getting trans boundary water right

8/14/2019 Getting Trans Boundary Water Right

1/32

Getting Transbundary Water Right:

Thery and Practice r Eective

Cperatin

REPoRT 25

This report has been prepared as

input to the 2009 World Water

Week and its Special Focus on

Transboundary Waters.


2/32

Copyright 2009, Stockholm InternationalWater Institute, SIWI

ISBN: 978-91-975872-5-9

ISSN: 1404-2134

How to Cite: Jgerskog, A., Zeitoun, M. 2009. Getting

Transboundary Water Right: Theory and Practice or

Eective Cooperation. Report Nr. 25. SIWI, Stockholm.

Design and production by Britt-Louise Andersson, SIWI.Printing by Trosa Tryckeri, Trosa, Sweden. The printing

process has been cert ied according

to the Nordic Swan label or environ-

mental quality. For electronic versions

o this and other SIWI publications,

visit www.siwi.org.

Cover photo: Image Source


3/32


Thery and Practice r Eective

Cperatin


4/32

Addressing Transbundary Water Management Challenges: Getting it Right 5

Righting wrongs 6

Lessons learned 7Reerences 8

Cnrnting Pwer: Strategies t Supprt Less Pwerul States 9

Sot sticks, big impacts 9

Engaging with new ideas 11

Quality: The orgotten ace o cooperation 11

Dealing with power asymmetry 12

Reerences 13

Eective Cperatin n Transbundary Waters: A Practical Perspective 15

Why do countries cooperate? 15

How is eective cooperation achieved? 18Reerences 20

A Path Twards Realising Tangible Benefts in Transbundary River Basins 21

The transboundary water management and development dilemma 21

Transboundary waters opportunity (TWO) analysis 22

Strategic environmental assessment: A pre-investment tool 23

Understanding and overcoming barriers to development 24

Conclusions 25

Reerences 26

Cperatin in a Trubled Regin The FEME Experience rm the Jrdan River Basin 27

Experience shows progress is possible 28

Restoring and re-allocating the Jordan 29

Nte t the Reader

Table Cntents

Water energises all sectors o society. Nearly hal o the

global available surace water is ound in 263 interna-

tional river basins, and groundwater resources, which

account or more than one hundred times the amount

o surace water, cross under at least 273 internationalborders. National boundaries make water issues politi-

cal and so much more complex. This report challenges

those in the international water community to grapple

with some o the latest conceptual thinking and most

recent lessons learned rom around the world. The our

chapters in the volume present real-world experience o

cooperation at the international and community levels

and innovative approaches to overcome political obsta-

cles to cooperation.

This report serves as input to the 2009 World WaterWeek and its Special Focus on Transboundary Waters and

was edited and prepared by Dr. Anders Jgerskog, Pro-

gramme Director, Stockholm International Water Institute

(SIWI) and Dr. Mark Zeitoun, Senior Lecturer, University

o East Anglia and was published by SIWI. Contributing

authors o the report chapters are Mr. David Grey, Senior

Water Advisor (Arica and South Asia), The World Bank,New Delhi; Dr. Claudia Sado, Lead Economist (South

Asia), The World Bank, Kathmandu; Dr. Genevieve Con-

nors, Water Specialist (South Asia), The World Bank, New

Delhi; Mr. Jakob Granit, Programme Director, SIWI; Dr.

Marius Claassen, Manager, Water Resources, The Council

or Scientic and Industrial Research in South Arica; Mr.

Munqeth Mehyar, Chair Person and Jordanian Director,

Ecopeace/Friends o the Earth Middle East (FoEME); Mr.

Nader Khateeb, Palestinian Director, FoEME and Mr. Gidon

Bromberg, Israeli Director, FoEME. The authors are pleased

to acknowledge and grateful for the support of the Swed-

ish International Development Cooperation Agency.


5/32

5

Photo:JakobGranit,

SIWI

Getting transboundary water resources managementright is not simply important. It is urgent to secure

the livelihoods o billions o people and sustain the

resource across the globe. Te response o the interna-

tional water community to the mounting challenges

and pressure placed on shared waters has thus ar

been inconsistent and inadequate. Te special ocus

o the 2009 World Water Week in Stockholm on

transboundary waters is an attempt to deal directly

with the pressing developmental and security issues

these ows bring about.Tis volume supplements the week by challenging

the international water community to grapple with

some o the latest conceptual thinking and most recent

lessons learned rom around the world. Te articles

in this report intend to provoke appropriate concern

and inspire action where needed.

Water energises allsectors o society. Everything

rom basic ood production to advanced industrial

technologies depend on it. Growing demands rom

many ronts place the earths water sources under

increased strain (WWAP 2009). Managing these de-

Intrductin

Addressing Transbundary Water Management Challenges:

Getting it RightBy Anders Jgerskog, Mark Zeitoun, and Anders Berntell

mands is not straight-orward either. Te availabilitywater resources vary in volume over both time and

space, and climate change makes these shits even less

predictable (Jgerskog and Phillips 2008).

National boundaries make these water issues politi-

cal. Politics always add complexity. Nearly hal o the

global available surace water is ound in 263 interna-

tional river basins. In Arica (FDD 2008), where 90

percent o surace water is shared, the inecient gov-

ernance o transboundary water management holds the

continents development eorts hostage and must beimproved to stimulate growth. Groundwater resources

are even more challenging and critical to co-manage

sustainably. Tey account or more than one hundred

times the amount o surace water, and cross under at

least 273 international borders (UNESCO 2008).

Te healthy debates about how to manage trans-

boundary waters witnessed at most international

meetings reect the tense reality seen in the basins

themselves. Appeals or collective action and water

rights ace the promoters o unilateral action and

increased privatisation. On international rivers, the


6/32

6

economic benefts o large dams must be weighed not

only against their potentially devastating environ-

mental and social eects, but against their political

and security implications as well. We are all obligedto reconcile competing pressures to balance the con-

servation and sustainable development o rivers and

aquiers. In many regions, this will require that historic

inequities, mismanagement and deeply-entrenched

interests be overcome.

Generally, the international water community is

split into three camps over how transboundary ows

relate to livelihoods, development, and human, state

and regional security. Some emphasise the causal

relationships between water scarcity (or oods) andviolent conict or poverty. Others contend that the

evidence o cooperation that exists globally suggest

a comorting trend towards stability and wealth.

Te third camp sits between the two. Not indecisive

ence-sitters, this latter group stresses the existence

o numerous water conicts that all short o vio-

lence. Tey ocus on the need to resolve conicts

equitably and balance concerns or livelihoods and

the environment. While the authors o this volume

belong to the latter group, they are writing here or

all across the spectrum.

Righting wrongs

It is time to address the limitations that the inconsist-

ent behaviour o the international water community

has led to. Tis means addressing undamental ques-tions that are oten unexamined. What is the quality

o cooperation (Jgerskog 2008)? What does coop-

eration mean in the frst place? Whyand under what

conditionsdo states cooperate? Te our contributions

in this volume span rom real-world experience o di-

erent orms o cooperation at the international and

community levels to innovative conceptual approaches

to overcome political obstacles to cooperation. Te

essays construct a path towards more eective trans-

boundary water management through ocus on theopportunities provided by cooperation, methods to

deal with power asymmetries and lessons that can be

learned through partial successes.

Zeitoun and Jgerskog suggest an analytical meth-

od to help transboundary water initiatives respond to

power asymmetry. Tey note that the most powerul

riparian is oten able to determine the outcome o the

transboundary water interaction, either or unilateral

gain or the collective good. Tere are two options:

either fnd ways to strengthen the weaker players,

or level the playing feld. Presenting cases rom the

Photo:ManfredMatz


7/32

7

Jordan, Ganges, Nile and Mekong rivers, the authors

insist that not all orms o cooperation are as benign as

they may frst appear. Tey propose strategies designed

to enable eective cooperation by working to inuence

and challengepower asymmetry.

Grey, Sado and Connors also recognise the merits

o eective cooperation and a level playing feld in theirexploration o why countries cooperate, and how this

may be acilitated. Teir contribution deepens the

concept o beneft sharing (Sado and Grey 2002) to

recognise that collective action may be driven as much

by common goals to reduce risk as it is to share benefts.

Perspectives rom their experiences in the Senegal,

Columbia, Nile and Ganges rivers lead to several key

recommendations, and an appeal or long-term donor

commitment to transboundary water processes.

