gent_2007_between a new film culture and the socialist economy

8/7/2019 Gent_2007_Between a New Film Culture and the Socialist Economy

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Between the Model of a New Film Culture and the Reality of

Socialist Economy

Film distribution in Czech lands1

from the point of view of the conflict between

ideological and economic goals (1948-1968)

Abstract:

Distribution was supposed to serve the Czechoslovakian communist regime as a vehicle for

creating a new type of film culture. The failure of this model highlighted the tension between

the ideological requirements put on cultural policy and the economic requirements put on the

film industry. Therefore, distribution in 1948-1968 can be seen not only as a vehicle for the

implementation of the official political ideology, but also as a place of clashes of different

interests implemented by means of particular distribution practices. Besides the research of

the changes of the individual distribution strategies, it is also possible to see a certain stable

feature of the operation of film distribution within a socialist economic system: It is a

shortage. Jnos Kornais economic modelof an economy of shortage represents a productiveconceptual framework for research of both film distribution and reception under the

conditions of a totalitarian communist system.

We have nationalized not only film production ... we have also nationalized film renting,which means that it is impossible for foreign film agencies to nose around here freely and sell

all kinds of rubbish as they did in the past. Film distribution is fully in the hands of the state,which has to ensure that even the most expensive films are shown everywhere and not only in

those places where the rent fee is paid... Kopeck, presentation at the VIII. Czechoslovakian Communist Party (KS) congress, March1946

2

As this quotation, presented two years before the communist putsch, suggests, film

distribution was perceived not only by the communist machinery, but also by some of the film

industry executives, as a vehicle of creating a new national film culture the process ofcleaning out the rubbish3 was not supposed to be limited by the commercial aspect of profitor at least returnability. However, the total and immediate subordination of the film

distribution practice to the goals of the KSs cultural policy was not possible even afterthe putsch, mostly due to two interconnected reasons: The first one is the inertia of the fixed

distribution mechanisms maintained mainly by contractual obligations towards foreign

distributors (due to these, a more consistent implementation of the cleaning did not happenuntil almost two years after the communist putsch); the second one is the financial intensity

of maintaining the nationalized domestic film industry, which was connected with state

budget on one side and with economic results of distribution on the other side. The total

subordination of the distribution practise to ideological goals was conditioned by economic

criteriathe definition of a suitable relationship between the cultural-political and economicview became the central and explicitly reflected criteria for creation and partial changes ofthe distribution practices for the whole period of 1948-1968 (and, of course, until 1989). The

emphasis on the cultural-political value, i.e. looking at film not only from the economic, butalso from the artistic and political points of view, is connected to the actual nationalization


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concept, which was already formed by left-wing, mainly communist, film industry agents

during WWII.4

Therefore, it also suggests itself as a suitable viewpoint when describing the

practices developed in this sector helping to analyze the important changes or deviations that

occurred. These can be studied in two lines, which react to the more or less reflected tension

between the ideological formation of film culture and the economic requirements of the film

industry. One line is represented by system changes and regulations coordinated by theCommunist Party and government authorities. The second line is represented by the efforts

made by subjects on various levels of the distribution organization these try to implementsuch measures within the system that will enable them to fulfil the tasks assigned. With such a

detailed view it is necessary to correct the assertion of Eva Dzrikov, who, in the onlymonograph so far devoted to the history of distribution in Czechoslovakia, says that due to the

maximum centralization of film making management the import and distribution policy ofideology in film, the Communist Party line and up-to-dateness was implemented in practicewithout any major problems.5 In fact, in the period of 1948-68 it is possible to see severalstages in which there were not only changes in the system carried out on the basis of the

Communist Party and government organizations, but also different conflicts, clashes of

interests, and applications of practices that were supposed to subordinate the ideologicalassignment to the subjects own interests.

A diachronic point of view makes it possible to highlight the specific nature of the film

distribution mechanisms, whose changes are not fully synchronized with the wider political

and social processes. Besides that, this approach makes it possible to see the distribution

practices and presentations not only as the gear control lever for the implementation of

cultural policy based on ideological assignment, but also as a place for the conflict of interests

in different institutions, political authorities and the more or less independent economic units

The Czechoslovakian Film Association, or The Czechoslovakian State Film, The DistrictFilm Enterprise, and the National Committees (the committees comprised a system of local

authorities at the level of village, city, or a district). Their goal is not only the fulfilment of the

ideological assignment but also the performance of their own particular interests and

justification of their positions within the distribution system. Thus, we will not study

distribution and presentation as the mere implementation of ideological frameworks and

economic criteria for the planned fulfilment imposed from above, but as a specificprocesses that will try to comply with those frameworks but that is at the same time a place of

deviations, a place that puts up resistance against the smooth progress of the ideology.

Whether, to a certain extent, intentional, caused mainly by the economic interests of a certain

institution or unintentional, caused by the particularity of distribution mechanisms and

structure.

The basic conceptual framework in which it is useful to study these mechanisms is thepolitical-economic analysis of the socialist system performed by the Hungarian economist,

Jnos Kornai.6 This helps us to grasp, on a more general level, the sources and mechanisms ofthe tension worked between the economic and ideological tasks, and the motivation of the

practices that try to subdue this tension. We will focus mainly on one typical feature shown

by the film distribution service during the whole period of 1948-1970this feature is chronicshortage economy.

From 1949 there is, in the distribution offer, an inhibition of a certain film product type for

which there was high demands from the viewers and that can be for the given purpose

identified with the production of capitalist countries, which was included in the periodsstatistics under other production (i.e. production that does not come from Czechoslovakia,

the Soviet Union or peoples democratic countries). Such equivalence, which requiresidentification of a certain value of goods with national production (especially American,


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British, French and Italian), is, of course, only provisionalfurther research will have the taskof finding out what types of values are offered, among others, by the films ofthesenational

cinema industries which were missed by the viewers (we will look for the values in certain

types of genre structures and in experiences connected to them, for example adventure,

detective and comedy genres). However, the data of attendance and number of presentations

shows us that the bearers of the values that the viewers looked for in the cinema were filmsfrom the capitalist countries. However, their offer was strongly limited to 1960 and it was also

limited during the 1960s based on ideological criteria. The viewpoint of national productionfor the differentiation of offer is problematic from the point of view of demand and reception,

but from the standpoint of the offer it corresponds with the periods criterion for definingcultural-political values and it facilitates the analysis of distribution and exhibition practices.

Until the beginning of the 60s, these values had automatically been attributed mechanicallyaccording to the film place of originit was only in 1963 that the requirement for individualevaluation of individual films began to gain more ground.

7

The existence of the shortage economy is, according to Kornai, not an accidental feature,

but a feature principally connected to the classical socialist systemis caused by the interests

and motivations of the individual agents of the system as well as by the most general pre-requisites of its functioning, i.e. the official ideology of the ruling (communist) party and the

dominant position of state property. Kornais model gives a general picture of the causalconnections that in the case of film distribution worked in relationship with centre of power,

which formed distribution primarily on the basis of ideological criteria, as well as in the

relationship to particular administrative and economic agents (The Czechoslovakian State

Film, the district film enterprises and the National Committees) that fulfilled their tasks and

enforced their interests.8Kornais model shows that the situation of the absence of goods on

the market is conditioned not only by the previous link of the causal chain, which is in our

case especially the performance plan, but immediately also by other characteristic features of

the system: ideological requirements on suitable compositions of distribution offer as they

were expressed by the Communist Partys and governments authorities; the states monopolyon distribution; or central dramaturgy of distribution. It is, of course, necessary to historicize

this model and study its particular implementations and changes e.g. the bureaucratizationof management was most obviously shown at the end of the 40s and at the beginning of the50s in the form of programme series, then programming was decentralized in two stages.


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The main line of causality

Block 1

Undivided

power of the

Marxist-

Leninist party;

Dominant

influence of

the official

ideology

Block 2

Dominant

position of

state and

quasi-state

ownership

Block 3

Preponderance

of bureaucratic

coordination

Block 4

Plan

bargaining;

Quantity drive;

Paternalism;

Soft budget

constraint;

Weak

responsivenessto prices; ...

Block 5

Forced growth;

Chronic

shortage

economy;

Labor shortage

and

unemployment

on the job;

the system

specificsituation and

role of foreign

trade; ...


