globalization and the secularization of immigration … iv special/jacksonparkes-fm.pdfglobalization...

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ISSN: 1540-5699. © Copyright by Ahead Publishing House (imprint: Okcir Press). All Rights Reserved.

HUMAN ARCHITECTURE

Journal of the Sociology of Self-

A Publication of OKCIR: The Omar Khayyam Center for Integrative Research in Utopia, Mysticism, and Science (Utopystics)

In

Guests and Aliens

(1999: 151), SaskiaSassen posits that the denationalization ofcapital and workforce flows has led to afundamental convergence among highlydeveloped nations regarding immigration.Her work concurs with Jacobson’s (1996:85) analysis underscoring the impact of theEuropean Convention on Human Rights(ECHR) on the trend toward isomorphismin European states’ immigrant protection

initiatives. Signed in 1950, the ECHR origi-nally stressed the role of states in assuringthe human rights of minorities, but “indi-vidual petitions have gained increased im-portance since the 1970s and 1980s.” TheConvention has thus been instrumental inthe shift of national policy in signatorystates toward “harmonization” of the lawsrelating to migrants and minorities. Tran-snational human rights norms have

Dr. Pamela Irving Jackson, Director of the Justice Studies Program and Professor of Sociology at Rhode Island College,focuses on issues of social control and minority status, including comparative analysis of the integration of Muslims inwestern societies. She is the recent recipient of two Fulbright grants on this topic. Roderick Parkes (UK), research assistantat the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin and doctoral candidate, focuses on the development of justice and homeaffairs integration in the EU, and specifically on questions of asylum and immigration. He received an M.Phil in EuropeanStudies from Cambridge University in 2002. The authors would like to thank the Fulbright Program, the Rhode IslandCollege Faculty Research Fund and the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) at the University of Bonn, Germanyfor their support of this project. The paper reflects the authors’ views, not necessarily those of their institutions.

Globalization and the Secularization of

Immigration PolicyCompeting Influences on Immigrant Integration Policy in

Germany, France, Britain and the United States

Pamela Irving Jackson and Roderick Parkes

Rhode Island College • Center for European Integration (ZEI), Germany––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––[email protected] • [email protected]

Abstract: This article examines the extent to which anti-racist policy development is on the frontline of the struggle between the denationalizing forces of global economic integration and the re-nationalization efforts inherent to the securitization of immigration policies. Sassen (1999) con-tends that global economic integration has stimulated labor demands and migration patternsthat have fostered the transnationalization of immigration policy and provided some protectionsto immigrants. Jacobson (1996) and Hollifield (1992) have demonstrated global convergence inhuman rights standards. But national governments have responded to the supra-national influ-ences in anti-racist and minority integration policy development by substituting internal secu-rity goals for economic ones in immigration policy changes. The paper suggests that whileglobalization has stimulated initiatives encouraging greater tolerance of diversity, national secu-ritization efforts have had a detrimental effect on policies aiming at the integration of immi-grants in four western post-industrial societies.

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emerged as primary criteria for the devel-opment of policies on asylum, immigrationand aliens’ status, Jacobson contends (1996:93, also citing Soysal, 1993). Althoughstates have willingly bound themselves tosuch norms, it is arguable that these permitindividuals to circumvent state sovereigntyin making immigration and human rightsdemands.

Immigration and refugee policy-mak-ing in the United States has increasinglybeen influenced by transnational agree-ments interpreted as imposing significantlimits on the autonomy of the state (al-though in many cases the U.S. Constitutionhas been judged to be in agreement withthese documents making reliance on thelatter unnecessary). Jacobson (1996: 98-101)asserted that the shift from the dominanceof state sovereignty to international humanrights in the U.S. became evident in the1970s and 80s, and is most clearly seen infederal court cases filed in the 1980s. JamesHollifield (1992: 181-2) also pointed out thesignificance of these decisions, but cited ap-propriate cautions concerning their futureimplications. He warned, “while trends inadministrative and constitutional law havebeen in the direction of a greater rights-based politics, there have been some rever-sals of liberal policy, especially in the powerand willingness of immigration authoritiesin the United States to incarcerate aliens,pending a decision of their petition to re-main.”

Hollifield’s caveat highlights the factthat the convergence in immigration pat-terns is not only attributable to the judicialdynamics and processes of denationaliza-tion that have challenged national execu-tives’ capacity to control migration. Thereare also striking commonalities betweennational executives’ responses to such pres-sures. These can be seen to ‘renationalize’migration—in other words they concern ef-forts to reassert control over internationalmigration flows. The ‘securitization’(Huysmans 2000; Tirman 2004 a,b; Balzacq

2005) of migration policy-making describesthe way in which migration flows havebeen conceived as a threat to a state’s inter-nal, social and economic security and arerestricted as such. In some cases, stateshave cooperated together, thus giving up acertain degree of national sovereignty in or-der to regain

de facto

control over migrationflows. Analysis suggests that the framing ofmigration as a threat to security in much ofcurrent European (and specifically EU) im-migration and asylum policy-making isdisproportionate to the reality of the threatposed. This can be put down in large part tothe fact that sections of the national bureau-cracy have been able to extend their compe-tencies and resources by reconceiving of so-cial, economic and foreign policy issues asquestions of security (Clutterbuck 1990;Guiraudon 1998; Bigo 1994). It is also thecase, however, that this reconceptualisationof migration has empowered national exec-utives to bring in restrictive immigrationmeasures which might otherwise havebeen rejected by those parliamentary andjudicial actors that uphold internationaland national norms to the benefit of immi-grants.