Granit and Claassen present conceptual models

that can assist transboundary water management and

stimulate national economic development. Building

upon the beneft sharing concept, they present the

ransboundary Water Opportunity (WO) Analy-

sis, which provides stakeholders with a ramework to

identiy a variety o opportunities or a basin. Strategic

Environmental Assessments and barrier analysis are

proposed as complements to the WO that can be

used to bring potential cumulative economic, environ-mental and social impacts to the oreront o planning

transboundary initiatives.

Mehyar, Khateeb and Bromberg conclude the re-

port with a concrete example o how power asymmetry,

beneft sharing and development opportunities impact

the Jordan River riparians. Teir review o the coopera-

tion between Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian com-

munities to improve the dire quality and distribution

o the Jordan shows that collective action is possible

in regions where politics are tense. Tis approach toenvironmental peacemaking is centred on the hope

that the cooperation at the community level can be

emulated at the national level. Te authors highlight

the opportunities that are usually ignored in avour o

large inrastructure such as water demand manage-

ment where they have brokered promises rom each

government to take action.

Lessons learned

Eective cooperation in transboundary basins is built

through strong and equitable structures and institu- Photo:ManfredMatz


8/32

8

References

Jgerskog, Anders (2008) Prologue Special Issueon Hydro-Hegemony. Water Policy10 (S2): 1-2.

Jgerskog, Anders and David Phillips (2008)Man-

aging Transboundary Waters. Arab Journal o

Water 1 (2).

Sado, Claudia W. and David Grey (2002) Beyond

the River: The Benets o Cooperation on Interna-

tional Rivers. Water Policy(4): 389-403.

SMFA (2001) Transboundary Water Management

as an International Public Good. Development

Financing 2000. Stockholm, Sweden, Swedish

Ministry or Foreign Aairs, May 2001.

TFDD (2008) Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Da-tabase. Corvallis, Oregon State University Insti-

tute or Water and Watersheds. www.transbounda-

rywaters.orst.edu/database/.

UNESCO (2008). Groundwater Resources o the

World: Transboundary Aquier Systems (Map).

Worldwide Hydrogeological Mapping and Assess-

ment Programme. Hannover, Paris: UNESCO/IHP.

WWAP (2009) The United Nations World Water

Development Report 3: Water in a Changing

World. World Water Assessment Programme. Paris,

London: UNESCO/Earthscan.

tions or collaboration at community, national and

regional levels. Most bilateral donors, UN agencies and

development banks are inappropriately programmed

to fnance processes without a clear outcome and time-

line (SMFA2001). A summary o the other lessons

learned rom the volume ollows.

Lessons learned about transboundary water cooperation

ereisbenetinestablishinganaccepteddeni-

tion o cooperation. Some cooperation can be

coercive. Cooperation should not be seen as a goal

in and o itsel, and eective cooperation is required

to meet the goals o the co-riparians.

Cooperationatthecommunitylevelcanleadto

cooperation at the municipal level. It may lead to

cooperation at the international level.

Cooperationismosteectivewhenthereisequalparticipation and decision-making power between

all parties.

Lessons learned that are relevant to transboundary water

analysis and programme design

Tepotentialforcooperationandforopportunities

is unique to each basin.

Arangeofdevelopmentopportunitiesexistinall

basins. A key is to identiy these benefts as wellas the potential barriers that may hinder realising

these benefts.

Statesmaycooperatewhentheneteconomicand

political benefts outweigh the benefts o unilateral

action. Actions taken to broaden the basket o ben-

efts have potential to drive eective cooperation.

Statesmaybeevenmorelikelytocooperateto

reduce common water-related risks.

Economic inequity and power asymmetry are

among the most important barriers to cooperation.

Te asymmetry may be conronted through strate-

gies to inuence a powerul state with win-winsolutions, or by transorming the basin bully into

a basin leader.

Capacity-buildingofweakerstatesandthecreation

o objective and air water-sharing standards can be

eective ways to challenge power asymmetry and in-

crease equity in transboundary water management.

Long-termandexiblesupportfromthirdparties

encourages eective cooperation. Tis is particular-

ly important to support dialogue and institutional

arrangements.

Te political economy o transboundary waters

will be addressed in-depth at the 2009 World Water

Week in Stockholm and in the upcoming publication,

ransboundary Water Management: From Principle to

Practice (Earthscan). Te international water commu-

nity must begin addressing the use o transboundary

waters in a coherent and responsible manner. I we do

not, then progress towards sustainable developmentand security will stall and may alter. Perhaps most

o all, those o us willing to engage in building co-

operative arrangements in shared river basins require

clear sight, steady vision and tenacity to overcome

the obstacles.


9/32

9

It seems obvious. ransboundary waters are highly

political. And politics are ruled by power. Yet, tra-

ditional and emerging orms o interaction in the

Mekong, Jordan, Ganges, Nile and so many other

transboundary waterways reveal that the international

community turns a blind eye to the power plays overwater. oo many have silently submitted to the no-

tion that more equitable, sustainable and ecient

transboundary water cooperation is not possible. As

the methods by which the hydro-hegemon dictates

the rules o engagement in the basin continue to go

overlooked, this prophecy may become sel-ulflled.

Unchallenged, the hydro-hygemon can act as a basin

leader, or as a bully and pursue its interests unilater-

ally by strong arming less powerul states. Some o

the resultant orms o cooperation are actually quite

unair and ultimately perpetuate, not resolve, conict

(ZeitounandMirumachi2008).Lesspowerfulstates

ace two routes: they can thrive under the direction

o a basin leader or they are orced to adapt to the

unsustainable arrangements.

Power asymmetry may be unavoidable but its more

destructive maniestations need not be. Tis essay sug-gests two broad strategies to assist with the challenge o

conronting power asymmetry in transboundary water

interaction: it can be inuencedor can be challenged.

Te aim is to inorm policy leading to the establish-

ment o eective transboundary cooperation.

Soft sticks, big impacts

Power means so many things to so many people that

its very essence is contested (Evans and Newnham

1998). ransboundary water policy-makers and ana-

lysts should thereore be ready to question their own

Cnrnting Pwer: Strategies t

Supprt Less Pwerul StatesBy Mark Zeitoun and Anders Jgerskog

Photo:ManfredMatz


10/32

10

conceptions o power, especially in terms o riparian

position. Ongoing urkish or Chinese dam building

projects on the igris and Mekong rivers demonstrate

the advantage an upstream state has over its down-

stream neighbours, particularly when they are able to

sel-fnance large storage inrastructure. But this is notalways the case. Te same highland position enjoyed

by Ethiopia on the Eastern Nile or by Nepal on the

Ganges has not translated into the same mega-projects.

Te great bulk o these river ows are controlled by the

much more powerul downstream neighbours, Egypt

and India. Power trumps topography.

Power in water conict is not commonly exercised

through the use o military orce. Various combina-

tions o sot power are more oten the preerred tool

to assure compliance o co-riparian states. Chinasfnancial assistance to Cambodia in sectors unrelated

to the Mekong has been credited or ensuring ocial

Cambodian acquiescence to the building o poten-

tially devastating upstream dams (Menniken 2007,

see also Molle, et al. 2009). Such use o carrots to

induce cooperation is more welcome than the use o

the stick, o course. Under this unilateral paradigm,

however, states can resort to threats and coerce their

neighbours to submit to an agreement whose terms

may return to haunt them. By limiting the explora-

tion o options, the strong arming can also prevent

the creation o a more sustainable agreement based on

meeting common interests.

Bargaining power is the perhaps the most common

orm o sot power used in transboundary basins.

All legitimate actors in a relationship have bargaining

power, i in unequal measure. A recent World Bankreport on the development o the Palestinian water

sector development details how such power is used at

the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee (JWC)

(World Bank 2009). Unlike the equitable transbound-

ary eorts occurring at the community and municipal

levels (Mehyar et. al., this volume), the structure o

theJWC allows the Israeli side to eectively veto even

the most basic drinking water projects inside the West

Bank (Selby 2003). Inextricably bound to the broader

Palestinian-Israeli conict, Palestinian bargainingpower proved insucient to bring about any improve-

ment o the highly asymmetric status quo during the

fve water meetings o the 2008 Annapolis round o

negotiations. So ew concessions were made, in act,

that the Palestinian side was unable to table a positive-

sum outcome solution it had developed, even though

this was designed to meet the interests o both sides

(Kawash 2008). No carrot was needed or on oer rom

the Israeli side to get what it wanted. Its bargaining

power proved sucient to deect even initial attempts

to reach a common negotiation agenda.

