General Ike: Eisenhower's Contribution to the Allied Forces Success in World War II

Whitney Welsh Gibbs (4461060)

MILH498: Senior Seminar in Military History

Professor Melinda Zupon

Paper written and submitted for fulfillment of Undergraduate Capstone requirements to American

Military University on March 18, 2016

Dwight D. Eisenhower came to be recognized as one of the most prominent military leaders

during the Second World War. With his experience at West Point Military Academy as well as his

participation during World War I overseas, gaining experience in service of top ranking generals,

Eisenhower was able to prove his utility and skill both on and off the battlefield in order to rise through

the ranks to assume command of the United States Army Forces in Europe as the United States entered

into World War II. Through knowledge, experience, and ingenuity, General Ike found success on the

battlefields of Europe against the Axis Powers the United States vigorously fought to defeat. Though

Eisenhower had played an integral role for many years of the Second World War as commander of the

United States Army's forces within the European theater, his appointment as Supreme Commander of

Allied forces in Europe led the Allies to expand their tactical operations in order to gain victory over

the Axis Powers.

Eisenhower was born in Denison, Texas and raised in Abilene, Kansas with one dream on his

mind; to become an officer within the United States Armed Forces.1 After being accepted to West Point

Military Academy, Eisenhower successfully completed his program and graduated in 1915 as Second

Lieutenant and was assigned to work in logistics within the army infantry throughout the First World

War; a position that would gain him a great amount of invaluable knowledge that he would be able to

utilize in the years of global conflict to follow.2 Rather unfulfilling, the assignments at bases around the

United States between 1915 and 1918 afforded the young lieutenant the opportunity to begin to develop

his own ideas on military strategy and how in which it may be utilized in order to yield much greater

success in battle.

In 1920, Eisenhower published articles advocating that “the Army make better use of tanks to

prevent a repetition of the static and destructive trench warfare of World War I” and was met with

opposition from his military superiors who condemned his views as insubordination against the official

tactical procedures of the infantry forces.3 Eisenhower’s vision was not quelled as he saw battle in ways

1

that other officers had not, which allowed him to rise through the ranks as a United States Army officer

as he worked closely with General Fox Connor at the Panama Canal station and earn him a position at

the Command and General Staff College where he worked alongside Generals Pershing and

MacArthur.4 During this time, Eisenhower developed the ability to work together with generals he often

did not see eye to eye with and, although he disagreed, he was able to carry out orders of his superiors

which propelled his career to obtain a commanding role in the United States Army.

At the time World War II broke out in 1939, Eisenhower had been serving under MacArthur in

the Philippines; yet, soon after he was recalled to the United States in order to train the Third Army on

field maneuvers in Louisiana, with much success. Just nineteen years prior, Eisenhower had been

lambasted for his criticisms to the ways in which the infantry forces had fought during the First World

War; now he had successfully trained more than 400,000 infantry soldiers, proving his utility and

ingenuity on the battlefield where he excelled in strategic planning which earned him a promotion to

brigadier general.5 Eisenhower’s military planning abilities impressed even the most critical

commanders such as the ever-stern Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall.

Eisenhower continued to rise through the ranks of the United States Army until he was in

command of army forces put on the ground in North Africa in the 1942 Allied victory, Operation

Torch. During this campaign, Eisenhower was to bring the Allied forces of Britain and the United

States into Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, a region in which the Allies had exercised an overwhelming

control and would allow the forces to attack their adversaries in a pincer movement and gain victory.6

Eisenhower decided to utilize joint high command to successfully achieve both an amphibious and

aerial landfall into the crucial region held by the Vichy French.7 In order to quell resistance within the

region, the United States headed the mission and Eisenhower worked to unite the French forces in

favor of the Allies under Admiral François Darlan, whom was favoring the Germans at the onset of the

Second World War.8 The victory was crucial for the Allies in the war, not because it had the potential to

2

secure an overall victory in the war itself, but for the communication lines it would open in the

Mediterranean for the Allied Forces. These lines would not only make movement throughout the

Mediterranean possible, but it also freed up nearly six million tons of shipping power that Allied forces

could utilize elsewhere throughout the world in order to facilitate the lengthy war in which they had

entered just over three years earlier.9

His success during Operation Torch was, by all means, a reflection of his time spent working

alongside Army Chiefs of Staff and studying at West Point and the subsequent Command and General

Staff College. Rather than continuing the warfare trends of the Great War, Eisenhower looked beyond

the confines of trench warfare and brought forth, to a greater extent, the idea of a combined force

tactical plan. He also utilized the experiences of aiding General MacArthur, with whom he regularly

disagreed, in order to bring together tactical ideas and intelligence from various commanders within the

Allied forces; rather than taking sole command of the forces and implementing tactical plans purely of

his own design. Leading by example, Eisenhower and the other Anglo-American commanders brought

the forces together and taking into account the individual thought and tactical insight of his comrades,

which supplied a great majority of the forces within the operation; Eisenhower was able to increase the

flexibility and success rate of his forces. He also ordered his men to refrain from using force within the

operation unless they were met with resistance; a decision that could have turned French forces in

North Africa to favor the Germans and make it impossible for the Allies to build a stronghold within

the region.10

Eisenhower maintained his position as commander of the United States Army forces in the

European theater after the successes in the November 1942 Operation Torch as the United States began

to strengthen their presence within the fight within Europe and the Mediterranean. Eisenhower’s

influence grew within the proceeding months, during which time he took command of the British

Eighth Army forces that were making an advance west from Egypt. By February 1943, Eisenhower had

3

been promoted to General and headed the final blows of the Tunisia Campaign in order to bring an end

to the Afrika Korps led by German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and turn the Allied Forces’ efforts to

