global trends prospects and challenges for global trends

INPRO Di l F Gl b l N l E S i bili L P f N l E i

Global Trends Prospects and Challenges for

INPRO Dialogue Forum on Global Nuclear Energy Sustainability: Long-term Prospects for Nuclear Energy in the Post-Fukushima, 27-31 August 2012, COEX, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Global Trends, Prospects and Challenges for Innovative SMRs Deployment

Dr. M. Hadid SubkiTechnical Lead, SMR Technology Development, gy p

Nuclear Power Technology Development Section, Division of Nuclear Power, Department of Nuclear Energy

IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency

Outline• What’s new in global SMR development?• Roles of IAEA on SMR Technology Development• Roles of IAEA on SMR Technology Development• Status of Countries on Nuclear Energy Initiatives• Global Status of SMR Development and Deployment• Global Status of SMR Development and Deployment• Options of SMR Design & Technology

Percei ed Ad antages and Challenges• Perceived Advantages and Challenges• Newcomer Countries’ Considerations

C t N C t i ’ Pl• Current Newcomer Countries’ Plan• Identified Issues from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

S• Summary

IAEA 2

What’s New in Global SMR Development?

SMARTOn 4 July, the Korean Nuclear Safety and Security Commission issued the Standard Design Approval for the 100 MWe SMART – the first iPWR

i d tifi tireceived certification.

NuScalemPowerW SMR

US-DOE funding of 452M$/5 years for two (2) out of the four (4) US competing iPWR based SMRs Some have utilities to adopt in specific sitesW-SMR

Hi-SMURcompeting iPWR based SMRs. Some have utilities to adopt in specific sites

KLT-40sSVBR-100

2 modules marine propulsion-based barge-mounted KLT-40s are in construction, 90%; The lead-bismuth eutectic cooled SVBR-100 deployed by

SHELF, ; p y y

2018, SHELF seabed-based started conceptual PWR-SMR design

Flexblue DCNS originated Flexblue capsule, 50-250 MWe, 60-100m seabed-moored, 5-15 km from the coast, off-shore and local control rooms5 15 km from the coast, off shore and local control rooms

CAREM-25 Site excavation for CAREM-25 was started in September 2011, construction of a demo plan starts soon in 2012

4S Toshiba had promoted the 4S for a design certification with the US NRC for application in Alaska and newcomer countries.

IAEAHTR-PMACP-100

2 modules of HTR-PM are under construction; CNNC developing ACP-100 conceptual design 3

Roles of IAEA on SMR Development

• Facilitate efforts of Member States in identifying key y g yenabling technologies in development and addressing key challenges in deployment;

• Establish and maintain international networks with Member States, industries, utilities, stakeholders;

• Ensure coordination of Member State experts by planning and implementing training programme and knowledgeand implementing training programme and knowledge transfer through technical meetings and workshops

D l i t ti l d ti d id• Develop international recommendations and guidance focusing on specific needs of newcomer countries

IAEA 4

Status of Countries on NE Initiatives

Which countries deploy SMRs?

Technology developer countries (NPPs in operation)(NPPs in operation)

Countries with NPPs

Newcomer countries

Asia

Europe

IAEA 5

Africa

Latin America

Definition

• IAEA:• Small sized reactors: < 300 MW(e)• Small-sized reactors: < 300 MW(e)• Medium-sized reactors: 300 700 MW(e)• Regardless of being modular or non modular• Regardless of being modular or non-modular• Covers all reactors in-operation and under-development

with power up to 700 MWep p• Covers 1970s technology post 2000s innovative

technology• Several developed countries:

• Small reactors: < 300 MW(e)• Emphasize the benefits of being small and modular• Focus on innovative reactor designs under-development

IAEA 6

Concept of Integral PWR based SMRsSMART Westinghouse

SMR

pressurizer

CRDM

Steamgeneratorspumps

CRDM

g

Steamgenerators

CRDM

pumps

core + vessel

core + vessel

IAEA 7

Integral Primary System ConfigurationCourtesy: Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, All Rights Reserved