Photo:Manfre

dMatz


11/32

11

Engaging with new ideas

Much like the American la carte approach in

choosing which international environmental policies

to endorse (Falkner 2005: 586), it is the basin he-

gemons choice to engage in multilateral or unilateral

transboundary water interaction. urkeys Southeast-

ern Anatolia (GAP) project, Egypts oskha irrigationscheme, Israels National Water Carrier and Indias

NationalRiver-LinkingProject,forexample,haveall

been undertaken with little concern or their impact

on riparian neighbours. In this sense, the 2005 and

2009 releases o igris and Euphrates ows by ur-

key (Rashid 2005, erra Daily 2009), and basin-wide

discussions supported by Egypt (the negotiations or

a Cooperative Framework Agreement through the

Nile Basin Initiative) may be viewed as a step toward

engagement and collective action. Some argue that

the multilateral collective approach only materialised

because they are in the hegemons interest. Tis may

be true but it is beside the more relevant point: Te

collective approach is on oer only ater the resource

has been captured. Working with this insight is key

to the establishment o eective cooperation.

Te luxury o cherry-picking when and with whom

to engage over transboundary waters issues does not

necessarily extend to the weaker side. A non-hegemon(Syria and Iraq, or Ethiopia, in the above cases) can

only create wriggle-room through attempts to shape the

arrangements oered by the hegemon to be mutually

benefcial. Bangladeshi eorts to improve data-sharing

or to reach an equitable arrangement with India are

a case in point (see Grey, Sado and Connors, this

volume page 15-20). But examples like the Palestinian

positive-sum solution show that such pro-active eorts

are scarcely acknowledged by the international water

community, much less acted upon. Such proposals aremore likely to be written-o by independent mediators

as unworkable and unpragmatic. Short-term perspec-

tives and exclusive consideration o arrangements that

will beneft or be accepted by the basin hegemon (leader

or bully) can compromise their sustainability.

Quality: The forgotten face of cooperation

ransboundary water policy-makers must prioritise the

qualityo cooperation in their thinking. Te existence

o a water treaty, data-sharing or other minor orms

o intervention do not necessarily reect eective co-

operation (Daoudy and Kistin, 2008). Consider the

acclaim given to the conclusion and resilience o the

water clauses o the 1994 IsraelJordan Peace reaty

(e.g. Shuval 2006, Sosland 2007). Te skewed terms o

the arrangement in the hegemons avour is acknowl-

edged as an acceptable trade-o as part o a broader

goal o peace between ormer enemies (Haddadin2001). In the language o negotiations theory, this is

a great case o issue-linkage.

Te treatys longevity, however, is less important

than its ailure to conront the real conict between

the parties over the distribution o the shared water and

the benefts it generates. Te ambiguity in the treaty

that hinders its impact was deliberately built into it to

beneft the more powerul side (Fischhendler 2008).

Te asymmetric outcome endures alongside growing

physical water scarcity as Jordan reaches or increas-ingly distant sources to satisy its water demand (the

Red Sea, or the ossil water o the Disi aquier).

Te question or policy-makers is: Why is more

equitable sharing not possible as part o the peace

agreement? More undamentally, does the existence

o a treaty mean that parties are really cooperating

in a way the most o us would understand it or wish

it to be?

Some treaties stand or so long that their words andthe evolving (or devolving) reality on the waterront

are hopelessly distant. Te existence o the Mahakali

reaty between India and Nepal (Gyawali 2001), or

example, cannot hide the lack o coordination between

the two states. Its presence was nowhere elt when

the 2008 Kosi ood caused widespread destruction

on both sides o the border (D'Souza 2009). In this

sense, a bad treaty may even be part o the problem.

Tough a treaty may temporarily reduce the intensity

o a conict, the existence o an unair and ineectivetreaty can prevent a more equitable arrangement rom

being established.

Other orms o sot power help to explain these

unseen aces o cooperation. Tese include the abil-

ity to rame issues by limiting discussion about them

(Zeitoun, et al. orthcoming 2009). Unquestioned

and loosely-defned understandings o cooperation

become the norm. In the Nile, or example, substantial

amounts o water are used in the West Nile Delta or

oshka projects in Egypt. Since the abstractions all

outside o the mandate o the Nile Basin Initiative,


12/32

12

however, they remain largely unmentioned and insti-

tutionally invisible. Unquestioned and loosely-defned

understandings o cooperation become the norm.

Te 2006 Human Development Report asserts that

given the dierent strategic, political and economic

contexts in international basins, it makes sense to pro-

mote and support cooperation o any sort, no matterhow slight (UNDP 2006: 228). Tis perspective is not

thought-through. It does not make sense to support

cooperative eorts that perpetuate inequitable and un-

sustainable arrangements and risk urther reducing

the chance or dialogue through abandoned or paper

tiger (Bernauer 2002) treaties. Alternative strategies

that recognise power asymmetry are required, and

are being developed.

Dealing with power asymmetry

Power asymmetry in transboundary water settings

can be conronted in two ways: it can be strategically

inuencedor it can be challenged. While neither strat-

egy yields completely new ideas, mainstreaming them

explicitly into policy and programme design may oer

a clearer path towards more eective cooperation.

Tere are two general ways to inuencepower. Te

frst is to derive positive-sum outcomes. Te identifca-

tion or encouragement o win-win or positive-sumoutcomes can satisy all parties and in essence render

power asymmetry irrelevant. Te concept o beneft-

sharing (Sado and Grey 2002) is one such potential

method. Te idea is entirely rational rom a perspective

seeking optimal use o a river. Place inrastructure in

the preerred hydrological location to produce benefts

like hydro-electricity or ood which can be shared with

riparian neighbours. Te rationale is compelling, but

remains untested. Governments run complex states

that do not or cannot generally act rationally at alltimes, so the jury is stil l out on whether water-derived

benefts will be shared equitably when the water itsel

cannot be. In any case, the distribution o benefts are

also likely to all prey to power plays.

Te second theoretical way to inuence power

asymmetry is to create conditions to encourage basin

bullies to transorm into basin leaders. Hydropolitics

are always subordinate to the broader political context

(Allan 2001), suggesting that eorts at eective wa-

ter cooperation require international diplomacy (e.g.

Kjellen 2007). Experience suggests that basin bullies

can be susceptible to the powers o persuasion, and

may be less likely to orce an arrangement i they are

held accountable to an objective standard, or risk be-ing named and shamed. Te partial success o the

contraction and convergence model to induce inu-

ential climate-change policy-setters to reduce national

carbon emissions (GCI 2000) shows that inviting pow-

erul states to being part o the solution rather than

part o the problem should be pursued.3 State-level

environmental peacemaking eorts, such as those

led by the Woodrow Wilson Centers Environmental

Change and Security Program (e.g. Kameri-Mbote

2006), indicate that independent mediators are keyto this approach.

Power asymmetry can also be challenged in two

ways: one can either level the players, or level the

playing feld. o help level the players, capacity-

building programmes can improve the technical,

administrative or negotiation abilities and empower

non-hegemons. Tis can increase their bargaining

power and enable them to play a more eective role in

transboundary water interactions. It also helps themgenerate their own solutions to collective challenges.

As the ormerly weaker actors take on more respon-

sibility, they gain respect and power. Activities o the

EMPOWERs project in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine

may serve as examples o increasing the weaker sides

bargaining power, at least at the national level.

ransboundary water arrangements set out ac-

cording to coercive terms determined by a hegemon

cannot endure in the long term. Yet transboundary

water settings are generally not level, and the onlyrule o the game in many basins is the law o the

jungle. Te only option then is to work to level the

playing feld. Te international water community may

want to steal another page rom the ongoing climate

change negotiations, which explicitly avour (at least

on paper) the so-called non-Annex I developing

states. It does so by placing a greater burden on the

1 Similar to what Molle (2008) reers to as a nirvana concept.2 Benet-sharing has being explored in theoretical terms rom the Kagera to the Mekong (Jgerskog and Lundqvist 2006, Phillips, et al.2006), and it is being applied to the Nile confic t (Phillips and Woodhouse 2009).3 Application o the contraction and convergence concept to transboundary waters is at tributed to Dr Richard Taylor, o University College London.


13/32

13

References

Allan, J.A. (2001) The Middle East Water Question:

Hydropolitics and the Global Economy. London,

UK: I.B. Tauris.

Bates, B.C., Z.W. Kundzewicz, S. Wu and J.P. Palutiko,Ed. (2008) Climate Change and Water. Technical

Paper o the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change. Geneva, IPCC Secretariat.

Bernauer, Thomas (2002) Explaining success and

ailure in international river management.Aquatic

Science 64: 1-19.