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Shortage economy also enables us to grasp, as a model, the reaction of consumers viewerswithin the given economic relationships. In the event of absence of the sought-aftertype of goods on the market, consumers have the following options: 1. satisfy their needs by

means of forced substitution with another product; 2. continue looking for the required goodson the market; 3. postpone the purchase until the product is on the market; 4. give up their

intention of buying the product.

Shopping process starts

0. Good available right away 1. Good available Not availableat the first store at the first store: queuing

2. Forced substitution 3. Search 4. Postponement 5. Purchasing intent

abandoned

0. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 0. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

As we will try to show further herein, the film distribution system tried to solve the

shortage in three different ways. Changing its view of which solution was preferable oradmissible. In the first stage there was a prevailing emphasis on the viewers to satisfy their

demand for worthless goods represented by the escapist films of capitalist productionsubstitutionally -by means of cultural and ideologically valuable goods, or to change, in thefuture, even the need itself and not to demand the worthless goods at all. Even after the failure

of the assumption that a certain type of need will be totally and immediately successfully

forced out, this forced substitution remained the preferred and asserted solution. Besides that,

it was possible to satisfy the already accepted need of escapist products in two ways. Thefirst one, asserted by means of power, was satisfying the need by means of domestic

production, or the production of the Soviet Union or of the so called peoples democraticcountries. The second solution, which was gradually applied by the economic subjects

connected to distribution with increasing success, was a limited offer of films from thecapitalist production.


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Let us now have a look, from the standpoint of the functioning of the shortage economy, at

the quantitative data about the number of distributed films, number of exhibitions and

attendance. In the case of the number of screenings (chart no. 1) it is obvious that between

1948 and 1953 the exclusion of the films from capitalist countries was accompanied by a

simultaneous increase in the number of Soviet and Eastern Bloc films, which in connection to

the common practice of organized attendance implies the effort to force the viewers tosubstitute one product type with another. However, a look at the attendance statistics (chart

no. 2) shows that this effort was definitely unsuccessful and with regard to the economic

necessity of profit from cinemas for the operation of the film industry, it was necessary to

increase the number of Western movies attractive for the viewers. This increase was

accompanied by great interest from the viewers. In 1957 attendance reached the highest level

in the history of Czechoslovakian cinema. After a shorter deviation in the opposite direction

caused by repeated tightening in the application of the cultural-political views, the numberof Western films kept increasing until 1969. That corresponds to the increasing attendance of

these films and decrease in interest in any other production including Czech ones. Although

the total attendance in this decade kept decreasing, the attendance of Western films reached

higher figures than in 1957. Instead of the effort to eradicate a certain type of goods and thedemand itself, the viewers were offered the type of goods they were looking for and eventhe increase in the number of TV sets in households,

9which the film industry alleged as the

reason for the decrease in the total attendance, did not stop the interest in the Western

production. However, in the same period there was a significant decrease in the number of

viewers per screening (chart no. 3) even for movies from western countries, which shows a

change in the distribution approach. The point of view of economy, defined as themaximization of the usage of the cinemas capacity, regulated distributionwith the exceptionof a two-year easing in 1957-58up to the 60s. After that the criterion for the number ofcinema visits per inhabitant, which accounted for the increase in the screening of Western

films, started to be preferred. Such a change of approach can imply offer reduction because

films stayed on the programme longer then. However, the problem was that the high rate of

usage of the cinema capacities in the 50s had been basically reached by means of coordinatedcampaigns of mass organizations and by decreasing the number of screenings. Besides that,

films were often reprised because of limited stock distribution, so, ironically the extension of

offer and horizontal differentiation did not happen. On the other hand, the criterion for the

number of cinema visits per inhabitant led to a higher number of screenings and it justified

keeping successful, though politically and culturally worthless, films on the programmeuntil the demand had been met, and it also increased the availability of the demanded films.

The following text tries to describe some of the particular distribution practices as partial

reasons for the phenomenon of shortage as well as ways of response to its existence. We willstudy them as strategies that try to solve the discrepancy between the systems ideological andeconomic demands. It is important to distinguish between two types of shortage: vertical and

horizontal.10

The first one is connected to the relationships of superiority and subordination

among institutions and it lies in the insufficient supply of goods by the supplier. In our case of

film distribution this concerns insufficient supply of films attractive for the viewers caused by

putting a stop to the purchase of films from Western countries. Horizontal shortage appears in

the supplier-consumer relationship and the aforementioned model shows the consumerspossible reactions to the shortage of the demanded goods (films of the demanded

entertainment value). If there is a great shortage of certain goodsand a great surplus of othergoods that are supposed to work as substitutes which was a characteristic feature of

Czechoslovakian distribution in 1948-1970, then Kornais economic model provides a goodconceptual tool. It enables us to understand the particular distribution practices on the market


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as attempts to cope with the shortage, which appeared both among the individual subjects of

the distribution system (vertical shortage) and in relation to the viewers (horizontal shortage).

We will focus mainly on the period of 1948-1968. This period is defined from one side by

the communist putsch, which enabled a full-scale application of a classic socialist system,and from the other side by a temporary derailment of the distribution system in 1968-1969.

A rapid swing in both the distribution offers and attendance was caused especially by twofactors: Partly by the implementation of a new economic management system on 1 January

1969, which led to higher interest of the distribution employees in the economic results and it

represented one of the elements of the reform of the classical socialist system;11

and partly,

with regard to the distribution system, by an outside factor, i.e. the invasion of the

intervention troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This caused temporary suppression

of the distribution of Soviet and peoples democratic films as well as the viewersmanifestation of lack of interest in this production.

However, it is necessary to deal briefly with distribution in the early post-war years because

at that time the basic features of the system created after the communist putsch in February

1948 were already being formed. Besides the actual action of film industry nationalization on

August 28, 1945 and its consequences, another important cause of this partial continuity wasalso the fact that the film industry came under the Ministry of Information and was therefore

controlled by the communists, so distribution was heavily influenced by the Communist

Partys interests.

1945-48: Economic Arguments in the Service of Political Objectives

The main problem during the post-war launch of cinemas operations was, besides the

technical condition of the cinemas, lack of suitable films. There were only unacceptable

German films and Czech films with German subtitles that were provocative and technicallydifficult to remove.12 The situation was to be solved by import contracts mainly withHollywood studios and Sojuzintorgkino. The contract with the Soviet film industry made in

July 1945 favoured Soviet production in an extreme way and ensured Sojuzintorgkino 60% of

the screenings in cinemas and the purchase of at least 100 Soviet films during the first year of

the contract with a gradual increase of 5% per year. However, the Soviet film industry was

unable to meet such volumes and the lack of films for distribution was eventually solved by

an agreement with the MPEA, which ensured that in 1946 thirty-four and then a year later

eighty-two American films were accepted for distribution.13

As far as the number of

screenings is concerned, in 1946 films from the USA and Western Europe almost equalled the

Soviet production and in 1947 they dominated the cinemas with an almost 50% share (in

attendance they even reached a 55,6% share). The focus of the communist-controlleddistribution on Slavic countries and especially on the Soviet Union was obvious, but its fullimplementation was not successful because of the viewers strong demand for American filmsand due to criticism by some members of the press.

14

However, in that period particular distribution practices were to be formed by favouring of

Soviet movies. In his speech at the meeting of district cinema directors on 12 February 1947,

the General Director of the Czechoslovakian Film Association Lubomr Linhart supportedsuch a focus with a clumsy argument about the economic benefits of such practices resulting

from the allegedly advantageous contract with Sojuzintorgkino. This contract ensured the

distribution of the rentals in the 50:50 ratio, while with the MPEA the ratio was 35:65.

According to Linhart cinemas represented the most important profit segment of the

nationalized film, and distribution had to abide by the profitability criteria: Therefore,Czechoslovakian films, for which no profit shares were returned abroad, had to receive the


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most preferential treatment. After them it was necessary to privilege Soviet and Swiss films

provided under advantageous contracts. These should be preferentially scheduled for Friday-

Monday terms, but according to Linhart it was American films that were most often

improperly scheduled for weekends.

Linharts argument intentionally weakened the issue ofpopularity and higher attendance at

films from the individual film productions. The viewers behaviour was presented as a visitto the cinema (not a visit to a particular film) that happened mainly at weekends and it waspossible to use it economically in a better way by means of mechanical changes in scheduling.

