generations and the expression of symbolic racism

Generations and the Expression of Symbolic RacismAuthor(s): Dana WardSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 1-18Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791267 .

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Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985

Generations and the Expression of Symbolic Racism

Dana Ward'

This article examines the generational transmission of racial attitudes and beliefs. The study is based on in-depth interviews with the adult children of the men first interviewed by Robert E. Lane for Political Ideology (1962). While little evidence pointed to the direct imprinting of specific racial beliefs on the cognitive level, there did seem to be a transfer of underlying attitudes on the affective level. The children with fathers who opposed miscegenation tended to be the people who opposed quotas, affirmative action, and bussing. It is argued that the familial atmosphere produced a reservoir of racism beneath the surface of otherwise tolerant beliefs. The fathers' opposition to miscegenation may have established a negative affective evalution of blacks within the second generation which remained even after schools, peers, the media and other socializing agents fundamentally transformed the cognitive constructions through which opinions about race relations were expressed. Issues laden with racial symbolism would then activate the negative affect, producing opposition to policies designed to achieve equality between races.

KEY WORDS: symbolic racism; prejudice; generations; socialization; Lane's Political Ideology.

INTRODUCTION

A paradox of recent American political history is that there has been a great deal of change in the expression of racial prejudice, while at the same time there may have been substantially less change in the amount of prejudice. For example, public support for segregationist positions has ap- proached the vanishing point on a number of specific issues including vot-

IPolitical Studies, Pitzer College, Claremont, California 91711.

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0162-895X/85/0300-000!$04.50/1 @ 1985 International Society of Political Psychology



2 Ward

ing rights, schools, public facilities, housing, and employment. As indicated by a number of national and subnational surveys (e.g., Taylor et al., 1978; Kinder and Sears, 1980; and Converse et al., 1980) the expression of what McConohay and Hough (1976) call "redneck racism" declined in the 1970s to somewhere around 10%0 of respondents from rates that, depending upon the question asked, were 20 to 60% higher in the 1950s [see Rothbart (1976), who summarizes findings from Brigham and Weissbach (1972), Campbell (1971), and others]. At the same time, it is quite evident that racial prejudice continues to play a forceful role in determining political behavior.

In the Kinder and Sears study of the 1969 and 1973 mayoral elections in Los Angeles, for example, the authors concluded that "the racial issue generally, and symbolic racism in particular, were central to white voters' choices" (1980, p. 15). More recently, in Bradley's 1982 campaign for the Senate there was some indication that the race issue continued to affect voting behavior, and, quite clearly, race was a significant issue in the Chicago mayoral contest between Washington and Epton. Evidently, the issue of race remains a potent political force.

Naturally, voting behavior is not the only area susceptible to the influence of racial prejudice. For example, the race related issues of bussing, quotas, and affirmative action programs continue to elicit opposition among a large majority of respondents [one half to three quarters depending on the specific issue and question asked; see Converse et al. (1980)], and some of that opposition may stem from racial prejudice. How much of this majority is composed of individuals with prejudicial attitudes toward minorities is very difficult to assess because of the possibility that prejudice may no longer be expressed in directly racial terms, but in more indirect symbolic terms.

In its traditional form racial prejudice has been manifested by negative racial stereotypes, support for racial segregation, opposition to interracial marriage, lower wages and fewer jobs for minorities, and more generally by judging individuals on the basis of presumed racial characteristics of the group. That is, individuals are prejudged on the basis of group membership, with the presumption that the "out" group is morally and intellectually inferior to the "in" group, with race defining group boundaries. Thus, ethnocentrism in general shares structural similarities with racism, the difference being the boundary criteria separating "in" and "out" groups.

In its symbolic form racism is expressed in terms of traditional political values, such as equality, rather than in the language of racial inferiority. In this form, opposition to policies and programs favoring minorities is based on the cognitive construction holding that the policies violate basic political principles of equality and justice, and on a negative affective evalu-



Generations and the Expression of Symbolic Racism 3

ation of the minority group's behavior or characteristics. Prejudice in this form is disguised, embedded in consensual political values, and therefore difficult to identify. Furthermore, the prejudice which underlies the expression of symbolic racism may be entirely unconscious, exacerbating the problem of identification even further.

Of course, there are a number of nonracist grounds upon which to oppose bussing, quotas, and affirmative action programs. The safety of children bussed over long distances is a concern, as is the time lost in travel. Even if one strongly favors the principle of racial integration, one might oppose bussing for fear of potential racial violence in a particular school. Bussing can also be opposed on the grounds that a family worked hard to be able to afford a home in a neighborhood noted for the quality of its schools. Here the QUALITY of education, not race, might be the sole concern. For example, the family might oppose having their children bussed out of their neighborhood but might not oppose having qualified minority children bussed into their schools. Fear of discrimination also might be a source of opposition to bussing. Similarly, some blacks oppose bussing on the grounds that their children might be placed in schools that are not sensitive to the needs and aspirations of minority children. Indeed, many ethnic groups might oppose bussing on the grounds of protecting their cultural heritage, arguing that the preservation of diverse cultural groupings is an essential part of the foundation of a vibrant American society.

