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DOI: 10.1177/0002716202581001082002; 581; 74The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

Henk OverbeekNeoliberalism and the Regulation of Global Labor Mobility

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Neoliberalism and the

Regulation of Global Labor Mobility

By HENK OVERBEEK

Henk Overbeek is an associate professor in international relations at the Free Uni-

versity,Amsterdam. He received his masters degree and Ph.D. at the University of Am-sterdam, where he taught international politics between 1976 and 1999. He is also an

adjunctprofessor

at Webster University in Leiden. His research interests areprimarilyin international political economy. He is coeditor of the RIPE Series in Global Political

Economy (Routledge) and serves on the international editorial board ofthe Review ofInternational Political Economy His publications include Global Capitalism and Na-tional Decline: The Thatcher Decade in Perspective (1990), Restructuring in theGlobal Political Economy (editor, 1993), and The Political Economy of European(Un)Employment (forthcoming).

ABSTRACT: Globalization involves the international expansion ofmarket relations and the global pursuit of economic liberalism. Theessential factor in this process is commodification, including the com-modification of human labor. Globalization integrates an increasingproportion of the world population directly into capitalist labor mar-kets and locks national and regional labormarkets into an integratedglobal labor market. We are on the threshold of global initiatives toshift the balance even further, especially regarding the managementof global migration flows. The answer cannot be a return to strictlynational forms ofmigration control and should not be a complete ca-pitulation to market-driven regulation ofmigration. One possible an-swer is a new, multilateral, democratically screened, global migrationregime to set forth and guarantee the general principles governingthe regulation of transnational migrations, ensure proper coordi-nation between regional and national migration regimes, and callinto existence new institutional forms of transnational democratic

governance.


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GLOBALIZATIONis a sociopoliti-

cal project involving the &dquo;world-

wide application of laissez-faire prin-ciples&dquo; (Munck 2002 [this issue]). Yetthe principles of laissez-faire are un-

evenly applied to different categoriesof commodities in the global politicaleconomy today The zeal with whichthe free movement of goods is pur-sued through the World Trade Orga-nization (WTO), or the free move-

ment of capital promoted by theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF),is contrasted by the hostility of most

governments and international orga-nizations toward the free movement

of labor.

A closer look at the real nature of

the globalization project will revealthat this paradox entails no contra-

diction.After all, the globalizationproject is about the freedom of capitalto maximize its accumulation poten-tial, not about libertarian ideals.

Second, this article investigatesthe emerging global and regionalregulatory structures whose purposeit is to accommodate capitals free-dom to accumulate as far as it con-

cerns the movement of labor. It willbe argued that these new modes of

governance are characterized bytheir informal and disciplinarynature, thus demonstrating the

severely negative implications fordemocratic accountability of thoseinvolved in policy making.

The final argument of this article

will be that there is a contradictionbetween untrammeled commodifica-

tion on one hand and emancipationfrom bondage and deprivation on theother. To prevent the regulation ofglobal migration from privilegingdeeper commodification over

emancipation, transparency and

accountability in the institutional

setup are indispensable. The articleadvocates consensual multilateral-

ism instead of de facto bilateralism.

NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION

AND MOBILITY

Neoliberal globalization is both

process and project. While it is

important to emphasize the role ofagency in globalization, it is equallyimportant to understand the processof structural transformation

involved. Globalization is a dialecti-

cal phenomenon simultaneously cir-cumscribed by agency and structure

mutually constitutive of each other,or to borrow Robert Coxs (1981)

phrase, a &dquo;historical structure.&dquo;Viewed in this way, globalization con-sists in the dialectic between the

expansion ofmarket relations on onehand and the pursuit ofeconomic lib-eralism on the other. In its late twen-

tieth/early twenty-first century man-ifestation, globalization is reachingnew highs, or should we say new

depths.Globalization entails a qualitative

transformation in the political, eco-

nomic, cultural, strategic, and tech-

nological worlds around us of which Imention three elements: the com-

pression oftime and space, the rise ofa market-oriented neoliberal polit-ico-economic order, and the transi-

tion in world politics from the bipolarcold war order of system rivalry tothe present unipolar NATO-Ameri-can order.

The essential moving factor ofthis

process is the expansion of the mar-ket : ever more people, countries, and

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regions are incorporated into theglobal market economy (expansionas geographic widening), and moreand more spheres and dimensions ofhuman existence are invaded bymarket relations and subordinated

to the pursuit of private profit(expansion as deepening).

This deepening commodificationtakes place through three interre-lated processes, namely, the

transnationalization of production,the globalization of financial mar-kets, and the tendential emergence ofa global labor market. The first two

aspects of what is commonly called

globalization are abundantly docu-mented in much of the globalizationliterature. These aspects, althoughby no means beyond dispute, need

not be addressed here. For the pur-poses of this contribution, it is morerelevant to focus on the third

element.