The possibility of educating the viewers and leading them to the right cultural and political

valuesi.e., among other things, by means of the purification of the distribution offer wasonly implied at that time when the economic view was extended and it economized even thesector of artistic value:

The new film import committee had to eliminate all the rubbish especially when it is alsoeconomically unbearable. [...] Eliminate, within the shortest time possible, the loss-making

foreign films and mercilessly not only all the loss-making films from the economic point of

view, but also those films that are also loss-making from the cultural viewpoint of the

development of cultural education in Czech viewers.15Linharts argument was repeated in the correspondence of the Communist Partys apparatus

and there was pressure put on distribution to implement the objectives of the proposed

measures.16

From the archive materials it is clear that there was an obvious effort to enforce

the cultural- political objectives, i.e. encourage the viewers to go see Soviet films although they had so far been presented as subordinate to economic objectives: The transfer

of Soviet films to the more advantageous weekend dates was to lead to higher profit.

The degree of control in the distribution sector and the effort to use it for the preference of

Soviet films is also evidenced by the correspondence between Josef Jon, a Communist Partyofficial, and the Film Rental Office director, Josef Hlinomaz. Jon referred to the complaintof the KS District Secretariat inJindichv Hradec that characterize the opinion that Sovietfilms had been pushed aside not as a cause of economic loss, but as a sabotage: ... when aRussian film arrives, it is played on a weekday when the workmen are in factories so they

have no chance to see Russian films and they are only fed with Western films of a different

quality. ... we have the feeling that a reactionary is doing this on purpose, which is why we

need to exclude him from this activity in a short time.17It is, therefore, possible to see, even before the communist putsch, the distribution sector as

a sector of contradicting economic and political interests, or to see efforts to phrase

economically reasoned cultural-political guidelines. Both the contracts made and the choiceof films for distribution were visible and widely discussed and criticized in press therefore,they had to be, despite the left-wing orientation and the official foreign affairs political focus

on the Soviet Union, justified mainly by economic interests (necessity of foreign currencysavings, profitability of contracts). However, the less visible pressures in the film presentation

practice served the political interests of the Communist Party and they were preparing the

position for two main objectives of distribution after the putsch: Cleaning the national film

culture from all rubbish; and (re)educating viewers and directing them towards active,preferably repeated, attendance of suitable films, which would harmonize the cultural-

political and economic interests.

The cinema programmes in Brno18

show that these instructions were not consistently put

into practice in 1947-48 American and British productions prevailed on weekendprogrammes. However, at least partially successful pressure was obviously put on the

scheduling of Pragues cinemas. There was a strong interest in using the foreign sector for a

less obvious, and therefore less contestable, influence on the so far miscellaneous film offers,in which American production was superior in number (although this was partly due to the


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fact that the Soviet production could not use the space provided by the contract with

Sojuzintorgkino).19

These deformations of the distribution practice for political objectives

were justified especially by economic interests, which in the rhetoric of the Communist

Partys officials were already giving way to political interests and they became more o f asupportiveeven as still essentialargument. The following three years of film distribution

were the time of the most intensive efforts to suppress the discrepancies between theeconomic and cultural-political views. The cultural-political view put emphasis on the priority

of domestic, Soviet and peoples democratic films and of a limited number of progressivefilms from Western countries, and the objective was to reduce the national film culture to the

sphere of this production. The economic view expected the highest possible attendance

accompanied by maximum economy i.e. reaching the highest possible number of viewersper screening. Between 1949 and 1950 particular measures were taken that were supposed to

help to harmonize both criteria, i.e. attract the maximum number of viewers to the preferred

filmsa pre-requisite of a long-term, unenforced implementation of this requirement was there-education of viewers and change in their habits. The attendance was not to be kept up by

means of mass campaigns, but by the new distribution offer which would be an answer to the

existing demand.

1948-50: Unsuccessful Attempt at Creating a New type of National

Film Culture

After the February putsch there were purges in the film industry, but the change of regime

was not directly apparent in the particular offers of cinemas or in the distribution system.

However, in November 1948 at the national conference of the Czechoslovakian State Film the

Distribution Director, Jaroslav Mlek, defined the task of distribution as systematicspreading of film work among the people. During the fulfilment of this task the districtdirectors and cinema managers help those films that are valuable from the cultural andpolitical points of view and politically important by promoting and organizing massattendance. On the other hand, escapist films were labelled as harmful and attendanceshould not be organized for those films that are the inescapable evil that we have here andthat we still need to deal with.20 A year and a half later this task was confirmed by theCzechoslovakian Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC - V KS), which presenteda binding guideline for the Czechoslovakian State Film. It determined the need of such

distribution that educates viewers especially by means of our new films as well as by Sovietfilms and films from peoples democratic countries, and mass organizations , public

education and school administrations were to ensure their mass attendance.

21

In order to meetthe objective, i.e. the education of viewers by directing them towards ideologically suitable

works and the cleaning of distribution from the remaining relics of the pre-putsch cultural

policy (which would free the viewers from the possibility of a wrong choice), two crucial

measures were taken. At the beginning of 1949 circular distribution began which ensuredfast circulation of the most significant films from the distributional point of view in circuitcinemas. The presented films were put into quarterly programme sequences each sequencehad to include 6 Czechoslovakian and 4 Soviet films, and 3 places were left for presentations

made directly by the Distribution Centre or for special cases (such as the presentation of theRussian film called The Russian Question). This model, which only worked until the second

half of 1953,22

represented the highest degree of centralization and a pursuit of elimination

certain unpredictability and uncontrollability, which was represented by the schedulingprocess within the system.


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A year after the implementation of the circular distribution, in January 1950, the process

was completed by shredding all films that had been put into circulation between 1945 and the

autumn of 1948 (with the exception of Soviet Union films). All films eliminated in this way

were subject to a new censorship decision before they could possibly be put into circulation

again.23

The discrepancy between ideological and economic tasks, or between the culturally

and politically desirable but currently low attendance at suitable films and the harmful buthigh end economically useful attendance of capitalist production films, was to be removed in

this waythe remaining task was to ensure permanent and mass attendance of progressivefilms in such an ideal situation in which no other films were put on the programmes.However, because the premiere profile had been radically reduced (74 films presented in 1950

in comparison with the 92 in the previous year and 199 in 1947) as well as attendance

dropped (98.8 million viewers in 1950 in comparison with 122.2 million in the previous year),

distribution had the task of significantly changing viewers motivation, educating the viewersin a new attendance tradition, and teaching them, in the words of Jaroslav Mlek, to attendnot only the new films but to learn from progressive films again and again and to change the

current state in which a viewer always sees a film only once (underlined by P.S.) [...] film will

really become a possession of the working class, who will protect it against the reactionarydanger of embarrassingly low attendance by enjoying these films and learning from them in

the cinema on a large scale.24 In 1949-50 the most consistent attempt to implement the modelof a new viewer and new viewers culture was introduced whose formation had already begunwithin the discourse of (not only) the left-wing film critique before February 1948, especially

in a discussion about film rubbish and kitsch. The implementation of this radical vers ionof the model after 1948 was, however, deformed by a (supposedly temporary) lack of suitable

films from the Soviet Union and from the peoples democratic countries, which resulted in thenecessity of educating viewers who not only learn form the progressive films but who learn

again and again. This model of a new viewer and new viewers culture was to be based onthe activity of visiting cinemas as an act of self-education and also as a political act seeingSoviet Union films was supposed to be a manifestation of inseparable friendship with theSoviet Union, so it was not important whether the viewer had already seen the reprised filmor not;

25and on the contrary, avoidance of Soviet films was a matter of dubious personal

prestige of enemies of the time.26Of course, even after the shredding all the escapist films and capitalist production films

did not consistently disappear, but the differentiation was to be strongly limited. Therefore,

the distribution sector, also tied by central programming, became more predictable. It was still

suitable to motivate the cinema workers to ensure attendance at valuable films. A system ofbonuses was created for cinema managers which was to motivate them to ensure attendance

of progressive films; attendance competitions were announced; the public education

department of the Distribution Centre was supposed to make campaigns for progressive films;when important Soviet films, such as The Fall of Berlin or Secret Mission, were beingshown, it was ordered to screen only stock films concurrently that would not attract viewersattention.

