global governance 2025: at a critical juncture

8/8/2019 Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture

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Global Governance 2025:at a Critical Juncture


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Global Governance 2025:

At a Critical Juncture

Inquiries regarding this report may be made to Mathew Burrows,

Counselor to the National Intelligence Council, on (703) 482-0741

and to the EU Institute of Security Studies on 0033-1-56-89-19-51.


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Preface

The United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the European Unions Institute fo

Security Studies (EUISS) have joined forces to produce this assessment of the long-term prosp

for global governance frameworks. This exercise builds on the experience of the two institutio

identifying the key trends shaping the future international system. Since the mid 1990s, the NI

produced four editions of its landmarkGlobal Trends report. The most recent one, Global Tr

2025: A Transformed World, published in late 2008, noted that momentous change was ahea

the gap between increasing disorder and weakening governance structures widening. The EU

produced the first EU-level report on the factors affecting the evolution of the international sy

in 2006, The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025? The report stressed that amultipolar system is emerging and that matching the new distribution of power with new rule

institutions will be critical to preserving international peace and stability.

The US and the EU do not always see eye to eye on every issue on the international agenda, b

they share fundamental values and strategic interests to an extent not matched by any other pa

in the world. Transatlantic agreement is no longer enough to effectively manage global challe

Doing so will require renewed efforts to address governance gaps and strengthen multilaterali

partnership with other pivotal centers of power and with the international community at large.

This report provides an informal contribution to an important international debate on the wayforward for global, regional, and bilateral institutions and frameworks to meet emerging chall

It is not meant as an exhaustive report card evaluating the performance of individual institutio

While not being policy prescriptive, the report shares a strong beliefas exemplified by

multilateralist approaches of the US and EU governments to resolving global problems such a

recent financial crisisthat global challenges will require global solutions.

The report does not seek to examine all the various challenges likely to require multilateralist

but rather highlights several important governance gaps. We therefore do not go into depth on

proliferation or cybersecuritywhich we believe are receiving greater attention. Instead, we fon such issues as intrastate conflict, resource management, migration, and biotechnology. Alth

recognized by many as ongoing challenges, we believe the long-term impact of these issues o

strength of the international order has not been fully appreciated.

Global Governance 2025 is the result of an inclusive process, enriched by wide-ranging

consultations with government officials; as well as business, academic, NGO, and think tank l

and media representatives in Brazil, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Africa, and in the Gulf

(the UAE). The diversity of the comments and insights, which we have included in the body o

text, testifies both to the richness of the debate and to the difficulty of reconciling different intand standpoints when reforming global governance. A number of experts, acknowledged else

have contributed to the success of this project and to the high quality of this report. The Atlant

Council of the US and the Transatlantic Policy Network have been partners in supporting the

NIC Counselor Mathew Burrows and Giovanni Grevi from the EUISS have steered this proce

took charge of drafting the bulk of the report. Their work has set an excellent example of coop

i d li i j i t l i d hi i l l h d ti


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Global governancethe collective management of common problems at the internalevelis at a critical juncture. Although global governance institutions have rackedsuccesses since their development after the Second World War, the growing numbethe international agenda, and their complexity, is outpacing the ability of internationorganizations and national governments to cope.

With the emergence of rapid globalization, the risks to the international system havethe extent that formerly localized threats are no longer locally containable but are nopotentially dangerous to global security and stability. At the beginning of the centusuch as ethnic conflicts, infectious diseases, and terrorism as well as a new generatiochallenges including climate change, energy security, food and water scarcity, internmigration flows, and new technologies are increasingly taking center stage.

Three effects of rapid globalization are driving demands for more effective global gInterdependence has been a feature of economic globalization for many years, but tChina, India, Brazil, and other fast-growing economies has taken economic interdepnew level. The multiple links among climate change and resources issues; the econand state fragilityhubs of risks for the futureillustrate the interconnected natchallenges on the international agenda today. Many of the issues cited above involvdomestic and foreign challenges. Domestic politics creates tight constraints on intcooperation and reduces the scope for compromise.

The shift to amultipolar worldis complicating the prospects for effective global goover the next 10 years. The expanding economic clout of emerging powers increasepolitical influence well beyond their borders. Power is not only shifting from estabto rising countries and, to some extent, the developing world, but also toward nonstaDiverse perspectives and suspicions about global governance, which is seen as a Weconcept, will add to the difficulties of effectively mastering the growing number of

Brazilians feel there is a need for a redistribution of power from developed to dstates. Some experts we consulted saw Brazil tending to like old fashionedmultilateralism, which is state-centered and does not make room for nonstate ac

Many of our Chinese interlocutors see mounting global challenges and fundamein the international system but emphasize the need for China to deal with its inte

Executive Summary


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For participants from thePersianGulf region, the question is what sort of globaare most capable of inclusive power sharing. They bemoaned the lack of strong

organizations.

TheIndians thought existing international organizations are grossly inadequateworried about an absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability.that India is not well positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia givpreponderant role in the region.

Russian experts we consulted see the world in 2025 as still one of great powers

more opportunities for transnational cooperation. The Russians worried about thlack of transpacific security. The United States, Europe, and Russia also havegrowing much closer, while China, with the biggest economy, will be the mainchanging the world.

The South Africans assessed that globalization appears to be strengthening regiopposed to creating a single global polity. They worried that the losers from gloincreasingly outnumber the winners.

In addition to the shift to a multipolar world, power is also shifting towardnonstatethey agents or spoilers of cooperation. On a positive note, transnational nongovernmorganizations, civil-society groups, churches and faith-based organizations, multinacorporations, other business bodies, and interest groups have been equally, if not mothan states at reframing issues and mobilizing publicsa trend we expect to continuhostile nonstate actors such as criminal organizations and terrorist networks, all empexisting and new technologies, can pose serious security threats and compound syst

Many developing countrieswhich are likely to play an increasing role at the regioglobal levelalso suffer from a relative paucity of nonstate actors, that could help nemerging states and their governments deal with the growing transnational challeng

Global governance institutions have adapted to some degree as new issues have emeadaptations have not necessarily been intentional or substantial enough to keep up wdemand. Rather, they have been spurred as much by outside forces as by the instituthemselves.

The emergence ofinformal groupings of leading countries, such as the G-20; the prfurther regional cooperation, notably in East Asia; and the multiple contributions ofactors to international cooperationalthough highly usefulare unlikely to serve aalternatives to rule-based, inclusive multilateral institutions. Multilateral institutionpublic goods that summits, nonstate actors and regional frameworks cannot supply,


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institutional patchwork will be stretched by the type of problems facing the global onext few decades.

Numerous studies indicate the growing fragility of many low-income developing stapotential for more conflict, particularly in cases where civil wars were never fully reInternal conflict or collapse of large populous states on the scale of an Ethiopia, BanPakistan or Nigeria would likely overwhelm international conflict management effoAfghanistan, with approximately 28 million people, and Iraq, with 30 million, are ammost populous conflict management cases ever attempted, and they are proving diff

Regional organizations have performed comparatively few large-scale operational refragile states requiring humanitarian and peacemaking help. Although we can expepolitical and economic engagement from rising powersin part a reflection of theirglobal interestsemerging powers have deep-seated concerns about the consequencproactive management of state fragility.

Prevention, for example, often can require direct political intervention or even the thof military force as a last resort. Efforts to prevent conflict have often been slowed

and resistance to intervene directly, potentially overriding another countrys sovereiexperts in emerging states thought their governments probably would be particularlyintervention if it is driven by the West.

Another cluster of problemsthe management of energy, food, and water resourcesparticularly unlikely to be effectively tackled without major governance innovationsinternational agencies respond to discrete cases, particularly humanitarian emergencindividual countries. However, no overall framework exists to manage the interrelaof food, water and energy. The stakes are high in view of the impact that growing scould have on undermining the open international system. Resource competition inpowers seek to secure reliable supplies could lead to a breakdown in cooperation in Moreover, scarcities are likely to hit poor states the hardest, leading in the worst casor interstate conflict and spillover to regional destabilization.