In their path-breaking study ofthe new international division of

labor of the 1970s, the Germanresearchers Fr6bel, Heinrichs, andKreye (1977) observed an accelerat-

ing relocation of labor-intensive pro-duction processes from the older

industrial economies to low wagecountries inAsia and LatinAmerica.

Three preconditions made this relo-cation drive possible: the existence ofa sheer inexhaustible reservoir of

cheap labor in large parts of theThird World, new production tech-

nologies making it possible to sepa-rate the labor-intensive parts of the

production process from the capital-intensive parts, and new transportand communication technologiesfacilitating the coordination of dis-persed production and assembly

establishments. The authors con-

cluded that &dquo;the conjuncture ofthese

three conditions ... has created a sin-gle world market for labor power, atrue worldwide industrial reserve

army, and a single world market forproduction sites&dquo; (p. 30, authorstranslation). Crucial for this argu-ment is that as a consequence of the

rapid development ofnew communi-cation and information technology,

foreign direct investment (FDI)became a functional alternative not

only to trade but also to labor migra-tion. (Mobility of capital can substi-tute for the mobility of goods andlabor power.)

In the core ofthe global system, inthe Organization for Economic Coop-eration and Development (OECD)

countries, globalization has trans-formed the economy from a Fordistmodel (with mass production andmass consumption sustained by oneor another form of welfare state) intoa model of flexible accumulation

(with lean production and just-in-time delivery supported by a compe-tition state). This has had the funda-

mental consequence for the labormarket of establishing a &dquo;core-pe-riphery&dquo; structure within the ad-vanced capitalist economies (Cox1987), reflected particularly in the&dquo;peripheralization&dquo; of labor in the

global cities (cf. Harris 1995; Sassen1996a). One element of this has been

the reemergence of domestic labor,another the

reappearanceof sweat-

shop production in the garmentindustry:

There exists within New York, the globalcity, a substantial growing segment of thelabor force whose conditions of produc-



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77

tion resemble those of the labor force in

the Third World.... Sweatshops in NewYork are the

logical consequenceof the

global restructuring of production in the

garment industry and the consequentcompetition forjobs between segments ofthe global reserve of labor. (Ross andTrachte 1983, 416)

These developments go hand in hand

with, and are enhanced by, aneoliberal offensive of deregulation,liberalization, and flexibilization.While undermining the bargainingpower oforganized labor and helpingto depress wage demands, it simulta-neously creates and/or reinforces thedemand for various forms of un-

skilled and semiskilled labor, em-

ployed under increasingly precariousconditions (Cox 1987; Sassen 1996a;Castells 1998). Undocumented im-

migration is quite functional fromthis perspective. The employment ofundocumented foreign labor hasthus in many cases become a condi-

tion for the continued existence of

small- and medium-size firms, creat-

ing a substantial economic interestin continued (illegal) immigration(Brochmann 1993, 119-20; see alsoPapademetriou 1994, 27).

In more peripheral areas of theworld (e.g.,Africa, eastern Europe,and CentralAmerica), the two mostimportant changes since the mid-seventies (often interacting) havebeen the debt crisis, the ensuingimposition of structural adjustment

policies, and the end of the cold war.The StructuralAdjustment Pro-

grams of the IMF and the World

Bank and the withdrawal ofmilitaryand economic assistance by the

superpowers both resulted in a sub-

stantial reduction of external sources

of finance availablefor redistribution

by the state. In many cases, this seri-

ously affected the ability of govern-ments to co-opt rivaling elites intothe power structure, resulting inserious social and political crises,economic disasters, and regimechange or state collapse. These com-

plex processes largely explain thesurge in forced movements ofpeoplesince the mid-seventies across the

globe, in search of protection and insearch of a new and better life (cf.

Cohen and Deng 1998; Loescher

1993; United Nations High Commis-sioner for Refugees 1997; Zolberg,Suhrke, andAguayo 1989). In other

cases, governments of Third World

countries have turned to other

sources of external income and have

become intricately involved in thebusiness of promoting outward

migration ofskilled workers and pro-fessionals. Through workers remit-

tances, the inflow ofhard currency is

thus increased. Worldwide, remit-tances have surpassed developmentaid as a source of foreign exchange. In

1995, worldwide remittances ran to$70 billion; in the same year, develop-ment aid total ran to $66 billion(World Bank 1997). India and Egyptare two examples of countries inwhich the government has taken an

active role in this trade. In the 1970s,the Egyptian government &dquo;plannedto expand the output of teachers in

order to supply 14,000 ofthem to theoil-producing countries&dquo; (Harris1995, 151). The Indian governmentrecently announced plans to spend$650 million to double Indias cur-rent annual output of 100,000 infor-mation technology graduates by



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78

2002 and reach 500,000 by 2005

(Chanda 2000).