27However, it was more important to create such administrative and institutional

mechanisms that would ensure sufficient attendance for example, the function of a district promotion official, whose task was to educate viewers and increase attendance; 82% of promotion costs in 1949 was spent on progressive films, i.e. films from theCzechoslovakian, Soviet and peoples democratic productions.28 It was these mechanisms thatrepresented a new point of uncertainty, a potentially imperfect or totally non-functional

elementthere were, for example, complaints that even the Communist Party officials did notgo to see the preferred films,

29or the patronage that enterprises assumed over particular

cinemas was not working.30


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The significant decrease in attendance from 129 million in 1948 to 98 million in 1950

showed that the efforts to reach the objective had not been successfulthe average number ofviewers per one screening of a Soviet film was, despite organized attendance, 148, while in

the case of other, i.e. non-socialist, productions it was 228.In theReport of the Progress and Results of Distribution in 1949, written for a meeting of

the Cultural Committee,31

Mlek says that distribution had been freed from the Americanobligation of distributional bondage, Western films were only used as additions to thepremiere profile, and the programme need was reduced to 101 films that was, using thephrasing of that time, a transition from extensive to intensive distribution, which was based on

frequent reprises. For comparison it is suitable to say that, for example, in the early 30s onlyimport itself totalled about 300 films. Even the plans for post-war state-controlled distribution

counted on an import of 200-250 films a year.32

Mlek admitted that there was another threatof attendance decrease; it is necessary to deal with this seriously from the standpoint of the

cultural and political mission of film as a vehicle for mass awareness, exhilaration and

entertainment, as well as from the point of view of economic self-sufficiency of the

enterprise.33 On the one hand, he admitted the particularity of the economic interests, which

could not be fully identified with the fulfilment of the cultural and political interests, but onthe other hand, he also referred to a binding decision of the presidium of the Czechoslovakian

Communist Party Central Committee which said that it was a serious task of the Party, aswell as of the mass organizations, the state educational authorities, and school administration,

to continuously ensure mass attendance of Czechoslovakian, Soviet and other types of

progressive films. 34

For the year of 1951 Mlek announced programme extension by colour epic films that,besides entertainment, will also bring the viewers enlightenment, and dubbed films, which

will help particularly the rural inhabitants to understand the content of the films.35 Alsopromised was a bigger variety of topics, which was supposed to bring the escapist filmsviewers back to the cinema and persuade them about the importance of the progressive films.

Among those colour epic films on offer in 1951 was certainly the very popular historical

comedyEmperors Baker Bakers Emperoras well as the Austrian film Spring on the Ice.Attendance at the latter reached more than 3 million viewers during its whole presentation

time in Czech cinemas and at that time it was the most attended Western film shown fromthe end of WWII. Presenting a more varied programme was obviously the way to deal withthe task set for the second half of the year by the Ministry of Information to the

Czechoslovakian State Film. The task was to balance financial management, i.e. stop thedecrease in takings, which were in the first half-year 60 million lower than expected.

Attendance at the preferred films was to be further ensured, for example, by not screening

more attractive films at the same timehowever, the individual cinema managers did notalways adhere to this.36

From 1951 some new distribution practises were introducedthese changes resulted fromadmitting to the failure of creating a new, ideal film culture based on a new viewer thatdoes not look merely for entertainment but mainly for enlightenment. An economic

expression of this failure was a decrease in takings from CZK 389 million in 1948 to 245

million in 1950. In the following period there was a much more significant reflexion of the

discrepancy between the cultural-political and economic requirements put on distribution.

Which in turn was reflected in certain measures and implications of conflicts between the

Czechoslovakian State Film and the government or Communist Partys authorities.


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1951-56: The First Decentralisation, Implementation of So-Called

Extended Programmes, and Conflicts with State Authorities

In 1951 the Czechoslovakian State Film started to take various measures in the distribution

sector that were supposed to increase takings and use a certain differentiation of offer. Thecolour epic films promised by Mlek, particularly Spring on the Ice andEmperors Baker

Bakers Emperor, were exhibited for an increased flat fee i.e. the admission fee was notgraded into three categories according to the distance of the seat from the screen, but all

tickets were sold for the highest price set for the given cinema category. In the next two years

there were other foreign films shown in this way: Child of the Danube (Austria), Tiger Akbar

(West Germany), One Summer of Happiness (Sweden) and To the Eyes of Memory (France).

During 1953 the practice of exhibiting films for the increased flat fee was finished andinstead of that a larger number of films were shown within an extended programme for socalled normal fee increased by 1 CZK .37 In 1953 sixteen films were shown in this way andthere were three very popular Czech films among them (Africa I,Angel in the Mountains and

Rafters Card Game), the others were Western produced films, e.g. Fanfan the Tulip,Where No vultures Fly or The Beauty of the Devil. However, the Czechoslovakian Film was

heavily criticized by the Ministry of Culture, the State Planning Office and the Central

Government Presidium for showing selected films with the one-crown surcharge, which was

seen as a violation of state discipline. It was required that this measure be cancelled and

thoroughly investigated. The State Film defended itself by saying that it had been trying toadd to the ideologically weaker films culturally and politically valuable film supplementsthat would normally not be seen by most viewers on other occasions.38 In the first stage afterthe implementation of double-programmes the film supplements shown were Soviet

documentaries, such as Soviet Moldavia or Through the Altai. The State Film was obviously

trying to compensate for the admission fee adjustment. However it got into arguments withmanagement over the bureaucratic rules and it also caused the government authorities to feara negative reaction from the population against such a form of price increase. The already

implemented increased admission fee eventually remained, perhaps also because attendance

had not decreased after its implementation and it had not caused complaints by viewers.

This effort to differentiate the distribution offer and its usage for increase in takings was in

contrast with the programming of travelling cinemas, which ensured film were shown in areas

without cinemas. The country was an object of the effort to use film for educational and

cultural-political activities. Which was evidenced, for example, by the organization of anevent called Spring in the Country (1951-56), and for a short time, also by the organization of

the Film Summer and Film Autumn (1951). The usual programme of the travelling cinemas

also unequivocally preferred Soviet and domestic production, which was also caused by the

fact that tours made by the travelling cinemas to small villages were not so profitable for the

Czechoslovakian State Film.39

It was not only the function of film as an ideological and

enlightenment vehicle for the education of the country but also lack of profitability that

influenced the way the travelling cinemas worked and were programmed, their role and

economic profitability did not significantly change until a few years later under the

management of district film enterprises and after wide-screen formats had been spread.

In 1952 the first, though very limited, decentralisation took place when cinema programming

was transferred to district directorates. However, those were part of the Czechoslovakian State

Film. The Ministry of Information and Enlightenment also consolidated its partial control

over programming by preparing a cultural and political distribution plan. Although this didnot concern the department of normal cinema programming, it was formed most


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significantly by creating a detailed calendar of cultural and political events and important

anniversaries. This calendar determined what films it was necessary to exhibit, for example,

on the anniversary of Lenins death (all Soviet films about Lenin had to be exhibited andSoviet films had to prevail on cinema programmes for the whole week). During the

International Womens Day celebrations ( Soviet films had to be exhibited in which a

struggling and hard-working woman is an important character), or on the Soviet Union AirForce Day (when renewed premiers ofValerij Tchkalov, Test Pilotand Girls Squadron hadto be exhibited), etc.

40

It was the extensive decentralisation alone41

that in 1957 brought the economic interests of

two new elements of the system into distribution: National Committees became cinema

owners and takings represented an important part of their budgets; and cost-accounting(khozraschet) District Film Enterprises (DFE), which became a central link between the

National Committees s and the Czechoslovakian State Film. Therefore, programming started

to take place on multiple levels and it became the subject of stricter supervision and criticism

by the Czechoslovakian State Film and especially by the government and Communist Party

authorities. However, in 1956, a year before decentralisation, there was a significant increase

in the number of newly exhibited feature films put into the category of others from 23 in1955 to 52 and a corresponding increase in attendance from 129 million to 146 million.

However, the 105 % fulfilment of attendance and of the financial plan led to a significant

increase in the plans for the following year, which put pressure on the newly created district

film enterprises and it motivated them to more frequent showings of attractive, but from the

point of view of cultural-political goals problematic, Western produced films. Anothersource for a conflict of interests was the fact that after decentralisation cinemas were owned

by the National Committees, whose budgets absorbed 60% of cinema takings. Besides that,

the District National Committees made plans for the performance of cinemas and therefore

they determined the economic framework for the DFE.42

Immediately after the beginning of

the new distribution system a situation was created that sharpened the disagreement between

the economic interests of the individual subjects that were involved in distribution and takings

and the economic and cultural-political objectives that distribution was supposed to meet. The

priorities of the centrally planned enterprises and Communist Party authorities entered into a

mutual conflict, which required intervention by the Czechoslovakian Communist Party

Central Committee.