D'Souza, Rohan (2009) From Damming Rivers to

Linking Waters: Is this the beginning o the end o

Supply-Side Hydrology in India? The Currents o

Power: Water and the New World Order, hosted

by the Centre or Advanced Studies (Oslo) and the

University o Bergen, Bergen, 20-21 April 2009.

Daoudy, Marwa (orthcoming 2009) Asymmetric

Power: Negotiating Water in the Euphrates and

Tigris. International Negotiations 14: 359-389.Daoudy, Marwa and Elizabeth Kistin (2008) Beyond

Water Conict: Evaluating the Eects o Interna-

tional Water Cooperation. Paper prepared or the

49th annual Conerence o the International Studies

Association, San Francisco, 26-29 March 2008.

Evans, Graham and Jerey Newnham (1998) Dic-

tionary o International Relations. London, UK:

Penguin Books.

Falkner, Robert (2005) American Hegemony and the

Global Environment. International Studies Review

7: 585-599.

stronger (and more carbon producing) Annex I states

(see e.g. Bates, et al. 2008). Eective legislative andthe regulatory context already level the playing feld

at the sub-national level in many countries. At the

international level, the 1997 UNConvention serves as a

useul guide to air water-sharing even i only hal the

35 states required to make it binding have acceded to it.

Support or the Conventions call or more equitable

and reasonable water use is growing, and is supported

bytheInternationalLawCommissions2008Draft

Articles on groundwater. Te agreement by the gov-ernments o France, Spain and a dozen others at the

2009 Istanbul 5th World Water Forum to promote such

standards is a urther positive development.

But not all steps currently being taken are moving

us orward. Te push or hydro sovereignty at thesame World Water Forum appears to be a reversion

to the discredited Harmon Doctrine that had been

abandoned over a century ago. Resistance by the pow-

erul riparian states to the WWF-World Wide Fund

or Nature campaign to establish a legal and air water

sharing principles reminds us that not all hegemons

are leaders. Tis makes the role o third-parties all the

more crucial. We are confdent that the international

water community can take on this responsibility. Wemust keep our eyes open to recognise and conront the

reality o power asymmetry, basin bullies and coercion

in order to achieve eective cooperation.

Photo:MattiasGranberg


14/32

14

Fischhendler, Itay (2008) Ambiguity in Transboundary

Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Israel-

Jordanian Water Agreement.Journal o Peace

Research 45(1): 91-110.

GCI (2000) Contraction and Convergence: A Global

Solution ot a Global Problem, Global Commons

Institute: Website publication www.gci.org.uk/contconv/cc.html.

Haddadin, Munther (2001) Diplomacy on the Jordan:

International Conict and Negotiated Resolution.

International Development Research Centre and

Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Jgerskog, Anders and Lundqvist, Jan (2006) Benet

Sharing in International River Basins. WaterFront,

No. 1, May 2006,

Kameri-Mbote, Patricia (2006) Water, Conict, and

Cooperation: Lessons rom the Nile River Basin. No.4 in the Navigating Peace series, Woodrow Wilson

International Center or Scholars, Environmental

Change and Security Programme, January 2007.

Kawash, Fadel (pers. comm) (2008) Personal

communication with head o Palestinian water

negotiations team. Personal communication with

author, Ramallah.

Kjellen, Bo (2007)A New Diplomacy or Sustainable

Development. London: Taylor & Francis.Menniken, Timo (2007) China's perormance in Interna-

tional Resource Politics: Lessons rom the Mekong.

Contemporary Southeast Asia 29(1): 97-120.

Molle, Francois (2008) Nirvana Concepts, Narratives

and Policy Models: Insights rom the Water Sector.

Water Alternatives 1(1): 131-156.

Molle, Francois, Tira Foran and Phillipe Floch (2009)

Introduction: Changing Waterscapes in the Me-

kong Region Historical Background and Context.

In: Molle, F., T. Foran and M. Kknen, ContestedWaterscapes in the Mekong Region: Hydropower,

Livelihoods and Governance. London: Earthscan.

Phillips, David, Marwa Daoudy, Joakim jendal,

Anthony Turton and Stephen McCarey (2006)

Trans-boundary Water Cooperation as a Tool or

Conict Prevention and Broader Beneft-sharing.

Global Development Studies No. 4. Stockholm,

Sweden: Ministry o Foreign Aairs.

Phillips, David and Melvin Woodhouse (2009)

Beneft Sharing in the Nile River Basin: Strategies

or Fresh Water Use at the Country and Sub-basin

Levels. Entebbe, Report prepared or the Socio-

economic Development and Benet Sharing Unit

o the Nile Basin Initiative.

Rashid, Abdul Lati (2005) Address to the Coner-

ence rom the Minister o Water Resources o

Iraq.Seminar on Agricultural Water in the Middle

East, SIWI World Water Week, Stockholm, Sweden,Stockholm International Water Institute and the

Israel Palestine Centre or Research and Inorma-

tion, 24 August 2005.

Sado, Claudia W. and David Grey (2002) Beyond

the river: the benets o cooperation on interna-

tional rivers. Water Policy(4): 389-403.

Selby, Jan (2003) Dressing up Domination as 'Co-oper-

ation': The Case o Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations.

Review o International Studies 29(1): 121-138.

Shuval, Hillel (2006) Water in the Middle East: Con-ficting Interests and Cooperative Approaces An

Israeli Approach to Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian

Water Issues. Water and Environment Workshop,

Prague, 12-14 June 2006.

Sosland, Jerey K. (2007) Cooperating Rivals: The

Riparian Politics o the Jordan River Basin. New

York, USA: State University o New York Press.

Terra Daily (2009) Iraq says Turkey to double water

supply. Terra Daily, 25 March 2009,UNDP (2006) Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and

the Global Water Crisis. Human Development

Report 2006. New York, USA, United Nations

Development Programme.

World Bank (2009) West Bank and Gaza: Assessment

o Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Devel-

opment Sector Note April 2009. Middle East and

North Arica Region Sustainable Development.

Report No. 47657-GZ Washington, The Internation-

al Bank or Reconstruction and Development.WWF (2009) Interest growns in neglected water

treaty. Worldwide Fund or Nature website, 21

March 2009. Geneva.

Zeitoun, Mark and Naho Mirumachi (2008) Trans-

boundary water interaction I: Reconsidering con-

fict and cooperation. International Environmental

Agreements 8: 297-316.

Zeitoun, Mark, Naho Mirumachi and Jeroen Warner

(orthcoming 2009) Transboundary water interac-

tion II: Sot power underlying confict and coopera-

tion. International Environmental Agreements.


15/32

15

Building eective cooperation on transboundary wa-

ters is always a lengthy and complex journey. Embrac-

ing cooperation is no simple task or a nation state,not least because o the perceived costs o the erosion

o sovereignty, however small that erosion might be.

While there are many examples o where cooperation is

non-existent or weak, there are also examples across

countries and across time o eective cooperation.

Tis essay examines these issues through a practi-

tioners lens to draw a ew lessons rom experience on

why countries cooperate and how cooperation can

be achieved.

Why do countries cooperate?

Why do countries cooperate on transboundary waters?

At frst glance, the obvious answer is that coopera-

tion is by defnition good and is, thereore, the right

course o action. Tis is asserted time and again as a

frst principle in countless international meetings and

proclamations. Yet the reality is more nuanced. Te

UNConventionontheLawoftheNon-navigational

Eective Cperatin

n Transbundary Waters:A Practical Perspective

By David Grey, Claudia Sadof and Genevieve Connors1

Uses o International Watercourses was 27 years in

preparation prior to its adoption by the UN General

Assembly in 1997. Now, 12 years later, only 16 stateshave ratifed the Convention and it has not entered

into orce. As a consequence, despite the irreplaceable

role o water in lives, livelihoods and production,

there is no universal treaty in orce to regulate the

use and protection o shared waters (Salman, 2007).

Te absence o this kind o universal treaty has not

precluded cooperation between sovereign states, nor

does it imply that the principles are not broadly ac-

cepted, but clearly most states are not ready to commit

themselves to a binding legal obligation.Te record to date suggests, quite simply, that

countries do not cooperate in the management o

transboundary waters because they are compelled

by an ethic o cooperation. Tey cooperate when the

net benefts o cooperation are perceived to be greater

than the net benefts o non-cooperation, and when

the distribution o these net benefts is perceived to be

air. In other words, states work together when doing

1 The ndings, interpretations, and conclusions in this paper are entirely the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views o theWorld Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.

Photo:MattiasGranbe

rg


16/32

16

so oers special economic and political advantages

over unilateral development, and when these larger

benefts are shared.

