current status of call-back services
Although call-back service operators are still relatively small in number and in revenue terms,they have a potential to impact on PTO revenue. One of the largest call-back operators in the US hasattained operating revenues of US$ 64 million in 1994 and was expected to have revenues of $200million in 1995, equivalent to about 2 per cent of total international telecommunication revenue in theUS5. It has been estimated that there were about 76 facilities based call-back operators in May 1995,growing to about 100 by August 1995. The size of the call-back market in 1995 is approaching $ 500million according to one estimate6.
Telecommunication operators providing service in competitive markets have in general tolerated,and in many cases assisted alternate calling service providers. This is because these service providers helpin generating traffic some of which ends up on the networks of these telecommunication operators. Theyare also customers for the facilities of telecommunication operators. For some types of call-back services,however, the reaction of operators in competitive markets has been negative. For example, in the UnitedStates, a petition was filed with the FCC against call-back services using uncompleted call signalling onthe basis that this amounted to wire fraud and was forbidden by the Communications Act of 1934.Similarly, the international carriers in Japan have filed a petition with the MPT alleging that call-backoperators do not bear the cost of sending signals to countries where their facilities are based (mainly theUS). The argument in these cases is that call polling uses the network of an operator to signal a switch
25
based in another country; the signal provides the switch with information to re-dial a call to the countryoriginating a signal. Even though a large number of international calls are uncompleted (unanswered)because the called party is not there, the aim of these types of calls is to attain completion. In contrastcall-back services based on re-dialling technologies do not seek call completion; on the contrary theirpurpose is only to provide signalling information.
The FCC determined that international operators have the right to charge for uncompleted calls.But this may raise a number of legal problems with respect to identifying which calls were undertaken forthe express purpose of call signalling, what is the threshold for the number of calls made to a specificnumber which identifies these calls as call signalling as opposed to call completion attempts, etc. Noattempt has yet been made to charge these operators for uncompleted calls. Furthermore, call-back serviceproviders are beginning to use packet switched networks for call signalling so that technology may solvethe concern of operators with respect to uncompleted call signalling.
Rather than trying to determine whether uncompleted call signalling constitutes illegal use of thenetwork, it is more fruitful to provide solutions to the users who obviously benefit from the use of suchservices. Many of the new entrants providing re-dial call-back services can be viewed as arising fromincentives from inefficient pricing behaviour and it is this behaviour which needs to be addressed as theroot of the problem. Inefficient entry will cease when market conditions result in prices being aligned withcosts.
Part of the problem which arises from new call-back service operators entering the market is thatthey not only impact on markets where there are high prices, but also on the competitive markets wherethese operations are often based. This should be viewed as an international spill-over resulting frominefficient practices in foreign markets. However, the solution is to eradicate these international spill-overeffects by tackling the direct cause, which is the lack of competition in markets, and moreover theunwillingness of operators (and governments) to adjust prices to costs. Much of the present policy ofgovernments, especially in developing economies, is misguided with regard to call-back services in thatby trying to ban these service providers, they are only tackling the symptoms rather than the cause.
However, a number of countries are trying to make call-back service illegal. In a number ofOECD countries the toll-free lines used by call back operators have been disconnected even though theselines were provided by other (US-based) carriers. This has been the case for Austria, Portugal, Spain andTurkey. Many non-OECD economies have regulated against call-back services considering them illegal.It is unlikely that prohibition of call-back services will be successful. This is because, despite the fact thatsome call-back services require extremely cumbersome procedures, demand for these services remainsvery strong7. Furthermore, it can also be technically difficult to distinguish the call-back traffic from othertraffic, and the number of different variants in providing call-back have developed rapidly with newtechnologies. Many established international operators also view the provision of capacity and freephonenumbers (international 800 numbers) to call-back service providers as legitimate business. The policy ofbanning call-back services goes counter to the stated aims of most countries’ telecommunication policies,that is, provide efficient, ubiquitous service at the lowest cost.
In response to the Collective letter 6/3 of 24 January 1995 by Study Group 3 of the ITU’sTelecommunication Standardisation Bureau many responding administrations/regulators/operators thoughtthat call-back services were not in conformity with the International Telecommunication Regulations.However, it needs to be stressed that the ITR and the relevant Recommendations place emphasis on thefact that distortions may arise through lack of symmetric accounting rates and collection charges. Further,
26
they also stress that these prices should be based on costs. The burden should be placed on governmentsand operators in meeting the provision of these Regulations rather than on the call-back service operatorswho are able to provide service exactly because these Regulations are not respected.
At the ITU it has been recommended that those call-back applications which seriously degradethe quality and performance of the PSTN, such as constant calling (or bombardment or polling) andanswer suppression, should be avoided. At the same time it was recognised that account rate sharesshould move towards cost-orientation to reduce arbitrage opportunities.
OECD countries should in any event be preparing to introduce facilities-based competition andrebalancing tariffs. Call-back service providers should be viewed as providing an added incentive to theirdomestic operators to enhance their competitiveness. Policy should therefore be tolerant towards theseservice providers.
Development of call-back markets has provided an incentive to further refine technologies forsuch services: for example, auto-diallers have improved significantly and can handle a large number ofcalls; packet switching technology has been used for re-origination of calls. As competition grows andwith tariff divergencies still existing, call-back operators will begin to enter a number of markets. Thus, itcan be expected that following 1998 when there will be no service monopolies in most EU countries, call-back operators will be able to easily target intra-European traffic. This is a large market given that thebulk of EU traffic is intra-European. Countries maintaining their monopolies until the year 2003 or laterwill have difficulty preventing this form of ‘indirect’ market entry. The impact on their operators will bemore severe through call-back than it would be if they allowed infrastructure competition.
Increasingly telecommunication customers are placing a premium on mobility. The provision ofroaming capability within national borders for mobile cellular communication services has in recent yearsextended to cross-border service provision, especially within Europe. Cellular providers are now alsousing call-back to access the international market. Often these services use X.25 switches to send theinitial signalling message to a call-back switch which provides the line to the cellular customer. Given therapidly increasing size of the mobile market this extension of service provision will also place significantpressure on traditional telecommunication services and pricing frameworks.
In addition to lower prices, call-back providers offer customers services such as itemized billingand billing inquiry service which are not in many cases available from PTOs. Thus, in many cases, call-back services may improve quality for customers.
Impact on Collection Charge
The impact of call-back services on the accounting rate system and on collection charges ispositive in that it puts downward pressure on prices. A number of operators have begun to reduceinternational prices for telephony and have begun to introduce volume discounts for large customers inorder to recapture traffic that they have lost to call-back operators. One such example is Telintar inArgentina.
A comparison of a call-back service operator’s tariffs (USA Global Link) tariffs to NorthAmerica, Asia-Pacific and European destinations relative to tariffs of operators from OECD countries tothese different regions is provided in Table 7. It is evident that the call-back service provider has a price
27
advantage for most routes (the bolded figures in the table show where call-back has a price advantage),except the intra-European routes. This does not reflect so much a price disadvantage but rather the fact thatthe intra-European market has not been specifically targeted by the call-back provider.
Earlier in the paper the lack of symmetry in calling charges between bilateral relations wasshown. Although these differences based on standard published prices play an important role, they are notthe only factor in terms of creating arbitrage opportunities. The willingness of established operators toprovide discounts to large customers of international direct dial services, such as call-back operators, andthe fact that there are restrictions in a number of countries on providing price discounts, is a crucial factorin the viability of call-back services. Call-back services in fact provide a mutual opportunity for profits forboth established operators and call-back service providers. This is because call-back companies, in somecases, divert direct traffic between two countries to the country where the call-back company is basedbefore completing the call to the destination country. The two outgoing calls that this generates from thehome base of the call-back company also helps the established operator obtain additional traffic throughproportionate return policies with the country originating the call and the country of destination(see Box 1).
One response to the ITU Circular letter noted above argued that “call-back operators are viablefor long periods owing to the charge subsidy on the part of ROAs (Recognised Operating Agencies)supporting call-back operators.8” The argument here is that discounts constitute a “subsidy”. However,this confuses pricing capacity at competitive rates with pricing below cost. In a competitive market itwould be expected to price capacity close to cost and to try and maximise the rate of utilisation ofcapacity. Aggressive marketing in a competitive environment would lead incumbent operators to use“resellers” or call-back companies as retailers to collect customers in foreign countries, and channel theirbusiness indirectly to the wholesaler (the established PTO).
Table 8 tries to show the relative margins available to PTOs as compared to call-back operators.Using New Zealand as an example, which is generally considered as having relatively competitive tariffs,the collection charge to other OECD destinations relative to the average accounting rates for differentOECD regions is used to determine a call margin. This is contrasted with the margin available to the call-back service provider based on the revenue they obtain from customers for a call originationg in NewZealand to other OECD destination, relative to the two settlement rates (NZ to the US and the US toanother OECD country). The two settlement charges represent the floor which the call-back serviceprovider would be required to pay the PTO in the US for transmitting a call. The difference between themargin for the direct dialled call from New Zealand of 124 per cent and the call-back operator margin of31 per cent on average is quite significant. The call-back service provider has cheaper collection charge forall the destinations except to Australia. In this example it would appear that reducing the opportunity forarbitrage between prices would require a reduction in the average margin from 124 per cent to 28.6 percent9 by a New Zealand operator.
While this example shows the potential opportunities call-back operators have to exploit the highmargins which exist in the provision of international telephony services, it also indicates that if operatorsview call-back services as problematic they are fairly easily able to reduce their margins and reducecollection charges. It is exactly for this reason that call-back service providers are providing a useful roleby placing pressure on collection charges.
There is an important policy issue for many governments here in that in many cases volumediscounts for large customers are not authorised. One of the managers of an international carrier in Japanmade the following statement in an interview on call-back:
28
“In fact, I think that the only way to cope with call-back service is to reduce the collectioncharges. Call-back service is viable because there is a difference in the collection charges in eachdirection of the same relation. In reality, there is no difference in the collection charges betweenour customer and those of the US. But it is the large customer discount (volume discount) in theUS that makes call-back service possible. The call-back operators fully utilise the volumediscount in the US and we will not be able to compete with them unless we introduce volumediscounts10”.
Table 7. An example of a call-back operator’s tariff compared to standard PTO tariffs
To Europe To N. America To Asia/PacificRegion
FromAustralia (Telstra) 66% 36% 85%Austria 141% 58% 64%Belgium 151% 60% 57%Canada 73% 44% 61%Denmark (Tele Denm.) 174% 59% 55%Finland (Telecom Fin.) 186% 61% 65%France 131% 47% 42%Germany 134% 40% 45%Greece 181% 48% 52%Iceland 97% 48% 42%Ireland 156% 62% 64%Italy 172% 53% 53%Japan (KDD) 34% 25% 38%Luxembourg 169% 63% 56%Mexico 32% 148% 23%Netherlands 143% 53% 45%New Zealand (TCNZ) 63% 43% 83%Norway 182% 77% 80%Portugal 110% 43% 46%Spain 153% 55% 37%Sweden (Telia) 153% 46% 45%Switzerland 119% 55% 47%Turkey 118% 54% 72%United Kingdom (BT) 146% 45% 61%United States (AT&T) 37% 33% 26%
Simple Average 125% 55% 55%
1. Comparison using (1 initial minute + 3 additional minutes)/4 and peak time where applicable.2. Tax is included in the PTO tariff.3. Exchange rate is average 1994.4. Between Mexico and US, the cheapest rate was used.5. Between Canada and US, the 340-630 miles tariff was used.6. Mexico is excluded as a destination for OECD countries.7. Figures in bold show where call back is less expensive.8. Collection charges are for Jan. 1995.9. Call-back operator’s collection charge is from July 1995. A customer pays a minimum monthly usage charge of US$ 25 for
each line.
Source: OECD
29
Table 8. Relation between collection charge and accounting rate(PTO and USA Global Link, NZ example) (Methodology based on Box 1)
Public Telecommunication Operator Call-back Operator (in US)A B (A-B)/B C D (C-D)/D
From NewZealand
CollectionCharge
Average HalfAR by
Regions
Margin CollectionCharge
Half AR (NZ-US) + Half
AR toDestination
Margin
ToAustralia 0.71 0.45 58% 0.82 0.81 1%Austria 1.51 0.85 78% 1.13 0.76 48%Belgium 1.82 0.85 114% 1.11 1.04 6%Canada 1.47 0.45 230% 0.71 0.53 34%Denmark 1.89 0.85 122% 1.07 0.80 33%Finland 1.98 0.85 133% 1.08 0.72 50%France 1.79 0.85 111% 0.92 0.69 33%Germany 1.51 0.85 78% 0.91 0.68 34%Greece 1.97 0.85 132% 1.21 1.15 5%Iceland 2.08 0.85 145% 1.43 1.00 44%Ireland 1.83 0.85 115% 1.19 0.82 45%Italy 1.80 0.85 111% 1.22 0.79 55%Japan 1.44 0.45 223% 1.00 0.90 11%Luxembourg 1.92 0.85 126% 1.18 0.80 48%Mexico N/A 0.45 N/A 0.92 0.86 7%Netherlands 1.51 0.85 78% 0.92 0.72 27%NZ - - - - - -Norway 1.86 0.85 119% 1.06 0.65 65%Portugal 1.96 0.85 130% 1.15 0.80 44%Spain 1.92 0.85 126% 1.21 0.96 26%Sweden 1.89 0.85 122% 0.88 0.61 46%Switzerland 1.61 0.85 89% 0.95 0.80 18%Turkey 1.92 0.85 126% 1.50 1.27 18%UK 1.50 0.85 77% 0.77 0.61 27%US 1.39 0.45 211% 0.52 0.41 26%
Average 1.48 0.77 124% 0.99 0.70 31%
1. Comparison using (1 initial minute + 3 additional minutes)/4 during peak periods where applicable.2. Exchange rate used is the average for 1994.3. Between Mexico and US, the cheapest rate was used.4. Between Canada and US, the 340-630 miles tariff was used.5. Bolded figures show where call-back is less expensive.6. Accountings rate data is for 1994.7. Collection charge is for Jan. 1995 and includes tax.8. Call-back operator’s collection charge is for July 1995. Call-back customers pay a US $25 minimum monthly usage charge
for each line.9. According to Fig. 5 in Box 1, B= AR0/2, D= AR1/2+ AR2/2.
Source: OECD
30
Box 1Figure 5. Traffic flow of call-back services
Callback traffic
AR2AR1
Normal traffic
AR0
B
C
A
DestinationOriginating country
Actual Callback traffic
Terms:
Call-back OperatorReseller of volume discounted facilities to countries outside country C.
PTO (call-back facility provider)The telecommunication operator in C providing facilities through discounted charges to Call-backoperators.
A Originating country
B Terminating country
C Country where the call-back facility provider is located.
Call-back trafficThe traffic flow that users of call-back service recognise. In the example, it is from A to B.
Actual call-back trafficThe traffic which actually flows in the PSTN. In the example, there would be two traffics: from C to A,and from C to B.
Normal trafficThe international traffic which does not use call-back technology. In the example, the traffic flowsdirectly from A to B.
.../...
31
Stage 1 Contacting Call-back operator in C
If a call-back subscriber in A wants to make an international call to B using a call-back service, he would contactthe call-back operator’s facility by:
− uncompleted call;
− completed call;
- via PSTN,- via leased line by call-back operator,- via packet switched network,
− using constant polling from the call-back operator’s facility.
Stage 2 Setting up calls
After receiving a signal, the call-back operator would make two telephone calls using the PSTN, one to theoriginating terminal and the second to the destination country. These calls normally use discounted tariffs offeredby the PTO to call-back operators.
Financial implication
The margin of the call-back service would be much smaller as compared to normal traffic. This is because:
− the collection charge of the call-back service is lower than to normal traffic,
− the PTO in C will pay settlements both to the PTO in A and the PTO in B,
− the margin of the call-back traffic should be shared by both call-back operator and the PTO in C.
It should be noted that the incentive for the facility providers in C is not only the income obtained directly fromcall-back services but also from the profitable proportional return traffic which results from outbound trafficgenerated by call-back operators.
Implications for Accounting Rates
As seen in Table 8 the call-back service margin is relatively slim. Facility providers incompetitive countries are also probably earning small margins on the facilities they make available to callback service providers. However, these international facility-based carriers have an added incentive inselling capacity to call-back companies in that call-back traffic stimulates profitable inbound traffic. Thisis because call-back, by increasing outbound traffic through proportionate return policies is increasing thepercentage of traffic that the facility-provider obtains from foreign destinations. In effect, the revenue frominbound accounting rates compensates for any reduction in profit margins on outbound calls or on capacitybeing used for outbound calls. The incentives provided here result from the fact that through the bilateralaccounting rate system, and through polices such as proportionate return, there is a close link betweenoutbound and inbound traffic. Breaking this link would occur in a competitive environment and would bean important factor in reducing incentives to make available capacity to call-back providers at lowmargins.
32
The proportionate return system, which is a regulatory tool, links the outbound calling price tothe profit earned from terminating incoming calls. By artificially creating a joint service the respectivecost of providing each service is ignored. The fact that operators from competitive countries cannotcompete in price terms to obtain incoming traffic (because of uniform accounting rates and proportionatereturn requirements), results in this distorted system of trying to obtain incoming calls. This linkagetherefore causes price distortions. Setting the settlement rate to cost, that is a termination charge, wouldreduce the profitability of incoming calls and the incentive to “export dial tone”, that is by stimulatingoutgoing calls for the sole purpose of obtaining incoming calls would lose its relative attractiveness. Thisdoes not imply that there would be no competition to obtain incoming traffic. On the contrary, there wouldbe competition but based on the most advantageous price for termination of calls.
Proportionate return policies have been implemented as a safeguard when operators incompetitive markets need to deal with a monopoly operator in the provision of international service (seeBox 2). Some monopoly operators whose market has been targeted by call-back service providers wouldprefer that call-back minutes not be counted in proportionate return calculations. However, it may bedifficult to determine which calls are generated by call-back services.
In the countries where call-back customers are located there may be downward pressure onaccounting rates if demand for these services is sufficiently strong. This assumes that the PTO reducescollection charges, and wishes to maintain existing rates of return which may provide an incentive toreduce accounting rates. However, such a direct relationship may not occur depending on how call-backimpacts on the direction of traffic flow. For example, countries which are important users of call-backservices may find that incoming calls are growing faster than outgoing. Instead of trying to reverse theflow through price reductions, this may give PTOs an incentive to increase accounting rates from thecountry where call-back facility providers (PTOs) are located.
However, such policies by operators would tend to create a polarisation between a group ofcountries with relatively competitive prices and low accounting rates, and a second group of countries withprices significantly above cost. The latter group would be under considerable pressure as competitionincreases throughout global markets. Furthermore, they would find it extremely difficult in such asituation to rebalance their prices in a smooth way and without adverse effects. This danger is real,especially between OECD countries and a number of non-OECD countries who have difficulty inenvisaging the benefits which they can attain from competitive telecommunication markets.