1957-1960: Decentralised Distribution and Restored Ideological

Control

As part of the reorganisation, the economic organisations Central Film Rental Office andCzechoslovak Film Export were set up as of 1 January 1957. On the same day, the existing

regional film directions were replaced with DFE those were managed by District NationalCommittees, and cinemas were signed over to them in the first stage by the end of March.

However, cinemas were transferred on to municipal and local national committees on 1

April.43

The momentous importance of the change was also implied in the return to the name

film hire the previous term distribution centre suggested that there were no businessrelations within the distribution system.

As mentioned above, the new system soon required a correction of the distribution practices

according to the criteria set by the power hub the Party. The Fourth Department of theCzechoslovakian Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) presented a report on the

current cultural and political problems of film distribution on 17 September 1957. It statedthat the increased number of film premieres and the related variety of programming in 1956


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were welcomed warmly by the public, and even the fact that films made in capitalistcountries showed the highest attendance per screening was not viewed as a problem because

those films include a number of outstanding works that help the cultural and politicaleducation of our people. However, such films were neglected in programming already in thefirst half of 1957, and the the greatest number of screenings is given to marginal films of

such provenance [] Regional film corporations are trying to meet their difficult financialplans by increasing the number of screenings of supplementary Western films, yet the planswere not met. A rapid increase in the attendance of Western films and a decrease in the case

of Czech and Soviet films were stated the cause given was weakened supervision of thecultural and political content of the distributed materials on the part of regional national

committees and regional and district Party structures. A resolution of the CCPCC Secretariat

was drafted based on the report. It obliged(authors italics) Minister of Education and CultureKahuda to enforce the rule of not presenting more than 35% of foreign films set by the

Ministry.44

It is thus obvious that the decentralisation introduced a considerable conflict of interest in the

distribution system: the ideological requirements of the Party apparatus on the one hand, and

the efforts of the national committees and the regional film corporations to get additionalbudget incomes and to meet their plans, respectively. Besides the Party and administration

bodies controlling the work of the regional film corporations, a quantitative limitation on the

number of capitalist films exhibited became the main regulatory instrument. The 35% limit

was the central criterion of the distribution practice for the following years; it stood not only

for the number of films, but also of screenings and of viewers until 1964.45

The brief period of weaker control over distribution in 1957 was also a time of the highest

attendance rates in Czech cinemas. In the following three years, the share of capitalist

productions in the total screenings was decreasing, while the share of Soviet films grew

rapidly (see Chart 1). The decrease in the overall attendance rates followed the trend (Chart

2). The effort to stop the short-term liberalisation and differentiation of distributed supply was

reinforced in a speech by Minister of Education and Culture Frantiek Kahuda at the NationalConference on Film Distribution held in October 1958. In his paper, he declared the task to

cleanse the cinema programming of rubbish and increase the ideological effectiveness andeducational effect of film. The presentation form of extended programme was to be phasedout. Extended programmes endured after all, partly maybe because a similar form was

planned in the Soviet Union, known as the Grand Film Programme; the Filmov ekonomikamagazine no. 10 was quick to translate an article about the plan from the Iskusstvo kino.

46

Another explicit measure was a reduction in the numbers of screenings, justified by the fact

that the number of unprofitable screenings, which raised wage expenditures, had to be cut

down.47

In reality, the reduction affected the high-attendance Western productions while the

numbers of screenings of Soviet films kept growing.Another manifestation of the efforts to repress any differentiation in the supply and restore

ideological control over the distribution was the rejection of the attempts to establish film

clubs with the justification that film clubs were meaningless in the countrys context. Unlikein the West, where they fulfilled a progressive role by exhibiting films which would not bedistributed otherwise for commercial or discriminatory reasons, the entire Czechoslovakcinema network served the cultural and political interests of the state.

48The Czechoslovak

Film Company Central Administration reiterated the opinion: since the entire distribution was

directed by the interest of cultural-political education of the viewer, there was no need for

film clubs as a special type of establishment.49

The ex plicit primary reference point of all the measures was the XI. KS Congress and its

follow-up task to participate in the completion of cultural revolution. It is thereforeappropriate to see the three years of distribution corseted by increased ideological restrictions


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in connection with the preparations for declaring a successful transition to socialism.50

As

shown by the inspection on distribution in the regions, however, the goals were not met,

particularly the task of increasing the attendance of films of great ideological and artisticimportance. One of the main causes stated was that the programming departments of theregional film corporations favoured capitalist film productions and presented them on

Sundays and public holidays. Even the cinema staff often requested the regional corporationsto send escapist and ideologically objectionable films, including those that had been takenout of circulation.

51

In a situation where the main line formulated at the Conference on Distribution contradicted

the interest in economic performance and where the task of balancing or reducingsignificantly the difference in average attendance rates for screenings of films of cultural and

political importance and so-called attractive supplementary films failed the control over thecorrect cinema programming composition was assigned to education and culture departments

of regional national committees.52

The following period saw a gradual liberalisation of the

distribution due to pressures of cultural-political criteria, which can be documented

quantitatively by the changing composition of premiere presentations and numbers of

screenings of various national provenances. At the same time, however, this weakening ofideological restrictions led to an increased tension between the economic interests of the

Central Film Rental Office (total revenues forced by annual plans), regional film corporations

(corporate profit), and national committees (receipts transferred to national committee

budgets).

1961-1967: From the completion of socialism to the economic

reforms

Naturally enough, the period saw numerous minor adjustments, and a certain liberalisation

and atmosphere of economic reforms were manifested by the fact that the economic

difficulties of the distribution were discussed in the press openly. No fundamental structural

change occurred, however, in spite of the relatively fierce debate and fights over the

ownership of cinemas, one of the most important characteristics of the economic development

of the distribution in the 1960s. Others include, above all, the gradual and limited

liberalisation of the distribution from the talons of the cultural-political value criterion, and

growing receipts. The trend culminated in 1969, when the receipts even exceeded the 1957

levels, although the overall attendance kept dwindling throughout the period (with the

exception of the year 1969 itself, when it was slightly above the previous years). The growthin cinema receipts, encouraging the national committees to maintain their operation, werecaused mainly by increasing admissions for extended programmes, double screenings, wide-

screen films, and open-air cinema (summer cinema) screenings.The statistics suggest years of a relatively linear trend in the same direction. Most of all, the

number of screenings of films categorised under other increased dramatically: from 182,681in 1960 to 322,323 in 1966 (whereupon the increase stagnated for two years); there was a

corresponding rapid drop in the number of screenings of Soviet films from 240,982 in 1961

(meaning that the decrease began a year later) to 59,546 in 1967 (to keep decreasing for two

more years to 19,536 screenings, which was also partly due to the extraordinary political

situation) (Chart 1). The total number of screenings kept decreasing throughout the period, but

at a markedly lower pace than the numbers of viewers would suggest. In addition, despite the

continuing decrease in the total attendance, the number of viewers seeing the other categoryof films grew from 36,268,000 in 1960 to 49,525,000 in 1966 (Chart 2).


