Global Regimes and U.S-Latin American Relations:

Rethinking the Post-Cold War Era

THE PROBLEM

How to conceptualize the connection between the global arena and U.S.-Latin American relations in the wake of the Cold War? And then 9/11?

Widespread view: little if any connectionMy contention: the connection exists but is complex and

contradictory

READINGS

Smith, Talons, chs. 9-11

DFC, Contemporary, chs. 1, 3

GUEST SPEAKERS

Apr 23 Adela Navarro (drugs in Mexico)May 07 Jeffrey Davidow (impacts of 9/11)May 14 David Shirk (drug violence)May 21 Tom Wong & Kathy Kopineck

(migration)May 28 Charles Shapiro (Venezuela)

After the Cold War: The Global Arena

1. Collapse of the Soviet Union

2. U.S. military primacy: the “unipolar moment”

3. “The End of History”?

4. Transnationalization and non-state actors

5. Process of “globalization”

6. Shift from geo-politics to “geo-economics”

7. Economic multipolarity: Europe, Japan, others?

ON “GLOBALIZATION”

• Factors:– End of Cold War=reduction of political barriers– Communication technologies– Transnational enterprises: production chains and consumer

markets– Movement of people and goods, legal and illegal

• Features:– Inexorability, inevitability– Politics the result of economics– Inclusion vs. exclusion?– Claim: no ideology

GEO-ECONOMICS: RULES OF THE GAME

1. Presumably “peaceful” competition

2. Positive-sum, not zero- or negative-sum

3. Goal: increase or guarantee share of economic benefits—without destroying (or even defeating) rivals

4. Strategy: Maintenance of global “stability”

5. Tactic: formation of “open” blocs

RULES OF THE GAME (cont.)

Competitive arenas: Consumer markets, natural resources (energy, water, etc.) Technology Financial markets

State roles: Direct participation Shaping of incentives Legitimacy on basis of “market discourse”

Regional integration: Strong seek to perpetuate primacy Weak seek to avoid exclusion Thus asymmetrical bargaining

North American Free Trade (NAFTA/1994)

U.S. Perspectives: Supplement to FTA with Canada Support for neoliberal reforms in Mexico Growing Mexican-American population within U.S.

Incentives for Mexico: Exhaustion of alternatives Need to stimulate growth Perpetuation of Salinista policies

Key Characteristics: Uneven levels of development Cultural and political variation Hub-and-spoke arrangements (with U.S. at center) Absence of supranational authority (preservation of sovereignty)

Assessing Results: The Problem of Cause-and-Effect

NAFTA in comparison with:

• Initial expectations (and political rhetoric)

• Liberalization (mid-1980s)

• Global and/or U.S. economic conditions

• Long-term economic and social trends

• Short-term shocks (e.g., Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95)

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS

The Public Assertion: Free Trade = Democracy

The Silent Bargain: International Dimensions

• Political stability and social peace

• Access to petroleum

• Leverage vis-à-vis economic rivals

• Compliance on foreign policy

The Procession of Free Trade

1. NAFTA (1994)

2. FTAA process (R.I.P.)

3. Bilaterals and minilaterals:

• U.S.-Chile (2004)• U.S.-Central America + D.R. (2005)• U.S.-Peru (2007)• U.S.-Colombia (2011)• U.S.-Panama (2011)

George W. Bush and theGlobal War on Terror

PHASE 1: BEFORE 9/11 High level of presidential interest Relationship with Mexico (and Vicente Fox) Near-agreement on immigration reform (?) Support for FTAA Administrative team Isolation of Cuba

PHASE 2: AFTER 9/11 Change in regional priorities Unilateralist impulses End of wholesale immigration reform

GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:THE RULES OF THE GAME

1. Nations can respond however they choose—including the use of indiscriminate force.

2. Preventive action is appropriate and acceptable.

3. There is no need to adhere to international treaties or conventions.

4. Alliances are formed around one central issue—the anti-terror campaign under U.S. leadership. Support is black-white. Democracy and human rights are secondary issues.

5. Spectator nations must tread cautiously.

U.S. LOSS OF “SOFT POWER”

U.S. PRESTIGE IN LATIN AMERICA

CHANGING VIEWS OF U.S.

Distaste for Abu Ghraib, Haditha, “collateral damage” and loss of life

Solidarity with innocent civilians, hidden admiration for Osama bin Laden

Rejection of American society, not just U.S. foreign policy

Resentment of unilateral approachDistrust of democratic crusade

TWO-LEVEL GAMESGeo-economic game + new geopolitical game,

superimposed and simultaneousGeopolitics > geo-economics if necessary

Low priority for region Benefits of inattention (benign neglect?)

Examples: FTAs on basis of geopolitics Reluctance on immigration reform Allies in wars on drugs

Contradictions and trade-offs

…AND BARACK OBAMA?

Redefinition of war against terror Afghanistan > Iraq Al Qaeda ≠ Taliban Rules of game more subtly applied

Re Latin America, changes in rhetoric and emphasis rather than substance Immigration Drugs and drug trafficking FTAs Lingering effects