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GETTING TO THE FIRST HANDSHAKE: ENHANCING SECURITY BY INITIATING

COOPERATION IN TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER BASINS1

Jacob D. Petersen-Perlman and Aaron T. Wolf2

ABSTRACT: How does transboundary water cooperation begin at the initial stages, and how can third partieshelp to foster said cooperation? Many nations with transboundary waters do not cooperate or have ceased coop-eration. Yet cooperation often prevails, resulting in 688 water-related treaties signed from 1820 to 2007. Weaddress the following: by which practices can development partners best design and implement cooperative pro-jects at the state level to enhance basin water security in the earliest stages? This article identifies strategiesfor initiating cooperation and lessons drawn from reviewing select cases. We compiled from the Oregon StateUniversity Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database all transboundary water resources projects over thelast decade with multinational participation. We selected 10 case studies that enhance water security that fitthe following filtering criteria: (1) Funding exclusively/primarily from outside sources, (2) Including nonofficialstakeholders in project design/implementation, (3) Absence of formal relations around water resources betweenor among the riparian nations before the project was discussed, (4) Project design possibly enhancing hydropolit-ical relations. Findings suggest that to enhance water security, project designs should respect participatingriparians’ autonomies, create basin-wide networks of scientists, allow for each partner to garner responsibilityfor project activities, and consult a diverse group of stakeholders.

(KEY TERMS: water cooperation; water security; hydropolitics; informal cooperation.)

Petersen-Perlman, Jacob D. and Aaron T. Wolf, 2015. Getting to the First Handshake: Enhancing Security byInitiating Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins. Journal of the American Water Resources Association(JAWRA) 1-20. DOI: 10.1111/1752-1688.12348

INTRODUCTION

Water security has been defined by UN-Water(2013) as the “capacity of a population to safeguardsustainable access to adequate quantities of accept-able quality water for sustaining livelihoods, humanwell-being, and socio-economic development, forensuring protection against water-borne pollutionand water-related disasters, and for preserving

ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stabil-ity.” Allan and Mirumachi (2010) asserted that watersecurity is determined by the possession of a diversi-fied and strong economy. This view is indirectly sup-ported by Wolf et al. (2005), who stated thatalleviating poverty is implicitly tied to easing securityconcerns. Wolf et al. (2005) also emphasized theimportance of institutional capacity for water man-agement to enhance water security. Providing waterservices is seen often as a “peace dividend” that can

1Paper No. JAWRA-14-0193-P of the Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA). Received September 12, 2014;accepted June 22, 2015. © 2015 American Water Resources Association. Discussions are open until six months from issue publication.

2Graduate Teaching and Research Assistant (Petersen-Perlman) and Professor (Wolf), Geography program, College of Earth, Ocean,and Atmospheric Sciences, Oregon State University, 104 Wilkinson Hall, Corvallis, Oregon 97331 (E-Mail/ Petersen-Perlman: [email protected]).

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info:doi/10.1111/1752-1688.12348

bolster state legitimacy while also serving the needsof the people after a conflict has occurred (Weinthalet al., 2011).

It is possible for water security to be enhanced byformal cooperation. In this article, we define “coopera-tion” as actions considered to be +3 or above on theBasins at Risk scale (e.g., starting diplomatic rela-tions; establishing technological or scientific commu-nication; proposing or offering economic or militaryaid) (Yoffe and Larson, 2001). There are cases wherecooperative adaptation between nations may not bepossible under protracted conflicts (Fischhendleret al., 2011). Yet for nations not at war, it is alsoimportant to note that the absence of war does notmean the absence of conflict (Zeitoun and Warner,2006). When nations are not warring over water buta protracted conflict exists, alternative solutions maybe sought, and, in such cases, “environmental unilat-eralism” may be preferred by one or more states toachieve certain environmental outcomes (Fis-chhendler et al., 2011). Yet cooperation may be asuitable alternative for all parties in a river basinthat enhances water security, even allowing forfuture cooperation over other international issues, asnoted by past functionalist writings (Sewell, 1966;Mitrany, 1975; J€agerskog, 2001; Turton, 2003).

This is an article not about cooperation, but ratherabout how development partners (defined in this arti-cle as governmental organizations, intergovernmentalorganizations, or nongovernmental organizations thatmay lend political and/or financial support) may helpnations possibly go from a lack of cooperationbetween states toward cooperation at its most initialstages, and, in the process, enhancing their ownwater security. Moving from a lack of cooperationtoward cooperation may not enhance water securityin all cases; for instance, not all cooperation is goodfor both parties (see Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Indi-vidual policy makers in a nation making decisionsabout cooperation operate within the historical con-text of their nations, fed by a set of external andinternal drivers of decision making. Before them is apossibility of cooperation for a set of negotiated bene-fits. At this point, these policy makers must choose,on behalf of their nations, whether or not to cooper-ate. How do they make this decision? They do notconsider benefits alone, as there are many cases ofnations not joining other riparians in negotiating abasin agreement (e.g., Egypt in the Nile) or onlyselectively participating as an observer (e.g., China inthe Mekong). It appears that objective or “paper” ben-efits (as projected in the many studies on regionalcooperation or integration, e.g., Feitelson and Had-dad, 1998; Sadoff and Grey, 2002, 2005) are only thestarting point. In other words, benefits are necessary,

but they are not sufficient to induce cooperativeaction.

There is no one way to initiate cooperation — eachtransboundary basin is unique. It is difficult to writeprescriptions for how the cooperative process maybegin. Nor does cooperation follow a clear-cut, itera-tive process. However, there are underlying practicesfor how cooperation can be enhanced. In this article,we attempt to illuminate some techniques of initiat-ing cooperation processes in a basin with little to nocooperation amongst development partners.

We attempt to answer the following questions:

1. By which practices might development partnersbest design and implement collaborative projectsin their absolute earliest stages?

2. How well do the steps for initiating coopera-tion mentioned in literature (data exchange,scientific collaboration) help enhance formalcooperation?

We begin by discussing various barriers thatnations may have that inhibit engagement in cooper-ative processes. We also discuss strategies that devel-opment partners may use to improve cooperation. Wedescribe a case study selection process in whichnations attempted to facilitate transboundary watercooperation and our results for analyzing these casesfor lessons learned. We then discuss overall themesfrom the cases that we found that appeared to beeffective in enhancing cooperation: jurisdiction, pro-ject design, stakeholders, and negotiating. We con-clude that the principles for enhancing cooperationwere supported in these case studies, and suggestthat it is best to design projects that respect autono-mies of participating riparians, create basin-wide net-works of scientists, allow for each partner to garnerresponsibility for project activities, and consult adiverse group of stakeholders.

VARIABLES INFLUENCING COOPERATION

The purpose of this section is to review the variousissues that nations weigh before committing to coop-eration, to review concepts that have been suggestedin peer-reviewed and gray literature as agents in fos-tering cooperation, and to define the role that devel-opment partners may play in the process. Before this,however, we present a review of issues that develop-ment partners have considered in past water coopera-tion endeavors. The factors include: perceived risk,enhancing cooperation, cooperation-inducing design,

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PETERSEN-PERLMAN AND WOLF

nation drivers, pointers for partners, and Track I andTrack II Diplomacy.

Perceived Risk and Barriers

Perceived risk has been defined as the perceptionthat an act of cooperation will expose the nation toharm, will jeopardize something of value to thenation, or will threaten the political future of individ-ual policy makers (Subramanian et al., 2012). It is acore consideration for country decision makers; ide-ally, nations cooperate when there is more opportu-nity than risk and more benefit than cost. If a nationcannot find a way to compensate for or control risk, itmay choose not to enter into a cooperative agreement.Nations may also unilaterally develop projects withintheir own territories to avoid the political intricaciesposed by sharing resources (Wolf et al., 2005).

Subramanian et al. (2012) developed five generalcategories of risk perceived by decision makers. Thefirst category is the capacity and knowledge risk.This is where nations feared they would be at a dis-advantage in negotiations, which manifested in twomajor ways: (1) Nations perceived they had less nego-tiating capacity than their co-riparians, and (2)Nations perceived they did not have adequate oraccurate information about the basin.

