global swing states: brazil, india, indonesia, turkey, and the future of international order

7/29/2019 Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and the Future of International Order

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n o v e m b e r

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Glal Swig Stats

Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and

the Future of International Order

By Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine


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Cover Image

Photo illustration by Liz Fontaine, Center for a New American Security.

About this report

This report is part o an ongoing project undertaken by the Center or a New American Security (CNAS) and the GermanMarshall Fund o the United States (GMF). The project examines how the United States and its European allies can partnermore closely with Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey to strengthen the international order.

AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank our colleagues at CNAS and GMF or their support o the project. We are above all grate-ul to Kristin Lord or her extensive guidance on this report and to Matt Irvine and Sharon Stirling-Woolsey or their diversecontributions. We are thankul to Will Rogers, Shawn Brimley, Oriana Mastro, Mikeal Staier, David Forman, Nancy Brune,Nora Bensahel, David Barno, Dan Twining, Dhruva Jaishankar, Andrew Small and Emiliano Alessandri or providing criti-cal eedback on initial drats. J. Dana Stuster, Chris Whyte, Guilherme Annunciacao, Daaman Thandi, David Morrison andJonathan Condra all provided research and editorial assistance. We are grateul to Ozgur Unluhisarcikli and his sta inAnkara or arranging research interviews in Turkey and to Patrick Cronin or his help arranging meetings in Indonesia. Weare indebted to Kay King, Sara Conneighton, Liz Fontaine, Will Bohlen, Anne McGinn and Christine Chumbler or their mediaand publication expertise. We are grateul to GMFs ofces in Europe or hosting release events or this report and to DodieJones or her help with congressional outreach.

We also want to thank the individuals who provided external eedback on earlier report drats: Mark Lagon, Ted Piccone,Holly Morrow, Joshua Walker, Walter Lohman, Bruce Jentleson, Mort Halperin and Kellie Meiman Hock, who also helped to

arrange meetings in Brazil. We want to express our thanks to Jennier Hillman, Megan Garcia, Joseph Quinlan, Ted Picconeand James Kraska, who made intellectual contributions to the project through their papers. We extend appreciation toJoo Marques de Almeida, who hosted a roundtable or the project in Brussels and to Hazelia Margaretha, who organizeda orum or the authors in Jakarta. Lastly, we want to express our sincere thanks to the many individuals who participatedin the projects six working group meetings and to the dozens o Brazilians, Indians, Turks and Indonesians who generouslyshared their perspectives with the authors.

This report was made possible through the generous support o the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Swedish Ministry oForeign Aairs and the GE Foundation.

The authors are solely responsible or the views expressed herein.


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G Sg Stts

Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order

B Daie M. Kima ad Ricard Fotaie

N O V E M B E R2 0 1 2

Appedi C: Idia Recommedatios

Appedi D: Idoesia Recommedatios

Appedi E: Trke Recommedatios

T a b l e o C o n T e n T S

I. Eective Smmar 5

II. Itrodctio 7

III. Te Goba Order 8

IV. Promisig Parters 13

V. Mappig te Goba Sig States 17

VI. Terms o Egagemet 28

VII. Cocsio 34

Appedi A: Geera Recommedatios 37

Appedi B: Brai Recommedatios 38


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Global Swing States

Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International OrderN O V E M B E R 2 0 1 2

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About the Authors

Dr. Daniel M. Kliman is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

Richard Fontaine is the President of the Center for a New American Security.


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GlOBAl SwInG STATES: BRAzIl, InDIA,InDOnESIA, TuRKEy AnD ThE FuTuREOF InTERnATIOnAl ORDER

D M. Km d Rcrd t


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Global Swing States



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B Daie M. Kima ad Ricard Fotaie

I . E x E C u T I V E S u M M A R y An interlocking web o global institutions, rulesand relationships has ostered peace, prosperityand reedom or the past six decades. However,

without proper stewardship, this international

order is at risk. o deend and strengthen the

international order that has served so many or

so long, American leaders should pursue closer

partnerships with our key nations Brazil, India,

Indonesia and urkey. ogether, these global

swing states hold the potential to renew the inter-

national order on which they, the United States,

and most other countries depend.1

Te current international order conronts numer-

ous challenges. Some o those challenges largely

relate to the rise o China, such as outsized mari-

time claims and the bypassing o international

nancial institutions. Other challenges involve

stagnating multilateral trade talks, a weakened

global nancial architecture, the nuclear ambitions

o North Korea and Iran and a retrenchment o

democracy in some parts o the world. At the same

time, a combination o scal and political pressures

constrains the role o traditional supporters o the

global order such as the United States and Europe.

Te United States should thereore seize the oppor-

tunity to enlarge the international orders base

o supporters to include Brazil, India, Indonesia

and urkey. Tese our nations each possess a

large and growing economy, a strategic location

in their region and a commitment to democratic

institutions. And critically, each nations precise

international role is now in ux.

In the American political context, swing states arethose whose mixed political orientation gives them

a greater impact than their population or economic

output might warrant. Such states promise the

greatest return on investment or U.S. presidential

campaigns deciding where to allocate scarce time

and resources. Likewise, in U.S. oreign policy, a

ocus on Brazil, India, Indonesia and urkey can

deliver a large geopolitical payo, because their

approach to the international order is more uid


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Global Swing States


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and open than those o China or Russia. In addi-tion, the choices that these our countries make

about whether to take on new global responsibili-

ties, ree ride on the eorts o established powers

or complicate the solving o key challenges may,

together, decisively inuence the trajectory o the

current international order.

Te concept o global swing states oers a new

ramework or thinking about these our powers. It

describes their position in the international system;

however, it does not suggest an emerging bloc. On

the contrary, Brazil, India, Indonesia and urkey

are unlikely to act in concert. In most cases, U.S.

eorts will ocus on each nation separately rather

than on the our o them collectively. Nevertheless,

considering these countries through a common

ramework can clariy Washingtons oreign policy

priorities and lead to new and more strategic

approaches that go beyond simply managing our

bilateral relationships.

Americas engagement with the global swing states

should include our components:

Capitalizing on areas where Brazil, India,

Indonesia and urkey have already taken on new

global responsibilities;

Addressing some o their demands or greater

representation in international institutions;

Helping the our countries strengthen their

domestic capacity to more actively support the

international order;

Increasing the resources and attention that theU.S. government devotes to these nations to bet-

ter match their rising strategic importance.

Te stakes are high. I the United States, its allies

and these rising democracies strengthen the inter-

national order, they are all more likely to thrive. I

the global order ragments, they and the broader

world will suer the consequences.


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I I . I n T R O D u C T I O nTe rise o our powerul democracies Brazil,

India, Indonesia and urkey could bolster todays

international order. Yet this outcome is ar rom

assured. Te degree to which the our global

swing states, as we call them, will deend and

reorm the global order remains uncertain. I they

do, their rise presents an enormous opportunity or

the United States and its allies. I they do not, they,

the United States and countries across the globe

will suer the consequences. Tis report ocuses

primarily on how the United States can work with

these our powers to renew the international order.

All our global swing states may come to actively

support the main elements o the current interna-

tional order. As their economies expand, they will

have a greater stake in international arrangements

that acilitate the growth o trade and investment.

As democracies, they may be attracted to the open,

stable, rules-based nature o the existing system,

which has allowed representative government

to take root in many regions. As their militarystrength increases and the geographic scope o

their interests expands, they may also reap greater

benets rom a system that helps to prevent war

among the major powers.

All our nations remain skeptical, however, o

elements o the existing international order. On

top o this, domestic challenges in each country

will compete or the resources and attention that a

larger global role demands. Americas engagement

with these our countries is critical and can inu-ence their choices and enlarge their capacity to

take on new responsibilities but it remains a work

in progress.

Te United States has strived in recent years to

build closer relations with each o these countries.