XXXXXXXX XXXX

XX

XXXXXX

XXBenefits of integral vessel configuration: • eliminates loop piping and external components, thus enabling

compact containment and plant size reduced cost

IAEA 8

• Eliminates large break loss of coolant accident (improved safety)

Light Water Cooled SMRs

CAREM-25Argentina

IMRJapan

SMARTKorea Republic of

VBER-300Russia

WWER-300Russia

KLT-40sRussiaArgentina Japan Korea, Republic of Russia Russia Russia

mPowerUSA

NuScaleUSA

Westinghouse SMR - USA

CNP-300China Peoples Republic of

ABV-6Russia

IAEA 9

USA USA SMR - USA China, Peoples Republic of

How “small” are the iSMR vessels?Ø3.6 x 22 m

Ø3 7 24 7

Ø2.7 x 40 m

Ø2.7 x 13.7 m

Ø3.7 x 24.7 m

NuScale (NuScale)45 MWe

mPower (B&W)180 MWe Westinghouse SMR

225 MWe

IAEA 10

225 MWe

SMR-160(Holtec)

Heavy Water Cooled SMRs

EC6Canada

PHWR-220, 540, & 700India

AHWR300-LEUIndia

IAEA 11

Liquid Metal Cooled SMRs

CEFRChina

4SJapan

PFBR-500India

SVBR-100Russian Federation

PRISMUSA

IAEA 12

Gas Cooled SMRs

PBMRSouth Africa

HTR-PMChina

GT-MHRUSA

EM2

USA

IAEA 13

Motivations – U.S. Case

• Economic AffordabilityL f t it l t

Plants >50 yr old have capacitiesLess than 300 MWe

U.S. Coal Plants

– Lower up-front capital cost– Better financing options

• Load demand– Better match to power needs– Incremental capacity for regions

with low growth rateg– Allows shorter range planning

• Site requirements– Lower land and water usageLower land and water usage – Replacement for aging fossil plants– Potentially more robust designs

• Grid stability• Grid stability– Closer match to traditional power generators– Smaller fraction of total grid capacity

Potential to offset variability from renewables

IAEA 14

– Potential to offset variability from renewables

Motivations – U.S. Case

• Carbon Emission 2005 U.S. CO2 Emissions (Tg)

− Reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 17% by 2020…83% by 20502050

− Reduce federal GHG emissions 28% by 2020

• Energy and Economic Security− Pursue energy security through a gy y g

diversified energy portfolio− Improve the economy through

innovation and technologyinnovation and technology leadership

IAEA 15

Advanced Reactor Requirements

• Enhanced safety• Address lessons-learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident

• Proven technologySt d di ti• Standardization

• Economic competitiveness• Plant simplification • Improved design margin• Human factor engineering; man-machine interface• Regulatory infrastructure• Constructability• Maintainability

IAEA• Proliferation resistance and physical protection

16

Perceived Advantages and ChallengesIAEA Observation

Advantages Challenges

Technol

• Shorter construction period (modularization)

• Potential for enhanced safety and li bilit

• Licensability (due to innovative or first-of-a-kind engineering structure, systems and components)N LWR t h l i

logical Is

reliability• Design simplicity• Suitability for non-electric

application (desalination etc)

• Non-LWR technologies• Operability performance/record• Human factor engineering; operator

staffing for multiple modules plantssues

application (desalination, etc).• Replacement for aging fossil

plants, reducing GHG emissions

staffing for multiple-modules plant• Post Fukushima action items on

design and safetyFit f ll l t i it id E i titiN

on-TeI

• Fitness for smaller electricity grids• Options to match demand growth

by incremental capacity increaseSit fl ibilit

• Economic competitiveness• First of a kind cost estimate• Regulatory infrastructure (in both

di d t i )

echnologI

• Site flexibility• Reduced emergency planning zone• Lower upfront capital cost (better

affordability)

expanding and newcomer countries)• Availability of design for newcomers• Infrastructure requirements• Post Fukushima action items on

IAEA

gical

affordability)• Easier financing scheme

• Post Fukushima action items on institutional issues and public acceptance 17

Benefits of Introducing SMRs

35

25

30

15

20

Very Important

5

10y p

More Important

Important

Less Important

0 Not Important

IAEA 18Source: INPRO Dialogue Forum on Common User Considerations for SMR, IAEA – Vienna, 10 – 14 October 2011. 63 participants from 39 Member States

Impediments of Introducing SMRs

Towards commercialization, what hurdles need to be overcome?

