globalisation and economic success

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological UniversityBlock S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

TEL: 65-6790-6982, FAX: 65-6793-2991Email: [email protected], Website: http://www.idss.edu.sg

ORGANISED AND SPONSORED BY THE BRENTHURST FOUNDATION, SOUTH AFRICA

IN COLLABORATION WITH

INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, SINGAPORE;

KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG; AND THE EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF INVESTMENT

GLOBALISATION AND

ECONOMIC SUCCESS

POLICY OPTIONS FOR AFRICA

SINGAPORE CONFERENCE REPORT, 7-8 NOVEMBER 2005





GLOBALISATION AND

ECONOMIC SUCCESS



2 GLOBALISATION AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR AFRICA SINGAPORE EVENT, 7-8 NOVEMBER 2005

‘Globalisation and Economic Success: PolicyOptions for Africa’ is a three-part conference andresearch project to identify best practices foremerging economies engaging withglobalisation. It focuses on the nexus betweenpolitics and economics in identifying andcodifying lessons from high-growth economiesappropriate in the African context and consistentwith the plans of the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD). The project aims topinpoint the relevant macro- and micro-economic steps necessary for higher rates ofeconomic growth especially in countries thathave undergone significant political changeand have dealt with acute socio-politicalchallenges. The project also focuses on keyAfrican countries to assess their record andpotential for growth and engagement in theinternational economy.

This project is thus relevant to both policy andbusiness, and its findings are designed to feedinto wider national and continental debates. Thefocus of the project is less on prescriptivesolutions, focusing rather on having a series of‘productive conversations’ around the themes ofgrowth, governance and policy.

Round One of the project, on which this reportis based, was held 7-8 November 2005 inSingapore. The next two events are scheduled

to be held in Egypt in September 2006, assessingthe growth experiences in each of 16 countriesstudied, and South Africa in early 2007,examining options for applying specific lessonsidentified by the project to Africa’s particularcontexts.

Industrial policy, trade policy, regulatory policy,fiscal policy, foreign direct investmentrequirements, etc, are more often than not oneof the same picture. Rarely are they radicallydifferent (other than in transition) betweencountries. Papers presented at the first event inSingapore sought to identify the regionalconditions that have affected developmentprospects, including: history, the tradeenvironment, geography, conflict, ethnicity,ideology, external influences, and so on. Theconference also included a paper projectingchallenges on the road ahead for the globalpolitical-economy, as well as one assessing thelessons from the ‘Washington Consensus’reforms.

The project adheres to a variation onChatham House Rules. Accordingly, beyondthe points expressed in the prepared papers,no attributions have been included in thisconference report.

Globalisation andEconomic SuccessPolicy Options for Africa


Organised and Sponsored by the Brenthurst Foundation, South Africa

In collaboration with

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung; and the Egyptian Ministry of Investment

GLOBALISATION AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR AFRICA SINGAPORE EVENT, 7-8 NOVEMBER 2005 3

INTRODUCTORY SESSION

Barry Desker, director of the Institute ofDefence and Security Studies (IDSS), openedthe conference with a brief recollection ofSingapore’s own successful economicexperience. In August 1965, when Singaporeachieved independence, there were grave doubtsthat a tiny, multiracial city-state without naturalresources on the southern tip of the MalayPeninsula could survive. The project required asustained coherent strategy emphasisinginvestment, building of infrastructure anddevelopment of human resources. Today,Singapore enjoys per capita GDP of greater thanUS$24,000, possesses the world’s third largestoil-refinery capability, and the developmentemphasis is on the pursuit of forward-lookingindustries such as telecommunications andbiotechnology. Overall, its economic strategy isclosely tied to globalisation.

Greg Mills then laid out a series of questions toframe the dialogue, including:1. Can the right sets of policies, both internal

and external, make a difference to growthtrajectories?

2. Are these policies by themselves enough? Orare there other things beyond the policydomain that have also to be addressed – andcan they all be addressed?

3. What type and which institutions are key toeconomic progress and growth?

4. What can be learned from the experience ofcountries in terms of productive, positiveparticipation in the global economy?

5. Regional dynamics: How important arelocation, regional institutions, and regional‘branding’?

6. What relationship, if any, is there betweengovernance and growth?

7. What is the role of technology in growth andinstitution building?

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zainul Abidin Rasheed providesthe opening address.

Barry Desker, IDSS Director, discusses Singapore’s developmentalexperiences in the opening remarks.

Greg Mills of the Brenthurst Foundation provides seven guidingthemes for the conference series.

Minister Rasheed, Botswana Trade Minister Daniel Neo Moroka, andInternational Herald Tribune reporter Roger Cohen discuss Africa’sexperiences.


At a time when no country, whatever itsdevelopment status, can afford to go it alone,Singapore’s Minister of State for Foreign AffairsZainul Abiden Rasheed noted that it wasappropriate that this conference reaffirmed theancient links of global commerce between Asiaand Africa. Having emerged from a similarcolonial experience, Singapore, like many of itsneighbours, has much to offer Africa in terms oflessons for economic growth and nation building.In 1965, at independence, Singapore was poorerthan the average African state. Forty years later,the picture is radically different.

What, then, are the ingredients of Singapore’ssuccess?

A first step is the recognition of foreigninvestment as the main impetus of industrialgrowth. Having no domestic market, Singaporehad to pursue an export strategy, requiringdevelopment of a strong manufacturing base.Second, development of manpower is critical.The government therefore pursued a vigorousand sustained approach to educating itsworkforce. It established technical institutes totrain workers and universities to produce bankersand health practitioners and created strong tiesbetween government, business and labour.Singapore established industrial arbitrationcourts to settle disputes and ensured an adequatesocial safety net for its people.

Once these were in place, the governmentfocused on attracting foreign direct investment

and building its economic sectors andinfrastructure. Planning and foresight wascritical. At each stage of progress, thegovernment was already anticipating andcreating conditions for the next stage. Politicaland social stability were vital prerequisites.Eliminating inequalities, corruption, poverty andunemployment are essential to avertingnationalist and populist uprisings.