Washington has invested heavily in a long-term

strategic partnership with New Delhi; this invest-

ment has reaped near-term dividends on issues like

nonprolieration but has led to little progress oneorts such as multilateral trade liberalization. Te

U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership o-

cially launched in November 2010 remains more o

an aspiration than a reality. Washingtons engage-

ment with Brasilia has broadened to include joint

naval exercises and limited collaboration in Arica,

but cooperation between the two countries remains

but a shadow o its ull potential. Ankaras unwill-

ingness to back additional economic sanctions

against Iran and its growing tensions with Israel

temporarily strained U.S. relations with urkey,but the Arab Spring has created new opportunities

or cooperation even as the relationship remains

riddled with potential ashpoints.

Tis report begins by reviewing new challenges

to the international order and then lays out why

Brazil, India, Indonesia and urkey are particularly

promising partners in its deense. It then examines

the positions o each o the our nations regard-

ing ve central pillars o the global order: trade,

nance, the maritime commons, nonprolieration

and human rights. Te report ultimately presents a

series o detailed policy recommendations or how

to partner with the global swing states to pursue an

international order that will continue to promote

prosperity, enhance peace, and advance human

rights and democracy.


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Global Swing States


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I I I . T h E G l O B A l O R D E R

Following World War II, the United States and its

allies ashioned a new system, based on interna-

tional rules and rooted in new institutions, that

aimed to regulate the conduct o states. Te United

Nations was the orders crown jewel a parlia-

ment o man that aspired to prevent uture wars

among its members.2 Te World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) were estab-

lished to promote economic development and

nancial stability, and the General Agreement on

aris and rade (GA), the predecessor to the

World rade Organization (WO), was ounded to

promote trade liberalization.

Although routinely reerred to as a global order,

this system never encompassed the entirety o

the world. Te Soviet bloc stood outside many o

the new institutions or participated in them only

indierently; other bodies, such as NAO, were

ounded to maintain order precisely by opposing

Soviet designs. Te order also evolved over time

in response to technological changes, a growingdemand or natural resources and the trade imbal-

ances that emerged as Western Europe and Japan

recovered rom wartime devastation.3

oday, there are numerous elements o the interna-

tional order, but ve pillars are key:4

1. Te trade orderadvances the principles o com-

mercial reciprocity and nondiscrimination. It is

highly ormalized, based on the GA, and now

embodied in the WO and its web o rules anddispute resolution mechanisms. Te Doha Round

o global trade talks represents the current eort to

extend this order in the direction o reer interna-

tional commerce.

2. Tefnancial orderaims at monetary stabil-

ity. It is rooted in exible exchange rates, general

currency convertibility and the U.S. dollar as the

predominant international reserve currency. Te

IMF lls a role as a lender o last resort. Te World

Bank channels capital and strategic and techni-cal advice to middle-income and poor nations to

help spur economic development. Since 2008, the

Group o 20 (G20) has emerged as a key institution

that endeavors to guide the global nancial order.

3. Te maritime orderis premised on territorial

sovereignty and reedom o navigation. Many o

the rules underpinning the maritime order have

been ormalized in the U.N. Convention on the

Law o the Sea (UNCLOS). Although some coun-

tries (including the United States) have not ratied

the convention, Washington and most major

capitals recognize its key provisions as customary

international law. U.S. naval power continues to

backstop international law governing the use o the

maritime domain.

4. Te nonprolieration orderseeks to prevent the

spread o nuclear weapons and to reduce their

testing. It is rooted in the Nuclear Nonprolieration

reaty (NP), which draws a strict distinction

between recognized nuclear weapons states and all

others. It also includes the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) and multilateral export

control regimes that attempt to limit the spread o

particular weapons and delivery systems. Less-

institutionalized elements o the nonprolieration

order range rom eorts such as the U.S.-led

Prolieration Security Initiative (PSI) to ad hoc

multilateral coordination designed to stem proli-

eration nancing and gather intelligence.

5. Te human rights orderis rooted in respect

or undamental liberties and the democraticprocess. It encompasses a range o widely recog-

nized international norms relating to the basic

rights and liberties o all individuals. Tese

rights are enumerated in documents such as the

Universal Declaration on Human Rights and

the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights, along with the constitutions and

laws o many democratic nations. A new and

contested element o this order is emerging in the


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Responsibility to Protect, a doctrine that elevatesthe protection o individuals against atrocities

above the traditional sovereign norm against out-

side intererence.5

During the rst ve decades o its existence, the

global order permitted the expansion o peace,

prosperity and reedom. While by no means

banishing war, the order acilitated the longest

period o peace among great powers in modern

times. Te nancial architecture that it established

reduced both the requency and the severity o

global banking crises.6 Because o the economic

stability and openness engendered by the global

order, the world experienced a dramatic increase

in trade and investment and a rise in per capita

incomes unknown to an earlier age.7 Te spread

o nuclear weapons slowed, and some countries

relinquished their nuclear capability or abandonedtheir weapon-state ambitions.8 Moreover, democ-

racy took root in new areas o the world, including

regions where dictatorship had long prevailed,

enabling more than hal o humanity to live under

democratically elected governments.9

lmg CgsSince 2000, however, new challenges have

put pressure on each pillar o the global

order. During the 1990s, the consolidation o

ree-market democracies across Europe andelsewhere together with the economic integra-

tion o developing countries that had long stood

outside the global economy led some analysts to

predict the enduring triumph o the international

order.10 Te creation o the WO and the inde-

nite extension o the NP oered similar cause

or optimism.11 In reality, the late 1990s may have

marked the orders apogee. Multiple challenges

some emanating rom Chinas rise and others rom

a diverse set o international developments have

emerged.

Elements o Chinas ascendancy have put pres-

sure on the existing international system. In trade,

Chinas globally competitive state-owned enter-

prises and push or indigenous innovation have

revealed gaps in the WOs regulatory structure,

which divides trade into actions by governments

and actions by private companies. Unable to

employ multilateral mechanisms, nations have

responded to Chinas behavior through ad hoc

protectionist measures. In nance, China has

bypassed the World Bank by lending bilaterally to

developing countries and has started to transorm

the renminbiinto a global currency, a move that

may partly shif the international monetary system

away rom the U.S. dollar.12 Meanwhile, Beijings

claims to virtually the entire South China Sea and

attempts to limit reedom o navigation pose a

challenge to the maritime order.

However, China is not solely responsible or the

mounting pressures on the international order.

Because o objections rom countries such asBrazil and India, movement on the Doha Round

o talks has ceased, and there exists little discus-

sion about advancing ree trade at the global level.

What has emerged is a patchwork o regional

and bilateral deals, some o which all short o

actual ree-trade agreements. Te market turmoil

o recent years has raised questions about the

legitimacy o the nancial order. In East Asia,

powers that ofen compete have come together

Te late 1990s may have

marked the orders apogee.

Multiple challenges some

emanating rom Chinas rise

and others rom a diverse set o

international developments

have emerged.


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Global Swing States


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T G ordr: Mtrcs ts Sccss

iGuRe 1: woRlD GRoSS DoMeSTiC pRoDuCT

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

CurrentU.S.

Dollars(intrillions)

Year

iGuRe 2: woRlD TRaDe

Source: World Trade Organization Statistics Database

0

5

10

15

20

25

1948

1952

1956

1960

1964

1968

1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

CurrentU.S.D

ollars(intrillions)

Year

Tota Trade

Mercadise Trade

Services Trade


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1900-1945

88%

1946-2003

12%

iGuRe 4: baTTle-RelaTeD DeaThS

Note: 2003 is the last available year.

Source: Correlates o War Inter-State War Data

0

2

4

6

8

10

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

NumberofCountries

Year

iGuRe 6: nuMbeR o nuCleaR weapon STaTeS

Sources: Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,Arms ControlAssociat ion Fact Sheet, April 2005. Hedrick Smith, U.S. Assumes the IsraelisHave A-Bomb or its Parts, The New York Times, July 18, 1970. Brian Kaper,Understanding the South Arican Nuclear Experience and its Applicability toIran, Princeton Journal o International Aairs 19 (Spring 2008), 127.