Italy.11 In A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, Williamson Murray states that,

“Eisenhower’s gifts as a conciliator and strategist were exceptional; he was also willing to learn from

experience. And his usually patient personality allowed him to mold a group of disputatious and

quarrelsome generals from different countries into a winning team. That nearly everyone

underestimated him was a major factor in his effectiveness. He was now to display those talents in

marshaling and organizing Allied forces attacking the Axis positions in Tunisia.”12

With these natural gifts, he was able to achieve great success for the Allied Forces. Whilst

creating a combined “Inter-Allied” headquarters, Eisenhower reorganized the relationships between the

air, sea, and land power of the Allied Forces. With his vision of a combined force tactical system,

relentlessly bombarding their German adversaries, Murray contends that the Tunisian Campaign and

the failure of the Afrika Korps to stop the Eighth Army Forces became Field Marshal Rommel’s “swan

song in Africa” from which his men could not recover; sending Rommel back to Germany by May

1943 and the Allies seizing approximately 275,000 soldiers in what is said to be “almost as critical a

defeat as Stalingrad, for it eliminated virtually all the German reserves in the Mediterranean.”13

Eisenhower’s success on behalf of the Allied forces did not stop there, however. In July that

very same year, the Allies turned their attention to Italy and planned to launch an invasion upon Sicily

where they would be able to land their forces onto the island and gain it control from the Axis Powers

and effectively open the Mediterranean to the Allies in order to create merchant shipping routes for the

first time in two years. General Eisenhower, after his crucial Allied successes in Northern Africa, was

once again charged with the role as commander of the operation. The operation was to expand the

Allied influence within the Mediterranean in order to push the Italian forces out of the war and greatly

damage the German effort within Western and Eastern Europe.14 Eisenhower’s role within the operation

4

was to take position as “Supreme Commander” of the forces invading Sicily; a task that many believed

Eisenhower was not capable of accomplishing. General Sir Alan Brooke stated that Eisenhower had

“neither the tactical [nor] strategical experience required for such a task. Making him senior could not

help flattering and pleasing the Americans in so far as we were placing our senior and most

experienced commander to function under their commander who had no war experience.”15 However,

with British General Harold Alexander still occupied within Tunisia, Eisenhower seemed to be the

most promising individual to lead the campaign and, with the assistance of Admiral of the Fleet

Andrew Cunningham as acting naval commander and Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder appointed as

air commander, Eisenhower’s team was to include a large number of British influence.16

As planning for what was to be named Operation Husky began, General Montgomery

contended that the plan of attack must be well organized and well understood in order to be properly

executed in favor of Allied Forces and Eisenhower saw the importance of this as well.17 Eisenhower

conceded to cooperation between all commanding officers assigned to the operation and recognized, as

Montgomery stated “unless we have a good and firm plan at once; on which we can all work there will

be no Husky in July.”18 Preparations were to include each commanding officer, just as that of the

operation in Tunisia which began in the fall of the year before. Eisenhower, while exercising the power

of Supreme Commander in Operation Husky, called together the assembly of Generals in order to

create a strategic outline of the campaign in which it was determined that the invasion would be

preluded by a series of strategic bombings upon various regions of Southern Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily;

in hopes of thwarting the Axis forces before they were able to anticipate the next Allied attack.19

Eisenhower called for deception tactics to be implemented prior to the invasion such as

concentrated bombings upon Italian and Sicilian airfields whilst leaving beach defenses unscathed so as

to not give away the intended site of the impending offensive.20 By concentrating the bombing exercises

on the surrounding airfields, the Allies could force the German Luftwaffe to retreat from the region,

5

making the response time during an Allied invasion much longer and, likely, much less effective.

Eisenhower also found that the preliminary bombing efforts also depleted the German resources as the

Allies were able to destroy more than four hundred Axis aircraft stationed on the island or within the

Italian region.21 Deception continued as the Allies began to release “secret documents” depicting

knowledge of an impending operation, also codenamed “Husky” that was planned to invade the shores

of Greece rather than Sicily; successfully causing the German forces to turn their attention to Greece

rather than the true intended target which would allow for the Allied forces to launch their offensive

with much less resistance, something that had been a great concern of General Montgomery and

General Eisenhower alike as early planning began in April.22

Eisenhower led his attack from headquarters in Malta and, despite poor weather conditions,

began the invasion on the evening of July 9th, 1943. Although these forces found difficulty reaching

their intended landing targets and both the aircraft and amphibious forces struggled to make significant

gains within the first hours of the operation, Eisenhower had been wise in his decision to launch an

invasion in adverse weather. The Axis forces remaining on the island did not expect a landing in such

conditions and, as such, were caught off guard as the Allied executed strategic landings in the east and

west; the largest seen in the Second World War thus far.23 Eisenhower was aware that his Italian

adversaries could not facilitate a pitched battle and this allowed for the Allied forces to keep on track

relatively well, despite the shortcomings brought forth due to the weather conditions of the day and the

Joint Task Force Operations Support System Force were able to capture the port at Licata.24 With the

Axis Powers’ weaknesses clearly apparent to their adversaries, Eisenhower and his comrades exploited

their advantages and divided the nation as they headed north from the beachhead, taking great portions

of the island and forcing the Axis to evacuate before their significantly stretched manpower was

depleted further by Allied gunfire; resulting in an Allied victory by August 17th.25

The invasion of Sicily and Eisenhower’s role in it, were of significant importance to

6

Eisenhower’s leadership development as well as contributions to the Allied Forces’ efforts in the