Other over-the-horizon issuesmigration, the potential opening of the Arctic, and r

associated with the biotechnology revolutionare likely to rise in importance and dhigher level of cooperation. These issues are difficult ones for multilateral cooperatthey involve more preventive action. Under current circumstances, greater cooperaissues in which the risks are not clear-cut will be especially difficult to achieve.

Potential Scenarios


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cumulate over time. Crisesso long as they are not overwhelmingmay actually innovation and change in the system. Inaction over the long term increases the risk

complete breakdown.

Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat

In this scenario, seen as the most likely one over the next several years, no one crisioverwhelming as to threaten the international system even though collective managadvances slowly. Crises are dealt with ad hoc and temporary frameworks or institutdevised to avert the most threatening aspects of them. Formal institutions remain launreformed and Western states probably must shoulder a disproportionate share of

governance as developing countries prevent disruptions at home. This future is noover the longer term as it depends on no crisis being so unmanageable as to overwhinternational system.

Scenario II: Fragmentation

Powerful states and regions try to wall themselves off from outside threats. Asia buregional order that is economically self-sufficient. Global communications ensure gdoes not die, but it slows significantly. Europe turns its focus inward as it wrestles

discontent with declining living standards. With a growing work force, the US migbetter position but may still be fiscally constrained if its budgetary shortfalls and lonproblems remain unresolved.

Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux

Under this scenario, severe threats to the international systempossibly a loomingenvironmental disaster or a conflict that risks spreadingprompt greater cooperatioglobal problems. Significant reform of the international system becomes possible.

less likely than the first two scenarios in the immediate future, such a scenario mighbest outcome over the longer term, building a resilient international system that wouthe level of overall cooperation on an array of problems. The US increasingly sharewhile China and India increase their burden sharing and the EU takes on a bigger glstable concert could also occur incrementally over a long period in which economicand per capita income converges.

Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation

This scenario is among the least likely, but the possibility cannot be dismissed. Thesystem becomes threatening owing to domestic disruptions, particularly in emergingas China. Nationalistic pressures build as middle-class aspirations for the good lifstymied. Tensions build between the United States and China, but also among somBRICs as competition grows for secure resources and clients. A nuclear arms race E ld d l ll d bili i bl f i d l b l


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Contents

Preface

Executive Summary

Introduction

International Institutions in the Late 20th Century

Chapter One: Expanding Agenda Stretching Institutional CapacitiesComplex Risks Driving Demands for Global Governance

Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat

Chapter Two: Power Shifts Complicating Global Governance

Will Multipolarity Enhance or Erode Multilateralism?Scenario II: Fragmentation

Chapter Three: Some Success in AdaptingInformal GroupingsGrowth of RegionalismNonstate Actors Step Up to the Plate

Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux

Chapter Four: An Uncertain Future

Weak and Failing States

Interlocking Resource IssuesOver-the-Horizon Issues for Global GovernanceScenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation

Conclusion

Future Opportunities, but also Limits

Annexes A-F:

A: World Views of Global Governance

B: The Prospects for Regionalism

C: The Arctic: Challenge or Opportunity for Global Governance?

D: Are Global Governance Tools Sufficient for Fragile States?


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Acknowledgements

In preparing this work, the National Intelligence Council and the European Unions InstitutStudies received immeasurable and critical help from an array of think tanks, consulting firand governmental institutions, and literally scores of individual experts on all five continenfirst like to thank the Atlantic Council of the US (ACUS) and the Trans-Atlantic Policy Netwho were both partners in supporting this project. ACUS Dr. Banning Garrett and Mr. PaDeGategno were superb in arranging the numerous overseas meetings; ACUS President Freand Vice President Fran Burwell also participated in the planning and discussions in severaJames Elles, Member of European Parliament and head of TPN, was pivotal in helping to d

project and orchestrating key discussions in several capitals. He accompanied us on almostDr. William Burke-White of the State Departments Policy Planning Office provided guidasubstantive advice in addition to accompanying us on all the trips. Ms. Rosemary Opacic, Aof the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, also provided important cand participated in most of the research trips.

The following institutions, their directors, and participating staff were gracious in hosting useminars and, in many cases, inviting other experts in their countries and regions to the mee

Beijing: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).

Tokyo: Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA).

Dubai: Dubai Consultancy Research & Media Centre (b'huth).

India: Observer Research Foundation (ORF).

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Brasilia: Secretaria De Assuntos Estrategicos (SAE).

Sao Paulo: Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardos .

Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

Special mention goes to Bruce Jones, David Steven, and Alex Evans, at the Center on InternCooperation at New York University, for providing comprehensive and critical material on resource issues such as water and food, migration, and innovative biotechnologies. Charlesformer head of the global risks programme at the World Economic Forum and now an indeadviser, wrote the appendix on the Arctic. Dr. Alexander van de Putte of PFC Energy provon energy futures. Within the NIC, Ms. Elizabeth Arens provided essential editorial suppo

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Global governancethe collectivemanagement of common problems at theinternational levelis at a critical juncture.Although global governance has been arelative success since its development after

the Second World War, the growing numberof issues on the international agenda, andtheir complexity, is outpacing the ability ofinternational organizations and nationalgovernments to cope. Power shifts are alsocomplicating global governance.

There has been unprecedented increase in

the speed of movement of goods, people, andcommunications. This has led to new

problems and inadequacy of international

paraphernalia inherited from the 20th

Century.

Former Senior Official,

Government of India

Some progress has been made to adjustinternational institutions and regimes to meetthe new demands and to create workarounds,if not new frameworks. Such efforts areunlikely to suffice, however. If globalgovernance structures and processes do notkeep up with the changes in the balance of

power in the international system, they runthe risk of becoming irrelevant. Emergingpowers are suspicious of current institutionalarrangements, which appear to favorestablished powers. Without adequateframeworks to bring order to an international

The term global governanceapaper includes all the institutions

processes, partnerships, and netwcontribute to collective action ansolving at the international level.definition subsumes formal and iarrangements as well as the role actors in transnational settings. Rcooperation may also be regardeelement of global governance ins

contributes to broader efforts. Gdiffers from government, which sovereign prerogatives and hieraauthority. Global governance doto world government, which wouvirtually impossible for the foresif ever.

International Institutions in thCentury

Preserving international peace anwas the central preoccupation ofof the post-World War II United system. The UN Security Councall major powers of the time in thundertaking; UN peacekeeping ocontinue to be deployed to monitagreements and ensure stability awars. Bretton Woods institutionto help maintain financial and mstability and to foster the reconstwar-torn economies, against the the US dollar as the international

and reserve currency. Both sets have had their share of problemsmade substantial contributions inCold War period.

Although the Cold War was pun

Introduction


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with the danger of nuclear war andproliferation, nuclear and non-nuclear states

struck a global contract to stop the spread ofnuclear weaponsthe NonproliferationTreatyand the United States and Russianegotiated several treaties to delimit andreduce their respective nuclear arsenals andweapon systems.

On the economic front, trade liberalization

under the GATT and the WTO providedanother global public good in the shape ofincreasingly low tariffs and open markets,enhancing shared prosperity and preventingprotectionism from generating politicalconfrontation.

Over time, our expectations have continued to

grow as the scope for cooperation hasexpanded, especially in view of the pushprovided by globalization to growinginteractions. Individual agencies focused onspecific problems have been a growingfeature of global governance. As a result, theproblems of span of control, increasingstovepipes, and lack of strategic oversight

have come increasingly to the fore as majorchallenges to ensuring effectiveness in thesystem.


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Chapter 1:Expanding Agenda Stretching

Institutional Capacities


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With the emergence of rapid globalization,the risks to the international system have

grown to the extent that formerly localizedthreats are no longer locally containable butare now potentially dangerous to globalsecurity and stability. At the beginning of thecentury, threats such as ethnic conflicts,infectious diseases, and terrorism as well as anew generation of global challenges includingclimate change, energy security, food and

water scarcity, international migration flows,and new technologiesare increasinglytaking center stage. Although some of theemerging issues have been debated inmultilateral forums for over 20 years, suchissues have taken on new importance in aglobalized world because of the potential formore widespread disruption.