3540

,

202530

051015

Very Important

More Important

Important0 Important

Less Important

Not Important

IAEA 19Source: INPRO Dialogue Forum on Common User Considerations for SMR, IAEA – Vienna, 10 – 14 October 2011. 63 participants from 39 Member States

SMRs for Immediate Deployment

Name DesignOrganization Country of Origin Electrical

Capacity, MWe Design Status

1 PHWR-220 NPCIL India 220 16 units in operation

2 PHWR-540 NPCIL India 540 2 units in operation

3 PHWR-700 NPCIL India 700 4 units under construction

4 KLT-40S OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation 70 2 units under construction

Tsinghua Detailed design5 HTR-PM Tsinghua University China, Republic of 250 Detailed design,

2 modules under construction

6 CAREM-25 CNEA Argentina 27 Started site excavation in Sept 2011 construction in 20122011, construction in 2012

7 Prototype Fast Breed Reactor (PFBR-500) IGCAR India 500 Under construction –

Commissioning in mid 2012g

9 CNP-300 CNNC China, Republic of 300 3 units in operation,2 units under construction

IAEA

SMRs for Near-term Deployment

NameDesign

OrganizationCountry of

OriginElectrical Capacity,

MWeDesign Status

1System Integrated Modular Advanced Reactor (SMART)

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute Republic of Korea 100

Standard Design Approval Received 4 July 2012

2 mPower Babcock & Wilcox United States of America 180/module Detailed design, to apply for

certification - end of 2013

3 NuScale NuScale Power Inc. United States of America 45/module Detailed design, to apply for

certification - end of 2013

4 VBER-300 OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation 300 Detailed designFederation g

5 SVBR-100 JSC AKME Engineering Russian Federation 100 Detailed design for

prototype construction

6 Westinghouse Westinghouse United States of 225 Detailed Design6 gSMR Westinghouse America 225 Detailed Design

7 Super-Safe, Small and Simple (4S) Toshiba Japan 10 Detailed design

IAEA

Example of SMRs for Long-term Deployment

Name DesignOrganization

Country of Origin

Electrical Capacity,

MWDesign StatusOrganization Origin MWe

1 IRIS IRIS International Consortium

United States of America 335 Conceptual Design

P R t2

Power Reactor Innovative Small

Modular (PRISM)GE Hitachi United States of

America 311 Detailed Design

3AHWR300-LEU

using Thorium MOX BARC India 300 Conceptual DesigngFuel

p g

4 Integrated Modular Water Reactor (IMR)

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Japan 350 Conceptual Design

5 Flexblue DCNS France 50-250 Conceptual Design

6 FBNR FURGS Brazil 72 Conceptual Design

7 VK-300 RIAR Russian Federation 100/300 Conceptual Design

IAEA8 EM2 General Atomics USA 240 Conceptual Design

SMR for Near-term Deployment SMARTSMARTSMARTSMART• Full name: System-Integrated Modular

© 2011 KAERI – Republic of Korea

y gAdvanced Reactor

• Designer: Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Republic of KoreaInstitute (KAERI), Republic of Korea

• Reactor type: Integral PWR• Coolant/Moderator: Light Water

N t S t Th l N t• Neutron Spectrum: Thermal Neutrons• Thermal/Electrical Capacity:

330 MW(t) / 100 MW(e)• Fuel Cycle: 36 months• Salient Features: Passive decay heat

removal system in the secondary side; y yhorizontally mounted RCPs; intended for sea water desalination and electricity supply in newcomer countries with small grid

IAEA• Design status: Standard Design Approval

just granted on 4 July 2012

SMART – Safety Systems• Inherent Safety

• No Large Break : vessel penetration < 2 inch• Large Primary Coolant Inventory per MW • Low Power Density (~2/3)• Large PZR Volume for Transient Mitigation• Low Vessel Fluence• Large Internal Cooling Source (Sump-integrated IRWST)

• Engineered Safety Featuresg y• Passive Residual Heat Removal System (50 % x 4 train)

• Natural Circulation• Replenish-able Heat Sink (Emergency Cooling Tank)

• Safety Injection System (100 % x 4 train)• Direct Vessel Injection from IRWST

• Shutdown Cooling System (100 % x 2 Train)• Containment Spray System (2 Train)• Containment Spray System (2 Train)

• Severe Accident Management• In-Vessel Retention and ERVC

IAEA• Passive Hydrogen Control (PARs)

24

SMR for Immediate Deployment CAREMCAREM--2525CAREMCAREM 2525

• Full name: Central Argentina de Elementos

Modulares• Designer: National Atomic Energy

Commission of Argentina (CNEA)• Reactor type: Integral PWR• Coolant/Moderator : Light Water• Neutron Spectrum: Thermal NeutronsNeutron Spectrum: Thermal Neutrons• Thermal/Electrical Capacity: 87.0 MW(t) /

27 MW(e)• F el C cle 14 months• Fuel Cycle: 14 months• Salient Features: primary coolant system

within the RPV, self-pressurized and relying ti l t l tientirely on natural convection.

• Design status: Site excavation started for construction in 2012

IAEA

CAREM-25 – Safety Systems© 2011 CNEA A i

• Two (2) Shutdown

© 2011 CNEA - Argentina

( )Systems:1. First SS: by Control Rods =

Fast SS + Reactivity AdjustFast SS + Reactivity Adjust and Control System (ACS)

2. Second SS: Boron injection

• Passive Residual Heat Removal System (PRHS):

I l ti C d• Isolation Condensers

• Low Pressure Injection System:System:• Accumulators

IAEA 26

CAREM-25 – Suppresion Pool Type Containment© 2011 CNEA A i© 2011 CNEA - Argentina

IAEA 27S/P type C/V, reinforced concrete with stainless steel liner, 0.5 MPa Design Pressure

CAREM-25 –Severe Accident Prevention and Mitigationg

• Severe Accident Prevention:• A grace period extension, under the hypothesis of SBO longer than 72 hrs.,

by autonomous systems (fire extinguishing external pumps);• Water injection into the PRHRS pool;• Water injection into the PRHRS chamber;• Suppression pool cooling;

• Severe Accident Mitigation:• Severe Accident Mitigation:• In-vessel Corium retention: RPV external cooling by gravity;• Hydrogen passive autocatalytic recombiners.y g p y

• Passive safety system adoption and extended grace period result in very low frequency of core meltdown, the provision

id d f D f i D th L l 4considered for Defence-in-Depth Level 4.

IAEA 28

SMR for Near-term DeploymentNuScaleNuScaleNuScaleNuScale

• Full name: NuScaleFull name: NuScale• Designer: NuScale Power Inc., USA• Reactor type: Integral Pressurized Water

ReactorReactor• Coolant/Moderator: Light Water• Neutron Spectrum: Thermal Neutrons• Thermal/Electrical Capacity:

165 MW(t)/45 MW(e)• Fuel Cycle: 24 monthsy• Salient Features: Natural circulation cooled;

Decay heat removal using containment; built below groundg

• Design status: Design Certification application expected in 4th Quarter of 2013

IAEA

NuScale - Decay Heat Removal System© 2011 N S l P I

• Two independent single-failure-

© 2011 NuScale Power, Inc.