Africa, with its natural resource wealth, is wellpoised to tap into the global value chain,particularly given the growing demand forcommodities from China and India. Asian states,accounting for three billion people collectively– half the world’s population – represent a crucialmarket for Africa and are key potential exportersof capital to Africa. To harness this potential,Africa needs to develop strong manufacturingsectors, one of the advantages being that theycreate jobs quickly. Tourism is another asset,requiring sound infrastructure to facilitate themovement of goods, people and capital. Mostimportantly, Africa must invest in its ‘software’– its human resources.

SESSION ONE: AFRICA AND THECHALLENGE OF GLOBALISATION

Africa is at an important crossroads, arguedJeffrey Herbst. The debates of the 1980s and1990s about which economic path African stateswould take are over. Good governance,disciplined exchange rates, globalisation, marketeconomies are accepted as the orthodoxy. What,then, does globalisation offer African states, andhow can they position themselves to takeadvantage of those benefits? DifferentiatingAfrica is critical. Herbst identified fivecategories: high performers ready to globalise;countries on an upward trajectory; large andsmaller poorly performing states; and the oilproducing states. For those countries doing well,globalisation offers trade and foreign investment.Engagement with the global economy producesan upward spiral as countries grow and exchangeknowledge, skills and goods. The big problem,Konrad Adenaur Stiftung’s Helmut Reifeld welcomes participants.


however, is that the dozen or so African countriesready to develop rapidly are, with the exceptionof South Africa, relatively small, so the overallbenefits of sustained growth and participationin the international economy will accrue to asmall proportion of the continent’s overallpopulation. Three common obstacles impedegrowth across the range of performers. The firstis comparative advantage based on resourcesrather than manufacturing. Two, China and Indiaare formidable competitors and will dominatethe low-cost manufacturing market for the next25 years. Three, Africa is beset by persistentnegative perceptions. Developing domesticpolitical consensus around growth andpromoting positive branding are thereforeessential.

Following Professor Herbst’s presentation, thediscussion focused on obstacles to Africa’sparticipation the global economy and somepotential solutions.

While big international initiatives such as UKPrime Minister Tony Blair’s Africa Commissionand Jeffrey Sachs’ UN report kindled renewedtalk among Western states about doubling aidand cutting debt to jumpstart African economies,the debate on the continent itself reflecteddifferent concerns. At a time when Africa needsto be differentiated, the Blair report homogenisedAfrica. NEPAD, however, signals two criticalshifts in the African mindset: First, the continent,broadly, embraces the conventional economicprescriptions long advocated by the World Bank;second, the debate about good governance is now

internal rather than external. Even so, manyAfrican states remain deeply ambivalent aboutliberalisation and participation in the globaleconomy, retarding the adoption of pro-growthpolicy strategies.

A set of critical question therefore arises: Ifinternal policy in Africa must be and is beingdifferentiated, how might external policy be aswell? How might the international communitypromote the preconditions for embracingglobalisation larger states? If large increases inforeign aid are unlikely to materialise, how canreform and growth be financed? How can Africagain a foothold, let alone compete, against Asia?Would trade liberalisation be a tonic for Africa?

A consensus emerged around the importance ofinternal reform. Internally driven progresstoward growth is more realistic than an external‘big push’. Other regions, meanwhile, are betterpoised to take advantage of any liberalisationthrough the Doha Round faster than most Africanstates. A range of home grown measures aretherefore needed: First, African states mustmobilise local capital through higher savingsrates and local investment. Second, betterbusiness conditions must be created throughimprovements in physical infrastructure and thesupply of skilled local labour and cheaper, morereliable energy. Three, gains in domesticconsumption and poverty reduction are critical.Four, governments need to align their civilservices around pro-growth economic agendas.

There is some good news, however. First, whilethe collapse in Zimbabwe represents lostopportunities in terms of regional trade, thecountry’s crisis has been largely contained,suggesting that state failure need not becontagious. Two, the African states most poisedto make progress toward integrating with theglobal economy are democratic, offering thepotential for leaders to develop societalconsensus around the benefits of globalisationmore rapidly. Positive branding is critical. Africaneeds its equivalent of a Japan. Until a medium-to large-sized African country breaks into theinternational community with rapid and

Jeffrey Herbst describes the increasing diversity among Africancountries.


undeniable success, there will not be broadermomentum among African states in thatdirection.

SESSION TWO: WHERE HAVE WECOME FROM? REFLECTING ON THEWASHINGTON CONSENSUS

Reviewing his ten key reform propositions, whichbecame known as the Washington Consensus,John Williamson argued that the agenda is stillbroadly relevant to Africa 16 years after he firstfloated them, despite acknowledging that therevived economies they anticipated have not yetcome into being. The underlying principles of thisConsensus were macroeconomic discipline,microeconomic liberalisation, and globalisation.Looking back from the current global economicenvironment, a broader agenda must be concernedwith preventing economic crisis by limitingborrowing; switching borrowing from currenciesto forms of equity, growth-linked bonds, ordomestic security bonds; and accumulatingreserves and building a stabilisation fund whenprimary exports are strong. Other measuresinclude furthering liberalisation, stimulatinginvestment, building the requisite institutions forgrowth, and incorporating the social dimensionof economic policy.

In the discussion that followed, the issue ofexchange-rate controls was highlighted in thecontext of South Africa, in particular theproblems Pretoria has experienced in effectinga competitive exchange rate. It was suggestedthat although there was no easy lever one canpull, a worldwide-agreed set of targets exchangerates should be seriously considered. A majorproblem identified was that actors were notprovided with incentives to take long-term views,so there is nothing to pin down exchange ratesover the long-term. South Africa was also heldup in regards to the relationship betweendevelopment and massive inequalities in wealthdistribution. Is it harder for countries like SouthAfrica, with gross disparities between rich andpoor, to engender population-wide development

than it is for poorer countries with more evenlydistributed wealth?

To what extent have countries like China,Argentina and Pakistan followed or succeededin implementing the Washington Consensus?Aside from property rights and giving priorityto social expenditure, Pakistan has adhered tothe Consensus; Argentina made myriad positivereforms, but its performance on regulation wasrisible. All three situations threw up the issue ofIMF voting rights, and there was speculation thatwe are likely to see a movement of votes fromEurope to Asia. In terms of China, the efficacyof the ‘Shanghai Consensus’ – emphasizingdeeper South-South co-operation, capacitybuilding and information sharing – wasaddressed. To what extent does that supplementor replace the Washington Consensus?