These developments in variousparts of the world show that global-ization indeed integrates an increas-

ing proportion of the world popula-tion directly into capitalist labormarkets and locks national and

regional labor markets into an inte-grated global labor market. Themechanisms that produce this effect

are of three kinds.First, we witness various forms of

commodification of labor power,which was not previouslybought andsold on &dquo;free&dquo; labor markets. We can

think ofthree forms in particular:

~ incorporation of previously discon-nected areas (primarily former so-cialist economies but also the re-

maining precapitalist societies onthe outskirts of the modern world)into the capitalist world market,

~ continuing proletarianization of theworlds population through urban-ization and the disintegration ofsubsistence economies in the Third

World and through increasing labormarket participation in the indus-

trial economies, and~ privatization of economic activitieswithin capitalist societies previ-ously organized outside the market.

Second, nationally or regionallybounded labor markets are increas-

ingly integrated by the internation-alization of production. The impor-tance of this new form of inter-

nationalization as contrasted with

the earlier phases ofglobalization inwhich commercial capital and moneycapital moved across borders cannotbe overstated. Whereas money capi-tal imposes an abstract and indirect

discipline on labor, FDI directly re-

produces capitalist relations of

production within the host countries(Poulantzas 1974).2 Transnationalproduction has indeed become by farthe most important engine of accu-mulation in the global economy, as isconfirmed by a few key statistics:

~After a slowdown in the early 1990s,direct investments were growing

explosivelyin the

closing yearsof

the century.As a consequence, theshare of foreign investment inflowsin world gross fixed capital forma-tion has grown rapidly, from 1.1 per-cent in 1960 via 2.0 percent in 1980

to 7.4 percent in 1997 (United Na-

tions Conference on Trade and De-

velopment [UNCTAD] 1994,1998).~ By 1997, total assets offoreign affil-

iates of transnational corporationsstood at $12.6 trillion. Sales by for-

eign subsidiaries reached $9.5 tril-lion (UNCTAD 1998, 2). In additionto FDI, through strategic alliancesand other nonequity arrangements,transnational corporations gaincontrol over assets and markets that

are not measured in the statistics.~ In 1960, worldwide sales by foreign

affiliates of transnational corpora-tions were smaller than world ex-

ports, but in 1997, they stood at 148

percent ofworld exports (UNCTAD

1998, 2).~ One-third of world exports are ex-

ports offoreign affiliates (UNCTAD1998, 6).

~ Transnational corporations have astrong impact on the shape of the

world economy: &dquo;they organize theproduction process internationally:by placing their affiliates world-wide under common governance

systems, they interweave produc-tion activities located in different

countries, create an international



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79

intra-firm division of labor and, in

the process, internalize a range of

international transactions that

would otherwise have taken placein the market&dquo;(UNCTAD 1994, 9).

~ The rapid expansion of FDI is in-

creasingly tied up with the explo-sive increase in mergers and acqui-sitions in the world. The total value

of cross-border mergers and acqui-sitions in 1997 was approximately$342 billion (up from less than $100

billion in 1992), representing 58percent of FDI flows (UNCTAD1998, 19-20).

~ Cross-border mergers and acquisi-tions are mostly concentratedwithin the developed world, thus re-inforcing tremendously the processof transnationalization, the rapidlyintensifying interpenetration oftheeconomies (capital markets but

also labor markets) of the OECDcountries.

Third, nationally or regionallybounded labor markets are further

integrated by increased interna-tional labor mobility in its variousforms:

~ thespread

of transnationalcorpo-rations brings with it increased in-

ternational mobility of top- and in-termediate-level managers and

executives;~ the internationalization of services

(engineering, advertising, softwaredevelopment) creates increased in-ternational mobility of technicaland commercial experts;

~

the combination ofmore

restrictiveimmigration policies and labor mar-ket flexibilization and deregulationin the OECD countries creates in-

creased opportunities for illegal im-migration (increasingly throughthe intervention of organizedcrime); and

the economic and political crisis ofthe state inmany ThirdWorld coun-

tries and the

resultingintensifica-

tion of social and ethnic conflicts

swell the ranks ofinternational ref-

ugee movements and the outward

flow of migrant workers.

With the tendential formation ofa

global labor market and the in-creased labor mobility it implies, the

question ofthe internationalregula-tion of that mobility has gradually

become a more prominent issue onthe international agenda. Before wecan turn to a discussion ofthe emerg-

ing framework for the regulation ofglobal migration, however, we mustbriefly address some general issuesof global governance in the neoliberal

age.