Refile
Earlier OECD work on refile11 stressed the role that refile can play in placing pressure onaccounting rates. In comparison to call-back services, refile is usually undertaken on a larger scale andtends to be a carrier service rather than targeted to individual customers as would be the case for call-backservices. Because it deals with a higher volume of traffic, the impact of refile tends to be much higher andbecause refile is based on arbitrage of differences in accounting rates its impact on these prices is direct(see Box 3) whereas its impact on collection charges is much more indirect.
Refile is often carried out by the PTOs themselves and therefore helps to enhance competition inthe market for international telecommunication services. Refile, linked with international simple resale,can in fact result in significant pressure on accounting rates since in this form certain high cost routes canbe completely by-passed. The impact of refile is therefore likely to be on routes where accounting ratesexceed costs by a large margin (for example between A and B in Box 3), rather than the whole accountingrate system.
33
However, many PTOs may be reluctant to change traffic routes completely since they still needto maintain correspondent relations with other operators and may feel constrained because of earliercommitments on traffic forecasts not to disrupt traffic flows unduly. If this is the case refile may dealmainly with new traffic growth at present, although as competition increases it should be expected thatrefile will play a much wider role in traffic diversion. A difference between call-back services and refile isthat the former is much more visible in terms of its public profile and in terms of access to estimates ontraffic being handled by call-back, whereas it is difficult to estimate the extent of traffic refile that istaking place. The compatibility of refile with existing International Telecommunication Regulations (ITR)has been questioned by some countries.
Box 2 Policy Asymmetry
The attempt by international telecommunication operators in competitive markets to expand both the sizeof the market and their share of the market, also tends to increase outgoing traffic. As such, this competitiveprocess benefits a monopoly carrier in a call terminating market. The competitive process tends to reduce themargin between collection charges and accounting rates for operators in competitive markets, and increasesrevenue for operators in monopoly markets by increasing their incoming traffic. The fact that operators inmonopoly markets benefit from the competitive process in other markets is due to high accounting rates whichmake incoming calls profitable.
Competition at one end of a bilateral telecommunication relation where the competitors are traditionalPTOs using the PSTN does not place sufficient pressure on international monopoly carriers in other markets. On thecontrary, the power wielded by a monopoly carrier has required regulators in competitive markets to place limits onthe competitive process in their own markets. This has been undertaken to prevent the monopolists from usingdominant position to obtain special treatment from competitive carriers in other countries by playing one againstthe other, that is, “whipsawing”. Regulators have therefore required:
• Uniform accounting rates, that is, competing carriers must negotiate the same accounting rate and settlementrate with a corresponding carrier in another market. Only when it is considered that a foreign market iscompetitive will regulators normally dispense with the requirement for uniform accounting rates. For example,as shown in Table 3, UK international carriers only have different accounting rates for the US market.
• Proportionate return requirements, that is, operators in competitive markets must receive traffic from
monopoly carriers in the same proportion in which they send traffic to the monopoly carrier.
Uniform accounting rates limit the ability of a competitor in a country to gain an advantage over itsrival/rivals. On the other hand proportionate return provides an incentive for an operator in a competitive market toreduce collection charges in order to increase traffic growth and obtain return traffic from monopoly operators inforeign markets (it is even possible to envisage an operator in a competitive market making a loss on outgoingtraffic, if the margin on the increased incoming traffic exceeds this lost. If accounting rates were cost-based therewould be no incentive to make a loss since the accounting rate would cover the costs of termination and a normalprofit margin.
As long as there is a monopoly in corresponding countries, it would be very difficult to eliminate thesetwo rules. Call-back service operators serve an important function in that they allow competing operators toindirectly compete in monopoly markets, overcoming to some extent the restrictions which the necessary regulatoryrequirements impose on them. Parallel accounting policies can also result in new entrants following pricingpolicies of the market leader, thus reducing competition. Countries such as Australia and New Zealand do not haveparallel accounting rate and proportionate return policies since it has been considered that the threat of monopolistsunfairly playing-off carriers is overstated and is also far less than the benefits of increased competition.
34
Box 3Figure 6. Traffic flow of Refile
Refile traffic
AR2AR1
Normal traffic
AR0
B
C
A
DestinationOriginating country
Terms:
A Originating country
B Terminating country
C Country refiling traffic (“Hub”.)
Refiled trafficTraffic originating in A that is routed through C for termination in B.
Normal trafficInternational traffic which is not re-routed. In the example, the traffic flows directly from A to B.
The net increase of the income related to the accounting rates when traffic is refiled through C;
For the PTO in A - AR0/2-AR1/2 (>0 = income increase)For the PTO in B - AR1/2-AR2/2 (>0 = income increase)For the PTO in C - AR2/2-AR0/2 (<0 = income loss)
This also means that for refile to be viable:AR0 > AR1 > AR2
It should be noted that the incentive for the PTO in C is not only the income obtained directly from accounting ratearbitrage (AR1/2-AR2/2) but also from the profitable proportional return traffic which results from outbound trafficto B generated by refile traffic.
35
SECTION 4: ALTERNATIVE CALLING PROCEDURES:INTERNATIONAL SIMPLE RESALE AND NEW SERVICES
In the previous section, the call-back services which were examined provided service within theframework of the accounting rate and collection charge system. In this section, services which by-pass theinternational telecommunications charging system are examined. These services include internationalsimple resale, which is already being offered in some countries. Other services, such as telephony usingpacket switched networks, including the Internet, would also be included in this group of services.
New services and cost structures
An overview of the different charging and settlement for a number of technologies is shown inTable 9. The services where there is no settlement are to a large extent used mostly by large businesscustomers, but they are becoming increasingly available to the smaller customers given developments intechnology, and regulation.
In general, the pricing structure for telecommunication services other than telephony does notdepend on time and distance, and does not normally incur a settlement between the operators12. Telephonecollection charges have also shown a trend toward being less time and distance related reflecting thedigitalisation of networks. There is, therefore, precedence for using systems other than accounting rates.Despite different charging frameworks many of these other services based on technologies other than thePSTN are profitable.
Table 9. Collection Charges and Settlement for Different Services
Service Technology Collection Charge type SettlementSubscriber
LineTrunk Line
Telephone Switched Line Time/Flat Time/Distance Accounting rate systemPacket Packet Time/Volume Volume Settlement by traffic volumeX. 400 Store-and-Fwd - Volume No settlementLeased line Leased Line Flat Half split (No settlement)Frame Relay FR, ATM Flat Half split (No settlement)Internet Packet / Others PSTN, ISDN,
L. lines, etc.Flat No settlement
1. FR stands for Frame Relay Service.Source: OECD
36
Resale
The current inflexible pricing system and service provision for international telephone service isnot appropriate to bridge the gap between supply and demand for facilities. Facility supply has increasedsignificantly in recent years. Capacity utilisation of submarine fibre-optic cables was less than 20 per centin 1994 (Figure 7). Furthermore, it is projected that this ratio could decrease in the near future withtechnological innovations13. Given the nature of telecommunications there is always spare capacity onhand as a backup and to meet peak time-of-day demand requirements. However, much of this capacity hasbeen put into place either because of projected future demand growth, or as some operators try to attainsome independence from relying on access to PTO infrastructure. Nevertheless, under normalcircumstances one would expect that usage charges (collection and accounting rates) would decline inorder to stimulate demand and increase capacity utilisation.
Figure 7. Utilisation of Submarine Fibre-optic cables
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Opt
ical
fibr
es (
thou
sand
s)
Unused capacity
Used capacity
projection
Source: ITU
International simple resale provides one means to stimulate usage and reduce the gap betweenthe supply of facilities and their usage. As well, this would benefit users and the PTOs. With itsexperience for resale regulation from 1976 the US government has indicated, that “Carriers havediscovered that, far from threatening their existence, resellers represent large volume, important customerswho contribute significant revenue to the carriers14.” In the US, 180 pure resellers (non-facility basedservice providers) of international traffic reported to the FCC in 1994. The total revenue of pure resale inthe US added up to approximately US$ 1 120 million representing 13.6 per cent of the 1994 net revenueof international message telephone services by facility based carries. Also it is reported that BritishTelecom (BT) welcomes ISR15. In the UK, there are around 40 service providers licensed to provideinternational simple resale services.
Facility providers today find that it is more profitable to provide excess capacity to resellers andallow them to find customers and market this capacity rather than marketing this capacity themselves.Resale allows more segmented and flexible marketing including more market oriented prices. It alsoprovides the flexibility that many large customers wish to attain. From the regulatory perspective, resaleis a useful tool to increase efficiency, particularly in the transition to a fully competitive market.
37
Table 10. Arbitrage opportunities provided through International Simple Resale(the example of Norway)
Comparison of the collection charge and leased line cost in $US
From NorwayMonthly halfLL. price onboth sides
Leased lineprice perminute
Local callcharge onboth ends
Total ISRprice perminute
IDDcollectioncharge
Ratio ofISR tariff toIDD tariff
A B=A/ 44640 C D = B+C E D/ETOAustralia (Telstra) 8920 0.20 0.03 0.23 0.71 32.00%Austria 7344 0.16 0.09 0.25 0.49 51.23%Belgium 5164 0.12 0.07 0.18 0.49 36.90%Canada 6215 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.57 29.08%Denmark (Tele D.) 1989 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.28 40.17%Finland (Tele. F.) 1945 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.28 29.61%France 5399 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.49 37.89%Germany 5228 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.49 34.39%Greece 5928 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.57 27.97%Italy 5228 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.49 35.24%Japan (KDD, NTT) 14289 0.32 0.06 0.38 1.05 36.16%Netherlands 4369 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.49 32.37%Norway - - - - - -Portugal 6114 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.57 32.72%Spain 5922 0.13 0.04 0.17 0.57 30.41%Sweden (Telia) 1849 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.28 30.23%Switzerland 5129 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.49 51.56%Turkey 9187 0.21 0.04 0.25 0.71 35.03%UK (BT) 4498 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.49 36.08%US (ATT, Nynex) 7157 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.57 39.74%
Simple Average 5888 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.50 35.73%
1. The leased line charge per minute is calculated assuming that a 64 kbit/s leased line has four voice paths with a 25 per centusage ratio.
2. Leased line charges are calculated by adding half leased line prices of both terminating countries.3. Leased line charges used are the cheapest price available as of September 1994. IDD collection charges are from
January 1995.4. Calculations use 1994 exchange rates.
Source: OECD, ITU, LYNX
Arbitrage and International Simple Resale
The potential arbitrage opportunities which are available from ISR are shown in Table 10. Theassumptions underlying this table were used in earlier tables: it is assumed that a 64 kbit/s digital leasedline has only four voice paths with a 25 per cent usage ratio. This assumption is generous taking intoaccount the bulk discounts for capacity that ISR providers normally obtain from facility providers. Aswell, normally a 2 Mbit/s leased circuit would be used and with multiplexing and a higher usage ratio theratio of ISR prices relative to collection charges would be even less. The table tries to show the price percall minute using leased circuits at both ends of an international relation, compared to the internationaldirect dial price of a call. Even on the basis of assumptions which favour IDD calling, there is a significantdifference in prices per minute for relations between Norway and other countries. Norway has not been
38
singled out for this example, in fact Norway tends to have relatively cheap IDD prices. The pricedifferences shown in the Table would be similar for a large number of OECD countries. The exampleindicates that under competitive conditions where IDD prices would move closer to costs (using as aproxy leased lines price which are well above cost) customers could call for one-third or less of presentprices. The significant margins earned by PTOs exemplify their abuse of a dominant position in theirrespective markets.
ISR impact on accounting rates
The use of international simple resale has only been given approval in a few countries:Australia,, Canada, Sweden, the UK and the US. Further, definitions of what constitutes “equivalence” hasmeant that ISR in the case of the United States can only be applied for Canada, Sweden and the UK; theUK has approved ISR with Canada, Sweden, Australia and the US.
It is difficult to judge the impact of ISR on accounting rates. Table 11 shows the trend in UKaccounting rates from 1991-95 with those countries with which it has ISR agreements. Accounting rates ofUK operators with Australia, Sweden and the US have decreased on average 44.4 per cent from 1991 to1995 while other OECD countries have reduced their accounting rates with the UK by 18.9 per cent. Thismight reflect partially the pressure from the threat of simple resale as well as the actual introduction ofsimple resale at the international level. However, these changes also reflect the fact that these countrieshave competition between established international telecommunication operators. Canada, with nocompetition for intercontinental telecommunication services, nevertheless is subject to competitivepressure both through ISR and the fact that traffic for Canada, or from Canada, can be refiled via the US.
In the case of the United States, FCC data on accounting rates (see Table 4) indicate thataccounting rates with Canada and the US have declined from 0.32 SDR (US $ 0.42) to 0.20 SDR(US $ 0.28) for peak rates representing a 37.5 per cent decrease. These decreases were closely correlatedwith the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s decision on ISR which wastaken in March 199016. In comparison other OECD countries reduced accounting rates on average by 5 percent during 1989-90. In October 1994 the UK government designated the US as an ISR servicedestination. In 1995, the accounting rate between BT and AT&T declined by 24.2 per cent while thosewith the other OECD countries declined by 13.7 per cent.
ISR service provision by-passes the international charging and settlements system, and thereforeplaces significant pressure on accounting rates. Although reciprocity for liberalisation of ISR between twocountries may not be necessary, it is necessary to have some form of safeguards in place to prevent carrierswith monopolies in their markets from using ISR to avoid paying accounting rates for their outgoingtraffic while earning accounting rates for incoming traffic. The impact of ISR is not limited to thosecountries where it is allowed. The ability to refile traffic means that ISR can be used to bypass expensivetransit countries, or to re-route traffic to avoid paying high accounting rates for particular relations. Giventhe competitive nature of the UK or Swedish markets, for example, transatlantic traffic can be routedthrough these countries for termination in Europe. This may explain partly the significant recent decline inaccounting rates between Germany and the US. As an example of price arbitrage opportunities, the US-Spain accounting rate of SDR 1.2 compared to SDR 0.42 between the UK-Spain suggests that ISR wouldallow considerable savings in terminating traffic in Spain if US traffic were routed via the UK.
ISR can also impact on collection charges. KDD (Kokusai Densin Denwa Co.) in Japanannounced a 6.7 per cent rate reduction in November 1995. The peak rate to the US was reduced fromUS$ 1.96 to US$ 1.76 for one minute. However, within 2 months, KDD announced a further reduction
39
from US$ 1.76 to US$ 0.98 by 1998, that is half the price from that of November 1995. This movecoincided with the US government’s decision introduce ISR with the US in 1997 (as well as to regainmarket share from call-back operators)17.
Table 11. Changes in UK IDD Accounting Rate for Relations Allowing ISR(in SDR)
1991 1995 1991- 1995 Change %
Australia (Telstra) 0.7 0.385 -45.00%Canada 0.2Sweden 0.401 0.23 -42.64%United States 0.53 0.30 -43.40%
Countries with ISR 0.54 0.31 -43.68%Other OECD countries 0.54 0.41 -17.84%
1. The accounting rate with the US is that of Mercury.2. Canada is excluded from averages.
Source: OFTEL
Internet Telephony
The ability to provide voice services based on packet switched network technology isincreasingly providing a competitive threat to traditional public switched telecommunication networks.Although the use of this technology for voice is only emerging, there is considerable interest in itspotential. This interest is being fuelled by the fact that time-based usage charges are not traditionally usedfor packet switched networks. The Internet is providing the underlying infrastructure to begin experimentswith providing international voice communications over networks based on packet switched networktechnology. Although initially voice communications tended to be computer to computer communications,developments are now emphasising computer to telephone communications. The advantage of packetswitched networks also includes, as well, the ability to handle integrated voice, data, and video serviceswhich many customers are increasingly requiring for day-to-day business. The fact that there are nointernational usage charges and only the price of local calls is paid is evidently providing an impetus toInternet telephony. Although arguments have been made that existing Internet capacity will not be able tohandle an explosion of voice communication on these networks, it is not evident that the required capacitywill not be forthcoming if the demand for services is there.
The development of Internet telephony (see Information Infrastructure and Pricing: The Internet,OECD/GD(96)73 for a comprehensive overview of pricing on the Internet) threatens the viability of theexisting accounting rate system. The fact that telecommunication operators, and many governments, seemto continue to support high collection charges (and accounting rates) is in fact accelerating thedevelopment of new technologies which help by-pass the existing payments system. Long-term strategyby operators, if they wish to maintain their viability, would argue for lower, more competitive priceswhich would serve as well to slow down the development and diffusion of alternate calling procedures.
Governments, given the increasing liberalisation of data networks and in PSTN markets, willhave difficulty in regulating the entry of many new services which use packet switched networktechnology, including voice communications. First, there is the problem in differentiating one type ofdigital message from another. Second, there is the difficulty in disrupting communications with any one
40
relation in that re-routing of traffic is a simple procedure. Third, there is the policy emphasis that manygovernments have placed on the diffusion of broadband infrastructures to create the informationinfrastructures of the future. To have an economic impact, usage prices on these infrastructures need to below otherwise new services and on-line applications will be slow to develop. Many of these new serviceswill gravitate to packet switched networks because of price advantages.
There are other longer term pressures for change. For example, proposals to develop new globalmobile satellite systems could, once implemented, completely by-pass the existing collection charge andaccounting rate mechanism. Although projected start-up dates are only in a few years (see Table 12) it isunlikely that these services will have high rates of diffusion for another decade so that in the near futurethey will have minimal impact.
Table 12. Global Mobile Satellite Systems
Iridium Globalstar Inmarsat (ICO) OdysseyNumber of Satellites 66 48 12 12Satellites Type LEO LEO LEO LEOStart-up date Sept. 1998 Dec. 1998 Dec. 1999 2nd qtr. of 2000Tariff (Projection) US$3/ minute N/A US$2 /minute US$1/ minute
1. LEO - Low Earth Orbit System, MEO - Medium Earth Orbit System.
Source: OECD, Nikkei Communications
One of the important characteristics of these new services is that they have traditionally used flatrate tariff structures. Although it is not possible to obtain concrete tariff charges at present, it is extremelylikely that the use of flat rate tariffs for global communications would accelerate changes in pricingstructures for international direct dialled services where distance still plays an important part.
41
NOTES
1 A fuller description of these services is discussed in OECD/GD(95)19, Refile and Alternate CallingProcedures, Their impact on accounting rates and collection charges, OECD 1995.
2 Staple, G.C. (1995), Telegeography 1994 -- Global telecommunications Traffic Statistics and Commentary,Washington D.C.
3 These examples are aimed at showing the range in accounting rates and should not be interpreted as acriticism of BT. On the contrary, correspondent operators have often created difficulties for operators incompetitive markets.
4 Communications Week International, 18 December 1995.5 Journal of Commerce, 15 September 1995.6 Communications Week International, Telecom 95 Daily On Line.7 “There is very strong demand from the market for the telephone services of an acceptable quality at a price
that users can afford in those countries where alternative calling procedures are being used. Perhaps themain message is that price is very important indeed, certainly for many it is much more important thanquality.” INTUG presentation at SG3 in ITU. INTUG NEWS.