Decision makers experienced the second category,the accountability and voice risk, with the following:(1) Fear the co-riparians, third parties, or regionalinstitution may not deliver benefits; (2) Concern thatthe respective nation’s interests would not be ade-quately considered in joint decision-making processes;and (3) Perception of a high probability that theregional institutional arrangement would not resultin the flow of benefits.

To a greater or lesser extent, all the cases exam-ined reflected the significant risk of sovereignty andautonomy. This risk occurs when a decision makersenses the danger of intrusion into the nation’sauthority to make sovereign decisions. It addressesboth the desire to have control over national develop-ment goals and related development of resources andinfrastructure, and the right to make decisions inde-pendently. Another risk identified was the risk ofequity and access; which can be manifested as: (1)Fairness in any deal, regarding specified quantity orquality of water, benefit flows, or project costs, and/or(2) Entitlement to use the river. Some nations viewedentitlement as the right to continuing with historicuses; others as gaining access to a river runningthrough (or originating in) its territory; and yetothers viewed it as attaining benefits in proportion toa nation’s relative size in (or percent contribution to)the basin.

The risk of stability and support had both directnational and personal implications. All nations in thestudy had to consider this, but it was a stronger con-sideration for nations with diversified and powerfulstakeholders. The risk applied to both (1) the imple-mentability of an agreement due to the presence orabsence of key stakeholder support, and (2) a decisionmaker’s positive or negative public image.

In a study of transboundary water governance inWestern Canada and the United States, intervieweesidentified key barriers to cooperation, which includedmismatches in governance structures and integration,as well as mismatches in intra-jurisdictional integra-tion within nations. Other barriers included distinctand sometimes incompatible governance cultures andmandates; shortcomings in institutional capacity,financial resources, participation capacity, and dataavailability; social and spatial distance between par-ties; and psychosocial factors, including mistrust anda lack of leadership (Norman and Bakker, 2005).Blomquist and Ingram (2003) also detailed differencesin water use across boundaries; distinctions in ethnic-ity, culture, and religion; and differences in economic,political, and/or military resources across boundariesas compounders of transboundary resource problems.

Enhancing Cooperation

Political opportunity also helped to enhance coop-eration in many cases. In a workshop focused onsharing and managing transboundary aquifers,researchers emphasized how the beginning of thecooperation process needs to begin with confidencebuilding measures, especially joint monitoring, datacollection, data sharing, and the establishment of con-flict resolution mechanisms (Feitelson and Haddad,1998). Joint data collection and data sharing mayrelieve the risk Subramanian et al. (2012) noted,where nations feel at a disadvantage in negotiations,perceiving that they do not have accurate informationabout the basin. Subramanian et al. (2012) foundexamples of the perception of resulting national andregional political gains even trumped residual risk, inthat some nations were willing to cooperate even withsome risks given sufficient political opportunity.Third parties were also identified as those who couldplay important roles in supporting nations with riskreduction. Examples of this assistance includedengaging with nations at an appropriate scale (e.g.,the entire basin, subbasin, or national level); conduct-ing detailed risk assessments; designing risk reduc-tion strategies, including financing and guarantees totarget dominant risks; and periodically reassessingthe risk situation, employing new strategies asneeded.


GETTING TO THE FIRST HANDSHAKE: ENHANCING SECURITY BY INITIATING COOPERATION IN TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER BASINS

Nation Drivers

This is the critical question for explaining inte-grated water resources management at the level of ariver basin: what drives nations to enter into anagreement?

Internal Drivers

The basic needs of food, water, and energy securityfor its people drives developing nations to search forsolutions to achieve their goals through water devel-opment (Lautze et al., 2005; Subramanian et al.,2012). This process begins with nations craftingnational plans, at times relying on knowledge andfinancial assistance from development partners; theseplans can then be followed with regional plans andpartnerships. This is done because regional produc-tion centers of food and energy as well as regionalmarkets are seen as an attractive means of meetingnational goals and are often less costly for nations(Subramanian et al., 2012).

Subramanian et al. (2012) also stated that a senseof a nation’s rights pervade the thinking on watermanagement and cooperation in international waters.Because of this, nations stake claims on sharedwaters based on their respective sense of rights. Fac-tors such as commonly held beliefs about the riverflowing through one’s nation and legacies of use andmanagement under legal and constitutional instru-ments shape how people perceive these rights. Cul-ture and tradition related to water also often instillvalues that influence how rights are perceived. Nor-man and Bakker (2005) also mentioned more infor-mal drivers for cooperation, including leadership,contacts, personal relationships, and networks.

External Drivers

Regional institutions, shared culture and ethnicity,regional geopolitics, and regional thinking on norms,concepts, and best practices in sustainable develop-ment have been identified as regional influences(Lautze et al., 2005; Subramanian et al., 2012). Nor-man and Bakker (2005) included legal obligationsand bureaucratic transparency as minor drivers ofwater cooperation. Global trends can also exert influ-ence on cooperation, given the history of ideas andexperience regarding international waters thatnations and their partners contemplating cooperationcan draw from.

The current status of regional and global geopoli-tics can either provide stimulus for or against cooper-ation. Examples discussed in the case studies include

the breakup of Yugoslavia and dissolution of theSoviet Union for nations in the Aral Sea Basin. Nor-man and Bakker (2005) also mentioned how coopera-tion is facilitated by proximity.

Cooperation is not always brought forth in a peace-ful manner. There have been cases where cooperationhas been coercive, sometimes under the pressure ofmilitary force. An example of this occurred in the LaPlata Basin, where Brazil, frustrated at the perceivedslow pace of progress in negotiations with Paraguayover the development of the Itaipu dam site, optedfor a unilateral show of force, invading and occupyingthe border area in 1962 (Elhance, 1999). Anotherform of coercive cooperation took place in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, where Syria involved itself withTurkey’s internal struggles with its Kurdish popula-tion, allowing Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party(PKK) to base themselves within bordering Syria,securing water in return (MacQuarrie, 2004).

A future driver of cooperation could be climaterisks. However, the evidence for climate risk-coopera-tion is not forthright. De Stefano et al. (2010) exam-ined the relationship between basins likely toexperience change in variability due to climatechange and the robustness of the basin institutions’capacity for dealing with variability. The results ofthe study found significant gaps in institutionalcapacities to deal with variability (especially in SouthAmerica and Asia).

Cooperation-Inducing Design

In a review of several scholars, Blomquist andIngram (2003) pointed to building institutional capi-tal, achieving fairness and equity, and meeting needsthat accord with cultural values on both sides of theborder as important to success in transboundarywater management. This is all well and good, butwhat can be done when none of these things exist?How is institutional capital built, for example? Wolf(1995) listed general guidelines for cooperation-induc-ing implementation, using the pre-peace treaty Jor-dan Basin as his case study:

1. Control of one’s major water sources. It is neces-sary both to address past and present grie-vances as a prerequisite for market-drivensolutions. As such, an initial “dis-integration” ofthe basin is recommended.

2. Opportunities for cooperation may be hidden inthe details of each entity’s bargaining mix.

3. Water basin development can then proceed from“small and doable” projects to ever-increasingcooperation and integration, remaining alwayson the cutting edge of political relations.



Perhaps the most applicable guideline for this arti-cle would be the second. As demonstrated in the nextsection, negotiations over each riparian’s “share” ofwater resources have stalled. Creative solutions willbe needed to foster the first steps of cooperation.

One step that is often proposed for riparians in thenascent stages of cooperation is data and informationexchange between riparians. Uitto and Duda (2002)cited the development of a science-based diagnosticanalysis as an essential tool for, among other compo-nents, breaking issues into manageable parts withthe aim of developing a strategic action program.

Strategic joint fact-finding among nations engag-ing in a project can serve as an important catalytictool for developing political buy-in and fostering par-ticipation (Feitelson and Haddad, 1998; Uitto andDuda, 2002; Blomquist and Ingram, 2003; Wolfet al., 2005). Joint fact-finding also lowers the per-ceived risks of cooperation, as it has low sovereigntyinfringement and lower transaction costs. Factorscited as promoting data and information exchangeinclude the presence of compatible needs, absence oflegacies of mistrust, increasing water resourcesstress, perceptions of mutual benefit, external pres-sure and funding, comparable levels of institutionalcapacity, popular and political concern about waterresources management, and functional formal orinformal cooperative arrangements (Chenoweth andFeitelson, 2001). Chenoweth and Feitelson (2001)mentioned, however, that this may not be useful asa first step in establishing more comprehensive coop-eration depending on the situation. Also, it is impor-tant that data collection for its own sake may not beparticularly useful due to a large amount of datathat has been collected but never used (Van derGun, 2001).