GLOBALIZATION

AND GOVERNANCE

Changes in production organiza-tion and locationhave been accompa-nied by attempts at the political and

ideological levels to create more

transnational forms of governance.The key elements of the emergingstructure ofglobal governance can besummarized as follows (see Cox

1987; Gill 1995; McMichael 1996):

1. emerging consensus amongpolicy makers favoring market-based over state-managed solutions,

2. centralized management ofthe global economy by the G-7 states,and

3. implementation and surveil-lance by multilateral agencies suchas the World Bank, the IMF, and theWTO.



8/18

80

The key development in this respectis the reconfiguration of the state.

State forms and functions are beingtransformed under the impact of, butin turn itself furthering, globaliza-tion. Global restructuring leads to (orimplies) the creation of additionalformal and informal structures ofau-

thority and sovereignty besides and

beyond the state. With globalizationand the progression ofthe neoliberal

ideology, there has also been astrengthening of(quasi-) authoritar-ian structures and practices and anassault on established forms of pro-

gressive or Left popular participa-tion. In the core areas of the world

economy, this discipline appears inthe shape of voluntary programs of

competitive deregulation and auster-

ity that are codified and constitu-tionalized in such arrangements as

the Economic and Monetary Union

stability pact or the WTO liberaliza-tion regime.

In peripheral areas, the disciplineof the market is often externallyimposed through the financial powerexercised by the IMF and the World

Bank, which was tremendouslyintensified after the debt crisis ofthe

1980s.

In the context ofglobalization, thefunctions of the state dealing withtransnational processes are increas-

ingly performed transnationally by avariety of state, interstate, andnonstate institutions. The state is no

longer the proverbial Westphaliannation-state in which sovereigntyand territoriality are exclusivelycombined. Indeed, the &dquo;unbundling&dquo;of sovereignty and territoriality(Ruggie 1993, 165) makes it possiblefor governments to circumvent the

need to account for the international

agreements they conclude in their

own national parliaments. Ithas alsocreated a greater space for social

forces outside the state to become

involved in new forms of regulation.The boundaries between public andprivate regulation and betweennational and international relations

are becoming increasingly blurred,and policy formation in international

contexts is increasingly informal-ized, opening up the channels ofgov-ernance to nongovernmental organi-zations of various kinds. In a

reference to the manifestation ofthis

tendency in the area of migration pol-icy, Saskia Sassen (1996b) observedthat &dquo;we are seeing a de factotransnationalizing of immigration

policy&dquo; in which there is &dquo;a displace-ment of government functions on tonon-governmental or quasi-govern-mental institutions and criteria for

legitimacy&dquo; (pp. 1, 24). It is to this

particular area of global governancethat we now turn.

THE EMERGENCE OFA

NEOLIBERAL FRAMEWORKFOR

THE MANAGEMENT OF MOBILITY

In the postwar order, interna-tional labor migration was hardlyregulated. This provided a sharp con-trast with the regulatory frameworkfor financial relations (IMF, Bank forInternational Settlements) and for

international trade (GATT). To besure, there are international organi-zations that are concerned one wayor another with the international

mobility ofpeople, such as the Inter-national Labor Organization, theInternational Organization for



9/18

81

Migration, and of course the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Ref-

ugees. However, the regime theyform (if we may call it that) has beenfar weaker than the financial and

trade regimes. Several explanationsare possible for this state of affairs.For one, as is often observed in the

migration literature, the sovereignstate is assumed to be unwilling to

relinquish control over who crosses

its borders: &dquo;Since the developmentof the modern state from the fif-

teenth century onward, governmentshave regarded control over their bor-ders as the core of sovereignty&dquo;(Weiner 1995, 9). The argument doesnot convince, because state sover-

eigntyhas never been absolute, nor isthis an argument that would apply

exclusively to migration as opposedto other cross-border traffic such as

trade.A second possible explanationis the modest scale of international

migration in the twentieth century.The United Nations estimated the

worlds foreign-born population for1995 at 125 million or about 2 per-cent of the worlds population

(UNCTAD/International Organiza-tion for Migration 1996). Finally, dur-

ing the post-1945 decades ofembed-ded liberalism, foreign labor wasavailable in surplus quantities, andas a consequence, states did not need

to compete for scarce sources when

organizing their recruitmentschemes in the 1960s and 1970s

(Zolberg 1991, 309, 313-4).With the effects of globalization on

the mobility of people becomingstronger, the call for an effective in-ternational migration regime also

gained strength (for a survey, seeGhosh 2000). Four effects stand out:

o the growth of asylum migration tothe OECD countries;

o the

growingdemand for

cheapun-

skilled labor, the growth of illegallabor immigration, and the increas-

ing involvement of organized crimewith smuggling people across

borders;9 the shortage ofhighly skilled labor

in the OECD in sectors such as in-

formation and communication tech-

nology ; and9

the increased mobility of upper-level managers in transnational

corporations.