Thus, opposition to bussing, as well as opposition to quotas or affirmative action programs, is not rooted in any one attitude or rationale. It is an extremely complex, multiply determined set of beliefs, and racial prejudice need not be part of the pattern of determination. The fundamen- tal distinction between racist and nonracist opposition is the underlying affective attitude toward minority groups. In both cases the cognitive constructs might be identical, but the affective valences are opposite.

For some people, then, opposition to bussing, quotas, or affirmative action can be a convenient conduit for the expression of racial prejudice. Since the problem of racial discrimination is at the core of these issues it is by no means unreasonable to expect that individuals holding prejudicial attitudes toward minorities would oppose policies designed to remedy the problem.

Such individuals, however, are faced with a problem. Over the last generation there have been tremendous legal, institutional, and ideological changes with regard to the acceptability of overtly racist beliefs and prac- tices. The problem, then, is to find culturally acceptable terms for resisting change and for the expression of racial prejudice. As Kinder and Sears argued, white supremicist, segregationist attitudes have been fairly effectively suppressed and that such attitudes "no longer can be a major political force"



4 Ward

(1980, p. 5). If prejudice is to play a role in politics it must do so through the use of culturally acceptable terms. Symbolic racism provides those terms in that it

... represents a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience and discipline. (Kinder and Sears, 1980, p. 5)

The emergent literature on symbolic racism (McConohay and Hough, 1976; Sears, Hensler and Speer, 1979; Sears and Kinder, 1971; and Kinder and Sears, 1980) assumes that the source of symbolic racism "is traceable to pre-adult socialization" (Kinder and Sears, 1980, p. 1). It is argued that prejudicial attitudes remain relatively unchanged but that the norms by which the prejudice is expressed have been changed. The prejudicial attitudes are learned early in childhood and one major source (among others) of these learned attitudes is the family. Despite the emphasis on preadult socialization, most studies of symbolic racism have relied upon aggregate survey data and have not attempted to establish a direct link between parental attitudes and expression of symbolic racism in subsequent generations except by citing evidence from general studies of prejudice. These studies of prejudice, however, have produced, in Phyllis Katz's words, "scanty and inconsistent" evidence on the intergenerational transmission of prejudice (Katz, 1976, p. 130). Furthermore, so far as I know, there have been no studies of symbolic racism that can provide direct, intrafamily evidence of parental racial attitudes.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to provide some empirical and cross-methodological corroboration for findings at the aggregate level as well as providing direct (albeit meager) cross-generational evidence on the im- pact of parental attitudes on the expression of symbolic racism. The study attempts to illustrate how parental attitudes influence the underlying affective orientation toward racial minorities while social and political factors influence cognitive judgments on racial issues. It should be emphasized, however, that since this is a clinical study the data are illustrative and sug- gestive, not definitive in any way. The data are qualitative complements to other quantitative studies.

THE STUDY

In 1958, Robert Lane conducted in-depth interviews exploring the ideologies of 15 "common" men in the city of "Eastport" and published the results in the widely noted book Political Ideology (1962). In 1976, I located the families of Lane's 15 men and interviewed the two oldest children of each man. I limited the subjects to the two oldest children for several reasons. One was that about half the men had only two children, whereas the




other half averaged almost six children. If I had included all the children in the large families, some of my comparisons would be affected by a family size effect. Characteristics peculiar to one or two families would bias the overall characterization of the group. Thus, I tried to equalize the family contribution by including only two children from each family. Another reason for limiting the children was that several of the children in the large families were still in their adolescence and therefore could not be expected to have fully developed ideologies. This, too, would have made for difficulties in comparing intragenerational differences. Then, of course, practical mat- ters loomed large. If I had included all the children, both the time and the cost involved would have doubled-and both commodities were already overextended. While the 30 children ranged in age from 18 to 42, two-thirds were within 2 years (+ or -) of age 27, with the remaining children cluster- ing much closer to the average age than the two extremes. Thus, for the most part we are dealing with people born in the decade immediately after World War II. Lane's original interview format was used, including the majority of the original questions as well as the updated ones dealing with recent events. The questions were open-ended and covered a wide range of issues, including race and equality. The interviews were conducted in a se- ries of four or five, 1 1/2- to 2-hr sessions. Other researchers have subse- quently reinterviewed the fathers, but their data are as yet unavailable.

With one exception (Farrel's family), the children come from working class backgrounds. They spent their early years in the same integrated housing project (Hilltop), but most had moved out by the time they entered high school. In terms of social mobility, there were few examples of stunning economic successes or failures and children tended overwhelmingly to follow their parents in their choice of occupation; e.g., the accountant's daughters are legal and medical secretaries, the policeman's sons are policemen, the tradesman's sons are tradesmen. With a few exceptions, the children continue to live in the communities to which they moved when their families left Hilltop. The most important socioeconomic variable dividing the group is level of educational attainment. Half the children had graduated from high school but did not go on to college, while the other half had at least some college experience (13 had more than 2 years of college of whom 11 graduated). Despite the educational differences, it would have to be said that, overall, the word which best describes the lives of Eastport's second generation is "stable."

