Glossary

The Chinese proper names and places may present some confusion toEuro-American readers, since various systems of transliteration fromChinese ideographs to Euro-American alphabetic expressions refer to a sin-gle person or place in several different ways. To offer an interpretation ofChinese strategic culture for a general reader, rather than a more literal,rigid (or some might say precise) version for sinologists, the authors hope toaccommodate contemporary familiarities with some common Chineseproper names and places. The authors have tried to avoid military jargon—Chinese and English, ancient and modern—political rhetoric, and ideolog-ical implications that could introduce confusion for many readers.

Although neither of the two common systems of transliteration—Pinyinand Wade-Giles—is faultless in expressing Chinese thoughts in Euro-American terms, most mainland Chinese writers apply Pinyin formally intranslating source materials and to their own work. In contrast, manyimportant expressions are already familiar to Euro-American readers intheir Wade-Giles orthographies. To offer the work to both Chinese audi-ences and Euro-American readers, the authors have adopted the generalPinyin system of transliteration as the work’s standard orthography but haveembedded a number of exceptions.

To reflect contemporary usages, the authors have used the Wade-Gilesexpression—Peking—to refer to China’s capital through and during SunYatsen’s Peking Republic before the start of the Chinese Civil War.Reflecting contemporary usages, the authors have preserved the Wade-Gilesexpression—Peiping—to refer to the same city through the Chinese CivilWar. Following modern Chinese usage, the authors have adopted thePinyin expression—Beijing—to refer to the same city after the ChineseCivil War ended in 1949.

Quotations from English sources appear in the transliteration used bythe English author or source in their original forms. Quotations and refer-ences from Taiwanese authors and sources typically appear in the Wade-Giles transliteration.

In expressing Chinese proper names, the authors have tried to adhere tothe Chinese standards of separating the family name from a personal namein two English words—both with initial capitals—and combining the twocharacters of a personal name into a single English word with a hyphen.

As exceptions to the work’s general use of Pinyin transliteration, thefamiliar names of some historical persons and famous places, and some mil-itary, strategic, and political terms appear throughout the work in theirmore familiar, modern English-language alphabetic expressions. TheGlossary of the work’s standard, Pinyin, and Wade-Giles transliterationsrelates the various expressions of these exceptions to avoid confusion.

STANDARD PINYIN WADE-GILESChiang Kai-shek Jiang Jieshi Chiang Kai-shekChuang Tzu Zhuang Zi Chuang TsuHan Fei Tzu Hen Feizi Han Fei TsuHanguguan Han Yu guan HankukuanHong Kong Xianggang Hong KongHsing XingHsingHsun Tzu Xun Zi Hsun TsuHuai Nan Tzu Huai Nan Zi Huai Nan TsuHu Yin He In Hu YinKuan Tzu Guan Zi Kuan TsuKuomintang (KMT) Guo Min Dang (GMD) KuomintangLao Tzu Lao Zi Lao TsuLord Guan Guan Yu Kuan YuLuoyang Luoyan Lo-yangMao Tse-tung Mao Zedong Mao Tse-tungMencius Meng Zi Meng TsuPeng Yue Feng Yue P’eng YuehQing Bu Qing-bu Ch’ing PuQuemoy Jinmen QuemoyRuijin Rui-jin JueichinShang Yang (Lord Shang) Shang Jun Shang YangShanxi Shansi ShanhsiShenyang Shenyang MukdenShih Shi ShihSun Pin Sun Bin Sun PinSun Tzu Sun Zi or Sunzi Sun TsuSun Yatsen Sun Yixian Sun WenTai Kung (Chiang) Tai Gong ( Jiang)Tai KungTao Dao TaoTe De Te

Glossary234

Wei Liao Tzu Wei Liao Zi Wei Liao TsuWei-Chi game Wei Qi Wei Ch’iWuguan Wu Guan WukuanWu Tzu Wu Zi Wu TsuXian Xi’an HsianXianyang Ziangyang HsuanyangXinbaoan Xinbao’an HsinpaoanXuzhou Suzhou SuchouYanan Yan’an YenanYangzi River Chiangjiang River Yangtzu RiverYellow River Huanghe River Yellow RiverYi Di Eze I Ti

Character List

Throughout the book, the authors have expressed Chinese characters in thePinyin form, except those few words that have become familiar to Euro-American readers in their Wade-Giles forms. The left column presents thestandard transliteration that the authors have used in this book. The aster-isk indicates Wade-Giles transliterations used in the book, which, theauthors feel, are more familiar to Euro-American readers than their Pinyintransliterations. The center column presents the Chinese Mandarin charac-ters, and the right column presents the common Wade-Giles [in brackets]or Pinyin (in parentheses) transliteration of the characters.

Standard Mandarin [Wade-gile] or PinvinBaojia [Paochia]Beijing [Peking]Beiping [Peiping] (Old name of Beijing)Bengbu [Pangpu, Pangfu]Cai dynasty [Tsai]Cai Mao [Tsai Mao]Cao Cao [Tsao Tsao]Cao dynasty [Tsao]Cao Pi [Tsao Pi]Changchun [Changchun]Chengde [Chengte]Chenguanzhuang [Chenkuanchuang]Chiang Ching-kuo* ( Jiang Jingguo)Chiang Kai-shek* ( Jiang Jieshi)

Glossary 235

Chijiuzhan [Chihchiuchan]Chongqing [Chungching]Chu dynasty [Chu]Chuang Tzu* (Zhuang Zi)Dagu [Taku]Dalian [Dairen]Deng Xiaoping [Teng Hsiaoping]Donggu (Tonggu) [Tungku]Fancheng [Fancheng]Fu Zouyi [Fu Tsoui]Fuguoqiangbing [Fukuochiangping]Fujian Province [Fuchien]Gongming [Kungming]Gongsun Zan [Kungsun Tsan]Guangxi [Kuanghsi]Guangzhou Province [Kuangchou]Gubeikou [Kupeikou]Guilin [Kweilin]Guizhou [Kweichou]Han dynasty [Han]Han Fei Tzu* (Han Feizi)Han Xin [Han Hsin]Hanguguan [Hankukuan]Hankou [Hankou]Heilongjiang [Heilungchiang]Heishan [Heishan]Henan Province [Henan]Hezong [Hetsung]Hong Kong* (Xianggang)Hsing* (Xing)Hsun Tzu* (Xun Zi)Hu Yin [Hu Yin]Hu Zongnan [Hu Tsungnan]Hua People [Hua]Huai Nan Tzu* (Huai Nan Zi)Huai-Hai [Huaihai, Huai-Hai]Huangpo [Huangpo]Huangpu [Huangpu]Hui Wang [Huei Wang] King HuiHuludao [Hulutao]Hunan Province [Hunan]Jiang Zemin [Chiang Tsemin]

Glossary236

Jiangling [Chiangling]Jiangxi [Kiangsi]Jiangxia [Chiangsia]Jifu [Qifu, Chifu]Jijifangyu [Chichifangyu]Jin dynasty [Chin]Jingzhou [Chingchou]Jinzhou [Chinchou]Kian-Chienning Line [Chian-Chienning]Kuan Tzu* (Guan Zi)Kunming [Kunming]Kuomintang (KMT)* [Guo Min Dang] (GMD)Lanzhou [Lanchou]Lao Tzu* (Lao Zi)Li [Li]Li Peng [Li Peng, Li Feng]Li Si [Li Ssu]Li Zongren [Li Tsung Jen] [Li Tsong-jen]Liangcheng [Liangtseng]Liaodong [Liaotung]Liaoxi-Shenyang [Yaosi-Chenyang]Lin Biao [Linpiao]Lin Wu [Lin Wu] (general of Zhao)Lin Zhiqi [Lin Chihchi]Liu Bang [Liu Pang]Liu Bei [Liu Pei]Liu Biao [Liu Piao]Liuzhou [Liuchou]Lord Guan* (Guan Yu)Lord Shang* (Shang Jun)Lu dynasty [Lu]Lunghai (Railroad) [Lunghai]Luoyang [Luoyang]Lushun [lushun]Mao Anying [Mao Anying]Mao Tse-tung* (Mao Zedong)Mencius* (Meng Zi)Ming dynasty [Ming]Nanjing [Nanching]Nianzhuang [Nienchuang]Peiping-Tianjin (Beiping-Tianjin)Peng Dehuai [Peng Tehuai]

Glossary 237

Peng Yue [Peng yueh]Pengcheng [Pengcheng]Qin dynasty [Chin]Qin Shi Huangdi [Chin Shi Huangti]Qing dynasty [Ching]Qing Bu [Ching Pu]Qingdao [Chingtao]Qinghai [Chinghai]Qinhuangdao [Chinhuangtao]Quemoy* (Jinmen)Quilin [Kueilin]Quizhou [Kueichou]Ren [Jen]Ruijin [Jueichin]Shaanxi Province [Hsiahsi]Shandong [Shantung]Shang dynasty [Shang]Shang Yang [Shang Yang] (Lord Shang)Shanghai [Shanghai]Shanhaiguan [Shanhaikuan]Shanxi Province [Shanhsi]Shanxi Province [Shanhsi]Shenyang [Chenyang, Shenyang]Shih* (Shi)Shu dynasty [Shu]Shuangduiji [Shuangtsueichi]Shu-Han* dynasty (Shu-Han)Sichuan [Ssuchuan]Sima Fa [Ssuma Fa]Sima Qian [Ssuma Chien]Song dynasty [Sung]Ssu Ma* (Sima)Sui dynasty [tuo]Sun Pin* (Sun Bin)Sun Quan [Sun Chuan]Sun Tzu* (Sun Zi)Sun Yatsen* (Sun Yixian: Sun Wen)Suzhou [Suchou]Tai Kung* (Tai Gong)Taiyuan [Taiyuan]Tan Daoyuan [Tan Taoyuan]Tang dynasty [Tang]

Glossary238

Tang Enbo [Tang Enpo]Tao* (Dao)Te* (De)Tian Guang [Tien Kuang]Tian Shi [Tien Fu]Tianjin [Tientsin]Tonggu [Tungku]Wang Anshi [Wang Anshih]Wang Tiancheng [Wang Tiencheng]Wei dynasty [Wei]Wei dynasty [Wei]Wei Liao Tzu* (Wei Liao Zi)Wei-Chi game* (Wei Qi)Weishui [Weishuei]Wu dynasty [Wu]Wu Tzu* (Wu Zi)Wuguan [Wukuan]Wuhan [Wuhan]Xian [Hsian]Xian (Xiandi) [Hsienti]Xiang Yu [Hsiang Yu]Xiangyang [Hsiangyang]Xianyang [Hsuanyang]Xiao [Hsiao]Xiao He [Hsiao He]Xiaojifangyu [Hsiaochifangyu]Xichu Ba Wang [Hsichu Pa Wang]Xinbaoan [Hsinpaoan]Xingquo [Hsingkuo]Xinhai Revolution [Hsinhai]Xinye [Hsinyeh]Xizhou [Hsichou]Xu dynasty [Hsu]Xuzhou [Suchou]Yan dynasty [Yen]Yan Xishan [Yen Hsishan]Yanan [Yenan]Yang Fengan [Yang Fengan]Yang Hucheng [Yang Hucheng]Yangjiagou [Yang Chiakou]Yangzi River [Yangtzu]Yao dynasty [Yao]

Glossary 239

Yi Di [I Ti]Yichang [Ichang]Yin and Yang [yin and Yang]Yuan dynasty [Yuan]Yuan Shao [Yuan Shao]Yuan Shikai [Yuan Shihkai]Yue dynasty [Yueh]Yunnan Province [Yunnan]Zhai dynasty [Chi]Zhang Fei [Chang Fei]Zhang Huizan [Chang Hueitsan]Zhang Liang [Chang Liang]Zhang Xueliang [Chang Hsiaoliang]Zhang Yun [Chang Yun]Zhangjiakou [Changchiakou]Zhao dynasty [Chao]Zhao Zilong [Chao Tsulung]Zheng dynasty [Cheng]Zhongshan(kuo) [Chungshan]Zhou dynasty [Chou]Zhou Enlai [Chou En-lai]Zhoushan Island [Choushan]Zhuge Liang [Chuke Liang] GongmingZhujiang River [Chuchiang]

Glossary240

Notes

1 Strategy and Culture

1. Christopher Coker, “What Would Sun Tzu Say about the War on Terrorism?,”Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 148(1) (February2003): 16–20; especially 16, 17.

2. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data,” in Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition, ed.by Guoli Liu, 259–293 (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2004), 260. (First pub-lished as Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data,” The China Quarterly 153 (March 1998):1–30.)

3. John K. Fairbank, “Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience,” in ChineseWays in Warfare, ed. Frank Kierman and John K. Fairbank, (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1974), 6–7, 11, 25. See also Zhuge Liang and Liu Ji,Mastering the Art of War: Zhuge Liang and Liu Ji’s Commentaries on the Classic bySun Tzu, trans. by Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala, 1989), 20; Alastair IainJohnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in ChineseHistory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 63–65, 117–123.

4. See Thomas Cleary, trans. The Art of War: Sun Tzu, (Boston: Shambhala, 1988),19; Wei Rulin and Liu Zhongpin, Zhongguo Junshi Sixiang Shi (History ofChinese Military Thought) (Taipei: Liming, 1985), 437; Georges Tan Eng Bok,“Strategic Doctrine,” in Chinese Defense Policy, ed. Gerald Segal and WilliamTow (London: Macmillan, 1984), 4; Edward S. Boylan, “The Chinese CulturalStyle of Warfare,” Comparative Strategy 3(4) (August–October 1982): 341–364;345; Howard L. Boorman and Scott A Boorman, “Strategy and NationalPsychology in China,” The Annals 370 (1967): 152; Wang Jiandong, SunziBingfa Sixiang Tixi Jingjie (A Clarification of the Structure of Thinking in SunTzu’s Art of War) (Taipei: n.p., 1976), 77.

5. See Chong-pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition withoutEvolution (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988), 31–33; Zhuge Liang andLiu Ji, Mastering the Art of War, 20. Jonathan Adelman and Shih Chih-yu,Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840–1980 (Taipei: Institute ofInternational Relations, National Chengchi University, 1993), 31.

6. See Peter Alexis Boodberg, “The Art of War in Ancient China: A StudyBased upon the Dialogues of Li, Duke of Wei, Ph.D. dissertation, Universityof California, Berkeley, 1930, xii–xiv; Mark Edward Lewis, SanctionedViolence in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press,1990), 103.

7. The economic notions of sunk costs and the endowment effect reflect thehuman propensity to perceive either possessions or losses as gaining value withtime: People place an extra value on things that they already own or havealready lost. The sunk-costs and endowment effects obscure any rational assess-ment of investments in terms of expected future returns. For using force, thiseffect appears in comparing victories or gains with losses and casualties in con-trast to what is left of armies and resources after a battle. (If thousands of us havesacrificed their lives, how can we give up now?) See “To Have and To Hold,” TheEconomist 368(8339) (August 30, 2003): 56.

8. See John G. Morgan and Anthony D. McIvor, with the Secretary of the Navy’sAction Team, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” United States Naval InstituteProceedings 130/10/1, 208 (October 2003): 35, quoting Antoine Henri deJomini, The Art of War (New York: Greenhill, 1996).

9. See John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the PRC (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice Hall, 1993).

10. See Lionel Max Chassin, The Communist Conquest of China: A History of theCivil War 1945–1949 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1965),43–52.

11. See Shu-Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War,1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 76.

12. See Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster,1987), 123.

13. See Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politicsand strategy of Diplomacy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,1980), 120.

14. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 283. See also Ralph D. Sawyer,trans. and ed. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder, CO:Westview, 1993) 70–94.

15. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 4–5, 10–11.

16. See Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975); Allen S. Whiting, ChinaCrosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan,1960).

17. See Gerald Segal, Defending China (Oxford, New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1985); Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

18. See Thomas J. Christensen, “Threat, Assurances, and the Last Chance forPeace: The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” International Security,17(1) (1992): 122–154.

Notes242

19. See John Fairbank, The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1968).

20. Euro-American visions of warfare arose in the context of independent nation-states in a rough balance-of-power system, while Chinese approaches to warfaredeveloped around internal rebellion, probing raids or invasions by mobilenomads, or resistance of southern aborigines to Chinese dominance and expan-sion. See Adelman and Shih, Symbolic War, ch. 2.

21. See Alistair Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” InternationalSecurity, 19(4) (Spring 1995): 32–64.

22. See Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier,1979).

23. See Alistair Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy inChinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

24. See Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism.25. See Shen Kuiguan, “Dialectics of Defeating the Superior with the Inferior,” in

Chinese Views of Future Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (Washington DC:National Defense University Press, 1997).

26. See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1994); Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter theKorean War: History Revisited,” The China Quarterly, 121 (March 1990);Adelman and Shih, Symbolic War.

27. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub (Sun Tzu’s Art of War) (Seoul:Hanwon Press, 1990), 26, 240. See also Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics ofAncient China, 149, 157; Sun Tzu, Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare, translated byRoger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine, 1993), 18.

28. See John Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1983), 71, 124.

29. J.J.L. Duyvendak, trans. and ed., Tao Te Ching (The Book of the Way and ItsVirtue) (Boston: Tuttle, 1992), bk. 1, ch. 31, p. 77; bk. 1, ch. 30, p. 76; Bk. II,ch. 68, p. 144.

30. Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. Ch’u Ta-kao (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1973),ch. 25, 40, 48. See also ch. 29.

31. See Mencius, Works of Mencius, 2 vols., translated by Jasper Legge (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1895), vol. 1, bk. 1, pp. 3, 7; bk. 3, p. 3; bk. 6, p. 2.

32. Coker, “What Would Sun Tzu Say about the War on Terrorism?” 18.33. Ralph D. Sawyer, trans. The Complete Act of War: Seen Tzu and Sun Pin,

(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), Ch. 3, Planning Offensives, 175–179(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 177.

34. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories ofInternational Relations, 4th edn. (New York: Longman, 1996), 185.

35. Andrew Lambert, “The Future of Airpower,” RUSI Journal, 148(3) (June2003): 46–53; 49.

36. See Roger T. Ames, The Art of Rulership: A Study of Ancient Chinese PoliticalThought (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 66.