The United States has not been im-mune to this trend. Concern about illegalimmigration in the United States led to thepassage of restrictive immigration and wel-fare eligibility policies (in 1986 and 1996)that ultimately did not reduce the flow ofimmigration to the country, but did in-crease the securitization of immigrationpolicy: Immigrants were framed as a threatto economic security, a drain on the welfaresystem, and the source of drug and othercrime problems. The link has also beenmade between migration and harder formsof security issues: The 1993 World TradeCenter Attacks stimulated policy changesthat increased government prerogatives indealing with non-citizens deemed poten-tially threatening (Tirman, 2004a). But thesalience of immigration as a threat to na-tional security remained low until Septem-

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ber 11, 2001. After these attacks, the link be-tween immigration and hard forms of secu-rity threat became more concrete, despitethe economic importance of the global flowof peoples and ideas.

This can be understood as a product ofa ‘politics of exceptionalism’—wherebypolicy-makers refer to exceptional existen-tial threats to or from a specific group in or-der to legitimize exceptional security mea-sures, rather than of a ‘governmentality ofunease’ (Bigo 2002) as appears to havecharacterized developments at the Europe-an level. In the latter case, interior ministryofficials, police and other ‘security profes-sionals’ have become dominant in immi-gration policy and process it in the sameway as they would ‘hard’ security threats.In this conception of securitization, the dis-cursive reference to migrants as a securitythreat is also instrumental; however, actorscite a general threat posed by migrants tosecurity rather than an exceptional one.

In actual fact both processes have beenat work on both sides of the Atlantic: In hisdiscussion of the “migration-security nex-us,” John Tirman (2004a: 2) details severalof—what he views as—the unintendedconsequences of “the new securitization ofmigration,” especially as Homeland Securi-ty Directives have “locked immigrationand security together bureaucratically.” Forhim, the intended, or at least readily expect-ed consequences of the Patriot and Home-land Security Acts’ provisions regardingimmigrants included: a “prosecutorial jug-gernaut” that mounted a legal barrageagainst Muslim men in America, tightenedvisa requirements that led to “long waits toenter the U.S, historic levels of visa deni-als,” and dramatic decline in the number ofrefugees admitted to the U.S. As bureaucra-cies “create their own momentum” towardgreater internal security—a situation Tir-man (2004a: 3) likens to that surroundingthe 1947 National Security Act—signs ofthe unintended consequences of “secrecy,massive security spending…demonizing

adversaries” are emerging. Also unintend-ed, but apparent, is the shift away from animmigration policy driven more by eco-nomics than security (Tirman 2004a: 5).Greater “contingency” (Tirman 2004a: 6) inthe status of Muslim immigrants in Ameri-ca is becoming apparent, isolating themfurther from mainstream society, withdoubts about their “legality, utility and so-cial or cultural acceptability.”

Such developments are indicative of‘cultural securitization’ whereby immi-grants are treated as a threat to national cul-ture. These processes feed into broader ef-forts at nation-building at a time when thenation-state is deemed to be under threatfrom ‘post-national’ forces. National identi-ty is thus defined in contradistinction to the‘other’ or the ‘outsider’. Cultural securiti-zation results, in part, from national actors’attempts at self-legitimization in an unsta-ble setting (Balzacq 2005; Vuori 2006).

Efforts to integrate immigrants intohost societies sit on the borderline betweenthe competing dynamics of denationaliza-tion and renationalization: Policies aimedat delegitimizing racism and facilitating thesocietal and economic integration of immi-grants are perceived to count among the“pull factors” of immigration flows. Theyare, however, deemed to attract not onlydesirable forms of migration, but also un-desirable forms. In this way, they are reflex-ive both to international competition for la-bor and to national efforts to regain controlover undesirable forms of immigration.

Problems arise not only because of theperception that integration measures tar-geted at one particular category of immi-grant may nevertheless exert an undesired‘pull’ effect upon other categories, butalso—and more fundamentally—becauseof the difficulties involved in defining ‘de-sirable’ immigration. Forms of migrationthat appear desirable from an economic,demographic or humanitarian point ofview may seem unacceptable from a socialor security-centric stand point. Different ac-

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tors within the national and internationalpolitical systems promote differing priori-ties and conceptions of what forms of mi-gration are to be encouraged; these priori-ties in turn may further their own institu-tional interests. While security-centricconceptions of migration are often legiti-mized with reference to the narrow inter-ests of citizens, humanitarian as well assome economic and social conceptions re-fer in a more universalistic manner to therights of non-citizens.

Immigrant integration policies there-fore place immigrants at the intersection ofthe struggle between the denationalizingforces of global economic integration andthe efforts among governments to gain agreater degree of control over immigration.We define immigrant integration policies ina broad sense as those directed toward re-ducing discrimination and bias toward eth-nic (as well as racial and religious) minori-ties, and fostering their integration. We ac-knowledge the dangers of suchterminology, however, especially given thetraditional dichotomy between ‘anti-race’and ‘citizenship’ modes of integration poli-cy. Nevertheless, this broad approach al-lows us to search for convergence in thetreatment of immigrants. We recognize thatthe broader use of the term ‘integration’ toinclude, for example, assimilation policies,may also be problematic in light of tradi-tional perspectives of minority group rela-tions which distinguish among meltingpot, assimilationist and multiculturalistmodels (Schaefer 2004). Moreover ‘integra-tion policy’ can also refer to measuresaimed at excluding certain immigrants ei-ther from the national territory, or sociallyand economically in order to integrate oth-ers. We include this dimension in our un-derstanding of integration policy.