Track I and Track II Diplomacy

While any project can be designed to be coopera-tion-inducing, it is necessary for nations involved toalso go through diplomatic processes to agree upon aframework. Though it is not possible for third partiesto create a conducive, political environment alone,they can provide incentives both directly and indi-rectly to cooperate through playing a brokerage role:

1. Providing technical competence and examples ofbest practices

2. Assisting in negotiation and mediation skills,including the provision of legal and other waterexperts

3. Facilitating investments in transboundary set-tings (Phillips et al., 2006).

Four different strategies of third party support canbe identified (Mostert, 2005): Track I Diplomacy (co-operation); Track II Diplomacy (collaboration); TrackIII Diplomacy (transformation); and Continuing Sup-port. Track I Diplomacy involves supporting the con-clusion of a formal agreement between riparianstates, typically through mediation and facilitation.Track II Diplomacy tries to arrive at feasible develop-ment strategies on the ground through promotinginformal dialogues, research and studies, and capac-ity building. Track III Diplomacy addresses policiesat the national and local levels, which are typically atthe root of transboundary water problems. Finally,financial support may be required to sustain coopera-tion, which third parties can provide for a river basinorganization or loans for development projects.

None of these strategies are mutually exclusive;for example, Track II Diplomacy efforts may eventu-ally lead to the initiation of more formal, Track I dis-cussions (Qaddumi, 2008). This occurred during theIsraeli-Palestinian negotiations for the Oslo Accords,where Norway played an active role in elevating thetalks from an informal bridge-building exercise to for-mal negotiations (Waage, 2005).

Up to this point, most of the discussion has focusedon governmental actors and interactions with exter-nal partners in regards to cooperation. Though howthese actors cooperate is the focus of this article, it isworth noting how decision making in water coopera-tion is not necessarily conducted in a “top-down”manner. A number of scholars have demonstratedhow international water cooperation can manifestacross and beyond state actors (e.g., Mustafa, 2007;Milman and Scott, 2010; Norman et al., 2012).

This article attempts to identify practices that mayenhance the ability of development partners to designand implement collaborative projects in the earlieststages. Here, we have reviewed relevant literature topresent what may lead a riparian nation toward, andaway from, the cooperation process, as well asapproaches in program design. In the following sec-tion, we detail our criteria for transboundary projectand case study selection, in which we identify lessonsand recommendations based upon reports regardingproject successes and failures.

METHODS

In this section, we describe the initial identificationand filtering process for the list of transboundary pro-jects from which the case studies were selected, aswell as the criteria we used for case study selection



and evaluation. The previous section reviewed vari-ables that development partners weigh as they delib-erate on entering cooperative processes. We nowexplain the methods we used to test our argument.

Transboundary Project Selection Criteria

The first task was identifying potential case stud-ies. As previously noted, we culled information fromOregon State University’s Transboundary FreshwaterDispute Database (TFDD) to create a database of alltransboundary water resources projects (both surfaceand groundwater) that had multinational participa-tion, either official or unofficial. The TFDD includes315 projects identified as cooperative projectsbetween two or more riparians on internationalwaters.

To determine whether these 315 projects involvedformal or nonformal cooperation, we investigated theinvolvement of governments in these projects. Ofthese projects, 80 had nonformal cooperation, 232had formal cooperation, and 3 had both formal andnonformal cooperation. We catalogued details of themost relevant projects and organized each trans-boundary water project into a spreadsheet, listing thebasin name, project name, participating nations, levelof cooperation (formal or nonformal), type of coopera-tion, principal issues, date of the project, descriptionof the project, project tasks, and the source of infor-mation.

The type of collaboration was designated basedupon the desired outcome of the collaborative effort.Questions asked to determine the type of collabora-tion are as follows: What type of change in the riverbasin was targeted? Was the project primarily aneffort to improve the economic capability of theregion, or was the project an effort to preserve or con-serve, some natural resource and therefore largely anenvironmental initiative?

The type of project was divided into IGO, NGO, orGOV depending on whether the initial agreement orproject plan included official governmental agree-ments and/or participation. In the event that the pro-ject was largely funded and initiated by a nonprofit,the designation NGO was assigned. If intergovern-mental organizations such as the United Nations waslargely involved and some form of intergovernmentalpanel or group was formed, the designation IGO wasassigned to the project. If a government funded themajority of the project, the project was given the des-ignation GOV. There were 128 projects in the IGOcategory, 94 projects in the NGO category, and 68projects in the GOV category. It should be noted thatfour projects were categorized as both NGO and IGO,four projects were categorized as GOV and IGO, and

one project was categorized as GOV and NGO due tothe fact there were entities from multiple categoriesfunding these projects. Thirty-five projects did nothave any information regarding its funding sources,and were therefore eliminated.

The tasks and/or goals of the projects were usuallysourced from some type of project plan where possi-ble. If the tasks were already completed, then weupdated information on each project to reflect bothcurrent and original goals.

We then refined the database to select our 10 casestudies, using the criteria described below.

Case Study Selection Criteria

We then selected 10 case studies (Table 1) thatwould have direct implications for a pilot project thathas commenced project operations within the last15 years with the cooperation of nations and intergov-ernmental or nongovernmental organizations. Withthis, we recognize that we are ignoring self-initiatingcooperation. To make sure our cases were applicable,we based the selection on the following filtering crite-ria which operationalize our research questions.

Criterion #1. Funding exclusively or primarily fromoutside sources, for example, donor orNGO.

Criterion #2. The inclusion of stakeholders involvedin nonofficial capacities, i.e., thosewho are aside from the formal prac-tice of their governments (Joesoef,1977), or Track II, stakeholders inproject design and implementation.Track II refers to a type of diplomacythat tries to arrive at feasible devel-opment strategies on the groundthrough promoting informal (i.e.,nonofficial) dialogues, research andstudies, and capacity building, asopposed to Track I, formal (official)diplomacy (Mostert, 2005).

Criterion #3. Absence of formal diplomatic relationsbetween or among riparians nation-wide.

Criterion #4. Project design to include at least thepossibility of enhancing hydropoliticalrelations.

These filtering criteria were used to find case stud-ies from diverse locations where development part-ners were heavily involved in project design andimplementation (Criterion #1). Criterion #2 wasdeveloped based on literature describing the difficul-ties of initiating cooperation through Track I Diplo-



TABLE

1.Case

StudySelection

CriteriaMatrix.

Criteria

Case

Stu

dies

1AQ

-South

America

2BIO

-South

America

3North

Africa

4South

ern

Balk

ans

5Central

Mid

dle

East

6East

Africa

7Caucasu

s

8Basin-w

ide

Mid

dle

East

9WR

Central

Asia

10

TWC

Central

Asia

1.Fundingex

clusivelyor

primarily

from

outsidesources?

Yes

UU

UU

UU

UU

No

UU

2.Stakeh

older

involvem

entin

project

designandim

plemen

tation

?Yes

UU

UU

UU

U

No/other

UU

U

3.Absence

ofform

aldiplomaticrelation

sbetwee

n/amon

gripariansbasin-w

ide?

Low

conflict—

highcoop

eration

U

Low

conflict—

med

ium

coop

eration

UU

UU

Low

conflict—

low

coop

eration

U

Med

/highconflict—

low

coop

eration

UU

UU

4.Project

designto

includeatleast

thepossibilityof

enhancinghydropoliticalrelation

s?Yes

UU

UU

UU

UU

UU

No/other

Note:

The10projects:

1.Aquifer

Managem

entin

Sou

thAmerica(2003-2007.Argen

tina,Brazil,Paraguay,andUru

guay);

2.Biodiversity

Con

servation

inSou

thAmerica(2003-

2004.Bolivia

and

Peru);

3.Aquifer

Protection

inNorth

Africa

(2003-2006.Algeria,Libya,and

Tunisia);

4.WaterManagem

entSystem

intheSou

thern

Balkans(1998-2001.