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In addition to the growing attendance of films of capitalist provenance, their economic

importance was further underlined by the fact that they were presented at higher admission

prices. In 1962, the average receipts per viewer for Soviet films were 1.94 CSK, while the

number of viewers was 31 million and the total revenues, 69 million CSK. For films coming

from socialist community countries, the average receipts per viewer amounted to 3.04 CSK,

achieving comparable total revenues of 70 million CSK at a much lower attendance rate (23million viewers). Films from capitalist countries were seen by 51 million viewers, averaging

at 3.75 CSK per viewer and generating total revenues of 191 million CSK.53

The situation

where the capitalist production, largely culturally and politically unsuitable, achieved a greatattendance share and an even greater share in revenues, intensified the conflict of interests

between the Party and Governmental guardians of the cultural-political line of national culture

on the one hand and subjects showing predominantly economic interests (the Central Film

Rental Office and the DFEs) on the other hand. However, there were also discrepancies

among the distributing companies. The DFEs interest was to maximise the receipts whichwas not identical to the cinema owners interest in maximising profits, which were dependentthe hire fees, higher for Western films. At the same time, an increased share of Western films

in the distribution was understood as a guarantee of increased receipts, thus leading to theirincreased programming, which forced the film companies to show popular films, however

they were not the best from the cinema owners point of view. 54 A 1964 report by the CCPCCIdeological Department to the CCPCC Secretariat made a critical note that the economic

performance tends to be the primary criterion of cinema work and that financing andplanning departments of national committees are often more influential on the cinema than

education and culture commissions. The problem of using the revenues to finance nationalcommittee budgets, which did not reinvest in further development of the cinemas, was

regarded as so important that the report even suggested that the cinemas be transferred back to

the Czechoslovak Film Company.55

An experimental measure along these lines was even

taken in Pilsen, where the District Film, Concert and Variety Show Enterprise (DFCVSE) was

signed over the cinemas.56 The cinema dispute appeared in the press ever more frequently in

the latter half of the 1960s, where it was mostly the film companies who employed the

cultural- political value argument, this time in their own favour, saying that the currentsituation was forcing them to programme unsuitable, artistically and ideologically pointless

filmsthe deterrent example of this rubbish which was on the screen thanks to the currentsituation was the West German film Secret of the Chinese Carnation.

57

Measures to grant ideologically valuable films room in the cinemas remained in force. Thusin 1961, a session of the Brno DFCVSE stated that attractive films of capitalist origin mustnot be screened for over 5-6 weeks. The higher percentage of capitalist films programmed has

to be balanced by mostly Czechoslovak and Soviet productions.58 The frequent violations of

this rule were the object of criticism by the education and culture commission of the DistrictNational Committee,59

and the regional KS committee was another source of bans.60Nevertheless, the Brno DFCVSE meeting minutes are a valuable material showing the

concrete practices which the corporation applied to observe the established restrictions

formally, while meeting its planned attendance and receipts. It re-ran Czech films (instead of

showing loss-making Soviet or popular democratic ones) in order to keep the capitalist sharebelow the 35-percent limit;

61the capitalist films which were still successful after the permitted

five weeks recurred in the programme several weeks later;62

a cut in number of screenings in

the small cinemas was proposed to provide extra space for attractive presentation ofsuccessful comedies or Grard Phillipe films, for example;63 attractive films and extendedprogrammes were routinely programmed for high-capacity open-air cinemas, or screened in

night shows.64


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Wide-screen and 70-mm Western films were also often shown, for which higher admission

prices had been set the economy-motivated and only weakly Party-restricted wave ofinterest in such formats was in stark contrast to the attitude in the late 1950s. Back then in

1958, Minister of Education and Culture Frantiek Kahuda said at the National Conference onFilm Distribution that wide-screen films would not be approached from the commercial point

of view as was the practice in the West, where it represented curry favour to backward taste,which meant that very few of the Western wide-screen films [were] acceptable. His warningthat there would not be a sufficient supply of wide-screen films available in the nearestfuture meant a factual stop to their imports until 1960, when the transition to socialism wascompleted.

65

The more common use of wide-screen formats in the first half of the 1960s also had a

changing influence on the role of travelling cinemas. Cost-accounting DFEs ran travellingcinemas after the 1957 decentralisation. Although theirs numbers dwindled constantly, they

might have represented important sources of incomethe Brno DFE often programmed wide-screen films at higher admission prices for its travelling cinemas, which was an important

money supply. The change in the attitude to programming is evidenced, for instance, by the

criticism the Brno DFCVSE received in 1963 for screening largely escapist films of capitalistprovenance.66A certain acceleration in the trend of liberalising economic points of view from ideological

restrictions appeared in 1964. From then on, the 35-percent restriction on Western

productions only concerned the number of films brought into distribution in a given year (not

the numbers of screenings and viewers); in addition, productions of the so-called developing

countries were excluded from the category.67

In contrast to 1963, which saw the culmination

of a three-year general economic crisis and a definitive collapse of the five-year plan,68

the

imports of films from capitalist countries increased significantly in the following year.

Despite the continuing lack of foreign currency, the CCPCC Secretariat considered it

appropriate to grant special foreign currency allocations in justified cases for the purchase offilm epics, which admittedly were more expensive, but which would bring quite outstandingrevenues when distributed.69 In contrast to just four US films distributed in 1963, they wereeight in 1964, including such first-class hits as Big Country, Some Like It Hot, Roman

Holiday, and most importantly, The Magnificent Seven, which attracted over 6 million

viewers by the end of the 1960s.70

The gradually growing emphasis on the role of economic

performance of the distribution followed the reform of the national economy commenced in

the latter half of the 1960s, and the new management system rules were adopted in 1965.

They were only introduced to the film industry on 1 January 1969, but the reform air and

achievements were naturally reflected in the distribution. Already in 1965, the Central Film

Rental Office Deputy Manager Albert Nesveda took the opportunity of the new management

system in preparation, which placed an increased emphasis on the material interest andreinforced the goods-to-money relationships, to criticise the 1957 decentralisation. He proposed the establishment of a viable economic body in which progressive managementmethods could be implemented which meant, in reality, first and foremost a transfer ofcinemas under DFCVSE management and the restoration of the model which was in

operation very briefly in early 1957. Thus, Nesveda used the reformist rhetoric in the fight

over cinema management to support the efforts to cut cinemas off national committee

budgets.71

However, the efforts were fruitless, with the exception of the above mentioned

DFCVSE experiment in Pilsen.The increasing emphasis on the economic performance of the distribution, validated by the

introduction of the new management system in the early 1969, was regarded as negative one

year later, in the era of the so-called normalisation and repression of the 1960s reformisteffort: the economic interest of distribution personnel in the economic performance leads


18/27

to a general preference of commercial films, thus shifting the overall composition of films

introduced by the distribution network to an area of entertaining, adventure, and otherwise

escapist films.72Nevertheless, before the normalisation hit the film industry with its personnel cleanses

beginning in September 1969 and before the distribution supply was cleansed by excluding

32 Western films in 1971,73

the Czechoslovak Film Company achieved the greatest receiptsin history in 1969; in addition, the number of screenings of films in the other category wasthe greatest for the entire post-war period. Admittedly, the attendance rate for this category

did not beat the year 1947, but it was higher than that of 1957, which was the peak year in

terms of total attendance. The impact of the introduction of the new management system may

be understood as a continuation of the 1960s tendency, but the massive fluctuation in the

attendance and number of screenings of Western films on the one hand and Soviet andpopular democratic ones on the other hand was in part caused by a response of both thespectators and the distribution network to the invasion of the intervention armies in August

1968. The Government did request on 18 December 1968 an inclusion of artistically valuablefilms from the Five Countries74 in the programming, but the refusing attitude to their

presentation is obvious from Brno DFCVSE meeting minutes: they say that such films maybe included, but only upon explicit request and agreement with the cinema manager.75 At aMay 1970 meeting, the DFCVSE made a defence against an allegation of cultural

organisations for lack of will to normalise by saying that it was willing, but that economicinterests forced it to programme Western films, which yielded higher receipts. Nonetheless,

the programming department had already issued an order to programme one Soviet or

popular democratic film per month regardless of the cinema managers preferences.76 Thedefensive argument of economic interest was the final example of the open contradiction

between the ideological and economic requirements in the period in question it was to beresolved firmly by the normalisers.

Conclusion

Film distribution in the era of the totalitarian communist regime in Czechoslovakia was

defined in its principal contours by ideological requirements set by the Party apparatus. Their

implementation was carried out and controlled by a system of institutions and bodies of the

Communist Party, Government, state administration and specialised corporations. In the first

stage, the distributions mechanisms were set to achieve the primary objective, which was to

create a new type of national film culture, cleansed of the presence of Western filmproductions (of any escapist productions in its most radical form), and saturated by the self-

reliant production of the Eastern Bloc countries. Both the distribution supply and the concretepractices had to adapt gradually to the unfeasibility of the model, determined by two

interconnected factors: the failure to build a new model of film spectatorship, and the

economic requirements of the film industry. This paper attempts to present a description of a

certain historic model of distribution, shaped by a fundamental conflict between an

ideological model and economic criteria, from the specific point of view of the interests of the

constituent institutions and subjects which defined the basic distribution structure as well as

practices. In this perspective of economic and ideological interests of the constituent subjects,

the history of the distribution is shown not (only) as one of a smoothly functioning instrument

for the enforcement of power and ideological objectives of party and governmental bodies,

but also as an area of conflict and purpose-driven practice. Certainly, the fundamental changes

in the primary tendencies were dictated above all by the power hub after 1948, but theideological formation of the distribution was forced to respond to the economic requirements


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and the real performance, which led to an obvious tension between the cultural-political andeconomic requirements, making film distribution an area of covert, sometimes even overt

conflict.