8 Analysis of replies to the questionnaire on alternative calling procedure, Telecommunication StandardisationBureau (TSB), International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
9 (0.99 US$- 0.77 US$) / 0.77 US$.10 Nikkei Communications 1995.5.15.11 See: OECD, Refile and Alternate Calling Procedures, op.cit.12 Packed switched services and telegram services use a settlement system.13 World Telecommunication Development Report 1995, ITU.14 Presentation of US delegation at Ad-hoc meeting on international telecommunications charging practice,
15 June 1993.15 Financial Times, 3 October, 1995.16 Comments of Cable & Wireless Communications to the FCC in the matter of regulation of International
accounting rates, August 1991.17 Nikkan-Kogyo Shinbun, 27 Dec. 1995.
42
ANNEX
Trend of Average Collection charge and Accounting rate
Ireland
Ireland (to North America)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Ireland (to Asia Pacific)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
1. Tax is included in the collection charges.
Ireland (To all OECD Coutries)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Ireland (to Europe)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
43
France
France (To all OECD Countries)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
France (to Europe)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
France (to North America)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
France (to Asia Pacific)
00.5
11.5
22.5
33.5
4
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
44
New Zealand
NZ (TCNZ) (To all OECD Countries)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
New Zealand (to Europe)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
New Zealand (to North America)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
New Zealand (to Asia Pacific)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
45
Greece
Greece (To all OECD Countries)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Greece (to Europe)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Greece (to North America)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Greece (to Asia Pacific)
0
0.51
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
46
Italy
Italy (To all OECD Countries)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Italy (to Europe)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Italy (to North America)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Italy (to Asia Pacific)
00.5
11.5
22.5
33.5
4
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
47
Japan
Japan (KDD) (To all OECD C ountries)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Japan (to Europe)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Japan (to North America)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US
$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Japan (to Asia Pacific)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
48
Netherlands
Netherlands (To all OECD Countries)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Netherlands (to Europe)
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.8
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Netherlands (to North America)
00.20.40.60.8
11.21.41.6
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
Netherlands (to Asia Pacific)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
49
UK
UK(BT) (To all OECD Countries)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
UK (to Europe)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
UK (to North America)
0
0.2
0.40.6
0.81
1.2
1.4
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
UK (to Asia Pacific)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
50
USA
US (AT&T) (To all OECD Countries)
00.20.40.60.8
11.21.41.6
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
US (to Europe)
0
0.2
0.4
0.60.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
US (to North America)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
US (to Asia Pacific)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1991 1993 1994
US$
Collectioncharge
Accountingrate
51
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rge
Per
Min
utes
(19
88-1
993)
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Pea
k R
ate)
- J
an. 1
988
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Net
h.N
. Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U. K
.U
. S.
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.47
1.47
1.26
1.47
1.26
1.47
N/A
1.26
0.98
1.26
1.47
1.47
1.26
1.26
1.47
1.26
1.26
1.31
Aus
.4.
22-
0.69
1.42
0.69
1.05
0.69
0.69
1.05
1.05
1.05
0.69
4.22
0.69
N/A
0.69
4.22
1.05
1.05
1.05
0.69
1.05
1.05
1.05
1.42
1.37
Bel
.3.
350.
89-
1.91
0.89
0.89
0.57
0.64
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
3.35
0.40
N/A
0.40
3.35
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.57
0.89
0.57
1.91
1.21
Can
.1.
150.
781.
46-
1.27
1.27
1.15
1.46
1.54
1.15
1.27
1.70
2.02
1.27
N/A
1.27
1.27
1.27
1.70
1.70
1.27
1.46
1.70
1.15
0.40
1.33
Den
.1.
250.
400.
341.
25-
0.24
0.40
0.34
0.40
0.58
0.40
0.40
1.92
0.34
N/A
0.34
1.92
0.24
0.40
0.40
0.24
0.40
0.58
0.40
1.25
0.63
Fin
.2.
340.
930.
932.
340.
42-
0.93
0.93
1.26
0.49
0.93
1.26
3.88
0.93
N/A
0.93
2.34
0.42
1.26
1.26
0.42
0.93
1.26
0.93
2.34
1.29
Fra
.2.
680.
920.
631.
310.
630.
92-
0.63
0.63
0.92
0.63
0.63
2.68
0.63
N/A
0.63
3.07
0.92
0.63
0.63
0.92
0.63
0.92
0.63
1.31
1.05
Ger
.2.
040.
640.
642.
040.
640.
720.
64-
0.64
0.72
0.64
0.64
2.04
0.64
N/A
0.64
2.04
0.72
0.64
0.64
0.72
0.64
0.72
0.64
2.04
0.96
Gre
.3.
680.
921.
012.
921.
111.
381.
011.
01-
1.84
1.38
0.78
4.14
1.01
N/A
1.01
3.68
1.38
1.38
1.11
1.38
0.92
0.78
1.11
2.92
1.65
Ice.
2.92
1.71
1.71
2.33
1.29
1.42
1.71
1.71
1.91
-1.
711.
914.
891.
71N
/A1.
423.
961.
291.
711.
711.
291.
711.
911.
472.
662.
00Ir
e.3.
671.
321.
132.
211.
131.
131.
131.
131.
131.
32-
1.13
3.67
1.13
N/A
1.13
3.67
1.32
1.32
1.13
1.32
1.32
1.13
0.89
2.21
1.60
Ita.
3.64
0.94
1.08
2.82
1.08
1.24
0.94
0.94
0.94
1.24
1.24
-3.
640.
94N
/A1.
083.
641.
241.
241.
081.
240.
940.
941.
082.
821.
56Ja
p.3.
303.
943.
943.
303.
943.
943.
943.
943.
943.
943.
943.
94-
3.94
N/A
3.94
3.30
3.94
3.94
3.94
3.94
3.94
3.94
3.37
2.78
3.78
Lux.
3.35
0.50
0.33
3.35
0.50
0.89
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.89
0.50
0.50
3.35
-N
/A0.
333.
350.
720.
890.
890.
720.
500.
500.
502.
361.
15M
ex.
5.29
4.15
4.15
1.47
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
5.29
4.15
N/A
4.15
5.29
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
0.59
4.21
Net
h.3.
310.
720.
541.
950.
540.
890.
540.
540.
890.
890.
720.
723.
310.
54N
/A-
3.31
0.72
0.89
0.89
0.72
0.54
0.89
0.54
1.95
1.15
N. Z
.0.
911.
771.
771.
771.
771.
771.
771.
771.
771.
771.
771.
771.
771.
77N
/A1.
77-
1.77
1.77
1.77
1.77
1.77
1.77
1.77
1.77
1.73
Nor
.1.
930.
590.
591.
440.
310.
310.
590.
590.
590.
590.
590.
592.
580.
59N
/A0.
592.
58-
0.59
0.59
0.31
0.59
0.59
0.59
1.44
0.86
Por
.2.
801.
061.
062.
371.
061.
311.
061.
061.
241.
311.
061.
063.
841.
06N
/A1.
063.
841.
24-
0.82
1.24
1.06
1.19
1.06
2.37
1.53
Spa
.3.
941.
171.
171.
351.
171.
171.
011.
171.
171.
171.
171.
173.
941.
17N
/A1.
173.
941.
170.
89-
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.17
3.14
1.60
Sw
e.N
/A0.
840.
701.
540.
350.
350.
840.
701.
091.
090.
840.
84N
/A0.
84N
/A0.
70N
/A0.
351.
091.
09-
0.84
1.29
0.84
1.54
0.89
Sw
it.3.
760.
800.
802.
150.
990.
990.
800.
800.
800.
990.
990.
803.
760.
80N
/A0.
803.
760.
990.
990.
990.
99-
0.99
0.99
2.15
1.39
Tur
.5.
022.
572.
575.
022.
572.
572.
572.
572.
572.
572.
572.
575.
022.
57N
/A2.
575.
022.
572.
572.
572.
572.
57-
2.57
5.02
3.10
U. K
.1.
410.
780.
601.
090.
600.
780.
600.
600.
781.
090.
540.
682.
010.
60N
/A0.
601.
410.
780.
680.
600.
780.
600.
99-
1.09
0.86
U. S
.1.
921.
301.
300.
731.
301.
461.
301.
301.
461.
501.
331.
301.
921.
46N
/A1.
302.
061.
301.
501.
301.
301.
301.
501.
33-
1.41
Fro
m/T
oA
ul.
Aus
.B
el.
Can
.D
en.
Fin
.F
ra.
Ger
.G
re.
Ice.
Ire.
Ita.
Jap.
Lux.
Mex
.N
eth.
N. Z
.N
or.
Por
.S
pa.
Sw
e.S
wit.
Tur
.U
. K.
U. S
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m o
pp
osi
te d
ire
ctio
n.
So
urc
e: O
EC
D
52
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Che
apes
t Dis
coun
t Rat
e) -
Jan
. 198
8
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.25
1.25
0.98
1.11
1.11
1.11
1.18
1.39
1.95
0.95
1.02
1.26
1.39
N/A
1.11
0.76
1.11
1.39
1.46
1.11
1.25
1.39
0.95
0.95
Aul
.1.
19A
us1.
42-
0.63
1.00
0.63
1.00
0.63
0.63
0.63
1.00
1.00
0.63
1.42
0.63
N/A
0.63
1.42
0.63
1.00
0.63
0.63
0.63
1.00
0.63
1.00
Aus
0.85
Bel
.1.
340.
54-
0.80
0.54
0.67
0.45
0.45
0.57
0.89
0.54
0.54
1.34
0.40
N/A
0.45
1.34
0.67
0.57
0.57
0.67
0.54
0.80
0.45
0.80
Bel
.0.
69C
an.
1.19
1.28
1.47
-1.
111.
110.
971.
271.
881.
311.
111.
531.
621.
51N
/A0.
871.
191.
111.
702.
150.
870.
872.
230.
790.
40C
an.
1.28
Den
.1.
170.
530.
470.
82-
0.35
0.47
0.41
0.58
0.58
0.53
0.53
1.17
0.47
N/A
0.47
1.87
0.35
0.58
0.58
0.35
0.47
0.70
0.41
0.82
Den
.0.
64F
in.
1.34
0.87
0.83
1.29
0.42
-0.
830.
830.
870.
870.
870.
832.
260.
87N
/A0.
832.
260.
420.
870.
830.
410.
830.
870.
831.
29F
in.
0.97
Fra
.1.
620.
610.
510.
820.
610.
61-
0.51
0.61
0.79
0.61
0.51
1.62
0.51
N/A
0.51
1.62
0.61
0.61
0.51
0.61
0.51
0.87
0.51
0.82
Fra
.0.
75G
er.
1.74
0.64
0.64
1.10
0.64
0.72
0.64
-0.
640.
720.
640.
641.
740.
64N
/A0.
641.
740.
720.
640.
640.
720.
640.
720.
641.
10G
er.
0.84
Gre
.2.
180.
831.
002.
181.
001.
001.
001.
00-
1.81
1.00
0.83
3.69
1.00
N/A
1.00
3.69
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.83
0.83
1.00
2.18
Gre
.1.
39Ic
e.3.
102.
222.
222.
531.
501.
581.
761.
502.
53-
2.22
2.53
5.20
2.22
N/A
1.58
4.16
1.50
2.22
1.76
1.50
2.22
2.04
1.76
2.22
Ice.
2.27
Ire.
1.35
0.71
0.53
1.03
0.71
0.71
0.53
0.53
0.71
0.71
-0.
711.
780.
53N
/A0.
531.
350.
710.
710.
710.
710.
711.
010.
451.
03Ir
e.0.
80Ita
.2.
350.
960.
961.
640.
960.
960.
960.
960.
961.
280.
96-
2.35
0.96
N/A
0.96
2.35
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
1.28
0.96
1.64
Ita.
1.23
Jap.
2.49
2.83
2.83
2.42
2.83
2.83
2.70
2.70
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.83
-2.
83N
/A2.
832.
492.
832.
832.
832.
832.
832.
832.
702.
07Ja
p.2.
74Lu
x.1.
490.
540.
450.
990.
540.
730.
540.
540.
611.
340.
610.
541.
49-
N/A
0.45
2.29
0.73
0.61
0.61
0.73
0.54
1.34
0.54
0.99
Lux.
0.84
Mex
.5.
294.
154.
151.
474.
154.
154.
154.
154.
154.
154.
154.
155.
294.
15-
4.15
5.29
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.15
0.59
Mex
.4.
21N
eth.
1.73
0.72
0.47
0.84
0.54
0.89
0.47
0.47
0.72
0.89
0.72
0.72
1.73
0.47
N/A
-1.
730.
720.
720.
720.
440.
440.
890.
540.
84N
eth.
0.80
N. Z
.0.
701.
501.
501.
271.
501.
501.
501.
501.
661.
661.
501.
501.
391.
66N
/A1.
50-
1.50
1.66
1.66
1.50
1.50
1.66
1.27
1.27
N. Z
.1.
48N
or.
0.76
0.53
0.53
0.62
0.30
0.30
0.53
0.53
0.62
0.53
0.53
0.53
1.13
0.53
N/A
0.53
1.13
-0.
620.
620.
300.
530.
760.
530.
62N
or.
0.59
Por
.1.
620.
960.
961.
630.
961.
190.
960.
960.
961.
190.
960.
962.
270.
96N
/A0.
963.
021.
19-
0.96
1.19
0.96
1.19
0.96
1.51
Por
.1.
24S
pa.
3.16
0.77
0.77
1.35
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.77
2.64
0.77
N/A
0.77
3.16
0.77
0.77
-0.
770.
771.
060.
771.
35S
pa.
1.12
Sw
e.1.
670.
780.
650.
980.
320.
320.
780.
650.
780.
650.
650.
782.
180.
78N
/A0.
651.
670.
320.
780.
78-
0.78
1.00
0.58
0.98
Sw
e.0.
85S
wit.
1.29
0.71
0.71
0.86
0.71
0.71
0.64
0.71
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.64
1.72
0.71
N/A
0.57
2.29
0.71
1.00
1.00
0.71
-1.
000.
570.
86S
wit.
0.92
Tur
.5.
022.
572.
575.
022.
572.
572.
572.
572.
572.
572.
572.
575.
022.
57N
/A2.
575.
022.
572.
572.
572.
572.
57-
2.57
5.02
Tur
.3.
10U
. K.
0.95
0.64
0.49
0.70
0.49
0.62
0.49
0.49
0.49
0.94
0.41
0.49
1.42
0.49
N/A
0.49
0.95
0.64
0.49
0.49
0.64
0.49
0.49
-0.
70U
. K.
0.63
U. S
.1.
751.
531.
720.
551.
521.
571.
351.
272.
081.
751.
461.
581.
801.
53N
/A1.
331.
881.
381.
671.
661.
311.
562.
081.
15-
U. S
.1.
54
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
53
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Pea
k R
ate)
- J
an. 1
989
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Net
h.N
. Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U. K
.U
. S.
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.41
1.41
1.41
1.41
1.41
1.41
1.41
1.64
1.41
1.41
1.64
1.41
1.64
N/A
1.41
1.09
1.41
1.64
1.64
1.41
1.64
1.64
1.41
1.41
1.46
Aus
.4.
32-
0.70
1.46
0.70
1.08
0.70
0.70
1.08
1.08
1.08
0.70
4.32
0.70
N/A
0.70
4.32
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
0.70
1.08
1.08
1.46
1.40
Bel
.4.
530.
91-
3.26
0.91
0.91
0.58
0.63
0.91
0.91
0.91
0.91
4.53
0.41
N/A
0.41
4.53
0.91
0.91
0.91
0.91
0.58
0.91
0.58
3.26
1.49
Can
.1.
241.
661.
57-
1.36
1.36
1.24
1.57
1.66
1.24
1.36
1.83
2.18
1.36
N/A
1.36
1.36
1.36
1.83
1.83
1.36
1.57
1.83
1.24
0.46
1.47
Den
.1.
430.
440.
371.
43-
0.27
0.44
0.37
0.44
0.27
0.44
0.44
2.38
0.37
N/A
0.37
1.43
0.27
0.44
0.44
0.27
0.44
0.44
0.44
1.43
0.65
Fin
.2.
391.
131.
132.
390.
52-
1.13
1.13
1.54
0.52
1.13
1.54
4.23
1.13
N/A
1.13
2.39
0.52
1.54
1.54
0.52
1.13
1.54
1.13
2.39
1.46
Fra
.2.
600.
890.
611.
270.
610.
89-
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
2.60
0.89
N/A
0.89
2.60
0.89
0.61
0.61
0.89
0.61
0.89
0.61
1.27
1.08
Ger
.2.
090.
650.
652.
090.
650.
730.
65-
0.65
0.73
0.65
0.65
2.09
0.65
N/A
0.65
2.09
0.73
0.65
0.65
0.73
0.65
0.65
0.65
2.09
0.98
Gre
.3.
400.
760.
832.
390.
911.
130.
830.
83-
1.13
1.13
0.64
3.40
0.83
N/A
0.83
3.40
1.13
1.13
0.91
1.13
0.76
0.91
0.91
2.39
1.38
Ice.
2.63
1.53
1.53
2.09
1.16
1.28
1.53
1.53
1.72
-1.
531.
724.
391.
53N
/A1.
283.
561.
161.
531.
531.
161.
531.
721.
322.
391.
80Ir
e.3.
761.
351.
162.
271.
161.
351.
161.
161.
161.
35-
1.16
3.76
1.16
N/A
1.16
3.76
1.35
1.16
1.16
1.35
1.35
1.16
0.91
2.27
1.63
Ita.
3.63
0.94
1.07
2.81
1.07
1.23
0.94
0.94
0.94
1.23
1.23
-3.
630.
94N
/A1.
073.
631.
231.
231.
071.
230.
940.
941.
072.
811.
56Ja
p.2.
813.
773.
513.
383.
773.
773.
513.
513.
773.
773.
773.
51-
3.77
N/A
3.51
3.38
3.77
3.77
3.77
3.77
3.51
3.77
3.51
2.31
3.55
Lux.
3.40
0.51
0.34
3.40
0.51
0.91
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.91
0.51
0.51
3.40
-N
/A0.
343.
400.
740.
910.
910.
740.
510.
510.
512.
401.
17M
ex.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Net
h.3.
390.
730.
562.
000.
560.
910.
560.
560.
910.
910.
730.
733.
390.
56N
/A-
3.39
0.73
0.91
0.91
0.73
0.56
0.91
0.56
2.00
1.18
N. Z
.1.
011.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
96N
/A1.
96-
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.92
Nor
.2.
400.
740.
741.
780.
380.
380.
740.
740.
740.
380.
740.
743.
200.
74N
/A0.
742.
40-
0.74
0.74
0.38
0.74
0.74
0.74
1.78
1.02
Por
.2.
631.
041.
042.
631.
041.
281.
041.
041.
211.
281.
041.
043.