Greeceand

Bulgaria);

5.Reg

ionalData

WaterBanksin

theCen

tralMiddle

East

(2002-present.

Israel,Jordan,and

Palestinian

Authority);

6.Climate

ChangeMod

elingand

Stakeh

older

Preparednessin

East

Africa(2000-2006.Ken

yaandTanza

nia);7.Red

ucingTransb

oundary

Deg

radation

intheCaucasu

s(2009-present.

Arm

enia,Azerbaijan,Geor-

gia,andIran);8.Im

provingBasin-w

ideRelation

sin

theMiddle

East

(2008-2011.Iraq,Syria,andTurk

ey);9.Im

proved

Managem

entof

WaterResou

rces

inCen

tralAsia(2008-

present.

Afghanistan,Kaza

khstan,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,Turk

men

istan,andUzb

ekistan);10.CreatingaTransb

oundary

WaterCom

mission

inCen

tralAsia(2003-2004.Kaza

-khstanandKyrgyzstan).



macy. Criterion #3 was used as a filter for definingthe initial stages of cooperation. Criterion #4 wasused to sort projects that were designed to enhancecooperation from technical projects.

The first criterion used to trim the list of 315transboundary projects was whether the projectinvolved official funding and sponsorship or was lar-gely the effort of a nonprofit, intergovernmental orga-nization or other NGO (Criterion #1). Removing theprojects involving outside government funding andsponsorship culled the list to 222 possible projects.This was deemed most important, due to the purposeof this study of finding best practices applicable fordevelopment partners. Similarly, the entries werethen narrowed to those projects where the tasks andactivities of the project involved stakeholders in theregion and were meant to promote change at a localor regional level (Criterion #2). For example, develop-ment of the Zamorano project (officially, The Zamor-ano Pan-American Agricultural School) betweenHonduras and Nicaragua in the Choluteca RiverBasin in 1948 resulted in a collaborative institutionof higher education with the intention of enactingsocial, economic, and environmental changes.

The project list was then narrowed down by Crite-rion #3: riparians that had no relations. All projectsselected sought to improve the hydropolitical rela-

tions within the transboundary region, meaning, theproject design has to actually consider what the cur-rent hydropolitics are, and how the project influenceshydropolitics (Criterion #4).

As all of the criteria could not be met by most pro-jects (e.g., only six of the ten cases had both sourcesof funding that were primarily or exclusively fromoutside sources AND stakeholder involvement), weselected cases that came the closest to meeting allfour criteria, placing emphasis on Criteria #1 and #2.We consulted only official project documents as thebest measure of official cooperation is with officialdocumentation.

Classification of Transboundary Water Cooperation

The riparian relationships presented in each casestudy were classified according to the TransboundaryWaters Interaction Nexus (TWINS), as described byZeitoun and Mirumachi (2008). This classification hasfour groups: Low Conflict-High Cooperation, LowConflict-Medium Cooperation, Low Conflict-LowCooperation, and Medium/High Conflict-Low Cooper-ation (see Table 2 for more details). The characteriza-tions reveal three types of interactions: positive,neutral, and negative. Positive interaction is defined

TABLE 2. Types and Faces of Transboundary Water Interaction (A First Approximation).

Notes: IWL, international water law (1997 UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of Transboundary Watercourses); RBO, river basinorganization.Dashed lines indicate fuzzy frontiers (i.e., there is overlap between each and every category).Source: Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008).



as interstate interaction that generally tends to meetthe other actors’ interests, and contributes toimprovement or sustained relations at the broaderpolitical level; neutral interaction is defined as inter-actions which may have no inherent effect on thebroader political context; and negative interaction isdefined as interactions inducing a significant degreeof resentment with one or more actors, thereby nega-tively affecting the broader political context (Zeitounand Mirumachi, 2008). Classifying each case studyusing the TWINS framework helps to define the stateof the cooperative process, which correlates with Cri-terion #3.

Case Study Evaluation

Each of the case studies selected had in-depth pro-ject reports that described its objectives, successes,challenges, and lessons learned. From this informa-tion, we identified elements of the projects that weredeemed successful by the project reports and orga-nized them into four categories: jurisdiction, projectdesign, stakeholders, and negotiating. These lessonsand recommendations gathered from the projectdescriptions are described in greater detail in theDiscussion and Conclusion sections, respectively.

CASE STUDIES

This section presents a brief summary of each casestudy. Table 2 provides an explanation for how eachcase matches the criteria outlined above. Each casestudy describes the history of water relations betweenriparian nations, the problem at hand, the descriptionof the project, and the project’s results. See Table 3for a matrix of themes that emerged from the cases.

Aquifer Management in South America

History of Water Relations/The Prob-lem. Throughout history, Brazil has been the hege-mon in the region, asserting its right to develop thewaters of the La Plata without prior consultationwith the riparians of the La Plata Basin (whichinclude Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), particu-larly through Brazil’s unilateral development ofhydropower (Dinar, 2009). Argentina has had a riv-alry with Brazil since colonial times (Santos, 2002).That said, Gilman et al. (2008) have argued that thecurrent treaty arrangements for cooperation amongthe five riparian states (this includes Bolivia, which

does not have a share of the Guarani Aquifer) havebeen relatively successful, leading to significant eco-nomic gains, but at the expense of severe environ-mental degradation.

Before the 1980s, the Guarani Aquifer System hadnot been recognized as a transboundary aquifer sys-tem; before this project, there has been no formalcooperation between countries on this aquifer system.It should be noted, however, that countries have ahistory of formal cooperation regarding the La PlataRiver Basin, whose area considerably overlaps theGuarani Aquifer System’s. The four countries treatedparts of the system as national entities; in Uruguayand Argentina it was known as the Tacuaremb�oAquifer, in Paraguay, the Misiones Aquifer, and inBrazil, the Botutacu Aquifer.

Within this region, groundwater is increasinglybecoming a source of drinking water due to demo-graphic growth, economic expansion, and increasingpollution of surface water sources (Kemper et al.,2003). However, legal and regulatory mechanisms forgroundwater management are lacking throughoutthese four nations, and the consequences of thisdearth of coordinated management are already beingfelt. For example, substantial pollution of shallowgroundwater resources is occurring in Argentinaand Brazil, although it should be noted that theGuarani Aquifer System is not significantly affecteddue to its considerable average depth (Kemper et al.,2003).

Given that each nation is expected to expand itsuse of the Guarani Aquifer for public water supply,hydrogeothermal applications, and irrigation, the pro-ject was designed to be preventative in character.Because of each nation’s projected use, potential con-flict could occur due to excessive pumping in certainareas and a lack of aquifer protection for pollution inaquifer recharge areas.

Project Description. The Guarani Aquifer Pro-ject completed a full inventory of production bore-holes in the Guarani Aquifer System and also madesignificant efforts to improve deficiencies in ground-water regulations and/or tools in all four countries.Seven Brazilian states and three Argentinean pro-vinces also made specific Guarani Aquifer manage-ment provisions. At the international level, anotheroutcome of the Guarani Aquifer Project was theagreement for continuing regional cooperation on theGuarani Aquifer management and protection.

Project Results. Significant concerns about theinstitutional capacity for enforcement of groundwaterregulations still remain. There also has been reluc-tance or difficulty in retaining the services of thePilot Project Facilitators, which Foster et al. (2009)



TABLE

3.Case

StudyBestPractices

Matrix.

Theme

Case

Stu

dies

1AQ

-South

America

2BIO

-South

America

3North

Africa

4South

ern

Balk

ans

5Central

Mid

dle

East

6East

Africa

7Caucasu

s

8Basin-w

ide

Mid

dle

East

9WR

Central

Asia

10

TWC

Central

Asia

Jurisd

iction

Balance

ofautonom

yandcoop

eration

U+

U+

U+

U+

Creatingalonger

term

,stable

and

mutuallyben

eficial

coop

erativeframew

ork

U�

U+

U+

U+

U+

Project

design

Givingea

chproject

partner

resp

onsibilityforcertain

activities

U+

U+

U+

Buildingascientificteam

from

differentpartner

nation

sU+

U+

U+

U+

U+

U+

Basin-w

ideintegratedflow

assessm

ent/data

sharing

U+

U+

U+

U?