Second World War as a whole. Rather than exerting his power when he took command of the operation

in April 1943, Eisenhower responded to Brooke’s critical assertions of his appointment by stating that

he “ceased to concern himself directly with the details of the Sicilian operations.”26 He did not assume

entitlement when asked to cooperate with three other commanding officers while planning the invasion,

nor did he belittle their ideas on strategy and deception. Just as stated by Murray, Eisenhower was

gifted with the ability to bring together leaders of opposing viewpoints and argumentative dispositions

in order to find a suitable middle ground which, often times, yielded successful results in battle.27

Eisenhower also possessed the keen ability to see weakness within his enemy even as they

exercised a “home field advantage” and was able to pinpoint ways in which to exploit those

weaknesses in order to bring forth the most efficient results in loss of life and time spent on a

campaign. This meant that although factors in Eisenhower’s plans may have been affected by

unforeseen circumstances such as adverse weather conditions and miscalculations of intended targets,

there was room for error that may not have allowed for success if a strategy would have been chosen

that had not played to the weakness of the other side; such as that of a pitched battle which the Italian

forces in Sicily could not successfully engage in. In the same respect, Eisenhower also foresaw the

weaknesses of his own forces against the Axis Powers and responded to them prior to the initial

launching of Operation Husky. Recognizing that the German Luftwaffe forces were far superior to that

of the Allied air force capabilities, Eisenhower ordered for concentrated bombing on airfields rather

than the beach fortifications for which the Allies intended to land. With these bombings, Eisenhower

played with the idea that destroying an already exhausted German force would give Germany no way

of building back the strength of their air support prior to the intended date of landing. As such, with the

vast majority of the Luftwaffe fleet incapacitated within the region, the far less skilled Allied Air Force

could render more damage against the Axis Powers and ensure a relatively unopposed landing for

7

amphibious forces on the island. Each of these factors taken into account and the tactics implemented

by Eisenhower during the battle, disproved the assumption that Eisenhower’s appointment as Supreme

Commander of the operation was solely to appease the American forces; but, rather, that his experience

made him more than capable of meeting the task at hand.

This early portion of the war which brought the United States into combat within the European

theater and saw Eisenhower take direct command of forces on the battlefield for the first time was

crucial to the success of the Allies, perhaps even more so than the latter years of the war. As

Eisenhower took command of forces in Northern Africa, he made the decision to be an active

participate in the theater, having his war room not stationed in the United States or England, nations

where he would have been much safer and could have concentrated on numerous engagements

simultaneously, but instead opted to focus all his efforts on the sole task of securing North Africa; a

decision initially criticized by a large majority of Eisenhower’s superiors. This, however, gave

Eisenhower the advantage of quick decision making during the campaign as he was far more likely to

receive swift news from the battlefield and, as such, change the direction of his forces very quickly if

needed. With a better reaction time, the Allies were able to achieve an advantage over the German

forces in North Africa as they could cut off the head of the dragon, so to speak, before their adversaries,

whose forces were badly stretched beyond their capabilities in numerous theaters, could react.

The first engagement Eisenhower commanded against the Afrika Korps was also extremely

important to the Allies success in the Second World War for whom the campaign successfully

incapacity within the German Army. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was tasked with one job as he took

command of the Afrika Korp forces; to “prevent a complete collapse of the Axis position in North

Africa.”28 Rommel had found success since his assignment in North Africa which was gaining support

by foreign nations of Europe; support tending to favor the side which seems most likely to win the war

more so than that of ideological parallels. As support grew, especially support of the French of whom

8

largely populated the region of Africa both sides were struggling to hold, the potential for success of

the Allies became much less of a reality. In order to gain the support of key nations in favor of the

Allies, they needed to prove that a war to the scope and vastness of the Second World war was far

beyond the capabilities of the German forces. To accomplish this, the Allies had to secure the region

and effectively not only stop the Afrika Korps in North Africa, but also make Rommel incapable of

leading forces within the war. With the success of the Tunisian Campaign, the Allies were able to do

just that and force the German field marshal back to his home country, in need of medical care.

At the time in which Rommel took in the region, he was able to ensure that “British air attacks

from Malta and the fields around Benghazi would not strangle Axis forces in Libya by cutting off the

supply lines to North Africa from Italy.”29 As Eisenhower and his men moved in, the situation

drastically changed. Eisenhower was aware that even if his forces were able to secure North Africa,

there would be little success in a landing on the French coast by the Allies; however, if the forces could

secure the region and gain victory over the Germans, the Mediterranean where Germany had entrusted

much of the responsibility to the their Italian allies, and would be a key region in which the Allies

could further compel Germany to extend their army and resources. If Germany exhausted their efforts

too far in any direction, but particularly away from the main theaters on the Eastern and Western fronts,

they would continue to lose crucial ground and eventually either have to surrender or suffer an

overwhelming defeat to their adversaries.

As Eisenhower made very clear with his concentrated energy to gain victory in North Africa,

the greater the threat by the Allies of exercising control in one region, the greater the likelihood of

Germany to respond to that threat which would give the Allies the opportunity to dwindle the forces of

their opposers. Germany had assigned one of their most daring commanders to the North African

region as the British held a large majority of the surrounding region and with this, the Allies were given

the opportunity to successfully push forward and take out the command of the enemy forces that had

9

held the territory for so long. What then could this mean for the campaign in Sicily? Was Eisenhower’s

success further into the Mediterranean just as important to the success of the Allies as a whole in the

Second World War?

The Allied Invasion of Sicily, Operation Husky, and Eisenhower’s successful leadership of the

forces during the operation proved to be just as important, if not more important, than Operation Torch

in South Africa in the previous year had been to the success of the Allies in the Second World War.