Our focus and terminology permitcomparative analysis of the impact of glo-balization and the securitization of immi-gration regulations on several differenttypes of immigrant integration policy de-

velopment and implementation strategies.We argue that the dynamics linking theseforces reflect national efforts to maintainpolitical sovereignty in the face of econom-ic changes triggering global populationflows. We illustrate our thesis in four highlydeveloped western nations: Germany,France, Britain and the United States. Wedo not suggest that these are the only forcesdriving isomorphism, nor indeed that wecapture all aspects even of these two driv-ing factors.

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The post-nationalist perspective positsthat macroeconomic change in westernpost-industrial societies has stimulated la-bor demands and migration patterns thatnow propel these nations toward delegiti-mizing racism and integrating immigrants.Greater tolerance is sought to create the so-cial infrastructure necessary for continuedeconomic productivity. But Kathleen Mc-Namara (2001: 2, 5) cautions that critical ex-amination of the legitimation or delegiti-mation of specific policies through interna-tional economic, governmental and non-governmental institutions affirms the im-portance of a sociological view of the insti-tutional and policy isomorphism attributedto globalization. Some sociologists assumethat “markets…are embedded in a social,political and historical context which has apervasive effect on their operation,” and, inthis light, examine the twin forces of “inter-national economic integration” and “thespread of global cultural norms of neoliber-alism” as operating “in tandem” to refor-mulate the world. Efforts to combat racismare not merely a product of internationaleconomic competition: They also reflect at-tempts to maintain the embedded nationalsocial and economic structures that supportthe influence of the democratic nation-state

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as an organizational entity. Our model, therefore, recognizes the

importance of social context, and investi-gates the possibility that international eco-nomic integration facilitates the spread ofnorms through interaction with the social,political and historical infrastructure ofeach society.

However, it also recognizesthe

role of these entrenched structures inlimiting isomorphism, for example in theform of recent developments toward the“Europeanization” of immigration policy,especially with regard to ‘third-country na-tionals’ (immigrants without nationality ofone of the EU member states) (cf. Caviedes,2004). Paradoxically, though, national ef-forts to safeguard these specific—and inmany ways idiosyncratic—social and eco-nomic structures from unwanted immi-grants have also contributed to isomor-phism in measures to regulate the societaland economic position of immigrants.

The history of these four societies’ in-corporation of new groups and acknowl-edgement of their minority status has dif-fered markedly. One point of differentia-tion concerns the nature of migration flowsto which states have been

subject.

As Sas-sen (1999: 155) explains, international mi-grations are produced by economic andhistorical dynamics involving both receiv-ing and sending nations; they are patternedin that the occupational and industrial dis-tribution of nationals and immigrants usu-ally differ markedly; and they are embed-ded in specific historical phases

.

Bauer et al.(2002) discuss the importance of self-selec-tion in the migration process and comparemigrants to the population in the sendingand receiving countries. Migrations containtheir own regulatory forces within the geo-politics of the system.

They are boundedand differentiated processes involving bothcircular migration and permanent settle-ment. Policies regulating immigration andimmigrant residence in the national territo-ry are rooted in the underlying national so-cial structures to which McNamara draws

attention. Since the second world war the United

States and Britain have relied primarily onself-motivated immigration in the face oflabor shortages,

assuming—or compara-tively soon acknowledging—that most im-migrants would stay (Geddes and Guirau-don 2002; Kogan; Schaefer 2004). The focusof immigration control was

therefore at theentry border, unlike in

Gastarbeiter

or tem-porary work systems where immigrantswere expected to leave the country after alimited period of time. In Britain immigra-tion controls have been predicated on therationale that they permit the cultural ex-pression central to its model of immigrantintegration by carefully regulating the eth-nic diversity of the population.

Post-warimmigration restrictions in Britain were fu-eled by social disorder and popular hostili-ty toward immigrants (Hansen, 2000). Poli-cies that effectively excluded or limited en-try of members of certain racial groups atthe border were characteristic of both Brit-ain and the U.S. In Britain, justification forthese policies was the importance of assur-ing racial harmony; in the U.S., immigra-tion quotas until 1965 were based on thepercentage of each group already in the na-tion, thereby favoring immigration fromEurope. The Immigration and NationalityAct Amendments of 1965 dismantled thisquota system in the U.S., increasing immi-gration flows from South American andAsian nations (cf. Jernegan 2005). Addition-al labor market skills requirements wereadded in 1986 and 1990 in order to increasethe economic “quality” of immigrants.Those meeting the “skills” requirementswere less likely to be of color, but the eco-nomic aspect of this preferential criteria re-ceived attention, rather than the racial as-pect. Amnesty provisions were sometimesoffered (for example, in 1986) to integratelong-term, employed immigrants (withouta criminal record) in

the U.S.

(cf. Schaefer2004).

Britain restricted post-war immigra-

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tion earlier, and for different reasons thanits continental European neighbors. In Ger-many and France, despite concern over so-cial tensions, economic interests were em-phasized in immigration policy, particular-ly until the 1970s, and the socialconsequences of immigration (such as theunrest resulting from greater diversity)were not cited as a prime rationale in immi-gration restriction until they were used asan apology for several hate crimes againstlong-term immigrants in Germany in the1990s, including the 1992 racially motivat-ed firebombing in Moelln, and the 1993 ar-son attack in Solingen (ECRI, Germany,First Report, 1998). The greater longevity ofguest-worker programs in Germany andpost-colonial immigration in France weredue in part to the—implicit or explicit—of-ficial assumption that unwanted foreignerswould either choose to leave or be made to.This confidence was severely underminedby judicial activism which negated policiesaimed at repatriating unwanted immi-grants (Guiraudon 1998).