This decade opened with the attacks onthe Twin towers in New York as well asthe Pentagonbringing transnationalterrorism to the fore of the internationalagenda. The danger of proliferation anduse of nonconventional weapons took onnew urgency. Peace operations evolved to

include broader mandates such as tacklingthe root causes of conflict.

Climate change has trespassed theboundaries of environmental politics tobecome the subject of the global political,economic, and security debate and a newfocus of multilateral cooperation cuttingacross these and other domains.

The nascent recovery from the recenteconomic crisis has highlighted theimportance of developing countries

ti l l Chi t t ti th

resource issues are taking an pre-eminent place in internat

Biotechnologies and nanotecbear much potential both for example in the health sector, unprecedented risks, if divertcriminal purposes. Genetic mraise profound ethical questiowhile breakthoughs are likely

critical for societies strugglinresource issues such as food populations.

Complex Risks Driving Deman

Global Governance

The cumulative impact of emergwell as longstanding ones is tran

scale and nature of the challengeinternational community. Three rapid globalization are driving demore effective global governanceinterdependence, interconnected and the minglingof domestic polinternational issues. At the same technological progress alerts civi

bodies, such as NGOs, to new chto the need for cooperation and eto play a stronger role.

What worries me is that you see

chaotic world and less capable U

centrifugal forces pulling apart t

the world Resource constrain

huge implications for global soci

trainwreck is right ahead of us...

US Think Tan

Interdependence has been a feat


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latter group, has markedly diversified tradeand investment patterns and resulted in value

chains spread across different countries andcontinents. The accumulation of huge foreigncurrency reserves by emerging powers,notably China, has corresponded to theballooning debt of deficit countries, inparticular the United States. Emergingeconomies financed spending by the UnitedStates on their own exports. Among other

factors, such a structural imbalance producedthe severe financial crisis that flattenedgrowth, cut credit, and curbed privatespending in the developed world. Themonetary and fiscal policies of the UnitedStates, China, and the EU, among othereconomic powers, have become moreintertwined. The coordination of

macroeconomic measures is imperative tosustain global recovery.

Climate change is an issue of international

securitya threat multiplierThe core

challenge is that it not only threatens us

environmentally but also that it will

exacerbate conflicts over resources, water

shortages, and diminishing food stocks.

Administrator, European

Parliament

The multiple links among climate change, theeconomic crisis, and state fragilityhubsof risks for the futureillustrate the

interconnected nature of the challenges onthe international agenda today. Problems cantrigger each other with a cascading effect asshown, for example, by the potential impactof energy prices on the prospects for

i Th i t ti f

change threatens agriculturalmany poor countries with exp

populations, compounding th

Technological developmentsgeopolitical instability requirfocus on the protection and rethe electronic and energy infrunderpinning advanced socie

Concerns regarding the secursupply, but also demand, maypolicy choices that underminenvironment and investment.domestic reserves of fossil futerm access to foreign fields investment in renewables lesand compounds the growth o

gas emissions. Price uncertadepresses investment in expltransit infrastructures, possibway to supply shortages overdecade.

Many of the issues cited above ininterwoven domestic and foreign

The roots of the financial crisis, fincluded internal and external facNational policies prone to encoucredit and spiraling private debt usupervision have been enabled byflows from emerging economiesthe crisis, the management of balpublic deficits and debts in some

countries as well as measures to domestic demand in China and oemerging economies are matters political decisions with huge gloimplications.


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the global stock of greenhouse gases in theatmosphere and the variation of climate

change patterns, with dire consequences forthe most exposed countries.

Domestic politics creates tight constraints oninternational cooperation and reduces thescope for compromise. This was the case, forexample, at the recent Copenhagen summit onclimate change where domestic politics

constrained the positions of a number ofparticipants on reducing emissions. On adifferent matter, Chinas pervasive priority ofdomestic economic development, which hasbeen largely export-led, limits its willingnessto allow for an appreciation of Chinesecurrency to help rebalance its trade relationswith the US and the EU. The tightening of

political control on Russias largest energycompanies as well as broader concernsregarding rule of law and security ofinvestment within the country undermine thestrengthening of the EU-Russia energy andeconomic partnership.

The central challenge for most countries in

their engagement with new forms of globalgovernance is not how to replace the state in

international politics, but rather how states

regain their regulatory role.

South African Think

Tank Participant

Projected sluggish economic growth inadvanced countries over the next few years,paralleled by aging populations, suggests thatpublic attention may become increasingly

introverted. Under such circumspublic would be focused on jobs

with little room for longer term nmanaging diverse societies, envirsustainability, or equity and legitinternational level. Many expertnationalism and xenophobia on tRussia and China; EU countries are not immune from that either.tendencies contribute to making

positions in multilateral forums laccommodating. This may triggcircle of ineffective global goverdiverging perceptions, and angerpublic debates fueling each other

Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afl

In this scenario, which is probab

likely over the next several yearscrisis will be so overwhelming as

the international system even tho

collective management advances

Crises are dealt with ad hoc and

frameworks or institutions are de

avert the most threatening aspec

Formal institutions remain large

unreformed and Western states pshoulder a disproportionate shar

governance as developing coun

disruptions at home. This future

sustainable over the longer term

on no crisis being so unmanagea

overwhelm the international syst


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Excerpts from a long-running World Economic Forum-sponsored blog

Posted 3/3/12: Remember when black swans were all the rage? We have not had as manydisasters as some predictedbut why? Is it perception? Are we more agile? Or were the predictionsoff? Or a combination?

Posted 3/4/12: Dont count your chickens before they hatch! Its too early to be so confident. Theresbeen a lot less risk-taking since the f inancial crisis. And the series of mini-disasters and near misseshas strengthened defenses. The cyclones in the Bay of Bengal have meant we now have a world actionplan for Bangladesh . . . but a lot of things could still go terribly wrong.

Posted 9/15/14: I dont usually believe in grand bargains, but I think were witnessing one with theagreement worked out by the UN Security Council with Iran. No one saw it coming last year. Butthe change in Iran swept out the old government. It reminds me of the fal l of the Soviet Union. Fewsaw that coming, though it was clear in hindsight. We may be looking to a honeymoon period ininternational relations when there can be a lot more cooperation. The interesting thing about the Iranian

developments is that even if the political turnabout of the Iranian Government was necessary, theagreement still would not have happened without the deft intervention by some of the emerging powersin the G-20. In that vein, it showed that the G-20 had really come of age and could work with the UN.

Posted 5/15/17: Did you hear about the military incident between China and Vietnam in theSouth China Sea? It looks like they both suffered casualties. Had the UN Secretary General notjumped on the plane, it could have been much worse.

Posted 5/17/17: Yeah, I worry about the repercussions for multilateral cooperation. We were about tosee the UN Security Council dramatically transformed for the first time since its founding, but it nowlooks like Japans and Indias prospects for permanent UNSC membership are on hold, if not dashed.

Both Tokyo and New Delhi look like they are taking the side of Vietnam. What happened to developingstates sticking together? The dispute also questions the theory that resource wars wont happen. Iguess Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia got fed up with China . . .

Posted 5/20/17: India has just come out with a full-scale condemnation of China and expects the USand Europe to back it.

Posted 5/21/17: This is not the time to provoke China, either, with the Party unable to restrainrising nationalism.

Posted 5/22/17: Many developing states feel that China has turned its back on them . . . It is not

clear where the US stands or whether it can bring the two sides together. Talk about an era of badfeelings . . . everything has been affectedfrom trade to the competition over resources . . .

Posted 5/23/17: Look on the bright side. Oil exploration in the Arctic is beginning to pay off. We worrieda decade ago about a Russia growing more hostile. The financial crisis led to Russia opening up; itneeded Western technology to exploit the riches of the Arctic and now that is slowly coming to fruition.

Posted 12/1/20: Im preparing for my Davos panel on the future of the international system . . .

Scenario IBarely Keeping Afloat

HomeBlog


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Chapter 2:Power Shifts Complicating

Global Governance


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The shift to a multipolar world iscomplicating the prospects for effective

global governance over the next 10 years. Inthe second part of the last century, the UnitedStates shaped an international order thatlargely reflected its liberal worldview of freemarkets and democracy. The United Statesoversaw provision of global public goodssuch as monetary stability and open traderoutes. In particular after the end of the Cold

War, the EU has sought to export its model ofregional integration and sovereignty-sharingand has devised a distinctive discourse onglobal governance and priorities.