As a result, two seemingly contradic-

tory tendencies are visible in the on-

going policy discussions, namely, theeffort to control and reduce asylummigration and illegal migration and

the call (especially since the mid-1990s) to liberalize forms of migra-tion that are deemed economicallydesirable. To understand better how

this contradiction translates into

regulation, we must briefly analyzethe interface between the various

forms offactor mobility in the globaleconomy, especially in theAmericas

and in Europe.The idea ofmobility is, as we have

seen, usually associated with themovement of capital more than ofpeople. In theAmericas, some twentybilateral agreements have been

signed since 1990 that serve to liber-alize trade and investment between

South, Central, and NorthAmerican

countries. Here the emphasis is pri-marily on the subordination ofmigration management to the needsofcapital. In Europe, the significanceof arrangements facilitating themobility of capital within the region(primarily the completion of the



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82

Single Market and the flexibilizationof labor markets) has overshadowed

the number of initiatives whichEuropean capital developed in

peripheral economies. Nevertheless,in the framework ofincreasing coop-eration and economic aid, the Euro-

pean Union has signed a series ofaccession and association agree-ments with countries of central and

eastern Europe, with the Mediterra-

nean countries, and with the remain-ing states of the former Soviet Union.These agreements all have in com-

mon a number of regulations with

respect to the freedom of movementofpeople insofar as this movement isconnected to capital mobility. Free-dom of establishment, freedom to

migrate to set up businesses as self-

employed individuals, and nondis-crimination (national treatment) of

legally established firms, workers,and their families (cf. Niessen and

Mochel 1999) are the key elements.33

These rules about national treat-

ment for investments and labor tend

to have repercussions on labor mar-kets, on industrial policies, and on

judicial systems. The movement ofcapital requires some mobility of peo-ple as well, for labor market pur-poses, but also for access to land and

to markets. Especially relevant hereis the movement ofprofessionals andbusiness people whose professionsare related to trade in services. Their

movement is encoded in bilateral or

trilateral treaties, regional agree-ments (NAFTA, European Economic

Area), and global agreements (Gen-eralAgreement on Trade in Services[GATS]) (see Ghosh 1997; OECD

Syst6me dobservation permanentedes migrations 1998).

In addition to the formal arrange-ments the European states (east and

west) have developed, there is a par-allel system of informal consulta-tions on migration issues, the so-called Budapest Group.4 The originsof the Budapest Process go back tothe events leading up to the fall of theBerlin Wall in 1989 and the disinte-

gration ofthe Soviet Union. The pri-mary objective of the consultations

was to discuss measures for checkingillegal migration from and throughcentral and eastern Europe. Much

emphasis was put on the need to

strengthen the surveillance of bor-ders, the conclusion of readmission

agreements, and the harmonizationof visa policies. Technological andfinancial aid was promised. During

follow-up meetings, the themes thatwould dominate subsequent confer-ences became clear: criminalization

of trafficking and improvement ofpolice forces and border controls,imposition of carrier sanctions onairlines, exchange of information,conclusion of readmission agree-

ments, and financial assistance to

the central and east European coun-tries (which were in reality the tar-gets of these measures given theirdeficient or totally absent relevant

legislation and policies). The statu-

tory meeting of the Budapest Group(December 1993) reconfirmed these

objectives and decided that the groupwould comprise senior officials from

all participating states, making theBudapest Group into the only pan-European discussion forum for theseissues. The issue of visa approxima-tion was taken up at a special meet-ing in Portoroz (Slovenia) in Septem-ber 1998. The harmonization of visa



11/18

83

policies is to be achieved by the cen-tral and east European states align-

ing their policies with those of theEuropean Union member states. Inrecent years, the Budapest Grouphas also set up an elaborate monitor-

ing system to keep track ofthe prog-ress with the implementation of

agreed measures, thus acquiring a

very real influence over national pol-icy making.

In theAmericas, most of theregional integration processes ignoreor sidetrack the question of the move-ment ofpeople. This is the case withthe Mercado Comun del Sur (South-

ern Cone Common Market), with

NAFTA, and with the series of bilat-eral treaties on free trade in the

region. Yet despite limited state reg-

ulations, labor migration repre-sented a significant dimension oftransborder economic activities, con-trolled mostly by the private sectors.The Puebla Process, which started in1996 under the name Regional Con-ference on Migration (RCM), marks asignificant step in the region-alization trend in migration control.5

5

Officially, the direct trigger of theRCM was the population conferencein Cairo in 1994, but it was alsolinked to the plans for the Free Trade