621.
04N
/A1.
042.
631.
21-
0.80
1.21
1.04
1.21
1.04
2.63
1.47
Spa
.4.
171.
241.
241.
431.
241.
241.
071.
241.
241.
241.
241.
244.
171.
24N
/A1.
244.
171.
240.
95-
1.24
1.24
1.24
1.24
3.33
1.70
Sw
e.3.
180.
870.
731.
220.
370.
370.
870.
731.
130.
370.
870.
873.
180.
87N
/A0.
733.
180.
371.
131.
13-
0.87
1.13
0.87
1.22
1.14
Sw
it.3.
830.
820.
822.
191.
001.
000.
820.
821.
001.
001.
000.
823.
830.
82N
/A0.
823.
831.
001.
001.
001.
00-
1.00
1.00
2.19
1.42
Tur
.3.
031.
551.
553.
031.
551.
551.
551.
551.
551.
551.
551.
553.
031.
55N
/A1.
553.
031.
551.
551.
551.
551.
55-
1.55
3.03
1.87
U. K
.1.
550.
850.
651.
190.
650.
850.
650.
650.
650.
850.
590.
752.
190.
65N
/A0.
651.
550.
850.
750.
750.
850.
650.
65-
1.19
0.90
U. S
.2.
111.
121.
120.
501.
121.
121.
121.
121.
121.
121.
031.
122.
111.
12N
/A1.
122.
111.
121.
121.
121.
121.
121.
121.
03-
1.21
Fro
m/T
oA
ul.
Aus
.B
el.
Can
.D
en.
Fin
.F
ra.
Ger
.G
re.
Ice.
Ire.
Ita.
Jap.
Lux.
Mex
.N
eth.
N. Z
.N
or.
Por
.S
pa.
Sw
e.S
wit.
Tur
.U
. K.
U. S
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
54
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Che
apes
t Dis
coun
t Rat
e) -
Jan
. 198
9
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.41
1.41
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.41
1.17
1.64
1.17
1.41
1.64
1.41
1.64
N/A
1.41
0.94
1.17
1.64
1.64
1.17
1.64
1.64
1.17
1.17
Aul
.1.
36A
us.
4.32
-0.
701.
460.
701.
080.
700.
701.
081.
081.
080.
704.
320.
70N
/A0.
704.
321.
081.
081.
081.
080.
701.
081.
081.
46A
us1.
40B
el.
4.53
0.91
-2.
470.
910.
910.
580.
630.
910.
910.
910.
914.
530.
41N
/A0.
414.
530.
910.
910.
910.
910.
580.
910.
582.
47B
el.
1.42
Can
.0.
871.
171.
10-
0.96
0.96
0.87
1.10
1.17
0.87
0.96
1.17
1.53
0.96
N/A
0.96
0.96
0.96
1.28
1.28
0.96
1.10
1.28
0.87
0.19
Can
.1.
02D
en.
1.43
0.44
0.37
1.43
-0.
270.
440.
370.
440.
270.
440.
442.
380.
37N
/A0.
371.
430.
270.
440.
440.
270.
440.
440.
441.
43D
en.
0.65
Fin
.2.
391.
131.
131.
910.
39-
1.13
1.13
1.54
0.39
1.13
1.54
4.23
1.13
N/A
1.13
2.39
0.39
1.54
1.54
0.39
1.13
1.54
1.13
1.91
Fin
.1.
40F
ra.
2.60
0.62
0.41
0.78
0.41
0.62
-0.
620.
620.
620.
620.
622.
600.
62N
/A0.
622.
600.
620.
410.
410.
620.
410.
620.
410.
78F
ra.
0.83
Ger
.2.
090.
490.
492.
090.
490.
730.
49-
0.49
0.73
0.49
0.49
2.09
0.49
N/A
0.49
2.09
0.73
0.49
0.49
0.73
0.49
0.49
0.49
2.09
Ger
.0.
88G
re.
3.40
0.76
0.83
2.39
0.91
1.13
0.83
0.83
-1.
131.
130.
643.
400.
83N
/A0.
833.
401.
131.
130.
911.
130.
760.
910.
912.
39G
re.
1.38
Ice.
2.63
1.53
1.53
2.09
1.16
1.28
1.53
1.53
1.72
-1.
531.
724.
391.
53N
/A1.
283.
561.
161.
531.
531.
161.
531.
721.
322.
39Ic
e.1.
80Ir
e.3.
761.
351.
161.
701.
161.
351.
161.
161.
161.
35-
1.16
3.76
1.16
N/A
1.16
3.76
1.35
1.16
1.16
1.35
1.35
1.16
0.61
1.70
Ire.
1.57
Ita.
2.74
0.75
0.86
2.08
0.86
0.98
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.98
0.98
-2.
740.
75N
/A0.
862.
740.
980.
980.
860.
980.
750.
750.
862.
08Ita
.1.
21Ja
p.1.
692.
262.
112.
032.
262.
262.
112.
112.
262.
262.
262.
11-
2.11
N/A
2.11
2.03
2.26
2.26
2.26
2.26
2.11
2.26
2.11
1.38
Jap.
2.12
Lux.
3.40
0.51
0.28
3.40
0.40
0.91
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.91
3.39
0.40
3.40
-N
/A0.
283.
400.
740.
910.
910.
740.
510.
400.
401.
54Lu
x.1.
22M
ex.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
-N
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AM
ex.
N/A
Net
h.3.
390.
730.
562.
000.
560.
910.
560.
560.
910.
910.
730.
733.
390.
56N
/A-
3.39
0.73
0.91
0.91
0.73
0.56
0.91
0.56
2.00
Net
h.1.
18N
. Z.
1.01
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
1.96
N/A
1.96
-1.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
961.
96N
. Z.
1.92
Nor
.2.
400.
740.
741.
320.
380.
380.
740.
740.
740.
380.
740.
743.
200.
74N
/A0.
742.
40-
0.74
0.74
0.38
0.74
0.74
0.74
1.32
Nor
.0.
98P
or.
2.63
1.04
1.04
2.06
1.04
1.28
1.04
1.04
1.21
1.28
1.04
1.04
3.62
1.04
N/A
1.04
2.63
1.21
-0.
801.
211.
041.
211.
042.
06P
or.
1.42
Spa
.4.
170.
770.
772.
210.
770.
770.
650.
770.
770.
770.
770.
774.
170.
77N
/A0.
774.
170.
770.
77-
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.77
2.21
Spa
.1.
34S
we.
3.18
0.87
0.73
1.22
0.37
0.37
0.87
0.73
1.13
0.37
0.87
0.87
3.18
0.87
N/A
0.73
3.18
0.37
1.13
1.13
-0.
871.
130.
871.
22S
we.
1.14
Sw
it.3.
830.
680.
681.
640.
820.
820.
680.
680.
820.
820.
820.
683.
830.
68N
/A0.
683.
830.
820.
820.
820.
82-
0.82
0.82
1.64
Sw
it.1.
24T
ur.
2.40
1.20
1.20
2.40
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.20
2.40
1.20
N/A
1.20
2.40
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.20
-1.
202.
40T
ur.
1.46
U. K
.1.
240.
700.
520.
910.
520.
700.
520.
520.
520.
700.
390.
612.
190.
52N
/A0.
521.
240.
700.
610.
610.
700.
520.
52-
0.91
U. K
.0.
73U
. S.
1.26
0.67
0.67
0.30
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.62
0.67
1.26
0.67
N/A
0.67
1.26
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.62
-U
. S.
0.73
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
55
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Pea
k R
ate)
-
Jan.
199
0
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Net
h.N
. Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U. K
.U
. S.
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.34
1.34
1.34
1.34
1.34
1.34
1.34
1.66
1.34
1.34
1.34
1.66
1.66
N/A
1.34
1.03
1.34
1.66
1.66
1.34
1.66
1.66
1.34
1.34
1.43
Aus
.2.
12-
0.66
1.36
0.66
1.01
0.66
0.66
1.01
1.01
1.01
0.66
2.12
0.66
N/A
0.66
2.12
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.01
0.66
1.01
1.01
1.36
1.06
Bel
.3.
170.
85-
1.81
0.85
0.85
0.54
0.59
0.85
0.85
0.54
0.85
3.17
0.38
N/A
0.38
3.17
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.54
0.85
0.54
1.81
1.13
Can
.1.
191.
471.
47-
1.30
1.30
1.19
1.47
1.56
1.56
1.30
1.67
1.57
1.30
N/A
1.30
1.19
1.30
1.77
1.77
1.30
1.39
1.77
1.19
0.48
1.38
Den
.1.
420.
460.
381.
42-
0.27
0.46
0.38
0.46
0.27
0.46
0.46
2.19
0.38
N/A
0.38
1.42
0.27
0.46
0.46
0.27
0.46
0.46
0.46
1.42
0.66
Fin
.1.
580.
930.
931.
580.
47-
0.93
0.93
1.10
0.47
0.93
1.33
3.26
0.93
N/A
0.93
1.58
0.47
1.10
1.10
0.47
0.93
1.10
0.93
1.58
1.11
Fra
.2.
520.
860.
591.
230.
590.
86-
0.59
0.59
0.86
0.59
0.59
2.52
0.59
N/A
0.59
2.52
0.86
0.59
0.59
0.86
0.59
0.59
0.59
1.23
0.96
Ger
.1.
660.
610.
611.
660.
610.
690.
61-
0.61
0.69
0.61
0.61
1.95
0.61
N/A
0.61
1.66
0.69
0.61
0.61
0.69
0.61
0.61
0.61
1.66
0.87
Gre
.3.
000.
640.
832.
380.
831.
010.
830.
83-
1.50
1.01
0.64
3.00
0.83
N/A
0.83
3.00
1.01
1.01
0.83
1.01
0.64
0.64
0.83
2.38
1.28
Ice.
1.98
1.16
1.16
1.58
0.88
0.96
1.16
1.16
1.30
-1.
161.
303.
311.
16N
/A0.
962.
680.
881.
161.
160.
881.
161.
301.
001.
811.
36Ir
e.3.
501.
260.
862.
110.
861.
260.
860.
860.
861.
26-
0.86
3.50
0.86
N/A
0.86
3.50
1.26
0.86
0.86
1.26
0.86
0.86
0.68
2.11
1.39
Ita.
3.58
0.89
1.02
2.64
1.02
1.17
0.89
0.89
0.89
1.17
1.17
-3.
700.
89N
/A1.
023.
701.
171.
171.
021.
170.
891.
171.
022.
641.
52Ja
p.2.
503.
443.
173.
083.
443.
443.
173.
173.
443.
443.
443.
17-
3.17
N/A
3.17
3.08
3.44
3.44
3.44
3.44
3.17
3.44
3.17
2.01
3.21
Lux.
3.17
0.53
0.38
1.90
0.53
0.89
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.89
0.53
0.53
3.17
-N
/A0.
383.
170.
690.
890.
530.
690.
530.
890.
531.
901.
06M
ex.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Net
h.2.
760.
680.
521.
230.
520.
850.
520.
520.
850.
850.
680.
682.
760.
52N
/A-
2.76
0.68
0.85
0.85
0.68
0.52
0.85
0.52
1.23
0.99
N. Z
.0.
841.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
65N
/A1.
65-
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.61
Nor
.2.
260.
700.
701.
410.
360.
360.
700.
700.
700.
700.
700.
702.
260.
70N
/A0.
702.
26-
0.70
0.70
0.36
0.70
0.70
0.70
1.41
0.92
Por
.2.
120.
860.
861.
830.
860.
980.
860.
860.
860.
980.
860.
862.
500.
86N
/A0.
862.
120.
98-
0.74
0.98
0.86
0.98
0.86
1.83
1.15
Spa
.3.
731.
100.
923.
070.
921.
100.
920.
920.
921.
100.
920.
923.
730.
92N
/A0.
923.
731.
100.
92-
1.10
1.10
0.92
0.92
3.07
1.52
Sw
e.2.
380.
770.
641.
070.
350.
350.
770.
640.
980.
980.
770.
772.
380.
77N
/A0.
642.
380.
350.
980.
98-
0.77
0.98
0.77
1.07
0.98
Sw
it.1.
960.
690.
691.
220.
860.
860.
690.
690.
861.
220.
860.
691.
960.
69N
/A0.
691.
960.
860.
860.
860.
86-
0.86
0.86
1.22
1.00
Tur
.3.
211.
611.
613.
211.
611.
611.
611.
611.
091.
611.
611.
613.
211.
61N
/A1.
613.
211.
611.
611.
611.
611.
61-
1.61
3.21
1.93
U. K
.1.
440.
790.
651.
150.
650.
790.
650.
650.
790.
790.
540.
702.
020.
65N
/A0.
651.
440.
790.
700.
700.
790.
650.
79-
1.15
0.87
U. S
.1.
921.
301.
300.
501.
301.
301.
301.
301.
301.
301.
161.
301.
921.
30N
/A1.
301.
921.
301.
501.
301.
301.
301.
301.
16-
1.34
Fro
m/T
oA
ul.
Aus
.B
el.
Can
.D
en.
Fin
.F
ra.
Ger
.G
re.
Ice.
Ire.
Ita.
Jap.
Lux.
Mex
.N
eth.
N. Z
.N
or.
Por
.S
pa.
Sw
e.S
wit.
Tur
.U
. K.
U. S
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
56
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Che
apes
t Dis
coun
t Rat
e) -
Jan
. 199
0
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.34
0.94
0.94
0.94
0.94
0.94
0.94
1.66
1.34
0.94
0.94
1.66
1.66
N/A
0.94
0.71
0.94
1.66
1.66
0.94
1.66
1.66
0.94
0.94
Aul
.1.
18A
us.
2.12
-0.
501.
360.
500.
660.
500.
500.
660.
660.
660.
502.
120.
50N
/A0.
502.
120.
660.
910.
660.
660.
500.
660.
661.
36A
us0.
87B
el.
3.17
0.85
-1.
810.
850.
850.
540.
590.
850.
850.
540.
853.
170.
38N
/A0.
383.
170.
850.
850.
850.
850.
540.
850.
541.
81B
el.
1.13
Can
.0.
841.
041.
04-
0.91
0.91
0.84
1.04
1.10
1.10
0.91
1.17
1.10
0.91
N/A
0.91
0.84
0.91
1.24
1.24
0.91
0.97
1.24
0.84
0.19
Can
.0.
96D
en.
1.42
0.46
0.38
1.42
-0.
270.
460.
380.
460.
270.
460.
462.
190.
38N
/A0.
381.
420.
270.
460.
460.
270.
460.
460.
461.
42D
en.
0.66
Fin
.1.
580.
700.
701.
190.
35-
0.70
0.70
1.10
0.70
1.10
0.70
3.26
0.70
N/A
0.70
1.58
0.35
1.10
1.10
0.35
0.70
1.10
0.70
1.19
Fin
.0.
97F
ra.
1.70
0.58
0.39
0.93
0.39
0.58
-0.
390.
390.
580.
390.
391.
700.
39N
/A0.
391.
700.
580.
390.
390.
580.
390.
390.
390.
93F
ra.
0.65
Ger
.1.
660.
460.
461.
660.
460.
690.
46-
0.46
0.69
0.46
0.46
1.95
0.46
N/A
0.46
1.66
0.69
0.46
0.46
0.69
0.46
0.46
0.46
1.66
Ger
.0.
77G
re.
3.00
0.64
0.83
2.38
0.83
1.01
0.83
0.83
-1.
501.
010.
643.
000.
83N
/A0.
833.
001.
011.
010.
831.
010.
640.
640.
832.
38G
re.
1.28
Ice.
1.98
1.16
1.16
1.58
0.88
0.96
1.16
1.16
1.30
-1.
161.
303.
311.
16N
/A0.
962.
680.
881.
161.
160.
881.
161.
301.
001.
81Ic
e.1.
36Ir
e.3.
501.
260.
651.
190.
651.
260.
650.
650.
651.
26-
0.65
3.50
0.65
N/A
0.65
3.50
1.26
0.65
0.65
1.26
0.65
0.65
0.34
1.19
Ire.
1.19
Ita.
3.00
0.71
0.82
2.14
0.82
0.93
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.93
0.93
-3.
700.
71N
/A0.
823.
700.
930.
930.
820.
930.
710.
930.
822.
14Ita
.1.
29Ja
p.1.
502.
071.
901.
852.
072.
071.
901.
902.
072.
072.
071.
90-
1.90
N/A
1.90
1.50
2.07
2.07
2.07
2.07
1.90
2.07
1.90
1.20
Jap.
1.91
Lux.
3.17
0.53
0.33
1.27
0.43
0.89
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.89
0.43
0.43
3.17
-N
/A0.
333.
170.
690.
430.
430.
690.
530.
890.
431.
27Lu
x.0.
94M
ex.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
-N
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AM
ex.
N/A
Net
h.2.
760.
680.
521.
080.
520.
850.
520.
520.
850.
850.
680.
682.
760.
52N
/A-
2.76
0.68
0.85
0.85
0.68
0.52
0.85
0.52
1.08
Net
h.0.
98N
. Z.
0.54
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
1.65
N/A
1.65
-1.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
651.
65N
. Z.
1.60
Nor
.2.
260.
700.
701.
170.
290.
290.
700.
700.
700.
700.
700.
702.
260.
70N
/A0.
702.
26-
0.70
0.70
0.29
0.70
0.70
0.70
1.17
Nor
.0.
89P
or.
1.96
0.86
0.86
1.72
0.86
0.98
0.86
0.86
0.86
0.98
0.86
0.86
2.50
0.86
N/A
0.86
1.96
0.98
-0.
740.
980.
860.
980.
861.
72P
or.
1.12
Spa
.2.
610.
730.
632.
090.
630.
730.
630.
630.
630.
730.
630.
632.
610.
63N
/A0.
632.
610.
730.
63-
0.73
0.73
0.92
0.63
2.09
Spa
.1.
05S
we.
2.38
0.77
0.64
0.83
0.25
0.25
0.77
0.64
0.98
0.98
0.77
0.77
2.38
0.77
N/A
0.64
2.38
0.25
0.98
0.98
-0.
770.
980.
770.
83S
we.
0.95
Sw
it.1.
960.
490.
490.
980.
610.
610.
490.
490.
610.
980.
610.
491.
960.
49N
/A0.
491.
960.
610.
610.
610.
61-
0.61
0.61
0.98
Sw
it.0.
80T
ur.
2.19
1.09
1.09
2.19
1.09
1.09
1.09
1.09
0.71
1.09
1.09
1.09
2.19
1.09
N/A
1.09
2.19
1.09
1.09
1.09
1.09
1.09
-1.
092.
19T
ur.
1.31
U. K
.1.
150.
650.
500.
870.
500.
650.
500.
500.
650.
650.
360.
572.
020.
50N
/A0.
501.
150.
650.
570.
570.
650.
500.
65-
0.87
U. K
.0.
70U
. S.
1.15
0.78
0.78
0.25
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.70
0.78
1.15
0.78
N/A
0.78
1.15
0.78
0.90
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.69
-U
. S.