37. Although his family name was Chiang (Jiang), and King Wen bestowed theadditional honorific title Wang, historians have recognized Chiang Tai Kung

Notes 243

Wang by his primary honorific title Tai Kung (Taigong). The Chinese honorificTzu means honorable teacher. Sun Tzu’s name was Sun Wu; people addressedand referred to him as Sun Tzu; Sun Tzu’s book, Sun Tzu Bingfa, is The Art ofWar. Wu Tzu’s name was Wu Qi; people addressed and referred to him as WuTzu; Wu Tzu’s book, Wu Tzu Bingfa, is the Wu Tzu. Wei Liao Tzu’s name wasprobably Wei Liao; people addressed and referred to him as Wei Liao Tzu; he orhis descendants wrote the Wei Liao Tzu Bingfa, the Wei Liao Tzu.

38. See Roger T. Ames, trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare (New York: Ballantine,1993), 82; Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 71.

39. See Ames, Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare, 77, 82.40. See Fairbank, The United States and China, 53.41. See Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., The Tao of War (Cambridge, MA: Westview,

1999), 151.42. See Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 81, 167.43. See Boylan, “The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare, 341–364” Comparative

Strategy, 3(4) (1982).44. See Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat (Baltimore:

The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 242–243.

2 The Idea of Shih

1. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub (Sun Tzu’s Art of War) (Seoul:Hanwon Press, 1990), 132. The term men refers to military troops rather thangeneral human beings.

2. Sun Pin, Sun Pin: Military Method, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (San Francisco:Westview Press, 1995), 116.

3. Roger T. Ames, The Art of Rulership: A Study of Ancient Chinese PoliticalThought (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 66.

4. Ralph D. Sawyer, trans, Sun Tzu, Art of War, Ch. 3, Planning Offensives,175–179 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 177; See also Byung-Chon Ro,Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 80, 81.

5. Also known by its Japanese name, Go, Chinese Wei-Chi is a military strategicboard-game between two players for spatial control of the board. See ScottBoorman, The Protracted Game: A Wei-Chi Interpretation of MaoistRevolutionary Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

6. See Chuang-tzu, Chuang-tzu, trans. by James Legge (New York: Ace, 1971), ch. 22.7. See Chuang-tzu, Ch. 22.8. Lin Yu Tang, The Wisdom of Lao Tse (New York: The Modern Library, 1948),

205–206.9. Huai Nan Tzu, (140 BC?), quoted in Science and Civilization in China, by

Joseph Needham, vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 51.10. Wang Ch’ung, (AD. 27–97), quoted in Science and Civilization in China, by

Joseph Needham, vol. 4, 7.

Notes244

11. Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1967), 297. At the same time that Lao Tzu was developing thisdualistic worldview, Heraclitus of Ephesus also taught not only the Taoist ideaof continuous change, but the notion of cyclical flow. “The way up and downis one and the same. . . . Cold things warm themselves, warm cools, moist dries,parched is made wet. . . . God is day-night, winter-summer, war-peace, satiety-hunger”. See George S. Kirk, Heraclitus—The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1970), 105, 149, 184.

12. Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, trans. Gh’u Ta-Kao (New York: Samuel Weisen, 1973),ch. 36, 22.

13. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 128; Ralph D. Sawyer, The CompleteArt of War: Sun Tzu and Sun Pin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 63.

14. Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, (San Francisco Westview,1993), 157. See also Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub 27–28.

15. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 132.16. See Wade Baskin, ed., Classics in Chinese Philosophy (New York: Philosophical

Library, 1972), 141–142.17. Sawyer, Sun Pin, 1118. Ames, Art of Rulership, 74.19. Probably the fourth emperor of China, Yao introduced principles of filial piety,

compassion, benevolence, and love and treated the people as his own sons andyounger brothers. See Bai Shouyi, ed., An Outline History of China (Beijing:Foreign Language Press, 1982), 52; L.H. Dudley Buxton, The Peoples of Asia(New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trubner, 1925), 153; Marcel Garnet,Chinese Civilization (New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trubner, 1930), 63;Kenneth S. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture 2 volumes(New York: Macmillan, 1934), 35–36.

20. Ames, Art of Rulership, 74.21. See Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (London: Allen and

Unwin, 1939), 199–252.22. Thomas Kane, “China’s Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign

Policy,” in Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition, edited by Guoli Liu, 101–115(New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2004), 106.

23. See William Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, eds.,Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press,1960), 129–131.

24. See Baskin, Classics in Chinese Philosophy, 138–139, 142.25. See Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization, 2nd ed. (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1996), 90; Ames, Art of Rulership, 90.26. Li Si, quoted in de Bary, Chan, and Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 142.27. See Ames, Art of Rulership, 76, 85.28. See Gernet, History of Chinese Civilization, 159.29. Hsun Tzu wrote 32 essays—The Hsun Tzu. Convinced that man was naturally

evil, he recognized the Confucian ideal of transformation as the result ofartificial training by an enlightened ruler using state power to improve people.See de Bary, Chan, and Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 114.

Notes 245

30. See Ames, Art of Rulership, 86.31. See Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization, 96.32. See John Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1983), Ch. 3, “The Confucian Pattern.”33. See Sawyer, The Complete Art of War, 106, 107.34. Sawyer, Sun Tzu, Art of War, 167.35. Mencius, in Mencius, trans. Sun-kyun Pum (Seoul: Hae Won, 1997), 136.36. Andrew Lambert, “The Future of Airpower,” RUSI Journal 148(3) (June 2003):

46–53; especially 49.37. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 27–28, 32–33; Sawyer, The Seven

Military Classics, 157.38. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 2.39. Ralph D. Sawyer, trans, The Seven Military Classics, 41. See also Ki-dong Kim,

Chungkuk Byungpub ui Chihae (The Wisdom of the Chinese Military Art),(Seoul: Soe-kwang-Sa, 1993), 13–61.

40. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 80; see also 28.41. See Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, 70–94; Quotations from 52, 70.42. See Ames, Art of Rulership, 77. See also 66, 76.43. See J.A.C. Roberts, The Complete History of China (New York: Sutton, 2003), 4.44. See Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, 68–72, 126–127; Ames, Art of Rulership, 7.45. The orthodox understanding of Clausewitz’s axiom subordinated war to poli-

tics. More liberal interpretations expect political leaders to use force in parallelwith nonmilitary policy instruments.

46. See United States, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine forJoint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3–0, September 10, 2001 (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), I-4–I-6, III-1–III-4; UnitedStates, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine forCampaign Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5–00.1, January 25, 2002(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), I-4–II-2.

47. See Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. edn. (London: Praeger, 1967), 322;John Collins, “Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices,” in Military Strategy:Theory and Application, ed. by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.Army War College, 1993), 20–28.

48. See Ames, Art of Rulership, 70.49. Ames, Art of Rulership, 71.50. Sawyer, Sun Pin, 140. See also 138; Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, 121.

Historians attribute the Sima Fa to Tian Rangju, a Zhai general who com-manded King Jian Gong’s (547–490 BC) army. Tian Rangju’s descendantscompiled the Sima Fa in about 342 BC.

51. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 27.52. Ames, Art of Rulership, 70.53. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub 2.54. Byung-Chon Ro, 263, 281; see also 191.55. See Sawyer, The Complete Art of War, 64.56. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 114.57. Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics, n. 433.

Notes246

58. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 154. See also 127.59. Byung-Chon Ro, 157.60. See Gernet, History of Chinese Civilization, 158.61. Roger T. Ames, trans., Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare (New York: Ballantine,

1993), 76–77, 81, 119. See also Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 154,157, 284.

62. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 157, 156. See also 27.63. Confucius, The Analects of Confucius, trans. Simon Leys (New York:

W. W. Norton, 1997), 1.64. Confucius, The Sayings of Confucius: A New Translation of the Greater Part of the

Confucian Analects, trans. and annotated by Lionel Giles, (Boston: Tuttle,1993), 59–60.

65. Confucius, The Sayings of Confucius, 36.66. Gernet, History of Chinese Civilization, 9.67. Players alternately place their white or black markers—stones—on intersections

of the board’s perpendicular lines. Patterns of stones of one color that surroundan area control that area for the player who placed those stones.

68. See Boorman, The Protracted Game, 26–27.69. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 39.70. Sawyer, The Complete Art of War, 50.71. Sawyer, The Complete Art of War, 51; Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja

Byungbub, 82.72. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 96, 97, 228.73. Lambert, “The Future of Airpower,” 49–50.74. Sawyer, The Complete Art of War, 41.75. Sawyer, The Complete Art of War, 41.76. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 69.77. Hans Delbruck understands all strategies as either annihilation or exhaustion.

See Delbruck, History of the Art of War within the Framework of PoliticalHistory: Antiquity (Contribution in Military Studies), 4 vols., trans. Walter J.Penfroe, Jr., vol. 2, Warfare in Antiquity (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1975),140, 362–363.

78. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 39, 40, 131, 143, 178.79. The Wiles of War: 36 Military Strategies from Ancient China, trans. Sun Haichen

(Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1993), 51, 113, 178, 251.80. Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms (April 12, 2001, as amended through April 9, 2002); availablefrom www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/

81. Clausewitz, On War, 202–203.82. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 37–43; see also 127.83. See Delbruck, History of the Art of War, 140, 362–363; Gordon A. Craig,

“Delbruck: The Military Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, MilitaryThought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle, (Princeton NJ:Princeton University Press, 1943), 260–283.

84. Lambert, “The Future of Airpower,” 50.

Notes 247

3 Ancient Chinese Wars

1. Qin Shih Huangdi ended the Warring States period, unified China in221 BC, and took the title of emperor. As sole ruler of China from 221to 210 BC, he first gave the country standard law, currency, road system,weights, and measures.

2. See Kuan Yang, Zhanguo Shi (History of the Warring States) (Taipei: GufonChubanshe, 1986), 215.

3. Mark E. Lewis, “Warring States: The Political History,” in The CambridgeHistory of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C., ed.Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1999), 611.

4. Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics:Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe,”International Organization 58(1) (Winter 2004) 189. See also Lin Jianming,Qin Shi (A History of Qin) (Taipei: Wunan Chubanshe, 1992), 328; Douglas C.North and Robert P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New EconomicHistory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 2.

5. Hsu Cho-yun, “War and Peace in Ancient China: The History of ChineseInterstate-International Relations,” Occasional Paper 75 (Washington, DC:Woodrow Wilson Center Asian Program, 1997), 5.

6. Lewis, “Warring States, 639.7. Hui, “Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics, 191.8. Zhongyue Mu and Guoqing Wu, Zhongguo Zhanzhengshi (History of Wars in

China), vol. 2 (Beijing: Jincheng Chubanshe, 1992), 148.9. Hui, “Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics, 189.

10. Mu and Wu, Zhongguo Zhanzhengshi, 10.11. See Ki Dong Kim, Chungkuk Byungpub ui Chihae (The Wisdom of the Chinese

Military Art) (Seoul: Soe-kwang-Sa, 1993), 23.12. See Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe (Military History Committee),

Yokdaebyongyo I (I, Chronicle History of Military Thought) (Seoul:Guningongjehoe, 1991), 192, 195, 204.

13. See Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe, Yokdaebyongyo I, 214.14. See Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe, Yokdaebyongyo I, 206.15. The generals commanding the two major choke points in the east—

Hanguguan and Wuguan—surrendered without fighting. See Kim, ChungkukByungpub ui Chihae, 21–22.

16. See Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe, Yokdaebyongyo I, 214.17. See Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe, Yokdaebyongyo I, 216–217, 222–223.18. Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe, Yokdaebyongyo I, 216–217.19. Confucius reported that Chin-sung-ja had killed his king, Kan-gong, to seize

royal power. Confucius advised his king that it was righteous to raise an armyto destroy the state in which a vassal had killed his king and usurped power.See Kim, Chungkuk Byungpub ui Chihae, 152, 154.

Notes248

20. In 205 BC, Xiang Yu replaced King Jonsi of Shandong with Jondo, divided thepeninsula into three states and appointed subordinate kings for each state. SeeKunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe, Yokdaebyongyo I, 217.

21. Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe, Yokdaebyongyo I, 261.22. Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe, Yokdaebyongyo I, 207.23. Shih-strategists usually compared the enemy’s Tao with their own before raising

an army. See Ro Byung-Chon, Dohae Sonja Byungbub (Sun-Tzu’s Art of War)(Seoul: Hanwon Press, 1990), 27.

24. Ralph D. Sawyer, ed. and trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China,(San Francisco: Westview, 1993), 58. The origin of Tai Kung’s The Six SecretTeachings and the Three Strategies is controversial. Shih Chi recorded that ZhangLiang received a book from an old man with the comment that “if you readthis, you can become a teacher of kings.” He discovered the book to be TaiKung’s military strategy. See also Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics, 282.

25. See Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe, Yokdaebyongyo I, 213–214.26. Han succeeded Qin and ruled China between 206 BC and AD 220. See John

K. Fairbank, China: A New History, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1992), 57–71. In AD 9, when the Han court lost prestige, a Han minis-ter, Wang Mang, took the throne and reigned until AD 23 when the later Hansucceeded it. See Charles O. Hucker, Imperial Past, (Stanford CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1975), 128–130.

27. As the Han court declined, peasant discontent and uprisings increased andculminated in AD 184 with the Yellow Scarf Faction, religious sectariesorganized on communal lines hoping for an age of “Great Well-being.” SeeMark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, (Stanford CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 1973), 35.

28. In AD 199, Emperor Xian cut his finger and used his blood to compose adecree: “We believe that in the human order the bond of father and son is fore-most, and that in the social order the obligation between sovereign and servantis paramount. Of late, the treasonous Cao Cao, abusing his authority, insultingand degrading his sovereign, has connived with his cohorts to the detriment ofour dynasty’s rule. Instructions, rewards, land grants, and punishments now falloutside the imperial jurisdiction. . . . Exterminate this perfidious faction andrestore the security of our holy shrines for our ancestors’ sake.” See LuoGuanzhong, Three Kingdoms, trans. Moss Roberts, (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1991), 160.

29. Their timeless peach-garden oath idealized in the allegory of Three Kingdoms—Wei (AD 220–265), Shu Han (AD 221–263), and Wu (AD 222–280)—thesame virtues that later inspired European chivalry. “We three, though of sepa-rate ancestry, join in brotherhood here, combining strength and purpose, torelieve the present crisis. We will perform our duty to the Emperor and protectthe common folk of the land. We dare not hope to be together always buthereby vow to die the selfsame day. Let shining Heaven above and the fruitfulland below bear witness to our resolve. May Heaven and man scourge whoso-ever fails this vow.” See Lou Guanzhong, The Three Kingdoms, 9.

Notes 249

30. See Lou Guanzhong, The Three Kingdoms, 300–301.31. Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe (Military History Committee), Yokdaebyongyo II

(II, Chronicle History of Military Thought), (Seoul: Guningongjehoe,1991), 45.

32. Remembered in Chinese folklore and idealized in historical fiction, Liu Bei’swithdrawal became the ideal for Chinese civil–military relations and the modelfor Mao Tse-tung’s Long March from Jiangxi in the 1930s. See LouGuanzhong, Three Kingdoms, 314–317.

33. Xun You said to Cao Cao, “Why did you grant such exalted titles to thosecraven toadies? And why make them naval superintendents into the bar-gain? . . . Do you think I don’t know them for what they are?” Cao Cao replied.“Do not forget, we have an army of Northerners unused to naval warfare. Thosetwo can be of help at the moment. When we have accomplished whatwe want, they will be dealt with as they deserve!” See Lou Guanzhong, ThreeKingdoms, 316.

34. Traditions uggested that Cai Mao and Zhang Yun were executed because oftreachery. A spy from Sun Quan delivered to Cao Cao false information that ledhim to understand that the two generals had connections with the enemy. Abetter understanding is that the two southerners could not adjust to serviceunder the new lord. The new chief naval commanders were Mao Ji and Yu Jin.See Lou Guanzhong, Three Kingdoms, 350–351.

35. Although the Three Kingdoms refers to about 500,000 men, Cao Cao himselfstated that he marched to Sun Quan’s base commanding 800,000 men. CaoCao had created a cavalry arm after destroying Yuan Shao who controlled thenorthern Chinese source of excellent horses. Cao Cao also created a small navyafter he seized Jingzhou along the Yangzi River. Sun Quan’s staffs estimated thatCao Cao had only 150,000–160,000 infantry. Liu Bei commanded about100 thousand troops, although Sun Quan’s estimate was only 20,000–30,000.Although Liu Bei’s army was small, it included experienced cavalry units,powerful fire support units equipped with long-range bows, and a navy.Although sources differ, Sun Quan had 50,000–200,000 troops including themost powerful navy and cavalry troops. See Kunsa Pyonchan Wuiwonhoe,Yokdaebyongyo II, 66–69; Ki-Hyun Paik, The History of the Chinese MilitarySystem, (Seoul: Sam-Po-Sa, 1998), 89–103.

36. Lou Guanzhong, Three Kingdoms, 328.37. See Lou Guanzhong, Three Kingdoms, 325.38. Lou Guanzhong, Three Kingdoms, 340.39. Sun Quan justified his decision by saying that “long, too long, has the traitor

sought to remove the Han and establish his own house.” With his sword, SunQuan sheared a corner off the table at which he received petitions saying that“Any officer or official who advocates submission will be dealt with so!” LouGuanzhong, Three Kingdoms, 341.

40. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 27.41. The Three Kingdoms related that Liu Bei mobilized seven hundred thousand

soldiers to invade Wu, Sun Quan’s kingdom. See Lou Guanzhong, The ThreeKingdoms, 617.

Notes250

42. Lou Guanzhong, The Three Kingdoms, 611.43. See Lou Guanzhong, The Three Kingdoms, 300–301.44. Cao Cao’s spies reported: “Liu Bei is accompanied by a multitude of common

folk. They’re only three hundred li from here and moving at barely ten li a day.”Cao Cao ordered five thousand horsemen to overtake Liu Bei within one day.See Lou Guanzhong, The Three Kingdoms, 317.

45. As technology developed, new weapons appeared on the battlefield. Arrowswith iron tips became popular. Gongming, Liu Bei’s chief advisor, invented adevice for launching multiple arrows to attack moving targets, especially heavycavalry. A primitive fighting vehicle also appeared in the battlefield. See Paik,The History of the Chinese Military System, 101–102.

4 The Chinese Civil War

1. The Qing dynasty from Manchu succeeded the Ming dynasty in 1636. Amongmodern foreign invasions were the Anglo-Chinese Opium War (1839–1842),the Anglo-French invasion, and the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).Domestic rebellions included the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), the NianMovement (1853–1868), and the Boxer Rebellion (1898–1901). See John K.Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,1992).

2. After 1924, Mao worked in the united front under the KMT as director of thePeasant Movement Training Institute. See Fairbank, China: A New History,280–281, 301–304.