U?

U?

U?

U?

U+

Stakeh

olders

Con

sultation

withwide

swath

ofstakeh

olders

U+

U+

U?

U?

U+

U?

U?

Stakeh

older

commitmen

t,ow

nersh

ip,anden

gagem

ent

U+

U+

U?

U?

U+

U?

U?

U?

Negotiating

Neu

tralissu

ediscu

ssions

U+

U+

Track

IIdialogues

U+

U+

U?

U+

U�

U+

U+

U+

Note:

Casessa

measin

Table

1.A

“U”indicatesthatthebestpracticewaspresentin

thecase

study.A

“+”indicatesthatthepracticewassu

ccessful,a“?”indicatesthatit

was

either

unclea

rwhether

thepracticewassu

ccessfulor

thaton

lypart

ofthepracticewassu

ccessful,wherea

sa“�

”indicatesthatthereweredifficu

ltiesin

implemen

tingthis

prac-

tice.



explain is “critical to continuity and effectiveness” ofthe projects. Foster et al. (2009) also mention thatcontinuing the further development and operation ofSISAG (the shared aquifer information system) andregular exchanges of scientific data and managementexperiences should be future priorities.

The riparians preferred creating a Steering Coun-cil instead of a semi-independent “TransboundaryGuarani Aquifer Commission.” This was due to itsimplied high transaction costs and the risk of theCommission being out of touch with national andstate groundwater issues, capabilities and procedures(Foster et al., 2009). This alternative could imply areluctance to give up some autonomy on managingthe Guarani Aquifer System, but could also indicatean improvement of hydropolitical relations betweenthese countries.

Biodiversity Conservation in South America

History of Water Relations/The Problem. Bi-national cooperation regarding management of theLake Titicaca-Poop�o System began in 1955 when Boli-via and Peru agreed to carry out a diagnosis of thebasin. This was followed in 1957 with an “Agreementfor the Preliminary Economic Study on the Use of theLake Titicaca Water Resources” (Convenio para elEstudio Econ�omico Preliminar del Aprovechamientode las Aguas del Lago Titicaca (ALT)). This focus onconsidering joint cooperation on economic develop-ment in the Titicaca Basin continued throughout the1960s and 1970s (Mart�ınez Gonzales et al., 2004).

Bolivia and Peru continued to cooperate further onLake Titicaca, examples including the sharing bathy-metric data beginning in 1976, jointly conducting afishery survey from 1980 to 1983, and jointly conduct-ing a hydrometeorological study of Lake Titicaca in1985. Peru and Bolivia signed agreements on achiev-ing execution of the Peru-Bolivia Hydrological SystemMaster Plan in 1987 and 1988, respectively. ThisMaster Plan established two programs, one for workundertaken nationally in each country, and the otherfor work to be executed by Peru and Bolivia jointly.The Master Plan called for a series of studies andplanning for future management of the Lake Titi-caca-Poop�o Basin (Mart�ınez Gonzales et al., 2004).Nevertheless, biodiversity and endemic species lossescontinued to be a problem within this basin.

Project Description. In 1992, Bolivia and Peruapproved the Lake Titicaca, Desaguadero River, Poop�oLake and Coipasa “Salar” (TDPS) Binational MasterPlan. This agreement led to the creation of a binationalentity in charge of executing this plan. In 1994 Boliviaand Peru applied for a joint petition to the United

Nations Global Environment Fund for the develop-ment of a Biodiversity Conservation Project in theTDPS Basin, which was signed in 1998 by the Bolivianand Peruvian governments and the United Nations.

Project Results. While relations had alreadyexisted between Bolivia and Peru regarding theTDPS, this plan further strengthened them. Accord-ing to Revollo et al. (2006), efforts made during theprocess of negotiations and studies between the twocountries have led to many joint accomplishments,including: defining the juridical situation of the basin;making technical studies between the two countries;and establishing common technical organization. Thisprocess also established a number of avenues for citi-zen and stakeholder participation through informingthrough different media, socialization, and capacitybuilding, at both national and more local levels.

Aquifer Protection in North Africa

History of Water Relations/The Problem. Atthe time of the project’s inception, Saharan ground-water had been intensively exploited by Algeria andTunisia for 50 years, and more recently, withincreased use from Libya. Over 85% of the waterdrawn from the North West Saharan Aquifer System(NWSAS) is used for agriculture; each governmentanticipated an expansion of agriculture in comingyears, yet wanted to develop it sustainably “if the rel-evant information for decision making is available”(GEF, 1999, p. 16). There was also no record of for-mal cooperation between these countries over thisshared resource.

Transboundary impacts have already beenreported in the NWSAS. Algeria utilizes the watersof the aquifer system greatly, followed by Tunisiaand Libya (Scheumann and Alker, 2009). Besbeset al. (2004) have observed the first signs of aquiferdegradation, including in the Algero-Tunesian chotts(Saharan depressions) the Gulf of Syrte, and majorspring flows in Tunisia.

During the last 30 years, drilling of NWSASwaters has increased fourfold, from 0.6 to 2.5 billionm3/yr. Because of this increase, the aquifer is at riskof water salinity, artesianism reduction, natural dis-charge depletion, piezometric level fall, and interfer-ences between countries (OSS, 2008). Water qualityhas also deteriorated in some areas (GEF, 1999).

Project Description. The project for the Trans-boundary Aquifer System of the Northern Sahara (Al-geria, Libya, and Tunisia), Protection of the NWSASand Related Humid Zones and Ecosystems, had as itsobjective the protection of this critical resource, and



in particular of the recharge areas and humid zonesand ecosystems related to the aquifer. It includes twocomplementary components: (1) improving the knowl-edge of the aquifer and related ecosystems throughupdating the evaluation of NWSAS water resourcesand (2) implementing a consultation mechanism atthe hydrogeological basin level (GEF, 1999).

Project Results. Perhaps most significantly, thethree ministers of water signed a formalized agree-ment that creates a permanent Consultation Mecha-nism for the NWSAS. The studies related tounderstanding the exchanges between the Chotts/Se-bkhas and the underlying aquifers “have been initi-ated but not completed” (Puyoo, 2007, p. 2). At thetime the report was issued, though, the water qualitymonitoring network had not been realized, nor hadthe analysis of the phenomena of water level rises inthe surface aquifers been conducted. In addition, thelink modes between the GIS database and local data-bases had not been clearly established.

Water Management System in the Southern Balkans

History of Water Relations/The Problem. Beforethis project’s implementation, there were no bilateralagreements that were operational between Greece andBulgaria regarding the Struma River Basin. Bilateralwater cooperation between Greece and Bulgariastarted in 1964; from 1964 to 1991, Greece andBulgaria signed seven bilateral transboundary wateragreements, including agreements on scientific andtechnical cooperation and an agreement for flood con-trol of the Struma River in 1980 (TWIENEE, 2012).However, no international river commission has beenformed, nor is any bilateral agreement for StrumaRiver water management currently operational. Thebasic agreement between the two countries concerningthe management of transboundary waters is also obso-lete (TWIENEE, 2012).

Project Description. The System for WaterMonitoring and Sustainable Management Based onGround Stations and Satellite Images (WATERMAN)Project was implemented in the Struma River Basin,which consists of Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia.The project’s aim was to improve monitoring theStruma River Basin, to control and forecast waterquantity and quality, and to create a decision supportsystem to make objective management decisions onthe river.

Project Results. Cooperation between the part-ner teams “was very fruitful,” as collaboration andtransfer of knowledge took place between teams and

was slated to continue in future projects (WATER-MAN, 2012). Some of the project’s successes includedevelopments of various models and databases for theStruma River Basin as well as many other technolog-ical advances. The main problem of the WATERMANproject was the collection, detection, and pre-process-ing of data (WATERMAN, 2012).