Prior to the offensive, the Axis Powers had exercised dominance in the Mediterranean and had

restricted Allied merchant shipping routes and communication lines within the region. This meant that

the Allies would have difficulties launching a large scale campaign that could successfully topple Italy,

Germany’s colleague, and greatly weaken German forces within the European theater. It is important to

note that while Italy was not the most influential strength of the Axis Powers, the participation of

Germany on the Eastern Front was dependent upon Italy’s ability to maintain control over the

Mediterranean. Without this, the Allies would have the ability to make their way into the Eastern Front

from the South and overwhelm the already depleted German forces before they could gain an

irrepressible victory against the Red Army.

After being charged with the command of all the participating forces of the offensive,

Eisenhower made a crucial decision that would not only affect the operation itself but the war as a

whole. Eisenhower had proven himself to be capable of commanding a successful operation on his

own. He had been formally trained for many years prior to the war and had the keen ability to think

outside the realm of that of the average soldier in battle which made him an excellent candidate as

supreme commander of Operation Husky. However, Eisenhower decided that it would be in the best

interest of the campaign to bring together the strategies and ideas of all the commanding officers

involve; for he understood that the war was not able to be won by one nation alone and commanding

the forces of various nations without the unification and aid of their own, familiar commanders would

10

not lead to success on the battlefield. Instead, he brought unification to the root of the Allied army and

built a trust and confidence within the forces that would create a strong collective force that would

carry throughout the remainder of the war.

Eisenhower’s success during the Allied Invasion of Sicily brought the Allied forces leaps and

bounds closer to gaining victory over the Axis Powers in the war. With control of Sicily falling from

the Germans and Italians into the hands of the Allies, it put Germany in a precarious position.

Mussolini, Italian leader during the Second World War, had struggled since Germany had secured the

Mediterranean in 1941, to maintain control of the region without German intervention.30 As the Allies

cut through Sicily, it was clear that their next target would be mainland Italy in order to throw

Mussolini himself from power and secure a route to the Eastern Front. This became abundantly clear to

the Axis Powers as well, however, their forces were stretched in supply and number in two theaters;

three would, without a doubt, lead to disastrous consequences on the battlefield.

With this in mind, the Allies made their move into the Italy and were able to overthrow

Mussolini and take control of the region.31 Germans engaged in heated battle against the Allies in the

East, had lost their secure route of retreat in the south as well as an ally which supplemented both

soldier and supplies to the Axis forces, making it possible to maintain the war for the years leading up

to the fall of the Italian government. This left Germany with no choice but to reassign some of their

men from the Eastern theater to the Mediterranean in an attempt to take back the crucial sea-bordered

region from their adversaries. With the displacement of German soldiers from the Eastern Front, the

Allies were able to renew their efforts against a now much smaller army which would prove to make an

astounding difference on the battlefield. If the Allies were able to secure victories on the Eastern Front

and keep the Germans from capturing the Russian stronghold of Moscow, they would be able to deplete

the German forces enough that the Germans could no longer afford to concentrate their efforts within

the region; whilst simultaneously weakening the forces throughout the other regions of the European

11

theater while the German forces attempted to maintain their influence within the western, eastern, and

Mediterranean fronts.

Based on his successful lead of the forces in Africa and the Mediterranean, it was seen fit that

Eisenhower be assigned the role of Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe. Once an aide-

de-camp to MacArthur, Eisenhower was now leading forces on all fronts in Europe while his former

superior took command of the war in the Pacific. Eisenhower’s appointment, however, was not initially

warmly welcomed by all the Allied belligerents. David T. Zabecki writes that MacArthur was always

seen as Eisenhower’s greatest competition and even found himself resentful of Eisenhower’s

“meteoric” rise in ranks during the Second World War.32 The appointment of Eisenhower as Supreme

Commander of Allied Forces in Europe was also met with much chagrin from the British soldiers

fighting in the theater. While being highly educated at West Point and the Command and General Staff

College, many British forces saw the appointment as unwarranted as Eisenhower had heard “no shots

fired in anger until November 1942.” 33

British First Viscount Alan Brooke was a “decorated combat veteran of both World Wars and

had twice commanded a corps in World War II”; clearly seen as more than capable to lead the Allied

forces to victory. Beyond this, Britain’s most iconic soldier had been looked over to in the wake of

Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe.34 The British believed that British

General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery was much better suited for the role of Supreme Commander for

his efforts leading the British 21st Army Group and that Montgomery himself was far more capable of

leading the war to a swift and decisive victory against the Germans.35 Yet, Eisenhower possessed an

understanding that Montgomery did not, which proved to be crucial to the victory of the Allies in the

war. Unlike Montgomery who had pushed for a singular approach in forging a path to Germany,

Eisenhower constructed a strategy to include all fronts of the war in order to defeat the Axis Powers;

which to some, was seen as an attempt to draw out the war.36 Eisenhower, however, clearly understood

12

that a war against the Axis needed to continue to spread their adversaries forces as thinly as possible in

order to gain an advantage over them and, for this reason, multiple fronts were seen by Eisenhower as

key components to success. As Eisenhower took over the multi-front war in Europe, he also was given

command of troops under the direction of generals such as Patton whom was actively liberating Nazi-

ran concentration camps across Europe. In this time Eisenhower was responsible for the direction of the

forces and their treatment of the opposition within the region as well as the citizens whom had

complied with the camps for the years of the war.