Another critical question was how to create theconditions that will enable African countries togrow and expand thin, anaemic industrial bases?It was noted that even countries with strongerindustrial bases, like South Africa, have provedincapable of building a strong small- andmedium-sized business base. Thus it was deemedimperative that governments must make it lessdifficult to establish small and medium-sizedenterprises (SMEs). Creating a culture ofproductivity, competitiveness and innovationwas seen as essential, and to that end a verystrong case was made for developing NationalInnovation Strategies (rather than nationalindustrial strategies).

Author of the “Washington Consensus, ” John Williamson, reflects onhow well his propositions have held up over time.


SESSION THREE: WHERE ARE WENOW AND WHERE MIGHT WE BE WEGOING? UNDERSTANDING THECONTEMPORARY GLOBAL POLITICALECONOMY

Paul Bracken traced the three key factorsshaping globalisation and the opportunities andchallenges it offers for countries trying to benefitfrom it: politics, economics, and the role ofindividuals. The world political economy raisestwo interesting questions: First, what are thechanging meanings of ‘capitalism’ and‘democracy’, the ascendant economic andpolitical systems respectively; and second, whatis the tension between them? Democracy stressesequality; capitalism inequality. Is there a pointat which they could be knocked intodisequilibrium, and by what factors? Brackenstressed the importance of two interconnectedvariables to national competitiveness:management and the role of business.

The discussion that followed Bracken’spresentation focused on the importance – but alsothe pitfalls – of branding. Many successfulcountries have developed brands and slogans thatare internationally recognised. Others havedeveloped marketing campaigns that have notbeen backed by substance. It is essential thatpolicies match the image and message that isprojected.

SESSION FOUR: THE EAST ASIANEXPERIENCE

In assessing lessons from the East Asiandevelopment experience, Barry Desker andDeborah Elms prompted a debate about theappropriate role of government vis-à-vis theglobal economy.The development experience of the Asian Tigersconfirms that there are multiple paths to goodgovernance, but there are also commonprerequisites to participation in the globaleconomy. These include a keen awareness oflocal conditions, the establishment of appropriate

institutions, laws and market regulations, cleangovernance, and a relentless commitment tointernational competitiveness. Countries thatorient policies outward have fared better thanthose who have not. Governments have a keyrole to play in defending private property rightsand instituting a vigorous legal structure toresolve disputes rapidly. Investment in ‘hard’ and‘soft’ infrastructure is also vital. Beyondestablishing these conditions, however, directgovernment intervention in the marketplace ismore often counter-productive. This thesis, theyargue, stands in marked contrast to and rejectsan alternative explanation of Asian growth – thatsuccess comes from government prowess in‘picking winners’, or directly backing orprotecting key industries.

The discussion explored a range of questions:What lessons should Africa find in the East Asianexperience? Should government play the role ofumpire or participant in the marketplace? Whattypes of institutions are key to economic growth?Are the East Asian strategies still feasible in thecurrent global economic context? To what extentdo states still have the freedom to manoeuvreunder existing WTO rules? Do African stateshave the capacity to adopt Asian growth models?In the context of trade liberalisation, whatspecific trade policies and market regulationsshould developing states adopt? How can Africanstates reconcile higher wage rates andcompetitiveness? If East Asia can be relativelysuccessful in a short period of time, can thoselessons be transferred?

Barry Desker and Deborah Elms describe East Asia’s economic path.


Asia is a differentiated story, just as Africa mustalso be. Fifty years ago it was not obvious thatAsia would create the conditions for rapiddevelopment. Although the region advancedunevenly, some generalisations are instructive.Asian leaders tended to put the economy first,protected property rights, invested in educationto fuel industry and form competent and cleancivil services, wove strong social safety nets andinvested in infrastructure.

An outward economic focus is vital in an age ofglobalisation. Strong financial sectors andmacro-economic policies are pivotal. Bankingand business sectors need to be integrated.

Finally, it was argued that WTO rules should notbe seen as obstacles to development andengagement with the global economy. Rather,they should be seen as a means of disciplinepreventing states from taking actions that wouldimpede trade and inflows of foreign directinvestment. The critical question is how statesimplement international trade rules. Overall, thelesson should be noted that when countriesprovide security, power and telecommunications,they integrate rapidly and costs dropdramatically. In short, they become highlycompetitive. To date, very few African countrieshave gone successfully through this process ofintegration.

SESSION FIVE: LESSONS FROM SOUTHASIA

Predeep Mehta argued that development inSouth Asia – India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – isa study in gradualism. Five conditions aredesirable: macroeconomic stability; investmentin physical infrastructure; investment in humandevelopment; promotion of small and mediumenterprises; and the creation of social safety nets.Higher social and human development can beachieved even at lower levels of per capitaincome.

Three questions prompted the discussion: One,are the stop-go reforms of Sri Lanka and Pakistan

the result of political instability and policyincompetence? Two, how do political systemsinteract with economic policy and performance?Three, is South Asian gradualism – gradualopening to the world economy with elements ofhard interventionism – appropriate to the Africancontext?

There are certain circumstances wheregradualism is not viable. Hyperinflation mayrequire a shock response, for example, just ashigh public indebtedness may necessitate defaultand restructuring. But in lesser circumstances,gradualism can be beneficial and more realistic.The benefits are larger if reforms are multifacetedand simultaneous: investment in human capitaland infrastructure, liberalisation, and so on. Thesecond advantage is the opportunity to learn bydoing. Gradualism allows time to correctmistakes and enables the people to digest thebenefits.

One important factor explaining greater successin East Asia compared with South Asia was thatthe latter states were hampered by ideology inthe early post-war years. The exceptions in EastAsia – China, Vietnam and North Korea – provethe rule. Where economic ideologies persisted,states achieved slower growth and failed to adoptoutward looking policy strategies.

Pakistan’s success in driving up its economicgrowth rate in recent years provides an important,if subtle, lesson for African states. The biggestchange in Pakistan followed 9/11 when, as anindirect consequence, many Pakistani expatriates

Vo Tri Than highlights the challenges Vietnam has faced from China’seconomic growth.


remitted their funds back home to avoid themcoming under sudden scrutiny from Westerngovernments. This influx gave the Pakistanieconomy a kick start. The moral: Grab youropportunities. One does not know what thefactors may be at any given time, but when goodfortune comes along it should be seized.