Regional Water Data Banks in the Central MiddleEast

History of Water Relations/The Problem. By1991, several events combined to shift the emphasisfrom the potential for “hydro-conflict” in the MiddleEast to the potential for “hydro-cooperation.” The firstevent was natural, but limited to the Jordan Basin.Three years of below-average rainfall caused a dra-matic tightening in the water management practicesof each of the riparians — Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, thePalestinian Authority and Syria — including ration-ing, cut-backs to agriculture by as much as 30%, andrestructuring of water pricing and allocations.Although these steps placed short-term hardships onthose affected, they also showed that, for years of nor-mal rainfall, there was still some flexibility in the sys-tem. Most water decision makers agree that thesesteps, particularly regarding pricing practices andallocations to agriculture, were long overdue.

The Jordan River Basin has a varied history ofboth cooperation and conflict. More recently, thebasin has seen more peaceful relations related towater. As part of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty of1994, each riparian agreed to “rightful allocations” oftransboundary water resources in the Jordan RiverBasin. In the water resources-focused Article 6, eachparty states that it will develop its water resourceswithout harming the other, while also acknowledgingwater scarcity in the region and committing to findand develop new sources partly through cooperativeprojects (J€agerskog, 2001).

Israel and Palestine negotiated an Interim Agree-ment in 1995, where Israel first recognized Pales-tinian water rights (Wolf, 1999). Joint WaterCommittees were called for in the water clauses ofboth the Israeli-Palestinan Interim Agreement of1995 and the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty of 1994(J€agerskog, 2001).

Project Description. The Regional Water DataBanks Project (Project EXACT), a project of the Mul-tilateral Working Group on Water Resources, is com-posed of two representatives from each of the CoreParties (Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians) andfrom each of the Donor Parties (currently composedof the United States, European Union, and The



Netherlands). The Project consists of a series ofactions to be taken by the Core Parties to foster theadoption of common, standardized data collection andstorage techniques, improve the quality of waterresources data collected in the region, and to improvecommunication among the scientific community inthe region.

Project Results. The project has included somesuccesses in improving hydropolitical relationsbetween Israel, Jordan, and Palestine; most notably,the agreement to jointly share and collect data. Also,in 2006, Jordanian and Israeli mayors signed amemorandum of understanding to cooperate onshared water issues (+4 on the BAR scale) (TFDD,2015). Yet, the project goal had not been fullyachieved by the end of 2010, as the project compo-nents of water treatment plants and artificialrecharge trials were still in progress (EXACT, 2011).There was also frustration on the part of many ofthe participants that the project was not, by design,a vehicle for actually resolving any of the issues atconflict, such as water rights and allocations andwater quality issues. Also, Syria and Lebanonrefused to participate in any of the multilateralworking groups, meaning that a comprehensive set-tlement of the conflicts related to the Jordan or Yar-mouk Rivers is precluded from discussions (Wolf andNewton 2008).

Climate Change Modeling and StakeholderPreparedness in East Africa

History of Water Relations/The Problem. Themajority of the Pangani River Basin lies within theborders of Tanzania. It is arguably the most water-stressed basin in the country, with population growthand migration intensifying local water conflicts (Mbo-nile, 2006). In 1991 the Tanzania-based PanganiWater Basin Authority was established, transferringownership of water to the Tanzanian government(MWEM, 1995). In Kenya, water resources have beenplaced under a Water Resources ManagementAuthority charged with the responsibility of integrat-ing river basin management and including stake-holder groups in the management structure (IUCN,2003). A “sectoral” approach to management is pre-sent in both countries, in that departments aremanaging resources in parallel to one another, com-plicating the possibilities for integrated approaches tobasin management. Tanzania’s Pangani Basin WaterOffice has, however, sent representatives to the Pan-gani Basin Water Board to ensure the communicationof various departments with one another (IUCN,2003). As of 2003, no mechanism existed for Kenya

and Tanzania to coordinate their management of thePangani River Basin (IUCN, 2003).

Project Description. The Pangani River BasinManagement Project (PRBMP) is generating techni-cal information and developing participatory forumsto strengthen Integrated Water Resources Manage-ment in the Pangani River Basin of Kenya and Tan-zania, including mainstreaming climate change, tosupport the equitable provision and wise governanceof freshwater for livelihoods and environment for cur-rent and future generations.

Project Results. From reading the PanganiBasin Water Board/International Union for Conserva-tion of Nature Future of the Basin report, it appearsthat this project was a successful first step in gather-ing and disseminating knowledge about the presentand future conditions of the basin across both coun-tries. But, this project was delayed multiple timesdue to attempts to obtain acceptable climate changeand other data. This caused the project to extend overseveral years with gaps in time between activities.The Summary Report writers state that a preferableplan would have been to have a sequence of shorterprojects with well-defined end points (PBWO/IUCN,2009).

Reducing Transboundary Degradation in theCaucasus

History of Water Relations/The Problem. Asof 2008, no water treaties have existed among the for-mer Soviet republics, though they are willing to coop-erate on water-related issues (Vener and Campana,2008). Because of the issues involving the disputedterritory of Nagorno Karabakh, the countries areunwilling to sign any type of agreement but are will-ing to find a solution (Vener and Campana, 2008).The water users in all three countries have variouswater quality and quantity problems; generallyspeaking, Georgia has an oversupply of water,Armenia has some shortages based on poor manage-ment, and Azerbaijan has a water deficit (TACIS,2003).

There are many major regional projects related totransboundary water resources management; manyare related to each other, but there is little to nocooperation or data sharing among the organizationsand agencies coordinating the projects (Vener andCampana, 2008).

The Kura-Aras Rivers have been seriouslydegraded in certain places, both in water quality andquantity. Basin residents have impaired the waterquality of the rivers by high sedimentation loads



resulting from upstream deforestation and the dump-ing of municipal, industrial, medical, and agriculturalwastes. Water quantity has been constrained by agri-cultural use and hydropower (UNDP/BRC, 2009).

Project Description. The immediate objectivesof the project “Reducing Transboundary Degradationin the Kura-Aras Basin” are: (1) to foster regionalcooperation; (2) to increase national and regionalcapacity to address water quality and quantity prob-lems; (3) to make noticeable improvements to waterquality/quantity at some points along the river; (4) todevelop sustainable financial and institutionalarrangements for long-term management and protec-tion of the rivers; (5) and to promote changes in theeconomic sectors which cause pollution, water short-ages, and habitat degradation. This project has hadfour countries signed up to the project: Armenia,Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran(UNDP/BRC, 2009).

Project Results. Successes drawn from the pro-ject by March 2007 include the strengthening of theregional network of technical experts working ongroundwater issues, completing national and regionalreports, and producing initial project documents.Challenges included a lack and/or absence of validand reliable data, no capacity to undertake integratedmanagement of water resources at the basin level,and a lack of participation from all riparians in thebasin. It is also unclear whether the project is imple-mentable in the short to medium term (UNDP/BRC,2009).

Improving Basin-wide Relations in the Middle East

History of Water Relations/The Problem. Inthe early 1980s Iraq took the initiative for the forma-tion of a permanent Joint Technical Committee (JTC)with Turkey and Syria to discuss issues involved inwater development along the Tigris and Euphrates.However, the Committee became deadlocked after16 meetings — examples of issues that led to thisdeadlock include defining whether discussions shouldbe exclusively limited to the Euphrates and thewording of the final objective of the JTC (Kibaroglu,2004).

More recently, tensions have been exacerbatedbetween riparians with increased, excessive demandfor more water and construction of major develop-ment projects. Iraq has maintained that it hasrequired water rights relating to its ancestral irriga-tion using the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, with Syr-ian official arguments more or less overlapping withthe Iraqi ones (Kibaroglu and Unver, 2000). Iraq,

unlike Syria and Turkey, has not expressed plans todevelop the Tigris or Euphrates Rivers for hydroelec-tricity. Thus, Iraq’s concerns mainly lie with waterquality and quantity.

Project Description. In May 2005, nine foun-ders created the Euphrates Tigris Initiative for Coop-eration (ETIC) as a new approach for sustainablecooperation on regional development. The goal ofETIC is to establish cooperation for economic, techni-cal, and social sustainable development within theEuphrates and Tigris region through mobilizing col-lective expertise, catalyzing processes and developingappropriate partnerships to encourage riparian coop-eration and development through Track II Diplo-macy.