YeaR

all

CounTRieS

nuMbeR

of

DeMoCRaCieS

peRCenTaGe

of

DeMoCRaCieS

1974 145 39 27%

1989 167 69 41%

1993 190 108 57%

2000 192 120 63%

2006 193 123 64%

2011 195 117 60%

iGuRe 5: DeMoCRaCieS in The woRlD

Sources: Figures or 1989-2011 are rom Freedom in t he World 2012; thegure or 1974 is rom Table 2.1 in Larr y Diamond, Developing Democracy

iGuRe 3: inTeRnaTional MaRiTiMe TRaDe

Source: U.N. Conerence on Trade and Development

0

5

10

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

CargoWeight(in

millionsoftons)

Year


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Global Swing States


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to expand the Chiang Mai Initiative, a sharedcurrency pool that is becoming a regional alter-

native to the IMF.13 Te maritime order is being

challenged by urkeys outsized claims in the

eastern Mediterranean, Russias extensive claims

in the Arctic Ocean,14 and piracy, a threat that has

waxed and waned in Southeast Asia, the Horn o

Arica and now the Gul o Guinea. Although sus-

tained international vigilance has at times curbed

piracy in specic regions, the total number o

incidents afer 2000 has remained high compared

to the preceding period.15

Nuclear pursuits by North Korea and Iran pose

a proound challenge to the nonprolieration

order. North Korea has withdrawn rom the NP,

developed a nuclear weapons capability and tested

missile delivery systems. International sanctions

and covert measures notwithstanding, Irans

nuclear program also continues to progress.16

Te human rights order, too, conronts new pres-

sures. Te wave o democratization that began

in the 1970s has crested; the number o electoraldemocracies in the world dropped in 2010 to 115,

the lowest level since 1995, and has rebounded

only slightly.17 Countries in Latin America, Arica

and the ormer Soviet Union have seen declines in

democracy.18 Mixed regimes have emerged that ea-

ture the trappings o electoral rule but ail to grant

citizens basic rights such as reedom o speech,

blurring the distinction between democracy and

other orms o government.

Te debt crisis that has orced a new era o auster-ity on America and many o its European allies

poses an additional challenge to the order. Current

i not necessarily long-term scal pressures will

likely reduce American military and oreign aairs

spending in the coming years. Europe conronts an

even bleaker scal landscape, and many European

countries have already started to slash deense out-

lays and cut oreign aid.19 Because Western military

and nancial capabilities have long underwritten

the global order, the advent o scal austerity putsurther strain on the international system.

On balance, todays global order is subject to

growing pressures. Yet there is no single emerg-

ing alternative. Unlike the communist bloc afer

World War II, there are no countries today with

both the power and ambition to construct a rival

system. Although sometimes touted as the oun-

dation o a new international order,20 the BRICS

grouping which brings together Brazil, Russia,

China, India and South Arica lacks the neces-

sary unity o interests and ideological cohesion

to ulll this role. And whether the BRICS can

expand to encompass other rising powers is in

doubt. Indonesia and urkey, or instance, preer to

engage the groups members bilaterally.21

In the uture, the principles advanced by the

international order may become less universally

binding; dierent parts o the world may inter-

pret and apply them based on local consensus or

the desires o the regionally dominant power. For

instance, reedom o navigation could retain itscurrent meaning in the North Atlantic but apply

only to commercial vessels in Chinas exclusive

economic zone (EEZ). In this uture, institutions

and arrangements that have successully regulated

key areas o state behavior may become less eec-

tive as they are replicated. Te consolidation o

the Chiang Mai Initiative into a potential regional

alternative to the IMF is a harbinger o this. Such

ragmentation would be deeply inimical to all

countries that depend upon an open and stable

world or their security and prosperity.


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IV . PROMISInG PA RTnERSTe United States must seize the opportunity

to preserve the international order by enlarging

its circle o supporters. In this endeavor, Brazil,

India, Indonesia and urkey represent particularly

promising partners. All possess large and rapidly

growing economies. All occupy central posi-

tions in a region or stand at the hinge o multiple

regions. All embrace democratic government at

home, which endows them with the potential to

ully support an order dened by liberal values and

norms.22 Lastly, all are increasingly inuential at

the regional and global level, and although they

desire changes to the international order, they do

not seek to scrap it.

brzBrazils uture appears increasingly bright. Its gross

domestic product (GDP) expanded by 3.5 percent

per year rom 2000 to 2011 and now totals more

than $2 trillion (this and subsequent GDP gures

are in terms o purchasing-power parity). In 2012,

Brazil passed the United Kingdom to become theworlds sixth-largest economy.23 Geographically,

Brazil dominates South America; it shares a border

with every country on the continent except Chile

and Ecuador. In addition, with a coastline that

extends ar into the South Atlantic, Brazil econom-

ically and culturally bridges South America and

West Arica. Since the transition rom military to

civilian rule in 1985, democracy in Brazil has taken

ever-deeper root.

Brazil has emerged as a regional leader andinuential global power. Regionally, Brazil has

expanded the Mercosur customs union beyond the

original ounding members, supported the creation

o the Union o South American Nations, led the

U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti and enhanced

integration with its neighbors by unding inra-

structure projects.24 Globally, Brazil has taken on

a higher prole by holding a nonpermanent seat

on the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), pressing

or UNSC permanent membership, exhibitingleadership within the G20, increasing its activities

in the WO, engaging in nuclear talks with Iran

and encouraging annual meetings or groups o

emerging powers, such as the BRICS and the IBSA

Forum (which comprises India, Brazil and South

Arica).

Brazilian leaders express eagerness or the

increased global recognition that they believe is

Brazils due. For several years, Brazils oreign

policy leaders have called or the United States to

publicly support Brazils aspirations to perma-

nent membership on the UNSC.25 As justication,

Brazilians cite the need to rebalance the UNSC

to include emerging-market interests, as well as

their countrys recent success at reducing inequal-

ity while boosting economic growth, democracy,

racial diversity and capacity to mediate inter-

national disputes. Brazilian leaders seek greater

weight within the IMF and the World Bank as well.

In a 2011 IBSA communiqu, Brazil joined India

and South Arica in calling or a new worldorder, one whose political, economic and nan-

cial architecture is more inclusive, representative

and legitimate.26 Tis rhetoric stems more rom

Brazils desire to gain a more prominent role

within the existing system or itsel and or

other emerging countries than rom an interest

in pursuing new rules and arrangements. As one

Brazilian observer put it, Brazil wants to expand

its room in the house, not tear the house down.27

idIndias power has begun to catch up with its sheer

size. Its GDP is roughly $4 trillion and grew at

7.4 percent annually between 2000 and 2011. By

some measures, India is now the worlds third-

largest economy.28 Sitting at the edge o the Middle

East and East Asia, India occupies the majority

o the South Asian landmass and has a land or

maritime boundary with every state in the region,

plus China, Burma, Indonesia and Tailand.


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Global Swing States


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Democracy in India has endured with only a singlebrie interruption since independence.

Since its economic reorms o the early 1990s,

Indias rising national wealth together with the

new military capabilities and diplomatic initiatives

that greater wealth aords have ueled Indias

global inuence. In the immediate region, New

Delhis activism has included signicant recon-

struction aid or Aghanistan and the promotion o

cooperation among Indian Ocean states.29 On the

global stage, India is a member o the BRICS and

boasts the largest emerging economy in the G20

afer China. India also recently held a nonperma-

nent seat on the UNSC and has played a critical

role in multilateral trade talks under the auspices

o the WO.

An overarching element o Indias oreign policy

is its quest or greater international recognition

and status, including permanent membership in

an enlarged UNSC. From New Delhis perspec-

tive, the argument or an Indian seat is plain:

Te worlds oremost decisionmaking body mustinclude a country that is both the most populous

democracy and an incontrovertible example that

electoral politics and economic growth can pro-

ductively coexist on the road to development. Te

United States has reinorced Indias ambitions by

issuing an unqualied endorsement o its pursuit

o a Security Council seat an unprecedented

step that the United States has yet to take or any

other emerging power.30 New Delhi also desires

enhanced weight within other major international

institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank,in which Indias inuence has not grown in parallel

with its relative economic size.31

Indian leaders have on occasion called or a new

global order.32 In practice, however, they preer to

boost Indias representation in the institutions that

exist.33 Te real tension in New Delhis oreign pol-

icy is whether to pursue an international approach

aimed at giving India the space to ocus on internal

development or to simultaneously pursue eco-nomic growth at home while taking on greater

and more costly responsibilities abroad.34 It is

currently unclear which argument will win out and

just how active India will become in upholding the

current system over the medium term.

idsIndonesias success is remarkable given that, little

over a decade ago, it was caught up in economic

and political disarray. Its political transition ol-

lowing the collapse o the Suharto dictatorship

in 1998 resulted in sustained democratic rule.