0.80
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
57
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Pea
k R
ate)
- J
an. 1
991
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.1.
401.
401.
161.
241.
241.
241.
401.
552.
181.
161.
241.
551.
55N
/A1.
401.
011.
241.
551.
711.
241.
401.
551.
161.
161.
38A
us.
2.46
-0.
761.
580.
761.
170.
760.
761.
171.
171.
170.
762.
460.
76N
/A0.
762.
461.
171.
171.
171.
170.
761.
171.
171.
581.
23B
el.
3.32
1.00
-1.
200.
901.
000.
640.
640.
901.
000.
640.
902.
240.
45N
/A0.
533.
321.
000.
900.
901.
000.
641.
000.
641.
201.
13C
an.
1.17
1.50
1.50
-1.
271.
271.
171.
501.
591.
591.
321.
591.
591.
32N
/A1.
271.
171.
271.
791.
681.
171.
321.
791.
170.
451.
37D
en.
1.68
0.54
0.45
1.29
-0.
390.
540.
450.
540.
780.
540.
542.
070.
45N
/A0.
452.
590.
390.
540.
540.
390.
540.
780.
541.
290.
80F
in.
1.41
0.92
0.92
1.41
0.47
-0.
920.
920.
920.
470.
920.
922.
380.
92N
/A0.
921.
410.
470.
920.
920.
470.
920.
920.
921.
410.
99F
ra.
2.95
1.02
0.70
1.45
0.70
1.02
-0.
700.
701.
020.
700.
702.
950.
70N
/A0.
702.
951.
020.
700.
701.
020.
701.
020.
701.
451.
14G
er.
1.94
0.71
0.71
1.94
0.71
0.80
0.71
-0.
710.
800.
710.
711.
940.
71N
/A0.
711.
940.
800.
710.
710.
800.
710.
800.
711.
941.
00G
re.
2.42
0.75
0.97
2.42
0.97
1.06
0.97
0.97
-1.
760.
970.
973.
080.
97N
/A0.
973.
081.
060.
970.
971.
060.
750.
750.
972.
421.
36Ic
e.2.
411.
401.
401.
570.
991.
031.
401.
151.
57-
1.40
1.57
3.62
1.40
N/A
1.03
3.25
0.99
1.40
1.15
0.99
1.40
1.57
1.15
1.57
1.54
Ire.
2.86
1.47
1.01
1.85
1.01
1.47
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.47
-1.
012.
861.
01N
/A1.
012.
861.
471.
011.
011.
471.
011.
470.
791.
851.
43Ita
.2.
940.
860.
982.
710.
981.
120.
860.
860.
861.
121.
12-
3.45
0.86
N/A
0.98
3.45
1.12
1.12
0.98
1.12
0.86
1.12
0.98
2.71
1.44
Jap.
1.80
2.30
2.30
1.80
2.30
2.30
2.30
2.30
2.30
2.30
2.30
2.30
-2.
30N
/A2.
301.
802.
302.
302.
302.
302.
302.
302.
301.
472.
19Lu
x.3.
740.
620.
442.
240.
621.
000.
620.
620.
621.
500.
620.
623.
74-
N/A
0.44
3.74
0.81
0.62
0.62
0.81
0.62
1.50
0.62
2.24
1.26
Mex
.N
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
eth.
2.31
0.80
0.60
1.43
0.60
0.99
0.60
0.60
0.80
0.99
0.80
0.80
2.31
0.60
N/A
-2.
310.
800.
800.
800.
800.
600.
990.
601.
431.
01N
. Z.
0.83
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
N/A
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.62
1.66
Nor
.2.
450.
710.
711.
190.
350.
350.
710.
710.
710.
710.
710.
712.
450.
71N
/A0.
712.
45-
0.71
0.71
0.35
0.71
0.71
0.71
1.19
0.93
Por
.2.
221.
011.
012.
221.
011.
181.
011.
011.
011.
181.
011.
012.
961.
01N
/A1.
013.
231.
18-
0.96
1.18
1.01
1.18
1.01
2.22
1.39
Spa
.3.
991.
401.
192.
901.
191.
401.
191.
191.
191.
401.
191.
193.
991.
19N
/A1.
193.
991.
401.
19-
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.19
2.90
1.77
Sw
e.2.
590.
830.
691.
170.
380.
380.
830.
691.
061.
060.
830.
832.
590.
83N
/A0.
692.
590.
381.
061.
06-
0.83
1.06
0.83
1.17
1.06
Sw
it.2.
300.
810.
811.
441.
011.
010.
810.
811.
011.
441.
010.
812.
300.
81N
/A0.
812.
301.
011.
011.
011.
01-
1.01
1.01
1.44
1.17
Tur
.4.
032.
402.
404.
122.
402.
402.
402.
401.
632.
402.
402.
404.
122.
40N
/A2.
404.
122.
402.
402.
402.
402.
40-
2.40
4.12
2.74
U. K
.1.
530.
850.
641.
170.
640.
850.
640.
640.
640.
850.
570.
642.
170.
64N
/A0.
641.
530.
850.
640.
640.
850.
641.
07-
1.17
0.89
U. S
.1.
921.
301.
300.
501.
301.
301.
301.
301.
301.
301.
161.
301.
921.
30N
/A1.
301.
921.
301.
491.
301.
301.
301.
301.
16-
1.34
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
58
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Che
apes
t Dis
coun
t Rat
e) -
Jan
. 199
1
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Net
h.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.Sw
e.S
wit.
Tu
r.U
KU
SA
ve.
Fro
mA
ul .
-1
.01
1.0
11
.16
0.9
30
.93
0.9
31
.01
1.2
42
.18
0.9
30
.93
1.2
41
.24N
/A1
.01
0.6
90
.93
1.2
41
.24
0.9
31
.01
1.2
40
.93
0.9
3A
ul .
1.0
8A
us.
2.4
6-
0.5
91
.58
0.5
90
.76
0.5
90
.59
0.7
60
.76
0.7
60
.59
2.4
60
.59N
/A0
.59
2.4
60
.76
0.7
60
.76
0.7
60
.59
0.7
60
.761.5
8A
us0
.99
Bel
.3
.32
0.7
5-
1.2
00
.64
0.7
50
.47
0.4
70
.64
0.7
50
.47
0.6
42
.24
0.3
3N/A
0.3
93
.32
0.7
50
.64
0.6
40
.75
0.4
70
.75
0.4
71
.20
Bel
.0
.96
Can
.0
.82
1.0
51
.05
-0
.89
0.8
90
.82
1.0
51
.12
1.1
20
.93
1.1
21
.12
0.9
3N/A
0.8
90
.85
0.8
91
.25
0.8
90
.82
0.9
31
.25
0.8
20
.20
Can
.0
.94
Den
.1
.68
0.5
40
.45
1.2
9-
0.3
90
.54
0.4
50
.54
0.7
80
.54
0.5
42
.07
0.4
5N/A
0.4
52
.59
0.3
90
.54
0.5
40
.39
0.5
40
.78
0.5
41
.29
Den
.0
.80
Fin
.1
.06
0.6
80
.68
1.0
60
.34
-0
.68
0.6
80
.92
0.6
80
.68
0.9
22
.38
0.6
8N/A
0.6
81
.06
0.3
40
.92
0.9
20
.34
0.6
80
.92
0.6
81
.06
Fin
.0
.83
Fra
.1
.99
0.6
80
.47
0.8
90
.470
.68
-0
.47
0.4
70
.68
0.4
70
.47
1.9
90
.47N
/A0
.47
1.9
90
.68
0.4
70
.47
0.6
80
.47
0.6
80
.47
0.8
9F
ra.
0.7
6G
er.
1.9
40
.57
0.5
71
.94
0.5
7 0.8
00
.57
-0
.57
0.8
00
.57
0.5
71
.94
0.5
7N/A
0.5
71
.94
0.8
00
.57
0.5
70
.80
0.5
70
.80
0.5
71.9
4G
er.
0.9
2G
re.
2.4
20
.75
0.9
72
.42
0.9
71
.06
0.9
70
.97
-1
.76
0.9
70
.973
.08
0.9
7N
/A0
.97
3.0
81
.06
0.9
70
.97
1.0
60
.75
0.7
50
.972.4
2G
re.
1.3
6Ic
e.1
.68
0.9
80
.98
1.0
90
.69 0
.72
0.9
80
.81
1.0
9-
0.9
81
.09
2.5
30
.98N
/A0
.72
2.2
80
.69
0.9
80
.81
0.6
90
.98
1.0
90
.81
1.0
9Ic
e.1
.08
Ire.
2.8
61
.47
0.7
61
.39
1.4
71
.47
0.7
60
.76
0.7
61
.47
-0
.762
.86
0.7
6N
/A0
.76
2.8
61
.47
0.7
60
.76
1.4
70
.76
1.4
70
.40
1.3
9Ir
e.1
.29
Ita.
2.3
10
.69
0.7
91
.64
0.7
90.9
00
.69
0.6
90
.69
0.9
00
.90
-3
.45
0.6
9N
/A0
.79
3.4
50
.90
0.9
00
.79
0.9
00
.69
0.9
00
.791.6
4Ita
.1
.17
Jap.
1.0
71
.38
1.3
81
.07
1.3
8 1.3
81
.38
1.3
81
.38
1.3
81
.38
1.3
8-
1.3
8N/A
1.3
81
.07
1.3
81
.38
1.3
81
.38
1.3
81
.38
1.3
80
.92
Jap.
1.3
2Lu
x.3
.74
0.6
20
.37
1.5
00
.501
.00
0.5
00
.50
0.5
01
.50
0.5
00
.503
.74
-N
/A0
.37
3.7
40
.81
0.5
00
.50
0.8
10
.62
1.5
00
.50
1.5
0Lu
x.1
.14
Mex
.N
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/A-
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Mex
.N
/AN
eth.
1.9
20
.66
0.4
91
.26
0.4
9 0.9
90
.49
0.4
90
.66
0.9
90
.66
0.6
61
.92
0.4
9N/A
-1
.92
0.6
60
.66
0.6
60
.66
0.4
90
.99
0.4
91
.26
Net
h.0
.87
N. Z
.0
.52
1.6
21
.62
1.0
51
.62 1
.62
1.6
21
.62
1.6
21
.62
1.0
51
.62
1.6
21
.62N
/A1
.62
-1
.62
1.6
21
.62
1.6
21
.62
1.6
21
.05
1.0
5N
. Z.
1.4
7N
or.
2.4
50
.57
0.5
70
.94
0.2
80.2
80
.57
0.5
70
.57
0.5
70
.57
0.5
72
.45
0.5
7N/A
0.5
72
.45
-0
.57
0.5
70
.28
0.5
70
.57
0.5
60
.94
Nor
.0
.81
Por
.1
.87
1.0
11
.01
1.8
71
.01 1
.18
1.0
11
.01
1.0
11
.18
1.0
11
.01
2.3
71.0
1N
/A1
.01
3.2
31
.18
-0
.96
1.1
81
.01
1.1
81
.011
.87
Por
.1
.32
Spa
.2
.84
1.0
10
.87
2.0
50
.87
1.0
10
.87
0.8
70
.87
1.0
10
.87
0.8
72.8
40
.87
N/A
0.8
72
.84
1.0
10
.87
-1
.01
1.0
11
.01
0.8
72.0
5S
pa.
1.2
7S
we.
2.5
90
.83
0.6
90
.90
0.2
70.2
70
.83
0.6
91
.06
1.0
60
.83
0.8
32
.59
0.8
3N/A
0.6
92
.59
0.2
71
.06
1.0
6-
0.8
31
.06
0.8
30
.90
Sw
e.1
.02
Sw
it.2
.30
0.5
80
.58
1.1
50
.720
.72
0.5
80
.58
0.7
21
.15
0.7
20
.58
2.3
00
.58N
/A0
.58
2.3
00
.72
0.7
20
.72
0.7
2-
0.7
20
.72
1.1
5S
wit.
0.9
4T
ur.
2.8
81
.63
1.6
32
.88
1.6
31
.63
1.6
31
.63
1.0
61
.63
1.6
31
.632
.88
1.6
3N
/A1
.63
2.8
81
.63
1.6
31
.63
1.6
31
.63
-1
.63
2.8
8T
ur.
1.8
8U
. K.
1.2
30
.69
0.5
20
.91
0.5
2 0.6
90
.52
0.5
20
.52
0.6
90
.41
0.5
22
.06
0.5
2N/A
0.5
21
.23
0.6
90
.52
0.5
20
.69
0.5
20
.91
-0
.91
U. K
.0
.73
U. S
.1
.15
0.7
80
.78
0.3
00
.78 0
.78
0.7
80
.78
0.7
80
.78
0.7
00
.78
1.1
50
.78N
/A0
.78
1.1
50
.78
0.9
00
.78
0.7
80
.78
0.7
80
.69
-U
. S.
0.8
1
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Net
h.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.Sw
e.S
wit.
Tu
r.U
KU
SA
ve.
1.
Ca
lcu
latio
n u
ses
exc
ha
ng
e r
ate
of
pre
vio
us
yea
r.2
. T
axe
s a
re e
xclu
de
d.
3.
Th
e c
ha
rge
s in
th
e s
ha
de
d c
ells
are
mo
re t
ha
n t
wic
e (
ligh
tly s
ha
de
d c
ells
) o
r th
ree
tim
es
(de
nse
ly s
ha
de
d c
ells
) o
f th
e c
ha
rge
ap
plic
ab
le f
rom
th
e o
pp
osi
te d
ire
ctio
n.
So
urc
e: O
EC
D
59
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Pea
k R
ate)
- J
an. 1
992
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.40
1.40
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.64
1.64
1.25
1.25
1.64
1.64
N/A
1.25
1.01
1.25
1.64
1.64
1.25
1.40
1.64
1.25
1.25
1.37
Aus
.2.
40-
0.74
1.54
0.74
1.14
0.74
0.74
1.14
1.14
1.14
0.74
2.40
0.74
N/A
0.74
2.40
1.14
1.14
1.14
1.14
0.74
1.14
1.14
1.54
1.20
Bel
.3.
250.
98-
1.17
0.88
0.98
0.63
0.63
0.88
0.98
0.63
0.88
2.20
0.44
N/A
0.52
3.25
0.98
0.88
0.88
0.98
0.63
0.98
0.63
1.17
1.10
Can
.1.
201.
351.
35-
1.26
1.13
1.08
1.26
1.62
1.20
1.20
1.62
1.52
1.26
N/A
1.20
1.20
1.13
1.62
1.71
1.08
1.26
1.83
1.08
0.44
1.29
Den
.1.
630.
500.
501.
25-
0.38
0.50
0.44
0.56
0.75
0.50
0.56
2.00
0.50
N/A
0.50
1.63
0.38
0.56
0.56
0.38
0.50
0.75
0.50
1.25
0.74
Fin
.1.
340.
870.
871.
340.
45-
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.45
0.87
0.87
2.25
0.87
N/A
0.87
1.34
0.45
0.87
0.87
0.45
0.87
0.87
0.87
1.34
0.93
Fra
.2.
951.
020.
701.
450.
701.
02-
0.70
0.70
1.02
0.70
0.70
2.95
0.70
N/A
0.70
2.95
1.02
0.70
0.70
1.02
0.70
0.70
0.70
1.45
1.13
Ger
.1.
880.
690.
691.
880.
690.
780.
69-
0.69
0.78
0.69
0.69
1.88
0.69
N/A
0.69
1.88
0.78
0.69
0.69
0.78
0.69
0.78
0.69
1.88
0.97
Gre
.2.
110.
650.
842.
110.
840.
920.
840.
84-
1.53
0.84
0.84
2.68
0.84
N/A
0.84
2.68
0.93
0.84
0.84
0.92
0.65
0.65
0.84
2.11
1.18
Ice.
2.38
1.39
1.39
1.55
0.98
1.02
1.39
1.14
1.55
-1.
391.
553.
581.
39N
/A1.
023.
210.
981.
391.
140.
981.
391.
551.
141.
551.
52Ir
e.2.
780.
980.
981.
800.
980.
980.
980.
980.
980.
98-
0.98
2.78
0.98
N/A
0.98
2.78
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
1.43
0.77
1.80
1.30
Ita.
2.81
0.80
0.91
2.59
0.91
1.05
0.80
0.80
0.80
1.05
1.05
-3.
310.
80N
/A0.
913.
311.
051.
050.
911.
050.
801.
050.
912.
591.
36Ja
p.1.
932.
472.
471.
932.
472.
472.
472.
472.
472.
472.
472.
47-
2.47
N/A
2.47
1.93
2.47
2.47
2.47
2.47
2.47
2.47
2.47
1.58
2.36
Lux.
2.56
0.61
0.43
1.46
0.61
0.98
0.61
0.61
0.61
1.46
0.61
0.61
2.56
-N
/A0.
432.
930.
790.
610.
610.
790.
611.
460.
611.
461.
04M
ex.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Net
h.2.
250.
780.
591.
390.
590.
960.
590.
590.
780.
960.
780.
782.
250.
59N
/A-
2.25
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.59
0.96
0.59
1.39
0.99
N. Z
.0.
811.
541.
541.
461.
541.
541.
541.
541.
691.
691.
541.
541.
541.
69N
/A1.
54-
1.54
1.69
1.69
1.54
1.54
1.69
1.46
1.46
1.54
Nor
.1.
270.
620.
621.
030.
320.
320.
620.
620.
620.
620.
620.
621.
770.
62N
/A0.
621.
27-
0.62
0.62
0.32
0.62
0.62
0.62
1.03
0.72
Por
.2.
191.
001.
002.
191.
001.
171.
001.
001.
001.
171.
001.
002.
921.
00N
/A1.
003.
181.
17-
0.95
1.17
1.00
1.17
1.00
2.19
1.37
Spa
.3.
921.
371.
172.
841.
171.
371.
171.
171.
171.
371.
171.
173.
921.
17N
/A1.
173.
921.
371.
17-
1.37
1.37
1.37
1.17
2.84
1.73
Sw
e.2.
540.
820.
681.
140.
370.
370.
820.
681.
051.
050.
820.
822.
540.
82N
/A0.
682.
540.
371.
051.
05-
0.82
1.05
0.82
1.14
1.04
Sw
it.2.
230.
790.
791.
400.
980.
980.
790.
790.
981.
400.
980.
792.
230.
79N
/A0.
792.
230.
980.
980.
980.
98-
0.98
0.98
1.40
1.14
Tur
.3.
191.
851.
853.
191.
851.
851.
851.
851.
261.
851.
851.
853.
191.
85N
/A1.
853.
191.
851.
851.
851.
851.
85-
1.85
3.19
2.11
U. K
.1.
220.
760.
580.
930.
580.
760.
580.
580.
581.
010.
560.
581.
930.
58N
/A0.
581.
220.
760.
580.
580.
760.
581.
01-
0.93
0.79
U. S
.1.
711.
231.
300.
501.
241.
391.
221.
261.
461.
501.
191.
251.