Project Results. Since its inception, ETIC hasheld several meetings, workshops, and seminars(PSD, 2007, n.p.). However, current civil unrest inSyria undoubtedly complicates further basin-widecooperation. It appears that creating opportunitiesfor dialogue and workshops among the three ripari-ans has been successful, though there seems tobe no mention of pilot projects, stakeholderinvolvement, or improving public awareness takingplace.

Improved Management of Water Resources in CentralAsia

History ofWater Cooperation/The Problem. Thisproject takes place in one of the world’s most infa-mously mismanaged, water-stressed areas — the AralSea Basin. Aware of the deteriorating situation, theSoviet government approved the “State program onPriaralye” in 1986, created Basin Water Organiza-tions, and allocated large investments into projects,particularly those focusing on water supply and socialimprovements (Dukhovny and Sokolov, 2003). Afterthe Soviet collapse, two new organizations were estab-lished: the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea (for pro-gram coordination) and the International Fund forSaving the Aral Sea (for raising and controlling funds)in 1993. These two organizations later merged into one(Dukhovny and Sokolov, 2003). The first Aral SeaBasin Program was finalized in 1997. This programincluded regional water strategies, information sys-tems, water quality management, integrated land andwater resources management, and capacity building. Asecond Aral Sea Basin Program occurred during 2003-2010, but progress has been limited (ADB, 2009).

In 1998, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, andUzbekistan signed a Framework Agreement on theuse of water and energy resources in the Syr Darya



River Basin, entitled the Syrdarya Agreement. Tajik-istan joined this agreement in 1999. Since 2002, how-ever, the enforcement of the agreement has beensuspended due to dissent over exchange of irrigationwater for fuel between the downstream countries ofKazakhstan and Uzbekistan and the upstream coun-tries of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan (ADB,2009).

Project Description. The project had three com-ponents: (1) an improved knowledge base for theAmu Darya, (2) strengthening the institutionalframework and institutionalization of regional cooper-ation for water resources, and (3) support to the Chu-Talas Joint Rivers Commission.

Project Results. This project purportedly had anumber of successes in advancing cooperationbetween riparians. The Technical Assistance providedin this project is claimed by the Asian DevelopmentBank (ADB) as its first regional initiative in CentralAsia that helped to depoliticize regional water discus-sions and achieve positive results (ADB, 2009). Rep-resentatives of all the Central Asia states resumedwater discussions suspended since 2002 under thesecond component. Seventeen working group meet-ings were also held to draft a new Syr Darya Agree-ment, and stakeholders also started working on twonew interstate agreements; one on the use of waterand energy resources in the Amu Darya Basin, andone on database and information exchange (ADB,2009). Three training programs were conducted tosatisfy the third component, which were rated satis-factory (ADB, 2009). Some challenges included delaysin implementation of the Technical Assistance, due topoor performance of an international consultant.There also was “less than adequate” ADB staffinvolvement due to the Technical Assistance requir-ing day-to-day coordination with stakeholders in theregion, which proved difficult to achieve from ADBheadquarters.

Creating a Transboundary Water Commission inCentral Asia

History of Water Relations/The Problem. Kyr-gyzstan is located upstream of Kazakhstan, and hasworked to maximize hydropower generation, whichcontributed to downstream water shortages in thesummer and floods in the winter (Nichol, 2010).While the two countries are neighbors, multi-ethnicstates in Central Asia, and former Soviet republics,they differ significantly. Kazakhstan is significantlylarger in area and has significant natural wealth.Kyrgyzstan has only significant gold reserves and

hydroelectric power potential. Due to its naturalwealth, Kazakhstan had become the primary post-Soviet recipient of per capita foreign investment,whereas Kyrgyzstan became the leading post-Sovietrecipient of per capita international aid during the1990s (Gleason, 2001).

Project Description. This project centered onmanaging the Chu and Talas River Basins lyingbetween Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Chu Basinis part of the Aral Sea Basin, whereas the Talas isnot. This project marked the first official act of coop-eration over water between these two countries. Theproject, entitled “UNECE, UNESCAP, and OSCEProject: Support for the creation of a transboundarywater commission on Chu and Talas Rivers betweenKazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” is aimed to assistKazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in making the “Agree-ment on Utilization of the Water Facilities of Inter-state Use on the Chu and Talas Rivers between theGovernment of the Republic of Kazakhstan and theGovernment of the Kyrgyz Republic of 21 January2000” operational.

Project Results. In the Final Project Report, theauthors state that “there existed no comparable coop-erative projects in Central Asia at the start-up of theproject and this cooperation can therefore be seen asa nascent initiative in that direction” (p. 6). This pro-ject was also seen as progress toward coordinatingwater resources management between these twocountries “in a methodological and stable manner”(OSCE, 2006, p. 6). No significant challenges inimplementing the project were mentioned in theFinal Project Report.

DISCUSSION

The following discussion is built mostly on whathas been learned from our in-depth qualitative anal-ysis of the chosen case studies. The review hashighlighted the need for further discussion aroundfour distinct themes: jurisdiction, project design,stakeholders, and negotiating. See Table 3 fora breakdown of which case studies had thesethemes.

Jurisdiction

A balance of autonomy and cooperation within a pro-ject design can foster success where each riparian isallowed to assume responsibility for the continuation of



one of a project’s primary activities, as was seen in theAquifer Management in South America case. Whileeach nation’s interdependence on a shared resourcemust be acknowledged, each nation’s autonomy mustbe respected. To respect this, it was advised that ripari-ans should not be pushed toward ceding authority to abasin-wide (or aquifer-wide) agency for the AquiferManagement in South America and Improved Manage-ment of Water Resources in Central Asia cases. Theselessons culled from the case studies align with Subra-manian et al.’s (2012) writings about the risk of sover-eignty and autonomy when nations consider initiatingcooperation. The autonomous nature of the riparianteams in carrying out activity tasks can help bridgegaps in the collaboration process. As government offi-cials in the riparian nations are the decision makers inany action, however, they should be informed aboutwatershed activities and recommendations, which wasalso stressed by Norman and Bakker (2005).

When it comes to timing, it is never too early to getstarted with the cooperation process. No matter whenthe process begins, there is always some existingknowledge of the river and its people, and this knowl-edge can inform stakeholders and decision makers.Plus, implementation of an agreed desired river stateand environmental flow is a long and complex task.Time is needed to help alleviate what Subramanianet al. (2012) coined as the capacity and knowledgerisk. Governments, scientists, and stakeholders (in-cluding local subsistence users of the river) must worktogether as a team to achieve truly sustainable use ofthe river; this speaks to Blomquist and Ingram’s(2003) highlighting of building institutional capital asa key element in transboundary water management.

The creation of a longer term, stable, and mutuallybeneficial framework for cooperation, such as a bilat-eral commission between two riparians, can fostermore prudent mechanisms for regional governance.Specifically, the establishment of a basin commissionis cited as a motivator for other international organi-zations to provide assistance to the basin waterauthorities in the Creating a Transboundary WaterCommission in Central Asia case.

Project Design

Along with respecting each nation’s autonomy injurisdictional matters, giving each project partnerresponsibility for certain activities allows for more own-ership within each of a project’s tasks. Building a scien-tific team from different partner nations appears to be avery successful activity, as noted in the Water Manage-ment System in the Southern Balkans and ImprovingBasin-wide Relations in the Middle East cases, allowingfor knowledge transfers between teams and creating a

building block for cooperation in future projects. Thiswas one of the elements of the cooperation process citedby Feitelson and Haddad (1998) that were recom-mended for successful cooperative efforts.

For initial cooperative activities, a basin-wide inte-grated flow assessment should be done at the earliestpossible stage of water resources planning, so that afair tradeoff between development and river protec-tion can be agreed upon, as noted in the ClimateChange Modeling and Stakeholder Preparedness inEast Africa case. This can then guide all future watermanagement decisions for the river. Data sharingalso appears to be a good starting point for fosteringcooperation among riparians. These initial coopera-tive activities correlate with Feitelson and Haddad’s(1998) and Uitto and Duda’s (2002) writings.