Perceptions are pivotal. States must believe that

greater economic benefts will be gained and distribut-

ed equitably. Indeed, the role o perceptions in a coun-

trys cooperation calculus underscores the importanceo shared, trusted inormation. Perceptions are oten

distorted by inaccurate or mistrusted inormation,

but might be tempered by more credible inormation.

Perceptions can also be inuenced by historical ten-

sions and suspicions, which might be lessened through

sustained dialogue. We will return later to these central

themes o knowledge and dialogue.

Benefts themselves go beyond the obvious, and

take dierent orms (Sado and Grey, 2002). Tis

describes our types o benefts: environmental benetsto the river(e.g. improved water quality, conserved

biodiversity); economic benefts rom the river(e.g.

increased ood and energy production); reduction o

costs because o the river(e.g. reduced geo-political

tensions, enhanced ood management); and benefts

beyond the river(catalysing wider cooperation and

economic integration). Any one o these our beneft

types can promote cooperation. Te broader the basket

o benefts, the greater is the scope or structuringmutually benefcial cooperation.

I these kinds o enhanced benefts are to be gen-

erated, they also must be shared in a manner that

is perceived to be air. Tis can mean the separation

o the physical location o river development where

benefts are derived, rom the physical location where

benefts are distributed. For example, in the Senegal

River Basin, the three countries o Mali, Mauritania

and Senegal through the OMVS (the Senegal River

Basin Development Authority) developed a clearmethodology and ramework to frst quantiy and

then allocate the benefts and costs o multi-purpose

investments across the entire basin. Te Manantali

Dam, or example, which is located entirely inside

western Mali, was constructed through the OMVS in

the 1980s or hydropower, irrigation and navigation

benefts to be distributed across all three countries.

Te scale o benefts derived and the perceived airness

o the beneft sharing arrangement together with the

political ideal o solidarity between the three coun-

tries have sustained substantive cooperation and a

strong river basin organisation on the Senegal River

(Yu, 2008).

It is our view that an increasingly important andcompelling driver toward eective cooperation is the

management o water-related risks (e.g. o oods) com-

mon to some or all riparian states within a basin. Tis

is an example o the third type o beneft described

above. Tis can also be seen as a growing ocus on

managing the destructive impacts o water, relative

to capturing the productive potential o water both

o which are key aspects o achieving water security.

In recent years, there have been growing concerns

globally regarding the uncertainties o our climate

uture and, in particular, the impact o a changing

climate on water resources. aken together with other

changing climates changes to demographic, f-

nancial, economic and political climates the uture

challenges in managing the worlds water resources

look daunting and the risks great.

Co-riparian states can manage these risks that they

ace by pooling their resources to enhance inorma-

tion and early warning systems on their changinghydrologic variability and by ostering system-wide

river basin management. Climate change raises the

stakes o non-cooperation, encouraging nation states

not only to capture additional economic benefts, but

also to manage better their growing common risks. In

transboundary river basins, existing risks are likely to

be intensifed by climate change. Eective cooperation

in transboundary basin management could become a

singularly eective risk management strategy.

History suggests that a perception o common riskscan be particularly compelling motivation to manage

and share these risks through cooperation. Coopera-

tion between Canada and the Unites States on the

Columbia River, or example, was catalysed in large

part by recurring and sometimes devastating oods.

Tis is true even though and this is important the

perceived economic benefts o ood control were

2 Water security can be dened as the availability o an acceptable quantity and quality o water or health, livelihoods, ecosystems andproduction, coupled wi th an acceptable level o water-related risks to people, environments and economies. See D. Grey and C. W. Sado,Sink or Swim? Water Securit y or Growth and Development in Water Policy Vol. 9, No. 6. pp 545- 571. 2007.


17/32

17

Photo:ArneHoel/WorldBank

considerably less than those o other benefts rom

the reaty. Energy was the other key driver o the 1961

Columbia River reaty and the new storage dams,

constructed under the reaty and cooperatively op-

erated, enabled signifcantly more power generation

than could otherwise have been produced by unilateral

action (Yu, 2008).oday, similar processes may play out in the im-

mense Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Basin,

which is shared by Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India,

and Nepal. Te GBM is characterised by the worlds

highest mountains (including Mount Everest), greatest

oodplains, and largest basin population, with over

500 million people, many o whom are very poor.

Added to these superlatives are: a unique monsoonal

climate, with 50 percent o precipitation in 15 days and

90 percent o runo in 4 months; very little hydraulicinrastructure, with only 30 days o ow in artifcial

storage (compared to the 900 days o storage in the

Colorado and Murray-Darling basins (Briscoe and

Malik, 2006); extreme pollution (with consequent

ecosystem damage and biodiversity loss); and very

limited existing transboundary cooperation. Climate

models suggest that monsoon intensity could increase

and glaciers retreat, while populations, cities, indus-

tries and economies continue to grow rapidly. Terisks aced by the basins populations today are already

high: 70 million people in India and Bangladesh were

seriously aected by the 2007 monsoon, 4,500 were

killed, and crops across 75,000 km were destroyed.

Although the dynamics are complex and causality

is dicult to determine, it is possible that there are

already large numbers o climate migrants leaving

the basin, temporally or even permanently.

Future risks are undoubtedly high and could poten-

tially be mitigated through cooperation. Joint institu-tions or inormation sharing could help predict and

monitor the basins changing hydrology and underpin

early warning systems, thus enhancing both agricul-

tural productivity and disaster preparedness. Coop-

erative inrastructure development and/or operation

could help regulate river ows, to mitigate oods and

droughts, generate power and irrigate felds. Coopera-

tive environmental management could enhance water

quality and ensure environmental ows or ecosystem

health. And all o this cooperative engagement could

improve regional relationships beyond the river.


18/32

18

How is effective cooperation achieved?Tere are no blueprints or achieving cooperation

indeed it is oten unclear what is meant by the term

cooperation itsel. Te debate tends to be cast as an

all-or-nothing proposition implying that cooperation

is an absolute, in direct opposition to water wars.

In reality there are innumerable practical avenues o

cooperation that states can undertake to their mutual

advantage, each with dierent potential benefts and di-

erent associated costs. Eective cooperation can range

rom simple inormation sharing and hazard warning

protocols, to a ully integrated approach to developing

(investing in natural and man-made inrastructure) andmanaging (investing in institutions, inormation and ca-

pacity) basin-wide transboundary river ows. While the

latter remains an aspiration probably not yet achieved in

any transboundary basin, there are increasing examples

o eective transboundary cooperation.

Dierent modes o cooperation must be considered

in response to dierent circumstances, and will de-

pend on many actors. A continuum can be conceived

rom unilateral action (independent, non-transparent

national planning and management), to coordination

(sharing inormation regarding national planning and


19/32

19

management), to collaboration (adaptation o nationalplans or mutual benefts), to joint action (joint plan-

ning, management or investment).

For each international basin the optimal mode o

cooperation will depend on a mix o actors including:

hydrologic characteristics, the economics o cooperative

investments, numbers and relationships o riparians,

and the costs o parties coming together. It may not

necessarily be the case that more cooperation reaps

more benefts in all river basins (Sado and Grey,

2005). Te art is in identiying eective cooperation,

a term that deserves clear defnition.

Efective cooperation on an international watercourse

is any action or set o actions by riparian states that leads

to enhanced management or development o the water-

course to their mutual satisaction.

While the reasons and the mechanisms or coop-

eration may be increasing, and increasingly apparent,getting there remains a dicult journey and typically

requires a conscious, multi-year eort by all parties.

But practical experience does tell us something about

how to get there. Building the enabling environment

and in particular knowledge, trust and confdence

among co-riparian states is usually the frst step in

building cooperative transboundary institutions. Te

ownership o the cooperation agenda must be entirely

with concerned riparian countries, in order to ensure

commitment and endurance. However, experiencesuggests that invited third-party acilitation can be

useul, especially on large international river basins

with tense pasts and complex utures. Tird party

acilitation by trusted brokers and conveners can help

generate impartial knowledge and analyses, create a

neutral space or dialogue, and ultimately help secure

fnancing or cooperative investment. We have learned

that this acilitation must be patient, respectul and

reliable over a long period o time, possibly a decade ormore, and that it must almost invariably be low-profle.

No-ootprint is a useul rule, unless a ootprint has

a specifc and strategic value.