THE EASTPORTIAN CONCEPT OF EQUALITY

The second generation of Eastportians interprets equality strictly as meaning that all people should be treated the same. Implicit, and often ex- plicit, in their view of equality is the idea that different people have differ-



6 Ward

ent abilities - people are not the same. These individual differences are what allow for social mobility and individual success, and, for the system of social and economic rewards to be regarded as just, talent and effort must be rewarded proportionately. Even circumstances beyond one's control such as the economic class into which one is born are not perceived as barriers to individual talent and effort:

I would say every man and woman has the same chance to better themselves. If you are fortunate enough to be in the higher class, you have a 50% more of a chance to better yourself. In your lower and middle class this is something you have to work harder and struggle for. If the person is willing, I think the opportunity is there for everybody. (Jeff Johnson)

Thus, even if the opportunities are perceived as differential according to class status, it remains the individual's responsibility to determine his fate. The second generation, then, is in agreement with the first generation's belief that:

America opens up opportunity to all people, if not in equal proportions, then at least enough so that a person must assume responsibility for his own status... The circumstances of American life do not imprison men in their class or station-if there is such a prison, the iron bars are within each man. (Lane, 1962, p. 61)

Virtually no one argued that equality meant that everyone had to BE the same. Instead, it was widely accepted that equality referred to equal political rights and equal economic opportunity. Similarly, with only one exception, there was no desire for what might be termed equality of effect. This single individual argued that since individuals differ, different treatments must be devised to accommodate those differences. Otherwise, equal treatments would simply perpetuate existing inequalities.

The other Eastportians were much more willing to ignore the variable distribution of individual skills and resources, since to take those differences into account would require a program that would violate the primary tenet of their view of equality: All people must be treated the same; anything else smacks of favoritism. Their overall position on equality could be summarized thus: Regardless of where one stands in the socioeconomic hi- erarchy, in terms of rights and the benefits derived from government programs, everyone should be treated exactly the same.

RACE AND EQUALITY IN EASTPORT

Virtually all Eastportians agreed that the principle of equal treatment could be applied only if the effects of previous discrimination against racial minorities had been eliminated. Not surprisingly, then, the major division in the group centered upon judgments of the degree to which the effects of




previous discrimination had in fact been eradicated. Half the group argued that since minorities had not been treated equally in the past and continued to suffer from the effects of that discrimination, a special effort was needed to ensure equal treatment in the present and future. Consequently, this half of the second generation offered at least some support for bussing, affirmative action programs, and (to a lesser extent) quotas.

The other half of Eastport's second generation opposed bussing, affirmative action programs, and quotas, arguing that although minorities had been discriminated against in the past, that is not the case now. They believed that the short period of remedial action to undo the effects of subjugation had expired. From now on, they argued, if blacks and other minorities are unable to succeed it is not the fault of society but of the minorities themselves. The difference between the two groups, then, is a matter of time. For the supporters of bussing and affirmative action, racial discrimination is still a problem facing their own and future generations. Those opposed view racial discrimination as a problem in their parents' generation, but not now for their black and Hispanic peers.

Despite clear statistical evidence to the contrary,2 there is a good deal of experiential support for the views of those Eastportians who oppose any further remedial actions to undo the effects of racial prejudice. The East- portians, after all, grew up in an integrated housing project, went to integrated schools, and many work side by side with blacks-facts to which the Eastportians made frequent reference. Their black and Puerto Rican contemporaries were seen as having been provided precisely the same educational opportunities as the Eastportians. Yet there remains basic division within the second generation concerning the continuation of programs to ensure that racial minorities do not face further discrimination.

What are the factors differentiating this otherwise quite homogeneous group? Is opposition to programs combating racial discrimination merely a function of a rational judgment of present race relations, or are there irra- tional, racist, or unconscious motivations that divide Eastport's second generation?

I will suggest that a major contributor to the Eastportians' attitude toward such programs is their parents' attitude toward minorities in general. In brief, the argument to be made is that for roughly two-thirds of those against affirmative action, quotas, and bussing, the opposition rests upon an unconscious, or only partially conscious reservoir of prejudice "inher-

2For example, blacks own less than 1 %7 of all privately owned land; the unemployment rate is consistently higher among blacks; black males earn approximately 60% of the average white male with the same educational background; infant mortality rates are much higher among blacks than among whites, and so forth.



8 Ward

ited," as it were, from the attitudes expressed by their parents. Further, I shall argue that there are three types of opposition to programs designed to combat racial prejudice: nonracist, latent racist, and overt racist. The argument begins by identifying the three types of opposition and ends by looking at the fathers' attitudes toward minorities and how those attitudes may have contributed to an underlying reservoir of prejudice in the second generation.