The task of deciding how to liberate the death camps and the ways in which to manage the

captured Axis forces fell to the shoulders of Eisenhower; a task of great importance for the support and

ultimate success of the Allies within the war as a whole. If the Allies could swiftly and conclusively

liberate the prisoners of the concentration camps and bring to the forefront the atrocities conducted by

the German forces during the war, they would have concrete justification for their efforts against the

Axis Powers and would continue to earn the support necessary in order to facilitate an offensive

mission that would bring German to its knees. Therefore, Eisenhower commanded that the citizens of

the Allied and Axis nations not be shelter from the scenes of violence and death evident in the seized

death camps found within the European theater. To this regard, a letter has been preserved, written by

Eisenhower in response to General Patton on April 18th, 1945 in which he states, “Thank you a lot for

informing me about the new camp you found near Weimar. I suggest that every visitor coming into that

region should be urged to see the place if it is at all possible to arrange trips for them.”37

Eisenhower’s focus did not, however, leave the battlefield as he took charge as Supreme

Commander and led the forces of the Allied Army to victory in the final years of the Second World

War. The United States had expressed interest, since their engagement in North Africa during

Operation Torch, in making their way into what was now German occupied France in order to forge a

route to Germany which would dismantle the German supply lines in the region and weaken the

13

German forces to a point of surrender. With this in mind, Eisenhower turned his focus to what would

become one of the most well-known offensive operations conducted by the Allies in the war, Operation

Overlord.

The objective of Operation Overlord was fairly simple; the Allied forces hoped to invade the

German occupied Western European region, regain control within the territory, and unseat Adolf Hitler

in order to bring an end to the, at the time, five years of conflict that had battered and divided the

nations of the world. Both the Germans and the Allies knew that in order for the war to be won, a

cross-channel invasion would have to be launched against the Germans. The question remained as to

how the Allied forces would gain success within the region against an adversary that possessed the

advantage of a direct line of communication and supply to their home nation. Once again bringing

together the commanding officers of the Allied Forces, Eisenhower began to construct a plan which

would utilize deception, joint force operations, and trust in order to successfully invade and liberate

their French allies. The Germans had begun their preparations of the crucial landholdings by

constructing “millions of mines, thousands of bunkers and field fortifications, tens of thousands of

poles in fields to interfere with glider landings, and anti-boat obstacles along the beaches.”38

These preparations were enough to bring worry to the hearts of even the most skilled forces and

Eisenhower and his team responded by choosing to land not only at dawn, when visibility would be

low, but also during low tide which limited their potential for execution to only a few days a month.

For this plan to work, the landing could not be postponed for any reason including adverse weather

conditions or the preparedness of the opposing forces at the landing position, for the entire operation

was reliant upon the capturing of a major port in the initial days of the campaign, and it became even

more crucial for the offensive operation to take the enemy by surprise. The heavy reliance on accuracy

and success in the operation brought forth numerous obstacles that the Allies needed to overcome.

The first obstacle arose within the ever-differing perspectives of Anglo-American forces which

14

had, since their alliance began within the war, hindered the success of the Allies on the battlefield.

Murray writes, “If Ike deserves the accolade of ‘great,’ it rests on his performance in managing the

generals under his command, as fractious and dysfunctional a group of egomaniacs as any war had ever

seen.”39 Where the British forces were heavily reliant on firepower to overcome their opposers, the

Americans understood the necessity of maneuverability on the battlefield in order to gain success

against the Germans and finding a middle ground between the two very different strategies in which

both sides could agree to participate, was not always the easiest of tasks.

Yet another crippling obstacle the Allies faced when preparing for Operation Overlord was the

inescapable weakness of the Allied forces in weaponry and tactic. Although on the battlefield for many

years prior, the British and Canadian forces had done little to prepare themselves for the large scale

invasion at hand. Lower level British troops “possessed no common doctrine” which made training

inconsistent and ineffective; making even the most basic infantry strategy a game of chance rather than

organized skill.40 Further still, the American forces were met with their own shortcomings which

desperately needed to be addressed prior to the invasion. Although adaptable on the battlefield, the

Americans had not participated in the war for as long as either the Germans or the British and, as such,

did not possess the tactical sophistication of a seasoned army.41

These weaknesses of the Allied army had to be addressed and Eisenhower was keenly aware

that the task fell upon his shoulders to do so. Taking Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder as his chief deputy

whom worked tirelessly to construct the initial plans for the invasion, Eisenhower brought together

Ramsey, Montgomery, Leigh-Mallory, Smith, Gale, Creasy, Bull, Strong, Guingand, Wigglesworth,

Robb, Nevins, Patton, and Bradley in order to create an integrated strategic outline that married both

the ideas of the London as well as Washington into a cohesive offensive against the Germans.42 This

union allowed for the quarreling allies to bring forth an array of strategies which could then be sorted

through until the commanders could agree upon a singular strategy, making the probability of success

15

much higher than it could have been if there remained a chance of insubordination within the forces.

The invasion itself was a matter of great importance to the Allied Forces’ success in the war and

was reliant upon the steps that Eisenhower took to prepare his men for the battle prior to landing.

Eisenhower’s main tool for executing a successful invasion was information gathering on all levels of

the tactical planning front. This is crucial to battle and historically, has been seen as the downfall of the

Allied forces such as during the Gallipoli Campaign as part of the First World War when the Allied

ANZAC Army miscalculated their landing position by one mile due to adverse weather conditions and

were met with formidable enemy fire as they struggled to make their way onto the beach and break

away from the beachhead.43 As such, Eisenhower ordered weather reports of the landing position on

several occasions prior to the landing, including during the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary

Force (SCAEF) meeting on June 2, 1944 at 1000 hours and again, for a much more critical examination

at 2130 on that same day.44

This decision made by Eisenhower to create the most accurate understanding of the conditions

in which the Allied Forces would be landing was climacteric to the operation as a whole. As the

Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces knew, there was only a limited window of opportunity for

the landing, if the Allies hoped to find success against their German adversaries. Weather, although it

could not be a factor that the Allies allowed to end the campaign before it had begun, had to be taken

into account for various reasons. One of the most important factors that is determined by weather is

visibility. The Allied forces had decided to launch a joint forces attack which was to include aerial

bombings which would precede an amphibious beach landing; if the weather conditions created low

visibility within the region, there would be a greater chance of miscalculations during both the bombing

and landing operations. With in-depth examinations of the weather conditions during the preparations

for the operation, the Allies could account for discrepancies in the visibility of the forces which would

then allow for the most accurate and effective implementation of the campaign strategy on the

16

battlefield. The minor calculation adjustments necessary to, most importantly, the aerial bombing

campaigns had the potential for being the deciding factor as to whether or not the Allied Forces cleared

the German coastal defenses and broke free of the beachhead. While Eisenhower’s forecast tracking

played an integral role in the success of the Allied Forces at the Invasion of Normandy and paved the

way for the surrender of the Germans, there were also several other steps that Eisenhower took in order

to guarantee success of his forces in June of the year 1944.

A war cannot be won if the belligerents cannot gain support within their societies. Further still,

wars are not won by the senseless killing of innocent bystanders whilst attempting to gain an advantage

over the enemy. France had been captured by the German forces four years prior to the Invasion of

Normandy and with the invasion came the hopes of liberating the French people from the grasp of their

German opposers. A campaign of such a magnitude which was to include both aerial and land

operations would surely put the French citizens within the region in a dangerously close proximity to

battle and would increase the chances of injury or even death due to friendly fire. The loss of innocent

lives, one of the acts of the German Forces condemned by the Allies during the war, would be without

a doubt needless and could lose the support of not only the British, Americans, and their European

allies, but also their governments as well which fund the war effort.

Eisenhower and his council of Allied commanders decided that warning the French citizens of

the campaign prior to invasion would allow for a minimal number of civilian casualties within the area

which would then clear the path for the Allies as they made their way toward Paris. For this reason,

Eisenhower ordered, under the suggestion of Air Chief Marshal Tedder, that leaflets be dropped to the

French civilians that would provide warning to the citizens as well as provide aerial cover of the region

during “D-Day and subsequent days.”45 These precautions not only helped forge an unrestricted

battlefield for the Allies against the Germans, but it also helped to show the French that the Allies saw

their safety as their priority and would then encourage the French to aid in the Allied campaign to bring

17

the German forces in Europe to a crippling end; a partnership that would only strengthen the Allies

more against the weakening forces of the Axis Powers.

As the battle drew near, it was clear what this campaign truly meant to the overall success of the

Allied nations in the Second World War. If Eisenhower’s men could successfully land in Normandy,

France and secure the German route across Belgium into Germany, the German forces in Paris would

be cut off from reinforcements and be forced to surrender the region to their adversaries; at which point

the Allies would have gained crucial ground and received the support necessary to press forward into

Germany where they could halt a resurged German advance and end the war. The situation on the

Eastern Front continued to become more dire for the Axis Army as their Red Army opposers began to

successfully thwart their campaign to take control of Moscow.46 The possibility of the Germans pulling

their men from the region seemed unrealistic; yet, continuing to maintain more than one front without

another strong nation coming to their aid was proving to be an impossible feat. It did, however, set the

Allied Forces in an even stronger position as Operation Overlord crept ever nearer.

Since the success of the Allies was dependent on their opponent’s army being numerically and

provisionally weak, Eisenhower wanted the German forces to focus their attention away from the

Normandy shores so as to be confronted by the least amount of opposition possible when they launched

the operation. For this reason, two deception campaigns named Operation Bodyguard and Operation

Fortitude were launched in order to convince German intelligence examiners that the Allied Forces

were targeting separate regions within Europe that the Germans would then hope to stop before the

forces could reach their Soviet allies on the Eastern Front. With Operation Fortitude came Fortitude

North and Fortitude South which led the Germans to believe that the Allies had plans to target Norway

and Pas de Calais, respectively, in July of that very same year; thus, turning the attention away from the

beach front on along the English Channel.47 The deception was successful in many ways and, although

Germany had still laden the shores with numerous mines and shore fortifications, they had not

18

concentrated a large number of their forces to the region; creating a much greater possibility for

success of the Allied Army.

The preparations made by Eisenhower were meticulous and could even be seen by some as

unnecessary, such as continuing the elaborate deception operations even after the landing at the beaches

in Normandy, France; however, the steps taken undoubtedly assured the Allied victory in June 1944.

On June 6th at eight in the morning, Eisenhower wrote to General George C. Marshall of the progress of

the initial beach landings; of this, he wrote, “All preliminary reports are satisfactory. Airborne

formations apparently landed in good order with losses out of approximately 1250 airplanes

participating about 30. Preliminary bombings by air went off as scheduled. Navy reports sweeping

some mines, but so far as is known channels are clear and operation proceeding as planned. In early

morning hours reaction from shore batteries was sufficiently light that some of the naval spotting plane

have returned awaiting call.”48

Even the initial hours of battle, with little reports flowing to the command center, seemed promising

and hopeful that a successful campaign was not only possible, but in fact probable. Great bounds had

been accomplished in these first initial hours of the operation which were crucial to the future success

of the Allied Forces. The most important outcomes of Eisenhower’s plan of Operation Overlord was

the “sufficiently light” reactions from shore batteries. This meant that there was not significant

resistance waiting for the forces on the beach, which in return could be attributed to the steps taken to

mislead the German adversaries prior to the initial landings.

The German forces were crucially weakened over the length of the war, however, if Germany

had not focused their attention away from the region, the aerial bombardment as well as the amphibious

landings would have been met with resistance that could have made it impossible to break free of the

beachhead or could have even postponed the subsequent landings of the campaign, leaving the initial

forces without sufficient reinforcements. Furthermore, the Germans exercised superiority in aerial

19

battle with their highly trained Luftwaffe forces and having the ability to launch a quick counterattack

during the initial bombings could have led to the loss of a much more significant amount of aircraft and

men for the Allies.