Process is almost as important as product, at least

in the early days, and can be costly. ime spent build-

ing eective communications, working relationships

and a level playing feld o knowledge and skill is an

essential investment or reaching sound negotiation

outcomes. Te process can be as diverse as neces-

sary; shared experience, joint learning, round tables,cooperative assessments can all be part o the process

tool box. Starting rom a low base might mean nego-

tiating a shared vision, which sets a goal o a better

uture, and then builds shared knowledge to provide

the evidence to change the perceptions o benefts and

catalyse cooperation.

Tere are many stories o how the path to real

cooperation has been or is being explored a variety o

pathways to cooperation. wo evolving examples help

illuminate this point, one based on inormal dialogue,

the other rooted in high level institutional structures.

Photo:XuJianchu


20/32

20

References

Salman, S. (2007) The United Nations Watercourses

Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into

Force Proved Difcult?Water International, 32:1,

1-15, & pers. comm.

Sado, C. and D. Grey. (2002) Beyond the River: The

Benefts o Cooperation on International Rivers,

Water Policy, 4, 389-403.

Sado, C. and D. Grey. (2005) Cooperation on

International Rivers: A Continuum or Securing

and Sharing Benefts. Water International, 30:4,

420-427.

Yu, W. (2008) Beneft Sharing in International Riv-

ers: Findings rom the Senegal River Basin, the

Columbia River Basin, and the Lesotho Highlands

Water Project. World Bank AFTWR Working Paper

1, November.

Briscoe, J. Malik, R. (2006) Indias Water Economy:

Bracing or a Turbulent Future. The World Bank.

Among the countries that share the Rivers o the

Greater Himalayas and where cooperation today is very

limited, the current Abu Dhabi Dialogue (ADD)

provides a path o inormal consultation. Each year

it brings together senior political, government, and

non-government participants rom seven countries.

Trough non-representative, non-ormal, and non-

attributable dialogue around the themes o common

problems seeking common solutions, participants

build knowledge, relationships and trust. ogether

they have defned a shared vision o a knowledge-based

partnership o states airly managing and developing

the Rivers o the Greater Himalayas rom the sum-

mits to the seas. o materialise this vision, theADD

Knowledge Forum has been launched in parallel to

bring together key knowledge institutions and to f-nance collaborative research.

Te Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) illustrates a dierent

path. Since 1999 the NBI has been guided by a Council

o Ministers and supported by a dedicated NBI Secre-

tariat in Uganda. More recently, oces were established

or two sub-basins in the Nile: the Eastern Nile echni-

cal Regional Oce in Ethiopia, and the Nile Equatorial

LakesCoordinationUnitinRwanda.Teseoces,

working in a coordinated manner, are undertaking

cooperative regional assessments and analyses, capacity

building and investments in the Nile Basin.

In both examples, shared knowledge and patient

dialogue are the common themes however dierent

the paths to cooperation might otherwise be. Knowl-

edge is essential to identiy the common opportunities

and risks o transboundary water management, and tostructure equitable beneft sharing arrangements. Sus-

tained, inormation-based dialogue is essential to build

a shared understanding, to enable productive negotia-

tions, and to achieve robust cooperative outcomes.

So, states that are cooperating on international

rivers will almost invariably have worked long and

hard together to build trust, knowledge and institu-

tions oten, but not always, with patient, trusted and

committed external support. Teir analysis, explicitor implicit, individual or collective, will have dem-

onstrated that the benefts o cooperation are greater

than the benefts o non-cooperation. Te choices that

they have made will thereore have been rational. Tey

may still have much work to do to ensure that planned

benefts are actually being derived and being shared

airly. But they have had the courage to change, mov-

ing rom a past o non-cooperation towards a uture

o eective cooperation.

Photo:ArneHoel/WorldBank


21/32

21

Photo:JakobGranit,

SIWI

Leadersinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries

understand the importance o shared water resources to

public health, social development and economic vitality.

However, they are oten hard pressed to fnd practical

approaches to move rom understanding the problem

to deliver tangible benefts and improve livelihoods.

Tis chapter oers a path towards realising tangible

benefts rom cooperation in a transboundary river

basin. It supports the ransboundary Waters Oppor-tunity(WO) analysis, which identifes development

opportunities in a basin. Te WO analysis can be

used by governments, Regional Economic Communi-

ties (REC) and other potential investors to identiy

and promote cooperative development. Identifed

opportunities are prioritised beore being evaluated

through urther pre-investment analyses such as Stra-

A Path Twards Realising Tangible

Benefts in Transbundary River BasinsJakob Granit and Marius Claassen

tegic Environmental Assessment (SEA). A new tool,

the Barrier Analysis, is proposed. Te Barrier Analysis

identifes obstacles to cooperative management and

development and suggests options to overcome social,

economic, political and environmental constraints in

transboundary river basins. Te Barrier Analysis is

a useul complement to standard project easibility

studies to ensure eective and implementation.

The transboundary water management and

development dilemma

Limitedaccesstowatercanconstraindevelopment,

particularly with the orces o climate change, popu-

lation growth and prevailing economic conditions

converging to add pressure on limited water resources.

Consequently, eective water resources management


22/32

22

and development can promote sustainable growth and

poverty reduction. Growing demands or goods, serv-

ices and economic growth are increasing the pressureand competition or water resources at the regional,

national and local levels. In regions where water is

shared, transboundary water issues become even more

critical to development. Te management and develop-

ment o such shared resources can no longer be seen

only as a long-term concern. It is an issue o immediate

urgency or basin states (UN Water 2009).

States are slowly shiting their view o transbound-

ary water management. Tey are moving rom a past

preoccupation with discussions o the volumetric al-location o limited water resources between states

towards a wider ocus on water security. Water security

is defned as the availability o an acceptable quantity

and quality o water or health, livelihoods, ecosys-

tems and production, coupled with an acceptable

level o water-related risks to people, environments

and economies (Grey and Sado 2007). Achieving

water security requires more productive approaches

than past dialogue between countries, which have

traditionally concentrated on dividing water instead

o sharing the resource and associated benefts. Tis

narrow approach prevented many development oppor-

tunities rom being realised. Rather than dividing the

water volume along political boundaries, stakeholderscan fnd new opportunities by taking an alternative

approach that ocuses on sharing benefts through

regional cooperation and cooperative management and

development. What is needed is a practical approach

to understand the complex connections between so-

cial and economic development, water resources and

development opportunities.

Transboundary waters opportunity (TWO)

analysisCountries that share water bodies need to cooper-

ate and jointly explore opportunities and trade-os

to maximise sustainable development. Based on the

work done internationally on beneft sharing, Phil-

lips et. al. (2008) developed an approach that can

assist basin states and other stakeholders to analyse

potential benefts in a transboundary river basin to

optimise economic growth, political stability and re-

gional integration. It is intended to be used by basin

state governments, RECs, and fnancing entities. Te

concept stresses our key development opportunities

Photo:AlastairMorrison,

SIWI


23/32

23

Figure 1: Each river basin and regional context is unique. Stakeholders can use the TWO analysis to explore andidentiy options at dierent levels o detail.

a) New Water b) Efcient use water c) other surces in basinsthat are nt clsed

1. Hydrpwer andpwer trading

2. Primary prductin

3. Urban grwthand industrialdevelpment

4. Envirnment andecsystem services

5. others (everybasin is unique andther pprtunitesmay exist)

Categries:Surces

Develpmentopprtunity Factrs:

and associated benefts: ) hydropower production and

power trading; ) primary production; ) urban and

industrial development; and ) environmental and

ecosystem services. Other potential uses o water can

be considered in dierent regional settings.

Water availability can be improved through in-

novative management approaches. Te WO analysisproposes three potential sources o water to support

development. Te frst being New water which can

be introduced to a basin through desalination tech-

nologies, inter-basin transers or other means o adding

water to the inland water cycle. Secondly, water can

also be made available through more ecient use o

existing water sources such as more ecient irrigation

methods. Tirdly, other sources o water in a basin can

be put to productive use, such as unallocated water.

Te dierent potential combinations o watersources and water uses that can be explored through

WO analysis can be presented as development op-

portunities. By showing the positive gains that can

be shared, stakeholders and countries can identiy

preerred options or development. Each river basin

and regional context is unique and stakeholders can

use the WO analysis to explore and identiy options

at dierent levels o detail. Te diagram (fgure 1) can

be used as a starting point or the analysis o develop-

ment opportunities by dierent stakeholders. Practical

examples o beneft sharing include the connecting o

electricity transmission networks, the development

o power pools or energy markets and water trans-

er schemes developed between basins to meet water

demand in water scarce areas. Such practical ways odistributing benefts through market mechanisms

beneft citizens beyond the actual watershed, national

borders and economic communities (ibid).