3. See James P. Harrison, Modern Chinese Nationalism (New York: Hunter Collegeof the University of New York, 1969), 22.

4. Sun Yatsen remarked at the opening of the Whampoa Military Academy in1924 that “it was the lessons of the revolutions of Soviet Russia that have led ustoday to inaugurate this academy.” F. F. Liu, A Military History of ModernChina: 1924–1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), 8, 68,83.

5. See Owen Lattimore, China Memoirs: Chiang Kai Shek and the War AgainstJapan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990), 135–136.; Sven Hedin,Chiang Kai Shek: Marshal of China (New York: John Day, 1940), 80–91.

6. Stuart Schram, Mao Tse Tung (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 47.7. Fairbank, China: A New History, 285.8. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 99.9. Oliver J. Caldwell, A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944–1945 (Carbondale:

Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), 25.10. Fairbank, China: A New History, 293; Jin-young Seo, Joong Kuk Hyuk Myung

Sa: (History of the Chinese Revolution) (Seoul: Hanwoolsa, 1992), 162.11. Chiang Kai-shek, “Speech on the 18th Anniversary of the Central Military

Academy, June 16, 1942.”

Notes 251

12. Lloyd Eastman, Seed of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution1937–1949 (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), 144.

13. In March, 1941, President Roosevelt pledged U.S. assistance to China: “Chinalikewise expresses the magnificent will of millions of plain people to resist thedismemberment of their nation. China, through the generalissimo, ChiangKai-shek, asks our help. America has said that she shall have our help.” Franklin D.Roosevelt, address on March 15, 1941, in United States, Department of State,United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 49.

14. See Paul H.B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine,1949–1999,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. byMark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, NewYork: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 25.

15. See Ralph Sawyer, ed. and trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China(San Francisco: Westview, 1993), 213–214.

16. See Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: ForeignLanguage Press, 1972), 97.

17. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, 111.18. See Mao Tse-tung, “On Protracted War,” 247.19. Mao Tse-tung, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” December 1936, in

Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, 105.20. Mao Tse-tung, “On Protracted War,” 249.21. Military historians have called Chiang’s army the White Army to distinguish it

from Mao’s Red Army.22. Chu Wen-lin, Chiu Kung-yuan, Chang Chen-pong, Hsing Kuo-chiang, and

Tseng Yung-hsien, China’s Struggle with the Red Peril (Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, 1978), 126–131.

23. Chang Chun-ming, Chiang Kai-Shek: His Life and Times (New York: St. John’sUniversity, 1981), 296.

24. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, 126.25. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, 124. See also James P.

Harrison, The Long March to Power: History of the Chinese Communist Party,1921–1972 (New York: Praeger, 1972), 192.

26. Chang Chun-ming, Chiang Kai-Shek: His Life and Times, 294.27. Mao developed Sun Tzu’s principle by considering how to create circumstances

where the few can defeat the many. See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writingof Mao Tse-Tung, 109–111.

28. See Harrison, The Long March, 192.29. See Soon Kyu Kim, History of Chinese Strategy and Tactics (Seoul: Research

Center for Defense History, 1996), 66.30. See Soon Kyu Kim, 72.31. See Chang Chun-ming, Chiang Kai-Shek: His Life and Times, 381–383; Jin-

young Seo, Joong Kuk Hyuk Myung Sa: (History of the Chinese Revolution)(Seoul: Hanwoolsa, 1992), 161.

32. Chiang mobilized an additional 17 divisions with more than 153,000 men.See Chang Chun-ming, Chiang Kai-Shek: His Life and Times, 384.

Notes252

33. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, 135.34. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy,

1957), 64.35. See Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, 64.36. Jin-young Seo, Joong Kuk Hyuk Myung Sa, 172.37. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, 65.38. Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), 206.39. See Jin-young Seo, Joong Kuk Hyuk Myung Sa, 182.40. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, 63. See also Jin-young Seo, Joong Kuk

Hyuk Myung Sa, 188.41. Jin-young Seo, Joong Kuk Hyuk Myung Sa, 184–186. See also Fairbank,

China: A New History, 310.42. See Wu Tien-wei, The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History

(Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976),104–105.

43. See Fairbank, China: A New History, 309.44. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, 60.45. Chang Chun-Ming, Chiang Kai-Shek: His Life and Times, 432.46. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, 139.47. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, 131.48. See Donald G. Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911–1949

(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967).49. Caldwell, A Secret War, 106–107.50. See Jin-young Lee, Joongkuk In Minhae Bang Kunsa: History of Chinese People’s

Liberation Army (Seoul: Research Center for Defense History, 1998), 138–139;Jin-young Seo, Joong Kuk Hyuk Myung Sa, 202.

51. Dick Wilson, The Long March 1935 (New York: Viking, 1971), 258. See alsoJin-young Seo, Joong Kuk Hyuk Myung Sa, 272–273.

52. See William Hinton, Fan Shen: A Documentary of Revolution in a ChineseVillage (New York: Random House, 1966), 200.

53. See Jin-young Lee, Joong Kuk in Minhae Bang Kunsa, 24–25.54. After the end of World War II, Chiang received at least $700 million in aid

from the United States. See Lionel Max Chassin, The Communist Conquest ofChina: A History of the Civil War 1945–1949 (Cambridge MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1965), 96.

55. See Soon Kyu Kim, History of Chinese Strategy and Tactics, 264.56. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, 349; See also Soon

Kyu Kim, History of Chinese Strategy and Tactics, 270, 311.57. Moscow reminded Mao that “it was advantageous for you that the Soviet Army

was in Port Arthur and Manchuria.” “On the Issue of Port Arthur,” Cold WarInternational History Project Bulletin, issue 12/13 (Fall–Winter 2001):254–255.

58. See Chen Zhao, Liao-Shen Zhanyi (The Liao–Shen campaign) (Shanghai:People’s Press, 1959); Zhong Yu-fei, Liao–Shen Zhanyi (The Liao–Shen cam-paign) (Beijing: Qingnian Chubanshe, 1964); Liu, A Military History ofModern China; William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of

Notes 253

Communist Military Politics 1927–1971 (New York: Praeger, 1973); ZhongguoRenmin Jiefangjun Zhanshi (A Combat History of the People’s LiberationArmy), vol. 3 (Beijing: Military Science Press [Junshi Kexueyuan Chubanshe],1987).

59. See F.F. Liu, “Defeat by Military Default,” in The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949:Collapse or Conquest?, ed. P.Y. Loh (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1965), 10–11.

60. Thomas Cleary, trans., The Art of War, in Classics of Strategy and Counsel: TheCollected Translations of Thomas Cleary, by Thomas Cleary, vol. 1 (Boston:Shambhala, 2000), 110.

61. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, 368.62. Mao Tse-tung, “The Momentous Change in China’s Military Situation,”

November 14, 1948, in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 4(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), 287. See also Mao Tse-tung, SelectedMilitary Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, 368.

63. See Larry M. Wortzel, “The Beiping–Tianjin Campaign of 1948–1949: TheStrategic and Operational Thinking of the People’s Liberation Army,” inChinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan,David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe,2003), 60.

64. See Zhongguo Renmin JiefangjunQuangquo Jiefang Zhangzheng Shi (ChinesePeople’s Liberation Army: History of the War of Liberation) (Beijing: MilitaryScience Press [Junshi Kexue Chubanshe], 1997), 241–260.

65. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, 370.66. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, 369–371.67. See Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Quangquo Jiefang Zhangzheng Shi, 368–372;

Mao Tse-tung, “The Concept of Operations for the Peiping–TianjinCampaign,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 4 (Beijing: ForeignLanguages Press, 1975), 289–190.

68. See Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Quangquo Jiefang Zhangzheng Shi, 372.69. In January 1949, Stalin suggested Soviet mediation to reach a peaceful solution

to the civil war and expressed concern about U.S. intervention. See Sergei N.Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners (Stanford CA:Stanford University Press, 1993), 26.

70. See Soon Kyu Kim, History of Chinese Strategy and Tactics, 302.71. Roger T. Ames, Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare (New York: Ballantine, 1993),

76–77.72. Mao Tse-tung to Su Yu, Zhang Zhen, Zhou Jingming, and the Chinese

Communist Party East Chinese Bureau, June 21, 1949, Chinese CentralArchives, Beijing.

73. Mao declared that “[Today] we have . . . defeated both domestic and foreignaggressors.” Philip Short, Mao: A Life (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), 419.

74. See He Di, “The Last Campaign to Unify China: The CCP’s Unrealized Planto Liberate Taiwan, 1949–1950,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experiencesince 1949, 74.

75. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 2 (Peking: ForeignLanguage Press, 1975), 186.

Notes254

76. Mao Tse-tung, “On Protracted War,” May 1938, in Selected Military Writings ofMao Tse-Tung, 228; See also 88, 94–96, 260, 288, 350.

77. See Jin-young Lee, Joongkuk in Minhae Bang Kunsa, 98.78. Caldwell, A Secret War, 112. See also Eastman, Seed of Destruction, 147–148.79. See Mao Tse-tung, “On Protracted War,” 228–254.80. For a summary of Mao’s ten principles, see Mark A. Ryan, David M.

Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, “Introduction: Patterns of PLAWarfighting,” in Chinese Warfighting, 9–10; Godwin, “Change and Continuityin Chinese Military Doctrine,” 29–30.

81. Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and Counsel, 83, 85.82. Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and Counsel, 160.83. Wang Xi, Spring and Autumn Annals, commenting on Sun Tzu, in Classics of

Strategy and Counsel, 161.84. Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and Counsel, 66.85. Meng Shi (502–556) commenting on Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and

Counsel, 66.86. Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and Counsel, 104.87. Mei Yaochen (1002–1060) commenting on Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and

Counsel, 48.88. Wang Xi, Spring and Autumn Annals, 70.89. Du Mu (803–853) commenting on Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and

Counsel, 93.90. Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and Counsel, 105.91. Du Mu (803–853) commenting on Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and

Counsel, 112.92. See Wortzel, “The Beiping–Tianjin Campaign of 1948–1949,” 68.93. See Scott Boorman, The Protracted Game: A Wei-Chi Interpretation of Maoist

Revolutionary Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 26–27.94. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub (Sun Tzu’s Art of War) (Seoul: Hanwon

Press, 1990) 155.

5 The Korean War

1. Jonathan D. Spence, “The Once and Future China,” Foreign Policy 146(January–February 2005): 44–46.

2. See Dieter Heinzig, Die Sowjetunion und das Kommunistische China1945–1950: Der Beschwerliche Weg zum Bündnis (Baden-Baden: NomosVerlagsgesellschaft, 1998.

3. Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986), 152, cit-ing MacArthur to Department of Army, May 29, 1950; See also MemorandumDean Rusk to Dean Acheson, May 30, 1950, in United States, Department ofState, Foreign Relations of the United States—1950, vol. 6, East Asia and thePacific (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1976), 349–351.

Notes 255

4. See United States, Department of State, memorandum of conversation betweenDean Acheson and Jawaharlal Nehru, October 19, 1949, State Departmentdecimal file 845.002/10–1949, record group 59.

5. United States, Department of State, State Department to New Delhi, July 22,1950, State Department decimal file 795.00/7–2250, record group 59.

6. United States, Department of State, State Department to New Delhi, July 28,1950, State Department decimal file 795B.00/7–2850, record group 59.

7. In July 1950, the United Nations Security Council had adopted a resolutionrequesting the United States to designate a commander for all forces beingoffered by U.N. members. President Harry S. Truman designated GeneralDouglas A. MacArthur as commander, United Nations Command. Althoughthe Republic of Korea was not a member of the United Nations, its army joinedUNC by the agreement of the president of the Republic of Korea.

8. United States, Department of State, State Department to New Delhi,September 16, 1950, State Department decimal file 795.00/9–450, recordgroup 59; United States, Department of State, New Delhi to State Department,September 18, 1950, State Department decimal file 795.00/9–1850, recordgroup 59.

9. See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1994), 156, 161; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai,Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1993), 153.

10. By October 20, 1950, an intelligence summary from General MacArthur’sheadquarters predicted the war’s imminent end: “Communications with, andconsequent control of, the enemy’s field units have dissipated to a point of inef-fectiveness.” Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster,1987), 124.

11. Jawaharlal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, 1949–1953 (Delhi: PublicationsDivision, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), 418. See alsoRobert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman,1949–1953 (New York: Norton, 1982), 308.

12. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 162–163. For a generaltreatment of the issues and dilemmas surrounding China’s complicatedentrance into the Korean War, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries:Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 149–170.

13. See Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War,1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 18–19.

14. See Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu (Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing:PLA Press, 1984), 735; Peng Dehuai Zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehuai)(Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1993), 400; Yang Fengan and WangTiancheng, Jiayu Chaoxian Zhanzheng De Ren (Those Who Led the KoreanWar) (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party Central Party School Press, 1993),65, 80–82; Xu Yan, Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng LishiHuigu Yu Fansi (The First Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective andReview of the War to Resist America and Aid Korea) (Beijing: Zhongguo

Notes256

Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe (China Broadcasting and Television Press),1990), 23–24.

15. See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 146.16. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub (Sun Tzu’s Art of War) (Seoul:

Hanwon Press, 1990), 91.17. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign

Language Press, 1972), 260.18. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 153–154.19. Kavalam M. Panika, In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat (London: Allen and

Unwin, 1955), 108.20. See John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950–1953 (New York: William

Morrow and Company, Inc, 1991), 241–242.21. Peter Lowe, The Korean War (London: Macmillan, 2000), 41–47.22. Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the

Korean Conflict, 1950–1953 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,1985), 80.

23. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 169.24. Yang Fengan and Wang Tiancheng, Hankukjon el ikeunsaram: Chinese Leaders

in Korean War, trans. by Research Center for Defense History (Seoul: ResearchCenter for Defense History, 1993), 70.

25. See Xie Lifu, Chaoxian Zhangzheng Shilu (Record of the Korean War) (Beijing:World Affairs Press, 1994), 159–162.

26. Telegram to Joseph Stalin, in Mao Tse-tung, Jianguo Yilai Mao Tse-tung Wengao(Mao Tse-tung’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State), vol. 1(September 1949–December 1950), (Beijing: Central Press of HistoricalDocuments, 1987), 539–541.

27. See Xu Yan, Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Lishi Huigu YuFansi (The First Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective and Review of theWar to Resist America and Aid Korea), 22, 27; Peng Dehuai, Peng DehuaiJunshi Wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Peng Dehuai) (Beijing: CentralArchives and Manuscript Press, 1988), 322.

28. His newly opened front comprised land reform, repressing counter-revolution-aries, economic construction, and thought reform. Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 253.

29. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 194.30. Mao Tse-tung composed this poem of 56 Chinese characters when he occupied

Nanjing after crossing the Yangzi River. Yang and Wang, Jiayu ChaoxianZhanzheng De Ren (Those Who Led the Korean War), 21.

31. Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War:History Revisited,” The China Quarterly, 121 (March 1990): 108.

32. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2 (Peking: ForeignLanguages Press, 1975), 49; See also Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War,193.

33. Mao’s telegram to Zhou Enlai in Moscow, “Reasons for Our Army to Enter theKorean War,” October 13, 1950, in Mao Tse-tung, Jianguo Yilai Mao Tse-tungWengao (Mao Tse-tung’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State), vol. 1.

Notes 257

34. See “The Chinese People Are Determined to Liberate Taiwan,” Renmin Ribao(People’s Daily), March 15, 1949.

35. Mao Tse-tung to Su Yu, Zhang Zhen, Zhou Jingming, and the ChineseCommunist Party East China Bureau, June 14, 1949 and June 21, 1949, inDang De Wenxian (Party Documents) no. 2, [unpublished] 1990, 48–49,Central Chinese Archives, Beijing.

36. See Han Huanzhi, et al., Dangdai Zhongguo Jundai De Junshi Gongzuo (MilitaryAffairs of the Contemporary Chinese Army), China Today Series, vol. 1(Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1988), 160–161; Wang Dinglie, et al.,Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun (Military Affairs of the Contemporary Chinese AirForce), China Today Series (Beijing: Social Science Press, 1989), 35, 38; People’sRepublic of China, People’s Liberation Army, Junshi Ziliao (Army HistoricalMaterials), 10 (1985): 26; Lu Liping, Tong Tian Zhi Lu (Path to the Sky)(Beijing: PLA Press, 1989), 137–146, 165–166; Muo Shentian, “Zhang Aipingin the Initial Stage of the Creation of the People’s Navy in East China,” DaijangNanbei (North and South of the Yangtze River), 3 (1990).

37. See Su Yu, “Report on the Problem of Liberating Taiwan,” January 5, andJanuary 27, 1950, Chinese Central Archives, Beijing.

38. Deng Lifeng, Xin Zhongguo Junshi Huodong Jishi (Record of Military Activitiesof New China) (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party Historical Materials Press,1989), 82.

39. See Han Huanzhi, et al., Dangdai Zhongguo Jundai De Junshi Gongzuo (MilitaryAffairs of the Contemporary Chinese Army), China Today Series, vol. 2(Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1988), 155; Wang Dinglie, et al., DangdaiZhongguo Kongjun (Military Affairs of the Contemporary Chinese Air Force),66–67, 79–81, 83–85; Yang Guoyu et al. Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun (TheContemporary Chinese Navy) (Beijing: Social Science Press, 1987), ch. 1–3.

40. Central Military Commission to Chen Yi, Commander, PLA East ChinaHeadquarters, August 11, 1950, in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Huibian (ACollection of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Documents)[internal version, unpublished], 1950, 1208, Chinese Central Archives,Beijing. See also Xiao Jinguang, Xiao Jinguang Junshi Huiyilu (Memoirs of XiaoJinguang), vol. 2 (Beijing: PLA Press, n.d.), 26; Deng Lifeng, Xin ZhongguoJunshi Huodong Jishi (Record of Military Activities of New China), 113.

41. See Mao’s written instructions in the CMC report, September 9, 1950, in MaoTse-tung, Jianguo Yilai Mao Tse-tung Wengao (Mao Tse-tung’s Manuscripts sincethe Founding of the State), 4; United States, Department of State,Memorandum of Conversation, September 27, 1950, State Department deci-mal file 795.00/9–2750, record group 59; United States, New Delhi to StateDepartment, September 28, 1950, United States, Department of State ForeignRelations of the United States, 1950, vol. 7, Part 2, Far East and Australasia(Washington, DC: Department of State, 1976), 808–810; Panika, In TwoChinas, 109–111.

42. Mao Tse-tung to Chen Yi, November 17, 1950, in Mao Tse-tung, Jianguo YilaiMao Tse-tung Wengao (Mao Tse-tung’s Manuscripts since the Founding of theState), 669–670.