THE THREE TYPES OF OPPOSITION

Nonracist opposition is manifested by the complete lack of comments, over the course of 8 to 10 hrs of interviewing, that might be construed as derogatory toward minorities, by the care with which opposition is expressed, and by the deep concern exhibited that minority rights be re- spected. Surely, these are highly qualitative standards, and there is room for error. But from the clinical perspective from which this study was conducted it seemed that 4 of the 15 Eastportians who opposed these policies did so on the basis of a strong concern for freedom of choice or the welfare of the children involved. They were cautious in expressing opposition and deeply concerned that minorities be treated with utmost respect for their rights. The clinical judgment could be wrong, or the subjects might have misled the interviewer, but none of the four judged to be in opposition to the three public policies for nonracist reasons uttered any comments in- dicating a negative attitude toward minorities.

In contrast, five Eastportians opposed bussing, affirmative action, and quotas for what can only be described as racist reasons. They not only made numerous prejudical statements and tended to see themselves as prejudiced but also seemed particularly focused on the question of race. For example, Mike DeAngelo, sales manager at the printing company where most of his family works, is one of those most upset about attempts to reverse the effects of subjugation. Asked what life might have been like had he grown up in a black family, he responded:

Now we're getting into a heavy subject and we could probably go from now until seven hours from now. When you get on to black/white, I get very bitter. I don't consider myself a racist although at times I'll joke about it with guys. I grew up with black people. I lived at Hilltop for eighteen years of my life. Some of my best friends are black. My feeling is this: no one's going to convince me different and I don't care who tells me, they have as much opportunity in this country as any white person. I'm convinced of that and nobody will tell me different. If I build a government redevelopment project for them and they turn it into a slum and they hang their clothes out the window and they throw their garbage out into the street, they made it a slum, not me. I lived at Hilltop. It was predominantly white when we first lived there. When I grew up the place was neat. There were blacks there that were neat,




kept their houses nice, clean. Go there now. They have every opportunity to keep that place looking as good as it was when I lived there when I was two until I was eighteen. I didn't tell them to tear their fucking lawns up. I didn't tell them to break their windows and write graffiti on every god damn wall. That's up to them. They have every opportunity to go to school just like I do and I'm sick and tired of hearing different.

Mike DeAngelo is among the angriest of the Eastportians, and, despite his racist disclaimer, is among the minority who feels that races should not mix socially, believes blacks are lazy and Puerto Ricans smell. When asked why he thinks blacks are lazy he presents the "bleeding heart" theory, saying that there are many broken homes, slums, and so forth, but he discounts black social history in the next breath arguing that all that can be changed now if only blacks would exert the same effort he and others like him have exerted to bring themselves out of poverty:

I went to business school for a little while, college, and I didn't have the money either and my father was as poor as any black. I had to borrow the money from the government... The government doesn't look at it as black and white. They had the opportunity to go there and get that money just like me. If they're lazy, that's their fault, and you hear the bleeding hearts saying, 'well, it's because they're so oppressed and can't get jobs and this is what they turn to.' Well, that's not my theory. My theory is if you're black, hold your head high, keep your neighborhood looking good and something will break for you. Nothing came easy for me and that's what makes me bitter. What I'm doing today is because I worked hard at it and I really and honestly and truly feel it's not because I'm white that I had this opportunity. I'm sick and tired of people telling me...' it's because they're oppressed, they have no will to keep themselves up.' To me it's just a crock of shit. They're just lazy. They don't care and I'm sorry for them, but what can I say?

Mike DeAngelo's theory was by no means limited to blacks:

I don't particularly care for Puerto Ricans...they scare me to be perfectly honest... I don't have much use for them. I don't know that I would hire one if they came in. I don't know how to say this but to me they smell. They always seem to have that fish odor... I don't trust them. Let's just boil it down to that. Thank God I wasn't born Puerto Rican... I feel maybe they come here because they can collect that welfare check. Maybe they came with hopes that there'd be money, riches and the whole bit. They found that there wasn't, but they also found there's an easy way out. You can sit on your ass and collect a check. Let's face it, if you know you're getting something for nothing and you've got friends who want something for nothing and you tell them and they come and you have kids, they have kids and tell their other friends, before you know it, they're all coming over... The state capital is infested with them, My God, they've got their own community now... over four, five, six streets, seven long city streets.

Mike DeAngelo clearly expresses the type of racism which Kinder and Sears have argued plays a minor role in American politics. DeAngelo's prejudice is colorfully, if pejoratively, expressed in McConohay and Hough's terms as "redneck racism."

Symbolic racists, in contrast, tend to avoid the direct expression of racial prejudice, resorting instead to the language of equality and the invoca-



10 Ward

tion of traditional American values. Indeed, those who tend toward the symbolic expression of racism are careful to avoid any overt expression of racism when asked directly about racially charged issues. For example, Whitney Woodside, a policeman, discussed the issue of bussing in terms of the traditional values of reward for individual effort. He did not rest his argument on not wanting his children to associate with blacks, but upon the rewards for hard work:

I look at it on a smaller scale and I think of my own family, friends and neighbors and so on and what it's like to really try hard and send your kids to a school that's.., .a little upgraded. There's more money so they can pay better salaries and get better quality teachers.., and for me to work my heart out to move out to this area and then have my kids sent back into the city again, I mean it's a real bummer. It makes you feel like it isn't worth trying.

