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GLOBAL MACRO RESEARCH A FRACTURED WORLD AN INTERVIEW ON GEOPOLITICAL RISK WITH GEORGE FRIEDMAN

JUNE 2020

GEORGE FRIEDMAN George Friedman is an internationally recognised geopolitical forecaster and

strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitical

Futures. Dr. Friedman is a New York Times bestselling author. His most recent book,

THE STORM BEFORE THE CALM: America’s Discord, the Coming Crisis of the 2020s,

and the Triumph Beyond, published February 25, describes how “the United States

periodically reaches a point of crisis in which it appears to be at war with itself, yet

after an extended period it reinvents itself, in a form both faithful to its founding and

radically different from what it had been.” The decade 2020-2030 is such a period

which will bring dramatic upheaval and reshaping of American government, foreign

policy, economics, and culture. His most popular book, The Next 100 Years, is kept

alive by the prescience of its predictions. Other best-selling books include Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in

Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War and The Intelligence Edge. His books have

been translated into more than 20 languages. Dr. Friedman has briefed numerous military and government

organizations in the United States and overseas and appears regularly as an expert on international affairs,

foreign policy and intelligence in major media. For almost 20 years before resigning in May 2015, Dr. Friedman

was CEO and then chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996. Friedman received his bachelor’s

degree from the City College of the City University of New York and holds a doctorate in government from

Cornell University.

SECTION 1: China – are we on the verge of a new cold war? 3• Facing a series of internal and external problems, the risk for China is that it becomes overwhelmed

• There is growing unease within the Central Committee of China about President Xi’s overseeing of events

• The ability of China to compete head on with dominant Western firms in higher value goods is questionable

SECTION 2: Coronavirus – emerging from lockdown 6• Risks are growing that this is a depression rather than a recession, with large sections of the economy

destroyed

• It's difficult to see any winners, and the virus has increased stresses in a range of countries

• The WHO have not helped during the crisis and do not have the credibility to lead in the next stage

SECTION 3: Assessing the US political landscape 8• Whoever wins the Presidential election, the underlying divisions are here to stay

• The world is now reorganising itself for the modern era, and the role of many international organisations is

being questioned

• The coming decade is likely to be a difficult one, both economically and politically

SECTION 4: Europe – starting to fragment? 10• Brexit was an opportunity for the EU to re-evaluate – but it wasn't taken

• Europe needs solutions for its problems right now, it doesn't have the luxury of time

• Italy is likely to be the next test point for the EU

THE INSIGHT VIEW 13

3

GARETH: The world continues to reassess its relationship with

China, and this process will potentially accelerate as a result

of COVID-19. How do you see the relationship between China

and other major powers such as the US and European Union

evolving in the coming years? Are we at the start of what is

effectively a new cold war?

DR FRIEDMAN: For me, I think a bigger question is whether

China can survive at all as it is currently structured. Even before

the recent crisis China, and President Xi Jinping, looked far more

vulnerable than most people would believe. The coronavirus has

then accelerated the anti-China movement around the world.

This leaves China struggling to work out how it can maintain its

economy in a world that is less positively inclined to buy its

exports, and where its customers now see China as a risk in

their supply chains.

Internationally, the primary role of the Chinese President has been

to manage the American President, and in doing so allow China

to operate under a system of informal protectionism. Trump has

totally changed the game on this, and they don’t know how to

manage it. Exports represent around 20% of Chinese GDP and 5%

of those exports are to the United States.

Then domestically, China is facing a series of concerning internal

problems. Xinjiang, a province bordering central Asia, is in chaos.

In Hong Kong, the government have been forced to show restraint

for fear of the financial market implications, but this has left them

struggling with interference from the United States and United

Kingdom. One positive is that the regime has managed to present

itself as doing a brilliant job in managing the impact of the

coronavirus.

So rather than us being at the start of a cold war, I question

whether China can continue to exist as we currently know it.

Whether the stresses of trying to manage all these issues

eventually becomes too much.