Notes258

43. See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 128.44. Mao’s telegram to Zhou Enlai in Moscow, “The Advantages of Entering the

War,” October 15, 1950, in Mao Tse-tung, Jianguo Yilai Mao Tse-tung Wengao(Mao Tse-tung’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State), vol. 1.

45. Over the period 1949–1981, correlation tests between domestic unrest andChina’s foreign military activity associate a consistent increase in domesticunrest with decreases in external use or threat of force. This empirical result sug-gests a preoccupation model as a better fit to China’s use of force than conven-tional diversionary theory. The same data also reject a suppression model—highexternal military activity followed by low domestic unrest. China’s experienceswith external military action and domestic unrest suggest that Beijing’s preoc-cupation with domestic social order—national Shih—has been associated witha reluctance to use force. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s MilitarizedInterstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data,” in ChineseForeign Policy in Transition, ed. Guoli Liu, 259–293 (New York: Aldine deGruyter, 2004), 274–275.

46. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 209.47. Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: McGraw-

Hill Times Book, 1982), 208.48. Telegram to Zhou Enlai “Concerning the principles and deployments of the

People’s Volunteer Army as it Enters Korea for Combat,” October 14, 1950, inUseful Adversaries, by Christensen, 274–275.

49. Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 259, 287–289, 323.50. See Yu Bin, “What China Learned from Its Forgotten War in Korea,” in Chinese

Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M.Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, 123–142 (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 127; See also Zhao Yihong, Sanshiba Jun Chuanqi (TheStory of the 38th Army) (Lanzhou: Dunhuang Yishu Chubanshe (DunhuangArts Press), 1994), 270–289; Xie Lifu, Chaoxian Zhangzheng Shilu (Record ofthe Korean War), 203–205. 212, 229–230; Du Ping, Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu(At the Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Volunteers) (Beijing: PLA Press,1989), 68–70.

51. See Chinese Military History of the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea, trans.the Korean Research Institute for Security (KRIS) (Seoul: Sae Kyung Sa, 1991),34–38; Zhonggou Renmin Zhiyuanjun Jang Mei Yuan Chao Janshi (CombatHistory of the People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist America and Aid Korea)(Beijing: (Junshi Kexue Chubanshe) Military Science Press, 1988), 27; Xu Yan,Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Lishi Huigu Yu Fansi (TheFirst Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective and Review of the War to ResistAmerica and Aid Korea), 45.

52. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story, 307.53. The Chinese 38th corps found the enemy in Hui Chon but did not attack until

October 29, because the Chinese misperceived them as U.S. units. See ChineseMilitary History of the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea, 23–24, 29, 38, 41.

54. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 526.

Notes 259

55. Chinese Military History of the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea, 38–40.56. See Peng Dehuai Zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehuai), 426–427; Xie Lifu,

Chaoxian Zhangzheng Shilu (Record of the Korean War), 243–256; Xu Yan,Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Lishi Huigu Yu Fansi (TheFirst Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective and Review of the War to ResistAmerica and Aid Korea), 49–52.

57. Toland, In Mortal Combat, 271.58. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story, 317.59. Mathew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 60.60. The U.N. advance was not a general offensive, but a reconnaissance in force

after the Chinese disengagement. See Chinese Military History of the War toResist America and to Aid Korea, 49.

61. See Xie Lifu, Chaoxian Zhangzheng Shilu (Record of the Korean War),267–282; Yang and Wang, Jiayu Chaoxian Zhanzheng De Ren (Those Who Ledthe Korean War), 166–180; Du Ping, Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu (At theHeadquarters of the Chinese People’s Volunteers), 101–126; Zhongguo RenminZhiyuanjun Jang Mei Yuan Chao Janshi (Combat History of the People’sVolunteers in the War to Resist America and Aid Korea), 2–3, 52–67; Xu Yan,Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Lishi Huigu Yu Fansi (TheFirst Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective and Review of the War to ResistAmerica and Aid Korea), 55–57; Zhao Yihong, Sanshiba Jun Chuanqi (TheStory of the 38th Army), 297–319.

62. See Hastings, The Korean War, 146.63. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story, 409.64. See Peng Dehuai Zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehuai), 437–438; Yang and

Wang, Jiayu Chaoxian Zhanzheng De Ren (Those Who Led the Korean War),200–201; Du Ping, Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu (At the Headquarters of theChinese People’s Volunteers), 140–142.

65. Chinese Military History of the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea, 80–81.66. See Xie Lifu, Chaoxian Zhangzheng Shilu (Record of the Korean War), 353; Du

Ping, Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu (At the Headquarters of the Chinese People’sVolunteers), 143–153; Xu Yan, Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan ChaoZhanzheng Lishi Huigu Yu Fansi (The First Trial of Strength: HistoricalRetrospective and Review of the War to Resist America and Aid Korea), 61–63,338; Zhonggou Renmin Zhiyuanjun Jang Mei Yuan Chao Janshi (CombatHistory of the People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist America and Aid Korea),77–78, 88–89.

67. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 243.68. See Xu Yan, Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Lishi Huigu Yu

Fansi (The First Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective and Review of theWar to Resist America and Aid Korea), 64; Xie Lifu, Chaoxian ZhangzhengShilu (Record of the Korean War), 399–403; Zhonggou Renmin ZhiyuanjunJang Mei Yuan Chao Janshi (Combat History of the People’s Volunteers in theWar to Resist America and Aid Korea), 88.

69. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 190.

Notes260

70. Joint Chiefs of Staff 99935 to Commander-in-Chief, Far East, December 29,1950,79500/12–2950 telegram, in United States, Department of State, ForeignRelations of the United States—1950, Vol. 7, Korea (Washington, DC:Government Printing Office, 1976), 1625–1626.

71. See Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,”International Security 13(3) (Winter 1988–1989): 50–91.

72. Chinese Military History of the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea, 128.73. Xu Yan, Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Lishi Huigu Yu Fansi

(The First Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective and Review of the War toResist America and Aid Korea), 69; Zhonggou Renmin Zhiyuanjun Jang MeiYuan Chao Janshi (Combat History of the People’s Volunteers in the War toResist America and Aid Korea), 93–95; Du Ping, Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu (Atthe Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Volunteers), 192.

74. See Zhonggou Renmin Zhiyuanjun Jang Mei Yuan Chao Janshi (Combat Historyof the People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist America and Aid Korea) 93–95;Du Ping, Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu (At the Headquarters of the Chinese People’sVolunteers), 98, 102–103; Xie Lifu, Chaoxian Zhangzheng Shilu (Record of theKorean War), 426–428.

75. Mao’s directive was “Neng su sheng ze su sheng, bu neng su sheng ze huansheng,” Peng Dehuai Zhuan (Biography of Peng Dehuai), 452–453. See also XuYan, Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Lishi Huigu Yu Fansi(The First Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective and Review of the War toResist America and Aid Korea), 81.

76. See Xu Yan, Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Lishi Huigu YuFansi (The First Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective and Review of theWar to Resist America and Aid Korea), 71–74; Zhonggou Renmin ZhiyuanjunJang Mei Yuan Chao Janshi (Combat History of the People’s Volunteers in theWar to Resist America and Aid Korea), 120–121; Du Ping, Zai ZhiyuanjunZongbu (At the Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Volunteers), 204.

77. Chinese Military History of the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea, 104–105.78. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 37.79. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 155.80. See Xie Lifu, Chaoxian Zhangzheng Shilu (Record of the Korean War),

456–458; Yang and Wang, Jiayu Chaoxian Zhanzheng De Ren (Those Who Ledthe Korean War), 252–261; Du Ping, Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu (At theHeadquarters of the Chinese People’s Volunteers), 218–222.

81. See Chinese Military History of the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea, 136,146, 148.

82. The Wiles of War: 36 Military Strategies from Ancient China, trans. Sun Haichen(Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1993), 51; Mao Tse-tung, Selected MilitaryWritings, 116.

83. Although exact data are not available, estimates suggest about 450,000 casual-ties from the Chinese Army. See Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon (New York:Newmarket Press, 1988), 313.

84. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story, 581.

Notes 261

85. See Lowe, The Korean War, 83; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s MilitaryRomanticism, 245.

86. “On Issues Related to Korean Armistice Negotiation,” Renmin Ribao (People’sDaily) June 25, 1951; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 218.

87. See Hastings, The Korean War, 232; Chinese Military History of the War to ResistAmerica and to Aid Korea, 270–271.

88. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 81, 82.89. Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 218.90. Mao’s Speech on at the 38th meeting of the standing committee of the First

National Committee of the CPPCC, August 4, 1952, quoted in The Writings ofMao Tse-tung, 1949–1976, ed. Michael Y. M. Kau and John K. Leung,(Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), 275–276. See also Shu Guang Zhang,Mao’s Military Romanticism, 220.

91. Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 218–22092. “On Issues Related to Korean Armistice Negotiation,” Renmin Ribao (People’s

Daily) June 25, 1951.93. Chinese records report inflicting 148,293 casualties on U.N. forces from

October 25, 1950 through June 10, 1951, and 523,661 from June 11, 1951through July 27, 1953. The records disclose no Chinese casualties. See ChineseMilitary History of the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea, 393–394.

94. Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” in Chinese Foreign Policy inTransition, ed. Guoli Liu, 141–150, 142. Originally published as “Beijing as aConservative Power,” Foreign Affairs 76(2) (March–April 1997): 33–45.

95. Mao said, “We ourselves preferred to shoulder the heavy sacrifices necessary.”Among these was Mao’s personal sacrifice. His son was killed in the KoreanWar. See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 245.

96. See Xu Yan, Diyi Ci Jiaoliang: Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Lishi Huigu YuFansi (The First Trial of Strength: Historical Retrospective and Review of theWar to Resist America and Aid Korea), 99–100, 159–194, 326.

97. See Christensen, Useful Adversaries.98. Mao’s note on the General Staff Department’s report, August 16, 1951, quoted

in Kau and Leung, The Writings of Mao Tse-tung, 1949–1976, 27. See also; ShuGuang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 224.

99. Shim Jae Hoon, “Sitting on the Fence,” Far Eastern Economic Review 157(45)(November 10, 1994): 1.

6 The Sino-Indian War

1. “Two Systems, One Grand Rivalry,” The Economist 367(8329) ( June 21,2003): 21–23; 22.

2. “It is wise and essential that we should think of military steps lest others fail.That is why we have been engaged in road-building, building up our militaryapparatus, etc.” India, Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister on

Notes262

Sino-Indian Relations, vol. 1, “Indian Parliament,” part 2 (New Delhi: ExternalPublicity Division, Government of India, 1961–1962), 95–96. See also NewYork Times, October 26, 1962.

3. See Steven A. Hoffman, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1990), 9–74; Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (New York:Pantheon, 1970) 47–134; Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence:India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 1–41;Luke T. Chang, China’s Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes (New York:Oceana, 1982), 61–78.

4. The Nationalist Creed taught at the National Central Political TrainingInstitute in 1944, quoted in A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944–1945, byOliver J. Caldwell (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), 35.Before 1949, Sun Yatsen, Mao Tse-tung, and Chiang Kai-shek had variouslyasserted that all territory that ever belonged to China and all territory in whichChinese people formed a majority should be incorporated into a new China.

5. Neville Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962 and the Hindu Bomb,” WorldPolicy Journal 16(2) (Summer 1999): 111–118; 112; See also H. W. Brands,The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the ThirdWorld, 1947–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 15.

6. See United States, Central Intelligence Agency, “National Intelligence Estimate23,” September 4, 1951, President’s Secretary’s File, Harry S. Truman Papers,Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

7. In 1947, India requested grain, loans, and help in flood-control, irrigation, andhydropower projects from the United States. The Truman administrationresponded that U.S. commitments to Europe precluded any increases in U.S.grain shipments to India and referred Nehru’s government to the World Bank,the U.S. Export-Import Bank, or private American banks for interest-bearingloans. See United States, National Archives, Record Group 59, New Delhi toState Department, June 27, 1947, State Department decimal file845.00/6–2747; New Delhi to State Department, September 2, 1947, StateDepartment decimal file 102.78/9–247; New Delhi to State Department,September 3, 1947, State Department decimal file 845.01/9–347; StateDepartment to New Delhi, October 3, 1947, State Department decimal file102.78/10–347.

8. Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani ForeignPolicies, by S. M. Burke (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974),93. See also K. Raman Pillai, India’s Foreign Policy: Basic Issues and Attitudes(Meerut, India: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969), 28.

9. Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962,” 113, quoting Jawaharlal Nehru with-out source. “If a state proceeds alone to survey and delimit its border areas, nojuridical principle will apply to another state which, being directly interested,has not cooperated in any way in its execution or consented to accept its conse-quences. From the point of view of the nonparticipating state, the internationalboundary remains undefined.” A. Oye Cukwurah, The Settlement of BoundaryDisputes in International Law (Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceana, 1967), 159.

10. Brands, Specter of Neutralism, 22.

Notes 263

11. See Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (Cambridge MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1976–1984), 2: 195; Charles H. Heimsath and SurjitMansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Bombay: Allied, 1971),191–192; D. R. SarDesai, “India and Southeast Asia,” in Indian Foreign Policy,ed. Bal Ram Nanda, 78–101 (Delhi: Vikas, 1976), 87–88; Menno T.Kamminga, “Building Railroads on the Sea: China’s Attitude towards MaritimeLaw,”The China Quarterly 59 (September 1974): 544–588; especially545–546.

12. See George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia,April 1955 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956).

13. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms TradeWith the Third World (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1971), 468. See ZhouEnlai’s speech at Bandung, April 23, 1955, in Kahin, The Asian-AfricanConference, 60.

14. The pre–1911 Qing government and the successor Yuan Shikai administrationof the Republic of China had signed a series of trade agreements concerning theSino–Indian border after 1865. Sir Henry McMahon, chairing a Simla confer-ence of British, Chinese, and Tibetan plenipotentiaries, drew the McMahonline in 1913 in a draft Tripartite Convention that the three representatives ini-tialed. No Chinese government ever recognized either the McMahon Line orthe 1913–1914 Simla Treaty that established it. The Kuomintang view hadconsistently been that the new Republic of China had refused to accept thatthe then-independent Tibet had ceded to India the 90,000 sq km that becamethe North Eastern Frontier Agency in Arunachal Pradesh province. While theChinese representative, Chen Yifan, initialed the draft convention, the McMahonLine appeared in an appendix that had not been initialled, and Chen did notsign the treaty during the Simla Conference. See George N. Patterson, PekingVersus Delhi (New York: Praeger, 1963), 170; Melvin Gurtov and Byong-MooHwang, China Under Threat: The Politics and Strategy of Diplomacy (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 119; Maxwell, India’s China War,39–64; Alistair Lamb, The McMahon Line: A Study in Relations between India,China, and Tibet, 1904–1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 1;3–9, 638–639.

15. See exchange of notes between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, August 28, 1959, in XuYan, Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang (The Historical Truth of theSino-Indian Border War) (Hong Kong: Tian Di, 1993), 45.

16. See Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat, 115.17. Although Indian officials in Ladakh recognized the advantages—terrain, logis-

tics, and mobility—that China had created by building the road, Nehruremained unaware of the situation until the road was a fait accompli. “I do notknow when the road was actually made, but we heard of it at the end of 1957or 1958, I forget exactly when.” India, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations,108, 62, 123. See also Maxwell, India’s China War, 86–89, 181, 205, 254.

18. See Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, 107.19. See Maxwell, India’s China War, 73.

Notes264

20. India had rejected Soviet or U.S. military assistance until 1959. Moscowexploited India’s chagrin after the 1959 confrontations by proposing to meetIndia’s requirements “for considerably less cost than the United States.”Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, Arms for the Third World: SovietMilitary Aid Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 58.See also Christian Science Monitor, October 4, 1960; Times of India(New Delhi), October 4, 1960; New York Times, April 2, 1961. After Moscowand New Delhi agreed to deepen Soviet-Indian relations around Indianbelligerence toward China and Pakistan, Moscow became the dominantmilitary supplier and advisor to India. For a summary of Soviet military assis-tance to India, see William H. Mott IV, Soviet Military Assistance: An EmpiricalPerspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001), 225–239.

21. See John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Coexistence(Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1967), 116.

22. See United States, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory, People’s Liberation Army Unit History, trans. Military Advisory Groupto China (Taiwan) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965),31, 78; George N. Patterson, Tibet in Revolt (London: Faber and Faber,1960); and Lowell Thomas, Jr., The Silent War in Tibet (New York: Doubleday,1959).

23. See Xinhua News Agency, March 28, 1959, Peking Review, March 31, 1959, 7.24. Tibet was Chinese territory in 1950. On March 20, 1959, Tibetans opposed to

Chinese policy organized a revolt, which the PLA crushed in two days.Thousands of Tibetans escaped into Nepal and India. See Patterson, PekingVersus Delhi, 161; Maxwell, India’s China War, 103–105, 263; “Two Systems,One Grand Rivalry,” The Economist, 21.

25. See Maxwell, India’s China War, 175, 235.26. See Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat, 115–116.27. Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962,” 113, summarizing correspondence

between Zhou and Nehru.28. See Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat, 117, 120; Maxwell, India’s China

War, 174, 183.29. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi propagandy v kul’turnykh

svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238, April24, 1959, by Zhan Zhisyan, Chairman of the Chinese Committee on CulturalTies Abroad, in the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation(TsKhSD) (former Central Committee Archive of the Communist Party of theSoviet Union), Moscow, f. 5, op. 30, d. 307, LI. 18, 27.

30. See Editorial, Times of India, October 11, 1959; Maxwell, India’s China War,107–111.

31. See United States, People’s Liberation Army Unit History, 78.32. The Forward Policy annoyed China’s strategists, who referred to it as canshi

zhengce (nibbling at another’s country and gradually consuming it). See Xu Yan,Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 87.

33. See Maxwell, India’s China War, 226–227.

Notes 265

34. See Margaret Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert C. Huttenback, HimalayanBattleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh (London: Pall Mall,1963), 131.

35. Chou Chun-li, “Sino-Indian Border Situation Worsens,” Peking Review, July9–13, 1962, 11.

36. Maxwell, India’s China War, 245.37. Translated in Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 87.38. Sun Pin, The Lost Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary, in Classics of Strategy and

Counsel: The Collected Translations of Thomas Cleary, by Thomas Cleary, vol. 1,317–421 (Boston: Shambhala, 2000), 370.

39. Zhuge Liang and Liu Ji, Mastering the Art of War, in Classics of Strategy andCounsel, by Cleary, vol. 1, 183–313; 286, 305.