proof trains• Closed loop system• Two phase natural circulation• Two-phase natural circulation

operation• DHRS heat exchangers

nominally full of water • Supplies the coolant inventory• Primary coolant natural• Primary coolant natural

circulation is maintained• Pool provides a 3 day cooling

supply for decay heat removal

IAEA 30

NuScale - Decay heat removal using Containment© 2011 N S l P I

• Provides a means of removing core decay heat and limits

© 2011 NuScale Power, Inc.

ycontainment pressure by:

• Steam Condensation• Convective Heat Transfer• Heat Conduction• Sump Recirculation

• Reactor Vessel steam is vented th h th t t lthrough the reactor vent valves (flow limiter)

• Steam condenses on containment• Condensate collects in lower

containment region • Reactor Recirculation Valves open p

to provide recirculation path through the core

• Provides 30+ day cooling followed

IAEA

y gby indefinite period of air cooling.

31

Implications of Fukushima on NuScale

• No major impact to the NuScale design is currently ti i t danticipated.

• The NuScale design fully addresses decay heat removal for prolonged station blackout.

• As a result of the Fukushima event, NuScale will• Add long term air-cooling test to NuScale Integral System Test Matrix and

SIET d h t l t t t d t t ff ti f i iSIET decay heat removal tests to demonstrate effectiveness of passive air-cooling with an empty reactor building pool.

• Review Spent Fuel Pool Cooling capability under air-cooled conditions.• Examine role of “Island Mode” operation for multi-module plant.• Confirm adequacy of existing seismic design basis for NuScale (0.5g ZPA)

and ensure efforts are consistent with ongoing industry efforts.g g y• Review NRC recommendations when they become available and determine

applicability to NuScale.

IAEA 32

SMR for Near-term Deployment:mPowermPowermPowermPower

• Full name: mPowerDesigner Babcock & Wilco Mod lar• Designer: Babcock & Wilcox Modular Nuclear Energy, LLC(B&W), United States of AmericaR t t I t l P i d W t• Reactor type: Integral Pressurized Water Reactor

• Coolant/Moderator: Light Water• Neutron Spectrum: Thermal Neutrons• Thermal/Electrical Capacity:

530 MW(t) / 180 MW(e)( ) ( )• Fuel Cycle: 48-month or more• Salient Features: integral NSSS, CRDM

inside reactor vessel; Passive safety thatinside reactor vessel; Passive safety that does not require emergency diesel generator

• Design status: Design Certification application expected in 4th Quarter of 2013

IAEAapplication expected in 4 Quarter of 2013

mPower – Inherent Safety Features

• Low Core Linear Heat Rate:• Low power density reduces fuel and clad temps during accidents• Allows lower flow velocities that minimizes flow induced vibration

effectseffects

• Large Reactor Coolant System Volume:• Allows more time for safety system response in the case of accidentAllows more time for safety system response in the case of accident• More coolant is available during SBLOCA providing continuous

cooling to protect the core

• Small Penetrations at High Elevations:• Increase the amount of coolant left in the vessel after a SBLOCA

R d t f l t t i t lti i l• Reduce rate of energy release to containment resulting in lower containment pressures

IAEA 34

mPower - Decay Heat Removal System© 2011 Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.

IAEA 35

mPower – Containment System© 2011 Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.

• Underground containment, fuel storage and ultimate heat sink;storage and ultimate heat sink;

• Metal containment vessel;• Volume limits internal pressure

for all design basis accidents;• Simultaneous refuelling and

NSSS equipment inspections;NSSS equipment inspections;• Environment suitable for

human occupancy during normal operationnormal operation

IAEA 36

SMR for Near-term Deployment4S4S4S4S

• Full name: Super-Safe, Small and Simple

© 2011 TOSHIBA CORPORATION

Simple • Designer: Toshiba Corporation, Japan• Reactor type: Liquid Sodium cooled,

Fast Reactor but not a breederFast Reactor – but not a breeder reactor

• Neutron Spectrum: Fast NeutronsT bi / • Thermal/Electrical Capacity:

30 MW(t)/10 MW(e)• Fuel Cycle: without on-site refueling

Turbine/Generator

with core lifetime ~30 years. Movable reflector surrounding core gradually moves, compensating burn-up reactivity l 30

Steam Generator

loss over 30 years.• Salient Features: power can be

controlled by the water/steam system Reactor

IAEAwithout affecting the core operation

• Design status: Detailed Design

4S – Passive Decay Heat Removal • Natural air draft and natural circulation

• RVACS: Natural air draft outside the guard vessel


RVACS: Natural air draft outside the guard vessel• IRACS: Natural circulation of sodium and air draft at air cooler

Air outlet Air outletAir outlet Air outlet Primary temperature(~260,000sec)

IRACS (Air Cooler)

Air inlet

IRACS (Air Cooler)

Air inlet

y ( )

450

500

550

ure

(℃)

Core-inletCore-outlet

Sodium flow

Air inlet

inlet

SG

Sodium flow

Air inlet

inlet

SG 250

300

350

400

Tem

pera

t

Guard Vessel

SG

Guard Vessel

SG 2500 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000

Time (s)

Core temperatureduring loss of power

RVACS

Air flow pass

RVACS

Air flow pass RVACS: Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System,

during loss-of-poweronly with natural circulation

IAEA 38

y g y ,IRACS : Intermediate Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System

4S – Radionuclide Containment

• Fuel

Top DomeN2 gas


• Fuel• Fuel cladding

R t l (t ff t• Reactor vessel (trap effect by sodium)

• Containment• Containment• Guard vessel• Top domeTop dome• Mitigation of sodium fire by

nitrogen gas inside the top domedome

• Reactor buildingGuard

IAEA 39

Guard vessel

4S – Severe Accident Prevention and Mitigation Approachesg pp

Safety Related Issues 4S’s safety design to mitigate and prevent from severe accident

Station black out (SBO)Core damage is avoidable without any emergency power supply by passive decay heat removal system with natural circulation, not necessary the pump. There is no limitation for duration time.

Spent fuel poolNo need for spent fuel pool due to long-term cooling (about 1 year) after the long-term operation (i.e., 30 years) and then stored in dry cask for the 10MWe-4S.

Final heat sink in emergency situations

Air is the final heat sink (RVACS and/or IRACS), not depends on water and any emergency power (passive decay heat removal system).

Containment system reliability Containment system is consisted of top dome and guard vesselContainment system reliability Containment system is consisted of top dome and guard vessel.

Earthquakes Supporting the reactor building by seismic isolator.

Redundant shutdown system and passive decay heat removal

Tsunami / Flood

Redundant shutdown system and passive decay heat removal system without external power supply and emergency power system. Reinforced reactor building to protects from massive water invasion by keeping its water-tightness.

IAEA 40

Aircraft hazard Constructed under ground.

SMR for Immediate DeploymentSVBRSVBR--100100SVBRSVBR 100100

• Designer: JSC AKME Engineering

© 2011 JSC AKME Engineering

• Designer: JSC AKME Engineering –Russian Federation

• Reactor type: Liquid metal cooled fast treactor

• Coolant/Moderator: Lead-bismuth• System temperature: 500oC• Neutron Spectrum: Fast Neutrons• Thermal/Electric capacity: 280 MW(t) /

101 MW(e)101 MW(e)• Fuel Cycle: 7 – 8 years• Fuel enrichment: 16.3%

Di ti i hi F t Cl d l• Distinguishing Features: Closed nuclear fuel cycle with mixed oxide uranium plutonium fuel, operation in a fuel self-sufficient mode

IAEAsufficient mode

• Design status: Detailed design

Newcomer Countries Considerations

Robust EEnergy Policy

IntegratedInfrastructure

Security of Supply +

GRID

Proliferation resistance &

physical t ti

Affordability(Capital & electricity

Introduction of the first Nuclear Power Plant

protectiony

costs)