If the conversation had ended here Whitney may well have been among those who opposed bussing on nonracist grounds. But when we turned to other less directly racial issues, evidence of prejudice began to emerge. In a different context, discussing the rapid rate of social and technological change, Whitney Woodside commented:

People who can't keep up get swallowed up... Your blacks, your Puerto Ricans, the minorities, they are hostile and angry and lots of them do not even know why. The reason is they cannot keep up. In a lot of cases they do not have the mental capacity to be able to keep up that a lot of other people have. In other cases they become victims of their own society.

Thus, when asked directly about racial issues Whitney spoke in terms of traditional American values emphasizing the rewards for hard work, and his opposition to bussing was couched in those terms.

Later, however, when it came to an issue without any racial connota- tion to act as a cautionary flag, more negative attitudes toward minorities emerged. Having already broached the subject, Whitney went on to discuss how minorities become "victims of their own society." Here there is clear evidence of prejudice as he slips into racial stereotypy:

(Welfare) tends to make you a little lazy I think. You don't want to fight so hard for what you want. Sit back, let whitey give it to you, you know. If you sit back and cry loud enough. It develops a bad attitude. I don't see how people can be useful citizens when they just sit back and wait to have something handed to them... I can understand welfare, I can understand unemployment. It's a necessary evil. People that have no control over their situations and are very destitute, I think they should be helped. But there are too many freeloaders. . . They collect because their parents collected, their grandparents collected, so they are collecting, their children will collect. It is just established within their own society which is definitely a different society. . . . The blacks definitely live in a society which is living on welfare. If you're not collecting welfare they look at you strange: 'Oh, wow, man, you ain't getting your 50 bucks a month? You better run down there right now.'

Jim Johnson provides a final example of overtly racist opposition to the three public policies under discussion. Asked if equality is an important




issue to discuss, Jim Johnson replied:

No, to me I don't really hate anybody, black or white. I have some colored friends, but I don't really like them in general. Know what I mean? The majority of them, to me, they live different. They have different outlooks on everything. I don't like to get involved with people I don't want to associate with. Not that I'm better. It's just that they got their own, and we've got our own. If that's wrong or right, I don't know. That's the way I feel.

Later, discussing the period of slavery and its effect on blacks Jim Johnson summed up by saying: "Maybe that's what they were meant to be."

When doubts about the "mental capacity" of minorities are expressed, when the proposition that blacks were "meant" to be slaves is entertained, when cities become "infested" with Puerto Ricans, we are faced with prejudice. It does not require a delicate chain of inference and supposition to link such attitudes with opposition to bussing and affirmative action programs. These programs are opposed in such instances in order to maintain the barriers to an integrated, egalitarian society, to keep separate "our own" and "their own." Blacks and other minorities, in this view, are not the moral, intellectual, and social equals of whites.

The third category of opposition to bussing, affirmative action, and quotas is much less clear cut, but it is this category that is crucial to the idea of symbolic racism. Six people opposed the three policies and did not make the kinds of comments which peppered Mike DeAngelo's discussion, but nevertheless exhibited tension and ambivalence when discussing the issue of race relations. The latent racists tended to express sympathy toward the plight of minorities, and would like to see a better life for them, but not at the expense of whites. On any objective scale to measure racism they most likely would not be identified as racist. They did not oppose miscegenation, would and did mix socially with blacks, had no doubts about the "mental capacity" of minorities, nor about the moral equivalence of all categories of the human species.

Still, they were conflicted. There was a tension in their beliefs which most likely was held in check by social pressures. In some cases there was a conscious recognition of what can be called a "reservoir" of prejudice against which the individual had to be on guard lest the channels of the reservoir overflow. Others were not even aware that such a reservoir existed within them, and naturally the latitude for errors in my judgment is greatest for these individuals. These six either referred to themselves as being prejudiced at times, expressed ambivalence about their attitudes toward race relations, or exhibited overt symptoms of tension such as fidgeting in their chair, stumbling over their words, or had white-knuckled, tightly grasped hands resting in their laps.

Theoretically, latent racism can be described as based on a negatively charged affective evaluation (either conscious or unconscious) of minorities



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which is held in check by cognitive beliefs about the socially acceptable, or morally preferable, opinions toward minorities. That is, early in the socialization process blacks or other minority groups come to be regarded in negative terms. Blacks become a source of negative identity against which whites are able to differentiate their own positive characteristics and values.

As social conditions and opinions change, new cognitive constructs are introduced into the belief system. For some individuals this requires an affective change as well. For others, the affect remains, producing tension between the cognitive construct and the affective charge. This tension produces what I have called the "reservoir" of racism. Opposition to policies designed to bring about change in race relations therefore serves an important equilibrating function under these conditions of tension. The racially symbolic issues of bussing, affirmative action, and quotas can serve simul- taneously as a receptacle for both the negative affect and the socially acceptable cognitive construct. By adopting a position in opposition to these programs the individual forestalls the necessity for belief system reorganiza- tion and the psychological economy remains stable. The negative affect, the cognitive construct, and the individual's self-image as a socially responsible and acceptable individual remain intact, the belief system equilibrated.