40. Cleary, The Art of War: Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and Counsel, by Cleary,vol. 1, 107.

41. Cleary, The Art of War: Sun Tzu, in Classics of Strategy and Counsel, by Cleary,vol. 1, 110.

42. See Jian Si-yi and Li Hui, eds., Zhong-Yin Bianjing Ziwei Fanji Zuozhan Shi(History of the Self-Defensive Counterattack Operations on the Sino-IndianBorder) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1994), 143.

43. See Maxwell, India’s China War, 205, 254.44. “Two Systems, One Grand Rivalry,” The Economist, 21–22.45. New York Times, November 19, 1962.46. See Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 88–91.47. See Chang Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA Operational Principles and

Limited War: The Sino-Indian War of 1962,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLAExperience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A.McDevitt, 173–197 (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 182.

48. See Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat, 122.49. Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped (New York: Vintage, 1990), 177.50. See Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, 107.51. See Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat, 123.52. Klaus H. Pringsheim, “China, India, and Their Himalayan Border, 1961–63,”

Asian Survey 3 (October 1963): 488.53. Peking Review, October 12, 1962, 8; October 19, 1962, 6–7.54. See Chang Feng and Wortzel, “PLA Operational Principles and Limited

War,” 182.55. See Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 121–134.56. See India, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, 110–111.57. See Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 134–139; Maxwell,

India’s China War, 356–359.58. See Maxwell, India’s China War, 360–362, 366–373; People’s Republic of

China, Collection of Documents on the Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republicof China: 1962 (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1964), 109; Rowland, A Historyof Sino-Indian Relations, 169; Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan LishiZhenxiang, 145.

Notes266

59. See William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of CommunistMilitary Politics 1927–1971 (New York: Praeger, 1973), 488–489; Xu Yan,Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 148–188.

60. Maxwell, India’s China War, 397, 404.61. Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped, 177.62. See Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 180–185.63. See Maxwell, India’s China War, 417–418.64. See Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat, 142.65. India, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, 95. See also Gurtov and Hwang,

China Under Threat, 120.66. See Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962,” 116.67. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 310.68. Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat, 118, 121, 137.69. Chang Feng and Wortzel, “PLA Operational Principles and Limited War,”

189–190.70. See Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat, 143.71. See Jonathan R. Adelman and Shih Chih-yu, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of

Force 1840–1980 (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, NationalChengchi University, 1993), 204.

72. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub (Sun Tzu’s Art of War) (Seoul: HanwonPress, 1990), 218.

73. Maxwell, India’s China War, 335, 404.74. See Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 102–105, 111,

149–175.75. See Maxwell, India’s China War, 353–355.76. Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962,” 116. See also Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin

Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 119–121.77. See John K. Fairbank and Frank A. Kiernan Jr., eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 5–10, 25, 65; and MichaelL. Handel, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army WarCollege, Strategic Studies Institute, 1991), 12–18.

78. See Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Lishi Zhenxiang, 164.79. New York Times, November 20, 1962.80. See Peter J. S. Duncan, “The Soviet-Indian Model: Continuity in a Changing

Environment,” in Troubled Friendships: Moscow’s Third World Ventures, ed.Margot Light, 29–51 (London: British Academic Press, 1993), 30; ArthurStein, “India and the U.S.S.R.: The Post-Nehru Period,” Asian Survey 7(3)(March 1967): 31; Washington Post, October 30, 1962.

81. See SIPRI. The Arms Trade With the Third World, 477.82. Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 284. See also 154.83. See Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih, Symbolic War, 204.84. Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962,” 117.85. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub, 192.86. K. Shankar Bajpai, “Untangling India and Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs 82(3)

(May–June 2003): 116.

Notes 267

87. See “Two Systems, One Grand Rivalry,” The Economist, 22.88. Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962,” 117.89. See “Friendly Giants,” The Economist 367(8330) (June 28, 2003): 38.90. “No Order on the Border,” The Economist 368 (8335) (August 2, 2003): 41.91. Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962,” 113, quoting Nehru without source.92. “Too Early to Tell,” The Economist 375(8422) (April 16, 2005) 37.

7 The Sino-Soviet War

1. For details and analyses of this series of incidents, see, among others, Oleg B.Borisov and Boris T. Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945–1970(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975); Lowell Dittmer, Sino-SovietNormalization and Its International Implications, 1945–1990 (Seattle:University of Washington Press, 1992); Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” in Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as aPolitical Instrument, ed. Stephen S. Kaplan, 265–313 (Washington, DC:Brookings, 1981); Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Politicalchange and Communication (London: Council on East Asian Studies—HarvardUniversity Press, 1980); Tai Sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute(Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1973); Drew Middleton, The Duel of theGiants: China and Russia in Asia (New York: Scribner, 1978); Tsui Tien-hua,The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute in the 1970s (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic, 1984);Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Confrontation since Mao Zedong (New York:Columbia University Press, 1987); and Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers inArms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963 (Stanford CA:Stanford University Press, 2000).

2. See accounts of the Gorbachev visit to Beijing in 1989 and the JointCommuniqué of May 18, 1989, The China Quarterly 119 (September 1989):711–714 and 731–734.

3. Agence France Press, dispatch, April 28, 1999, in Foreign BroadcastInformation Services (FBIS), April 28, 1999, Document ID: FTS19990428000217.

4. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, vol. 5, “Vzaimootnosheniya s sot-sialisticheskimi strabami,” part G, “Vzaimootnosheniya s Kitaem” (Moscow:typescript, 1966–1970), 25–31.

5. See Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s China Problem (Washington, DC: CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, 1999), 9.

6. See E. Wayne Merry, “Moscow’s Retreat and Beijing’s Rise as Regional GreatPower,” Problems of Post-Communism 50(3) (May–June 2003): 22.

7. See I. F. Kurdyukov, V. N. Nikiforov, and A. S. Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie Otnosheniya, 1917–1957 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoi literatury,1959), 221–222, 227–229, 303–306.

8. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, vol. 5, 72–73.

Notes268

9. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961(Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1965), 293–294, 691–693.

10. See Andrei A. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, vol. 2 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoiliteratury, 1988), 132–133; John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s StrategicSeapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford CA:Stanford University Press, 1994), 16.

11. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, vol. 6, “Otnosheniya s kapitalistich-eskimi I razvivayushchimisya stranami”, part H, “Otnosheniya s arabskimistranami” (Moscow: typescript, 1966–1970), 57–58; “Kommyunike o vstrecheN.S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tse-duna,” Pravda (Moscow), August 4, 1958, 1–2;Klaus Mehnert, Peking und Moskau (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,1962), 388–392.

12. See Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, vol. 5, 73–74, Allen S. Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 14: The People’s Republic,part 2: “The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949–1965”, ed. RoderickMacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, 478–538 (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1987), 499–500.

13. See Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen(Beijing: New World Press, 1988), 572–573.

14. First published in Chinese in Hongqi 8 (April 16, 1960) and republished inEnglish in Peking Review 3(17) (April 1960): 14–22, Long Live Leninism isavailable in The Sino-Soviet Dispute, ed. G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, andRoderick MacFarquhar (New York: Praeger, 1961) and in Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963–1967, ed. John Gittings (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1968), 287–394. See also Aleksandr Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchikikitaitsev obuchali,” Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), May 13, 1995, 6.

15. See Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (Baltimore:Penguin, 1963), 97–110.

16. See Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in Red China (Montreal: InternationalPublishers Representatives, 1964), 164–188.

17. Lowell Dittmer, “The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: Ghost of theStrategic Triangle?” in Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition, ed. Guoli Liu,211–232 (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2004), 213.

18. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data,” in Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition, ed.Guoli Liu, 259–293 (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2004), 278. (First pub-lished as Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate DisputeBehavior 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data,” The China Quarterly 153(March 1998): 1–30.)

19. Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of1969,” Political Science Quarterly 118(1) (Spring 2003): 67.

20. See Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, NuclearWeapons Databook, vol. 5: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons(Boulder CO: Westview, 1994), 326.

21. See John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford CA:Stanford University Press, 1988), 212–213.

Notes 269

22. See Alexey Elizavetin, “Peregovory Kosygina I Chou En-lai v PekinskomAeroporte” (Negotiations between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai at the BeijingAirport), Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka 5 (September–October 1992): 46, contin-ued in Alexey Elizavetin, “Peregovory Kosygina I Chou En-lai v PekinskomAeroporte” (Negotiations between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai at the BeijingAirport), Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka 1 (January–February 1993): 107–119.

23. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics andStrategy of Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 201.See also Harry Gelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Takingagainst China, R–2943–AF, August 1982 (Santa Monica CA: Rand, 1982), 43;and Charles H. Murphy, “Mainland China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent,”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 28(1) (January–February 1972): 34.

24. See Yang Kuisong, interview with Lyle J. Goldstein, Beijing, July 19, 2000,reported in Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?” 71n94; Jiang Yi,(Institute of East European, Russian, and Central Asian Studies—Beijing),interview with Lyle J. Goldstein, Beijing, July 20, 2000, reported in Goldstein,“Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?” 71n94.

25. “Conversation between Mao Zedong and E. F. Hill,” in All Under Heaven isGreat Chaos—Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–69 at the Internet site of The Cold WarInternational History Project at http:\www.cwihp.si.edu.cwihplib.nsf/1 . . .712a28525677c00686a69, 8. See also “Report by Four Chinese Marshals—Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian—to the CCP CentralCommittee, ‘Our Views about the Current Situation,’ September 17, 1969,” inAll Under Heaven is Great Chaos—Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, andthe Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–69 at the Internet site ofThe Cold War International History Project at http:\www.cwihp.si.edu.cwihplib.nsf/1 . . . 712a28525677c00686a69, 25; Elizavetin, “PeregovoryKosygina,” Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka 5, 55–56.

26. See Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, War and Peace: The Views from Moscowand Beijing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 28.

27. Mao Tse-tung’s Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CCP’s NinthCentral Committee, April 28, 1969, on the Internet site of The Cold WarInternational History Project at http:\www.cwihp.si.edu.cwihplib.nsf/ 1 . . . 712a28525677c00686a69, 16.

28. Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China: An Investigative History(New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 73. For the normal schedule of Chinesenuclear tests, see also Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 244–245.

29. Neville Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962 and the Hindu Bomb,” WorldPolicy Journal 16(2) (Summer 1999): 112.

30. See Li Danhui, “1969 Nian Zhong-Su Bianjie Chongtu: Yuanqi He Jieguo” (The1969 Sino-Soviet Border Incidents: Origins and Outcome), in Dangdai ZhongguoShi Yanjiu (Contemporary China Historical Research), no. 3, [unpublished],1995, 42, Central Chinese Archives, Beijing.

31. Sun Haichen, ed. and trans., The Wiles of War: 36 Military Strategies fromAncient China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1993), 51.

Notes270

32. See Central Military Commission to Shenyang, Beijing, and military regions,in Xu Yan, “1969 Nian Zhang-Su Bianjie De Wu Zhang Chongtu” (The 1969Sino-Soviet Armed Border Conflict), Dangshi Yanjiu, Ziliao (Party HistoryResearch Materials), 1998 (Unpublished), 5, Central Chinese Archives,Beijing. Cited in Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts of1969: New Evidence Three Decades Later,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLAExperience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A.McDevitt, 198–216 (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 206.

33. Jiang Yi, (Institute of East European, Russian, and Central Asian Studies—Beijing), interview with Lyle J. Goldstein, Beijing, July 16, 2000, reported inGoldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?” 59n31. Li Danhui, (PekingUniversity), interview with Lyle J. Goldstein, Beijing, July 16, 2000, reportedin Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?” 59n29. See also Wich,Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 102; and Gelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup, 32.Some accounts report the Soviets as aggressors: Barbara Barnouin and YuChang-gen, Chinese Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution (London:Kegan Paul International, 1998), 87–88; Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 722; Neville Maxwell, “The ChineseAccount of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao,” The China Quarterly 56(October–December 1973): 730–739; Yang Kuisong, (Institute of ModernHistory, Beijing), interview with Lyle J. Goldstein, Beijing, July 19, 2000,reported in Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?” 59n30.

34. See Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background,Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political ScienceReview 66 (December 1972): 1175–1202; Strategic Survey 1969 (London: TheInternational Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), 66–67.

35. See Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 97; Maxwell, “The Chinese Account of the1969 Fighting at Chenpao,” 735; Nikolai Lobodyuk, “Za TumanamiDamanskogo,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie March 26, 1999; VladislavAnikeev, “Bole Damanskogo: Posleslovie k Grustnoy Date,” NezavisimayaGazeta March 30, 1999; Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts of1969,” 209, 213; Andrei Vladimirov, “Bolshaya Voina za Malenky Ostov,”Obshchaya Gazeta, March 10, 1999, 13; Thomas W. Robinson, “ChinaConfronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy in China’s Inner AsianFrontiers,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 15, The People’s Republic,part 2, “Revolution within the Revolution, 1966–1982,” ch. 3, ed. RoderickMacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, 218–304 (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991), 261.

36. See Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts of 1969,” 211.37. Victor Usov, “Tragediya na Ussuri,” Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka 3 (May–June

1994): 86, 89.38. See Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 105–106.39. See Elizavetin, “Peregovory Kosygina,” Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka 5, 50.40. See Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts of 1969,” 214.41. See Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 149.42. Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?” 60.

Notes 271

43. See Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts of 1969,” 214.44. Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World

Conflict since 1945 (New York: Vantage, 1990), 171.45. Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?” 60–61, quoting Maria S.

Kapitsa, Na Raznykh Parrallelyakh—Zapisky Diplomata (Moscow: Kniga IBizness, 1996). 86. See also Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 190; Henry A.Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 183–184.

46. Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?” 61, citing Elizavetin,“Peregovory Kosygina,” Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka 5, 55–56 continued inProblemy Dal’nego Vostoka 1, 107–119; and citing Li Jingjie (Institute of EastEuropean, Russian, and Central Asian Studies—Beijing), interview with Lyle J.Goldstein, Beijing, July 17, 2000, reported in Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMDArsenals Deter?” 62n44.

47. See Kapitsa, Na Raznykh Parrallelyakh, 92.48. See Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts of 1969,” 214.49. See Yang Kuisong, “Cong Zhenbao Dao Shijian Dao Huanhe Dui Mei

Guanxi” (From the Zhenbao Island Incident to the Warming of Relations withAmerica), in Dangshi Yanjiu, Ziliao (Party History Research Materials),[Unpublished], 1998, 5–10, Central Chinese Archives, Beijing.

50. Li Danhui, “1969 Nian Zhong-Su Bianjie Chongtu,” 6–7; Niu Jan, “1969Nian Zhong-Su Bianjie Chongtu Yu Zhongguo Waijiao Zhanlue DeTiaozheng” (The 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Clashes and the Adjustment ofChina’s Foreign Policy Strategy), [unpublished], 1998, Central ChineseArchives, Beijing; Xu Yan, “1969 Nian Zhang-Su Bianjie De Wu ZhangChongtu” (The 1969 Sino-Soviet Armed Border Conflict),2–6.

51. See William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, An International History,2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 396.

52. See Strategic Survey 1971 (London: The International Institute for StrategicStudies, 1972), 56.

53. Maxwell, “China’s Aggression in 1962,” 112. See also Robinson, “ChinaConfronts the Soviet Union,” 265–291.

8 The Sino-Vietnamese War

1. Colin Legum, “Africa’s Contending Revolutionaries,” Problems of Communism21 (March–April 1972): 8.

2. Communiqué of the 9th Session of the Central Committee of the VietnamWorkers’ Party, Hanoi, December 1967, cited in Adam Fjorde, “EconomicAspects of the Soviet-Vietnamese Relationship,” in Soviet Interests in the ThirdWorld, ed. Robert Cassen (London: Sage, 1985), 194.

3. See Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide toWorld Conflict since 1945 (New York: Vantage, 1990), 236; William H. MottIV, Soviet Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective (Westport CT:Greenwood, 2001), 242.

Notes272

4. Robert Legvold, “Soviet and Chinese Influence in Black Africa,” in Soviet andChinese Influence in the Third World, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New York:Praeger, 1975), 156, 162.

5. President Franklin D. Roosevelt accepted Nationalist China as a great power asone of the world’s Four Policemen. The United Nations had, on U.S. insistence,recognized Nationalist China as a permanent member of the U.N. SecurityCouncil and rejected great-power status for Beijing.

6. Victor Funnell, “The Soviet Union and Vietnam: Bilateral Relations in a Great-Power Triangle,” in Troubled Friendships: Moscow’s Third World Ventures, ed.Margot Light (London: British Academic Press, 1993), 87.

7. Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” in Chinese Foreign Policy inTransition, ed. Guoli Liu (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2004), 142.

8. Deng Xiaoping remarked, “Vietnam is pro-Soviet while the Soviets are our pri-mary enemy.” See Chao Chien, “An Analysis of the Deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” Fei Ching Yueh Pao, January 1, 1978: 47–52.

9. Funnell, “The Soviet Union and Vietnam,” 89. See also Nayan Chanda, “TheTimetable for a Takeover,” Far Eastern Economic Review 103(8) (February 23,1979): 33.

10. See Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped, 237.11. See Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (San Diego CA:

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).12. While the Chinese and many Southeast Asian Chinese speakers refer to ethnic

Chinese in Vietnam as Hua, Vietnamese speakers refer to them as Hoa.13. See Charles McGregor, “The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet

Union,” Adelphi Papers 232, Autumn, 1988 (London: Institute of InternationalStrategic Studies, 1988): 71.

14. See Thai Quang Trung, Collective Leadership and Factionalism: An Essay on HoChi Minh’s Legacy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).

15. Henry J. Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” inChinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, DavidM. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003),224. See also Chanda, Brother Enemy, 231–247.

16. See Renmin Ribao (Beijing), February 18, 1979; Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), February19, 1979; Peking Review (Beijing), February 23, 1979, 23; March 15, 1979,17–18.

17. See Chang Pao-min, The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute (New York:Praeger, 1986), 11–12.

18. Statement issued by the Chinese Government on February 17, 1979. SeeRenmin Ribao, February 18, 1979.

19. Chang Pao-min, The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute, 52.20. See Douglas Pike, “The USSR and Vietnam: Into the Swamp,” Asian Survey,

19(12) (December 1979): 1164.21. See Dong-A Ilbo, February 19, 1979.22. Jonathan R. Adelman and Shih Chih-yu, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of

Force 1840–1980, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, NationalChengshi University, 1993), 228.

Notes 273

23. See “Soviet Warships Heading for Cam Ranh Bay,” The Daily Telegraph,London, February 9, 1979, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, February 9,1979, K1; Chang Pao-min, The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute.