Area of theAmericas, which is toextend the liberalization of national

economies to Central and South

America. The immediate initiative

for the Puebla Process came from

Mexico, a country facing importantpressures from both its northern

partners, particularly the UnitedStates, to control the flows of peoplecrossing the border and from itssouthern neighbors in the form oftransit migration. The RCMs plan of

action, adopted in 1997 during itssecond annual meeting in Panama,

focused on information gathering aswell as on five areas of activities: (1)the formulation ofmigration policies(both emigration and immigration)that would respond to the commit-ments of the conference, (2) migra-tion and development, (3) combatingmigrant trafficking, (4) collaborationfor the return of extraregional

migrants, and (5)human rights. Mostof the work of the RCM has been

devoted, since then, to the combatingofmigrant trafficking while the areaof activity that received the leastattention was the formulation of har-

monized migration policies. Yet para-doxically, some form of coordinationof these policies does take place, but

indirectly, notably through the pro-motion by the RCM of transborderand labor market cooperationschemes.

There is obviously a clear analogybetween the Puebla Process and the

Budapest Process in terms of whichissues are central to their work. Theyshare, in particular, emphases on the

coordination of visa and migrationpolicy, on the combating of illegaltrafficking, and on the promotion ofasystem of readmission agreements.These informal modes of governancefulfil very specific functions. Theyfirst of all serve as channels for com-

munication between policy makers,experts, and interested third parties.

This is especially important for thosecountries (e.g., several of the Com-monwealth of Independent Statescountries) whose officials have littleor no direct contact with their coun-

terparts in the OECD world. Beyondthat, they further serve to socialize



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84

the officials, experts, and policy mak-ers of peripheral states into the exist-

ing epistemic communities in themigration field within the OECD,and they help to moor the policyreforms desired by the OECD part-ners within the associated states:

migration policies deemed desirableby the OECD partners are thuslocked in within the dependentstates. Finally, in the case ofthe rela-

tionship between the EuropeanUnion and a number of the central

and east European states involved,the Budapest Process is clearly com-plementary to the ongoing accession

process and prepares the ground, inthe area ofthe regulation ofpeoplesmobility, for ultimate full member-

ship of the European Union.

These neoliberal forms ofmobilitycontrols will not disappear with

political changes in countries at the

receiving end. Because oftheir inclu-sion into regional frameworks ofintegration, these mechanismsbecome locked in, and it would be

extremely costly, both economicallyand politically, not to respect them

(Gill 1998).Accordingly, statesbecome more accountable to external

than to internal forces. States are

made responsible for maintainingthe direction or the orientation taken

by the regional system and to uphold-ing the principles or social purpose ofthe agreements signed. Both theBudapest Process and the Puebla

Process have developed mechanismsto strengthen these tendencies andto monitor the compliance ofthe par-ticipating states. Particular empha-sis is placed in both contexts on theselective criminalization of

migration.

In fact, the selective criminaliza-tion of specific forms of migration

and the privileged treatment ofothertypes of mobility is functional notonly in the context of proliferatingneoliberal labor market reforms but

also in the context of redrawing theboundaries of the regions concerned.Both in the case oftheAmericas and

in the case of Europe, we observe therestructuring of regional hierarchies.

Certain countries or regions aregradually integrated into the OECDheartland (Mexico, Central Europe,and possibly in the long run, Turkey).These countries are themselves

becoming destination countries for

migrants from the outer layers ofthe

emerging new regional geohier-archies (just as a decade ago the

southern European countries madethe transition from migrant-sendingto migrant-receiving countries

against the background oftheir inte-

gration into the hegemonic struc-tures of the West). Other countries

are recast in the role of dependent(semi-) peripheries, whose migrantworkers are admitted to the heart-

land countries only on the strictestconditions, and who are themselvesburdened with the task of policingtheir borders with the external world

whose people can come in only as ille-gal migrants (and in decreasing mea-sure as asylum seekers) (cf. vanBuuren 1999).6

To summarize this section, Neo-

liberal restructuring of the globaleconomy involves both the deepeningand the widening ofmarket relationsand the transformation of gover-nance structures. Labor has a spe-cific role in this process: because

international labor migration is only



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85

one way in which global capital canaccess the emerging global labor

market, the emerging global regimefor labor involves both the disciplin-ing of labor and the selective freeingof the mobility of labor. There is

clearly a tension between regulatingmigration under the auspices of

global neoliberalism on onehand and

upholding the values of democratic

governance on the other. When we

turn to discuss the contours ofa pos-sible new comprehensive frameworkfor the regulation ofglobal migrationin the next section, we shall therefore

emphasize the importance of demo-cratic multilateralism as a safeguardagainst downward harmonization

through disciplinary neoliberal pol-icy competition.