So far, most of those in the latent racist faction have managed to suppress any racist sentiments. Sue Murphy is representative of those who are in touch with their underlying negative attitude toward minorites, but who struggle to suppress or eradicate those feelings. In contrast to Jim Johnson, she has a positive attitude toward the differences in social customs among different types of people. In the context of discussing the conflict over bussing and desegregation she commented:

Why couldn't you appreciate that particular thing that they do even if you don't approve of it or anything.... You could just say, well they have this custom that is kind of odd, you know, and this is what they do... but you should be appreciating it for what it is worth in their eyes anyway.

Sue Murphy remains opposed to bussing, however, because of the ill effects she believes it has on the children. There may be another reason, however, for her opposition. In another context, discussing the importance of religion in her everyday life, Sue commented:

If I happen to fall into one of my prejudicial moods, I try to say to myself, well, no, that is not being very Christian. Jesus, I know, he wouldn't have said 'Go away you dirty black man'...I'll try saying to myself, you know, that is not being very nice, let's be Christian about this. See, my husband is not prejudiced at all, so he helps me along very much, as well as my religion, my husband is good about that kind of stuff too.

Clearly, there is a tension in her attitude toward blacks. The social pressure provided by her religion and her husband as well as changing attitudes in the larger society keep the reservoir of racism from being too freely tapped.




When asked to elaborate on her feeling of prejudice, she continued:

I don't know, maybe, see I grew up in the project with, like I say, it was about half and half blacks and whites. There were a lot of things that went on between blacks and whites that kind of...made me prejudice against black people in general. On a one to one basis, no, but as a group... They were always very dirty in their appear- ance and their lawns, their houses, you know...it was degrading. You know, I mean if my house was nice and clean...and the people next door to me were black and they were dirty... it was kind of degrading... And my parents are extremely prejudiced, extremely prejudiced. I mean, very, very bad... I try not to show my prejudice in front of my daughter for that reason, because I feel maybe some of my prejudices are learned from my parents.

It is this reservoir of racism "inherited" from parents that I would suggest accounts for Sue's opposition to bussing, affirmative action, and quotas, and for the opposition of others in the latent racist faction. Bussing and affirmative action programs, as symbols of the race issue, become repositories for the flood of racism held in check by the dam of social pressure against outright expressions of prejudice. Indeed, these outright expressions are avoided completely in this faction's discussion of the three issues and their opposition is expressed in terms of traditional American values of freedom, equality, hard work, and individualism. They find overt expressions of racism embarrassing and may even cite their parents as negative examples of such unacceptable commentary. The parental contribution to the reservoir of racism is the question to which we now turn.

THE GENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF PREJUDICE

As a whole, the first generation of Eastportians were less open-minded toward minorities than their children. However, the original men could not be called bigots. They were fairly tolerant and in some cases progressive when considered in light of the prevailing attitudes toward blacks in the late fifties. Of the 15 original men, only Johnson could be considered to have openly racist attitudes toward blacks whose skin color he regarded as God's punishment. Kuchinsky's views were also harsh, but he still believed that one should be friendly and courteous toward blacks, although he did not believe whites should associate directly with blacks. For the most part, though, the first generation of Eastportians got on fairly amicably with their black neighbors and workmates.

An undercurrent of racism did surface, however, on the question of mixed marriages. Seven of the men (Johnson, Kuchinsky, Flynn, O'Hara, Woodside, Rapuano, and Ruggiero) were opposed to miscegenation. This rate of opposition to interracial marriages was somewhat less than the national average in 1983 for members of the first generation's age group. Ac- cording to a recent Gallup poll, citizens over 50 years old disapproved of



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interracial marriages by a margin of 68 to 26% (Washington Post National Weekly Edition, Feb. 6, 1984). This greater rate of opposition to miscegenation after 2?V2 decades of considerable change in race relations (among all respondents in the 1983 Gallup poll, 43% approved and 50% disapproved of interracial marriages) raises at least two possible interpretations of the first generation's responses. One is that Lane's subjects were in fact more tolerant than the nation as a whole, an interpretation that might be sup- ported by their willingness to live in an integrated housing project. Alterna- tively, the men might have been more prejudiced than their responses indicated. Naturally, the two interpretations are not mutually exclusive and both probably contain some explanatory power. There is some evidence, however, that the men were more prejudiced toward blacks than they re- vealed in their responses to Lane's questions. That evidence comes from the children's characterization of their parents' views on race relations.

Joe Ruggiero's father, for example, was extremely sensitive to the plight of blacks and on every count, except the issue of intermarriage, held quite progressive views. To his son, however, he was a "bigot." Joe is the most radical Eastportian and he experienced an identity crisis (based on Marcia's Identity Scale, and Joe's own judgment) during which he reformu- lated most of his political perspective, including his ideas about race relations. When Joe began to date a black woman he felt he could not tell his father, because Mr. Ruggiero's views on race relations were so strong as to eclipse his otherwise liberal belief system.