SESSION SIX: LESSONS FROM LATINAMERICA

Alberto Trejos drew practical lessons for Africafrom the experience of two successful LatinAmerican states: Costa Rica and Chile. The casesare of particular relevance to Africa becauseneither country has witnessed spectacular growth(a la East Asia); instead, they have experiencedimportant successes (more so in Chile) in exportpromotion and FDI attraction despite(particularly in Costa Rica’s case) their rathermediocre and patchy record of reform. Centralto their progress has been a strong commitmentto investment in education, human developmentand basic infrastructure. Human capital hasproven to be a key catalyst of productivity andexport-led growth in those countries. Theirexperience suggests that even for poor, smallcountries, fast export growth can achievesignificant economic results.

The discussion considered why both Costa Ricaand Chile chose to invest so heavily in humancapital at a time when, in financial terms, theywere so weak. One key reason related toenhanced legitimacy of the state: Palpablecommitments to and investments in health care,education, transportation and basic services notonly enhanced productivity but also instilled inthe people a stronger faith in the institutions ofgovernment and provided a degree of politicalstability that was critical to launching moreadvanced reforms. A strong emphasis was placedon increasing the importance of ‘non-tradable’in state development strategies.

Also discussed was the appropriate balancebetween public and private. At what price

privatisation? The participants agreed that therewas no easy balance to be struck; the experienceof both Costa Rica and Chile suggest for Africathe need to develop private/public balances basedon careful assessment of individual cases, ratherthan implement ‘generic’ privatization schemes.The same goes for branding: States must comeup with positive branding solutions that workfor them. In the case of Costa Rica, it shrewdly‘re-branded’ its rainy season as its ‘green’ seasonand in so doing dramatically increased touristrevenues over that period of the year.

China’s rising economic power, it was noted, hasnot had the devastating effect on countries likeCosta Rica and Chile that might have beenpredicted. In fact, the opposite might be true.China’s rise has benefited these countries insofaras it has driven up prices for some goods thatthey produce and also forced them to improvetheir own turnaround times and thereby increasetheir own efficiency. But the impact of China’s

Sara Pienaar highlights the developmental experiences of Central andEastern Europe.

Alberto Trejos, former Trade Minister, outlines Costa Rica’sexperiences with globalization.


rise is different for Costa Rica and Chile: forChile, China is primarily a customer, for CostaRica primarily a competitor.

SESSION SEVEN: LESSONS FROMCENTRAL/EASTERN EUROPE

Sara Pienaar examined aspects of the dramatictransformations that occurred in Eastern andCentral Europe and in the former Soviet Unionsince 1989, and suggested a number of potentiallessons learned from this experience that mightbe applied to Africa. The record from this regionis mixed, though there are several examples ofstates that have been liberated from scleroticpolitical and economic systems and are nowfirmly integrated into the international economyand experiencing impressive growth rates.Among the key determining factors for success/failure have been states’ geographical proximityto western Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures,natural resources, good leadership and, perhapsmost critically, the degree of internal civil unrest.Also identified as crucial was the ability to dealwith corruption.

The main question raised at the outset of thediscussion was the extent to which successfulCentral and Eastern European countries couldprovide a blueprint for African development.There are differences, however. The countriesthat have been successful in this region werehighly motivated by the prospect of a tangiblereward for rapid development, namelymembership of the European Union. No such‘prize’ underlies African countries’ development.Moreover, when the Berlin Wall fell Central andEastern European states had significant highlytrained and skilled populations. This made itmuch easier to adapt their human capital. Withfar fewer numbers in Africa, the task will be moredifficult. What the experience of the new EUentrants has demonstrated, however, is thecritical importance of staying the course –persistence in pursuit of reform, despite the short-term pain caused by the introduction of certainmeasures.

A key point missed in many of the debates oneconomic growth is happiness and quality of life.In focusing on how fast economies can grow, itwas agreed, quality of life issues should also beconsidered.

The War in Iraq was raised insofar as it bears onthe wider relationship between war and oilsecurity, and in particular the potential for WestAfrica to become of increasing internationalstrategic importance due to it major offshore oilreserves. What effect will that have on Africansecurity, given that oil possession is regardedwith as much apprehension as envy due to itspenchant for attracting unwelcome attention ona country’s territory and resources? In otherwords, will increasing interest in West Africa’soil reserves lead to a parallel increase in regionaltensions? Also related to the conflict in Iraq werethe priorities of major nations, the US and theUK in particular. Despite the commitments ofGleneagles, will the political will to assist Africannations in their development efforts evaporatebefore they make any progress?

SESSION EIGHT: LESSONS FROM THEMIDDLE EAST

The Middle East has grown since the 1970s,argued Eddie O’ Sullivan, but this has beenbased (almost) entirely on one single commodity– oil. He argued that the region’s growth andrelative prosperity is not due to the soundeconomic policies advocated by internationalinstitutions. Rather, they are a result of somebasic criteria that are also applicable to Africa.First, don’t let others define you and yourproblems. Secondly, ‘play to your strengths’ byfocusing on established capabilities instead ofattempting to undertake activities in areas wherethere is clearly more international competition.Thirdly, promote and advertise success storiesand develop a positive brand. Finally, diversifyinto services sector rather than manufacturing.

A number of participants countered the MiddleEast has very little to offer in terms of examples


for Africa. Indeed, the model may well be anegative one in terms of the overall effect of alack of liberalization, both economic andpolitical. The exception may be Dubai (which isbeing followed by others in the region such asAbu Dhabi and Qatar), which has broken themould from oil dependency by diversifying intoservices. This may offer some lessons to oilproducing countries in Africa.

CONCLUSIONS

Jeffrey Herbst, drawing on the two days ofdialogue, highlighted six salient points:1. No one raised an argument or alternative

development model that deviated fromgenerally accepted economic orthodoxy. Noteven in Latin America or Asia. This is goodnews for Africa. It suggests that there are nocultural or regional idiosyncrasies in thesetheories.

2. Domestic determinants are key. The driversof growth must be found from within. This isa telling indicator for Africa. The action isnot in NEPAD or the regional economiccommunities, but within individual states.

3. Hard (physical) and soft (human) investmentis critical.

4. Political consensus on growth is difficult tomaintain. Leaders must keep people in linewith long-term strategies while dealing withimmediate problems.