Gareth: We don’t see many headlines about Xinjiang. I’d

previously assumed that it was a similar situation to Tibet,

where there is ongoing unrest but it’s not a threat to the

broader Chinese regime.

DR FRIEDMAN: There isn’t much in the international press as they

aren’t allowed to go into the province to cover it; information is

very tightly controlled. China has four buffer states on its Eastern

border: Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Inner

Mongolia and Manchuria are currently ok, Tibet has flared up

again as a result of the problems with India, but Xinjiang was

basically in flames. China has now arrested vast numbers of

Uighurs1 and created a system of concentration camps. This is

obviously perceived extremely negatively around the world, has

damaged the relationship between China and Islamic countries in

places like the Middle East, and has worsened an already poor

relationship with neighbouring countries such as Kazakhstan.

SECTION 1 CHINA – ARE WE ON THE VERGE OF A NEW COLD WAR? • Facing a series of internal and external problems, the risk for China is that it becomes overwhelmed

• There is growing unease within the Central Committee of China about President Xi’s overseeing of events

• The ability of China to compete head on with dominant Western firms in higher value goods is questionable

AS INVESTORS, WE SPEND OUR DAYS SEARCHING ASSET MARKETS FOR FUNDAMENTAL VALUE AND

STRATEGIES TO GENERATE RETURNS. BUT, AS WE’VE EXPERIENCED IN 2020, EVENTS CAN SOMETIMES

OCCUR THAT DRAMATICALLY CHANGE THE INVESTMENT OUTLOOK. GARETH COLESMITH, HEAD

OF GLOBAL RATES AND MACRO RESEARCH SPEAKS TO DR GEORGE FRIEDMAN, AN INTERNATIONAL

EXPERT ON GEOPOLITICAL RISK, TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE RISKS FACING THE WORLD TODAY

3

1 The Uighurs are native to the province of Xinjiang but also live in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Uighurs speak their own native language and follow the Islamic faith.

44

Gareth: Could this ultimately deteriorate to a point where it impacts China’s access to

energy supplies from the Middle East?

DR FRIEDMAN: I doubt very much that it changes the economic relationships, but it has

created a dangerous Western front for China. The clashes that we have seen in the

Himalayas are minor so far, but they are symptoms of a frontier filled with unrest. This isn’t

something we’re that aware of in the West, but in China they are extremely aware of it, and

the potential for it to flare into much larger conflict.

The problem facing the regime now is that they don’t know how to deal with all this unrest.

They took extreme measures to bring Xinjiang under control and are now dealing with the

consequences of that. It’s clear that they don’t really know what to do in Hong Kong, things

are not going as they thought they would.

There is no doubt that there is massive unhappiness within the Central

Committee of China about Xi’s overseeing of events at this stage

Gareth: What does happen in Hong Kong? One proposal from the UK is that large

number of Hong Kong citizens could be granted UK citizenship. Do we reach a point

where China sees no choice but to crack down harder, and could that lead to large

numbers taking up the UK on its offer? Is there a risk that we see the total disintegration

of Hong Kong’s financial system?

DR FRIEDMAN: The importance of Hong Kong to China is that it is the gateway for China to

access Western capital. As this question mark about Presidents Xi’s leadership has grown,

he has had to show that he can act decisively but also can’t risk alienating the financial

community. It’s a very tricky middle line to walk. There is no doubt that there is massive

unhappiness within the Central Committee of China about Xi’s overseeing of events at this

stage. The question now is will Western powers understand this and give him some room to

manoeuvre through it, or will their interference force a different approach, in which case we

could see a firmer crackdown.

Gareth: How do you think China would respond if Western powers escalate tensions

over Hong Kong?