Without notable amounts of resistance, the Allies were put into a fortuitous position in which

they could secure the beachhead, which would create a clear path across the English Channel into

France for Allied Forces, and block the path of German soldiers crossing into France from Belgium

and Luxembourg. Having previously secured routes within the Mediterranean, this effectively detached

the remaining Axis Forces in France from gaining the supplies and numbers they needed in order to

launch a successful counter attack against the opposition and would be left with the decision to either

find a way in which they could retreat or surrender. Once the Allies were able to liberate Paris by

forcing a surrender of the German occupying forces, Western Europe would no longer be divided

between the two opposing sides and the Allied forces could make their way into Germany where they

would then be able to force a final surrender by the German government and officially end the war in

Europe by surrounding the Axis Powers on all sides.

Eisenhower had brought the Allied Forces to one of the first significant instances of superiority

in the war. For years the Allies had debated amongst themselves as to how and when their forces could

successfully launch an operation on the shores of France in order to regain the key to Western Europe.

Prior to Operation Overlord, the Southern shores of France had seemed to be the opportune objective,

however, with German forces concentrated on holding the Mediterranean region, a campaign by the

Allies would have surely ended with little to no significant gain in France and clearly would not have

led to the liberation of Paris. The operation launched on the much less fortified Northern shores of

France allowed for more than 2,052,200 Allied forces to overwhelm the just over one million German

troops by August 1944 and inflicting a fifty-three percent loss on the occupying forces as the Allied

army witnessed a loss of just over eleven percent of their forces participating Operation Overlord from

20

June 6th to August 30, 1944.49

The implications of a casualty count of that magnitude for the Germans was immense. At the

onset of the Second World War in 1939, the German population had reached 79.7 million with men

accounting for approximately 38.3 million of its inhabitants.50 By the time the war ended, the Germans

had lost over 7 million German citizens; at least half of which died on the battlefield.51 The war lasted a

total of six years and within three months of fighting during Operation Overlord, the Germans lost only

0.66 percent of their total population. However, if that same amount of German lives had been lost

every three months of the war during the six years of fighting, the total number of lives lost by the

Germans would have been, at the very least, 12,720,000; which would have been a staggering 15.95

percent of the 79.7 million citizens of Germany. Furthermore, if the Germans would have continued to

lose approximately 530,000 men from the time of the Invasion of Normandy to the end of the war, their

losses would have totaled roughly 1,749,000 within the remaining twelve months and three days of

war.

These losses would have been immense, as 12,720,000 is just over thirty-three percent of the

38.3 male citizens of Germany and 1,749,000 losses in just one year alone would have accounted for

4.56 percent of the German male population. Weakened and battered, the Germans were posed exactly

where the Allies need them to be by the operation largely constructed and led by Supreme Commander

General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Allies could then exploit their advantageous position on the

Western Front as the Red Army on the Eastern Front pushed the German forces away from the crucial

city of Moscow and toward a retreat back to their home nation. With a badly weakened and

unsupported German effort in the Mediterranean, there would be no way for the Germans to hold their

positions if, in fact, the deception operations Fortitude North and Fortitude South were legitimate and

the Allies would easily be able to make their way through Norway as well as through Pas de Calais on

the French coast with little chance of resistance; thus, forcing the surrender of the German forces and

21

ending the Second World War in Europe, in favor of the Allied Forces.

Though Eisenhower had not witnesses unfriendly fire in the years prior to his appointment in

Northern Africa during the Tunisian Campaign in the Second World War, he as a commander

contributed greatly to the success of the Allied forces in the war as a whole. Not only was Eisenhower

highly trained in leadership and strategy, working alongside some of the most highly regarded military

minds of his time in the years following his graduation from West Point Military Academy in 1915;

Eisenhower also gained much notability, and even at times, criticism from his peers and superiors for

his ability to think outside the box when looking to create a best possible strategy for success on the

battlefield. With both the Tunisian and Sicily Campaigns, Eisenhower exercised invaluable leadership

skills, taking a hands-on approach as commander and placed his focus solely on his forces in each

campaign in order to have the ability to quickly respond to the ever-changing conditions of the battle.

Eisenhower’s actions within these early battles grew support of the Allied Army within the crucial

nation of France which held the key to defeating the Axis Powers on the Western Front as well as North

Africa and would lead to increase Axis strength if the nation had seen hope in siding with the Germans.

Eisenhower was also able to secure the critically important Mediterranean region which allowed much

easier transportation of supplies and men for the Allies while fracturing Germany’s most prevalent ally,

the Italians.

As the War continued Eisenhower once again strengthened the Allied forces as he rose to the

position of Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe. In this position, Eisenhower was

successfully able to unify the Anglo-American commanders whom struggled to find a common ground

throughout the entirety of the war to the point that the military leadership of the nations were able to

come together and build a comprehensive and effective battle strategy in which each of the forces

played an integral role. Eisenhower also utilized his unique perspective of battle to take perceived

weaknesses of the nations and turn them into strengths in a joint force campaign which drove German

22

forces out of France and set the Allied Forces on the path of victory with a full surrender of the

Germans; thus, ending the war in Europe.

Eisenhower, a general once criticized by the British for being unqualified to lead the Allied

Forces within the war, proved to be a capable leader and an invaluable member of the Allied

commanding staff. With his patient and unapologetically deliberate demeanor, he was able to bring

together Britain, Canada, France, and the United States in order to bring the Axis Powers to its knees,

with over a half a million German forces lost in one campaign alone. For his efforts, the Allies were

given the tools to keep Germany from capturing Moscow and the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus,

uniting with the Vichy French which held much of North Africa, barring transportation routes within

the Mediterranean, and regaining control of France which held crucial route into Germany. Without

these great bounds, the Allies would have been unable to stop Germany from dominating the European

theater and risked losing the war in its entirety.