At issueit seems to me, is less the risk ofconflict, but the danger of a loss of coherence

and direction in the international system

while the redistribution of power plays itselfout.

European Think Tank

Participant

Today, the legitimacy and credibility of theUS and the EU as political leaders is openly

questioned by other rising power centers andlarge swathes of the international community.This is partly due to their perceivedshortcomings in providing the public goodsthey guaranteed before the shift to amultipolar world, such as economic stability,and to the view that their positions on issuessuch as trade and climate change are unfair to

the interests of others. At the same time, theexpanding economic clout of emergingpowers increases their political influence wellbeyond their borders. It can be argued thatalternative definitions of modernity are takinghold The virtues of open capital markets are

ideologies, are indispensable to sinternational problems.

The Western approach to globa

governance, with the US and the

center and creator of laws and ru

diminishes the readiness of other

cooperate.

Russian T

Speaker

Power is not only shifting from epowers to rising countries and, toextent, the developing world, butnonstate actors, be they agents ocooperation. On a positive note,nongovernmental organizations,

groups, churches and faith-basedorganizations, multinational corpother business bodies, and interehave become increasingly activepolicy and generating public intepressure. However, hostile nonssuch as criminal organizations annetworksall empowered by ex

new technologiescan pose serithreats and compound systemic r

In addition, state-owned and statcompanies and sovereign wealthparticularly those of China and Rlikely to play a growing role in ggovernance. These actors do not

into traditional categories as theyby a mix of political and economconsiderations.

Will Multipolarity Enhance or

Multilateralism?


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Global governance requires giving over

significant sovereignty to othersthat is the

view in ChinaSo far, sovereignty is the

number one priority, but China has to

b l i t d i t ti l

diverse perspectives will be criticfostering international cooperationumber of domains.

Th i i k th t th t ti l

0

5

10

15

20

25

BRussiaJapanIndiaEUChinaUS

Power as percentage of global power

2010

2025

The relative political and economic clout of many countries will shift by 2025,

according to an International Futures model measuring GDP, defense spending,population, and technology for individual states.

Source: International Futures model.

New International Lineup in 2025?


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way the renewed emphasis on sovereigntywill unfold in the next decade will haveserious implications for global governance.The extent to which power should bedelegated to international bodies and for whatpurposes will be debated. The question ofwhether and, if so, under what conditions theinternational community or internationalinstitutions can challenge or override theauthority of a state in its internal affairs will

also come to the fore.

The EU is the most advanced experience todate of voluntary sharing of sovereignty in aunique experiment of regional integrationwhich has largely succeeded in includingpost-Communist systems into the largerregional order. Most other key global actors

are reluctant to delegate regulatory powers, letalone assign jurisdiction, to an internationalbody, or to share sovereignty under majoritydecision-making. While their domesticpolitical systems widely differ, the UnitedStates, Russia, China and India, amongothers, share an ingrained suspicion of globalgovernance mechanisms that could impinge

on their sovereignty. Their positions,however, vary depending on the issue.

On balance, major powers subscribe toadvanced forms of international cooperationand supervision that they regard asembodying their interests or, at least, notdirectly affecting them. Nuclear weapon

states are comfortable with the intrusivepowers of the IAEA to inspect the nuclearfacilities of non-nuclear weapon states.However, countries are reluctant to endorserules constraining their behavior in areas of

ti d t t titi

In a more heterogeneous internatthe question is how to reconcile tand perspectives of major powergroupings of smaller countries inframeworks and regimes. Particneeded precondition is for all theto trust the system, commit to coaction, and accept stronger prerointernational institutions over thegovernance, where need be.

We have a major concern that t

organizations do not replicate th

unrepresentativeness of the past.

Brazilian Seni

Divergence on values or princip

affect the prospects for multilatecooperation. For example, althopositions and the policies of the UEU do not always coincide, the apromoting democracy and supporights, core values to their domesregimes, broadly informs their fopolicies. Major powers such as C

Russia, with considerable suppornumber of emerging and developcountries, take a more relative rehuman rights and are uncomfortabashing or sanctioning of brutal rIndia, the biggest democracy in twith a political tradition of non-aa significant nationalist strand to

policy, as well as Brazil, are cautappear as exporting their values interfering with the domestic affacountries.

Over the next decade balancing


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World Views of Global Governance

Diverse perspectives and suspicions about global governanceseen as a Westernwill add to the difficulties of effectively mastering the growing number of challengeof our interlocutors from the countries listed below. (See Annex A for further discu

Brazil. North-South relations and the need for redistribution of power from developdeveloping states remain central to the Brazilian outlook on international affairs. ExBrazil tending to like old fashioned multilateralism, which is state-centered and droom for nonstate actors. Nevertheless, the issues connected with global governanc

beginning to gain prominence in Brazil, spurred in part by public debates over climaChina. Many Chinese saw mounting global challenges and fundamental defects iinternational system but emphasized the need for China to deal with its internal probChinese envisage a bigger structure pulling together the various institutions and ghave been established recently. They saw the G-20 as being a step forward but quewhether North-South differences would impede cooperation on issues other than ec

India. The Indians thought existing international organizations are grossly inadequ

worried about an absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability. TIndia is not well-positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given Chinpreponderant role in the region. Some feared that a system developed by the Westincludes democracy and rule of lawwould suffer as the East becomes more pow

Japan. Many Japanese saw the governance gap as more about political leadership tstructure. Several questioned whether formal institutions, with their huge bureauceffective. At the same time, the Japanese felt the G-20 needs stronger political coheemphasized the need to boost national and regional means before reforming internatorganizations. Many were concerned about the lack of regional frameworkspartihard securityin East Asia but argued that Japan should take a more proactive roleregional cooperation.

Russia. Russian expertssaw the world in 2025 as still largely one of great powerssome expected the influence of multinational businesses to increase and opportunitietransnational cooperation. The Russians worried about the relative lack of transpasecurity. The United States, Europe, and Russia also have scope for growing much

while China, with the biggest economy, will be the main factor in changing the w

South Africa. The South Africans assessed that globalization appears to be strengthregionalization as opposed to creating a single global polity. They worried that the globalization increasingly outnumber the winners. The G-20 has little African repreFor Africans, the UN remains the global institution with the only legitimate creden


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of greater burden sharing by emergingpowers. Many of the emerging powers areinterested in international and regionalstability to better pursue their owndevelopment. For example, while India,Pakistan, and Bangladesh have long beenamong the top troop contributors to UNpeacekeeping, the involvement of China andBrazil in these operations is growing. Theseand other emerging powers may come to play

a key role in UN-mandated multilateralinterventions to preserve stability and buildlasting peace in conflict areas.

Managing differences to foster cooperationleads to addressing the tension betweeninclusiveness and effectiveness in multilateralframeworks. This goes to the heart of the

legitimacy question, which held sway as themost important issue for greater multilateral

cooperation in our discussions with

emerging power elites.

We need politics of inclusion of the weak

not just the powerful.

Participant from thePersian Gulf Region

Achieving a fair and equitable diburdens and responsibility probabecome more contentious in the future, according to many particiBecause some major emerging pand India) are relatively poor coucapita terms, diverse domestic prgenerate different assessments ofequanimity. This is already appanegotiations between developed

developing countries over climattrade.

Scenario II: Fragmentation

Powerful states and regions try t

themselves off from outside threa

builds a regional order that is ec

self-sufficient. Global communic

ensure globalization does not diesignificantly. Europe turns its fo

as it wrestles with growing disco

declining living standards. With

work force, the US might be in a

position but probably would con

struggle with similar issues, part

fiscal problems remain unresolve


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Scenario II

Fragmentation

Financial Times op-ed entitled,Crying Over the Gs, published March 12, 2023

The Gs are almost a distant memory. The G-20ended badly, and for the first time the UnitedStates, Canada, and the Europeans have

given up on the G-7. Whats the use? they ask.The new powers wont play even if the transatlanticpartners can get their act togetherwhich is rarethese days. The political mood is indeed very sour.This began several years after the Great Recessionwhen it became apparent that it would take a longtime before the West dug itself out and got back

on a reasonable growth trajectory. US-Chinese tiestook a big tumble as Beijing put off again and againa decision on allowing its currency to appreciate.It was never the right time. The US Congressstarted taking actions against Chinese imports. TheUS-China strategic and economic dialogue wassuspended. G-20 meetings became less frequent.It was always going to be hard to negotiate afollow-on to Kyoto, but the strains within the G-20,especially between the Chinese and the United

States, made it virtually impossible. China put moreenergy into developing regional ties, but its rivalrywith India made even that difficult. Trade withinAsia has continued to expand. India and China aremajor trading partners now, offsetting someof the decline in Chinese commerce with theUS and Europe.