5. The more interventionist the state is, thesmarter it must become to remain successful.States have to be willing to change coursewhen strategies or investments go sour. Thismarks a key difference between Asia andAfrica. Asia has demonstrated a willingnessto pull out of bad investments. Are Africancountries smart enough to do the same?

6. The real advantage to Asia that it started somuch earlier. Time is a crucial element indevelopment.

Greg Mills closed the conference with a briefconsideration of three ‘D’s which flowedthroughout the two days: differentiation,

diversification, and detail.

DIFFERENTIATION

There have been two unheralded major shifts inAfrica over the last 15 years: Democraticgovernment and a liberal economic reformagenda. Some states have applied such preceptsmore enthusiastically than others. Thus thereality of African political and economic unity,of increasing differentiation between states, doesnot equal the rhetoric of unity.

Here arises a key challenge for both those insideand outside Africa: Current external assistancestrategies do too little to recognise importantdifferences between regions and differencesbetween states within regions. For example,Africa’s least successful states have adisproportionate impact, not only on externalperceptions of Africa but also on the attention ofthe international community. The moresuccessful states suffer both from this diversionof attention, and also from the direct impact ofcross-frontier destabilisation. The response, bothglobal and regional, has generally been merelyto reiterate the standard mantras of Africanreform – state reconstruction, democracy, soundeconomic management and so forth – which mayhave much to offer some parts of the continent,but which are of limited if any relevance to thoseparts in which the basic conditions for effectivestatehood have not been met.

There is thus a need for a sharper concentrationon the increasing levels of divergence in Africantrajectories, and the different policy responsesthat these now call for, both within Africa andfrom the external world. We can no longerplausibly talk about ‘Africa’ as though it were asingle lump. We should instead craft approachesgeared, first, to different groups of states; and,second, to the specific circumstances of stateswithin each group. We need some ‘blue skiesthinking’ about what to do about the growingdifferentiation of African states – whereincreasing divergence rather than convergencein terms of state performance is likely to be thenorm.


DIVERSIFICATION AND GROWTH

It is clear that some states are at different levelsof reform and thus external requirements thanothers. In particular, there are those states whichhave moved beyond economic stability to theneed for strategies around diversification awayfrom, for example, commodity-based economies.

The experience of others highlights the followingcommon ten features – a ‘Decalogue’ – of reformand growth:

• The need for political stability and internalsecurity.

• Openness to the international economy whichgoes beyond exports and FDI to includeforeign skills, and includes the use of suitabletechniques and institutions for export-promotion and the avoidance of ‘anti-exportbiases’. There is also a need to move beyondthe ‘build and they will come approach’regarding policy, towards actually finding outwhat investors want.

• The importance of government as a key leadinvestor.

• The advantageous use of geographic location.• The importance of developing staged,

flexible, growth-oriented strategies.• The existence of a competitive currency.• The employment of asset acceleration and

leverage.• The need for high levels of public service

competence.• A focus on public utility commercialisation.• And the importance of international branding

and the use of key assets – notably the airlines– to do so. But the policies have to match themessage.

The answer to why some countries grow andothers does not lie in volumes of money receivedor, for that matter, access to commodities, eventhough the former generally reflects andreinforces success. Indeed, the dismaldevelopment history of aid to Africa or to Indiais evidence that money is not enough to makestates grow. If money was the issue, these stateswould be rich – or at least richer – today, and if

growth through aid was that simple, why has itnot occurred already? To the contrary, largeexternal aid flows may actually hinder growthprospects, distorting markets and sidetracking thedevelopment of the very financial instrumentsAfrican states themselves need to establish tofund development.

Strong work ethics and the application oftechnology do not alone provide the growthanswer. African states are poor today becausethey have in the main failed to take advantageof globalisation and put the institutions in placeto do so. They are high-cost, high-risk and lowin productivity. They may, indeed, be poorprecisely because they are expensive to operatein; and expensive to operate in because they arepoor. And those that are richer are so becausethey have adopted better standards of governanceand possess more responsive and responsiblegovernments. Individual freedoms and strongleadership are central to development. Allowingindividuals the sort of freedoms that lay behindthe European success and possessing theleadership that made necessary state-led strategicinterventions in East Asia’s case are central todevelopment.

DETAIL

Finally, of course, the devil is in the details. Herethere a number of key questions which werehighlighted in the course of what was discussedover the two days and will most certainly arisein the subsequent stages of the conference series:• How to build the social and political

governance regimes required for structuralreforms.

• The need to match macro- and micro-economic policies.

• The need to develop policies that inspirebusiness, and developing appropriate ways totreat the corporate sector.

• Finding out what the corporate sector wantsto invest.

• Developing ways to link the Diasporaprincipally through the creation of businessopportunities.

• Finding means to foster productivity and


innovation.• Overall, finding the means to do the ‘how’

rather than simply identifying the ‘what’.

Taking the final word, Barry Desker concludedby underscoring that the responsibility ofindividual states and societies is paramount. Eachstate must drive its own development. Lastly, he

This report was drafted by Dr. Greg Mills of the Brenthurst Foundation;Dr. Terence McNamee, Director of Publications at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London; andKurt Shillinger and Lyal White of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg.

noted in the course of the two days a movementfrom debate to conversation, underscoring thepotential of the conference series in establishinga constructive, nurturing exchange of ideasacross the diverse regions of the world. Now,these productive conversations should progressto the identification of salient, applicable lessonsin the remaining two events.