In the post-war period, the four stateshave referred to different paradigms intheir treatment of immigrants. The FrenchRepublican model is based upon the ideathat the national community can be definedby its active acceptance of common rationalvalues. The relative openness of French cit-izenship laws allows foreigners to join thenational community. This model is color-blind and does not recognize differencesbetween its citizens according to nationalor ethnic origin. Republicanism has re-quired color-blindness, restricting thestate’s capacity to deal with differencesamong immigrants who become citizens.These strictures have fostered abdication ofofficial responsibility for “immigrant” inte-gration.

German policies relating to immi-grants, in contrast to those of France, havebeen explicitly based on national and eth-nic distinctions. Yet, because Germany la-beled itself until recently “not a country of

immigration,” it, too, has been character-ized as having engaged in “self-abdicationof the political process to steer the incorpo-ration of labour migrants” (Joppke 1999:19). In this model, immigrants deemed toshare German ethnicity are welcomed intothe national community, while other cate-gories of immigrant have had only limitedopportunities to do so.

The British ‘philosophy of integration’(Favell 1998) is much less rigorously intel-lectualized than the French, basing itself in-stead upon historical precedent and prag-matic adaptation. British colonial historyled to the development of an open conceptof national membership. Citizenship has anuneasy place in this model, and the persis-tent influence of ideas of subjecthoodmeans that the rights attached to citizen-ship have typically been rather limited. In-stead of apportioning rights and privilegesaccording to membership in the nationalcommunity, this model accords rights on aterritorial basis. Precepts of multicultural-ism have restricted the state’s capacity tosteer the process of social integration. Crit-ics argue that British citizenship is an essen-tially empty concept, and there is no notionof the cultural requirements of immigrantintegration.

As a country of immigrants, the U.S.has maintained the system of ius soli it in-herited from the British. However, its con-ception of citizenship was not the passiveBritish one whereby birth on the territorysufficed to gain access to membershiprights. As in revolutionary France, therewas the expectation that citizens activelyparticipate in the state’s values. Yet itlacked the means and legitimacy to de-mand this. A unique brand of “civil reli-gion” (cf. Bellah 1975, 1985) was instead en-couraged and fostered by the state as a bot-tom-up approach after the AmericanRevolution to legitimize the newly formednation. Individuals are free to keep theirown culture, as long as they participate inthe nation’s economic system and proclaim

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their faith in the United States.

INTEGRATION EFFORTS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

Broadly speaking then, these nationspresent three different discourses on howto deal with immigrants in post-industrialwestern societies: France relies on citizen-ship as the right vehicle for integrating im-migrants; Britain (cf. Bleich 2003) and theU.S. have promoted anti-racism measures.In Germany, meanwhile, the dominant dis-course has often related more to the long-term exclusion rather than integration of(non-ethnic German) immigrants. It is,therefore, indicative of a significant shift indirection, that France has helped formulate,and signed up to anti-racist EU measures,on the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam’sArticles 6a and 13. Germany has opened upits citizenship laws to non-ethnics and par-ticipated in the formulation—although lessreadily in the implementation—of EU anti-discrimination measures. In Britain, we dis-cover a new emphasis on citizenship, andspecifically ‘active citizenship’. In both theUS and Britain in the past decade, certaintypes of immigrant have been excludedfrom benefits, which are now allotted prin-cipally to citizens (Fix and Laglagaron2002). We view changes like those in Franceand Germany as reflective of internationalcompetition for labor and of the related ef-fect of international anti-race norms, whilstthe changes in Britain and the US are basedmore on normative ideas of how to regaincontrol of immigration.

The EU’s recent role as a vehicle for thepromotion of immigrant integration mea-sures is at first glance unsurprising. Post-nationalists argue that anti-race measuresare motivated in part by a desire to encour-age international labor mobility; such freemovement aims occupied a core position inthe foundation of the European Economic

Community—precursor to the EU. More-over, the subsequent removal of many in-ternal barriers to the free movement of per-sons within the EU makes the immigrantintegration policies of one member state ofrelevance to the others, since disgruntledminorities from one state are increasinglycapable of traveling throughout the territo-ry of the EU, and because the economicmarginalization of immigrants in one coun-try may have implications for other statesin an enmeshed economic zone. This kindof ‘neo-functionalist’ (Haas 1964) explana-tion appears, however, overly determinis-tic, and fails to explain the form of the EU’scommon anti-race efforts.

We posit that the EU has provided anopportunity structure for actors ‘blocked’at the national level in immigration and im-migrant policy-making (Guiraudon 2001,2000a,b; Lavenex 2001; Maurer and Parkes2006). Sections of national bureaucraciesand NGOs have been able to use EU policy-making to pursue preferences that they areunable to realize at the national level. Inter-national norms may be referred to duringnegotiations: Sociological analyses of nego-tiations at the European level stress that de-liberation among individuals may encour-age them to follow a ‘logic of appropriate-ness’ in which such norms play a role.Actors may also be convinced that interna-tional norms provide a solution to nationalproblems. However, in their analysis of theformulation and adoption of the recent EUanti-race directive, Geddes and Guiraudon(2002) show that much depends upon thestrength of the actors who mobilize aroundcertain issues. European integration pro-vides a comparatively non-hierarchicalframework for policy-making in which themember states do not operate as unitary ac-tors. Actors who have driven minority inte-gration efforts in this sphere have pursuedtheir own specific institutional interestsand agendas. Sometimes these overlapwith the promotion of international norms,but there is by no means certainty that this

138 PAMELA IRVING JACKSON AND RODERICK PARKES


will be the case. Similarly the formulationof international norms may have little to dowith what might be objectively identifiedas existing best practice.