Indonesias economy, valued at about $1 trillion,

increased by 5.3 percent each year rom 2000

to 2011. Its status as the worlds most populous

Muslim-majority democracy is a major sof-power

asset. An archipelagic nation o more than 17,000

islands, Indonesia straddles two oceans and has

maritime boundaries with most Southeast Asian

nations, as well as Australia and India.

Indonesias economic rise has coincided with an

enlargement o the countrys regional and globalrole. Long the demographic heavyweight in

Southeast Asia, Indonesia has denitively emerged

since 2000 as the political center o gravity as well.

It successully chaired the Association o Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2011 and continues to

exercise a prominent voice within this regional

grouping, which has become the cornerstone o

many multilateral institutions in Asia. Beyond

the region, Indonesia is a member o although

not always a dynamic participant in several

notable orums, including the G20, the Asia PacicEconomic Cooperation orum and the 57-member

Organization o Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Compared with their Brazilian or Indian counter-

parts, Indonesian leaders are more circumspect

in articulating their desire or enhanced global

recognition. Pointing to its newly consolidated

democracy and status as the worlds most populous

Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia laid claim in


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| 15

2004 to a permanent seat in an enlarged UNSC.35

Since then, Jakarta has repeatedly called or reorm

o the Security Council to make the body more

representative, but it has tended to eschew directsel-promotion, instead advocating a standing seat

or a Muslim-majority nation or or more geo-

graphic diversity in the bodys membership.36

O the our global swing states, Indonesia remains

the most ocused on its own internal challenges

and has the least capacity to engage on global

issues. Whether Indonesia will decide to concen-

trate on internal development and retain a oreign

policy that remains overwhelmingly regional in

ocus or go global and work with the United States,

Europe and others to adapt and renew todays

international order remains uncertain.

TrkyOver the past decade, urkey has emerged as one

o the worlds most dynamic powers. urkeys GDP

expanded at an average rate o 4.3 percent rom

2000 to 2011 and today stands at approximately

$1 trillion. Lying at the juncture o Europe and

Asia, urkey borders many o the Middle Easts

most volatile countries, as well as the Balkans and

NORTH

AMERICA

A T L A N T I C

O C E A N

SOUTH

AMERICA

AFRICA

EUROPE

I N D I A N

O C E A N

AUSTRALIA

ASIA

CHINA

BRAZIL

Population 199,321,413GDP $2 trillion (2011)

Trade $310 billion (2011)

Land/Maritime boundaries 9

TURKEY

Population 79,749,461

GDP $992 billion (2011)



INDIA

Population 1,205,073,612

GDP $3.98 trillion (2011)



INDONESIA

Population 248,645,008GDP $992 billion (2011)



Sources: Population gures rom CIA World Factbook; GDP an d trade gures rom World Bank World Development Indicators database.

iGuRe 7: Global SwinG STaTe STaTiSTiCS


18/52

Global Swing States


16 |

the Caucasus. It also shares maritime boundar-ies with Russia and Ukraine. Military coups no

longer punctuate periods o civilian rule in urkey;

the coexistence o electoral democracy and a

Muslim-majority population is a distinguishing

characteristic o urkish politics.

Buoyed by rapid economic growth, urkey has

moved decisively toward an ambitious regional

and even global role in recent years. It belongs

to a diverse set o international institutions,

including NAO, the Organisation or Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD), the

Council o Europe and the OIC; it is also an appli-

cant or membership in the European Union (EU).

urkey actively participates in the G20 and recently

occupied a nonpermanent seat on the UNSC.

urkey aspires to a greater status in world aairs.

Tis is particularly true within the Middle East,

where Ankara has successully advanced regional

economic integration and, in the wake o the Arab

Spring, has put itsel orward as a democratic

model. In Syria, urkey has led the way in tak-ing military action against the Bashar al-Asad

regime. urkey seeks an elevated prole within the

U.N., and urkish leaders have already begun to

campaign or a new term on the Security Council,

arguing that urkey will provide signicant added

value to global peace and security in an era o criti-

cal and rapid change in international aairs.37 Te

government in Ankara sees the eventual enlarge-

ment o the Security Council as desirable and

would likely put orward urkey as a candidate

or a permanent seat.38 In the IMF and the WorldBank, urkey also seeks greater inuence, com-

mensurate with its newound economic clout.39

urkish Prime Minister Recep ayyip Erdogan has

called or a new global order based on solidar-

ity and trust rather than conict.40 In practice,

however, urkey has yet to sett le on any denitive

vision or that new order beyond expanded repre-

sentation in key orums.


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| 17

V. M A P P I n G T h E G l O B A l S w I n GSTATES

Tis section examines the positions o each o the

our global swing states toward key pillars o the

international order: trade, nance, the maritime

commons, nonprolieration and human rights.

brzBrazil seeks to modiy the trade, nance, mari-

time and human rights orders by working through

existing institutions and arrangements. At the

same time, it has started to take on new globalresponsibilities in development nancing and

maritime security.

TRaDe oRDeR

Brazil has at times worked to slow global trade

liberalization, enacted protectionist policies

within the scope allowed by the WO and

pressed or consideration o exchange rates as a

trade issue.

In the Doha Round o multilateral talks, Brazilorganized a coalition o emerging economies that

helped bring the Cancun Ministerial to a halt in

2003.41 It subsequently reused to separate emerg-

ing market economies rom underperorming

developing countries, thereby contributing to the

deadlock o these negotiations. Since the launch o

the Doha Round, Chinas rise has urther com-

plicated the equation, given ears in Brazil that a

global lowering o trade barriers would result in an

inux o Chinese imports. Brazil has taken protec-

tionist steps such as its Buy Brazil governmentprocurement policy, its Bigger Brazil industrial

policy and the recent temporary increase to 25

percent o import taris on 100 goods42 but it has

done so within the scope o its WO obligations.

Furthermore, Brasilia has made extensive use o

the WOs dispute settlement mechanism, bring-

ing complaints in 25 cases.43

Brazil has complained that monetary policy in

China and the United States has harmed its business

interests, and it has attempted to bring the matterbeore the WO. Brasilia regards currency valuation

as a commercial issue, arguing that an articially

depreciated currency unctions as an export subsidy.

o combat currency dumping, it has proposed a

dispute settlement mechanism to adjudicate alleged

cases o exchange-rate manipulation.44 Although

Brazils eorts have generated modest results thus

ar, its determination to work through an existing

multilateral ramework bears noting.

inanCial oRDeR

Brazil unds key nancial institutions and pro-

vides considerable development assistance while

advocating capital controls and a less dollar-centric

global monetary system.

Te Brazilian government has pledged to contrib-

ute up to $10 billion to bolster the IMFs lending

capacity as the European debt crisis lingers.45 While

still a major recipient o World Bank loans, Brazil

has also become a contributor, donating an average

o over $250 million each year rom 2004 to 2009.46

Most important, Brazil has become one o the larg-est providers o oreign assistance to poor countries

through its state development bank.47

Brazil is a vocal proponent o capital controls.

Under President Dilma Rousse, Brazil imposed

controls in a bid to stabilize its currency against

the monetary tsunami created by the asset pur-

chases o Western central banks looking to revive

domestic economic growth.48 However, even beore

quantitative easing became a household term,

Brazil questioned the rules governing internationalcapital ows, believing that it was unairly saddled

with an overvalued exchange rate and diminished

export competiveness. In the wake o the global

nancial crisis, Brasilia has succeeded in inducing

the IMF to rethink capital controls and develop a

new ramework or their use.49

Brazilian leaders object to the U.S. dollars sta-

tus as the worlds predominant reserve currency.