24. See Harlan W. Jencks, “China’s Punitive War on Vietnam: A MilitaryAssessment,” Asian Survey, 19(8) (August 1979): 807; Russell Spurr, “HoldingBack the Angry Giant,” Far Eastern Economic Review 103(10) (March 9, 1979):14–15; “Radio Hanoi, February 14, 1979,” Foreign Broadcast InformationService, February 15, 1979, K2.

25. See “Radio Hanoi, February 1, 6, 9, and 14, 1979,” Foreign BroadcastInformation Service, February 1, K1–K5; February 7, 1979, K1; February 9,1979, K9; February 15, 1979, K1; McGregor, “The Sino-VietnameseRelationship and the Soviet Union,” 32.

26. Radio Hanoi, “PRC Armed Intrusions Reported,” February 5, 1979, ForeignBroadcast Information Service, K1; “Beijing Authorities Are IncreasinglyProvoking and Threatening War,” February 13, 1979, K4.; Statement byVietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 14, 1979, K1.

27. Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” 228, 229.28. At peak strength, Chinese forces in Vietnam were probably eight divisions, over

100,000 soldiers. Estimates ranged from 80,000 (Guang Jiao Jing, Hong Kong,78 (March 16, 1979) ) to 125,000 (David Bonovia and Nayan Chanda, FarEastern Economic Review 103(10) (March 9, 1979): 12). About 300,000Chinese PLA, Vietnamese border troops, and militia participated in the war atvarious times and places. See Jencks, “China’s Punitive War on Vietnam: AMilitary Assessment,” Asian Survey, 19(8) (August 1979): 805–809.

29. See Vietnam News Agency Press Release, Hanoi, February 1, 1979.30. Ralph D. Sawyer, trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of War (Boulder, CO: Westview,

1994), 191.31. The New York Times, March 5, 1979, 13.32. See Jencks, “China’s Punitive War on Vietnam,” 813.33. See Sawyer, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, 187.34. Jencks, “China’s Punitive War on Vietnam,” 810.35. See Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub (Sun Tzu’s Art of War) (Seoul:

Hanwon Press, 1990), 178.36. Kyoto, February 23, 1979, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Services, No.

38: A13ff.37. Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” 230.38. See Jencks, “China’s Punitive War on Vietnam,” 802.39. See Russell Spurr, “The New Vietnam War: Changing the Course of History,”

Far Eastern Economic Review, 103(9) (March 2, 1979): 8–10; King C. Chen,China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications (StanfordCA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).

40. New York Times, February 23, 1979, 8.41. See The New York Times, March 9, 1979, 13; Jencks, “China’s Punitive War on

Vietnam,” 811.42. See Spurr, “The New Vietnam War,”10; Agence France Presse, Hong Kong,

February 23, 1979.

Notes274

43. Peking Review, March 9, 10, 1979, 12.44. The Wiles of War: 36 Military Strategies from Ancient China, trans. Sun Haichen

(Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1993), 51.45. The Military Balance 1978–1979 (London: International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 1978): 35–51.46. See Xinhua News Agency, March 14, 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information

Services, no. 52: 47.47. See Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” 231.48. Cao Bang and Lang Son provinces were home to many ethnic Chinese Nung

people who had fought against the Viet Minh. After the 1954 Viet Minh vic-tory at Dien Bien Phu, many Nung fled to South Vietnam to serve with U.S.Army Special Forces. After U.S. withdrawal and the fall of Saigon, the Nungreturned to their home provinces and China’s Guangxi province.

49. Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” 232–233.50. See Yang Zouzhou, Nanhai Fengyun (The International Conflicts in the South

China Sea) (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1993).51. Chen Jie, “China’s Spratley Policy: With Special Reference to the Philippines

and Malaysia,” Asian Survey 34(4) (October 1994): 893–903. See also RodneyTasker, “A Line in the Sand,” Far Eastern Economic Review 115 (April 6, 1995):14–16; Zhongfei Nansha Zhengyi You Zhuanji (An Optimistic Change for theSino-Philippines Dispute over the Nansha Islands), Yazhou Zhoukan, August27, 1995, 42–43.

9 Chinese Strategy: Shih-Strategy

1. See Roger T. Ames, The Art of Rulership: A Study of Ancient ChinesePolitical Thought (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994),ch. 3, Shih.

2. See Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy:Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2000).

3. Li Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking and the Defense Strategy of China(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,1997), 4.

4. Thomas Kane, “China’s Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese ForeignPolicy,” in Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition, ed. Guoli Liu (New York: Aldinede Gruyter, 2004), 103.

5. Samuel S. Kim, “China’s Path to Great Power Status in the Globalization Era,”in Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition, 364. See also Christopher Hughes,“Globalization and Nationalism: Squaring the Circle in Chinese InternationalRelations,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 26(1) ( January 1997):103–124.

6. Yuan Shibing, trans., Sun Tzu’s Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation(New York: Sterling, 1987), 105–106.

Notes 275

7. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol 2 (London: Lawrence andWishart, 1954), 201.

8. See Samuel Griffith II, Peking and People’s Wars: An Analysis of Statements byOfficial Spokesmen of the Chinese Communist Party on the Subject ofRevolutionary Strategy (London: Pall Mall, 1966), 68.

9. See Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966),186, 217.

10. See Robert Heuser, “Chinese Law and Foreign Trade: An Interview,” The ChinaQuarterly 73 (March 1978): 159–165.

11. One of the earliest formulations of Euro-American justice was that of RomanEmperor Justinian the Great (483–565; emperor 527–565): “Justice is the con-stant and perpetual will to render to each his due.” Justinian’s idea contains fourpowerful implications: importance of treatment of individuals, consistent treat-ment over time and among all people, equal treatment of equal behaviors, andtreatment proportionate to behaviors. Most Euro-American jurors simplyequate Justinian’s individual with the sovereign state in international law.

12. From 1949 through 1992, China’s propensity for militarized interstate disputesreflected the gap in relative power between China and the other great powers.As the gap closed from the 1970s, the frequency of Chinese use of forcedeclined. Although other factors were relevant, this correlation suggests thatChina chose “not to exploit its growing share of world power to pursue interestscoercively.” Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate DisputeBehavior 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data,” in Chinese Foreign Policy inTransition, 283.

13. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt,“Introduction: Patterns of PLA Warfighting,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLAExperience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A.McDevitt (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 7.

14. Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, “Introduction: Patterns of PLAWarfighting,” 12.

15. See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1994), 146, 153.

16. The first victim of the Mao’s Shih-strategy was British diplomacy in the UnitedNations. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British ambassador to the United Nations, saidthat they [European diplomats] did not want to let the “Asiatic octopus squeezeout all our common strength” and opposed the war against China. See JosephC. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: McGraw-HillTimes Book, 1982), 398.

17. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations,vol. 1. “Indian Parliament” part 2 (New Delhi: External Publicity Division,Government of India, 1961–1962), 200, 207.

18. On October 27, 1962, when Nehru declared the national emergency, B. N. Chakravarty, India’s chief delegate to the United Nations, asked U.N.members to accept Red China. He reasoned that only by being a member of theworld body could China be subjected to its “views and disciplines.” See John

Notes276

Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Co-existence (Princeton NJ:D. Van Nostrand, 1967), 169.

19. See James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., A Retrospective onChinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era (Santa Monica CA: The RANDCorporation, 2001), 129–130.

20. Kim, “China’s Path to Great Power Status in the Globalization Era,” 369–372.See also You Ji, “The PLA, the CCP, and the Formulation of Chinese Defenseand Foreign Policy,” in Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. byYounjin Zhang and Greg Austin (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001), 119–120.

21. See Wang Yizhou, ed., Quanqiuihua Shidai, de Guoji Anquan (InternationalSecurity in an Era of Globalization) (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1998);Wang Yizhou, Dangdai Guoji Zhengzhi Xilun (Analysis of ContemporaryInternational Politics) (Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe, 1995), 19–46; HuAngang, Yang Fan, and Zhu Ning, Daguo Zhanlue: Zhongguo de Liyi yu Shimin(China’s Grand Strategy: Missions and Interests) (Shengyang: Liaoning People’sPress, 2000); and Pang Zhongyin, ed., Quanqiuihua, Fanquanqiuhua, yuZhongguo: Lijie Quanqiuhua de Fuzaxing yu Duoyangxing (Globalization,Antiglobalization, and China: Understanding the Complexity and Diversity ofGlobalization) (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2002).

22. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data,” The China Quarterly 153 (March1998): 29.

Notes 277

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advance, 5, 46, 52, 53, 56, 62, 67,68, 71, 82–4, 89, 95, 97, 110, 114, 115, 118–21, 151, 197, 200, 202–4, 210, 212, 225

advantage, 3, 15, 19, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30, 33, 39, 43, 54–6, 63, 64,77, 82, 91, 94, 101, 108, 109,111, 120, 127, 128, 143, 149,151, 157, 167, 173, 182, 205,209, 211

aid, 10, 91, 104, 106, 107, 110,116–23, 125, 128, 134–7, 139,141, 154, 165, 181, 185–8, 190,191, 199, 225, 228

aircraft, 90, 92, 98, 104, 112, 127,139, 158, 164, 167, 172, 174,182, 199, 201

airpower, 10, 23, 39, 43, 87–92, 97,102, 107, 109, 119, 120, 122,126, 127, 149, 223, 229

all under heaven, 8, 9, 20, 29, 50, 78,167, 190

alliance, 37, 46, 47, 50–2, 58, 60,63–8, 87, 103, 104, 133, 137,149, 161, 198

ambush, 66, 81, 82, 101, 117, 124,127, 147, 122, 171–3, 176, 179,181, 203, 205, 226, 222

ammunition, 84, 113, 119, 122, 153,172, 176, 193, 210

annihilation, 3, 10, 28, 38, 40, 42–4,47, 48, 50, 55, 61, 63, 78, 80,

82–4, 86, 91–8, 100, 101, 109,110, 115–20, 122–7, 146–8, 151,154, 155, 158, 171, 173, 179,204, 205, 210, 211, 213, 222,223, 225, 228

armistice, 103, 106, 113, 114, 124–6armor, 91, 92, 97, 128, 174, 175,

209, 223army, 3, 4, 9–11, 15, 18, 22, 24–6, 29,

32–4, 37, 41, 47–50, 52–4,56–67, 73, 75–8, 80–91, 93–9,103–6, 108–15, 118, 123–5, 128, 131, 138–42, 144, 145, 147, 151, 153–6, 158, 169, 170,174, 176, 180, 185, 200, 201,203, 212, 216, 218, 223, 225,226, 229

border troops, 4, 131, 151, 201, 202irregular, 88, 90militias, 78, 80, 201–5, 208, 209peasant army, 4, 73, 91, 103, 108regular army, 78, 88, 90, 99, 174,

201guerrilla, 52–55, 78, 79, 81, 85, 86,

88, 90–3, 100, 101, 120, 179,185, 192, 203, 204, 212

arrogance, 50, 113, 118, 119, 122,124, 142, 145, 151, 154, 166,193, 197, 198, 220, 225, 226

artillery, 5, 92, 94, 95, 97, 105, 119,128, 140, 142, 144–7, 151, 155,156, 164, 174, 175, 200–3, 205,208–10, 213, 222–4

Index

assault, 46, 54, 94, 97, 109, 118, 152,174, 175, 199, 201, 202, 205,211–13

asymmetry, 78, 79, 133attack, 5, 13, 24, 26, 29, 30, 37, 38,

41, 42, 52, 55, 57, 63, 64, 67–9,72, 78–83, 92, 94, 96, 97, 101,104, 106, 112, 114–16, 118, 120,123, 124, 143–7, 150, 152, 165,167, 169, 171, 173, 174, 176,177, 179, 190, 194, 195,199–203, 206–8, 210, 212, 217,222, 227–9

attrition, 40, 45, 48, 80–2, 89, 101,122, 124, 125, 131, 181, 204,210, 227

autonomy, 2, 148, 181, 188, 189,216–19, 221

balance of power, 3, 137, 198, 219Bandung, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143,

149, 155, 157, 163, 165, 186,193, 196, 213, 216

Bandung initiative, 157, 163, 165,193, 213, 216

Bandung spirit, 140, 155, 186baojia, 16, 19–21, 48, 73, 74, 76, 90,

134barbarians, 13, 47, 49, 58, 162battle, 1, 3, 10–13, 15, 26, 28, 30,

32–4, 37–43, 46, 50, 52, 57, 61,66, 72, 81–3, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92,94, 95, 97, 101, 102, 109, 116,118, 119, 125, 128, 143, 151–3,156, 157, 164, 170–4, 179–82,199, 201, 204, 206, 212, 217,219–26, 230

battlefield, 4, 12, 13, 22, 27, 28, 30,32, 33, 36, 39, 41, 43, 49, 65, 70,72, 93–5, 101, 103, 107, 116,121, 122, 124–7, 129, 155–8,199, 201, 205, 210–13, 224–6

border, 4, 5, 13, 14, 106, 109, 112,113, 115, 129, 131–3, 135–49,

151, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159,161–3, 166–77, 179–83, 187,190, 191, 193–7, 199–205,207–10, 213, 216, 219, 224, 226,229, 231

campaigns, 1–4, 7, 9, 10, 13, 18 25,30, 33, 38–40, 42, 43, 50–4,59–66, 71, 72, 75–7, 80–7, 89,93–7, 99, 100, 102, 106, 108,110–12, 114–25, 127–9, 144,150, 152, 164, 165, 177, 186,197, 202, 203, 205, 206, 210,213, 221–3, 226, 228, 229

annihilation and attritioncampaigns, 80, 81

anti-Japanese campaign, 85, 86, 88deception campaigns, 42exhaustion campaigns, 40, 88, 227Huai River–Lunghai Railroad, 93–6,

206integration campaigns, 40Jiangxi, 43, 62, 76, 77, 80–9, 91,

92, 180, 206, 211, 221Korean campaigns, 106, 114–19,

121–5, 127–9, 131, 180, 209Liaoxi-Shenyang, 42, 93, 94 180,

206Long March, 62, 76, 77, 82, 84, 85,

90, 227manipulation campaigns, 41northern expedition, 75, 77, 81Peiping-Tianjin, 93, 96–8, 180, 206Red Cliffs campaign, 65–6Taiwan campaign, 98, 99, 108, 111,

112Yanan campaign, 86Yangzi campaign, 98

Cao Cao, 45, 58–71, 98Cao Pi, 68–70casualties, 3, 5, 13, 82, 103, 107, 108,

118, 122, 124–6, 167, 170, 173,202, 204, 205, 208, 212, 221–3,225, 227

Index296

cavalry, 19, 49, 62, 63, 72, 105, 115ceasefire, 106, 124, 125, 128, 146,

148, 150, 154, 155, 225Chiang Kai-shek, 46, 76–8, 81, 84, 85,

87, 132, 164, 192, 196, 218Chungking, 88, 89, 152general staff, 78, 128, 143, 147generalissimo, 75, 78nationalist, 74–8, 80, 85–90, 92,

94–8, 100, 108, 132, 136, 140,168, 185–7, 191, 210, 217

white army, 81–4, 86, 87Yang Hucheng, 86Zhang Xueliang, 86

Chinese civil war, 4, 5, 7, 73, 76, 91,98, 126, 132, 212, 219, 224, 232

Yanan, 76, 78, 84–6, 88, 92Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 74,

75, 83, 85, 86, 88–90, 99, 113,150, 167, 185, 219, 231

leaders, 3, 8, 9, 13, 23, 25, 66, 83,109, 111, 117, 127, 133, 150,154, 156, 161, 163, 165, 166,169, 171, 175, 177–9, 194,198, 207, 210, 219, 225, 231

nationalism, 7, 24, 75, 100, 105,111, 126, 127, 134, 135, 139,140, 157, 178, 217, 228

Politburo, 113, 122Chinese foreign policy, 2, 10, 48, 76–8,

107, 108, 112, 114, 129, 137,143, 144, 149, 150, 163, 166,168, 169, 171, 181, 189, 192–6,210, 213, 215–22, 231, 232

Cold War, 4, 93, 103, 104, 134–6,163, 165, 167, 168, 182, 187,232

détente, 188economic growth, 2, 129, 194, 231,

232engagement, 40, 55, 61–63, 66, 94,

101, 102, 131, 141, 143, 150,153, 154, 170, 171, 173, 174,179, 180, 208, 211, 220, 232

focus of, 7, 8, 13, 14, 21–5, 34,37–40, 44, 49, 53, 59, 84, 86,96, 118, 120, 127, 136, 157,163, 169, 180, 182, 190, 193,194, 196, 211, 216, 218, 229,230

great-power status, 105, 108, 111,126, 164, 166, 167, 177, 180,181, 187, 189, 193–5, 198,199, 217, 220, 231, 232

modernization, 107, 129, 165, 194,230, 231

trade, 2, 73, 74, 129, 138, 139, 155,158, 162, 166, 182, 218

Clausewitz, Carl von, 1–5, 9, 14, 28,80, 102, 116, 129, 131, 146, 148,156, 161, 177, 181, 182, 196–8,210, 211, 216, 217, 223, 231

Central Military Commission (CMC),107, 112, 145, 147, 150, 153,170, 171, 174

coercion, 3, 15, 38combat, 18, 19, 25, 28, 29, 32, 33,

37–41, 44, 55, 62, 63, 76–9, 87,90–3, 95–8, 100–2, 108, 109,112, 115–18, 120–3, 128, 147,152, 156, 158, 164, 175, 182,203, 205, 212, 221, 223, 225

Comintern, 74, 75command, 24, 28, 38, 50, 62, 75, 77,

82, 84, 87, 90, 93, 95, 96, 103,106, 107, 112, 114, 147, 150,152, 154, 167, 171–5, 179, 186,191, 210, 218, 221, 230

commander, 22, 26–8, 30, 39–41, 43,44, 49, 54, 56, 58, 59, 83, 86, 89,94, 95, 99, 106, 112, 118, 120,121, 125, 146, 152, 171, 173,174, 203, 221

communism, 104, 105, 134, 136, 139,157, 161, 162, 166, 186, 217,231

Communists, 75, 76, 84, 85, 87–89,94, 96, 100, 103, 163, 185

Index 297

Confucian, 2, 9, 10, 12, 16, 19,20–22, 31, 38, 39, 47, 48, 53, 54,59, 64, 65, 69, 74, 85, 107, 127,134, 185, 215, 218, 228, 231,232