691.
39N
/A1.
212.
061.
241.
501.
301.
201.
301.
501.
07-
1.33
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
60
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Che
apes
t Dis
coun
t Rat
e) -
Jan
. 199
2
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.40
0.98
0.93
0.93
0.93
0.93
0.93
1.64
1.32
0.93
0.93
1.64
1.64
N/A
0.93
0.70
0.93
1.64
1.64
0.93
1.40
1.64
0.93
0.93
Aul
.1.
16A
us.
2.40
-0.
571.
540.
570.
740.
570.
570.
740.
740.
740.
572.
400.
57N
/A0.
572.
400.
740.
740.
740.
740.
570.
740.
741.
54A
us0.
97B
el.
3.25
0.73
-1.
170.
630.
730.
460.
460.
630.
980.
460.
632.
200.
33N
/A0.
383.
250.
730.
630.
630.
730.
460.
730.
461.
17B
el.
0.95
Can
.1.
081.
211.
21-
1.13
1.02
0.97
1.13
1.46
1.08
1.08
1.46
1.37
1.13
N/A
1.08
1.08
1.02
1.46
1.54
0.97
1.13
1.83
0.97
0.18
Can
.1.
16D
en.
1.63
0.50
0.50
1.25
-0.
380.
500.
440.
560.
750.
500.
562.
000.
50N
/A0.
501.
630.
380.
560.
560.
380.
500.
750.
501.
25D
en.
0.74
Fin
.1.
000.
640.
641.
000.
32-
0.64
0.64
0.87
0.64
0.64
0.87
2.25
0.64
N/A
0.64
1.01
0.32
0.87
0.87
0.32
0.64
0.87
0.64
1.00
Fin
.0.
78F
ra.
1.99
0.68
0.47
0.88
0.47
0.68
-0.
470.
470.
680.
470.
471.
990.
47N
/A0.
471.
990.
680.
470.
470.
680.
470.
680.
470.
88F
ra.
0.76
Ger
.1.
880.
520.
521.
880.
520.
780.
52-
0.52
0.78
0.52
0.52
1.88
0.52
N/A
0.52
1.88
0.78
0.52
0.52
0.78
0.52
0.78
0.52
1.88
Ger
.0.
87G
re.
2.11
0.65
0.84
2.11
0.84
0.92
0.84
0.84
-1.
530.
840.
842.
680.
84N
/A0.
842.
680.
930.
840.
840.
920.
650.
650.
842.
11G
re.
1.18
Ice.
1.66
0.97
0.97
1.08
0.68
0.71
0.97
0.80
1.08
-1.
082.
500.
970.
71N
/A0.
712.
250.
680.
970.
800.
680.
971.
080.
801.
08Ic
e.1.
05Ir
e.2.
780.
740.
741.
351.
430.
740.
740.
740.
740.
74-
0.74
2.78
0.74
N/A
0.74
2.78
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.74
1.43
0.39
1.35
Ire.
1.10
Ita.
2.81
0.54
0.63
2.59
0.63
0.74
0.54
0.54
0.54
1.05
0.74
-3.
310.
54N
/A0.
633.
310.
740.
740.
630.
740.
540.
740.
632.
59Ita
.1.
15Ja
p.1.
151.
491.
491.
151.
491.
491.
491.
491.
491.
491.
491.
49-
1.49
N/A
1.49
1.15
1.49
1.49
1.49
1.49
1.49
1.49
1.49
0.99
Jap.
1.42
Lux.
2.56
0.61
0.37
0.98
0.49
0.98
0.49
0.49
0.49
1.46
0.49
0.49
2.56
-N
/A0.
372.
930.
790.
490.
490.
790.
611.
460.
490.
98Lu
x.0.
95M
ex.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
-N
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AM
ex.
N/A
Net
h.1.
870.
530.
431.
230.
430.
640.
430.
430.
530.
640.
530.
531.
870.
43N
/A-
1.87
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.43
0.96
0.43
1.23
Net
h.0.
77N
. Z.
0.51
1.54
1.54
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.69
1.69
1.54
1.54
1.02
1.69
N/A
1.02
-1.
021.
691.
691.
021.
541.
691.
021.
02N
. Z.
1.29
Nor
.1.
270.
500.
500.
820.
250.
250.
500.
500.
500.
500.
500.
501.
770.
50N
/A0.
501.
27-
0.50
0.50
0.25
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.82
Nor
.0.
61P
or.
1.84
1.00
1.00
1.84
1.00
1.17
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.17
1.00
1.00
2.33
1.00
N/A
1.00
3.18
1.17
-0.
951.
171.
001.
171.
001.
84P
or.
1.30
Spa
.2.
680.
890.
071.
910.
750.
890.
750.
750.
750.
890.
750.
752.
680.
75N
/A0.
752.
680.
890.
75-
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.75
1.91
Spa
.1.
11S
we.
2.54
0.82
0.68
0.88
0.26
0.26
0.82
0.68
1.05
1.05
0.82
0.82
2.54
0.82
N/A
0.68
2.54
0.26
1.05
1.05
-0.
821.
050.
820.
88S
we.
1.01
Sw
it.2.
230.
560.
561.
120.
700.
700.
560.
560.
701.
120.
700.
562.
230.
56N
/A0.
562.
230.
700.
700.
700.
70-
0.70
0.70
1.12
Sw
it.0.
91T
ur.
2.52
1.26
1.26
2.52
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
0.84
1.26
1.26
1.26
2.52
1.26
N/A
1.26
2.52
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.26
-1.
262.
52T
ur.
1.51
U. K
.1.
000.
650.
480.
760.
480.
650.
480.
480.
480.
850.
410.
481.
850.
48N
/A0.
481.
000.
650.
480.
480.
650.
480.
85-
0.76
U. K
.0.
67U
. S.
1.04
0.78
0.78
0.25
0.76
0.86
0.78
0.78
0.87
0.90
0.80
0.78
1.15
0.87
N/A
0.78
1.24
0.76
0.90
0.78
0.74
0.78
0.90
0.70
-U
. S.
0.82
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
61
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Pea
k ra
te)
- Ja
n. 1
993
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.32
1.32
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.54
1.54
1.17
1.17
1.54
1.54
N/A
1.17
0.95
1.17
1.54
1.54
1.17
1.32
1.54
1.17
1.17
1.30
Aus
.2.
55-
0.79
1.64
0.79
1.21
0.79
0.79
1.21
1.21
1.21
0.79
2.55
0.79
N/A
0.79
2.55
1.21
1.21
1.21
1.21
0.79
1.21
1.21
1.64
1.28
Bel
.3.
110.
98-
1.24
0.85
0.98
0.67
0.67
0.85
1.04
0.67
0.85
2.33
0.47
N/A
0.55
3.11
0.98
0.85
0.85
1.08
0.67
1.04
0.67
1.24
1.12
Can
.1.
141.
281.
28-
1.19
1.07
1.02
1.19
1.54
1.14
1.14
1.54
1.44
1.19
N/A
1.14
1.14
1.07
1.54
1.62
1.02
1.19
1.73
1.02
0.42
1.22
Den
.1.
720.
530.
461.
32-
0.40
0.53
0.46
0.60
0.79
0.53
0.60
2.12
0.53
N/A
0.53
2.65
0.40
0.60
0.60
0.40
0.53
0.79
0.53
1.32
0.82
Fin
.0.
990.
640.
640.
990.
33-
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.33
0.64
0.64
1.66
0.64
N/A
0.64
0.99
0.33
0.64
0.64
0.33
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.99
0.69
Fra
.2.
261.
050.
681.
110.
701.
05-
0.68
0.70
1.05
0.70
0.68
2.25
0.68
N/A
0.68
2.26
1.05
0.70
0.68
1.05
0.68
1.05
0.68
1.10
1.02
Ger
.2.
000.
740.
741.
260.
740.
830.
74-
0.74
0.83
0.74
0.74
2.00
0.74
N/A
0.74
2.00
0.83
0.74
0.74
0.83
0.74
0.83
0.74
1.26
0.97
Gre
.1.
580.
530.
671.
580.
670.
810.
670.
67-
1.21
0.67
0.67
2.45
0.67
N/A
0.67
2.45
0.81
0.67
0.67
0.81
0.53
0.53
0.67
1.58
0.97
Ice.
2.20
1.27
1.27
1.44
0.85
0.89
1.05
0.89
1.44
-1.
271.
442.
961.
27N
/A0.
892.
960.
851.
271.
050.
851.
271.
441.
051.
271.
35Ir
e.2.
941.
041.
041.
901.
041.
041.
041.
041.
041.
04-
1.04
2.94
1.04
N/A
1.04
2.94
1.04
1.04
1.04
1.04
1.04
1.51
0.82
1.90
1.37
Ita.
2.83
0.80
0.92
2.61
0.92
1.06
0.80
0.80
0.80
1.06
1.06
-3.
330.
80N
/A0.
953.
331.
061.
060.
921.
060.
801.
060.
922.
611.
37Ja
p.2.
052.
622.
622.
052.
622.
622.
622.
622.
622.
622.
622.
62-
2.62
N/A
2.62
2.05
2.62
2.62
2.62
2.62
2.62
2.62
2.62
1.68
2.51
Lux.
2.37
0.56
0.39
1.35
0.56
0.90
0.56
0.56
0.56
1.35
0.56
0.56
2.37
-N
/A0.
392.
700.
730.
560.
560.
730.
561.
350.
561.
350.
97M
ex.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Net
h.1.
990.
820.
631.
110.
631.
020.
630.
630.
821.
020.
820.
821.
990.
63N
/A-
1.99
0.82
0.82
0.82
0.82
0.63
1.02
0.63
1.11
0.97
N. Z
.0.
681.
371.
371.
311.
371.
371.
371.
371.
521.
521.
371.
371.
371.
37N
/A1.
37-
1.37
1.51
1.51
1.37
1.37
1.52
1.31
1.31
1.36
Nor
.1.
300.
600.
600.
960.
320.
320.
600.
600.
600.
600.
600.
601.
800.
60N
/A0.
601.
30-
0.60
0.60
0.32
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.96
0.71
Por
.2.
081.
251.
252.
081.
251.
451.
251.
251.
251.
451.
251.
252.
731.
25N
/A1.
253.
631.
45-
1.18
1.45
1.25
1.45
1.25
2.08
1.56
Spa
.3.
851.
281.
071.
931.
071.
281.
071.
071.
071.
281.
071.
073.
851.
07N
/A1.
073.
851.
281.
07-
1.28
1.28
1.28
1.07
1.93
1.57
Sw
e.2.
640.
850.
701.
180.
390.
390.
850.
701.
091.
090.
850.
852.
640.
85N
/A0.
702.
640.
391.
091.
09-
0.85
1.09
0.85
1.18
1.08
Sw
it.1.
710.
710.
710.
770.
710.
850.
710.
711.
001.
421.
000.
711.
710.
71N
/A0.
712.
280.
851.
001.
000.
85-
1.00
0.71
1.28
1.00
Tur
.3.
901.
951.
953.
901.
951.
951.
951.
951.
301.
951.
951.
953.
901.
95N
/A1.
953.
901.
951.
951.
951.
951.
95-
1.95
3.90
2.35
U. K
.1.
210.
760.
570.
840.
570.
760.
570.
570.
571.
010.
550.
571.
920.
57N
/A0.
571.
210.
760.
570.
570.
760.
571.
01-
0.84
0.78
U. S
.1.
711.
231.
300.
511.
241.
391.
221.
261.
541.
501.
191.
251.
691.
39N
/A1.
212.
061.
241.
301.
301.
201.
301.
591.
07-
1.33
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
62
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Che
apes
t Dis
coun
t rat
e) -
Jan
. 199
3
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.32
0.93
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
1.54
1.25
0.87
0.87
1.54
1.54
N/A
0.87
0.66
0.87
1.54
1.54
0.87
1.32
1.54
0.87
0.87
Aul
.1.
10A
us.
2.55
-0.
611.
640.
610.
790.
610.
610.
790.
790.
790.
612.
550.
61N
/A0.
612.
550.
790.
790.
790.
790.
610.
790.
791.
64A
us1.
03B
el.
3.11
0.78
-1.
040.
670.
780.
490.
490.
670.
780.
490.
672.
330.
35N
/A0.
413.
110.
780.
670.
670.
780.
490.
780.
491.
04B
el.
0.95
Can
.0.
790.
890.
89-
0.84
0.75
0.72
0.84
1.08
0.79
0.79
1.08
1.02
0.84
N/A
0.79
0.79
0.75
1.08
1.14
0.72
0.84
1.21
0.72
0.17
Can
.0.
85D
en.
1.72
0.53
0.46
1.32
-0.
400.
530.
460.
600.
790.
530.
602.
120.
53N
/A0.
532.
650.
400.
600.
600.
400.
530.
790.
531.
32D
en.
0.82
Fin
.0.
740.
480.
480.
740.
24-
0.48
0.48
0.64
0.48
0.48
0.64
1.66
0.48
N/A
0.48
0.75
0.24
0.64
0.64
0.24
0.48
0.64
0.48
0.74
Fin
.0.
58F
ra.
1.80
0.70
0.48
0.83
0.48
0.70
-0.
480.
480.
700.
480.
480.
810.
48N
/A0.
481.
800.
700.
480.
480.
700.
480.
700.
480.
83F
ra.
0.70
Ger
.2.
000.
550.
551.
260.
550.
830.
55-
0.55
0.83
0.55
0.55
2.00
0.55
N/A
0.55
2.00
0.83
0.55
0.55
0.83
0.55
0.83
0.55
1.26
Ger
.0.
86G
re.
1.58
0.53
0.67
1.58
0.67
0.81
0.67
0.67
-1.
210.
670.
672.
450.
67N
/A0.
672.
450.
810.
670.
670.
810.
530.
530.
671.
58G
re.
0.97
Ice.
1.65
0.95
0.95
1.07
0.63
0.67
0.78
0.67
1.07
-0.
951.
072.
270.
95N
/A0.
672.
220.
630.
950.
780.
630.
951.
070.
780.
95Ic
e.1.
01Ir
e.2.
940.
780.
781.
430.
780.
780.
780.
780.
780.
78-
0.78
2.94
0.78
N/A
0.78
2.94
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
1.51
0.41
1.43
Ire.
1.14
Ita.
2.22
0.64
0.74
2.05
0.74
0.85
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.85
0.85
-3.
330.
64N
/A0.
743.
330.
850.
850.
740.
850.
640.
850.
742.
05Ita
.1.
15Ja
p.1.
221.
581.
581.
221.
581.
581.
581.
581.
581.
581.
581.
58-
1.58
N/A
1.58
1.22
1.58
1.58
1.58
1.58
1.58
1.58
1.58
1.05
Jap.
1.51
Lux.
2.37
0.56
0.34
0.90
0.45
0.90
0.45
0.45
0.45
1.35
0.45
0.45
2.37
-N
/A0.
342.
700.
730.
450.
450.
730.
561.
350.
450.
90Lu
x.0.
88M
ex.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
-N
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AM
ex.
N/A
Net
h.1.
710.
570.
460.
970.
460.
680.
460.
460.
570.
680.
570.
571.
710.
46N
/A-
1.71
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.46
1.02
0.46
0.97
Net
h.0.
75N
. Z.
0.23
0.75
0.75
0.49
0.49
0.49
0.49
0.49
0.83
0.83
0.63
0.75
0.49
0.75
N/A
0.49
-0.
490.
830.
830.
490.
750.
830.
490.
49N
. Z.
0.62
Nor
.1.
300.
480.
480.
760.
260.
260.
480.
480.
480.
480.
480.
481.
800.
48N
/A0.
481.
30-
0.48
0.48
0.26
0.48
0.48
0.48
0.76
Nor
.0.
61P
or.
1.41
1.25
1.25
1.41
1.25
1.45
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.45
1.25
1.25
2.18
1.25
N/A
1.25
2.42
1.45
-1.
181.
451.
251.
451.
251.
41P
or.
1.40
Spa
.2.
700.
890.
751.
330.
750.
890.
750.
750.
750.
890.
750.
752.
700.
75N
/A0.
752.
700.
890.
75-
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.75
1.33
Spa
.1.
10S
we.
2.64
0.85
0.70
0.91
0.27
0.27
0.85
0.70
1.09
1.09
0.85
0.85
2.64
0.85
N/A
0.70
2.64
0.27
1.09
1.09
-0.
851.
090.
850.
91S
we.
1.05
Sw
it.1.
710.
570.
570.
950.
360.
710.
570.
570.
711.
140.
710.
571.
710.
57N
/A0.
572.
280.
710.
710.
710.
71-
0.71
0.57
0.95
Sw
it.0.
84T
ur.
2.80
1.43
1.43
2.80
1.43
1.43
1.43
1.43
0.98
1.43
1.43
1.43
2.80
1.43
N/A
1.43
2.80
1.43
1.43
1.43
1.43
1.43
-1.
432.
80T
ur.
1.71
U. K
.0.
990.
640.
470.
760.
470.
640.
470.
470.
470.
850.
410.
471.
840.
47N
/A0.
470.
990.
640.
470.
470.
640.
470.
85-
0.76
U. K
.0.
66U
. S.
1.04
0.78
0.78
0.26
0.76
0.86
0.78
0.78
0.92
0.90
0.80
0.81
1.13
0.87
N/A
0.78
1.24
0.76
0.76
0.82
0.74
0.78
0.99
0.70
-U
. S.
0.83
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
63
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Pea
k ra
te)
- Ja
n. 1
994
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.17
1.17
0.92
1.04
1.04
1.04
1.11
1.30
1.83
0.88
0.95
1.17
1.30
N/A
1.04
0.71
1.04
1.30
1.43
1.04
1.17
1.30
0.88
0.88
1.12
Aus
.2.
41-
0.75
1.20
0.75
1.15
0.75
0.75
1.15
1.15
1.15
0.75
2.41
0.75
N/A
0.75
2.41
1.15
1.15
1.15
1.15
0.75
1.15
1.15
1.20
1.18
Bel
.1.
450.
58-
1.02
0.58
0.72
0.48
0.48
0.62
0.96
0.58
0.58
1.45
0.43
N/A
0.48
1.45
0.72
0.62
0.62
0.72
0.58
0.87
0.48
1.02
0.76
Can
.0.
920.
991.
13-
0.85
0.85
0.74
0.98
1.45
1.01
1.01
1.18
1.25
1.16
N/A
0.67
0.92
0.85
1.31
1.66
0.67
0.67
1.72
0.61
0.41
1.00
Den
.1.
600.
490.
451.
23-
0.37
0.49
0.43
0.56
0.74
0.49
0.56
1.97
0.49
N/A
0.49
2.47
0.37
0.56
0.56
0.37
0.49
0.74
0.49
1.23
0.77
Fin
.0.
840.
550.
550.
840.
28-
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
1.42
0.55
N/A
0.55
1.42
0.28
0.55
0.55
0.28
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.84
0.63
Fra
.1.
920.
920.
541.
000.
650.