The promotion of international stan-dards in this area by some European levelinstitutions and agencies has been robust(not least because these actors are legiti-mized and assisted in pursuing their insti-tutional interests through such norms). In-dividuals within the European Commis-sion and European Parliament havepromoted international norms. To a degreethey are acting as ‘agents’ to their memberstate ‘principals’: Member states havecharged these agencies to promote and en-sure the proper application of measures tofacilitate desirable regional and even inter-national labor mobility. They are, however,capable of pursuing an autonomous agen-da, although to differing degrees. Commis-sion officials in the Directorate Generaldealing with social affairs were particularlyactive, for example, in the extension tothird-country-nationals of existing anti-dis-crimination measures for member state na-tionals working in other member states.

A European Commission Against Rac-ism and Intolerance (ECRI) has been estab-lished within the Council of Europe frame-work, and a European Monitoring Centeron Racism and Intolerance (EUMC) withinthe EU. In addition, several related frame-works, charters and protocols have beendeveloped, such as the European Conven-tion on the Legal Status of Migrant Workersand the European Convention for the Par-ticipation of Foreigners in Public Life at theLocal Level. The integration activities ofsome extra-state agencies mirror those ofnational bodies monitoring problems inimmigrant integration, underscoring thedevelopment of functional isomorphism inthis area but also the heterogeneity of na-tional methods to achieve policy aims(most obviously concerning the level atwhich agencies are set up). For instance, theroles of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission

(CRC), a U.S. national body, established in1957 under the Civil Rights Act, and the ex-tra-state European Commission on Racismand Intolerance (ECRI), established in 1993in the Vienna Declaration of the Council ofEurope’s first Heads of State Summit, aresimilar, though their structural position isnot. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission,though bipartisan, is a fact-finding agencyof the executive branch of the U.S. govern-ment. ECRI exerts pressure from outside ofthe nation investigated, while the CRCworks internally, alerting appropriate U.S.agencies to problems of bias. Both commis-sions issue evaluative reports on issues re-lating to discrimination. The reports of theCRC are intended to shed light on areas ofbias within individual states or with regardto specific federal policies in an effort toprod officials toward compliance with fed-eral civil rights standards. This can be seen,for example, in the 2002 reports, “CivilRights Issues Facing Arab Americans inMichigan,” and the “Briefing on CivilRights Issues facing Arab Americans inMilwaukee Post 9/11.”

In 1997 the European Council estab-lished the EUMC, to combat racist propa-ganda and hatred within EU member na-tions. EUMC provides research documen-tation, coordination of an informationalnetwork (of universities, NGOs and inter-national organizations), and publication ofannual reports alerting EU institutions andmember-state governments to racist trendsand encouraging them to undertake suit-able measures. As is true for ECRI reports,the issues central to EUMC publicationsalso have much in common with those atthe heart of the CRC reports. For example,EUMC focused its 2001 annual report, “Di-versity and Equality for Europe,” on dis-crimination and bias in the employmentsector, as did the CRC in its 2001 report,“Federal Efforts to Eradicate EmploymentDiscrimination in State and Local Govern-ments.”

While EUMC is an information gather-



ing resource, ECRI is a formal mechanismthrough which the European Union mem-ber states along with their partners in theCouncil of Europe seek to protect humanrights. A body of the Council of Europe,ECRI (2002: 2) was created to “reviewmember states’ legislation, policies andother measures to combat racism, xenopho-bia, anti-Semitism and intolerance, andtheir effectiveness,” to formulate and pro-pose policy recommendations, and tostudy and work toward the reinforcementof appropriate international legal instru-ments. ECRI is composed of independentmembers selected for their “moral authori-ty and recognized expertise in dealingwith…intolerance” (ECRI 2002: 2). Whileeach member state of the Council of Europehas a representative on ECRI, these mem-bers do not receive instruction from theirgovernment and are expected to be impar-tial in fulfilling the work of ECRI. The activ-ities of the ECRI are three-pronged, direct-ed at individual countries, selected themes,and efforts in the civil society. Country-by-country evaluations examine each of themember states of the Council of Europe atfour-year intervals, resulting in a series ofindividual reports for each country. Threereports each have been produced forFrance, Germany and Britain, with specificrecommendations intended to facilitate theinclusion of populations of color and Mus-lims. The nations have responded with pol-icy initiatives and dialogue. The interactionbetween ECRI and each of these countriesmerits evaluation.

Nevertheless, considerable variation innational and regional immigrant integra-tion efforts remains. Efforts to delegitimizeracism in Germany, France, Britain and theUnited States rest on cultural supports thatare different in each nation and within eachcountry’s social classes. In France, for ex-ample, Lamont (2000: 195) found that theupper class and intellectual elites accept themulticulturalist assumption that all cul-tures are valuable. The French working

class, however, still does not accept the rel-ativism of multiculturalism, but is drawnby the importance of solidarity in the na-tion’s historical traditions, its leftist poli-tics, and its Catholicism. Lamont character-izes French workers as unified in the beliefthat all workers, regardless of national ori-gin, need to work to eat. For Americanworkers, she found, money is the greatequalizer; those who find work and cansupport themselves may be consideredequal. “Socioeconomic success…is the cri-terion of social membership…The marketadjudicates the value of people…labormarket position…is one of the main princi-ples of equality used by American workers…” (Lamont, 2000: 196).