P R O G R A M M E

6 November 2005 (Sunday)

Arrival and check-in for overseas participants

1900 - 2100 Welcome reception for participants

Venue: Poolside, Level 5, Marina Mandarin

7 November 2005 (Monday)

Conference Venue: Taurus, Level 1, Marina Mandarin

08:30 Registration

09:00 Welcome and opening remarks: Barry Desker, IDSS

Introduction: Greg Mills, Brenthurst Foundation; Helmut Reifeld, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Opening address: Zainul Abidin Rasheed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Singapore

09:45 Coffee/tea break

10:00 The Challenge for Africa

Chair: Michael Spicer, South Africa Foundation

Jeffrey Herbst, Miami University, USA: “Africa and the Challenge of Globalization”

12:00 Lunch

Venue: Marina Mandarin, Leo Room, Level 1

13:30 The Global Economic Development Terrain

Chair: Friedrich Wu, IDSS

John Williamson, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC: “Where Have We ComeFrom? Reflecting on the Washington Consensus”


15:30 Paul Bracken, Yale University, USA: “Where Are We Now and Where Might We be Going To?Understanding the Contemporary Global Political Economy”

17:00 End of Session

19:00 Dinner

Venue: House of Peranakan Cuisine, East Coast Parkway

8 November 2005 (Tuesday)

09:30 Regional Development Paths

Chair: Razeen Sally, LSE

Barry Desker and Deborah Elms, IDSS Singapore: “The East Asian Experience: The Poverty of PickingWinners”


11:00 Pradeep Mehta, CUTS, India: “Engaging with Globalisation: Lessons from Pakistan and Sri Lanka”

12:00 Lunch

Venue: Marina Mandarin, Leo Room, Level 1

13:00 Regional Paths (continued)

Chair: Ebrahim Ebrahim, Member: NEC, African National Congress, South Africa

Alberto Trejos, INCAE, Costa Rica: “Lessons from Big and Small States in Latin America”

Sara Pienaar, South Africa: “Lessons from Central / Eastern Europe”


14:45 Eddie O’ Sullivan, MEED Dubai: “Lessons from the Middle East”

16:30 Conference Closing

Barry Desker, IDSS

Greg Mills, Brenthurst Foundation

Jeffrey Herbst, Miami University


L I S T O F C O N F E R E N C E P A R T I C I P A N T S

1) ZAINUL ABIDIN RasheedMinister of StateMinistry of Foreign AffairsTanglinSingapore 248163Email : [email protected]

[email protected]

2) Amr ABDEL AZIMVice ChairmanGeneral Authority for Investment and Free Zones(GAFI)Ministry of InvestmentSalah Salem Road, Nasr City, Cairo 11562EgyptTel : (202) 4055 471 Fax : (202) 4055 427Email : [email protected]

3) Sylvia Irene BERGHDoctoral CandidateUniversity of OxfordWorcester College, Oxford, OX1 2HBUnited KingdomTel : (212) 7185 2579 Fax : (41) 41 750 1555Email : [email protected]

[email protected]

4) Paul BRACKENProfessor of Management and Political ScienceYale University135 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06520USATel : (203) 432 5962 Fax : (203) 438 7294Email : [email protected]

5) Roger COHENColumnist/International-Writer-at-LargeInternational Herald Tribune and New York Times229 W. 43 Street, NY 10036New YorkUSATel : (1) 212 556 8865Email : [email protected]

6) Barry DESKERDirectorInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlock S4, Level B4, Nanyang AvenueSingapore 639798Tel : (65) 6790 6907 Fax : (65) 6793 2991Email : [email protected]

7) Colin DUERKOPRegional RepresentativeKonrad Adenauer Foundation34 Bt. Pasoh RoadSingapore 089848Tel : (65) 6227 2201 Fax : (65) 6227 8343Email : [email protected]

8) Ebrahim Ismail EBRAHIMAfrican National Congress73 Nicklaus St, Silver Lakes, PretoriaSouth AfricaTel : (27) 83 441 6147E-mail :[email protected]

9) Juan Carlos ECHEVERRYDean of EconomicsUniversidad de los AndesCarrera 19A, No. 1-37 Este Edif. C of 301, BogotaColombiaUSATel : (571) 332 4493 Fax : (571) 332 4492Email : [email protected]

10) Deborah ELMSAssistant ProfessorInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlock S4, Level B4, Nanyang AvenueSingapore 639798Tel : (65) 6790 6978 Fax : (65) 6793 2991Email : [email protected]

11) Peter FABRICIUSForeign EditorIndependent Newspaper, South AfricaP.O Box 1014, Johannesburg, 2000South AfricaTel : (27) 11 633 2579 Fax : (27) 11 836 8274Email : [email protected]

12) Dianna GAMESExecutive Directorrica@Work” Africa@Work4, 5th Avenue, Parktown NorthJohannesburg 2193South AfricaTel : (27) 11 880 4868 Fax : (27) 11 880 4869Email : [email protected]

13) Alan GELBDirector, Development PolicyThe World Bank1818H St.Washington DC20433USATel : (202) 473 9076 Fax : (202) 522 0906Email : [email protected]

14) Richard GIBBProfessor of Human GeographyUniversity of PlymouthSchool of Geography, Plymouth PL48AAUnited KingdomTel : (44) 1752 233073 Fax : (44) 1752 233054Email : [email protected]


15) Rudolf GOUWSChief EconomistRand Merchant BankP.O Box 786273Sandton 2146South AfricaTel : (27) 11 282 8711 Fax : (27) 11 282 8710Email : [email protected]

16) Ferial HAFFAJEEEditor-in-ChiefMail and GuardianGrosvenor Corner195 Jan Smuts Ave, RosebankSouth AfricaTel : (27) 11 250 7310 Fax : (27) 11 250 7506Email : [email protected]

17) Jeffrey HERBSTProvost and Executive Vice President for AcademicAffairsMiami University209 Roudebush HallOxford, OH 45215Tel : (513) 529 6721 Fax : (513) 529 8003Email : [email protected]

18) Leila JACKProject AdministratorThe Brenthurst FoundationSt Andrew’s House6 St Andrew’s Road, Parktown, GautengSouth AfricaTel : (27) 11 274 2096 Fax : (27) 11 274 2097Email : [email protected]

19) Heavenlight KAVISHECoordinatorParastatal Sector Reform Commission2nd Floor Sukari House, Ohio/Sokoine DriveP.O Box 9252Dar Es Salaam, TanzaniaSouth AfricaTel : (255) 222 113066 Fax : (255) 222 113065Email : [email protected]

20) Ashfaque Hasan KHANDirector General, Debt Office and EconomicAdviserMinistry of Finance, Government of PakistanBlock “S”, Pak Secretariat, IslamabadPakistanTel : (9251) 9202023 Fax : (9251) 9203388Email : [email protected]

21) Gaylard KOMBANIDeputy Permanent SecretaryMinistry of Trade and Industry, BotswanaP/Bag 004, GaboroneBotswanaTel : (267) 360 1200 Fax : (267) 397 1539Email : [email protected]