92-
0.54
0.65
0.92
0.65
0.54
1.92
0.54
N/A
0.54
1.92
0.92
0.65
0.54
0.92
0.54
0.92
0.54
1.00
0.88
Ger
.1.
890.
700.
701.
190.
700.
780.
70-
0.70
0.78
0.70
0.70
1.89
0.70
N/A
0.70
1.89
0.78
0.70
0.70
0.78
0.70
0.78
0.70
1.19
0.91
Gre
.1.
310.
440.
561.
310.
560.
670.
560.
56-
1.01
0.56
0.56
2.04
0.56
N/A
0.56
2.04
0.67
0.56
0.56
0.67
0.44
0.44
0.56
1.31
0.81
Ice.
1.77
1.02
1.02
1.17
0.69
0.72
0.81
0.69
1.17
-1.
021.
172.
381.
02N
/A0.
722.
380.
691.
020.
810.
691.
021.
170.
811.
021.
09Ir
e.1.
330.
700.
531.
010.
700.
700.
530.
530.
700.
70-
0.70
1.76
0.53
N/A
0.53
1.33
0.70
0.70
0.70
0.70
0.70
1.00
0.44
1.01
0.79
Ita.
1.86
0.58
0.66
1.43
0.58
0.66
0.58
0.58
0.58
0.83
0.66
-1.
860.
58N
/A0.
661.
860.
660.
660.
660.
580.
580.
830.
581.
430.
87Ja
p.2.
322.
992.
992.
322.
992.
992.
952.
952.
992.
992.
992.
99-
2.99
N/A
2.99
2.34
2.99
2.99
2.99
2.99
2.99
2.99
2.95
1.89
2.85
Lux.
2.36
0.58
0.42
1.26
0.58
0.79
0.58
0.58
0.58
1.26
0.58
0.58
2.36
-N
/A0.
422.
800.
790.
580.
580.
790.
581.
260.
581.
260.
96M
ex.
3.71
2.91
2.91
1.03
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
3.71
2.91
N/A
2.91
3.71
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
0.42
2.96
Net
h.1.
880.
780.
591.
050.
590.
970.
590.
590.
780.
970.
780.
781.
880.
59N
/A-
1.88
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.59
0.97
0.59
1.05
0.92
N. Z
.0.
681.
381.
381.
311.
381.
381.
381.
381.
521.
521.
381.
381.
381.
52N
/A1.
38-
1.38
1.52
1.52
1.38
1.38
1.52
1.31
1.31
1.38
Nor
.1.
060.
530.
530.
710.
280.
280.
530.
530.
530.
530.
530.
531.
060.
53N
/A0.
531.
06-
0.53
0.53
0.28
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.71
0.58
Por
.1.
740.
970.
971.
740.
971.
180.
970.
970.
971.
180.
970.
972.
220.
97N
/A0.
972.
851.
18-
0.97
1.18
0.97
1.18
0.97
1.74
1.25
Spa
.3.
071.
030.
841.
530.
841.
030.
840.
840.
841.
030.
840.
843.
070.
84N
/A0.
843.
071.
030.
84-
1.03
1.03
1.03
0.84
1.53
1.25
Sw
e.1.
360.
640.
530.
890.
290.
290.
640.
530.
820.
530.
530.
641.
970.
64N
/A1.
361.
970.
290.
820.
82-
0.64
0.82
0.53
0.89
0.80
Sw
it.1.
220.
680.
681.
020.
680.
680.
680.
680.
950.
950.
950.
681.
620.
68N
/A0.
612.
170.
680.
950.
950.
68-
0.95
0.54
1.02
0.90
Tur
.2.
441.
631.
632.
441.
631.
631.
631.
631.
091.
631.
631.
632.
441.
63N
/A1.
632.
441.
631.
631.
631.
631.
63-
1.63
2.44
1.78
U. K
.1.
030.
650.
490.
650.
490.
650.
490.
490.
490.
860.
450.
491.
650.
49N
/A0.
491.
030.
650.
490.
490.
650.
490.
86-
0.65
0.66
U. S
.1.
761.
251.
380.
541.
321.
391.
241.
261.
681.
501.
281.
411.
691.
39N
/A1.
232.
111.
241.
571.
521.
201.
361.
761.
08-
1.40
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.4
. C
alc
ula
tion
is b
ase
d o
n f
ou
r m
inu
tes
call
wh
ere
ap
plic
ab
le.
So
urc
e: O
EC
D
64
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Che
apes
t Dis
coun
t rat
e) -
Jan
. 199
4
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.17
0.84
0.70
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.76
1.30
1.83
0.67
0.67
0.91
1.30
N/A
0.78
0.47
0.78
1.30
1.43
0.78
1.17
1.30
0.67
0.67
Aul
.0.
95A
us.
2.41
-0.
571.
200.
570.
750.
570.
570.
750.
750.
750.
572.
410.
57N
/A0.
572.
410.
750.
750.
750.
750.
570.
750.
751.
20A
us0.
94B
el.
1.45
0.51
-0.
870.
510.
620.
430.
430.
540.
720.
510.
511.
450.
32N
/A0.
431.
450.
620.
540.
540.
620.
510.
720.
430.
87B
el.
0.68
Can
.0.
690.
740.
85-
0.65
0.65
0.56
0.73
1.09
0.76
0.76
0.88
0.93
0.87
N/A
0.51
0.69
0.65
0.99
1.25
0.51
0.51
1.29
0.46
0.16
Can
.0.
75D
en.
1.60
0.49
0.45
1.17
-0.
370.
490.
430.
560.
740.
490.
561.
970.
49N
/A0.
492.
470.
370.
560.
560.
370.
490.
740.
490.
99D
en.
0.75
Fin
.0.
630.
410.
410.
630.
20-
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
1.42
0.41
N/A
0.41
1.42
0.20
0.41
0.41
0.20
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.63
Fin
.0.
50F
ra.
1.59
0.65
0.45
0.74
0.45
0.65
-0.
450.
450.
650.
450.
451.
590.
45N
/A0.
451.
590.
650.
450.
450.
650.
450.
650.
450.
74F
ra.
0.68
Ger
.1.
890.
520.
521.
190.
520.
780.
52-
0.52
0.78
0.52
0.52
1.89
0.52
N/A
0.52
1.89
0.78
0.52
0.52
0.78
0.52
0.78
0.52
1.19
Ger
.0.
81G
re.
0.98
0.33
0.42
0.98
0.42
0.50
0.42
0.42
-0.
750.
420.
421.
530.
42N
/A0.
421.
530.
500.
420.
420.
500.
330.
330.
420.
98G
re.
0.60
Ice.
1.33
0.77
0.77
0.87
0.52
0.55
0.61
0.52
0.87
-0.
770.
871.
790.
77N
/A0.
551.
790.
520.
770.
610.
520.
770.
870.
610.
77Ic
e.0.
82Ir
e.1.
020.
530.
470.
780.
530.
530.
470.
470.
530.
53-
0.53
1.76
0.47
N/A
0.47
1.02
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.85
0.34
0.78
Ire.
0.64
Ita.
1.47
0.46
0.53
1.28
0.46
0.53
0.46
0.46
0.46
0.66
0.53
-1.
470.
46N
/A0.
531.
470.
530.
530.
530.
460.
460.
660.
461.
28Ita
.0.
70Ja
p.1.
371.
801.
801.
371.
801.
801.
801.
801.
801.
801.
801.
80-
1.80
N/A
1.80
1.39
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.19
Jap.
1.72
Lux.
2.36
0.47
0.37
0.84
0.47
0.79
0.47
0.47
0.47
0.84
0.47
0.47
2.36
-N
/A0.
372.
800.
790.
470.
470.
790.
471.
260.
470.
84Lu
x.0.
85M
ex.
2.48
1.94
1.94
0.45
1.94
1.94
1.94
1.94
1.94
1.94
1.94
1.94
2.48
1.94
-1.
942.
481.
941.
941.
941.
941.
941.
941.
940.
28M
ex.
1.96
Net
h.1.
620.
540.
430.
920.
430.
650.
430.
430.
540.
650.
540.
541.
620.
43N
/A-
1.62
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.43
0.97
0.43
0.92
Net
h.0.
71N
. Z.
0.23
0.76
0.76
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.84
0.84
0.63
0.76
0.50
0.84
N/A
0.50
-0.
500.
840.
840.
500.
760.
840.
500.
50N
. Z.
0.63
Nor
.1.
060.
420.
420.
560.
230.
230.
420.
420.
420.
420.
420.
421.
060.
42N
/A0.
421.
06-
0.42
0.42
0.23
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.67
Nor
.0.
50P
or.
1.18
0.74
0.74
1.18
0.74
0.91
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.91
0.74
0.74
1.48
0.74
N/A
0.74
2.00
0.91
-0.
740.
910.
740.
910.
741.
18P
or.
0.92
Spa
.2.
160.
710.
581.
060.
580.
710.
580.
580.
580.
710.
580.
582.
160.
58N
/A0.
582.
160.
710.
58-
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.58
1.06
Spa
.0.
87S
we.
1.36
0.64
0.53
0.68
0.21
0.21
0.64
0.53
0.82
0.53
0.53
0.64
1.97
0.64
N/A
1.36
1.97
0.21
0.82
0.82
-0.
640.
820.
530.
68S
we.
0.77
Sw
it.1.
220.
540.
540.
810.
540.
540.
540.
540.
680.
680.
680.
541.
620.
54N
/A0.
472.
170.
540.
680.
680.
54-
0.68
0.44
0.81
Sw
it.0.
74T
ur.
2.17
1.09
1.09
2.17
1.09
1.09
1.09
1.09
0.81
1.09
1.09
1.09
2.17
1.09
N/A
1.09
2.17
1.09
1.09
1.09
1.09
1.09
-1.
092.
17T
ur.
1.31
U. K
.0.
850.
550.
380.
600.
380.
550.
380.
380.
380.
730.
350.
381.
570.
38N
/A0.
380.
600.
550.
380.
380.
550.
380.
73-
0.60
U. K
.0.
54U
. S.
1.04
0.79
0.82
0.28
0.81
0.86
0.79
0.81
1.00
0.90
0.85
0.88
1.15
0.87
N/A
0.79
1.27
0.76
0.94
0.96
0.74
0.81
1.08
0.71
-U
. S.
0.86
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.4
. C
alc
ula
tion
is b
ase
d o
n f
ou
r m
inu
tes
call
wh
ere
ap
plic
ab
le.
So
urc
e: O
EC
D
65
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Pea
k R
ate)
- J
an. 1
995
T
oA
ul.
Aus
.B
el.
Can
.D
en.
Fin
.F
ra.
Ger
.G
re.
Ice.
Ire.
Ita.
Jap.
Lux.
Mex
.N
eth.
N. Z
.N
or.
Por
.S
pa.
Sw
e.S
wit.
Tur
.U
. K.
U. S
.A
ve.
Fro
mA
ul.
-1.
311.
311.
021.
161.
161.
161.
231.
452.
040.
991.
061.
311.
45N
/A1.
160.
801.
161.
451.
531.
161.
311.
450.
990.
991.
25A
us.
1.58
-0.
701.
110.
701.
110.
700.
700.
701.
111.
110.
701.
580.
70N
/A0.
701.
580.
701.
110.
700.
700.
701.
110.
701.
110.
94B
el.
1.49
0.60
-0.
900.
600.
750.
500.
500.
641.
000.
600.
601.
490.
45N
/A0.
501.
490.
750.
640.
640.
750.
600.
900.
500.
900.
77C
an.
0.87
0.93
1.07
-0.
810.
810.
700.
921.
370.
960.
811.
111.
181.
10N
/A0.
640.
870.
811.
241.
560.
640.
641.
620.
580.
390.
94D
en.
1.26
0.57
0.50
0.88
-0.
380.
500.
440.
630.
630.
570.
571.
260.
50N
/A0.
502.
010.
380.
630.
630.
380.
500.
750.
440.
880.
69F
in.
0.86
0.56
0.53
0.83
0.27
-0.
530.
530.
560.
560.
560.
531.
450.
56N
/A0.
531.
450.
270.
560.
530.
260.
530.
560.
530.
830.
63F
ra.
1.75
0.66
0.55
0.89
0.66
0.66
-0.
550.
660.
850.
660.
551.
750.
55N
/A0.
551.
750.
660.
660.
550.
660.
550.
940.
550.
890.
81G
er.
1.92
0.71
0.71
1.21
0.71
0.79
0.71
-0.
710.
790.
710.
711.
920.
71N
/A0.
711.
920.
790.
710.
710.
790.
710.
790.
711.
210.
93G
re.
1.22
0.47
0.56
1.22
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.56
-1.
010.
560.
472.
060.
56N
/A0.
562.
060.
560.
560.
560.
560.
470.
470.
561.
220.
78Ic
e.1.
711.
231.
231.
400.
830.
870.
970.
831.
40-
1.23
1.40
2.87
1.23
N/A
0.87
2.30
0.83
1.23
0.97
0.83
1.23
1.13
0.97
1.23
1.25
Ire.
1.36
0.72
0.54
1.03
0.72
0.72
0.54
0.54
0.72
0.72
-0.
721.
790.
54N
/A0.
541.
360.
720.
720.
720.
720.
721.
010.
451.
030.
81Ita
.1.
690.
550.
551.
110.
550.
550.
550.
550.
550.
810.
55-
1.69
0.55
N/A
0.55
1.69
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.81
0.55
1.11
0.77
Jap.
2.27
2.91
2.91
2.25
2.91
2.91
2.86
2.86
2.91
2.91
2.91
2.91
-2.
91N
/A2.
912.
272.
912.
912.
912.
912.
912.
912.
861.
832.
77Lu
x.1.
440.
520.
430.
960.
520.
710.
520.
520.
591.
300.
590.
521.
44-
N/A
0.43
2.22
0.71
0.59
0.59
0.71
0.52
1.30
0.52
0.96
0.81
Mex
.3.
502.
742.
740.
972.
742.
742.
742.
742.
742.
742.
742.
743.
502.
74N
/A2.
743.
502.
742.
742.
742.
742.
742.
742.
740.
392.
78N
eth.
1.92
0.80
0.52
0.93
0.60
0.99
0.52
0.52
0.80
0.99
0.80
0.80
1.92
0.52
N/A
-1.
920.
800.
800.
800.
490.
490.
990.
600.
930.
89N
. Z.
0.71
1.51
1.51
1.28
1.51
1.51
1.51
1.51
1.67
1.67
1.51
1.51
1.40
1.67
N/A
1.51
-1.
511.
671.
671.
511.
511.
671.
281.
281.
48N
or.
0.71
0.49
0.49
0.57
0.28
0.28
0.49
0.49
0.57
0.49
0.49
0.49
1.05
0.49
N/A
0.49
1.05
-0.
570.
570.
280.
490.
710.
490.
570.
55P
or.
1.48
0.88
0.88
1.50
0.88
1.09
0.88
0.88
0.88
1.09
0.88
0.88
2.08
0.88
N/A
0.88
2.77
1.09
-0.
881.
090.
881.
090.
881.
391.
14S
pa.
2.91
0.71
0.71
1.25
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.71
2.43
0.71
N/A
0.71
2.91
0.71
0.71
-0.
710.
710.
980.
711.
251.
03S
we.
1.37
0.64
0.53
0.80
0.26
0.26
0.64
0.53
0.64
0.53
0.53
0.64
1.79
0.64
N/A
0.53
1.37
0.26
0.64
0.64
-0.
640.
820.
480.
800.
70S
wit.
1.32
0.73
0.73
0.88
0.73
0.73
0.66
0.73
1.02
1.02
1.02
0.66
1.76
0.73
N/A
0.58
2.34
0.73
1.02
1.02
0.73
-1.
020.
580.
880.
94T
ur.
1.75
1.17
1.17
1.75
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.17
0.78
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.75
1.17
N/A
1.17
1.75
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.17
1.17
-1.
171.
751.
28U
. K.
0.89
0.60
0.46
0.66
0.46
0.58
0.46
0.46
0.46
0.88
0.38
0.46
1.33
0.46
N/A
0.46
0.89
0.60
0.46
0.46
0.60
0.46
0.46
-0.
660.
59U
. S.
1.61
1.40
1.58
0.55
1.39
1.44
1.24
1.20
1.91
1.61
1.34
1.45
1.65
1.40
N/A
1.22
1.72
1.27
1.54
1.53
1.21
1.43
1.91
1.05
-1.
42
Fro
m/T
oA
ul.
Aus
.B
el.
Can
.D
en.
Fin
.F
ra.
Ger
.G
re.
Ice.
Ire.
Ita.
Jap.
Lux.
Mex
.N
eth.
N. Z
.N
or.
Por
.S
pa.
Sw
e.S
wit.
Tur
.U
. K.
U. S
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.4
. C
alc
ula
tion
is b
ase
d o
n f
ou
r m
inu
tes
call
wh
ere
ap
plic
ab
le.
So
urc
e: O
EC
D
66
Col
lect
ion
Cha
rges
Per
Min
ute
(Che
apes
t Dis
coun
t Rat
e) -
Jan
. 199
5
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.F
rom
Aul
.-
1.31
0.94
0.78
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.85
1.45
2.04
0.75
0.75
1.02
1.45
N/A
0.87
0.53
0.87
1.45
1.34
0.87
1.31
1.45
0.75
0.75
Aul
.1.
05A
us.
1.23
-0.
530.
700.
530.
700.
530.
530.
530.
700.
700.
531.
230.
53N
/A0.
531.
230.
530.
700.
530.
530.
530.
700.
530.
70A
us0.
67B
el.
1.49
0.53
-0.
780.
530.
640.
450.
450.
560.
750.
530.
531.
490.
33N
/A0.
451.
490.
640.
560.
560.
640.
530.
750.
450.
75B
el.
0.69
Can
.0.
650.
700.
81-
0.61
0.61
0.53
0.69
1.03
0.72
0.61
0.83
0.88
0.82
N/A
0.48
0.65
0.61
0.93
1.18
0.48
0.48
1.22
0.44
0.16
Can
.0.
70D
en.
1.26
0.57
0.50
0.70
-0.
380.
500.
440.
630.
630.
570.
571.
260.
50N
/A0.
502.
010.
380.
630.
630.
380.
500.
750.
440.
70D
en.
0.67
Fin
.0.
650.
410.
410.
620.
20-
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
1.45
0.41
N/A
0.41
1.45
0.20
0.41
0.41
0.18
0.41
0.56
0.41
0.62
Fin
.0.
51F
ra.
1.62
0.46
0.46
0.68
0.46
0.46
-0.
460.
460.
650.
460.
461.
620.
46N
/A0.
461.
620.
460.
460.
460.
460.
460.
660.
460.
68F
ra.
0.65
Ger
.1.
920.
530.
531.
210.
530.
790.
53-
0.53
0.79
0.53
0.53
1.92
0.53
N/A
0.53
1.92
0.79
0.53
0.53
0.79
0.53
0.79
0.53
1.21
Ger
.0.
83G
re.