When Mr. Ruggiero discusses the race issue with Lane he may have felt constrained, as a representative of the "common man," to express the changing liberal consensus of the day. (We know, for example, that public opinion surveys must be designed to avoid the "socially desireable response set," and that it is common for respondents to put their best foot forward.) This may explain the Eastportians' remarkably advanced tolerance of interracial marriage, a tolerance which even 25 years later has not been matched by the nation as a whole according to Gallup's surveys. Consequently, for both generations it is probably best to assume that our assessment underes- timates the actual extent of racial prejudice in Eastport.

Although using opposition to interracial marriage as an indicator of racial prejudice in general may seem extreme, the argument could be made that, in the transition from prejudice to tolerance, the last opinion to change is probably that toward miscegenation. Attitudes toward miscegenation are important for the issue of the intergenerational transmission of prejudice because they may provide an indication of the familial atmosphere in which children grow up. When a child is informed that it is a bad idea for whites to marry blacks, the child learns prejudice. Marriage, after all, is the most important and intimate decision most of us make in




our lives. When blacks are prejudged as unworthy candidates for marriage, and when the communication comes from such authoritative sources as parents, the young child can conclude little else but that blacks, for some reason associated with their race, are inferior. This instills a negative affective evaluation of blacks as a group that may persist into adulthood even after all the cognitive constructions supporting the prejudice have changed.

It might be countered that many ethnic and religious groups choose to marry within their group. Therefore, are we to assume, for example, that Protestants who choose to marry Protestants regard other groups as inferi- or? This objection can be met on the following grounds. There is a difference between choosing to marry within one's own group, and opposing extra-group marriage on principle. One can choose to marry within one's own group for many reasons, but to oppose interfaith or "mixed" marriages on principle is, by definition, to prejudge individuals according to their group characteristics, characteristics that they possess merely by the circumstances of birth.

In our society Catholics, for example, approve interfaith marriages by a majority of 89 to 6% (Gallup, ibid), yet it is quite clear that 89% of all Catholics do not in fact marry outside their faith. The origins of the taboo against interfaith marriages clearly indicate that the "out" group was regarded by the "in" group as inferior; that is, as representatives of the Antichrist or as slaves to popery. These prejudices persisted in the United States at least into the postwar period and clearly reinforced social and economic discrimination against Catholics. Today, both Catholics and, to a slightly less degree, Protestants do not oppose interfaith marriages on principle (even though for Catholics it is against official church dogma), but for many reasons continue to marry predominantly within their own faith. In short, they have shed their ethnocentrism which was rooted in historical conflicts, and the decline in such ethnocentrism certainly must have contributed to the much more equal roles Catholics now play in American society.

It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that opposition to miscegenation on principle is probably a good indicator of prejudice. Whatever the justification, it represents something less than a full acceptance of equality between races. A full acceptance would include utter indifference to whether or not two people of different races should choose to marry. Opposition to miscegenation is a manifestation of racial prejudice. It represents prejudice because the individuals involved in the marriage decision are not judged on the basis of their individual qualities, but on the basis of their group membership, a membership about which they obviously have no choice. Hence, they are prejudged.

The maintenance of opposition to miscegenation by the seven Eastpor- tians in the first generation meant that their children grew up in an environ-



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ment in which at least one aspect of racism was tolerated and, indeed, preached. There is no way to know with what frequency or intensity the fathers expressed their views on miscegenation, but given Joe Ruggiero's reluctance to mention to his father that he was dating a black woman, it is clear that in at least one household the father's position was well known. There is also little evidence, other than the children's comments, on the mothers' attitudes toward racial minorities, and without direct evidence from the mothers it is difficult to know how to evaluate the children's comments. The question is, if at least one aspect of prejudice was expressed in public and on the record, might it not be suspected that other aspects would be more freely expressed in the privacy of one's own home? If that were the case, then we would expect a higher rate among the seven families headed by fathers opposed to miscegenation than in the eight other families.

In the second generation there are only 4 people out of 30 who choose not to date, marry or invite blacks into their homes (Alice Sokolsky, Mike DeAngelo, Jim and Jeff Johnson), and of these four, two have no objection to socializing freely with other mixed or black couples outside the home. In Alice Sokolsky's words: "I do have friends that are (dating blacks). They don't care what people say. And I have been in their company and I accept it, for them. But I just couldn't do it myself."

Clearly, the overt boundaries between blacks and whites have deterio- rated in the second generation. A change from 46 to 13% expressing opposition to miscegenation is substantial. It is interesting to note, however, that the rate of approval in Eastport (87%) is considerably higher than the rate of approval among the second generation's age group in the 1983 national Gallup poll (63%). Again, it would seem that the assessment of prejudice in Eastport is underestimated.