22) Michael Andreas LANGEResident RepresentativeKonrad Adenauer Foundation35 Abu El-Feda StreetFlat 18, Zamalek, CairoEgyptTel : (20) 2 735 4329 Fax : (20) 2 737 2121Email : [email protected]

23) John MCKAYPartnerAnalysis International1/6 Marne Street, South Yarra, Victoria 3141AustraliaTel (61) 3 9866 8009 Fax : (61) 3 9866 8709Email : [email protected]

24) Terrence MCNAMEEDirector of Publications / Editor, RUSI JournalThe Royal United Services Institute for Defenceand Security StudiesRUSI, WhitehallLondon SW1A 2ETUnited KingdomTel : (44) 20 7747 2613 Fax : (44) 20 7747 2647Email : [email protected]

25) Neva Seidman MAKGETLA Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) P.O. Box 1019 Johannesburg 2000 South Africa Tel: (011) 339 4911 Fax: (011) 339 5080 E-mail: [email protected]

26) Pradeep MEHTASecretary GeneralConsumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS)D-217, Bhaskar MargBani ParkJaipur 302016IndiaTel : (91) 141 2282 821 Fax : (91) 141 2282 485Email : [email protected]

27) Luis MEMBRENOPresidentMc Carthy de CentroamericaPaseo General Escalon #4714-C. Col Escalon.San SalvadorEl SalvadorCentral AmericaTel : (503) 2237 7788 Fax : (503) 2237 7790Email : [email protected]

28) Greg MILLSDirectorThe Brenthurst FoundationSt Andrew’s House, 6 St Andrew’s RoadParktown, 2193



South AfricaTel : (27) 11 274 2094 Fax : (27) 11 274 2095Email : [email protected]

29) Daniel Neo MOROKAHonourable MinisterMinistry of Trade and Industry, BotswanaP/Bag 004, GaboroneBotswanaTel : (267) 360 1252/3 Fax : (267) 391 3209Email : [email protected]

30) Mark NAPIERChief Executive OfficerFinMark TrustP.O Box 61674, Marshalltown, 2107South AfricaTel : (27) 11 315 9197 Fax : (27) 11 645 6896Email : [email protected]

31) Geoffrey ONEGI-OBELChairmanUganda Securities Exchange LtdP.O Box 23552, KampalaUgandaTel : (256) 41 343 297 Fax : (256) 41 342 841Email : [email protected]

32) Edmund O’ SULLIVAN Editorial Director Middle East Economic Digest P.O. Box 25960 Al Thuraya Tower 20th Floor Dubai Media City Dubai Tel: 0971 4 390 0045 Fax: 0971 4 368 8025 E-mail: [email protected]

33) Mark PEARSONProgramme DirectorRegional Trade Facilitation ProgrammeP.O Box 317, Persequor ParkPretoria, 0020South AfricaTel : (27) 12 349 1197 Fax : (27) 12 349 1094Email : [email protected]

34) Sara PIENAARResearch FellowSouth African Institute of International AffairsP.O Box 31596 Braamfontein 2017South AfricaTel : (27) 21 794 8240 Fax : (27) 21 794 8981Email : [email protected]

35) Gwyn PRINSAlliance Research Professor and Director-desig-nateThe LSE Mackinder Centre for the Study of LongWave Events

London School of Economics & Political Scienceand Columbia University New YorkLSE Houghton St LondonWC2A 2AEUnited KingdomTel : (207) 852 3678Email : [email protected]

36) Helmut A REIFELDHead of DivisionKonrad Adenauer FoundationLandgrafenstrasse 1410907 BerlinTel : (49) 30 26996 3467 Fax : (49) 30 26996 3556Email : [email protected]

37) Paul RIVLINSenior Research FellowThe Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East andAfrican Studies, Tel Aviv UniversityRamat Aviv, Tel AvivIsraelTel : (972) 3 640 6442 Fax : (972) 3 549 3247Email : [email protected]

38) Guillermo ROZENWURCELDirectorUniversidad Nacional de San MartinParana 145 4to PisoPisoTel : (54) 11 4374 7300 int 219Fax : (54) 11 4374 7300 int 201Email : [email protected]

39) Razeen SALLYSenior LecturerLondon School of EconomicsHoughton St London WC 2A2AEUnited KingdomTel : (44) 207 955 6788 Fax : (44) 207 955 7446Email : [email protected]

40) Sehoai SANTHOW.K. Kellogg Foundation Africa Program – Lesotho14 Beeton Street, Laadybrand, 9745AfricaTel : (27) 51 924 2586Email : o:[email protected]”[email protected]

41) Kurt SHILLINGERResearch Fellow, Security and Terrorism in AfricaSouth African Institute of International AffairsJan Smuts HouseUniversity of the WitwatersrandP.O Box 31596Braamfontein 2017South AfricaTel : (27) 11 339 2021 Fax : (27) 11 339 2154Email : [email protected]


42) Sanjeev Kumar SOBHEEAssociate ProfessorDepartment of Economics and StatisticsUniversity of MauritiusReduitMauritiusTel : (230) 454 1041 Fax : (230) 4656 184Email : [email protected]

43) Michael SPICERExecutive DirectorSouth Africa FoundationSt Margaret’s, 3 Rockridge Road, ParktownSouth AfricaTel : (27) 11 356 4650 Fax : (27) 11 726 4705Email : [email protected]

44) Mlanden STANICICDirectorInstitute for International RelationsLj.F. Vukotinovica 210000 ZagrebCroatiaTel: (385) 1 48 77 461 Fax. (385) 1 48 28 361Email: [email protected]

45) Alberto TREJOSProfessorINCAE Business SchoolCampus Walter Kissling960-4050 AlajuelaCosta RicaTel : (506) 437 2318 Fax : (506) 433 9606Email : [email protected]

46) VO Tri ThanhCentral Institute for Economic Management (CIEM)68 Phan Dihn Phung, HanoiVietnamTel : (844) 8456 903 Fax : (844) 8456 795Email : [email protected]

47) Quoc Ngu VUResearcherNational Centre for Social and Economic ModellingUniversity of Canberra170 Haydon Drive, Bruce 2617AustraliaTel : (612) 6201 2790 Fax : (612) 6201 2751Email : [email protected]