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Global Swing States


18 |

Although concerned about Chinas exchangerate manipulation, they regard the U.S. Federal

Reserves quantitative easing as a more signicant

economic threat.50 Brazils current nance minis-

ter, Guido Mantega, has called or a new monetary

system with special drawing rights rom the IMF

unctioning as an additional reserve currency.51

Furthermore, Brasilia has moved to denominate

its trade with Argentina and China in local cur-

rency rather than U.S. dollars.52 Te currency swap

agreement with China gives a boost to Beijings

aspirations to transorm the renminbi into a globalreserve currency.

MaRiTiMe oRDeR

Brazil has tried to bend maritime rules to its

advantage but has also started to make contribu-

tions to maritime security.

A signatory to UNCLOS, Brazil maintains that a

provision o the treaty grants coastal states the right

to regulate oreign militaries operating in their

EEZs. Brazil, however, has not harassed oreign

navies transiting its EEZ. Instead, Brazil has workedthrough UNCLOS to pursue its maritime ambitions.

For instance, Brazil in 2008 proposed to expand the

security zone around oshore installations allowed

by maritime law. Tis unsuccessul gambit would

have enabled Brazil to legally impede shipping by

constructing chains o maritime platorms.53

Brazil has taken modest steps toward supporting

maritime security. It has helped to equip and train

the Namibian navy and recently conducted coun-

ter-piracy training with the Nigerian navy.54 In theWestern Hemisphere, Brazil joins the nearly 20

nations that participate in PANAMAX, a multina-

tional exercise to promote interoperability among

regional navies as they conront potential threats to

the Panama Canal and its approaches.55

nonpRolieRaTion oRDeR

Brazil has reluctantly accepted most o the non-

prolieration orders legal elements while opposing

new nonprolieration measures on the grounds o

preserving sovereignty and attempting to broker a

nuclear deal with Iran.

Brazil signed the NP in 1998 and also ratied

the Comprehensive est Ban reaty (CB).56 Yet

Brasilia continues to chae at what it perceives as

the unbalanced nature o the NP and the ailure

o the nuclear weapon states to ulll their com-

mitment to disarm.57 Citing a lack o legitimacy

in the NP and the robustness o its bilateral

inspection regime with Argentina,58 Brazil has

reused to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol.59

Some Brazilian leaders have explained their coun-

trys reusal as stemming rom a desire to avoid

strengthening the NP in the hope that the treaty

might someday be replaced with an international

convention that bans the possession o nuclear

weapons by all states.60

Te preservation o sovereignty has at timesinclined Brasilia to oppose measures aimed at

strengthening the nonprolieration order. Brazil

regards access to uranium enrichment technology

as not only a path to enhanced international recog-

nition but also a necessity or continued industrial

development.61 It thereore remains wary o inter-

national eorts to limit access to the nuclear uel

cycle, including or Iran.62 In addition, Brazil has

remained outside the PSI because o the possibility

Although concerned about

Chinas exchange rate

manipulation, [Brazilians]

regard the U.S. Federal

Reserves quantitative

easing as a more signicant

economic threat.


21/52

| 19

that interdicting weapons o mass destruction andtheir delivery systems could undermine sover-

eignty norms.63

Brazils most high-prole engagement with the

nonprolieration order was a 2010 attempt to bro-

ker a nuclear agreement with Iran. Because Brazil

and urkey ailed to ully coordinate their initia-

tive with the permanent members o the UNSC,

the deal they had negotiated was rejected. Stung by

this response, Brazil and urkey voted against ur-

ther U.N. sanctions on Iran.64 Brasilias entry into

nuclear negotiations with Iran was not a harbinger

o its approach to uture nuclear issues. o the con-

trary, many Brazilians today view this episode as a

major oreign policy blunder.65

huMan RiGhTS oRDeR

Brazils approach to this pillar o the global order

has shifed in recent years rom an almost exclusive

ocus on economic, social and cultural rights to

greater yet still limited support or political and

civil rights abroad.

Under Luiz Incio Lula da Si lvas presidency, Brazil

opposed robust UNSC measures against human

rights violators and oered political support to

unsavory regimes. Lulas successor, Rousse,

has pioneered a dierent approach on human

rights issues, in great measure due to her per-

sonal experiences as a prisoner under the military

regime. In 2011, or instance, Brazil voted at the

U.N. Human Rights Council or the rst time to

support a special rapporteur or Iran.66 Brazilian

ocials spoke out against a 2012 military takeoverin Guinea Bissau.67 Brazil has also coounded the

Open Government Partnership, an initiative that

strengthens democracy by promoting transparent

and accountable government among the groups

membership.

Te use o military orce to halt atrocities remains

a red line or Brasilia, which preers multilateral

mediation and diplomatic consultation. Tis

position has colored Brazils response to the ArabSpring. Brasilia preerred a negotiated settlement

in Libya, did not support the UNSC resolution

authorizing intervention and viewed the NAO-

led military campaign as a gross distortion o the

U.N. mandate.68 Regarding Syria, Brazil at rst

opposed sanctions against the Asad regime and

initially reused in the UNSC to condemn the

crackdown.69 Brasilia continues to seek a mediating

role with Syria, with President Rousse clearly stat-

ing in her opening U.N. General Assembly remarks

in September 2012 that diplomacy, not orce, is theonly option or addressing Syrias challenges.70 Te

one region where Brazil has inched toward military

action in support o human rights is West Arica,

where it backed the use o all necessary means

by U.N. orces stationed in Cte dIvoire to deend

civilians rom post-election violence.71

Since the NAO-led campaign in Libya, Brasilia

has made a concerted attempt to reshape the

emerging norms governing humanitarian

intervention by proposing its own concept, the

Responsibility While Protecting.72 Te Brazilian

argument is that the international community

ought to codiy standards and procedures to gov-

ern humanitarian intervention in the uture lest

they become a pretext or geopolitical meddling.73

idWith the exception o trade, Indian policy has

increasingly supported the main pillars o global

order.

TRaDe oRDeRIndia has at times worked to slow trade liberaliza-

tion at the global level. A member o the WO,

India was initially critical o the Doha Round

and to an even greater extent than Brazil

objected to treating emerging-market economies

dierently rom underperorming developing

countries.74 By many accounts, India bears the

largest responsibility or thwarting a potential

breakthrough proposal that was put orward by


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Global Swing States


20 |

the WO Director General to a select group onations in 2008.75 oday, there is little domestic

support within India or a successul conclusion

o the Doha Round, in part because o ear that

this would lead to an inux o Chinese imports.

Furthermore, the business community has largely

concluded that the benets o Doha are unclear

and that India should instead prioritize bilateral

trade agreements.76 India has embraced another

unction o the WO: dispute settlement. India

has brought 20 cases against other WO mem-

bers and received complaints in 21 cases. In caseswhere it lost, India has complied or example,

by lifing import restrictions or removing local

content laws.77

inanCial oRDeR

India has invested in the IMF, become a oreign

aid donor and accepted the U.S. dollars role at the

center o the global nancial system.

New Delhi has taken on greater responsibility or

maintaining the worldwide nancial architecture.

It recently contributed $10 billion to buttress theIMFs lending acility despite domestic blowback

against a decision that was seen in some quarters

as a poor nation helping to bail out wealthy spend-

thrifs.78 Long a recipient o oreign aid, India has

in recent years become a donor, setting up a new

Development Partnership Administration within

its oreign ministry. In 2011, India distributed $1.5

billion in traditional development assistance; its

concessional loans pledged that year were much

larger still $5 billion or Arica alone.79

As a member o the BRICS, India has criticized the

U.S. dollars reserve currency role as a source o

nancial instability.80 It has done so, however, hal-

heartedly; New Delhi appears content to see the

U.S. dollars preeminence endure.81 With the rupee

a long way rom becoming a global currency, any

meaningul eort to displace the U.S. dollar would

only help Indias geopolitical rival, China, achieve

its currency ambitions.82

MaRiTiMe oRDeRNew Delhi has emerged as a maritime power that

champions reedom o navigation, combats piracy

and seeks to boost cooperation in the Indian

Ocean region.