There was no explosive tearing asunder oftransatlantic ties, just the relentless drifting apart

that finally undermined the alliance. Europehas been increasingly focused inward after theprolonged Eurozone crisis of the 2010s. Many inthe US thought Europes slow recovery was onereason for the United States tepid growth. Moreimportantly, the US sought more military helpin Afghanistan which the Europeans could notgive Personal animosities crept in The last G 8

arrangements at the final dinner, symptomof what had been a long period the risingtransatlantic tensions.

Does all of this matter? Theres no easy aPerhaps it is too early to tell. The Gs nevereal power. Many outsiders thought they not have any power at all. Diplomats comabout all the preparation necessary for whin some cases long-winded statements at tof G summits that did not always lead to cactions or improvements. A lot of the unnon-Gs thought the Gs were trying to usu

the UNs role. The Gs were a bit like old networksundemocratic and incestuous.miss them and at some point they will havreinvented, although it will take a major chits everybody to bring that about. But nointernational system is slowly unwinding.

Were not yet back in the 1930s, bracing fconflagration. The growing protectionismsubtle. Doha has been definitively shelved

is no forward movement. More sectors arestrategic, requiring some sort of protectiAlthough all states are interested in energyefficiency, major concerted steps toward care on hold even though there is more evidclimate change. The UN calculates a tenfoin environmental migrants over the past fiMilitancy is growing among disaffected gIndia and China while terrorists have stepptheir plotting against the West. Without a

international order, I worry about a nuclearace in the Middle East and South Asia. Tareas are not self-governing and need ouhelp to contain or dampen the potential foand regional conflagration. I have no doubUnited States and the Europeans will menonce the crisis breaks, but it may be too lapoint will they be able to do anything with


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Chapter 3:Some Success in Adapting


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Multilateral institutions have adapted to somedegree as new issues have emerged, but theadaptations have not necessarily beenintentional or substantial enough to keep upwith growing demand. Rather, they havebeen spurred as much by outside forces as bythe institutions themselves.

While multilateral institutions have beenstruggling to adapt, innovative approaches to

global governance have been coming to thefore. Three innovations are of particularinterest as pointers for future developments:the emergence of informal groupings ofleading countries, such as the G-20; theperspectives for further regional cooperation,notably in East Asia; and the multiplecontributions of nonstate actors to

international cooperation.

All three developments originated fromoutside global multilateral institutions,whether they were triggered by governmentsor civil society, and whether their scope isglobal or regional. In some cases, innovativeapproaches stem from dissatisfaction with the

relative inertia of traditional frameworks orwith their perceived Western bias. Suchapproaches often involve lighter forms ofcooperation than the highly legalized regimesinherited from the 20th century: consultationreplaces regulation, codes of conduct prevailon binding norms, regional initiatives escapelengthy debates in multilateral forums, and

national prerogatives trump internationalauthorities in implementing and overseeingagreements.

Innovative approaches to global governance

approaches typically develop in shifting international system.

These innovative approaches canalternatives to rule-based, inclusimultilateral institutions. Multilainstitutions can deliver public gosummits, nonstate actors and regframeworks cannot supply, or caa reliable way. These are, chiefl

enjoying universal legitimacy, nopredictable patterns of behavior breciprocity, mechanisms for impand for overseeing national meassome sectors, instruments to resoand redress torts, such as in tradethe international system grows mand potentially more fragmented

of these public goods will becomimportant.

My preliminary conclusions: A

different issues with the same me

does not workwe need differen

for different problems. For som

we need a combination of bilater

and global responses with a divislabor.

Chinese E

Looking ahead, neither traditionaframeworks nor new forms of colikely to solve global governance

exclusively. However, the two fglobal governance can complemeanother, according to many of ouinterlocutors. The former will stdeliver without serious reform; thlik l t i bl


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catastrophe or the implosion of a large failedstate could spark cooperation, but a reactiveapproach to such extreme contingenciesprobably would prove inadequate.

The global financial and systemic nature of

the crisis has compelled unprecedented

government responses in scope, speed, and

novelty. We had global crisis-management

governance.

European Expert

Progress in setting up a global governancesystem that draws on the added value ofdifferent bodies and networks in a coherentway will depend on three factors: a sharedknowledge of the issues to be confronted and

their connections to other challenges;innovation at the interface between old andnew, formal and informal, governmental andnongovernmental, and global and regionalgovernance frameworks; and an acceptablebalance between effectiveness andinclusiveness.

Informal GroupingsThe proliferation of regular summit-levelmeetings heldoutside global or regionalinstitutionsis a key feature of recent globalgovernance innovation. Informal groupingssuch as the G-8 and the G-20 have alreadysignificantly affected global governance, withan emphasis on the networked coordination of

national policies and on deliverables. Thedecisions of such forums as the G-8 and theG-20 are of a political nature and non-binding. Thus they are unlikely to sidelinethe UN and Bretton Wood institutions as

Following the establishment of thmid-1970s and of the G-8 in 199groups have been set up in the lain response to pressing issues oninternational agenda. The G-20 noticeable innovation because ofof its membership and the scope The Major Emitters Forum, set uand renamed the Major Economi(MEF) in 2009, deals with clima

The leaders of the BRIC emerginmet in Russia in 2009 and in Braand have announced that they wiChina in 2011.

Over the medium term, the role olikely to be circumscribed to sectwhere the small club of like-min

can bring added value if they aremobilize their resources. More gG-8 could remain a useful platfoothers, to elaborate ideas and brinlarger tables, such as the G-20. Ido so by engaging countries on tinitiatives, provided that these arlinked to the agenda of multilate

institutions and of groups such aIn time, this may also become thcontribution of the BRIC countrideliberations in broader framewoBRIC summits have been more nopposing existing norms than fornew ones and reaching out to othactors. Given the different fores

economic and political trajectorieBRIC countries over the next twhowever, the durability of this grremains to be tested.

A i f l i l th


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address shared problems outside theconstraints imposed by formal multilateralstructures, and second, the need to reflect thechanging balance of world power. As theworld grows more heterogeneous, the twobasic rationales behind the Gs may or maynot prove mutually reinforcing. The clash ofinformal groupings or stable coalitions insector-specific negotiations such as climatechange and differences on how to consolidate

global economic recovery expose the tensionbetween the shared commitment to problem-solving and the co-existence of differentpolitical priorities and agendas.

Under these circumstances, cohesion withineach grouping and coherence between themare essential conditions for their effectiveness.

Both requirements can be promoted bystronger coordination, both at the national andat the trans-governmental level, between thesherpas preparing the various summits, toensure the consistency of national positions indifferent formats.

There is institutional Darwinism and we will

see the survival of the fittest institution.

European Expert

The performance of the Gs will largelydepend on theirrelations with formalmultilateral structures. Informal groupingsmay be increasingly called upon to set the

tone and direction of international cooperationon important global issues and to serve as top-level international agenda-setting bodies, asthe G-20 did in coping with the fallout of thefinancial crisis. The G-20, for example,called upon the IMF and the World Bank to

has encouraged closer cooperatiovariety of institutions including tInternational Energy Agency (IEOECD, and the World Bank. In asummit decisions can spur institureform. The G-20 has triggered from the Financial Stability ForuFinancial Stability Board and hasmomentum for the incremental rIMF.