DR FRIEDMAN: I wouldn’t expect the Chinese regime to act violently or aggressively

towards the West as ultimately that’s not an option for them. China needs Western finance

at favourable rates, and they need access to American markets. But it could add pressure

on the regime that ultimately forces China to go through a period of self-examination in

terms of how it is governed. China is certainly not going to turn towards an American or

Western style democracy, but there is a question about whether Beijing will be able to

5

retain control of the regions, or will the regions pull apart and resume their own history.

People forget that China has only been united for around 70 years, and that prior to that the

regions had been in civil war for 100 years.

Gareth: The other potential flashpoint is Taiwan and we’re seeing increasing tensions

between the US and China on technology. The US has previously tried to put pressure

on Taiwanese semiconductor companies to stop supplying Chinese technology

companies. Is there a risk that escalates?

DR FRIEDMAN: I’m not too worried about China and Taiwan. Although we see a lot of

rhetoric between the two sides, I think underlying that the Chinese and Taiwanese

understand each other very well.

A bigger problem is China’s goal of moving away from being an exporter of low value

products and to compete in high tech. China now finds itself trying to complete with the

United States, Germany and UK amongst many other countries, in one of the most

competitive and complex markets that exists. One of the ways that it can do that is by using

its political power which increases tensions.

In South Africa for example, despite the country being in economic disarray, they have

agreed to use Chinese technology to install 5G, which seems to be a politically driven

decision.

Gareth: Do you think China will be able to use its influence in emerging markets to

effectively replace lost demand from Western markets? What happens to the Belt and

Road Initiative2 now?

DR FRIEDMAN: I don’t think its possible to replace the demand from Europe and the United

States with demand from emerging markets. If China wants to move to higher value

products, they need to find a niche and dominate it – in the long-term they can’t keep

challenging Western companies that are already in a dominant position. That’s a very hard

battle to win.

The Belt and Road Initiative was a beautiful public relations exercise until you stop and think

about the cost implications of moving goods by road or rail rather than by ship. Then you

add in that a lot of the work must take place in one of the most unstable regions of the world

and it really stops making sense. I wonder if China meant to carry this through, or whether it

was just about positioning – China is always making announcements about investment that

never actually turns up. Alternatively, it could have effectively been an employment

programme, as where projects have taken place, they have been built by Chinese workers

rather than local workers. As it currently stands the initiative seems to have merely

damaged relations with countries such as Kazakhstan and Pakistan who were promised that

it would bring future prosperity that has never actually occurred.

Gareth: One issue that we have become concerned about is food supplies in China. It’s

well known that Asian swine flu has created problems for Pork supply, but we believe

cereals could also become a problem, as the timing of the lockdown meant crops

weren’t planted at the correct times. Are you concerned about potentially destabilising

food shortages and food price spikes?

DR FRIEDMAN: Crop shortages are something that’s not on our radar yet but one thing

we are concerned about is the struggle between President Xi and the Premier of the State

Council, Li Keqiang over the status of wet markets. President Xi is of the view that the wet

markets should be closed, but Li is opposed to this because they are the primary retail

outlet in many areas of China, and it’s not clear how food distribution would take place

without this infrastructure.

5

2 The Belt and Road Initiative was announced by the Chinese government in 2013 and was a plan to invest in infrastructure across close to 70 countries to create overland routes for the transportation of goods. The project is due for completion in 2049.

Gareth: We’re starting to move out of lockdown in many countries – but what do you

see as the longer-term repercussions of the coronavirus? Do we shift to an era of

greater government intervention and higher healthcare spending?

DR FRIEDMAN: The big question for us right now is are we in a recession or are we in a

depression? From a geopolitical viewpoint they are very different beasts. A recession is a

perfectly natural cyclical event that occurs within a business cycle, whereas in a depression

you see the physical destruction of major parts of the economy.

We’ve started to open the economy up again, but we don’t know what the consequences

will be, whether the infection will start to spread once again and whether we’ll have another

explosion of cases. I don’t know what will happen, but I do know that from an economic

perspective one of two things needs to happen before the fourth quarter. Either we get a

vaccine, and everyone goes back to work, or we have a change in social structure where we

learn to live with the disease, accepting that there is a small chance of dying but returning to

work without being terrified.