Such a historic rendering of the distribution system and exposure of its internal dynamics and

conflict, however, must not obscure or weaken the usefulness and effectiveness of examining

the film industry in general and the distribution system in particular as a specific case of thefunctioning of the socialist economic system. In doing so, my attention focuses on one of its

manifestations, titled economy of shortage by Jnos Kornai. Despite a certain tendency ofhis towards essentialism and historicity, I regard the application of Kornais economic modelas very useful. It may help define the basic difference between a distribution system formed

primarily by market mechanisms on the one hand and a system affected by a qualitatively

different set of ideological, proprietary, bureaucratic and economic relations on the other

hand. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the distribution mechanism in post-war

Czechoslovakia in the period in question was defined markedly by the shortagephenomenon (be it a shortage due to low productivity of the Eastern Bloc film industry, or the

ideological impediments to importing Western productions). It manifested itself both in the

vertical relationships among the elements of the distribution system and in the horizontalrelationship to the consumer. It is this horizontal relationship to the viewer which opens up a

productive opportunity to link the research into the socialist distribution model with reception

research. First and foremost, research into the popularity of certain types of production,

defined either in terms of genre or national provenance, will require different conceptual

instruments in a situation of very limited vertical and horizontal differentiation of supply than

it will in the case of a system defined, at least in its basic parameters, by the supply-demand

relation.

Africa I(Miroslav ZikmundJi Hanzelka, Studio umleckho filmu; Afrika I, CZ, 1952)Angel in the Mountains(Boivoj Zeman, Studio umleckho filmu; Andl na horch, CZ,1955)

Beauty and the Beast(Ren Clair, Universalia/ENIC/Franco Londonfilm; La Beaut dudiable, France/Italy, 1950)

Big Country, The (William Wyler, Anthony Productions/Worldwide Productions; US, 1958)

Child of the Danube (Georg Jacoby, Nowafilm/Wienfilm; Das Kind der Donau, Austria,

1950)

Emperor and the Golem, The (Martin Fri, Studio umleckho filmu; Csav peka Pekav csa, CZ, 1951)Fall of Berlin,The (Michail iaureli, Mosfilm; Padenije Berlina, SU, 1949)

Fan-Fan the Tulip (Christian-Jaque, Amato Produzione/Filmsonor/Les Films Ariane;Italy/France, 1952)

Girls Squadron (Semen Timoschenko, Lenfilm; Nebeskij Tichochod, SU, 1945) Hunchback of Paris, The (Andr Hunebelle, P.A.C./Globe Film International; FR/IT, LeBossu 1960)

Magnificent Seven, The (John Sturges, The Mirisch Corporation/Alpha Productions; US,

1960)

Moby Dick(John Huston, Moulin Productions Inc; US, 1956)

New Fighters Shall Arise (Ji Weiss, Studio umleckho filmu; Vstanou nov bojovnci, CZ,1950)

One Summer of Happiness (Arne Mattsson, Nordisk Tonefilm; Hon dansade en sommar,

Sweden, 1951)Rafters Card Game(Vclav Wasserman, Studio umleckho filmu; CZ, 1952)


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Roman Holiday (William Wyler, Paramount Pictures;US, 1953)

Russian Question, The (Michail Romm, Goskino; Russkiy vopros, SU, 1947)

Secret Mission (Michail Romm, Mosfilm; Sekretnaja Missija, SU, 1950)

Secret of Chinese Carnation (Rudolf Zehetgruber, Rapid Imp.Ex.Ci/Rapid; Das Geheimnis

der chinesischen Nelke, DE/FR, 1964)

Some Like It Hot(Billy Wilder, Ashton Productions/The Mirish Corporation; US, 1959)Soviet Moldavia (J. Aron, Odesa; Sovetskaja Moldavija, SU, 1951)

Spring on the Ice (Georg Jacoby, Wien-Film, Nova-Film; Frhling auf dem Eis, Austria,1951)

Test Pilot(Alexandr Stolper, Mosfilm; Nasche serdce, SU, 1947)

Through the Altai (L. Saakov, Mosfilm; Po Altaju, SU, 1950)

Tiger Bay (J. Lee Thompson, Rank; GB, 1959)

Tigers Claw,The (Harry Piel, Allianz film; Tiger Akbar, West Germany, 1952),To the Eyes of Memory (Jean Dellanoy, Gibe; Aux jeux du souvenir, France, 1948)

Valerij Tchkalov (Michail Kalatozov, Lenfilm; SU, 1941)

War and Peace (King Vidor, Paramount; US, 1956)

Where No Vultures Fly (Harry Watt, African Film Associates/Ealing Studios/The RankOrganisation; GB, 1951)


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Chart 1:

Number of screenings

0

100 000

200 000

300 000

400 000

500 000

600 000

700 000

800 000

900 000

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

total

Czechoslovak production

Soviet production

peoples democratic countries production

the others


22/27

Chart 2:

attendance

0

20 000

40 000

60 000

80 000

100 000

120 000

140 000

160 000

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

year

atten

dance(inthousands)

Total


Soviet production

Peoples democraticcountries production

the others


23/27

Chart 3:

Number of viewers per screening

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

averagenum

berofviewers


Soviet production

Peoples democracy countries production

The others


24/27

1 Even as the Czech lands Bohemia and Moraviawere parts of Czechoslovakia, we are not dealingwith Slovakiathe specificities of distribution system were not essential, but the differences in attendance ofnational productions, as well as in the number of theatres, were significant.2 Ideov vchova a kulturn politika strany. Z refertu Vclava Kopeckho na VIII. sjezdu KS (March

1946). In: Zdenk tbla Pavel Taussig,KS a eskoslovensk kinematografie (vbor dokument z let 1945-1980) (Praha, 1981), p. 28.3

The process was not limited to the cinemafor the sphere of literature, it is analysed elaborately byPavel Janek in his bookLiterrn brak. Operace vylouen, operace nahrazen, 1938-1951 (Brno, 2004).4 See Jindich Elbl, Jak byl znrodnn eskoslovensk film. Patnct let filmov politiky 1933-1948. 2.st, Film a doba, 8 (1965), p. 399.5 Eva Dzrikov,Dejiny filmovej distribcie vorganizcii a sprve slovenskej kinematografie

(Bratislava, 1996), p. 78.6 Jnos Kornai, The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, 1992).7 In January 29, 1963, the secretariat of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party Central Committeeaccepted a report of a commission constituted by the employees of Central directorate of Czechoslovak film,

Ministry of Information and State Planning Office. According to the report, the existing monitoring of

attendance based on the criterion of national production is not suitable any more, as it does not allow to evaluate

a cultural-political values of imported movies. Because an import of progressive movies is a part of the importfrom capitalist countries, it is recommended to differentiate the statistics of attendance.8

Kornai, p. 361.9 In 1960, there was one TV set for 13,4 inhabitants, in 1966 it was already one TV set for 5,2

inhabitantsmeanwhile, the attendance of western production grown up from 36,3 million to 49,5 million.10

Kornai, pp. 240-243.11 See Ji Havelka, s. filmov hospodstv 1966-70 (Praha, 1976), p. 22; see also a report about thesituation in Czechoslovak film industry given by Jan Fojtkto the presidium ofV KS, 6 January 1970.Dokumenty z archivu V KS, Iluminace, 25 (1997), p. 167.12 Anon., Pro dosud nehraj esk kina? Problm novch kopi a problm starch titulk. Filmovprce, 2 (1945), p. 1.13

See Petr Mare, Politika a Pohybliv obrzky. Spor o dovoz americkch film do eskoslovenska podruh svtov vlce, Iluminace, 13 (1994); Petr Mare, Vemi prostedky hjen kinematografie. vodemkedici dokumentu Zznam na pam, Iluminace, 6 (1991), pp. 75-105.14

The most active critic of the communists politics was the weekly published magazine of the ChristianParty Obzorythe minister of the Information Vclav Kopeck attempted to stop its publishing already at theend of 1945. See Karel Kaplan, Cenzura 1945-1953. In: KaplanDuan Tomek (eds.), O cenzuev eskoslovensku v letech 1945-1956(Praha, 1992), p. 8; and Milan Drpala, Na ztracen vart Zpadu.Poznmky kesk politick publicistice nesocialistickho zamen v letech 1945-1948, Soudobdjiny, 1(1998), pp. 16-24.15

eskoslovensk filmov spolenost II (unprocessed files), National Film Archive, Prague. 16

A letter ofJosef Jon, the chief of organizational secretariat of Cultural and promotional division VKS, 14 March 1947, addressed to Gustav Bare (the chief of the Cultural and promotional divisionV KS).