Strategic environmental assessment:

A pre-investment tool

Te WO analysis outlines water-related collaborative

management and development opportunities in a trans-

boundary river basin. Tis is an initial step towards real-

ising tangible benefts in a basin in the key areas defned

above. Te easibility o the identifed development op-

portunities should be assessed through pre-investment

analysis. Most pre-investment work is undertaken rom

a strategic perspective and done in support o in-country

and inter-country consultations.

Riparian countries need structured approaches

to evaluate, assess and agree on both positive and

negative impacts rom identifed development op-


24/32

24

portunities and programmes. All riparian countries

should have access to the same inormation to evaluate

benefts and trade-os o cooperation. Tis allows or

inormed decision-making and agreement on next

steps towards development. Such approaches promote

transparency and trust which is important in the

international context.Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is gain-

ing increasing attention as a transparent and practical

approach to analyse the impacts o development pro-

grammes early in the development planning process

(Ahmed et. al. 2005; European Union, 2001; Hirji

and Davis, 2009). It is a more integrated and longer

term approach towards development programmes,

compared to project specifc easibility studies and

Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). Te SEA

strives to bring cumulative environmental, economicand social impacts o major development programmes

to the ore in the planning, project development and

investment process.

In developing countries especially, SEAcan sup-

port cooperative planning in inrastructure develop-

ment that incorporates sustainable energy production

or socio-economic development and environmental

management. Te SEAdoes not replace the traditional

easibility study and environmental impact assessments

that are subsequent pre-requisites or project approval.

It is an umbrella assessment to identiy project options

and ensure that identifed projects moving into the fnal

approval and fnancing stages can be compared with all

options or meeting development needs in the country

or region. For such comparisons, social and environ-

mental actors are considered o equal importance to

technical and economic actors (King et. al. 2008).

Te SEAalso provides inormation to potential in-vestors rom the domestic, regional and global market

in support o major development initiatives. It provides

upront inormation to these investors rom both the

public and private sectors, acilitating their decision-

making about entering and promoting project develop-

ment. Te SEAoutlines the key risks and opportunities

or dierent options as well as mitigation options.

Understanding and overcoming barriers to

developmentTe WO analysis and the SEAare two useul ap-

proaches or riparian countries to identiy and agree

on development options and subsequently to coop-

eratively analyse the impacts o such development

opportunities.

It is also necessary to identiy and assess the most

signifcant barriers to development in the transbound-

ary region in order to ormulate eective strategies to

circumvent those barriers or minimise their impact.

Tis applies to both potential internal barriers and

external barriers used in development theory (Cypher

Photo:Anto

nEarle,

SIWI


25/32

25

and Dietz 2004). Internal barriers include highly un-

equal income distribution, low-level and inecient

inrastructure, the role and level o fnancial markets,

the development level o the education system, the

prevailing ideological thinking including religion,

natural resources endowment, the role o the state

and the strength o the democratic process, the ex-tent o corruption, and the degree o market ailures.

External barriers can be created by multinational or

transnational corporate control over resources, patterns

o international trade, the unctions o international

fnancing institutions, geopolitical interests and power

o states, and economic policies o states (ibid).

Tis experience in Barrier Analysis can also be

applied to transboundary basins. In this context, the

barriers blocking development in a river basin would

primarily be external, such as those identifed by Cy-pher and Dietz (2004), but would also include some

internal ones. While much has been written about

transboundary river basin management, little is said

about barriers to cooperative development. Barriers or

development in a transboundary river basin context

could include the ollowing:

A high level o inequality between riparian

states (e.g. GDP per capita) Major dierences in political systems (e.g.

authoritative vs. democratic)

. A strong geopolitical inuence in a basin by

certain states

. Dierence in riparian state religious views and

ethnic composition

. A large dierence between riparian states legal

systems

. Dierence in access to investment markets by

riparian states. Te existence o civil strie in a basin

. Dierent and/or low levels o in-country inra-

structure

. Te absence o regional cooperative rame-

works, e.g. Regional Economic Commissions or

transboundary waters institutions

. A basin that is closed i.e. with limited water

resources or water quality constraints

11. Limitedin-countrycapacitytomanagewater

resources and to eectively participate in re-

gional cooperation

I stakeholders jointly analyse the barriers they ace,

they could identiy and address obstacles early in the

cooperative management and development process.

Te objective o the Barrier Analysis is not to chal-

lenge state sovereignty, but to enable basin countries

to identiy strategies to overcome oreseeable obstacles

to ensure that preerred development opportunitiescan be implemented more eectively.

Conclusions

Riparian states can explore preerred water-related de-

velopment opportunities through the WO analysis.

Further cooperative pre-investment work is necessary

in order to jointly agree on preerred management and

development programmes and to mitigate potential

negative impacts o development. Te SEAapproach

allows or participation o many stakeholders, provides

or inormed decision-making, improves transparency

and guides investment in projects across sectors. Tis

is done through a systematic analysis o potential

impacts o single- and/or multi sector programme-

based development.

Riparian states oten do not address existing bar-

riers towards cooperative management and develop-

ment. Tis can be due to the sensitivity o addressing

dierences in political and economic power withina river basin. Tis essay identifed a set o potential

elements that can be included in a qualitative Barrier

Analysis. Te Barrier Analysis should be undertaken

to highlight dierences and issues within and between

states that may hinder development. Riparian states

that identiy a specifc development opportunity or

programme o investment should conduct a Barrier

Analysis to acilitate and ensure implementation o the

preerred project and programme options.

o promote smart management and develop-ment o a shared basin, participating states should

consider using approaches to identiy development

opportunities, assess the cumulative impacts o the

development programme and consider constraints

to development. Tey can achieve this by perorm-

ing WO analysis, SEA and a Barrier Analysis to

acilitate implementation o preerred development

options. Such a step wise approach can be a practical

way to unlock development opportunities in trans-

boundary river basins.


26/32

26

References

Ahmed, K., Mercier, JR., Verheem, R. (2005)Stra-

tegic Environmental Assessment Concept and

Practice. World Bank

Cypher, James., Dietz, James. (2004) The Process o

Economic Development. Edition: 2. Routledge.

European Union, (2001) Directive 2001/42/EC o theEuropean Parliament and o the Council on the

Assessment o the Eects o Certain Plans and

Programmes on the Environment. EU

Grey, David; Sado, Claudia W., (2007) Sink or Swim?

Water Security or Growth and Development, in:

Water Policy9, 07 (IWA Publishing) 545571.

Quotation: (Grey/Sado 2007)

Hirji, Rak; Davis, Richard., (2009)Strategic Environ-

mental Assessment: Improving Water Resources

Governance and Decision Making, Water SectorBoard Discussion Paper Series, Paper no. 12,

World Bank, Washington

King, Michael; Nol, Raymond; Granit, Jakob, (2008)

Strategic/Sectoral Social and Environmental As-

sessment o Power Development Options in the

Nile Equatorial Lakes Region Lessons in coop-

eration. Paper or the Arican Development Bank

First Water Week, Tunis, 26 March, 2008.Phillips, David; Allan, Anthony; Claassen, Marius;

Granit, Jakob; Jgerskog, Anders; Kistin, Elizabeth;

Patrick, Marianne; Turton, Anthony, (2008) The

TWO Analysis: Introducing a Methodology or

the Transboundary Waters Opportunity Analysis.

Report Nr. 23. (SIWI, Stockholm).

UN Water (2009) The United Nations World Water

Development Report 3 Water in a Changing

World. (UNESCO Publishing/Earthscan).

Photo:AlastairMorrison,

SIWI


27/32

27

eLowerJordanRiverhasowedfreelyforthou-

sands o years. Tis important regional water resource

once carried an average o 1.3 billion cubic metres ofreshwaterfromLakeTiberiastotheDeadSeaevery

year. From 1930-1950 the rivers waters even powered

a hydroelectric power station, which in that period

produced up to 24 percent o the electricity needs o

Mandate Palestine. Sadly, the "mighty Jordan" has

been devastated by over-exploitation, pollution and a

lack o regional management.

Te river's central location in the Great Rit Val-

ley, at the meeting point o Asia, Arica and Europe,

creates a lush wetland ecosystem. Rich in biodiversity,the wetland serves as one o the most important mi-

gratory yways on the globe with an estimated 500

million birds travelling its length twice annually.

Te river is also sacred to many. It is immortalised

in the Holy texts o the three Abrahamic traditions

and remains an important cultural anchor or hal

o the world's population.

oday the river's ow has been reduced to a trickle.