IMPLICATIONS FORA

FUTURE MULTILATERAL

AGREEMENT ON MIGRATION

We have, in the preceding analy-sis, argued that the contemporarymigration issues must be viewed

against the backdrop of globaliza-tion. Likewise, if we want to specu-late on the contours ofa future inter-

national migration regime, let usfirst look at the implications of glob-alization for such an enterprise.

First, unless an effort is made toaddress the underlying causes, espe-cially of all forms of involuntarymigration, any effort to create an

international migration conventionwill inevitably result in the codifica-tion ofthe existing extremely restric-tive immigration practices ofmost ofthe countries of destination. The

international community (this oftenabused eulogism) must address the

structural inequities in the globalpolitical economy producing and/or

reproducing poverty among two-thirds ofthe worlds population (suchas unequal exchange, the dumping of

agricultural surpluses, etc.). Itshould also look very critically at the

global arms trade that fuels many ofthe refugee-producing conflictsaround the globe. Especially wherearms trade and neocolonial political

interference with (ifnot initiation of)regional and local conflicts by majorpowers coincide, the results havebeen disastrous.

Second, the particular character ofglobalization as a process of deepen-ing commodification and as a projectofprivileging the market over publicregulation suggests that to be demo-cratic and responsive to the needs ofall people, certain fundamental prin-ciples must underlie any regulatoryproject. It is, first, of crucial impor-tance that the trend to further com-

modification is reversed and that

essential spheres of human life arewholly or partly decommodified. Thisimplies also that we must reassertthe primacy of public governance asopposed to the market-led gover-nance, which neoliberalism advo-

cates for those areas where the inter-

ests of capital predominate. Finally,these new forms of public governanceof global processes must provide fordemocratic decision making andgrassroots participation, not just at

the national and international levelsbut also in transnational settings.Atthe national level, the institutions to

implement democratic control and

popular participation exist, at leastin principle if not everywhere inpractice, in the form of political



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86

parties, parliaments, and legal sys-tems.At the international level, we

have the institutions and practices oftraditional diplomacy, including theframework of the United Nations

system, to guarantee the representa-tion ofall sovereign states in the pro-cess. Notwithstanding its manyshortcomings, it should be obviousthat the United Nations is preferableas a framework for worldwide agree-

ments to other frameworks. This is sowhether these are international but

with representation based on eco-nomic strength (such as the IMF orthe WTO) or whether they are bilat-eral and skewed toward the stron-

gest economic power (as in the bilat-eral negotiations between the

European Union and the individual

candidate-members on their terms ofentry).

In such a new, democratic, multi-

lateral context, we might envisagethe creation of a comprehensive in-ternational migration frameworkconvention. The purpose of this con-

vention is to set forth and guaranteethe general principles governing the

regulation of transnational migra-tions, to ensure a sufficient degree ofcoordination between regional andnational migration regimes, and todeal with those migratory move-ments that cannot be covered in a re-

gional setting. There are three majorcomponents in such a regime.

1. The institutional frameworkto be developed at the world (and re-gional) level must be democratic,that is, transparent and responsiveto the needs ofmigrants as well as tothose ofthe participating states. Theorganizational forms for such an en-

terprise are still to be developed;theywill need to find a balance between

facilitating grassroots participationand democratic representation,which is often lacking in the litera-ture singing the praises ofglobal civil

society and of transnational

nongovernmental organizations.2. The asylum and refugee

framework providing the basis forthe existing international refugee re-

gime (i.e., the 1951 Geneva Conven-tion and the 1967 New York Protocol)

must be amended to take account of

the changed nature of international

refugee movements. Here the propos-als put forward by Zolberg, Suhrke,andAguayo (1989) may serve as a

starting point. They propose to intro-duce as the central principle &dquo;the im-

mediacy and degree of life-threaten-ing violence&dquo; (p. 270) to afford

protection to the &dquo;victims&dquo; on an

equal footing with the more commonsubjects of present asylum law, the&dquo;activists&dquo; and the &dquo;targets.&dquo;The asy-lum policies of the OECD countriesdeserve special mention here: thesetend to produce illegal immigrants in

large numbers through the practiceof denying official status to asylumseekers who cannot be returned to

their countries of origin because ofhumanitarian concerns.

3. An equivalent framework forvoluntary migration (permanent andtemporary) must be created in whichstates undertake to bring their na-

tional and regional immigration poli-cies in accordance with an interna-

tionally negotiated set of minimumcriteria formulated to safeguard theinterests of migrants as well as theinterests ofthe signatory states. The

existing provisions of international



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87

labor organization conventions andthe GATS should be incorporated

into such a framework or replaced byit where they conflict with the funda-mental principles set out above. One

important principle to be obeyedhereis that the legal position of long-termresidents must be improved. Boththe return ofmigrants to their homecountries and their effective integra-tion into the host society are ob-

structed by their insecure status (i.e.,by the difficulty in many host coun-tries of obtaining full membership inthe welfare state and by the difficul-ties they encounter on return to theirhome countries). These problemscould be substantially reduced, forinstance, by expanding the possibili-ties for dual citizenship or by allow-

ing reimmigration with full retentionof rights in case of failed returnmigration.