Informal groupings such as the Gproved flexible and proactive intheir original purview. The agenG-20 has also expanded since 20Pittsburgh summit agreeing on a for strong, sustainable and balancA debate is under way regarding

G-20 has a vocation to enlarge itfurther, becoming a sort of informgovernance hub. According toobservers, the G-20 would suffercapacity deficitin dealing withagenda. The G-20 infrastructureconsidered robust enough to suststronger flow of information and

that would occur with a greatly eagenda and is not structurally concompetent bodies at the national However, as issues become moreor crisis-driven common interestbeyond facilitating an economic requiring the G-20 to expand its further.

When informal groupings are tooas the G-8, their legitimacy is colimited membership of informal entails that deliberations involve


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agreement and deliver resultsyet theirlegitimacy remains challenged by those statesinevitably left on the outside.

Options we heard to improve the Gsdecisionmaking process include strengtheningthe teams of sherpas assisting politicalleaders, setting up support unitsperhapsfocusing on specific issues and embedded inexisting multilateral bodiesand enhancingcooperation between successive annualpresidencies. Longer yearly meetings couldbe held between national leaders themselves,giving them the opportunity to debate issuesin depth and finalize agreements not only onguiding principles but also on concreteinstruments and arrangements, where actionoften falls short of statements.

Instead of looking at what G-20 will look

like in 2025, we should ask what will make it

credible and legitimatehow do you ensure

that voices outside the G-20 are heard while

also not slowing its ability to make decisions?

To what extent has the G-20 championed the

interests of the low-income and developing

countries? I dont think so far that it has.

South African Expert

Growth of Regionalism

No comprehensive trend can be detectedtoward deepening regional governancestructures. However, some progress toward

closer cooperation at the regional level hasbeen achieved over the last decade in regionsas diverse as South America, Africa, and mostnotably, East Asia. It is doubtful, however,whether increased regional groupings in thenext decade or two will be able to deal with

performance of global governancas either ineffective or carrying pagendas not fitting distinctive regcontexts, or both. Second, relatishifting at the regional level as weminent actors such as China, Jahave chosen to invest into regioncooperative frameworks to manadifferences and confirm their leaThird, the global financial crisis

all global regions and amplified bsuspicion of external interferenceaffairs and a sense of self-relianceconomic and political challenge

Regionalism could bring an impocontribution to managing shared the local and regional levels and

Regional governance arrangemento the sources of the problems tobe they security crises, economicor trans-regional threats. Neighbcountries are directly affected bystemming from respective regiondrug trafficking or state failure, adevelop a sense of solidarity in a

them. National leaders may be mwith one another than in global pregional instruments may be mobthan those of larger multilateral oIn practice, however, cooperationwell short of its potential in most(See Annex B for further discuss

Renewed interest in regional soluresponse to economic and politiccould, however, create new mombehind regional arrangements antheir effectiveness. If so, the key

h th i li ill t


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scarce. In the latter case, the investment inregional cooperation might detract from theambition to strengthen global governanceframeworks, for example, in trade matters. Inturn, this could lead to economic and politicalfragmentation between different regions.

Contrary to the experience of the EuropeanUnion, regional cooperation has so far notresulted in a significant pooling or delegationof sovereignty. In fact, most regionalframeworks uphold the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of memberstates. It follows that common institutions arerelatively weak. Regional cooperationdynamics, notably in East Asia and SouthAmerica, reflect the increasingly pivotalposition of major regional powers and the

extent to which their leadership is accepted,contested, or feared. State-led projects mostlylag behind the initiative of private actors.Business has often played a pioneering role inweaving a dense web of economic links at theregional level, including when politicalrelations are strained. This can contribute tobuilding trust and create incentives to forge

ahead with regional cooperation. At the sametime, the benefits may disproportionatelyaccrue to the biggest economies in respectiveregions.

We need to reinforce regional institutions,

especially in Asia.

Chinese Think Tank Expert

A new phase ofEast Asian regionalism maybe dawning. Although growing nationalismmay serve as an eventual brake, experts weconsulted thought both regional

institutionalization, a non-intrusiinformality, permanent consultataversion to conflict. From an ec

political standpoint, Asian interloChinas centrality to the region a

In what has been defined as a pashift, Japanese interlocutors havacknowledged the need to adjustregional context and some envisalook West policy, turning Japafrom its US ally in the Pacific to Asia. Our interlocutors were somdubious that the bilateral allianceJapan and the US will prove comdeepening multilateral frameworAsia, which may not include the States.

Contrasting trends indicate potenregional cooperation or fragmentSouth America. The region is ddifferent states following disparapolicies and political trajectoriessuch as Chile, Peru, and Colombpursuing economic liberalization

trade deals with the United Stateincreasingly, China. The countriBolivarian Alliance, led by Veneengaged in ideological competitiagainst US influence in the regiotoward Brazil and others that haveconomic globalization.

At the same time, South Americastable, countries face common trthreats such as drug trafficking, abenefit from better transport and infrastructures to boost trade andand harness their natural resourc


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playing a leading role, despite its rapid rise.Others saw Brazil outgrowing itsneighborhood and increasingly focused on

enlarging its role in global vice regionalforums. Recent initiatives, such as the launchof the Common Market of the Southern Cone(UNASUR) in 2008, however, indicate someambition to play a greater regional role.

Unlike in East Asia and South America, noAfrican country has sufficient influence andresources to steer regional cooperation at thecontinental level. South Africa has beenplaying a key role by its involvement in thecreation of the New Partnership for AfricasDevelopment, in the shift from theOrganization for African Unity to the AfricanUnion (AU) in 2002, and in the establishment

of the African Peace and SecurityArchitecture (APSA). However, Africa is toobig and diverse for a single regional leader toemerge. Instead, it was argued that thedomestic evolution and foreign policypriorities of a handful of key countries such asthe Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt,Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, among

others, will be decisive for the future of thecontinent.

Prospects for regionalism in Africa depend ona combination of factors besides theleadership of major regional players. Crisismanagement and peace-building activitieswould greatly benefit from better cooperation

among the AU, sub-regional organizations,and the UN. From this standpoint,regionalism in Africa is likely to draw onglobal governance tools and resources.Greater development of home-grown civil

i t i ti tt d t t ti l

markets (and even for land) amoglobal players. Such renewed ceencourage coordination and coop

regional level in dealing with extpartners. However, perhaps morcould also contain the seeds of mfragmentation, with different coureaping the benefits of bilateral dregional arrangements.

Nonstate Actors Step Up to the

The experts we consulted felt thachallenges cannot be effectively individual states acting alone. Ltransnational challenges cannot bby governmental actors on their Governments often lack the experesources, and legitimacy to addr

that affect a much wider range ofstakeholders. Nonstate actors arcentral role both on the demandsupply sides of global governacontribute to setting the internatiand are essential participants in isolutions.

The engagement of nonstate actogiven the complexity of the risksinternational community and muframeworks. Challenges such aschange, pandemics, or the prolifesensitive materials and technologflexible responses to a fast-changas well as capacity-building.

Increasingly nonstate actors ac

generators and are directly invol

decisionmaking and implementat

policy.


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Role of Mass Communications

New technologies, such as the Internet,

empower individuals and groups and enablenonstate actors to coordinate actions acrossnational boundaries. As one participantstated,

The Internet is an enabler, it gives the weak

a chance to do things they could not do

before. That creates a kind of power shift.

In the global health arena, for example, theexposure by Chinese medical practitioners viathe Internet of provincial governments effortsto hide the spread of SARS in 2002-2003 ledBeijing finally to take action against the virus.During the color revolutions and morerecently in Iran, democratic pressure groupsused the Internet to organize massdemonstrations. Equally, the spread of massmedia in regionslargely ruralthathistorically have been cut off has increasedpressures on government for bettergovernanceparticularly at home. As aconference participant put it,

To predict the future, you need information

and technology, but many people in the world

dont have these tools. We need to get people

the tools so they will have a stake in the future

and policy.

Wider public participation through mass

communications also has been important inputting greater emphasis on transparencyhonest and open transactionsgeneratingpressure on governments. Governmentsefforts to adapt and be more transparent have,in fact fed the desire for greater participation

corporations and business coalitiphilanthropy, often associated wiand civil society initiatives or to

authorities, has made an importain areas such as health and educa

Hybrid, public-private partnershihave been emerging as an importglobal governance innovation, nofield of sustainable developmentrelevance of PPPs is likely to groreach out to multiple stakeholder

The mass communications revolunotably the invention and increaswidespread use of the Internetbeen the most important vehicle expanded role of civil society gropublic opinion at large in agendagovernance issues.