95 percent o the river's ow is diverted to meet do-

mestic and agricultural purposes in Israel, Syria and

Jordan. Tis leaves only 70-100 million cubic metres

o water per year to maintain the river ecosystem.

Te reduced ow to the Jordan River and its tribu-

taries has devastated its terminal lake, the Dead Sea,and drastically reduced biodiversity along the river's

banks. Te culturally and historically important river

has been transormed into little more than an open

channel o agricultural run-o, diverted saline waters

and wastewater.

With the execution o the reaty o Peace between

the State o Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom o

Jordan in 1994, hopes were renewed that the two

governmentswouldacttorestoretheLowerJordan

River through coordinated management. Annex IVo the reaty in act committed the two sides to act

towards the ecological rehabilitation o the river.

In the 15 years that have passed since the signing o

the Peace reaty, neither government has taken any

concrete action to return any measure o reshwater

back to the river. On the contrary, a new dam was

built on the Yarmouk River to capture the remaining

winter oodwaters. In recent years, long stretches o

theLowerJordanhavehadsuchlittleowduringthe

summers that vegetation covers the little water let in

the river. Summer grass fres that cross the river rom

Cperatin in a Trubled

Regin The FEME Experiencerm the Jrdan River Basin

By Munqeth Mehyar, Nader Khateeb and Gidon Bromberg

Photo:ItamarGrinberg


28/32

28

Israel and the Palestinian West Bank into Jordan and

visa versa are now a serious problem. Indeed, or the

past 60 years, much o the river located in a enced

and mined border zone between Israel, the West Bank

and Jordan has been o-limits. Tis has enabled the

ongoing draining and degradation o the river to take

place out o sight and out o mind o area residents.TestoryofthedemiseoftheLowerJordanis

hardly unique. Around the world, human activity

has pulled massive quantities o water rom the great

rivers the Indus on the Indian subcontinent, the Yel-

low in China, the Rio Grande along the USA-Mexico

border to the extent that they now either disappear

beore reaching the sea or contain long sections that

seasonally run dry. Te underlying reason is always the

same: rivers are not viewed as valuable in themselves.

Instead, they are seen as exploitable resources or hu-man and economic development. Te vital ecosystem

services they supply that support people, fsh, ani-

mals, and plants, as well as economic development,

are overlooked until they are lost.

Experience shows progress is possible

It is not too late to undo the damage the done to the

Jordan over the past 60 years. Even in the midst o vio-

lent conict, animosity towards the other and reducedprecipitation due to climate change, it is possible to

start the process to reverse the rivers decline. Positive

action, though still piecemeal and slow, is taking place.

Increasing public awareness on the unacceptable state

o the river has created political will at the municipal,

national and international levels to reorm policy.

At the grassroots level, thousands o Jordan Valley

residents have participated in knobbiers path tours

based in 15 communities. Part oFoEMEs Good Water

Neighbours project, the tours educate residents, youthandadultsalike,onthestateoftheLowerJordanand

its tributaries. Trough their participation, many resi-

dents learn how the rivers waters are being diverted

and come to understand the eects o present day

pollution. Tey can see the missed economic oppor-

tunities presented by the unhealthy state o the river,

particularly or rural, cultural and eco-tourism uses.

Some tours actually cross the border to the other side.

Critically, the FoEME local sta person that guides

the tours, either in Arabic or Hebrew, at least describes

the context across the river.

Oten held with local and international media,

participants o the tours come to understand that

coordinated regional action is needed to improved

the state o the river. Media participation helps tell thestory o the Jordan River to the broader public, both

local and international, and break through barriers

o access to the river. Journalists can place the rivers

plight at the centre o the public debate and create a

constituency o local residents empowered to voice

their concerns.

Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian mayors were in-

volved rom the outset as necessary partners in support

o regional water policy reorm. Mayors are the most

receptive to community residents needs and perspec-

tives. Tey are also key stakeholders with much to gain

The Jordan River Basin, covering parts o Lebanon, Syria,Jordan, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian West Bank.

Source:TheMinistryofPlanning,

PalestinianAuthority


29/32

29

rom the economic opportunities o a rehabilitated

river. Mayors have not only participated in tours in

their own communities and that o their cross-border

neighbours. On several occasions local Mayors have

literally jumped into the river together in public

events designed to help them express their commit-

ment to regional river water policy reorm.Te activities are starting to pay o. Concrete reorm

has been achieved, particularly in the removal o sewage.

In Israel, a sewage treatment plant has been completed

in the community o Beit Shean. Tis will end the cur-

rent practice o the community dumping untreated sew-

age rom the Beit Shean area into the river. Te Jordan

Valley Regional Council, also in Israel, has taken a large

loan to start the design and building o a new sewage

treatment plant. It will treat the sewage o iberias and

Sea o Galilee communities, which are also at presentdischarged into the river. In Jordan, North Shuna, the

largest community in the valley, has launched a project

to collect sewage rom cesspits or treatment rather then

allowing the sewage to seep into the ground and pollute

the springs in the Jordan River.

All the mayors have signed memorandums o un-

derstanding with their neighbours to commit their

communities to rehabilitate the river and identiy

concrete actions that are within their respective powers

to undertake. Tese commitments have enabled ur-

ther fnancial support o joint projects. New initiatives

include a crossborder Israeli/Jordanian Peace Park at

the conuence o the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, the

building o an environmental education centre in Auja,Palestine and the creation o a protected area park and

visitors centre on the Ziglab stream, a tributary o the

Jordan River, in Jordan.

Restoring and re-allocating the Jordan

Returning reshwater to the river is the key and most

dicult issue to tackle. Te Israeli, Jordanian and

Palestinian governments have made public comments

that state their commitment to reviving the river.

Tough these statements have yet to be ollowed upwith any national government action, representatives

o the environment, water and tourism ministries o

the three governments have joined the advisory com-

mittees o a newFoEME project that investigates the

meanstorehabilitatetheLowerJordanRiver.

Te Jordan River Rehabilitation Project initiated

three new studies to strengthen the knowledge base

Photo

:EcoPeace/FriendsoftheEarthMiddleEast

Alumot Dam at the Lake o Tiberias preventing fow to the Lower Jordan River.


30/32

30

on the Jordan River. Tese studies will look into the

political barriers to reorm, and the environmental

ow requirements to rehabilitate the river. Tey will

perorm an economic analysis o where the water could

come rom and at what price, and identiy trade-os

and opportunities in national and regional water man-

agement reorm. Each o these studies is undertaken

trilaterally with Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian

experts working together.

Initial results rom the studies have identifed sig-nifcant opportunities to redirect water to the Jordan

River through more sustainable and ecient regional

management o water resources. Tis can be done

primarily through domestic and agricultural water

demandmanagement.Localmembersoftherespec -

tive parliaments and high profle individuals are be-

ing identifed to become the public champions o a

rehabilitated Jordan River. Tey can work to create the

national and regional level political will required to

implement the measures recommended in the studies.

Public hearings, parliamentary debates and regional

conerences are planned to educate the public and

create the political momentum to enact water policy

reformtorevivetheLowerJordanRiver.

Te equitable sharing o Jordan River water resources

between people and nature and among all o the rivers

riparians is paramount. Tis includes the Palestinians,

who are presently denied rom extracting any water

rom the river. Support rom the International com-

munity is being targeted both to encourage the national

governments to work together or water policy reormand to share international experience o riparian river

basin management. Knowledge is welcome, be it rom

theRhineRiverinEurope,theGreatLakesofNorth

America or the Nile Basin Initiative in Arica.

For decades, conict and human arrogance have

beenresponsiblefortheneartotaldemiseoftheLower

Jordan River. It is FoEMEs experience that coopera-

tion in search o peace and sustainability is the only

hope to restore the river to health and to thereby create

the economic and social opportunities or this river

o the people to be rehabilitated.

Photo:EcoPeace/FriendsoftheEarthM

iddleEast

Water quality monitoring on the Lower Jordan River.


31/32

31


32/32


Thery and Practice r Eective CperatinGetting transboundary water resources manage-

ment right is not simply important. It is urgent to se-

cure the livelihoods o billions o people and sustain

the resource across the globe. The response o the

international water community to the mounting chal-lenges and pressure placed on shared waters has

thus ar been inconsistent and inadequate. This re-

port challenges the international water community to

grapple with some o the latest conceptual thinking

and most recent lessons learned rom around the

world. The our chapters in the volume present real-

world experience o cooperation at the internationaland community levels and innovative approaches to

overcome political obstacles to cooperation.

S I W I, SIWIDgg 33, - 5 S

getting trans boundary water right

Documents