Even though the second generation expresses much less opposition to miscegenation than the first, it is significant that of the 15 people opposed to the three policies which compose our index of symbolic racism, 10 are children of the men in Lane's sample who opposed miscegenation. This con- nection needs further exploration for it suggests some carry-over of racial prejudice, albeit of a less direct nature. Table I shows the cross-generational distribution of the fathers' position on miscegenation and the children's po-

Table I. Fathers' position on

miscegenation

Approve Oppose Children's Approve 11 4

position on bussing, etc. Oppose 5 10




Table II. Fathers' position on

miscegenation Approve Oppose

Children's Approve 11 4 position on bussing, etc. Oppose 2 9

sition on bussing, affirmative action, and quotas. Table I does not take into account the threefold classification used to analyze the children's opposition to the three policies. If we exclude the children who opposed bussing for nonracist reasons, then the relationship between the fathers' position on miscegenation and the children's position on the three issues becomes even stronger (see Table II). Thus, 9 of the 11 people who oppose bussing, affirmative action, and quotas are children of men who opposed miscegenation. The strength of the relationship shown in Table II lends some credence to the possibility that the fathers' opposition to miscegenation represents a somewhat wider scope of prejudice. Perhaps, within the privacy of their own families, the fathers' reluctance to embrace racial equality as represent- ed by their opposition to miscegenation may have been given wider expression. This may have established a negative affective evaluation of blacks within the second generation which remained even after schools, peers, the media, and other socializing agents fundamentally transformed the cognitive constructions through which opinions about race relations were expressed. Issues laden with racial symbolism would then activate the negative affect, producing opposition to policies designed to achieve equality between races.

These various threads of evidence point to a reservoir of racism beneath the surface of otherwise tolerant beliefs. Although it cannot be argued that the Eastportians are "representative" of larger social groups, the strength of the correlation between the fathers' position on miscegenation and the children's positions on bussing, affirmative action, and quotas suggest, as Kinder and Sears suspected, that the root of symbolic racism can be found in the process of socialization and that the family is one of the primary agents of socialization.

CONCLUSION

We do not know whether the percentages hold for the population as a whole, but in Eastport over two-thirds of the opposition to policies to bring about racial equality can be linked to racial prejudice. In half the



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cases, however, the link is weak, hidden beneath the surface or held at arm's length.

This suggests a weakening of racial prejudice across the generations, a process of diminution that may well continue in succeeding generations. If we compare the two generations as a whole, the Eastportians are propor- tioned roughly the same between the prejudiced and the unprejudiced. In the second generation, however, the scope of prejudice is much more re- stricted, much less direct. Still, there remains a strong tension in their attitudes toward minorities, a tension that cannot be ignored. This tension could conceivably be manipulated and exploited during a period of crisis to the disadvantage of minorities, but to do so would be to reverse the trend. The trend is toward more harmonious interracial relations.

The next generation of Eastportians will probably be even less prejudiced and will show a marked reduction in the proportion of those expressing some form of prejudice. The children of those included among the latent racists most likely will not be exposed to the racist sentiments the second generation learned from the first. To the extent that racist beliefs are less direct, and in cases such as Sue Murphy's, camouflaged from the children's view, the familial foundation of racism is weakened. In addition, the fact that the premise of equality between the races is fully accepted by almost 90% of the children offers some hope for racial harmony and the erosion of racism. Even those who are prejudiced tend to couch their argu- ments in the language of equality rather than the language of inferiority. This is a hopeful sign that the idea of equality in America is becoming more firmly entrenched.

REFERENCES

Brigham, J. C., and Weissbach, T. A. (eds.) (1972) Racial Attitudes in America, Harper and Row, New York.

Campbell, A. (1971). White Attitudes Toward Black People, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Converse, P., Dotson, J., Hoag, W., and McGee, W. (eds.) (1980). American Social Attitudes Data Sourcebook, 1947-78, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Katz, P. (1976). The acquisition of racial attitudes in children. In Katz, P. (ed.), Towards the Elimination of Racism, Pergamon Press, Inc., Elmsford, N.Y.

Kinder, D., and Sears, D. 0. (1980). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism vs. racial threats to the good life. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 40: 414-431.

Lane, R. E. (1962). Political Ideology, Free Press, New York, N.Y. McConohay, J., and Hough, J. C. (1976). Symbolic racism. J. Soc. Issues 32: 23-45. Rothbart, M. (1976). Achieving racial equality: An analysis of resistance to social reform. In

Katz, P. (ed.), Pergamon Press, Inc., Elmsford, N.Y. Sears, D. O., Hensler, C. P., and Speer, L. K. (1979). Whites' opposition to 'Bussing': Self-

interest or symbolic politics? Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 73: 369-384. Sears, D. 0., and Kinder, D. (1971). Racial tension and voting in Los Angeles. In Hirsh, W.

Z. (ed.), Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership, Praeger, New York, N.Y. Taylor, D. G., Sheatsley, P. B., and Greeley, A. M. (1978). Attitudes toward racial integra-

tion. Sci. Amer. 238: 42-49.



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