A signatory to UNCLOS, India advances an inter-

pretation o the convention that would require

oreign navies to obtain coastal state consent

beore operating in EEZs. Indian domestic law

also stipulates that oreign warships must oer

notication prior to transiting Indian territorial

waters.83 However, these positions appear to be

holdovers rom an earlier era beore India emerged

as a rising naval power. India has rerained rom

deploying ships to harass oreign navies in its EEZ

and, at most, has lodged inrequent diplomatic

protests. Indeed, New Delhi has started to cham-

pion reedom o navigation. At the 2012 ASEAN

Regional Forum Summit in Phnom Penh, it joined

other Asian capitals in pressing Beijing to abide by

international law in the South China Sea.84

India is increasingly committed to deploying itsnew naval assets to deend the maritime commons.

It has dispatched ships to engage in counter-piracy

operations o East Arica, and it participates in

the Contact Group on Piracy o the Coast o

Somalia.85 Critically, India is shaping the naval

environment by helping nations in the region to

strengthen their maritime capabilities. It is work-

ing with the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Mauritius

to set up a coastal radar network; conducts joint

patrols with Mozambique; and trains and equips

the security orces o the Seychelles.86 India alsoconvenes the Milan Exercise, which brings together

14 navies rom the Asia-Pacic region or counter-

piracy, counterterrorism and search-and-rescue

training.87

New Delhi also established the Indian Ocean Naval

Symposium to underpin maritime security in the

region. Launched in 2008, the symposium now

encompasses 35 member countries and convenes


23/52

| 21

a agship biannual conerence and smaller work-shops. Although still modest in scope, it has the

potential to become a platorm or greater regional

cooperation in the years ahead.88


India has moved closer to key elements o the

nonprolieration order while remaining ambivalent

about the use o economic coercion against Iran.

India is one o the ew states to remain outside the

ramework o the NP. New Delhi rst detonated

a nuclear device in 1974 and then surprised theworld in 1998 by engaging in a series o under-

ground nuclear tests. Since then, it has produced

an estimated 80 to 100 nuclear warheads and

successully developed long-range missile deliv-

ery systems.89 India has never transerred nuclear

weapons technology or ssile material to other

countries, actions that would have amounted to a

rontal assault on the nonprolieration order.

Te U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement inked in

2008 has paved the way or Indian integration intothe nonprolieration regime. India has pledged to

put civilian nuclear reactors under IAEA sae-

guards and has moved closer to harmonizing

its policies and practices with the guidelines o

the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). New Delhi

now seeks membership in the NSG and the other

major multilateral export control regimes and

also supports the multilateral negotiation o a

Fissile Material Cuto reaty all indications o

Indias growing support or the nonprolieration

order.90 India, however, has shown less inclinationto integrate into a less-ormalized element o the

nonprolieration order, the PSI.

Regarding Iran, India has a mixed track record.

In multilateral orums, it has backed eorts

to pressure ehran to clariy the nature o its

nuclear program. In 2006, India was among the

26 members o the IAEA to vote to reer Iran to

the UNSC.91 Five years later, during its tenure as a

nonpermanent member o the UNSC, New Delhipublicly called or the ull implementation o

multilateral sanctions against ehran.92 However,

unlike their American and European counterparts,

Indian leaders have rerained rom unilaterally

cutting o trade and investment ties with Iran.

Tey have continued to push commercial rela-

tions even as they have reduced Indias imports

o Iranian oil.93 op Indian ocials continue to

express doubts about the ecacy o sanctions on

Iran.

huMan RiGhTS oRDeR

India has actively promoted the consolidation o

democracy in transitional states but has generally

avoided singling out regimes or human-rights

violations and has eschewed supporting armed

interventions to protect civilians.

India is a co-ounder o, and leading contribu-

tor to, the U.N. Democracy Fund, which provides

nancial resources to civil society organizations

operating in countries experiencing political

transitions. New Delhi is also one o 10 oundingmembers o the Community o Democracies, an

intergovernmental coalition o democratic nations

that works to promote the rule o law and good

governance.94 Yet this readiness to help states as

they move away rom authoritarianism has not

coincided with a new willingness to name and

shame individual nations in multilateral institu-

tions. At the U.N. Human Rights Council, India

has rarely supported country-specic resolutions.95

India has made concrete eorts to bolster demo-cratic institutions within its region. Trough its

donations to Aghanistan, New Delhi has trained

civil servants, constructed the national parliament

and supported the holding o elections.96 India

coordinated with the United States and Europe to

urge constitutional reorms in Nepal.97 Between

2000 and 2012, mounting strategic competition

with China led India to overlook the Burmese mili-

tarys human rights abuses and provide the regime


24/52

Global Swing States


22 |

with aid and investment. Yet with the recent politi-cal opening in Burma, New Delhi has pivoted to

oering democracy support.98

Te Arab Spring has highlighted the limits o

Indias current stance on human rights. As popu-

lar uprisings burst orth across the Middle East

and North Arica, Indias external aairs minister

remarked: India does not believe in interering

in the aairs o another country. We will take the

cue at an appropriate time depending on how they

want India to help.99 Sitting on the UNSC as the

revolution in Libya unolded, New Delhi approved

a resolution directing sanctions against individual

ocials in the Moammar Gadha regime but

abstained rom a later resolution authorizing the

use o orce to protect civilians.100 Indias approach

to the turmoil in Syria shifed rom censuring

all sides to support or U.N. sanctions, but New

Delhi remains opposed to any external military

intervention.101

ids

Indonesia has taken positions that generally rein-orce the international orders nance, maritime,

nonprolieration and human rights pillars.

TRaDe oRDeR

Indonesia has remained relatively passive with

respect to the global trade architecture. In the

WO, Indonesia has demanded preerential tari

cuts rom the worlds established economies but

has generally opted to ollow rather than lead

throughout the course o Doha Round negotia-

tions. Unlike Brazil and India, Indonesia did nottorpedo a new multilateral agreement. It has

brought only ve cases against other nations at the

WO and received our complaints.102

Indonesias economic growth afer 2000 set a

positive example or what market opening and lib-

eralization can accomplish. Its economic expansion

was based not on a mercantilist export strategy

but rather on trade with China, rising commodity

prices, domestic consumption and a rising middleclass.103 However, the Indonesian government has

recently erected new barriers to oreign investment

and moved to regulate mineral exports. Tese steps

threaten to diminish the open economic model

that Indonesia has provided or the region.104

inanCial oRDeR

Indonesia has supported key nancial institutions

while simultaneously promoting a move away rom

the U.S. dollar and acilitating the emergence o an

Asian alternative to the IMF.

Despite IMF-imposed structural adjustments

during the 1990s that proved economically and

politically disruptive, Jakarta pledged $1 billion

in mid-2012 to bolster the IMFs reserves, with

a senior government ocial noting: Tis move

is to show our commitment as part o the global

community to strengthen world nancial institu-

tions.105 Indonesia has played a role in the World

Banks leadership ormer nance minister Sri

Mulyani Indrawati now holds the number-two post

there. In the G20, Indonesia has navigated betweenthe emerging-economy and established-economy

blocs and has tried to exercise a voice on behal

o developing countries that are not represented.

Indonesia has also put its inuence behind eorts

to improve economic governance, and it co-chaired

the G20s Anti-Corruption Working Group.106

Indonesias central bank has expressed support or

diversication away rom international dependence

on the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency.107

More recently, Indonesia has begun to diversiyits own oreign currency reserves by purchasing

renminbi-denominated bonds and has concluded

currency swap agreements with Beijing both

actions chip away at the margins o the U.S. dol-

lars predominance in international nance.108 An

action with more ar-reaching repercussions is

Jakartas promotion o the transormation o the

Chiang Mai Initiative rom a collection o bilateral

currency swaps into a multilateral reserve pool.


25/52

| 23

Tis moves the arrangement one step closer towardbecoming a regional monetary authority with

potential to supplant the IMF in Asia.109

MaRiTiMe oRDeR

Despite serious constraints on its naval capabil-

ity, Indonesia has upheld the maritime order by

using the law o the sea in its diplomatic relations,

pushing back against Beijings claims in the South

China Sea and combating piracy in the Strait o

Malacca.