If neither of those happen then the real question is how to avoid a 1930s style depression.

Whole sectors such as airlines would no longer exist and that then has knock-on effects to

other industries.

What’s concerning is that even if we find a vaccine by September, it will be towards the end

of the year before we can manufacture and distribute sufficient amounts of it. We started

the crisis around March in most major economies, and that would mean ten months of

economic destruction before this is over. We’ve withdrawn labour from the economy, but

will those jobs be there when people want to return? Corporations are complex and

generally built up over many years – but when you shut down as we have labour moves,

and that can be hard to recover. Going back to the airline industry, will the pilots come back,

or will they have got alternative jobs? What about the stewards, or the ticketing agents? The

risk is that recovery becomes more difficult than anticipated.

SECTION 2 CORONAVIRUS – EMERGING FROM LOCKDOWN• Risks are growing that this is a depression rather than a

recession, with large sections of the economy destroyed

• It's difficult to see any winners, and the virus has increased stresses in a range of countries

• The WHO have not helped during the crisis and do not have the credibility to lead in the next stage

6

Gareth: I’ve seen plenty of estimates that suggest we don’t get a vaccine distributed

until the middle of next year. If this carries on for a prolonged period, are there any

countries that you would be particularly concerned about?

DR FRIEDMAN: I see this as similar to the aftermath of a World War, an event that no-one

comes out of undamaged. China is very vulnerable as we’ve discussed, and on the verge of

being overwhelmed by the problems it faces. Russia is in trouble – they are still living off the

export of a primary commodity and have no control over its price. It looked very scary for a

moment for Russia as oil prices collapsed and they started having to draw down reserves.

Oil prices have bounced back, but the vulnerability remains. The power of the United States

remains intact, but the country is amidst a massive political crisis, not stemming from the

virus, but with the virus potentially compounding the destabilisation. Then there is the

European Union, which I don’t see holding together over the long term.

Gareth: Do you see the World Health Organization as being instrumental in co-

ordinating a response or is it irrelevant now?

DR FRIEDMAN: Like many United Nations related entities, the WHO is not very well

organised or managed and that hasn’t helped during the crisis. There is also a problem in

that they don’t really have anything new to say, there are no solutions. For people to believe

you are credible you need to be able to speak in an authoritative voice, this is a situation

where public relations matters, and they just don’t have that.

Gareth: Iran is now under severe pressure from a combination of low oil prices,

coronavirus and sanctions. Is that a country you are concerned about in terms of

stability? Or could the regime potentially try to cause problems elsewhere to build

domestic support?

DR FRIEDMAN: Iran is boxed in pretty well at the moment. When they come West, the

Israelis are hammering them. Turkey has little use for them and doesn't trust them at all.

The Russians will support them to frustrate the US, but they won’t go further than that.

The US has shifted from a primarily military mode of dealing with problem countries, to a

primarily economic one. In China, they’ve used tariffs and with Russia and Iran they’ve used

sanctions. These measures may not get you exactly what you want, but they do exert

tremendous pressure, and that’s what we’ve seen in Iran. On their side, the Iranians have

underestimated the degree to which sanctions have put pressure on them and

overestimated the degree to which other countries would come to their assistance. So now

they are in the midst of a massive internal power struggle, the results of which will

determine their future.

7

It looked very scary for a moment for Russia as oil prices collapsed and they started having to draw

down reserves

8

Gareth: Who do you believe will win the US Presidential

election in November?

DR FRIEDMAN: It’s very difficult to say. Despite what the

media say, I think the protests are helping Trump. When you

look deeper into some of the polling around 70% of people

oppose the idea of defunding the police. But ultimately,

whoever wins the election, the same forces will continue to

tear up the country.

On the one side you have the largely white industrial working

class. Many have lost their jobs, and they believe that China

is responsible. They are the foundation of Trump's support.