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KS V 1945-1989, Cultural and promotional division V KS files. Archival unit 660, National Archive,Prague (hereafter V KS, OKP, AU 660, NA).17

V KS, OKP, AU 660, NA.18

This study is a part of a wider research project that will be focused on the history of a local film culture

in Brnothe second largest city of Czech Republic, which had 285 thousands inhabitants in 1950.19

Measured by the number of movies accepted for distribution in 1947, the dominant production wasAmerican with 82 movies, followed by 38 Soviet and 32 British films.20

A quotation from the presentation of Mlek at the conference of the Czechoslovakian State Film inNovember 1948. In:Zprva o prvn celosttn podnikov konferenci eskoslovenskho sttnho filmu (Praha,1948).21

Za vysokou ideovou a umleckou rove eskoslovenskho filmu. Usnesen pedsednictva stednhovboru KS o tvrch kolech eskoslovenskho filmu. Rud prvo, 19 April 1950, p. 3.22 The model of circular distributionwas finally denied as evolutionarily permanently unbearable andfor the year 1953 only two programme sequences were put together. See Ji Havelka, Vron zprva s.

sttnho filmu za rok 1952 (Praha, 1964), p. 115.23 Artu ernk, Vron zprva o s. filmovnictv.Rok 1950 (Praha, 1952), p. 175.24

V KS, OKP, RG 666, NA.25

Bohuslav Hammer, the Brno districts director. Inscription of the theatres heads, 28 January 1949,Krajsk filmov podnik (unprocessed files), G 604, Moravsk zemsk archiv Brno (hereafter KFP, G604,MZA).26 Jaroslav Bro, Chome do kina bezpedsudk, Svt prce, 20 (1949), p. 10.27 An inscription of a deliberation at the film subcommittee of the District National Committees schooldivision, Brno, 12 December 1950 (KFP, G604, MZA).28 Artu ernk, Vron zprva o s. filmovnictv.Rok 1949 (Praha, 1952), p. 160.29

Working conference, Brno, 28 November 1950 (KFP, G604, MZA).30

To give an example: the Assotiation of Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship assumed a patronage over the

enterprise called A week of revolutionary movies and promised to get 100% attendance however, accordingto a complaint lodged at the working conference in November 28, the actual attendance reached the point of

3,6% (KFP, G604, MZA).31 The Cultural Committee was established by Directoriate of V KS in September 1948 and headed by

Vclav Kopeck.32 Jak byl znrodnn eskoslovensk film. Jindich Elbl. Film a doba, 8 (1965), p. 399.

33 28 April 1950, V KS, OKP, AU 666, NA.34 Za vysokou ideovou a umleckou rove eskoslovenskho filmu. Usnesen pedsednictva stednhovboru KS o tvrch kolech eskoslovenskho filmu. Rud prvo, 19 April 1950, p. 3.35 Dubbing was understood as a form of programme differentiation that gives a higher attractivity to the

Soviet movies above all (from 1946 till 1953, only Soviet and peoples democratic countries movies weredubbed)it is obvious from the complaints on a bad quality and legibility of subtitles or from the complaintsthat village people dont manage to read them so quickly. Films for children represented a specific problem itwas recommended to the cinemas managers to summarize the story before the screening. See workingconference, Brno, 28 November 1950 (KFP, G604, MZA).36

See e.g. a memo of Czechoslovakian State Film that pointed out a case of a fault in programming:some premieres took the audience in the time when preferred movieNew Fighters Shall Arise was programmed.

An inscription of a deliberation at the film subcommittee of the District National Committees school division,Brno, 12 March 1951 (KFP, G604, MZA).37 Ministery of Culture, 1953-1956, AU 867, 196/141, National Archive, Prague (hereafter MK, AU 867,

NA).38

Ibid.39 Osvtov beseda, 5 (7 March 1956).40

Cultural-political plan of movie distribution for 1952, Ministry of informationsupplements, 1945-1953, RG 861/0/1, 134/471, NA.41 Governmental decree, 16 January 1957, no. 4/1957 about organization of film business: all property of

cinemas including real estates was handed over to National Committees. At the same time district film

enterprises were established.42 The remaining 40% was rental: 89% of the rental was kept by Central Film Rental Office and 11%was used to cover up expenditures of DFE. See ideological department ofV KS 1945-1989, 05/3, file 11, AU

69, NA; see also Albert Nesveda, Kproblematice plnovn v kinech, Filmovm objektivem 4 (1963) 4, pp. 61-62; and A. Nesveda,Ekonomika provozu kin (Praha, 1963), p. 90.


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43

Ji Havelka, s. filmov hospodstv1956-1960 (Praha, 1973), p. 184.44 A report for CCPCC Secretariat, given by the fourth department of CCPCC Secretariat: report about

contemporary cultural political difficulties of film distribution. stedn vbor KS 1945-1989, Praguesecretariat 1954-1962, RG 1261/0/14, file 130, AU 192, item 3, NA (hereafter V KS, secretariat 1954-1962, AU192, NA).45

O co vlastn jde? O divka o penze o ...? Divadeln a filmov noviny, 13 (1965-66), p. 1.46 Zelen novm metodm, Filmov ekonomika, 10, p. 61 (translation from Iskusstvo kino, 8, 1960).See also A. Nesveda,Ekonomika provozu kin (Praha, 1963), p. XX. Not only that the Extended Programmessustained - as the supplements were not used the cultural-political valuable documentaries already, but filmsabout Czech popular film actors.47

Memo of Central Film Rental Office, KNV Olomouc (1857) 1949-1960, sheaf II, 2068/1491, Country

Archive Opava, subsidiary Olomouc.48 Zvit ideovou innost a vchovn psoben filmu, vestrann zkvalitnit innost kin. Presentation ofthe Minister of School and Education Frantiek Kahuda. Celosttn konference o filmov distribuci (Praha,1958), p. 11.49 The Czechoslovak Film Company Central Administration 1958-59, Ministry of School and Education,

34 III, 2000/33, NA.50 See e.g.: Hlavn koly kulturn revoluce. Zusnesen XI. sjezdu KS (erven 1958). In: Zdenk tbla

Pavel Taussig,KS a eskoslovensk kinematografie (vbor dokument z let 1945-1980) (Praha, 1981), p. 77-78. See also the report for the ideological commission of V KS about the contemporary situation in featurefilm production, presented by a member of the commission and employee of V KSSecretariat Zdenk Urban12. November 1959. Edice materil Bansk Bystrica 1959. Dokumenty ke kontextm I. festivalueskoslovenskho filmu. Iluminace 56 (2004), pp. 200-209.51 Ministry of School and Education, ministers committee meetings, 1956-1966, board no. 32, 13.August 1959, NA.52

Report about fulfilling tasks for a ministers committee meeting, conference about film distribution, 28October 1959. Ministry of School and Education, 42/1959, file 23, board no. 42, NA.53

The Czechoslovakian Film Companys politics of export and import in the period 1957-1963. V KS,secretariat 1962-1966, RG 1261/0/15, file 26, AU 48, item 1, NA.54 O co vlastn jde? O divka o penze o ...?, Divadeln a filmov noviny, 13 (1965-66), p. 3.55 The contemporary situation in film distribution and a proposition of rules for the future development.

Secretariat ofV KS 1962-66, RG 1261/0/15, file 26, archival unit 20, item 3, NA.56 See Ladislav enek, Abychom mohli hledat souadnice, Kulturn tvorba, 17 (1966), pp. 4-5. Thesecond exception was Film Enterpr

gent_2007_between a new film culture and the socialist economy

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