Confucius, 9, 16, 17, 22, 30–2, 54confusion, 3, 5, 12, 23, 49, 117, 118,

190, 212

deception, 2, 12, 17, 23–25, 29, 30,33, 34, 38, 39, 41–4, 47, 50, 53,78, 80, 96, 101, 107, 110, 114,115, 117, 118, 124, 126, 128,135, 141, 149, 151, 152, 165,179, 200–2, 210–12, 222, 223,225–30

defeat, 3–5, 7, 13, 15, 17, 24, 25, 27,33, 37–41, 46–9, 55, 59, 66, 77,78, 82, 83, 86, 87, 90, 93, 100–2,10–9, 111, 116, 117, 119, 122,125, 129, 173, 181, 211, 217,224, 225

defense, 2, 4, 15, 25, 29, 41, 53, 64,80, 83, 87, 90, 92, 98, 101, 104,109, 110, 112, 113, 120, 124,128, 131, 139, 143, 144, 149,151–3, 170, 171, 173, 174, 177,179, 180, 183, 195, 198, 202,204, 205, 207, 208, 211, 216,217, 231

active, 80, 101offensive, 80positional, 80, 87, 124, 128, 174,

208Deng Xiaoping, 183, 190, 196denial, 2, 3, 9, 10deployment, 25, 169despair, 71, 98diplomacy, 2, 3, 25, 27, 42, 49, 68, 72,

109, 121, 137–9, 161, 167, 171,173, 177, 193, 196, 201, 211,216, 225, 229, 231

discipline, 23, 24, 74, 77, 78, 90, 96,107, 110

disposition, 28, 41domestic order, 1, 22

economy, 2, 7, 94, 109, 158elder brother, 185, 187–9, 193–5, 197,

231employment, 12, 25, 217, 230encirclement, 48, 77, 81, 86, 87, 92, 95,

96, 101, 118, 123, 124, 143, 153,154, 158, 166, 168, 189, 198

enemy, 3, 9–15, 22–4, 26–30, 35–44,47, 48, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 69–71,78–84, 87, 92, 94, 98–102,107–11, 113, 114, 116–20,122–5, 127–9, 133, 150, 151,153, 154, 156, 165, 166, 168,173, 176, 178, 181, 182, 190,191, 195, 201, 203, 204, 206,208, 209, 211–13, 215, 217, 218,222–30

enticement, 41, 79, 117, 181, 182,226, 231

estimate, 37, 63, 65, 66, 98, 109, 124,134, 149, 152, 201, 230

Euro-American perspectives, 1, 2, 6–8,10, 12, 19, 20, 30, 113, 133, 134,137, 154, 161, 192, 197, 206,211, 216, 218, 219, 221, 232

Euro-Americans, 1, 2, 4–6, 13, 23,134, 154, 157, 170, 181, 185,197, 198, 216, 223, 232

Euro-American analyses, 2, 5, 13,195, 210, 226, 231, 232

Euro-American doctrine, 13, 38, 77,103, 148, 195, 212, 217–19

fear, 2, 5, 18, 22, 28, 43, 84, 92, 98,111, 113, 149, 154, 155, 165,166, 189, 190, 194

firepower, 2, 77, 83, 87, 89, 91, 102,107–9, 119, 120, 122–4, 126–8,131, 209, 210, 222, 225, 229

first battle, 41–3, 87, 94, 101, 116,151, 153, 173, 201, 204, 230

Index298

flanks, 89, 97, 120, 147, 148flexibility, 29, 80, 102, 120, 122, 151,

154, 171, 179, 191, 210, 218,221, 226

force, 1–15, 17–19, 21, 25–8, 37–9,41, 45, 48, 52–5, 57, 58, 60, 61,63–8, 73, 76–8, 81, 82, 84, 86,87, 89, 92, 94, 97, 99, 102, 103,106–9, 112, 114, 118, 119, 121,125, 128, 129, 131, 137, 138,143, 145, 147–9, 151, 152,154–7, 163, 165, 170, 171, 173,174, 176, 177, 179, 182, 184,185, 187, 189, 191–203, 205,206, 209–13, 215–24, 226–8,230–2

China’s use of force, 2, 6–8, 12, 14,114, 151, 193, 197, 198, 206,209–11, 218, 220, 221, 227,231

use of force, 1–3, 5–9, 12–14, 25,68, 81, 82, 114, 129, 131, 237,151, 155, 163, 170, 171, 179,192–8, 206, 209–11, 215,218–22, 224, 226–32

formation, 48, 143, 173, 177, 202,203

formless, 29, 30, 33, 41, 42, 47, 48,81, 82, 88, 117, 118, 121–3,127–9, 152, 180, 212, 222, 229

France, 104, 154, 161, 191, 194, 196,205

French, 2, 73, 104, 167, 185, 189,191, 193, 194, 196

front, 9, 46, 74–7, 85–8, 90, 94, 95,101, 108, 110, 122–4, 127, 128,143, 152, 153, 171, 186, 191,202, 207, 212, 218, 225

Great Leap Forward, 156, 163Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,

129, 162, 166, 169, 171, 178,179, 181–3, 186, 188, 191, 194

Gulf of Tonkin, 195, 199, 202

harmony, 1, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16–18, 20, 22–4, 27, 28, 30–3, 38, 39, 47, 49, 55, 69, 75, 78, 88–90, 92, 157, 216, 219, 221,228, 232

Hong Kong, 111, 138, 154, 185, 201,205

Huai Nan Tzu, 17, 25–8, 93

ideology, 4, 5, 78, 99, 105, 163, 166,211, 219, 223

India, 5–7, 14, 46, 104, 131–42,144–6, 148–55, 157–9, 164, 166,171, 173, 177, 182, 192–4, 197,206, 209, 211, 212, 219, 220,222, 225, 226, 229

Indians, 133, 134, 137, 140, 142–5,150, 152, 155, 156, 158, 171,225, 226

New Delhi, 105, 106, 112, 131,134, 136–9, 142, 144, 145,147, 148, 150, 156–9, 176,209, 212, 226

Indochina, 6, 43, 104, 132, 137, 166,187–90, 194, 195, 198, 204, 207,220, 227

Indonesia, 137, 177, 213infantry, 19, 49, 62, 63, 65, 66, 80, 91,

95, 97, 105, 107, 109, 115, 119,122, 123, 140, 142, 146, 147,153, 155, 174, 175, 201–5, 208

initiative, 41, 43, 59, 67, 80, 81, 89,91, 95, 101, 102, 105, 122, 123,151, 157, 163, 165, 171, 173,180, 182, 187, 193, 194, 213,216, 217, 221, 222, 226

intelligence, 19, 42, 80, 84, 101, 106,109, 134, 200, 230

interdependence, 2, 23, 28, 217, 232intervention, 5, 93, 98, 103, 104, 106,

107, 109–14, 117, 126, 136, 150,155, 164, 166, 170, 186, 189,211, 220

Index 299

invasion, 47, 49, 60, 68, 70, 73, 76,77, 85, 90, 105, 106, 112, 131,137, 144, 145, 147, 165, 176,192, 197–9, 201, 207–9, 212,216, 223, 228

Japan, 75, 76, 83, 85–9, 100, 103,111, 121, 132, 133, 163, 167,189, 196

Tokyo, 75, 112, 199

Korea, 4, 5, 14, 103–26, 128, 129,132, 133, 136, 139, 150, 154,156, 163, 164, 167, 170, 171,179, 183, 185, 186, 189, 191,192, 196, 206, 209–13, 220–3,225, 227–9

38th parallel, 105, 109, 118–20,122, 124, 125

Koreans, 104Korean War, 4–7, 14, 43, 100,

103–29, 132, 133, 136, 139,150, 154, 156, 163, 164, 167,169–71, 179, 183, 185, 186,189, 191, 192, 196, 206, 207,209–13, 220–9

Chong Chon, 116, 117, 123Guam, 121Han River, 120, 122Kum River, 120, 121, 128MacArthur, Douglas A., General,

105, 106, 109, 112, 115, 118,121, 127, 129, 131, 176, 201

Peng Dehuai, Marshal, 54, 55, 107,110, 112–25, 128, 129, 158,170, 221, 225, 229

Pusan, 106, 107Seventh Fleet, 93, 104, 112

Kuomintang, 74, 93, 104, 132, 138,150, 164

Lao Tzu, 8, 17, 18Laos, 14, 137, 183, 190, 196, 202,

204, 205, 207, 209

law, 17, 19–21, 45, 73, 74, 136, 137,151, 218

legalists, 18–21, 48, 73, 77legitimacy, 2, 9, 19, 21, 28, 42, 51,

53–5, 57, 59, 74, 77, 108, 113,116, 121, 132, 133, 135, 137,140, 150, 151, 155, 157, 164,166, 178, 180, 182, 183, 187,189, 192, 216, 219, 221, 226,227, 231

Li, 2, 10, 11, 18, 21, 30–47, 49–57,59–65, 67–71, 73, 77, 81–3,85–94, 96, 100, 102, 110, 111,114, 118, 120–2, 129, 131, 133,136, 137, 140–3, 148–50, 154,155, 158, 164, 169–71, 178, 180,181, 183, 187, 191, 192, 195,196, 198, 205, 206, 210–12, 216,220, 221, 226–8, 231

grand Li, 31–4, 38, 88, 89great Li, 32, 68, 96, 111, 136, 148,

150, 187intermediate Li, 88, 164local Li, 34, 133, 136, 137, 148,

149, 155, 170, 171, 180, 181,183, 191, 192, 212, 226, 227

minor Li, 150, 154territorial Li, 63, 67, 192, 198

Li Si, 21, 49Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, 4, 5, 8, 12Lin Biao, 93–5, 97, 107, 112, 209, 217Lin Wu, 15Liu Bang, 45, 51–7, 61, 85Liu Bei, 45, 60–72logistics, 11, 19, 23, 48, 62, 65, 67, 71,

72, 78, 83, 90, 92, 94, 102,106–8, 112, 116, 120, 122,126–8, 139, 143, 144, 151–3,156, 158, 164, 169, 176, 203,205, 210, 211, 220, 222, 229

supply, 9, 52, 55, 63, 80, 81, 91–4,101, 106, 108, 119, 127, 143,152, 153, 164, 186, 192, 205,211

Index300

London, 2, 19, 25, 104, 109, 136, 138,140, 142, 148, 155, 161, 171,172, 182, 186, 188, 193, 199,207, 217

Lord Guan, 59, 60, 68

Mao Tse-tung, 5, 43, 46, 48, 78–82,84, 87, 92, 94, 96, 98–100, 108,110–13, 124, 125, 127, 132, 150,215, 217, 218

eight rules, 90, 91Maoism, 133, 165, 166objective conditions, 107, 108people’s war, 7, 78, 80–2, 91–3, 99,

100, 102, 122, 125, 126, 165,167, 179, 191, 192, 204,206–9, 211, 215, 217, 221,228

protracted war, 7, 78–81, 91, 92, 99,100, 128, 192, 208, 230

Manchuria, 42, 46, 83, 93, 108, 109,112, 113, 168

maneuver, 42, 86, 89, 97, 101, 123,127, 143, 147, 151, 153, 170,203, 222

manipulate, 15, 25, 40, 41, 118, 119,228

masses, 99, 108, 217, 232Mencius, 8, 22, 31Middle East, 104, 136, 163, 164military assistance, 89, 90, 135, 136,

139, 186, 189, 191, 207military forces, 4, 12, 25, 32, 36, 37,

41, 55, 58, 61, 64, 75, 77, 125,129, 179, 231

missile, 6, 155, 156, 164, 165, 167,172, 211, 225

mobility, 67, 79, 80, 83, 87, 95, 97,107, 126, 139, 151–3

mobilize, 11, 20, 37, 58, 65, 75, 127, 210Mongolia, 168–70, 172, 176, 177,

183, 196, 231morale, 10–12, 25, 26, 30, 40, 43, 62,

65, 83, 87, 92, 94, 96, 98, 101,

107, 116, 117, 119, 120, 151,156, 225

mountains, 26, 41, 56, 57, 81, 83, 84,91, 92, 96, 116, 118–120, 122,123, 153, 155, 190, 192, 202,203

movement, 9, 12, 16, 30, 37, 73–5,81, 90, 104, 110, 113, 118, 123,127, 155, 157, 165, 186, 187,191, 209, 222, 228, 229

national interest, 20, 31–3, 37, 38,111, 135, 149, 150, 166, 232

navy, 19, 62, 63, 66, 93, 112, 155,213, 223

night, 17, 23, 27, 102, 115, 127, 128,131, 152, 205, 222

North Korea (People’s DemocraticRepublic of Korea, DPRK), 105,106, 108, 109, 191, 225

North Korean People’s Army(NKPA), 105–7, 115, 120, 127

North Koreans, 106, 115, 129Pyongyang, 109, 117, 118, 121,

122, 129nuclear, 2, 109, 114, 121, 129, 164,

165, 167, 168, 170–2, 175–183,222, 226, 228, 230

Guam, 121, 182

offense, 29, 80, 151–3, 222officers, 52, 65, 77, 78, 95, 128, 156,

221official, 65, 104, 110, 178, 200, 217opportunity, 11, 25–7, 30, 39, 42, 43,

50, 53, 59, 63, 67, 69, 80, 83, 87,93, 98, 114, 115, 120, 121, 125,126, 140, 141, 145, 151, 152,155, 156, 162, 169, 170, 177,197, 225

Pakistan, 132, 133, 135–7, 139, 157,158, 164, 182, 183

panchasheel, 137, 193

Index 301

patron (-age), 104, 106, 149, 151, 154,175, 180, 186–90, 192, 194, 198,207, 208

patterns, 5–7, 11, 17, 22, 29, 31, 33,48, 58, 81, 82, 87, 89, 94, 101,143, 144, 155, 171, 179–81, 195,202, 203, 206, 207, 210, 211,218, 221, 223, 226, 231

peace, 6, 8, 17, 24, 46, 48, 49, 58, 67,103, 125, 127, 134, 135, 137,138, 158, 162, 164, 167, 176,188, 198, 208, 213

peaceful coexistence, 137, 139, 142,163, 165, 176, 186, 211

people, common, 3, 4, 6, 8–13, 15–25,27, 28, 31–4, 36, 38, 39, 47–59,61, 62, 65–7, 69–71, 74–9, 81,83–5, 88–90, 92, 93, 99, 100, 107–11, 113, 117, 126, 127, 132–4, 139, 142, 154, 157,163, 168, 170, 174, 182, 187, 191, 192, 195, 196, 201,207–9, 212, 215–19, 224, 228,230, 232

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 78,91, 94, 97–101, 107, 110, 112,113, 115, 128, 138–40, 144, 145,148, 150, 153–7, 170, 191, 195,201, 202, 204, 213, 218, 221,223, 226, 231

Philippines, 133, 194, 213, 214plans, 13, 37, 41, 42, 115, 120, 125,

150, 164, 174, 177, 194, 221politics, 1, 2, 7, 9, 23, 25, 48, 49, 64,

76, 93, 122, 125, 126, 134, 135,138–40, 147, 161, 162, 165, 167,171, 173, 175–7, 179, 180, 183,187, 189, 190, 223, 224, 231

power, 1–4, 6, 7, 9–13, 15, 16, 18–24,26–9, 31–3, 36–8, 40, 41, 43, 44,46, 47, 49–51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59,61, 68–71, 74–9, 82, 84–8, 90,96, 98–100, 102–5, 107–9, 111,114, 116, 121, 122, 126, 127,

129, 132, 134, 135, 137, 150,151, 161–4, 166, 167, 170, 171,175, 177–83, 187–90, 192–5,198, 199, 204, 205, 211, 213–17,219, 220, 224–8, 230–2

dynamic, 11, 18, 26, 28, 36, 37military, 6, 32, 50, 51, 56, 57, 61,

74, 75, 220people’s, 7, 24, 32, 36, 71, 75, 77,

78, 84, 86, 90, 100, 102, 127,167, 215, 230–2

revolutionary, 75, 78static, 18, 26, 27, 36, 37, 78

People’s Republic of China (PRC), 4,131, 167, 185, 200

Beijing (Peking), 4, 5, 13, 14, 19,41, 74, 76, 78, 49, 93–96, 98,99, 104–12, 114–16, 118, 119,121, 122, 124, 126, 127, 129,131–4, 136–45, 147–50, 152,154–9, 161, 163–72, 175–84,186–201, 204–15, 217,219–21, 225, 226, 229, 231,232

preparation, 80, 101, 105, 131, 144,145, 164, 170, 179, 200, 205,218, 220, 221, 226

principles, 4, 7, 8, 13, 14, 19, 20, 24, 25, 31, 38, 45, 48, 70, 71, 75, 78–80, 86, 94, 99–102, 115, 120, 122, 132, 137, 141,145, 150, 152, 156, 166, 170,191, 216, 218, 219, 222, 224, 232

Clausewitzian principles, 80Euro-American principles of

war, 4, 8, 24, 38, 79, 94, 98,152

Mao’s ten principles for the PLA,101, 102, 222

Marxist principles, 166Sun Tzu’s fourteen principles, 78,

79, 101prosperity, 47, 53, 134, 217, 221

Index302

Qin, 47, 50, 215Qin Shi Huangdi, 21, 49, 58Qing, 73, 74, 162, 168

realpolitik, 2, 6, 14, 56, 131, 144, 148,181, 195, 196, 198, 217, 220

rear, 49, 54–6, 63, 65, 67, 90, 117,120, 123, 128, 148, 152, 154,175, 193, 203, 208, 216

red army, 76, 80–7, 90, 91, 99, 109,169, 170, 176, 180, 185, 223,226

Red Cliffs, 60, 65–71rested, 9, 18, 71, 102, 129, 223retreat, 28, 55, 66, 71, 79, 80, 92, 96,

97, 115, 116, 118, 145, 154, 159,162, 171, 174, 207, 213

revolution, 9, 57, 58, 74, 75, 77, 78,83, 85, 87, 90, 99, 102, 104, 107,110, 113, 127, 129, 161, 162,166, 168, 169, 171, 173, 178,179, 181–3, 185, 186, 188, 191,193, 194, 217, 228, 232

Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin, 78,128, 154, 202

ruler, 8, 9, 11–13, 16–18, 20–5, 27, 28,30–4, 38, 39, 45, 47–9, 51, 53, 54,56, 59, 64, 68–70, 75, 78, 88–90,92, 99, 154, 157, 216, 219, 221