23

Notes

1. “Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969),” Accessed February 17, 2016,http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/eisenhower-dwight.cfm.

2. “Life Before Presidency,” Accessed on February 17, 2016,http://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/essays/biography/2.

3. Ibid.4. Ibid.5. Ibid.6. John Patch, Fortuitous Endeavor: Intelligence and deception in operation TORCH, Naval War

College Review 61 (4) (2008): 73.7. Ibid.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War,

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2000), 272-273.11. Ibid, 300.12. Ibid, 301.13. Ibid. 14. Mark Zuehlke, Operation Husky: The Canadian Invasion of Sicily, July 10-August 7, 1943

(Vancouver, Canada: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), 27.15. Ibid, 33. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid, 38-39.18. Ibid, 39.19. Ibid, 45.20. Ibid, 45-46.21. Ibid, 49-51.22. FH Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its influence on Strategy and

Operations (London, UK: Stationery Office Books, 1994), 341.23. Brigadier C. J. C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Campaign in Sicily 1943

and The Campaign in Italy 3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944, (Uckfield, UK: Naval &Military Press, 2004), 52.

24. Ibid. 25. Ibid, 168.26. Mark Zuehlke, Operation Husky: The Canadian Invasion of Sicily, July 10-August 7, 1943

(Vancouver, Canada: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), 33. 27. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War,

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2000), 301.28. Ibid, 101.29. Ibid. 30. Ibid, 108.31. Ibid, 303.32. David T Zabecki, PhD., U.S.A, "Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower,

Arnold, Bradley," Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 117-118.33. G. E. P. Murray, "Eisenhower as Ground-Forces Commander: The British Viewpoint,"

Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 97, no. 4 (2007): 153.

24

34. Ibid.35. Ibid.36. Ibid, 154.37. Dwight D. Eisenhower, General Eisenhower to General Patton in Response, April 18, 1945,

Letter, From the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library,https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/holocaust/1945_04_18_DDE_to_Patton.pdf (Accessed February 26, 2016).

38. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War,(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2000), 412.

39. Ibid, 416.40. Ibid, 417.41. Ibid.42. Unknown Author, Minutes of the SCAEF 21st Meeting, June 2, 1944, Manuscript, From the

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library,https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/d_day/Minutes_of_the_SCAEF.pdf (accessed February 26, 2016).

43. Harvey Broadbent, Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore, (Camberwell, Victoria: Viking/Penguin, 2005),45.

44. Unknown Author, Minutes of the SCAEF 21st Meeting, June 2, 1944, Manuscript, From theDwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library,https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/d_day/Minutes_of_the_SCAEF.pdf (accessed March 2, 2016).

45. Ibid.46. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War,

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2000), 408.47. John Keegan, The Second World War, (London, UK: Hutchinson, 1989), 279.48. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Message from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Gen. George C. Marshall

about the Invasion of Normandy on D-day, June 6, 1944. Letter. From the National Archives.https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/d-day-memo/#documents (accessed March 3,2016).

49. Stephen Badsey, Normandy 1944: Allied Landings and Breakout, (Botley, Oxfordshire, UK:Osprey Publishing, 1990), 85.

50. “Germany- Population: Historical Background,” Accessed February 4, 2016,http://countrystudies.us/germany/84.htm.

51. Ibid.

25

Bibliography

Badsey, Stephen. Normandy 1944: Allied Landings and Breakout. Botley, Oxfordshire, UK: Osprey Publishing, 1990.

Broadbent, Harvey. Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore. Camberwell, Victoria: Viking/Penguin, 2005.Country Studies. “Germany- Population: Historical Background.” Accessed February 4, 2016.

http://countrystudies.us/germany/84.htm.Eisenhower, Dwight D. General Eisenhower to General Patton in Response, April 18, 1945. Letter.

From the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.Eisenhower, Dwight D. Message from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Gen. George C. Marshall

about the Invasion of Normandy on D-day, June 6, 1944. Letter. From the National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/d-day-memo/#documents (accessed March 3, 2016).

https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/holocaust/1945_04_18_DDE_to_Patton.pdf (Accessed February 26, 2016).George Washington University. “Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969).” Accessed February 17, 2016.

http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/eisenhower-dwight.cfm.Hinsley, FH. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its influence on Strategy and Operations.

London, UK: Stationery Office Books, 1994.Keegan, John. The Second World War. London, UK: Hutchinson, 1989.Miller Center, University of Virginia. “Life Before Presidency.” Accessed on February 3, 2016.

http://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/essays/biography/2.Molony, Brigadier C. J. C. The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and The

Campaign in Italy 3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944. Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press, 2004.

Murray, G. E. P. "Eisenhower as Ground-Forces Commander: The British Viewpoint." Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 97, no. 4 (2007): 153-186,256.

Murray,Williamson and Allan R. Millett. A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2000.

Patch, John. Fortuitous Endeavor: Intelligence and deception in operation TORCH. Naval War CollegeReview 61 (4) (2008): 73.

Unknown Author. Minutes of the SCAEF 21st Meeting, June 2, 1944. Manuscript. From the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/d_day/Minutes_of_the_SCAEF.pdf (accessed February 12, 2016).

Zabecki, David T,PhD., U.S.A. "Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Arnold, Bradley." Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 116-118.

Zuehlke, Mark. Operation Husky: The Canadian Invasion of Sicily, July 10-August 7, 1943. Vancouver, Canada: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009.

26