When the Soviet Union collapse

said we had only one superpowe

two: the US and international pu

opinion.

Economist from a

Tank

As the scope of transnational chawidened and figured more highlyinternational policy agenda, nonshave been at the forefront, pushininstitutions to adapt. They have if not more effective than states aissues and mobilizing publicsexpect to continue. The InternatCriminal Court (ICC) and LandmTreaties were both led by civil sosupported by like-minded states.


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new global governance regimes such asUNAIDS, involving NGOs. Philanthropicfoundations such as those led by Bill and

Melinda Gates have made a key contributionin this context. Transnational advocacy andpressure groups have been instrumental inbuilding and keeping momentum behind othermajor governance initiatives, such as theMillennium Development Goals launched in2000.

Maybe we are seeing a shift that is not

geographical but horizontalwe are seeing

the emergence of a global management elite

and wondering what that means for the future

of liberal democracy.

South African

Participant

In addition to their role as agenda-setters,nonstate actors are essentialsources ofknowledge and expertise. The InternationalPanel on Climate Change (IPCC), anintergovernmental scientific body gatheringthe contribution of thousands of scientistsworldwide to assess the evolution and impactof climate change, is perhaps the mostprominent case in point. Expertise willbecome more salient in all fields ofinternational policymaking, from managingthe implications of technological innovationto food and resource scarcityissues thatrequire ongoing monitoring. Scientific advice

is vital in the field of public health. Forexample, the WHO has created the GlobalOutbreak Alert and Response Network, a webof over 140 scientific institutions in over 60countries, mandated to detect and respond tothe outbreak of epidemics alerting national

play a key role in conflict prevenpeace-building.

Gathering and sharing knowledgfor setting international norms anInternational organizations efforstandards and rules are increasincomplemented or paralleled by cconduct from the private sector asociety. Multi-stakeholder coopeengaging business, NGOs, and pinstitutions, is a growing feature international standard-setting. Iminitiatives have been undertaken,to enhance transparency in sensitsuch as extractive industries and commodities like coffee and cocdiamonds. In the environmental

certification schemes such as theStewardship Council and the MaStewardship Council have brokewith standards adopted by nonstaprogressively endorsed by internnational authorities.

PPPs can also focus on the imple

broad agendas established at the level, as exemplified by the overpartnerships launched following Summit on Sustainable DevelopmThese partnerships can help bridbetween global rule-making and governance and engage a wide rastakeholders from within and wit

individual countries or regions, tas catalysts of political purpose a

Looking ahead, opportunities exithe interaction between state and

actors and enhance the performa


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domain at large, transfers of greentechnologies and of dual-use technologies,and measures to adapt to climate change as

well as the management of humanitariancrises and international migration.

Second, thus far multi-stakeholdercooperation has been largely initiated, driven,and supported by governmental andnongovernmental bodies from advancedcountries. This has hampered the engagementof nonstate actors and governments fromdeveloping and emerging countries. Anincreasing focus on local governance and theinclusion of diverse perspectives in the earlystages of multi-stakeholders dialogues wouldameliorate this problem.

Third, the effectiveness of self-regulation andof public-private partnership is predicated onthe existence of clear guidelines and precisetargets and on mechanisms for regularreporting and accountability. This will entailclose interaction with public authorities at theinternational and national levels to formulateshared objectives and uphold viable

standards.

Scenario III: Concert of EuropUnder this scenario, severe threa

international systempossibly a

environmental disaster or a confspreadingprompt greater coop

solving global problems. Funda

reform of the international system

possible. Although less likely th

two scenarios in the immediate f

scenario would be the best outco

long term. The US increasingly

while China and India step up th

sharing and the EU takes over a

global role. A stable concert cou

incrementally over a long period

economic gaps shrink and per ca

converges.


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Extracts from the Final Press Conference of the International Energy Organization Summit;New Delhi, 28 November 2025.

Indian Prime Minister:I am pleased to welcome you to the new Global India Congress Center, the larworld. I was honored to host this summit and I am especially grateful that so many world leaders have

on this stage.India World Service:Excellencies, my question goes to all of you. The statement you just released sayestablishment of the International Energy Organization (IEO) in Delhi marks an historic turning point. WAfter many empty promises, please convince us.

Prime Minister of China: It is a pleasure to be here again after the second India-China ComprehensivePartnership Summit last year. Today is nothing less than historic. For the first time the entire internatiocommunity has come together to agree to a single package of rules governing energy markets, transit

investment, and to set up an organization overseeing these rules. I am proud of the role that China andPartners of the East Asia Economic Community have played in hosting the preparatory conference to tLet me also take this opportunity to praise the leadership of the US Government and of the EU, which ysparked the whole process.

US President:Today matters not just because we set up a new institution but because this is the resulong years of collective leadership. You all recall where we stood in 2018, the year when the oil price b$300/b ceiling. Oil and gas supply could no longer cope with demand, investments had been far belowwe needed since the Great Recession of 2008 and we found ourselves on the brink of a second econo

crisis. Back then, my predecessor met in Brussels with the Presidents of China and Russia as well as European allies. They agreed on a massive concerted supply of strategic oil reserves, unlocked joint fintop investment projects, and drafted the Brussels letter to OPEC, later signed by India, Japan, and dozother countries. OPECs response was swift. All of that was good, but it happened almost by chance adramatic events. That night, we all knew things had to change. Today, that hope becomes a reality.

BBC:I dont want to spoil the party but, for all the pledges to avert that, will the IEO make us even moron fossil fuels? What about the Washington Agreement on emissions?

EU President:You have touched on a crucial point. Of course energy and climate are two sides of thecoin. In fact, I think we would not be here today without the 2020 Washington Agreementglobal emto peak in 2025 and be halved by 2045. Yes, this took too long, but all major polluters have finally comto binding targets to reduce the volume of their emissions and we are on track. Pressure from the ACTfor Climate Treaty) coalition of developing countries was critical to get there. Political momentum in thEconomies Forum has built up for a new deal to coordinate investment in energy efficiency and renew

Scenario III

Concert of Europe Redux


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New York Times:The Washington deal was a game-changer, but have private actors followed? Are ththeir part to mitigate climate change and uphold energy security?

US President: Well, most of them are. It is not that we have set the stage and others have followed. Pactors have been in the lead on many fronts. Public-private partnerships like the Energy Investment Co

doubt helped pave the way to the Washington Agreement. They showed how resources could be harnchanneled to sustain a green industrial revolution not only in Europe and the US but also in new giantsand India. Business has long sought a predictable regulatory framework. Building on earlier national lewe achieved in Washington a transatlantic cap-and-trade system, and we will soon expand that to otheincluding India.

Indian Prime Minister:Nonstate actors have played a key role in facilitating technology transfers to Inmany other countries from what was called the Global South. Over ten years ago the G-20 asked the Wthe World Intellectual Property Organization to launch a multi-stakeholder process to build a legal fram

sharing green technology and promoting joint R&D. The launch of the first generation of power plants with carbon capture and storage systems is an example of what has been achieved. The Smart Partneexpand smart grids in Asia and in Africa is the next challenge. Capacity-building at the local level to immitigation and adaptation measures needs to speed up. But networks of officials and nonstate actors hwonders. The impact of the floods in southern India three years ago would have been catastrophic hadbuilt an efficient alert system and more resilient infrastructure, including through regional cooperation.

Arab News:Turning to geopolitical risks, the crisis in Central Asia showed that energy security remainvulnerable to disruptions. What is your outlook for stability in Central Asia?