Indonesia departs rom accepted interpretation oUNCLOS by requesting that noncommercial ves-

sels give notication prior to entering its territorial

waters and objecting to oreign navies operating

in its EEZ. In practice, however, Jakarta has not

interered with reedom o navigation.110 Critically,

Indonesia has embraced the law o the sea to dene

the extent o its maritime claims and manage

potential boundary disputes. In 2010, Indonesia

delineated part o its maritime border with

Singapore; negotiations based on UNCLOS remain

ongoing with Singapore, Australia and Malaysia.111Jakarta has also acted as a responsible steward o

the Strait o Malacca. It backed an accord acili-

tated by the International Maritime Organization

that brought together states bordering the strait

and nations dependent on the international

waterway the rst such agreement concluded in

accordance with UNCLOS.112

Once hesitant to intervene in South China Sea

territorial disputes, Jakarta has in recent years

challenged Beijings extensive claims. In 2010, theIndonesian government submitted a letter to the

U.N. Secretary General maintaining that Chinas

assertion o sovereignty over virtually the entire

body o water clearly lacks international legal basis

and is tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982.113

When divisions within ASEAN over the South

China Sea prevented the organization rom issuing

a joint communiqu in mid-2012, Jakarta went on

a diplomatic oensive and succeeded in restoring

unity, paving the way or an ASEAN statementthat called or peaceul resolution o maritime

disputes.114 Indonesias new willingness to reinorce

ASEAN cohesion has limited Beijings room to

maneuver in the South China Sea. Furthermore,

it represents a real contribution to the maritime

order and signals a growing appetite or regional

leadership.

Although possessing limited naval capabilities,

Jakarta has successully curbed maritime-based

transnational threats.115 Along with Malaysia and

Singapore, Indonesia initiated coordinated tri-

lateral patrols in the Strait o Malacca in 2004.

Indonesia subsequently invited Tai participation,

and in 2005, all our nations launched a combined

aerial surveillance program.116 Tese eorts have

largely eradicated piracy in the Strait o Malacca,

securing the waterway which carries some 40 per-

cent o the worlds commerce.117


Indonesia has embraced the legal elements o

the nonprolieration order but remains wary oenorcement measures such as maritime interdic-

tion and economic sanctions.

Indonesia is a longstanding member o the NP and

has signed the IAEAs Additional Protocol. At rst

unwilling to ratiy the CB until Washington did

so, Jakarta has changed course and became a party

to the treaty in 2011.118 Indonesia has contributed to

the Nuclear Security Summit by leading a working

group ocused on moving orward the ratica-

tion o nuclear-related treaties and conventions. As Indonesia continues to develop its plans or a

domestic nuclear power industry, it has scrupulously

ollowed international saety and security practices,

earning the IAEAs commendation.119

Although increasingly supportive o the legal

component o the nonprolieration order, Jakarta

has been less eager to embrace enorcement mech-

anisms. Indonesia has avoided participation in


26/52

Global Swing States


24 |

the PSI, citing legal and sovereignty concerns.120

At the UNSC, the government o Indonesia sup-

ported a 2007 resolution on Iran but abstained

rom a subsequent resolution in 2008, noting that

Indonesia remains to be convinced o the ecacy

o adopting additional sanctions at this junc-

ture.121 Jakarta continues to see the IAEA as the

appropriate orum or deal ing with Irans nuclear

program; it has rerained rom imposing unilat-

eral economic sanctions and has sel-consciously

preserved a position as a potential mediator with

ehran.122

huMan RiGhTS oRDeR

Although Indonesia remains somewhat wary o

humanitarian intervention, its support or the

human rights order has come to include the shar-

ing o experience, the construction o regional

norms and the naming and shaming o human

rights abusers.

Te post-1998 transition rom dictatorship to

democracy convinced Indonesian leaders that

their countrys oreign policy should reectits domestic principles. Tey take pride in the

nations new democratic identity and see that

Indonesia can be a model where Islam and

democracy exist hand in hand, with no contra-

diction between the two.123 Indonesia has begun

underscoring the benets o democracy to its

neighbors in a way that avoids lecturing and

acknowledges the chal lenges that accompany

political transitions.124 In addition, Jakarta has

played a key role in eorts to enshrine human

rights within ASEAN.125 Never keen to sanction

Burma, Indonesia nonetheless blocked Burmas

quest to chair ASEAN until it adopted reorms

and has worked to consolidate the political

opening there by dispatching experts to help the

government set up a human rights institution.126

Te Bali Democracy Forum, launched in 2008, is

an initiative with no parallel in the human rights

policies o the other global swing states. It brings

together Asian and Middle Eastern countrieswith the goal o ostering political development,

through dialogue and sharing o experience, aim-

ing at strengthening democratic institutions.127

Since its inception, the Bali Democracy Forum has

grown in prole, attracting participants rom as ar

away as Europe and even China.

Te Arab Spring has tested Indonesias commit-

ment to supporting human rights abroad with

avorable, i delayed, results. Although it was not

a member o the UNSC at the time, Jakarta was

wary o military action against the Gadha regime.

Indonesia originally hesitated to voice its outrage

about the situation in Syria but then departed rom

a longstanding tradition o not supporting coun-

try-specic resolutions at the U.N. Human Rights

Council. Tus ar, Jakarta, like some other OIC

members, has backed multiple resolutions concern-

ing Syria and has even called or the entry o U.N.

peacekeepers into Syria to halt the violence.128

Trky

On balance, urkish policies have strengthenedthe trade, nancial and nonprolieration pillars o

the international order. Its human rights policy has

rapidly evolved rom nonintererence to limited

interventionism. Meanwhile, in the maritime

domain, urkey has adopted positions that coun-

tervail existing global arrangements.

TRaDe oRDeR

urkey has remained relatively inactive within the

WO and through the success o its ree mar-

ket reorms has set a powerul example or theMiddle East.

Except or spearheading a coalition o countries

that ought or extending quotas on textile imports,

urkey has avoided taking on a leadership role

within the WO. It was not a member o the small

group o nations that came together on several

occasions to attempt to revive the stalemated Doha

Round negotiations. urkeys engagement with


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the WO dispute settlement system also remains

limited. It has initiated two cases and received only

a handul o complaints.129

urkey has served as an example o how ree-

market reorms can yield signicant and

balanced economic growth.130 Membership in

the European Customs Union has locked urkeysdomestic economic policy into upholding the

principles o commercial reciprocity and nondis-

crimination that underlie the world trade order.

Tere is currently little prospect o urkey back-

tracking rom the course o trade liberalization

that has made it a regional model.131

inanCial oRDeR

urkey has supported the global nancial system

by contributing to the IMF, becoming a develop-

ment lender and embracing the G20.

urkish leaders perceive an interest in reinorcing

the principles advanced by the IMF and the World

Bank, and in June 2012, they pledged $5 billion to

bolster the IMFs lending acility.132 Ankara has

made signicant strides as a nancier o develop-

ment assistance the urkish Cooperation and

Coordination Agency now has an annual budget o

nearly $750 million.133

urkey has embraced the G20 as a new platormor exerting inuence. It has tried to champion the

interests o the worlds least-developed countries,

and ocials in Ankara eagerly anticipate urkeys

assumption o the G20 presidency in 2015.134

On global currency issues, urkey has generally

adopted a passive approach. In early 2012, Ankara

and Beijing negotiated a currency swap that will

enable them to conduct a portion o their com-

merce without converting their local currencies

into U.S. dollars.135

MaRiTiMe oRDeR

urkey has continued to reject the legal oundation

o the maritime order and has asserted extensive

claims in the eastern Mediterranean, even as it

has become a major contributor to counter-piracy

eorts.

Ankara rerained rom signing UNCLOS in 1982

and has remained outside the ormal legal rame-

work ever since. Unlike another non-signatory

the United States urkey does not treat most

clauses o UNCLOS as customary internationallaw; on the contrary, urkey objects to provi-

sions such as the 12-mile international water

line because o ears that maritime disputes with

Greece in the Aegean Sea would be adjudicated to

its disadvantage.