In Germany there is less cultural sup-port for multiculturalism in the upperclasses and less tolerance of difference inthe working classes than in France or theUnited States. While the Green Party cham-pioned the rights of immigrants and madedual citizenship part of its campaign agen-da, there have been few other supports forGerman elites or workers to find common-alities with the foreign workers or transna-tionals in the country. The Catholic Churchin Germany, for example, has not provideda basis for the group solidarity that Lamont(2000) found it fostered in France, and post-war German voters have not supported aperiod of socialist government, as have theFrench. The communist ideology that dom-inated the eastern part of Germany for ageneration provided one cultural supportfor solidarity among workers of differentethnic and racial backgrounds (and mayhave provided part of the electoral supportfor the Green party during its recent coali-tion with the Social Democrats (SPD)), butthe lack of diversity resulting from theclosed borders of the east during the com-munist era gave Germans there little expe-rience with tolerance. Add to that the factthat Germans have not historically seentheir nation as an immigration nation (acultural support for multiculturalism in the



United States) and the importance of themarket imperative in stimulating Germanefforts to delegitimize racism becomesclear.

The concrete effects arising from theformulation of international norms shouldnot, therefore, be overestimated. CathrynCluver (2005:8) has described the prospectof “the slow death of far-reaching anti-dis-crimination legislation that would haveeased the lives of hundreds of thousands ofmigrants and other population groups liv-ing in Germany…[as] reflecting poorly onthe ‘success story’ of the Race Direc-tive…and [proving] the insufficiency of EUenforcement power on ‘soft policy’ issues.”Cluver (2005:2) argues that Angela Mer-kel’s CDU coalition government has dis-missed the need to put EU anti-discrimina-tion legislation into German law, arguingthat “these points are already sufficientlyaddressed in the German Constitution.”Germany has only recently officially recog-nized the multiethnic character of its popu-lation. While there are fewer cultural sup-ports for antiracism in Germany than inFrance, the SPD/Green coalition headed bySchroeder (immediately preceding Mer-kel’s Christian Democratic coalition gov-ernment), projected a greater sense of ur-gency regarding tolerance building effortsin Germany. Aware of the awful legacy ofits past intolerance, the German federalgovernment had begun to implement a setof policies and practices to make up for thelack of antiracist cultural supports in thenation’s recent history. Cluver’s concernabout the demise of anti-discriminationlegislation, noted above, may be applied toGermany’s entire array of anti-hate initia-tives in the current political context.

IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND ‘THE NEW RACISM”

As economic restructuring increasedunemployment in the unskilled sector by

the early 1970s, a negative political reactionagainst immigrants spawned extremistgroups and anti-immigrant legislation. Ac-cording to Balibar (1991: 21 as cited in Holt,2000: 14), for example, the rhetoric of newforms of popular racism “cites the insur-mountability of cultural differences…theharmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the in-compatibility of lifestyles and traditions.”Holt (2000: 16-17) points out that ethnicallymotivated conflicts appear to have greaterlegitimacy and rationality because theyavoid the bias attached to biological dis-tinctions. Such discourse is apparent in allfour of the nations under examination.

Efforts to curtail immigration in Ger-many coincided with vociferous public dis-cussion reaffirming German popular senti-ment against becoming an “immigrationnation.” In 1968 France limited Algerianimmigration, and by 1974 had curtailedany new immigration—as much as possi-ble—from sources outside the EuropeanEconomic Community. Repatriation effortsaimed at North African immigrants werebegun in 1977, but were ineffective. The1986 “Pasqua Act” (the Loi Relative aux Con-ditions d’Entrée et de Sejour des Etrangers enFrance) led to a wave of involuntary depor-tations (cf. Kushnick, 1995: 189), since itpermitted officials to stop foreigners tocheck their documents, and gave thosewithout the correct paperwork twenty-fourhours to leave or face arrest and deporta-tion. Discourse and policy responses thusconceived of non-nationals as a threat tothe national economy and society. This re-flects the way that the nation-state’s polityis structured, drawing its legitimacy fromnationals. Actors were thus able to promoteand legitimize their policies with referenceto the threat posed to nationals.

Like Germany and France, the UnitedStates reacted to the economic restructur-ing of deindustrialization with more re-strictive immigration policy and criminaljustice net—widening directed at both im-migrants and people of color. The Immigra-



tion Reform and Control Act of 1986 criminal-ized hiring illegal aliens, punishing em-ployers with fines and incarceration, evenwhile it offered amnesty to illegal alienswho had entered the country before Janu-ary of 1982 and lived there continuouslysince then. The restrictive 1996 Illegal Immi-gration Reform and Immigrant ResponsibilityAct required deportations of legal immi-grants convicted of even a minor offense,and swift review of asylum seekers by Im-migration and Naturalization Serviceagents with limited special training in thisarea. Affirmative action and bilingual edu-cation programs were cut back in somestates. In Britain, as well, the 1980s broughtrestrictionist immigration legislation: TheImmigration Act of 1988, the Asylum and Im-migration (Appeals) Act of 1993, and furtherlegislation in 1996 and 1999.