On the other side you have those living on the Northeast and

West coast who were doing fairly well, caught up in

technocratic activities. Both sides despise each other, and

neither is going away. So, whoever wins this coming election,

you will have a large group of people bitterly opposed to the

direction the country is taking.

Gareth: Is there any prospect of a President at some point

being able to heal those divides?

DR FRIEDMAN: Well the US got through its civil war, with

650,000 dead. It got through the great depression, the

seventies, Richard Nixon and everything else. One thing that

will happen over time is that the industrial working class will

die. Their children will remain, but they will be gone. The

question is whether that new generation will have a different

view of the world.

Gareth: Under the Trump administration the US has

changed its relationship with several international

organisations such as the World Trade Organization and

the World Bank, even questioning the role of these

institutions. How important is that?

DR FRIEDMAN: What we’re seeing right now is the ending of

a period that started in 1945, and the world reorganising

itself for the modern era. In the years following World War II

these organisations were set up under the assumption that

there was common global interest, underpinned by the need

to prevent future wars. But the United States is increasingly

questioning how it benefits from its participation in these

structures. If we use NATO as an example, why does NATO

actually exist? Who is the enemy that NATO is facing off

against? When World War II was a close memory it was

reasonable for America to feel that it had to take a leading

role in defending Europe, but it's no longer evident why

they’d want to do that today. It’s no longer clear to many

Americans that these institutions have a purpose.

SECTION 3 ASSESSING THE US POLITICAL LANDSCAPE• Whoever wins the Presidential election, the underlying divisions are here to stay

• The world is now reorganising itself for the modern era, and the role of many international organisations is being questioned

• The coming decade is likely to be a difficult one, both economically and politically

9

Gareth: You seem to have a pretty gloomy prognosis – does

that mean more economic pain to come?

DR FRIEDMAN: I thought that the next ten years would resemble

the seventies, but I’m now wondering if it might resemble the

thirties. Historically America goes through fifty-year cycles, and

the politics get ugly during these periods. Presidents get

impeached, civil wars breakout but in the end the United States

weathers the storm as a new generation rises and throws aside

the old ways of doing things.

My prediction is that the next ten years will be very bad. Natural

events such as the virus are always with us, but when you are

particularly fragile, as we are right now, they have a

disproportionate effect.

Whoever wins this coming election, you will have a

large group of people bitterly opposed to the direction the

country is taking

9

10

Gareth: You’ve written in the past about crisis in Europe

and that you don’t think the European Union (EU) will

survive. Do you still have that view? The EU has

historically dealt with its internal divisions by doing just

enough to avert crisis – continuously taking small steps

forward. Do you feel that we reach a point where they are

unable to take the next step?

DR FRIEDMAN: I still don’t see how the EU can survive and

Brexit has further convinced me of that view. Britain is the

second largest economy in Europe and significant importer

of goods from countries such as Germany, but rather than

decide to use Brexit as a reason to re-evaluate, the EU

instead decided to go to war.

There are too many vulnerabilities within the EU. The EU has

allowed itself to be defined by Northern European ideals, but

Eastern and Southern Europe are culturally very different,

Southern Europe is also economically very different. Even

within Northern Europe there are vulnerabilities, Germany for

example is heavily reliant on exports. Ultimately, although it

all worked when the global economy was doing well, they

failed to make the necessary changes in 2008 and have

simply tried to continue under the same structure.

The EU was set up for common interests, but the more those

interests diverge, the more it becomes apparent that the EU is

just a collection of individual countries which are increasingly

difficult to bring together. At this stage there seems no

inclination at the centre to create a new understanding

between countries and a new common interest.

Gareth: Do you see the EU slowly withering away similar

to the Holy Roman Empire where it lasts for centuries but

with less and less power as power transfers to the nation

states?