0.91
0.35
0.42
0.91
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.42
-0.
760.
420.
351.
550.
42N
/A0.
421.
550.
420.
420.
420.
420.
350.
350.
420.
91G
re.
0.58
Ice.
1.29
0.92
0.92
1.05
0.62
0.65
0.73
0.62
1.05
-0.
921.
052.
150.
92N
/A0.
651.
730.
620.
920.
730.
620.
920.
840.
730.
92Ic
e.0.
94Ir
e.1.
040.
540.
480.
790.
540.
540.
480.
480.
540.
54-
0.54
1.79
0.48
N/A
0.48
1.04
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.87
0.34
0.79
Ire.
0.65
Ita.
1.42
0.43
0.43
0.86
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.65
0.43
-1.
420.
43N
/A0.
431.
420.
430.
430.
430.
430.
430.
650.
430.
86Ita
.0.
62Ja
p.1.
351.
791.
791.
321.
791.
791.
741.
741.
791.
791.
791.
79-
1.79
N/A
1.79
1.35
1.79
1.79
1.79
1.79
1.79
1.79
1.74
1.10
Jap.
1.69
Lux.
1.44
0.44
0.38
0.78
0.44
0.71
0.44
0.44
0.49
0.87
0.49
0.44
1.44
-N
/A0.
382.
220.
710.
490.
490.
710.
441.
300.
440.
78Lu
x.0.
73M
ex.
2.33
1.83
1.83
0.43
1.83
1.83
1.83
1.83
1.83
1.83
1.83
1.83
2.33
1.83
-1.
832.
331.
831.
831.
831.
831.
831.
831.
830.
26M
ex.
1.85
Net
h.1.
650.
660.
470.
820.
490.
800.
470.
470.
660.
800.
660.
661.
650.
47N
/A-
1.65
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.44
0.44
0.80
0.49
0.82
Net
h.0.
75N
. Z.
0.25
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.92
0.92
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.92
N/A
0.55
-0.
550.
920.
920.
550.
550.
920.
550.
55N
. Z.
0.63
Nor
.0.
570.
420.
420.
490.
220.
220.
420.
420.
490.
420.
420.
421.
050.
42N
/A0.
421.
05-
0.49
0.49
0.22
0.42
0.57
0.42
0.49
Nor
.0.
48P
or.
1.07
0.69
0.69
1.07
0.69
0.87
0.69
0.69
0.69
0.87
0.69
0.69
1.39
0.69
N/A
0.69
1.89
0.87
-0.
690.
870.
690.
870.
691.
01P
or.
0.86
Spa
.2.
060.
550.
551.
000.
550.
550.
550.
550.
550.
550.
550.
552.
060.
55N
/A0.
552.
060.
550.
55-
0.55
0.55
0.68
0.55
1.00
Spa
.0.
79S
we.
1.28
0.53
0.45
0.62
0.19
0.19
0.53
0.45
0.53
0.45
0.45
0.53
1.65
0.53
N/A
0.45
1.28
0.19
0.53
0.53
-0.
530.
690.
400.
62S
we.
0.59
Sw
it.1.
320.
550.
550.
690.
550.
550.
550.
550.
690.
690.
690.
481.
760.
55N
/A0.
452.
340.
550.
690.
690.
55-
0.69
0.45
0.69
Sw
it.0.
75T
ur.
1.40
0.78
0.78
1.40
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.58
0.78
0.78
0.78
1.40
0.78
N/A
0.78
1.40
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
-0.
781.
40T
ur.
0.91
U. K
.0.
770.
510.
380.
610.
380.
510.
380.
380.
380.
740.
260.
381.
270.
38N
/A0.
380.
770.
510.
380.
380.
510.
380.
38-
0.61
U. K
.0.
51U
. S.
0.92
0.83
0.85
0.31
0.86
0.78
0.75
0.74
0.96
0.99
0.78
0.96
0.91
0.77
N/A
0.75
0.99
0.78
0.98
0.95
0.75
0.76
1.24
0.66
-U
. S.
0.84
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ic
e.Ir
e.Ita
.Ja
p.Lu
x.M
ex.
Neth
.N
.Z.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
we.
Sw
it.T
ur.
U K
U S
Ave
.1
. C
alc
ula
tion
use
s e
xch
an
ge
ra
te o
f p
revi
ou
s ye
ar.
2.
Ta
xes
are
exc
lud
ed
.3
. T
he
ch
arg
es
in t
he
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls a
re m
ore
th
an
tw
ice
(lig
htly
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
or
thre
e t
ime
s (d
en
sely
sh
ad
ed
ce
lls)
of
the
ch
arg
e a
pp
lica
ble
fro
m t
he
op
po
site
dir
ect
ion
.4
. C
alc
ula
tion
is b
ase
d o
n f
ou
r m
inu
tes
call
wh
ere
ap
plic
ab
le.
So
urc
e: O
EC
D
67
Exchange Rate used for calculation.
For ‘88 For ‘89 For ‘90 For ‘91 For ‘92 For ‘93 For ‘94 For ‘95
Austria 1.43 1.28 1.26 1.28 1.28 1.36 1.47 1.37
Australia 12.64 12.34 13.23 11.37 11.67 10.99 11.63 11.42
Belgium 37.33 36.77 39.40 33.42 34.16 32.15 34.56 33.46
Canada 1.33 1.23 1.18 1.17 1.15 1.21 1.29 1.37
Denmark 6.84 6.73 7.31 6.19 6.40 6.04 6.48 6.36
Finland 4.40 4.19 4.29 3.82 4.04 4.49 5.72 5.22
France 6.01 5.96 6.38 5.45 5.45 5.29 5.66 5.55
Germany 1.80 1.76 1.88 1.62 1.66 1.56 1.65 1.62
Greece 135.43 141.64 162.42 158.23 182.06 190.47 229.14 242.20
Iceland 38.68 43.03 57.04 58.36 59.07 57.62 67.65 7-
Ireland 0.67 0.66 0.71 0.60 0.62 0.59 0.68 0.67
Italy 1296.07 1302.00 1372.09 1198.00 1240.65 1232.00 1572.00 1613.00
Japan 144.64 128.20 137.96 144.80 134.50 126.70 111.20 102.20
Luxembourg 37.33 36.77 39.40 33.42 34.162 32.15 34.56 33.46
Mexico 2.24145 2.28 2.6795 2.9419 3.074 3.1174 3.1904 3.39
Netherlands 2.03 1.98 2.12 1.82 1.87 1.76 1.86 1.82
New Zealand 1.70 1.53 1.67 1.68 1.73 1.86 1.85 1.69
Norway 6.74 6.52 6.90 6.26 6.48 6.21 7.09 7.06
Portugal 140.88 143.94 157.46 142.31 144.35 134.82 160.65 166.00
Spain 123.48 116.49 118.38 101.94 103.93 102.40 127.24 134.00
Sweden 6.34 6.13 6.45 5.92 6.05 5.82 7.78 7.72
Switzerland 1.49 1.46 1.64 1.39 1.43 1.41 1.48 1.37
Turkey 857.22 1419.40 2121.68 2606.50 4168.99 6860.60 10968.70 29778.00
United Kingdom 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.67 0.65
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: OECD
68
Inte
rnat
iona
l Lea
sed
Line
Pric
e be
twee
n S
elec
ted
OE
CD
cou
ntrie
s (A
in T
able
10)
(Mon
thly
pric
e of
56
/ 64
kbit/
s D
igita
l Lea
sed
Line
Ser
vice
)
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ita
.Ja
p.N
eth.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
wa.
Sw
i.T
ur.
UK
US
Ave.
From
Aul.
Aul
.11
074
Aus.
1475
3A
us.
8867
Bel.
9331
7008
Bel
.63
14C
an.
7887
9684
6625
Can
.72
73D
en.
1053
761
0843
6061
55D
en.
5594
Fin.
8955
6739
4828
6250
1843
Fin
.56
03Fr
a.13
941
7512
4178
5815
4864
4794
Fra
.65
89G
er.
1140
269
7847
9764
9140
6847
8445
81G
er.
6699
Gre
.12
403
8742
6831
9698
5654
5902
6797
7988
Gre
.79
12Ita
.10
252
7341
5862
6611
4954
5202
4944
5926
5846
Ita.
6718
Jap.
1351
520
122
1470
010
810
1590
614
325
1570
916
013
1777
315
622
Jap.
1549
8N
eth.
9005
6483
4175
5855
3572
3764
5222
4578
5767
5067
1437
4N
eth
5780
Nor
.89
2073
4451
6462
1519
8919
4553
9952
2859
2852
2814
289
4369
Nor
.58
88Po
r.11
922
8386
6206
7031
5648
6089
6001
6875
7512
6270
1638
254
1261
14P
or.
7493
Spa.
8953
7407
5227
6247
4320
4568
4690
5452
5991
5291
1432
248
1359
2247
26S
pa.
6310
Swa.
9659
7036
4856
6004
1747
1703
5091
4921
6345
5646
1502
940
4518
4965
3253
92S
wa
.58
42
Swi.
8679
6273
4525
5974
4593
4524
3876
4495
6527
4857
1404
939
8351
2961
7151
9248
21S
wi.
6055
Tur.
1655
212
001
1009
113
847
9176
9162
1045
310
490
6533
1038
921
921
9027
9187
1138
692
5196
0597
87T
ur.
1106
0U
K10
758
7312
4047
6292
3700
3893
4984
5196
7874
5196
1612
839
3844
9851
0049
4241
9050
9711
134
UK
6373
US
1298
511
249
7152
4696
7097
7193
6341
7017
1022
471
3713
466
6381
7157
8596
7190
6530
6500
1014
268
18U
S80
98
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ita
.Ja
p.N
eth.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
wa.
Sw
i.T
ur.
UK
US
Ave.
1.
Le
ase
d li
ne
ch
arg
es
are
ca
lcu
late
d b
y a
dd
ing
ha
lf le
ase
d li
ne
pri
ce o
f b
oth
te
rmin
atin
g c
ou
ntr
ies.
2.
Le
ase
d li
ne
ch
arg
es
are
th
e c
he
ap
est
pri
ce a
vaila
ble
at
Se
p.
19
94
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
, IT
U/L
YN
X
69
Tot
al In
tern
atio
nal S
impl
e R
esal
e P
rice
per
min
ute
for
Sel
ecte
d O
EC
D c
ount
ries
(D
in T
able
10)
[Per
min
ute
pric
e of
56
/ 64
kbit/
s D
igita
l Lea
sed
Line
Ser
vice
+ C
all C
harg
es o
n bo
th e
nds
(0 k
m)]
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ita
.Ja
p.N
eth.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
wa.
Sw
i.T
ur.
UK
US
Ave.
From
Aul.
Aul
.0.
39Au
s.0.
39A
us.
0.38
Bel.
0.25
0.25
Bel
.0.
32C
an.
0.18
0.28
0.19
Can
.0.
30D
en.
0.28
0.24
0.18
0.18
Den
.0.
30Fin
.0.
210.
220.
160.
150.
09F
in.
0.28
Fra.
0.35
0.26
0.17
0.17
0.19
0.16
Fra
.0.
32G
er.
0.28
0.24
0.17
0.17
0.15
0.14
0.16
Ger
.0.
31G
re.
0.28
0.25
0.19
0.22
0.17
0.14
0.19
0.20
Gre
.0.
31Ita
.0.
260.
250.
200.
180.
180.
160.
180.
180.
16Ita
.0.
30Ja
p.0.
340.
540.
400.
270.
430.
370.
420.
410.
430.
41Ja
p.0.
51N
eth.
0.23
0.24
0.16
0.16
0.15
0.13
0.19
0.16
0.16
0.17
0.39
Net
h.
0.30
Nor
.0.
230.
250.
180.
170.
110.
080.
190.
170.
160.
170.
380.
16N
or.
0.30
Por.
0.29
0.27
0.20
0.18
0.19
0.17
0.19
0.20
0.19
0.19
0.42
0.18
0.19
Por
.0.
32Sp
a.0.
210.
240.
170.
150.
150.
130.
160.
160.
150.
160.
370.
150.
170.
14S
pa.
0.19
Swa.
0.23
0.23
0.16
0.15
0.09
0.07
0.17
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.38
0.14
0.08
0.18
0.15
Sw
a.0.
29Sw
i.0.
300.
310.
250.
240.
250.
220.
230.
230.
260.
250.
460.
230.
250.
270.
240.
23S
wi.
0.38
Tur.
0.39
0.34
0.28
0.33
0.26
0.23
0.29
0.27
0.16
0.28
0.54
0.25
0.25
0.29
0.24
0.25
0.34
Tur
.0.
40U
K0.
290.
270.
180.
190.
170.
150.
200.
190.
220.
190.
440.
170.
180.
190.
170.
160.
270.
31U
K0.
33U
S0.
330.
350.
240.
150.
240.
210.
220.
220.
270.
230.
370.
220.
230.
260.
220.
200.
300.
280.
24U
S0.
36
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ita
.Ja
p.N
eth.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
wa.
Sw
i.T
ur.
UK
US
Ave.
1.
Le
ase
d li
ne
ch
arg
e p
er
min
ute
is c
alc
ula
ted
ass
um
ing
th
at
64
kb
it/s
lea
sed
lin
e h
as
fou
r vo
ice
pa
ths
with
25
pe
r ce
nt
usa
ge
ra
tio.
2.
Le
ase
d li
ne
ch
arg
es
are
ca
lcu
late
d b
y a
dd
ing
ha
lf le
ase
d li
ne
pri
ce o
f b
oth
te
rmin
atin
g c
ou
ntr
ies.
3.
Le
ase
d li
ne
ch
arg
es
are
th
e c
he
ap
est
pri
ce a
vaila
ble
at
Se
pte
mb
er
19
94
. I
DD
co
llect
ion
ch
arg
es
are
fro
m J
an
ua
ry 1
99
5.
4.
Ca
lcu
latio
n u
ses
19
94
exc
ha
ng
e r
ate
s.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
, IT
U/L
YN
X
70
The
Rat
io o
f Tot
al In
tern
atio
nal S
impl
e R
esal
e P
rice
per
min
ute
com
pare
d to
IDD
colle
ctio
n ch
arge
in S
elec
ted
OE
CD
cou
ntrie
s (D
/E in
Tab
le 1
0)
To
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ita
.Ja
p.N
eth.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
wa.
Sw
i.T
ur.
UK
US
Ave.
From
Aul.
30%
19%
17%
24%
18%
30%
23%
19%
13%
26%
20%
20%
20%
14%
20%
23%
27%
29%
34%
Aul
.22
%Au
s.25
%36
%25
%34
%20
%38
%34
%36
%23
%34
%34
%36
%24
%34
%33
%44
%31
%39
%32
%A
us.
32%
Bel.
16%
42%
21%
29%
21%
34%
34%
30%
20%
27%
33%
24%
31%
26%
22%
42%
31%
35%
26%
Bel
.29
%C
an.
20%
30%
17%
22%
19%
24%
18%
16%
18%
23%
26%
21%
15%
10%
24%
38%
20%
33%
37%
Can
.23
%D
en.
22%
42%
35%
20%
25%
37%
35%
27%
28%
34%
30%
30%
30%
24%
25%
50%
35%
39%
27%
Den
.31
%Fin
.25
%40
%29
%18
%34
%29
%27
%26
%28
%25
%24
%31
%31
%24
%25
%42
%42
%28
%26
%F
in.
29%
Fra.
20%
40%
30%
19%
28%
23%
29%
28%
21%
24%
34%
28%
29%
28%
25%
42%
30%
35%
25%
Fra
.28
%G
er.
15%
34%
24%
14%
22%
18%
23%
29%
23%
22%
22%
21%
28%
23%
19%
33%
34%
27%
18%
Ger
.24
%G
re.
23%
55%
34%
18%
30%
26%
34%
36%
16%
21%
29%
29%
34%
27%
28%
55%
35%
40%
22%
Gre
.31
%Ita
.15
%46
%36
%16
%33
%29
%32
%34
%29
%24
%32
%32
%35
%29
%31
%45
%34
%35
%21
%Ita
.31
%Ja
p.15
%19
%14
%12
%15
%13
%15
%14
%15
%14
%13
%13
%15
%13
%13
%16
%19
%15
%20
%Ja
p.15
%N
eth.
12%
30%
31%
18%
25%
13%
36%
30%
20%
18%
20%
20%
22%
19%
28%
47%
25%
28%
23%
Net
h.25
%N
or.
32%
51%
37%
29%
40%
30%
38%
34%
28%
35%
36%
32%
33%
30%
30%
52%
35%
36%
40%
Nor
.36
%Po
r.20
%30
%23
%12
%21
%16
%22
%23
%22
%17
%20
%20
%17
%16
%17
%31
%27
%21
%18
%P
or.
21%
Spa.
7%34
%24
%12
%21
%18
%22
%23
%21
%23
%15
%22
%25
%20
%21
%34
%24
%24
%17
%S
pa.
21%
Swa.
17%
36%
30%
19%
36%
25%
26%
28%
25%
32%
22%
26%
32%
29%
23%
36%
30%
33%
25%
Sw
a.28
%Sw
i.23
%42
%34
%28
%35
%31
%35
%32
%25
%24
%26
%40
%35
%27
%23
%32
%34
%47
%34
%S
wi.
32%
Tur.
22%
29%
24%
19%
22%
20%
25%
23%
21%
24%
31%
21%
21%
25%
20%
21%
30%
27%
16%
Tur
.23
%U
K33
%45
%38
%29
%37
%25
%43
%41
%49
%22
%33
%37
%30
%40
%38
%26
%59
%68
%37
%U
K38
%U
S21
%25
%15
%26
%17
%15
%18
%18
%14
%14
%23
%18
%18
%17
%14
%17
%21
%15
%23
%U
S18
%
Aul
.A
us.
Bel
.C
an.
Den
.F
in.
Fra
.G
er.
Gre
.Ita
.Ja
p.N
eth.
Nor
.P
or.
Spa
.S
wa.
Sw
i.T
ur.
UK
US
Ave.
1.
Le
ase
d li
ne
ch
arg
e p
er
min
ute
is c
alc
ula
ted
ass
um
ing
th
at
64
kb
it/s
lea
sed
lin
e h
as
fou
r vo
ice
pa
ths
with
25
pe
r ce
nt
usa
ge
ra
tio.
2.
Le
ase
d li
ne
ch
arg
es
are
ca
lcu
late
d b
y a
dd
ing
ha
lf le
ase
d li
ne
pri
ce o
f b
oth
te
rmin
atin
g c
ou
ntr
ies.
3.
Le
ase
d li
ne
ch
arg
es
are
th
e c
he
ap
est
pri
ce a
vaila
ble
at
Se
pte
mb
er
19
94
. I
DD
co
llect
ion
ch
arg
es
are
fro
m J
an
ua
ry 1
99
5.
4.
Ca
lcu
latio
n u
ses
19
94
exc
ha
ng
e r
ate
.S
ou
rce
: OE
CD
, IT
U/L
YN
X