Beyond rejecting UNCLOS, urkey has advanced

its own theory or delineating EEZs in the eastern

Mediterranean that extends its EEZ to Egypts

northernmost waters.136 Without the discovery

o energy deposits in the eastern Mediterranean,Ankaras claims would have ew ramications or

the maritime order, but the rush to exploit new-

ound gas elds in these waters has transormed a

legal dispute into a political ashpoint involving

urkey, Cyprus, Lebanon and Israel.137 Ankara has

not hesitated to back its claims with strong rheto-

ric. In 2012, the urkish government warned states

to rerain rom bidding on oil and gas concessions

around Cyprus.138

urkish policies have

strengthened the trade,

nancial and nonprolieration

pillars o the international

order. Its human rights policy

has rapidly evolved rom

nonintererence to limited

interventionism.


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Global Swing States


26 |

urkey has made signicant counter-piracy con-tributions. Ankara was a ounding member o the

Contact Group on Somali Piracy and was quick

to dispatch ships to ght this reemerging threat to

vital shipping lanes.139 In 2009, urkey became the

second country to command a multinational naval

task orce engaged in counter-piracy a signicant

step given urkeys traditionally limited maritime

role.140 More recently, urkey headed Operation

Shield, the NAO eort to combat piracy in

the Gul o Aden and o the Horn o Arica.141

Bilaterally, urkey has engaged in counter-piracycooperation with the United Arab Emirates and

Egypt.142


urkey has upheld the nonprolieration orders

legal components but at times has complicated

international eorts to pressure Iran.

urkey has never pursued nuclear weapons and has

embraced the legal elements o the nonproliera-

tion order without reservation. It is a party to the

NP, a signatory o the CB and a member othe NSG and the other major multilateral export

control regimes. urkey has also approved the

IAEA Additional Protocol, opening its nuclear

acilities to a high level o international scrutiny. It

has also shown less aversion than the other global

swing states to countering prolieration through ad

hoc measures. Unlike Brazil, India and Indonesia,

urkey has joined the PSI. Although not a core

member, it hosted a large-scale interdiction exer-

cise in May 2006 and remains actively engaged.

At the same time, Ankara opposes international

eorts aimed at limiting access to civilian nuclear

technologies that could acilitate a countrys

military ambitions. urkey maintains that all NP

signatories are entitled to obtain nuclear material,

equipment and technology or peaceul purposes

and that the worlds nuclear suppliers should not

impose conditions beyond what the NP stipu-

lates.143 Within the NSG, urkey has blocked new

guidelines or nuclear trade that would have takeninto account the recipient states stability and

security.144

urkey has sometimes hindered multilateral eorts

to prevent Irans progress toward a nuclear capabil-

ity. Along with Brasilia, Ankara in 2010 attempted

to broker a deal enabling ehran to enrich ura-

nium abroad. However, this diplomatic oray

occurred without the UNSCs blessing, resulted in

rustration all around and culminated with urkey

opposing a new round o U.N. sanctions against

Iran.145 Since mid-2012, urkey has moved to

reduce its oil imports rom Iran.

huMan RiGhTS oRDeR

urkeys approach has evolved rom a residual

attachment to nonintererence to a willingness to

intervene politically, and even militarily, to uphold

human rights in its part o the world.

Representing a multiethnic, Muslim-majority

country on the edge o the Middle East that has

successully transitioned rom military-dominatedpolitics to electoral democracy, urkey is unsur-

prisingly viewed by its leaders as a model or others

in the region. Long beore the Arab Spring, urkey

was already urging that Middle Eastern autocracies

embark on a path o gradual reorm and politi-

cal opening.146 Speaking at Harvard University

in January 2003, Prime Minister Erdogan said,

Democratization in the Middle East is an outcome

that mustbe attained.147

urkeys actions have not always measured up tosuch high-sounding rhetoric. Te pursuit o trade

and energy interests has thus ar rendered Ankara

silent on ehrans treatment o its population.

urkey has avoided lending its support to U.N.

General Assembly resolutions criticizing Irans

human rights record and sof-pedaled Irans crush-

ing o the Green Movement.148 Syria prior to the

Arab Spring was another instance in which urkey

overlooked a regimes repression o its citizens and


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instead concentrated on building economic anddiplomatic ties.

As the Arab Spring has unolded, urkish human

rights policy has exhibited considerable variation.

In the case o Egypt, Prime Minister Erdogan

made a dramatic public intervention, rst tell-

ing President Hosni Mubarak to heed the protest

movements demands and then, a day later, calling

or the Egyptian leaders immediate resigna-

tion.149 On Libya, the urkish government initially

opposed the UNSC resolution authorizing the

use o orce and the NAO intervention that ol-

lowed,150 only to then back the campaign and even

help nance the Libyan rebels ghting to topple

Gadhas government.151 Having orged a close

relationship with the Asad regime, the urkish

government at rst sought to acilitate top-down

democratic reorms in Syria. As the crackdown in

Syria has worsened, however, Ankara has gravi-

tated toward an increasingly hard-line position

imposing sanctions, severing diplomatic ties,

giving material aid to the Syrian rebels and taking

direct military action against the regimes orces.152


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Global Swing States


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V I . T E R M S O F E n G A G E M E n TTere is signicant opportunity or Washington to

build closer partnerships with each o the global

swing states to bolster key elements o the inter-

national order. American engagement should

capitalize on areas where Brazil, India, Indonesia

and urkey have already taken on new global

responsibilities. Yet this is not enough; to set the

right tone in relations with the our global swing

states, American leaders should at least partially

address the desire o those nations or greater

recognition in key international institutions.

Furthermore, without a parallel eort to assist the

our countries in strengthening their domestic

capacity to more actively support the international

order, American engagement will all short. Finally,

it is critical that Washington look inward and ensure

that the attention and resources allocated to the our

nations reects their rising strategic importance.

Te ollowing recommendations are not

exhaustive; they represent a menu rom which

policymakers might choose. Tis report sets orthboth large-scale initiatives and small-scale pro-

grams because the opportunities vary by country

and area o cooperation. However, these diverse

recommendations have a single uniying objective:

to partner more closely with the our global swing

states in the pursuit o international order.

Trd ordrTe United States should seek to expand and rein-

orce the rules-based trading system and energize

domestic groups within each country that couldemerge as inuential voices or the trade order.

Washington should take the ollowing actions:

Work with the global swing states to dene and

address unair commercial practices by state-

owned enterprises. Just as in the United States,

rms in Brazil, India and Indonesia ace growing

pressure rom Chinese companies that receive

government backing, while in urkey, leading

businesses see similar pressure looming on thehorizon.153 Te United States should emphasize

the treatment o state-owned enterprises in its

economic dialogues with all our powers. It should

also urge the Business and Industry Advisory

Committee (BIAC) o the OECD to establish a

policy group dedicated to exploring this issue. (O

the global swing states, urkey is the only mem-

ber o the OECD, but business associations rom

Brazil, India and Indonesia all have observer status

at the BIAC and could contribute to a new policy

group.) I the United States can orge a consensuswith these our powers, it might be possible to craf

a multilateral solution to the rise o state-owned

enterprises rather than allowing ad hoc remedies

to undermine the trade order.

Seek ree-trade agreements with the global swing

states.154 A ree-trade agreement with any o the

our nations remains aspirational. In Washington

and in the capitals o the our global swing states,

ree-trade legislation would today encounter

substantial i not insurmountable domestic

opposition. In Brazils case, even a double taxation

treaty has thus ar proven unobtainable,155 and the

United States and India do not yet have a bilateral

investment treaty. However, the United States

should persist in pursuing economic accords even

i the road ahead is long and rustrating. Voicing

support or ree-trade agreements could reinorce

proponents o urther trade liberalization within

each country.

Convene the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in

all our countries by 2020. Te summit whichbrings together innovators, investors, academics

and government ocials was initially conceived

as a tool or engaging the Muslim world and was

rst held in urkey. Convening the summit in the

other global swing states could help to galvanize

technology startups, creating new voices in support

o domestic and international saeguards o intel-

lectual property.

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global swing states: brazil, india, indonesia, turkey, and the future of international order

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