Russia, 75, 84–7, 161, 162, 168, 231Russian far east, 162, 166, 168Russians, 161, 162, 166, 168

security, 2, 5–7, 9, 17, 59, 63–5, 67,74, 104–6, 110, 116, 118, 121,127, 166, 176, 182, 187, 194,196, 199, 211, 216, 217, 219,231

seize, 4, 32, 41, 47, 54, 59, 68, 94, 96,102, 111, 123, 142, 173, 202,206, 212

Shandong Peninsula, 52, 54, 55, 95Shanghai, 75, 76, 93, 98, 112, 183,

231

Shanxi, 76, 86, 88, 93, 96Shih, 2, 7, 10–16, 18–62, 64–90,

92–102, 105, 107–14, 116–29,131–8, 140, 143, 144, 147–58,163, 166–71, 177–99, 201–32

battlefield Shih, 28, 49, 65, 70, 93,157, 199, 224, 226

desperation Shih, 28, 49, 97, 126,127, 167, 203, 204, 207–11,227, 228

endogenous Shih, 16, 19, 21, 24–28,41, 43, 51, 53, 56–8, 60–2,64–7, 69–71, 99, 107

exogenous Shih, 16, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 39, 62, 66,70, 80

grand Shih, 36, 129, 136, 225, 226great, 33, 51, 54, 71, 90, 111, 112,

114, 132, 133, 137, 149, 163,171, 193, 194, 212, 231

morale Shih, 26, 30, 40, 43, 92, 94,96, 98, 117, 119, 120, 156,225

opportunity Shih, 26, 27, 30, 39,93, 152, 155, 156, 225

people’s Shih, 79solidarity as Shih, 22, 23, 27, 74, 90,

99, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111,114, 117, 126, 127, 129, 132–5,137, 145, 146, 151, 154, 155,157, 158, 163–7, 171, 178, 180,189, 192, 194, 201, 216–19,221, 223, 228, 231, 232

terrain Shih, 26, 27, 28, 30, 93, 119,120, 151, 156, 158, 202, 209

Singapore, 194, 213Sino-Indian War

Aksai Chin, 131, 136, 138–42, 144,148, 150–2, 155, 179, 180,192, 193, 220

anti-nibbling campaign, 142, 144,150–2

Arunachal Pradesh, 132, 138, 144,159

Index 303

Sino-Indian War—continuedBhutan, 132, 142, 147Burma, 89, 108, 132, 135, 147,

164, 183Che Dong, 144forward policy, 139–44, 148–50,

152–4, 156, 181, 190, 192,195

Line of Actual Contact (LAC), 139,141, 142, 144, 148, 158

Ladakh, 131, 138, 139, 142, 153,159

McMahon Line, 138, 139, 141,142, 144–8, 151, 153, 158

Nagaland, 157Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA),

131, 132, 138, 140, 142, 145,148, 151, 157

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 104, 106, 133–8,140–5, 147–51, 154, 156, 158,159, 181, 187, 190, 195, 225

Nepal, 132, 135, 138, 140, 183neutrality, 54, 134, 135, 150, 155,

226nonalignment, 134, 135, 149, 187,

195Thag La, 142, 144, 158, 212Tibet Military Region, 152Xinjiang Military Region, 138, 176Xinjiang–Tibet road, 138, 152

Sino-Soviet War, 5, 7, 161, 171, 172,180–2, 187, 201, 211, 220, 226,228

Amur River, 172, 175, 176Brezhnev doctrine, 165, 166, 169,

171, 190Shenyang Military Region, 170,

171, 174Siberia, 132, 168, 169, 172, 176,

177strategic blunders, 193, 209, 210Ussuri River, 150, 168, 169, 171,

174, 175, 179, 193Zhilixin, 170, 172, 174

Sino-Vietnamese War, 5, 179, 189,195, 199–201, 203, 206, 207,212, 226, 228

Cam Ranh Bay, 189, 199Cambodia, 137, 187, 189–92,

196–8, 200, 201, 204, 205,207–9, 213, 227

Ho Chi Minh, 178, 185, 186, 189,190, 194, 201, 204, 205,207–10, 227

Hua people, 161, 191, 195, 212Kampuchea, 190–2Khmer Rouge, 191, 192, 212, 213Lang Son campaign, 5, 195, 198, 200,

202–6, 208–10, 212, 220, 221Paracel Islands, 192People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN),

185Phnom Penh, 190, 191, 197Pol Pot, 190–2, 213Red River delta, 200, 201, 205, 206,

208, 209, 213Red River valley, 204Spratly Islands, 192Viet Minh, 104, 185, 186, 191, 193,

212Vietnamese Communist Party, 185

soldiers, 4, 5, 11, 19, 27, 28, 40, 42,48, 53, 54, 62, 65–8, 77, 83,90–100, 105–8, 114–17, 126,128, 141, 142, 145, 147, 153,155, 171–4, 177, 201–4, 210,222, 223

South China Sea, 187, 192, 199, 213South Korea (Republic of Korea,

ROK), 4, 105, 106, 133, 189, 213Seoul, 8, 15, 22, 24, 50, 51, 57, 61,

63, 83, 90, 108, 109, 116,119–23, 129, 151, 196, 204

South Koreans, 116Southeast Asia, 104, 132, 136, 137, 163,

188, 194, 197–9, 209, 213, 227Soviet Union, 4, 5, 14, 46, 103, 113,

114, 121, 132, 134, 137, 141,

Index304

150, 154, 155, 157, 161, 162,164–7, 169, 172, 173, 175–7,180, 182, 183, 186, 188, 190,191, 193, 198–200, 219, 225–8

Kremlin, 77, 165, 176, 188Moscow, 93, 104, 106, 108, 109,

111–13, 121, 135–7, 139, 141,142, 148–51, 155, 157, 158,161–7, 169, 170, 172, 174–8,180–3, 186–91, 194, 195, 198,199, 207, 218, 220, 226–8

Soviet far east, 162, 166, 167, 169,171–3, 175–7, 182

Soviets, 104, 162, 166, 167,169–71, 173–6, 178, 181, 190,226

Spring and Autumn period, 45, 46,101

state, role of, 2, 8, 9, 11, 15, 18–24,31, 54, 56, 63, 64, 66, 70, 78, 85,95, 98, 99, 104–6, 109–13, 121,132, 134, 136, 138, 144, 155,159, 163, 196, 215, 218

strategic approachcircuitous, 12, 54direct, 3, 4, 12, 32, 36, 37, 44, 90,

97, 116, 154, 227indirect, 4, 17, 23, 33, 36, 37, 44,

85, 116, 124, 126, 127, 169,227, 230

the orthodox, 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 25, 29,30, 37, 42, 44, 52, 53, 56, 94,103, 118, 121, 123, 156, 170,179, 203, 204, 206, 210, 219,220, 230

the unorthodox, 4, 24, 25, 29, 30,37, 39, 42, 44, 52, 53, 57, 94,98, 118, 120, 151–3, 156, 180,203, 204, 223, 230; Euro-American orthodoxy, 3,5, 94, 181, 206

strategic culture, 1, 2, 6–10, 12–14,19, 25, 31, 32, 39, 42, 45, 51, 70,73, 77, 78, 99, 100, 102, 110,

127, 133, 135, 150, 156, 181,195, 210, 215, 217–19, 221–3,230–2

strategic response, 5, 170, 197strategic triangle, 166, 180, 181, 187,

199strategists, 1, 4–6, 10–15, 18, 22, 23,

25, 29, 31–4, 37–43, 45, 51, 56,57, 70, 71, 77, 108, 128, 142,144, 156, 161, 167, 171, 176,177, 181, 183, 197, 198, 207,215, 216, 224, 228, 230

ancient, 13, 156, 224Chinese, 13, 14, 70, 167, 224Clausewitzian, 5, 161, 197Euro–American, 4, 25, 31, 42, 144,

161, 167, 177, 183, 216strategy, 1–7, 10–13, 15, 18, 19, 23–5,

30–57, 60–5, 68–72, 77–84,86–9, 91–4, 96, 97, 99–102, 104,107, 109, 111, 113, 114, 116–29,131, 133, 135, 137, 138, 140,143, 144, 146, 147, 149–52, 154,155, 157, 158, 166–8, 170, 171,176–9, 181, 183, 186–9, 191,193–5, 197–9, 204, 206, 207,209–13, 215–19, 221–32

Euro-American strategy, 7, 13, 23,25, 102, 132, 196, 218

forces-based strategy, 38, 44, 81,120, 121, 204

intent-based strategy, 4, 39, 44, 129,222, 232

Li-strategy, 32–40, 42–7, 49, 50, 52,53–6, 60–5, 68, 69, 71, 77,81–3, 86, 87, 89–93, 96, 102,121, 129, 131, 149

Shih-strategy, 10–14, 18, 23–5, 31,33–54, 57, 61, 64, 65, 68,70–2, 77, 78, 81–4, 86–8, 92,94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 109,110, 113, 116–22, 124–9,131–7, 138, 140, 143, 144,147, 149–52, 154, 155, 157,

Index 305

strategy—continued158, 166–8, 170, 171, 177–9,181, 183, 184, 186–9, 191,193, 194–9, 204, 206–13, 215,217–19, 221, 223–32

Te-strategy, 71strength, 4, 9–13, 15, 18, 20, 26, 28,

29, 39–41, 43, 50, 52, 57–9, 61,66, 68, 79, 80, 83–5, 90, 92, 94,96, 100, 102, 107, 110, 116–18,120, 122, 125, 128, 147, 169,176, 181, 182, 185, 201, 225,226, 231

Sun Quan, 58–72, 98Sun Tzu, 2, 8–11, 13, 15, 18, 23, 24,

27, 29, 42, 66, 78–80, 82, 96, 99,101, 107–9, 122, 126, 135, 151,153, 156, 158, 169, 201, 204,207, 210, 217, 222, 224

earth, 17, 23, 27, 107fourteen principles, 78, 79, 101general, 8, 12, 15, 18, 22–7, 29,

32–4, 38–40, 50, 54, 55, 58,59, 63, 64, 68, 71, 74, 77, 78,89, 91, 96, 97, 105–9, 112,118, 128, 131, 143, 145, 147,149, 154, 167, 176, 180–2,201, 226

heaven, 8, 9, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27,29, 50, 51, 56, 59, 78, 107,167, 190

Marxian objective conditions, 107,108

Sun Tzu’s orthodox, 2, 3, 5, 7, 13,25, 29, 30, 37, 42, 44, 52, 53,56, 94, 103, 118, 121, 123,156, 170, 179, 203, 204, 206,210, 219, 220, 230

organization and discipline, 23Sun Yatsen, 74, 75, 132superiority, 5, 19, 29, 32, 33, 37–9, 41,

43, 44, 56, 58, 63, 66–8, 80–4,94, 97, 98, 101, 102, 107, 108,110, 112, 113, 117, 119, 123–6,

128, 145, 153, 156, 158, 170,173, 174, 179, 180, 195, 201,205, 207, 208, 210–12, 222, 226

surprise, 5, 24, 42–4, 69, 78, 94, 96,107, 114–16, 120, 124, 151, 171,173, 179, 181, 200–2, 204,210–12, 222, 225, 226, 228, 230

tactics, 29, 40–2, 61, 66, 80, 81, 83,84, 87, 99, 102, 108, 119, 122–4,127, 128, 144, 152, 176, 179,203, 204, 207, 222

Tai Kung, 11, 24, 57Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC), 98,

99, 103–5, 108, 111–14, 133,136, 137, 140, 141, 150, 154,155, 163–5, 179, 183, 189, 192,213, 220, 223

Taipei, 2, 47, 48, 81, 111, 112, 151,182, 183, 198, 213

Taiwan Straits, 98, 99, 103–5, 108,111–14, 133, 136, 137, 140, 141,150, 154, 155, 163–5, 179, 183,189, 192, 213, 220, 223

tanks, 95, 105, 151, 177, 201, 203,204, 224

Tao, 8–14, 16–25, 27–34, 36–9, 43,48, 51, 53–5, 57–9, 61, 62, 64–6,68–71, 73, 75, 78–80, 83, 85, 88,90, 93, 96–100, 105, 107,109–11, 114, 116, 117, 121,125–7, 129, 132–5, 137, 138,140, 149–51, 154–8, 163, 166,167, 169, 171, 180, 182, 183,187–90, 192–8, 205, 206, 211,214–32

Taoist, 8–10, 16, 17, 20, 22, 47, 232Te, 8, 16, 18, 59, 68–71terrain, 5, 16, 23, 25–28, 30, 39, 44,

53, 61, 62, 65, 66, 80, 82, 83, 89,93, 96, 98, 113, 119, 120, 128,139, 143, 149, 151, 153, 156,158, 200, 202, 203, 205, 206,208–10, 212, 216, 220, 222

Index306

critical, 5, 26, 27, 39, 66, 83, 89,93, 98, 119, 139, 143, 156,200, 202, 203, 212

Thailand, 133, 177, 188, 189, 194the few can defeat the many, 27, 78, 87Tibet, 7, 111, 112, 114, 132, 133,

137–41, 143, 146, 147, 149, 150,152, 153, 158, 163, 164, 170,193, 196, 210, 211, 220

Lhasa, 132, 140Tibet Military Region, 152

training, 21, 62, 66, 74, 78, 81, 104,113, 115, 132, 156, 177, 208,220, 229

troops, 4, 5, 11, 12, 15, 18, 26–8, 39,40, 43, 44, 49, 52–56, 58, 60, 62,63, 65, 71, 78, 80–3, 87–9,91–100, 104–6, 108–10, 112,113, 115, 116, 118–25, 127–9,131, 132, 141–7, 151–3, 156,158, 161, 168–75, 178, 189, 191,193, 200–9, 211–13, 221, 223–6

the unexpected, 4, 5, 24, 102, 118,153, 179, 220, 225

United Nations (U.N.), 4, 5, 103–7,109, 112, 114, 115, 117–25, 127,131, 182, 187, 189, 191, 213,214, 225, 226, 228, 231

Security Council, 105, 106, 118,182, 187, 231

United Nations Command (UNC),103, 106, 191

United States (U.S.), 2, 4, 6, 25, 73,78, 88–91, 93, 98, 100, 103–16,118–29, 133–7, 139, 140,149–51, 154–7, 163–5, 167, 170,175–7, 180–3, 186–91, 194, 198,208, 209, 211, 212, 216, 220,223, 225–9

Acheson, Dean, 105, 109, 118–20,122, 124, 125

Americans, 2, 4, 8, 12–14, 22, 25,75, 76, 78, 88, 91, 103–6,

108–18, 121, 124, 125, 127,129, 132–4, 136, 137, 139–42,150, 154, 155, 157, 162, 163,165, 167, 175, 181–3, 185–9,191, 193, 194, 196, 216,224–8, 232

containment, 104, 114, 133, 139,155, 157, 163

Cuba, 155, 156, 165, 196, 225Guam, 121, 182U.S. Army, 25, 103, 105, 113, 114,

154, 156, 212, 216, 225Washington, 7, 25, 48, 78, 89,

103, 104, 106, 109, 111, 112, 114, 116, 121, 135, 136, 140, 148–51, 154, 155,157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 165,176, 180–3, 187–90, 194, 198, 199, 201, 207, 218, 219,225, 226

unity, 22–4, 27, 47, 62, 85, 88–90, 99,108, 133, 163, 216, 223, 228

victory, 1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 22,25–8, 30, 33, 35, 37–40, 42, 43,46, 49–51, 53, 55, 56, 59, 67, 69,79, 81, 82, 88, 89, 92, 94, 96, 98,101, 102, 110, 113, 116–22, 126,129, 131, 148, 152, 153, 156, 163,168, 171, 175, 183, 189, 197, 200,205, 210, 212, 221, 224, 231

Vietnam, 5–7, 14, 46, 113, 132, 157,164, 170, 176, 182, 185–201,203–13, 219–23, 226, 227, 229,231

Hanoi, 176, 178, 185–92, 195–209,212, 213, 227

Vietnamese, 3, 5, 157, 179, 185–7,189–213, 220, 226, 228, 229

virtue, 8, 30, 50

war, 1–9, 11–15, 17–19, 22–5, 27, 28,30, 31, 33, 36–41, 43, 46, 48,50–8, 60, 61, 63–73, 75–82,

Index 307

war—continued84–6, 88–96, 98–111, 113–29,131, 132, 134–6, 138–58, 161–5,167–73, 175, 177–82, 185–9,191–213, 215–32

forces-based war, 4, 122, 227wars of annihilation, 3, 78, 91

warlords, 58, 67, 70, 73–5, 85, 88Warring States period, 9, 31, 45–48,

54, 58, 215water, 18, 29, 41, 210weak, 5, 25, 29, 30, 33, 39, 41, 42, 61,

63, 65, 78–80, 87, 92, 101, 108,109, 111, 125, 129, 137, 149,156, 171, 210, 226, 228, 230

weakness, 6, 13, 26, 39, 47, 56, 66, 78,92, 94, 118, 120–2, 125, 143,149–51, 171, 174, 178, 217

weapons, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10–12, 15–19,27, 32, 40, 43, 65–7, 72, 77,89–91, 97, 100, 102, 107–10,121, 143, 152, 153, 155, 165,167, 170–2, 175–80, 186, 188,193, 203, 208, 224–6, 230

Whampoa, 75, 77will to fight, 12, 82, 83, 92, 94, 96winning without fighting, 12, 15, 25,

38, 81, 94, 125, 126, 183, 191,204

withdrawal, 5, 10, 15, 62, 69, 82, 84,87, 96, 116, 117, 120, 121, 122,125, 142, 143, 148, 150, 154,

158, 162, 165, 168, 173, 180,185, 187–9, 194, 197, 198, 200,205, 206, 208, 209, 211–13, 219,225

World War II, 23, 76, 77, 91, 100,105, 111, 154, 215

Wu Tzu, 11, 12, 25, 78, 143

Xian, city in northwest China, 76, 86,88

Xian, Emperor (r. 189–220), 59, 66,69

Xiang Yu, 45, 50–8, 87, 110, 111

Yakub Beg Rebellion, 168Yalu, 106, 113, 115, 129Yan Xishan, 76, 88, 93yang, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 29, 31,

47, 86, 107, 109, 111, 112, 118,119, 123, 167, 171, 181, 213,229, 231

Yellow River, 49, 52, 55, 58, 59, 86, 89

Yi Di, 50, 53yin, 17, 26, 27, 29, 31, 54, 93, 138,

142–4, 146–8, 151, 153, 154,156

Yuan Shao, 58, 59, 63Yuan Shikai, 74, 138

Zhang Fei, 59, 67–9Zhang Liang, 51, 57

Index308