President of Russia:In Central Asia, we have learned that all dimensions of security are connected: hsecurity and state security; energy security and economic security. When the civil war started, oil and supplies from Central Asia to Russia, China, and the EU came to a halt. This precipitated the energy cr2018. Neighboring countries risked contagion. We failed to prevent the crisis, but I think we did a gooresponding to the situation. We were all a bit surprised that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, NAthe EU could achieve such a coordinated response in a matter of weeks, with the UNSC blessing the oWhen the UN took over, security conditions had improved. The SCO Regional Dialogue with our EuropAmerican Partners contributes to the stability of Central Asia. We also agree with our partners that gov

and the rule of law are important factors for growth and stability. This is the road that we took many yeto modernize and diversify our economy and join the WTO. Over the last 10 years, we have achieved sgrowth rates and the share of energy exports in Russias GDP has fallen. The IEO Charter that we adopwill provide for more accountability and predictability in the energy sector worldwide, improve the busienvironment, and boost economic growth.

Scenario III

Concert of Europe Redux


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Chapter 4:An Uncertain Future


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We assess that the multiple and diverseframeworks, however flexible, probably arenot going to be sufficient to keep pace with

the looming number of transnational andglobal challenges absent extensiveinstitutional reforms and innovations. Thecapacities of the current institutionalpatchworkhowever much bolstered byincreasing nonstate support and regionalmechanismswill be stretched by the type ofchallenges facing the global order over thenext few decades. Several clusters ofproblemsweak and failing states andresources issuesappear particularly unlikelyto be effectively tackled without majorgovernance innovations because there is nooverall framework to handle them. We alsocite over-the-horizon issuesmigration, the

Arctic, and biotechnologythat are likely torise in importance and will demand a higherlevel of cooperation. The issues discussedbelow are difficult subjects for multilateralcooperation because they involve morepreventive action, which is likely to require ashared assessment of the challenges aheadand close monitoring of the implementation

of national measures. Under currentcircumstances, greater cooperation on thoseissues in which the risks are not clear-cut willbe especially difficult to achieve.

As for the future, it will not be a linear

progression but zig-zags and ups and downs,

probably marked by discontinuities and

surprises.

Participant from the

Gulf Region

Weak and Failing States1

Numerous studies indicate the grfragility of many low-income de

states and potential for more conparticularly in cases where civil wnever fully resolved. Althoughglobalizationparticularly the ricommodity priceshas providedbenefits, it has also increased preincome disparities have widenedbetween countries. The birth ratthese countries remain relativelyincreasing pressures on what are cases the countries limited resouPoverty and weak economic linkglobal system are often combinegovernance and unresolved ethnidivisions.

Some think we have the perfect

climate change, resource scarcit

economic growth that carries wi

lifestyles and greater resource

consumption

Senior Research F

Institute for Secur

Climate change studies indicate genvironmental pressures hitting mlowest income countries particulExperts believe the risks are espeand growing for armed conflict ainstability in Africa, South and C

and the Middle East. Studies shoneighboring weak or failing oneswhich are also strugglingalso b

1 We relied on published works from the Un


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the spillover effects from weak and failingstates, increasing the risks of theirsuccumbing to failure. Internal conflict or

collapse of large populous states on the scaleof Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Nigeria2would likely overwhelm international conflictmanagement efforts, given the difficultchallenges posed by smaller countries such asSudan or Somalia. Afghanistans 28 millionand Iraqs 30 million are among the mostpopulous cases ever attempted, and they areproving difficult.

Regional organizations have donecomparatively little in terms of large-scaleoperational responses to fragile states. Asidefrom NATO and the EU, a partial exception isthe African Unions limited but brave initial

response in Darfur before the larger jointUN/AU efforts. ECOWAS has played animportant but relatively brief role in rapidresponse in West Africa. ASEAN has nopeacekeeping capacity, and the League ofArab States only official peacekeepingoperation was cover for large-scale Syrianintervention in Lebanon after the conclusion

of the Taif Accords.

The response to Afghanistan has driven a newevolution, namely the creation by ISAFmembers of substantial bilateral developmentand civilian operational arms. So far, theseefforts have been more aspirational thanactual. Experts see weaknesses in the

bilateral capacities: they are less well-coordinated than the panoply of UN agenciesand lack the comparative experience ofeffective lessons learned.

Emerging powers have played anrole: India is the third largest deactor in Afghanistan after the US

Brazil leads the UN peacekeepinHaiti. China has chosen to expanoperational role primarily throug

Prevention Particularly Difficul

situations can be anticipated withaccuracy than before, allowing fodiplomatic, political, and economThe UN, major powers, and regiorganizations have growing expesuccess at containing such situatibrokering negotiated settlementspeacekeepers to enforce solutionby US, European, and NATO effBalkans.

Prevention often requires direct pintervention or even the threat ormilitary force as a last resort. Efprevent conflict have often been the international communitys reintervene directly, potentially ovanother countrys sovereignty. A

conflict has often only been stopsignificant amount of bloodshed occurred. Many experts in emerthought their governments probaparticularly leery of any intervendriven by the West and not maUN Security Council under Chap

A joint initiative by the Brookingand New York and Stanford UniRussian, Chinese, Indian, and Soapproaches to fragile states founddeep-seated concerns within eme


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eventual verdict on the interventions in pastyears in Iraq and Afghanistan by UnitedStates and NATO will have far-reaching

impacts on how pro-active emerging powerswill be when faced by future calls forintervention.

The world will be a sad place if by 2025 we

have not legalized quick military intervention

for humanitarian causes in cases of failing

states. We will need a new legal system for

sending quickly military intervention squads

to save normal human beings from what they

are suffering.

Japanese Participant

Sustaining the Effort also Difficult. Overthe longer run, sustained reconstruction and

reconciliation after conflict lessens the risk ofa recurrence of conflict. The downward trendin armed conflict that was noticeable throughthe early years of this century has beenreversed in part because previously dormantconflicts such as those in DemocraticRepublic of the Congo and Somalia haveresumed. Slow economic growth, badlytimed international aid, and lack of attentionto social reforms are key factors that lead torecurrence.

Although we can expect increased politicaland economic engagement from risingpowersin part as a reflection of their

increasing global intereststhe participationof emerging powers is likely to be on an adhoc basis absent a more concerted multilateralframework. In many of the emerging powers,contact between personnel involved in peace

ti d th l di t d d

Interlocking Resource Issues

The need for a cross-disciplinaryeffort is probably most exemplifi

case of the interrelated resource ienergy, food, and water. Individinternational agencies serve to rediscrete cases, particularly humaemergencies in individual countroverall framework exists to manainterrelated scarcities in the case water and increasing volatility insupply. Climate change also furtexacerbates the looming food anscarcities as well as injecting addto the transition out of fossil intofuels.

The stakes are high in view of thgrowing scarcities could have onthe current relatively open internsystem. Resource competition inpowers seek to secure reliable sulead to a breakdown in cooperatibroad spectrum of issues, such aspeacemaking. Moreover, scarcitto hit hardest on poorer states, le

worst case to internal or interstatspillover to regional destabilizati

The global aggregate demand forcoming decade (2010 to 2025) prsubstantially increased because oexpected additional 700 million pAsia, Africa, and Latin America;

dietary preferences for protein; alikelihood of a rise in demand fobiofuel. On the supply side, globchange trends are likely to depreagricultural productivity in some


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sufficiency. On the basis of the populationgrowth, another 15 countries will join theirranks by 2025. By that year, 1.4 billion

people are projected to live in the 36 countriesthat will experience cropland scarcity.

The water situation is a major driver behindfood scarcity. Water use is closelyintertwined with food production. Today, 40percent of the worlds food supply comesfrom land that is irrigated, but most irrigation

is highly inefficient in water use. Aspopulation and average per capita water usehave grown, the amount of fresh waterwithdrawn globally each year has growntoofrom 579 cubic kilometers in 1900 to3,973 cubic kilometers in 2000. Demand isprojected to rise further to 5,235 cubickilometers by 2025. Over one billion peoplelive in areas where human use of availablewater supplies has exceeded sustainablelimits; by 2025 this figure will rise to 1.8billion, with up to two-thirds of the worldspopulation living in water-stressed conditions,mostly in non-OECD countries. Climatechange will compound the scarcity problem in

many regions as precipitation patterns changeand many populous areas become drier.

The real question is whether scarcity

problems lend themselves to global

governance. My view is that they do not. The

competition for scarce resources will

continue. China will not give up its quest for

resources and

global governance 2025: at a critical juncture

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