Public acceptance

Economic Competitive

ness

NuclearSafety

Domestic Industry

Participation

IAEA 43

Viable financing scheme

Current Newcomer Countries PlanA paradox of SMR Deployment in Newcomer countries

Country Grid Capacity in GWe

Current Deployment Plan

A paradox of SMR Deployment in Newcomer countries

in GWeBangladesh 5.8 2 x 1000 MWe PWRs in Rooppur in 2018Vietnam 15.19 4 x 1000 MWe PWRs in Ninh Thuan #1 by 2020

4 x 1000 MWe PWRs in Ninh Thuan #2 by 2025Jordan 2.6 2 x 1000 - 1100 MWe PWR in + possible

interest in SMRUAE 23.25 4 x 1400 MWe PWR in Braka by 2018Belarus 8.03 2 x 1200 MWe PWR in Ostrovets by 2018Turkey 44.76 4 x 1200 MWe PWR in Akkuyu by 2022Malaysia 25.54 2 x 1000 MWe LWRs, 1st unit by 2021Indonesia 32 8 2 x 1000 LWRs with potential interest ofIndonesia 32.8 2 x 1000 LWRs, with potential interest of

deploying Small Reactors for industrial process and non-electric applications by 2024

IAEA 44

Commercial Availability limits Newcomer Countries in SMR Technology Selection

New entrants with active participation in IAEA’s Programme on SMRin IAEA s Programme on SMR

Country Grid Capacity in GWe

Current Plan Rationales(in addition to the small grid capacity)

Mongolia 0.83 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)

Egypt 24.67 Had considered 1000 MWe Class LWR and/or SMR

Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)

Ghana 1.99 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security

Kenya 1.71 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security

Morocco 6.16 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply securityMorocco 6.16 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security

Nigeria 5.9 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)

Sudan 2.34 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)

Tunisia 3.65 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)

Algeria 10.38 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security + non-electric application(s)

Albania 1.6 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security

Croatia 4.02 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security

IAEA 45

Jamaica < 3 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security

Uruguay 2.25 Potential for future SMR deployment Energy supply security

Reactors Under Construction with SMR category

Country ReactorModel

Output(MWe)

Designer Number of units

Site, Plant ID, and unit #

CommercialStart

I di PHWR 700 640 NPCIL 2 K k 3 d 4 6/2015 d 12/2015India PHWR 700 640 NPCIL 2 Kakrapar 3 and 4 6/2015 and 12/2015

PHWR 700 640 NPCIL 2 Rajashtan units 7 and 8 6/2016 and 12/2016

PFBR 500 500 IGCAR 1 PFBR Kalpakkam 2015(LMFBR)

p

Pakistan CNP-300 300 CNNC -China

2 Chasnupp 3 and 4 12/2016

Romania CANDU-6 620 AECL 3 Chernavoda units 3 4 and 5 2016 2017 2018Romania CANDU-6 620 AECL 3 Chernavoda units 3, 4 and 5 2016, 2017, 2018

RussianFederation

KLT-40S(ship-borne)

30 OKBMAfrikantov

2 Akademik Lomonosov 2012

Slovakia VVER-440 405 OKB 2 Mochovce 3 and 4 ~ 2018Slovakia VVER 440(V213)

405 OKBGidropress

2 Mochovce 3 and 4 2018

China HTR-PM(GCR)

200 Tsinghua Univ./ Harbin

1 Shidaowan unit 1 2017 ~ 2018

Argentina CAREM 25 27 CNEA 1 Formosa unit 1 2017 2018Argentina CAREM-25(a prototype)

27 CNEA 1 Formosa unit-1 2017 ~ 2018

IAEA 46

Identified Issues from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

• Expanded scenario of Design Basis Accident (DBA) Multiple external initiating events and common cause failuresinitiating events and common cause failures

• Station blackout mitigation• Ultimate heat sink for core and containment cooling in post severe accident• Reliability of emergency power supply• Optimization of the grace period (i.e. operator coping time)