This act of building a basin-wide network of seniorand young scientists may be used in future activities,as noted in the Water Management Systems in theSouthern Balkans case. Again, this is an example ofbuilding institutional capital, mentioned by Blom-quist and Ingram (2003) as important to success intransboundary water management. Once this net-work is established, using this spirit of cooperationamong the riparian experts is an effective means ofproducing a valuable source of data.

Effectively managing change to physical compo-nents of a river system requires equal considerationof the social system. If the flow regime of a riverchanges then the river ecosystem will change inresponse. People might feel positive and/or negativeimpacts. To manage the change ecological and socialissues in a structured and agreed way need to beautomatically included into water-resource manage-ment plans so that the future implications can beunderstood and an acceptable future chosen. Havingthese socioeconomic and environmental syntheses, aswell as having related workshops and the setting upof national steering committees, was cited as instru-mental in broadening the scope of the project stake-holders by involving ministries which were not partof the Aquifer Protection in North Africa project’s ini-tial decision-making process. This was also recom-mended in the Climate Change Modeling andStakeholder Preparedness in East Africa case.

Stakeholders

Consultation with a “wide array of stakeholders”could reveal further scenarios of interest to the basinpopulation at large, as was found in the Aquifer Pro-tection in North Africa and Climate Change Model-ing, Stakeholder Preparedness in East Africa, andReducing Transboundary Degradation in the Cauca-sus cases. It was found that a qualitative stakeholder



assessment may be a key to the project’s success. Itmay enable the project to obtain an initial assess-ment of stakeholder concerns, especially those whoare underrepresented or not represented in officialcapacities. Performing a qualitative stakeholderassessment, especially with traditionally underrepre-sented groups, provides a significant amount of sup-port for transboundary diagnostic assessmentdevelopment in the Reducing Transboundary Degra-dation in the Caucasus case. Local stakeholderinvolvement has the potential to be a strong guidingforce in the project’s development and implementa-tion. Of course, it may be advisable to clarify withgovernments and hosting organizations the nature ofa qualitative stakeholders’ assessment, so as to avoidmisunderstandings and different expectations for thiscomponent.

In designing certain projects due considerationshould be given to (1) stakeholders’ commitment andownership to avoid implementation delays, (2)engagement of mature international consultants withgood record of regional experience to avoid promotionof blue-print solutions; and (3) development of alonger term vision to ensure consistent support, aswas noted in the Improved Management of WaterResources in Central Asia case.

Negotiating

The first task of water negotiations between partic-ularly hostile riparians may be simply to get individ-uals together talking about relatively neutral issues,which could be part of what Wolf (1995) refers to asthe “bargaining mix.” Successful negotiations mightinclude an eventual simultaneous narrowing andbroadening of focus, to move from the neutral topicsnecessary in early stages of negotiation to dealingwith the contentious issues at the heart of a waterconflict. This was also cited by Waage (2005), whenthis occurred during the Israeli-Palestinian negotia-tion of the Oslo Accords. Concepts of integrated watermanagement may also be included.

In attempts at resolving particularly contentiousdisputes, solving problems of politics and resourceuse is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcingtracks, cited in examples by Waage (2005) andQaddumi (2008). Of course, Track II dialogues losemuch of their utility if there is no mechanism forfeeding ideas generated into the main negotiatingtrack.

In cases where there is no external support, per-haps one of the bigger limitations might be dataavailability and collection. Lack of external fundingmakes defining jurisdiction, building trust, and activ-ities such as performing an integrated flow assess-

ment and consultations with stakeholders much moredifficult. In these cases, it makes sense for ripariansto focus on projects of a smaller scale that involvesscientific collaboration.

CONCLUSION

Our discussion has highlighted practices wheredevelopment partners may play a role in designingand implementing collaborative projects in the earli-est stages. Here, we examine the recommendationsmade by the literature and discuss how the litera-ture matches the four themes that emerged in thediscussion. This section closes by posing suggestionsfor best practices for development partners todesign and implement collaborative projects intheir absolute earliest stages, drawn from lessonslearned and project recommendations from the casestudies.

We identified many design elements that likelyadded to the success of projects in the case studiesreviewed herein, including: respecting autonomy ofeach participating riparian; creating and supportingbasin-wide networks of scientists; considering boththe physical and social components of basin man-agement; consulting with (and including ideas by)stakeholders in project design and implementation;and creating Track Two dialogues. We have alsofound that our findings from this selection of casestudies have aligned with previous scholarly think-ing on what constitutes successful transboundarywater management. However, we must qualify ourresults in saying that each river basin offers uniquechallenges and problems and no one combination ofproduct design strategies may fit the needs of allriparians. Also, we must note that this article’sfocus does not extend to analyzing the eventsafter these initial cooperative projects may be com-pleted.

We discussed in our jurisdiction sub-section howrespecting riparians’ autonomy during cooperativeprocesses can foster success. Our discussion describedhow in designing the projects, allowing each partnerto garner responsibility for project activities allowsfor more ownership and allays the risks of account-ability and voice and sovereignty and autonomy.Other elements of designing a project that we suggestinclude basin-wide integrated flow assessments andbuilding a basin-wide network of senior and youngscientists.

We identified that consulting a diverse group ofstakeholders may also serve as a useful tool in projectdesign and implementation. Finally, in negotiating,



we pointed toward getting individuals together tospeak about relatively neutral issues and negotiatingin two mutually reinforcing tracks. These two pointsallow for opinions to be heard and added into projectdesign. What should be noted in our article is thereliance on official project documents for sources onthe case studies. These reports could be inherentlybiased, as it is more likely that project results will bepresented in a positive light when authored by pro-ject designers. With that said, the project documentswere still quite useful, especially as we are examiningofficial positions of the projects.

We close with offering some recommendations withhow development partners may assist riparians inproject design. These recommendations are not meantto be prescriptive in nature; as we said earlier, everybasin is unique and these recommendations must betaken into the basin’s context. However, these prac-tices can be used in most collaborative situations.

1. Define the juridical situation of the basin(Revollo et al., 2006). Determining who hasjurisdiction and over what areas must be madeclear. This recommendation is drawn from theBiodiversity Conservation in South Americacase, but the recommendation also appears to besalient in the Improved Management of WaterResources in Central Asia case.

2. Undertake joint fact-finding or collaborativemodeling. It is also important to carry out basicstudies of the basin in a joint basis with otherriparians (Revollo et al., 2006). Keeping ripari-ans involved allows for all parties to validatethe information and creates buy-in among coop-erative partners. It would be advantageous tochoose national team members who could takepart in some way in any specialist studies, evenif only in an advisory capability. This recom-mendation is also drawn from the BiodiversityConservation in South America case, but thisconcept was also implemented with success inthe Water Management System in the SouthernBalkans, Climate Change Modeling and Stake-holder Preparedness in East Africa, and Improv-ing Basin-wide Relations in the Middle Eastcases.

3. If necessary, riparians can turn to internationalassistance from partners to help ensure a smoothprocess. This is particularly useful in areaswhere there are high political tensions, as wasapplicable in the Regional Data Water Banks inthe Central Middle East, Reducing Transbound-ary Degradation in the Caucasus, ImprovingBasin-wide Relations in the Middle East, andImproved Management of Water Resources inCentral Asia cases.

4. After the basic studies are completed, elabora-tion of a Master Plan to determine the handlingof the water resources and its use should be thenext step. This was recommended by Revolloet al. (2006) in the Biodiversity Conservation inSouth America case. Riparians are more likelyto buy into the cooperative process aftercompleting in a collaborative basic study ofthe basin together. This increases the chancesof riparians creating a plan to manageshared waters, like in the Creating aTransboundary Water Commission in CentralAsia case.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This article draws from an unpublished report, “LessonsLearned from Transboundary Water Collaboration across theWorld.” The authors wish to thank Peter Reiss of DAI who hasshepherded these efforts. The authors would also like to especiallythank the four anonymous reviewers for their helpful commentsand suggestions. Thanks also to Caryn Davis for her editing andlayout assistance. Thank you to Megan Drinnan for help in con-structing the database. Finally, thank you to Drew Bennett andBrian Chaffin for their assistance and suggestions.

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