48) Lyal WHITESenior Researcher - Asia & Latin AmericaSA Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)P. O Box 31596Braamfontein 2017South AfricaTel : (27) 11 339 2021 Fax : (27) 11 339 2154Email : [email protected]

49) John WILLIAMSONSenior FellowInstitute for International Economics1750 Mass Ave NWWashington DC 20036USATel : (1) 202 454 1340 Fax : (1) 202 659 3225Email : [email protected]

50) Friedrich WUAdjunct Associate ProfessorInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesNanyang Technological UniversityBlock S4, Level B4, Nanyang AvenueSingapore 639798Tel : (65) 6790 5944 Fax : (65) 6793 2991Email : [email protected]

51) Jun ZHANGDirectorChina Center for Economic Studies,Fudan University220 Handan Road, Shanghai 200433ChinaTel : (86) 21 6564 3054 Fax : (86) 21 6564 3054Email : [email protected]



Singapore Conference Observers

1. Ozichi J Alimole, Acting High Commissioner:Nigeria High Commission, Singapore,Tel: (Singapore) 6732 1743

2. Christopher Cheang, Deputy Director: InternationalEconomics Directorate: Ministry Of Foreign Affairs,Singapore,Email : [email protected]

3. Mohamed Elzorkany, Ambassador of Egypt:Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Singapore,Email: [email protected]

4. Hossam El-Shenawy, Third Secretary: Embassy ofthe Arab Republic of Egypt, Singapore.

5. Musa Fazal, Senior Assistant Director (DirectorateA): Ministry of Trade & Industry, Singapore,Email : [email protected]

6. Flavio Fonseca, Minister Counsellor: Embassy ofThe Republic of Angola,Email: [email protected]

7. Stacey Foo, Assistant Director: Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Singapore, Email: [email protected]

8. Zanele Makina, High Commissioner: South AfricaHigh Commission, Email: [email protected]

9. Ng Kim Neo, Consultant (Directorate A): Ministry ofTrade and Industry, Singapore,Email: [email protected]

10. Graham Gerard Ong, Associate Research Fellow:IDSS, Singapore, Email: [email protected]

11. MPH Rubin, High Commissioner of Singapore toSouth Africa: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore,Email : [email protected]

12. Premjith S, Director: South Asia and Sub-SaharanAfrica, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore,Email: [email protected]

13. Sheryl Shum, Country Officer: Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Singapore,Email: [email protected]

14. Michelle Teo, Communications and ConferenceCo-ordinator: IDSS, Singapore,Email: [email protected]

15. Bobby Thomas, Research Assistant: IDSS, Singa-pore, Email: [email protected]

16. Jasmine Quah Zubair, Assistant Director: TradeDivision, Ministry of Trade & Industry, Singapore,Email: [email protected]

Students

1. Nwachukwu Dimkpa Damian, IDSS,Email: [email protected]

2. Uche Frank Ogakwu, IDSS,Email : [email protected]

3. Agha Ikenna Benjamin, IDSS,Email : [email protected]


The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies(IDSS) was established in July 1996 as anautonomous research institute within theNanyang Technological University. Itsobjectives are to:

• Conduct research on security, strategic andinternational issues.

• Provide general and graduate education instrategic studies, international relations,defence management and defence technology.

• Promote joint and exchange programmes withsimilar regional and international institutions,and organise seminars/conferences on topicssalient to the strategic and policy communitiesof the Asia-Pacific.

Constituents of IDSS include the InternationalCentre for Political Violence and TerrorismResearch (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellencefor National Security (CENS) and the AsianProgramme for Negotiation and ConflictManagement (APNCM).

RESEARCH

Through its Working Paper Series, IDSSCommentaries and other publications, theInstitute seeks to share its research findings withthe strategic studies and defence policycommunities. The Institute’s researchers are alsoencouraged to publish their writings in refereedjournals. The focus of research is on issuesrelating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications forSingapore and other countries in the region. TheInstitute has also established the S. RajaratnamProfessorship in Strategic Studies (named afterSingapore’s first Foreign Minister), to bringdistinguished scholars to participate in the workof the Institute. Previous holders of the Chairinclude Professors Stephen Walt (HarvardUniversity), Jack Snyder (Columbia University),Wang Jisi (Chinese Academy of SocialSciences), Alastair Iain Johnston (HarvardUniversity) and John Mearsheimer (Universityof Chicago). A Visiting Research FellowProgramme also enables overseas scholars tocarry out related research in the Institute.

TEACHING

The Institute provides educational opportunitiesat an advanced level to professionals from boththe private and public sectors in Singapore aswell as overseas through graduate programmes,namely, the Master of Science in StrategicStudies, the Master of Science in InternationalRelations and the Master of Science inInternational Political Economy. Theseprogrammes are conducted full-time and part-time by an international faculty. The Institutealso has a Doctoral programme for research inthese fields of study. In addition to these graduateprogrammes, the Institute also teaches variousmodules in courses conducted by the SAFTIMilitary Institute, SAF Warrant Officers’ School,Civil Defence Academy, and the Defence andHome Affairs Ministries. The Institute also runsa one-semester course on ‘The InternationalRelations of the Asia Pacific’ for undergraduatesin NTU.

NETWORKING

The Institute convenes workshops, seminars andcolloquia on aspects of international relations andsecurity development that are of contemporaryand historical significance. Highlights of theInstitute’s activities include a regular Colloquiumon Strategic Trends in the 21

st Century, the annual

Asia Pacific Programme for Senior MilitaryOfficers (APPSMO) and the biennial AsiaPacific Security Conference. IDSS staffparticipate in Track II security dialogues andscholarly conferences in the Asia-Pacific. IDSShas contacts and collaborations with manyinternational think tanks and research institutesthroughout Asia, Europe and the United States.The Institute has also participated in researchprojects funded by the Ford Foundation and theSasakawa Peace Foundation. It also serves asthe Secretariat for the Council for SecurityCooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP),Singapore. Through these activities, the Instituteaims to develop and nurture a network ofresearchers whose collaborative efforts will yieldnew insights into security issues of interest toSingapore and the region.

ABOUT IDSS

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological UniversityBlock S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

TEL: 65-6790-6982, FAX: 65-6793-2991Email: [email protected], Website: http://www.idss.edu.sg





GLOBALISATION AND

ECONOMIC SUCCESS



globalisation and economic success

Documents