E h d t i t h d d i t th• Enhanced containment hydrodynamic strength• Hybrid passive and active engineered safety features• Safety viability of multiple-modules – first of a kind engineeringSafety viability of multiple modules first of a kind engineering• Accident management, emergency response capability and costs• Seismic and cooling provisions for spent fuel pool • Hydrogen generation from steam-zirconium reaction; recombiner system• Environmental impact assessment and expectation

C t l h bit bilit i t id t t i tIAEA

• Control room habitability in post accident transient47

IAEA Response to the Global Trend

• Project 1.1.5.5:C T h l i d I f SMRCommon Technologies and Issues for SMRs

• Objective: To facilitate the development of key bli t h l i d th l ti f blienabling technologies and the resolution of enabling

infrastructure issues common to future SMRsA ti iti (2012 2013)• Activities (2012 – 2013):• Formulate roadmap for technology development incorporating

safety lessons-learned from the Fukushima accidentsafety lessons learned from the Fukushima accident• Review newcomer countries requirements, regulatory infrastructure

and business issues• Define operability-performance, maintainability and constructability

indicators• Develop guidance to facilitate countries with planning for SMRs

IAEADevelop guidance to facilitate countries with planning for SMRs technology implementation

48

2014 – 2017 Vision, Challenges .. etc

• Enhanced understanding on prioritized various safety action plans on Post F k shima (in depth elaboration)action plans on Post-Fukushima (in-depth elaboration)

• Operational Issues for SMRs – Overcoming Constraints:• Licensability of non LWR technologies in newcomer countries• Licensability of non-LWR technologies in newcomer countries• Control room staffing and human factors• Connection to the gridg• Site specific exclusion zones and EPZs

• Deploying SMRs in Developing / Newcomer Countries• Integrated infrastructure development• International regulatory frameworks

F l l i• Fuel cycle preparations• First of a kind cost estimate• Integration with renewable energy resources

IAEAIntegration with renewable energy resources

• Does SMR help Public Acceptance after Fukushima accident?49M. Hadid Subki (NENP/NPTDS) - SMR

Technology Development

Summary• SMR is an attractive option to enhance energy supply

security in newcomer countries with small grids and y gless-developed infrastructure;

• SMRs have the potential to provide significantly enhanced plant robustnessenhanced plant robustness

• Innovative SMR concepts have common technology development challenges:

• licensability, competitiveness, control room staffing for multi-modules plant, and so forth.

• Needs to address lessons-learned from the F k hi id t i t th d i d l t dFukushima accident into the design development and plant deployment

• The key is: SMR Deployment must demonstrate commitment toThe key is: SMR Deployment must demonstrate commitment to nuclear safety

IAEA 50

… Thank you for your attention.… Thank you for your attention.

IAEA For inquiries, please contact: Dr. M. Hadid Subki <[email protected]> 51

2011 IAEA Major Workshops on Advanced Reactor Technology Developmentgy p

• Interregional Workshop on “Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technology for Near Term Deployment” on 4 - 8 July 2011Deployment on 4 8 July 2011 http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Technology/Meetings/2011-Jul-4-8-ANRT-WS.html

• Technical Meeting on “Options to Enhance Energy Supply Security with NPPs basedTechnical Meeting on Options to Enhance Energy Supply Security with NPPs based on SMRs” on 3 - 6 October 2011 http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Technology/Meetings/2011-Oct-3-6-SMR-TM.html

• INPRO Dialog Forum on Nuclear Energy Innovations: “Common User Considerations for SMRs” on 10 – 14 October 2011 http://www.iaea.org/INPRO/3rd_Dialogue_Forum/index.html

• Workshop on “Technology Assessment of SMR for Near-Term Deployment” on 5 – 9 December 2011http://www iaea org/NuclearPower/Technology/Meetings/2011 Dec 5 9 WS SMR htmlhttp://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Technology/Meetings/2011-Dec-5-9-WS-SMR.html

Please click the links to download the detailed presented materials.

IAEA 52

global trends prospects and challenges for global trends

Documents