Fearful of the loss of voter support toright-wing politicians, the traditional par-ties in all four nations moved their plat-forms in the direction of the rightist groups,promising to curtail immigration, reduceassistance and limit eligibility for natural-ization. In taking this approach the main-stream parties legitimized the anti-immi-grant and racist scapegoating promulgatedby the extremist parties (cf. Marcus, 1995;Feldblum, 1999). Xenophobic fears of a linkbetween societal diversity and crime led togreater scrutiny of those who were or ap-peared to be foreigners. The relationshipbetween the loss of jobs for unskilled laborand criminal justice net-widening policiesis currently under examination by scholarswho have cited the disproportionate im-pact of this trend on minority populations(cf. Western and Beckett, 1999; Beckett andSasson, 2000). However, its criminalizingimpact on the permanent foreign work-force in post-industrial nations needs morestudy. Initial evidence suggests its signifi-cance. In France, for example, from 1970-1990, while the foreign (etranger) popula-tion increased by only 2.9 percent (from 5.0to 7.9 percent), the percent of those incar-

cerated who were etrangers (not-born inFrance and not naturalized) rose from 15%to almost 30% (cf. Jackson, 1995: 352).Etrangers are more likely to be incarceratedfor offenses for which French nationals re-ceive suspended sentences (Jackson, 1997).The proportion of foreign population inGermany was relatively stable from 1977-1997, rising gradually from 6.4 to 9.0 per-cent (with the post-1990 figures for the unit-ed Germany and the earlier figures for theformer West Germany) (Federal Ministry ofthe Interior, 1998: 13). Yet the percentage ofimprisoned persons who were foreigngrew almost five-fold, from 5.8% of thoseconvicted in 1977 to 26.6% in 1997 (Statistis-ches Bundesamt, 1999: 67). The vast majorityof offenses for which foreigners were incar-cerated involved violations of asylum pro-cedures, immigration law and illegal or ir-regular documents. Because most foreign-ers in Germany were in the West (2001-5Germany Info, www.germany-info.org),German reunification might be expected tohave reduced the percentage of prisonerswho were foreign (as the prison populationincreased with the larger overall popula-tion of Germany). Instead, the percent ofimprisoned persons who were foreign in-creased steadily from 1992 until the turn ofthe century. Thus, reunification probablymasked even greater imprisonment likeli-hood for foreigners over the decade of the1990s than the existing figures demon-strate. The greatest growth in the propor-tion of the imprisoned population that wasforeign was between 1987 and the 1994-95period, when the increases taper off some-what. A gradual decline begins in 1999,leaving foreigners 22.4% of those incarcer-ated in 2001. In Britain (where the collectionand publication of data for foreign nation-als in the prison system of England andWales began in 1993), there was a 120% in-crease in the population of foreign nation-als incarcerated (to 7,720) from 1993-2003,while the increase was only 55% for Britishnationals (Home Office, 2003; cf. Jackson



and Parkes, 2005). While the proportion offoreign nationals among the total prisonpopulation remained at 8% from 1993-1999,it grew to 11% of the British prison popula-tion between 1999 and 2002 (Jackson andParkes, 2005).

In all three countries the current levelof incarceration for non-nationals is higherthan it was when records began. In Germa-ny and France these increases coincide withthe period of immigration restrictionismwhich began in the mid-1970s. The figureshave, however, begun to taper off. InFrance, the level of non-national incarcera-tion reached its highest point in the early—to mid-1990s. In Germany, the proportionof foreign prisoners peaked somewhat lat-er, in the mid to late 1990s. When recordsbegan in Britain, the relative proportion ofimmigrants among the imprisoned appearsto have been lower (and still remains low-er) than in France or Germany, but contin-ued to rise after the other two had peaked.The proportion of foreign nationals impris-oned has been relatively low and has begunrising only in the last five years, partly re-flecting the changing makeup of immigra-tion to the country. The percentage of eth-nic minority prisoners is substantially high-er in Britain in recent years and shows nosign of dropping off. Taking into accountimmigrants’ numbers within the total pop-ulation, immigrant incarceration is dispro-portionally high in all three states.

In the United States restrictiveness inimmigration policy development coincidedwith greater scrutiny of non-citizens byboth immigration and criminal justice au-thorities in the United States. Marshallused Bureau of Justice Statistics reports todemonstrate that “the number of nonciti-zens who were prosecuted in U.S. districtcourts from 1984-94 increased an average often percent annually from 3,462 to10,352…compared to a 2% annual increasein overall federal caseload…[reflecting] anincrease in the number of noncitizenscharged with drug and immigration offens-

es (BJS, 1996, pp. 5-6,” as cited in Marshall,1997: 21). Scalia and Litras (2002:8), exam-ine more recent data in a Bureau of JusticeStatistics Special Report, indicating that“noncitizens accounted for about a third ofthe growth in the Federal prison popula-tion, 1985-2000…In 1985, 5,561 noncitizenFederal inmates were 14% of the total; in2000, 37,243 noncitizens inmates were 29%of all Federal prisoners…During 2000, 54%of noncitizen inmates had been convictedof a drug offense; 35% of an immigrationoffense; and 11% of other offenses.” Theyfurthermore explain that immigration of-fenses accounted for most (two-thirds) ofthe noncitizen inmate growth from 1996-2000, increasing this figure from 4,411 to13,162. The restrictive immigration policiespassed in 1986 and 1996, no doubt, explainthis increase. Convicted immigration of-fenders were more likely to be incarceratedduring this period: Their incarceration rateincreased from 57% to 91%. The averagetime that they served in prison also in-creased more than five-fold (from 3.6months to 20.6 months) during these years(Scalia and Litras, 2002:2).

Wacquant (1997: 219) claims that dur-ing this period “an amalgam of immigra-tion, illegality and criminality” was forgedcreating a “suitable enemy” of foreignersand quasi-foreigners. Since the 1980s, im-migration and asylum have been politi-cized, increasingly cast as a source of terror-ism, and a threat to national identity andeconomic stability (Huysmans, 2000). Evensupranational institutional and policy de-velopments have been based on thepremise of immigrants’ threat to nationaland internal stability. “The vision of an in-tegrated, European-wide law enforcementaction against international organizedcrime [has become] a reality” (Loader, 2002:128). A “culture of post/national policing”has developed, supported by “discoursesof danger and security practices [deriving]their political significance from their capac-ity to stimulate people to contract into a po-



litical community and to ground—or con-text—political authority on the basis of re-ifying dangers” (Loader, 2002: 129, citingHuysmans, 2000: 757).