On the basis ofsuch a comprehen-sive set ofprinciples, regional migra-tion conventions can then create the

institutional and operational set-tings for their practical implementa-tion. It is plausible that only in re-gional settings will it be possible todevelop effective instruments to dealwith such undesirable developmentsas the increasing role of organizedcrime in the trafficking of people (anddrugs and arms).As with Prohibitionin the 1930s, an exclusively repres-sive policy only raises the price ofthe

prohibited goods (in this case accessto the labor markets of the OECD

countries) without substantially re-ducing the flow. These regional re-gimes might be expected, dependingon specific circumstances, to incorpo-rate regional development, educa-

tional and employment initiatives,

preferential trade agreements, effec-

tive measures against trafficking inpeople, agreements on the readmis-sion of illegal migrants, arrange-ments for temporary labor migration,quota for permanent immigration,return migration schemes, and im-

provement ofthe legal position of mi-

grants in host countries.An integraland comprehensive approach is es-

sential. If certain elements, such astemporary labor provisions, are real-ized in isolation from the other ele-

ments and principles, such schemesare bound to serve only the interestsof the employers looking for cheapworkers. Public governance of these

processes must guarantee the bal-

ance between the various elements of

the conventions.

This article has put forward thatthere is a possibly irreconcilable ten-sion between commodification on one

hand and emancipation and depriva-tion on the other. The present trendin the global economy is to privilegeprivate market forces over publicregulation. We are presently on thethreshold ofglobal initiatives to shiftthis balance even further, especiallywith respect to the management of

global migration flows. This articlemaintains that the answer cannot be

a return to strictly national forms of

migration control and should not be acomplete capitulation to market-driven regulation of migration.

Polanyis (1957) &dquo;double movement&dquo;is now, more than ever, operative atthe global level, and this implies thatwe must actively develop globalforms of social protection (comple-menting, not replacing, nationalforms) to counter the destructive



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88

effects of deepening commodifica-tion. Resisting the subordination of

international labor markets to theneoliberal regimes of the WTO (viaGATS and the MultilateralAgree-ment on Investment) must be an

integral component of the strugglefor a more democratic global eco-nomic order.

Notes

1. Remittances in India indeed cover more

than half of the negative balance of interna-tional trade.At the same time, India has illit-

eracy rates of some 35 percent for men and

more than 60 percent for women (World Bank

1997).

2. Financial globalization, that is, the

emergence and growth ofglobal financial mar-kets, is identified by many as the hallmark of

globalization. From the perspective of theoverall transnationalization of the circuits of

productive capital, the role of global finance isin a sense secondary, namely, to keep the sys-tem together and to lock the spatially dis-

persed sites of production and accumulationinto one global system. We will therefore notdiscuss this here.

3. Note that national treatment is also one

ofthe founding principles in the aborted Mul-tilateralAgreement on Investment and theGATS.

4. By 1997, the Budapest Group encom-

passed thirty-six European states (includingamong the republics of the former Soviet Un-ion the three Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine,Moldova, and the Russian Federation),Aus-

tralia, Canada, and the United States, as wellas the Central European Initiative, the Coun-cil of Europe, theEuropean Union Council Sec-

retariat, the European Commission, the Inter-

governmental Consultations onAsylum,Refugee and Migration Policies, the Interna-tional Center for Migration Policy Develop-ment (functioning as the secretariat of the Bu-dapest Group), the International

Organization for Migration, Interpol, theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Ref-

ugees, the International CivilAviation Orga-nization, and the United Nations Commissionon Crime Prevention. For more information as

well as sources on the work of the BudapestGroup and also of the Puebla Process, thereader is referred to Pellerin and Overbeek

(2001).5. The Puebla Process involved the partici-

pation of ten countries of Central and NorthAmerica (Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, El Salva-

dor, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicara-

gua, Panama, and the United States).A fewcountries and international organizationswere invited as observers: Colombia, the Do-

minican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, andPeru, as well as the Economic Commission for

LatinAmerica, the United Nations High Com-missioner for Refugees, and the International

Organization for Migration.6. Of course, this process of regional

hierarchization intersects with processes of

geostrategic rivalry being played out partly inthe same region, such as NATO interventionin Kosovo, the involvement ofseveral Westerninterests in the Caucasus, and most recentlythe entry of Western forces in centralAsia

through the war inAfghanistan.

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