DR FRIEDMAN: But that’s one of the problems, power never

left the nation states. There would never have been an EU if

nation states had been asked to give up their national

identity. How can Italy accept the pricing of the Euro? How

can Catholic Poland accept the constant massive criticism

from Germany? The centre attacks the periphery and the

question for the periphery must be, what am I getting out

of this?

Gareth: But do you have a similar situation as you’ve

talked about in the US, where you have a conflict

between classes, but ultimately those people die and you

have a new generation born that have a different view

about what Europe is about?

DR FRIEDMAN: The problem is that Europe’s situation

doesn’t have the time to wait for that solution. They need a

solution that bridges the divide between the North and

South right now. The hostility between Hungary and Poland

to Germany is very real and needs to be resolved now.

In the end, the United States is one country. It has a people

with a common history. In Europe each country has a

different identity. It’s not even economic, the Italian solution

for a problem will be very different to the German solution.

The EU is simply a contrivance, whose justification is

usefulness, so when it ceases to be useful there is no moral

obligation to continue with it. It was created with the idea of

creating peace and prosperity, but you don’t have that. At

the end of the day no one is going to fight to impose the will

of Brussels – it is not a country it is just a treaty, and treaties

can end.

10

SECTION 4 EUROPE – STARTING TO FRAGMENT?• Brexit was an opportunity for the EU to re-evaluate – but it wasn't taken

• Europe needs solutions for its problems right now, it doesn't have the luxury of time

• Italy is likely to be the next test point for the EU

11

Gareth: Given that you see rupture as far more likely – what

kind of timescale do you see that happening over? Should we

expect a large country to leave say after the next Italian

election, the next French election?

DR FRIEDMAN: The immediate problem is Italy; it’s a large country

and it needs to make decisions by the end of this year. So that will

be the next test.

Gareth: Pulling it all together, it sounds fairly gloomy overall.

China is fragile. The US has deep divisions, it will probably pull

through but may have a decade-long depression. The EU is

likely to break up. Are there any bright spots to finish on?

DR FRIEDMAN: The point is that these are cyclical events and the

world has entered this together, much as they did in the 1920s

and 1930s. We go through this periodically and it is the way that

advanced industrial economies cleanse themselves. China will still

be vibrant. The US will pull together. Europe may or may not have

the European Union – but Europe itself will still be there. The

question is how we get through this period to the end – and that

is likely to be painful.

Gareth: Can the world go through this and not end up with the

kind of conflict that resulted after the 1930’s?

DR FRIEDMAN: I see the possibility of war, but I don’t see the

players. The idea that the US and China would go to war is crazy.

The US can’t possibly invade China and it’s not going to try, and

China can’t possibly take the Pacific waters from the United States

and they won’t try. The structure of the world at the moment

doesn’t really permit war on any meaningful scale.

The EU was set up for common interests, but the more those interests diverge, the more it

becomes apparent that the EU is just a collection of individual

countries which are increasingly difficult to bring together

11

Whether a recession or a depression, it is clear that the

impact of the coronavirus will be with us for many

years to come

13

THE INSIGHT VIEWWe also believe that China has a difficult road ahead, as it continues to

transition from an export and investment-led growth model to one that is

consumption based. We expect China to move to a sustained current

account deficit of 1-2% of GDP over the next 10-years, with China forced to

further open its capital account to attract foreign investment and allow it to

maintain its managed exchange rate.

Whether a recession or a depression, it is clear that the impact of the

coronavirus will be with us for many years to come. Central banks are likely

to want to maintain monetary policy at historically easy levels for a

considerable period, and a period of above-target inflation may become

more acceptable to support government finances and to ensure that a

recovery is firmly entrenched. The US election, and the fiscal plans of the

incoming administration are something that we will be closely monitoring.

In Europe, we are more optimistic that the EU will ultimately survive, but

steps towards fiscal union are likely to be necessary for long-term

sustainability.

13

CONTRIBUTORS

Gareth Colesmith, Head of Global Rates and Macro Research, Fixed income, Insight Investment

Simon Down, Senior Content Specialist, Insight Investment

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