We view state-led efforts at the exclu-sion of certain immigrants as a constituentpart of integration policies, so the growth inimmigrant incarceration has relevance tothe study of immigrant integration andgeneral integration policies. The perceptionthat efforts to exclude immigrants at theborder were failing contributed to a growthin active efforts to exclude immigrantswithin society. Yet, although the increasesin immigrant incarceration levels may bepartly accounted for by criminal justice net-widening, and other policies actively seek-ing to exclude unwanted immigrants with-in society, it may also be indicative of re-strictions to integration policy: By restrict-ing generous integration policies, the statemay ‘passively’ exclude immigrants (Jack-son, Zervakis and Parkes, 2005; Jacksonand Parkes, 2005). Both strands reflect secu-ritarian policy-making and the perceptionof the “immigrant threat.”

CONCLUSION

This article differs from previous anal-yses of immigration policy isomorphism inwestern post-industrial societies in its focuson the degree to which the pressures of in-ternational global interdependence andcompetition are refracted through en-trenched national social and socio-politicalstructures. Earlier work on this topic hassuggested a relative ‘passivity’ on the partof states in the face of the de-nationalizingpressures of global and regional economicintegration. We argue that states have ac-tively attempted to reassert control overmigratory flows, irrespective of these eco-nomic realities. Homogenisation has oc-curred not because of the inability of statesto resist change, but rather through com-monalities in their responses to external

pressures. One of the responses has beenthe securitization of immigration policies,which has affected the nature both of immi-gration and immigrant policies. Even with-out the formal harmonization of policies,national ministerial officials have ‘policyshopped’, adopting (restrictive) policiesdeveloped in other states.

We identify both dynamics in the cur-rent development of European asylum, im-migration, and immigrant policy. Integra-tion in this sphere stems in part from theinitial economic cooperation that typifiedthe post-war European project. The neo-functionalist understanding of Europeanintegration, which builds upon Liberal ac-counts of the prevalence of economic forcesin preference formation, identifies a processof ‘spillover’ from the core economic inte-gration. Efforts to encourage the mobility oflabor between the member states have cre-ated pressure to regulate the movement, aswell as the societal and economic positionof ‘third-country-nationals’. Equallythough, cooperation in this sphere also de-veloped outside the mainstream of Europe-an cooperation, as national government of-ficials used ‘transgovernmental’ coopera-tion as a means to regain control overmigration flows. The measures resultingfrom this cooperation were restrictive intone, and the concept of ‘pull factors’ wasprevalent. It has been argued that the actorsin these forms of cooperation—predomi-nantly officials from justice and interiorministries—made use of transgovernmen-tal cooperation as a means of escaping theconstraints posed by national judiciaries,social and economic ministries (Guiraudon2000a). Yet, despite a degree of harmonisa-tion in this sphere, national differences re-main apparent, and have disrupted bothpolicy-formulation and implementation.

In their efforts to regain control overmigration, sections of national govern-ments have conceived of uncontrolled mi-gration flows as a threat to security. The so-cietal position of immigrants is seen to have



a bearing on the effectiveness of immigra-tion controls, and there is pressure to re-strict rights accordingly. The attacks onLondon suggest, however, that the securi-ty/rights nexus should be legislated for ina different way, since the failure to facilitatethe societal integration and promote therights of immigrants may actually be detri-mental to national security. Nevertheless,we can identify the two competing dynam-ics—one seeking to ‘integrate’ immigrantsand delegitimize racism, the other seekingto prevent this integration where it disruptsimmigration controls—in the four states’immigrant and immigration policies. Thedevelopment of governance beyond the na-tion-state has broken the hierarchy, andunitary nature, of policy-making in the na-tion-state, allowing certain sections of thenational executive to dominate policy-mak-ing, and sharpening the tension betweenthe two dynamics.

We find a degree of isomorphism thatcan be traced to the two competing dynam-ics. In Britain and the United States, immi-gration controls have been extended fromthe border into society, as they are in Franceand Germany (cf. Jackson and Parkes,2005). The assumption that underpinnedearlier access to benefits and privileges inBritain—namely that those on the nationalterritory were legally there and were there-fore entitled to such access—has proveduntenable in the face of growing migrationflows. Immigration controls have been setup to guard access to social, economic andlegal benefits. Similarly, citizenship has be-come the gateway to many benefits, andideas of ‘active citizenship’ are being real-ized; under the current Labour govern-ment, official definitions of ‘Britishness’ arebeing formulated. This shows similaritieswith both the German and French models.In France, meanwhile, renewed efforts arebeing made to combat discrimination, andthere has been shift away from the color-blind notion of Republican citizenship.This pushes it closer to the British or US

model. Germany has weakened the exclu-sive ethnic basis of its citizenship laws andhas made (somewhat limited) efforts tocombat discrimination. France and Germa-ny both set a premium on the exclusion ofunwanted immigrants at the entry border,predicating this partly on the idea that thisis a prerequisite of good societal relationswith the immigrant population. Similarly,in the United States, securitization effortsimplemented through the Patriot Act areintended to tighten exclusion at the border,in an effort to assure internal security. Stateinvolvement in immigrant integration ef-forts has not increased in the United States;rather, securitization-fueled perceptions ofthe “threat” posed by Muslims may, in thelong run, reduce the integration of someimmigrant populations, bringing the U.S.closer to its European partners in the “Waron Terrorism.”

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