geoffrey hale political science 3170 the university of lethbridge october 14, 2010
TRANSCRIPT
What is the WTOOrganizational Structure and Governance
Facts, myths, and theoretical insights.Canada’s Evolving Role at the WTOTrade “Clubs”, Canada and the WTO
Other major governance issuesBudget – distributed in proportion to member countries’ share of
global trade – EU > 40%; US: 13.5%; China: 5.9%; Canada 3.36%Total Budget - 189 MM CHF $C 180 MM.
Decision-makingBy consensus – not unanimity (except for changes to general
principles guiding WTO), but not against opposition of major trading power.
Usually requires “log rolling” among major nations, coalitions¾ vote on interpretations of WTO rules, waiving disciplines against
members.Two-thirds vote for technical rule changes, approving “accession” of
new members.
WTO Accession ProcessApplicants must agree to WTO processes, make binding
undertakings re: own trade and related policies.Must negotiate entry with existing WTO members who may
negotiate specific terms in return for approving accession.Negotiations typically “asymmetric”Negotiations have become more demanding with growth,
diversity of existing WTO membership.
WTO Facts and MythsWTO is intergovernmental
organization Members determine start (and
terms) of new negotiating rounds
National governments broker level and terms of autonomy on specific rule clusters
Medium-sized and smaller countries benefit from “club rules” capacity to cooperate in rule enforcement
WTO is not international trade constitution – precluded by detailed negotiations on rules. Still major power asymmetries. Rule commitments are
cumulative.
Medium-sized, smaller countries cannot compel compliance of large countries, although international coalitions help.
Other useful policy insights (per Froese)Political institutions still matter as much as economic ones in
trade policiesNational / regional decision-making structures determine terms
and context of participation, negotiating positions, especially of larger, medium-sized trading countries.
National sovereignty not incompatible with global governanceGovernments still retain capacity for policy discretion within
boundaries of international, regional agreements. Policy “realism” heavily circumscribed by realities of
interdependence for large, small countries alike. WTO embedded within complex networks of international, regional
and sectoral agreements with interconnected implications.
Canada’s Evolving Role at the WTOCanada still 5th largest trading country in world
11th or 12th largest if individual European countries and/or Hong Kong included
But – no longer one of “inner core” players in global negotiationsReflects shift in power of different “trade clubs” at WTO
Factors in Canada’s declining role at WTOInternational
Emergence of large developing countries (e.g. China, India, Brazil) has broadened “inner circle” at WTO
Australia now playing leading role as leader of agricultural exporting countries
Growing important of regional and bilateral trade agreements
Canada-related issues “trivial” to WTO outcomes (per Wolfe.
Domestic Canadian domestic trade options
constrained by persistence of minority governments, related salience of regional issues (e.g. protection of supply management)
Growing impact of competitive liberalization, pursuit of regional trade deals on Cdn. priorities.
Post-2004 division of Commons’ Foreign Affairs / Trade ctees. Relative decline of DFAIT
influence within fed. gov’t?
The Politics of Trade Clubs (per Wolfe)Wolfe – “group of states associated for a particular
purpose”Potential roles:
“Analytical burden sharing” – coordination of national strategies May involve log-rolling among members with complementary trade
priorities.
Keohane & Nye – “places where ‘insiders’ know the rules and ‘outsiders’ have limited influence Proliferation of issues under review at multiple WTO committees requires
all but largest states to focus efforts on areas of key importance.
Features of major trade clubsCommon characteristics
e.g. region or level of developmentCommon objectives
Reduction of barriers to agricultural trade (e.g. Cairns Group)Protection of domestic farm sectors (G-10, G-33)“Bridge clubs” – organized to broker differences among
competing positions.
Factors contributing to “club” growthGrowing number of members
Networking through clubs critical for smaller countries to exercise any influence over trade negotiations
WTO tradition of consensus decision-makingClusters of states more likely to secure accommodation of
positions or provide blocking coalitions until accommodation secured.
WTO tradition of “single undertaking”“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”
Implications for WTO ProcessesEmergence of negotiations through “series of nested
‘concentric circles’”WTO Plenary Meetings (formalities)Informal PlenariesTechnical experts’ meetings“Green Room” inclusive core group representing key trade
clubs relevant to issue. Wolfe notes Doha roadblock between Brazil, India-led groups, US, EU
attempted bridging by G-4 (US, EU, Brazil, India), G-6 (+ Australia, Japan)