GMD and Spare Equipment Database:GMD and Spare Equipment Database:Perspectives and StatusPerspectives and Status

Eric Rollison

Engineer of Reliability Assessments

About NERC: MissionAbout NERC: Mission

Develop and enforce reliability standards

Assess current and future reliability

Analyze system events and recommend improved practices

Encourage active participation by all stakeholders

Pursue mandatory standards in all areas of the interconnection

To ensure the reliability of the North American bulk power system

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NERC Reliability Assessments

Peak Demand Forecasts

Resource Adequacy

Transmission Adequacy

Key Issues & Emerging Trends Impacting Reliability

Regional Self-Assessment

Ad-hoc Special Assessments 3

High-Impact, Low-Frequency (HILF) RisksHigh-Impact, Low-Frequency (HILF) Risks

“Black Swan” events

• Occur very infrequently, or, in some cases, have never occurred

• Little real-world operational experience with addressing these risks

• Generally have the potential to impact many assets at once

• Catastrophic impacts on the bulk power system and society-at-large

HILF ReportHILF Report

Created a common understanding of three HILF risks

• Coordinated Cyber/Physical Attacks

• EMP/GMD

• Pandemics

Lays the groundwork for the development of an action plan

• 19 Proposals for Action suggested by workshop participants

Critical Infrastructure StrategicCritical Infrastructure StrategicCoordinated Action PlanCoordinated Action Plan

NERC Technical Committee Leadership

Planning

Operating

Critical Infrastructure

Protection

Resources and

Expertise

Electricity entities

Vendors

Suppliers

Government partners

Scope ApprovedDec 2010

Scope ApprovedSep 2010

GMD BackgroundGMD Background

Geomagnetic Disturbances is on the NERC President’s Top Priority issues for Bulk Power System Reliability – MRC, January 2011

Geomagnetic storms emanating from the sun can produce an impulsive disturbance to earth’s geomagnetic field over wide geographic regions.

• This field disturbance causes induced ground currents (geomagnetically induced currents or GIC)

These GIC can saturate and severely damage bulk power system equipment that may be difficult to replace, such as high voltage transformers.

GMD 7

SWPC G2 Alerts and Warning dissemination

Midwest ISO, St. Paul

NYISO

WECC Reliability Coordinator, Vancouver

WECC Loveland, CO

SWPC product distribution

GMD Task Force Scope - Deliverables

PC/OC/CIPC March 2011 9

Purpose of GMD TF: … will investigate bulk power system reliability implications and develop solutions to help mitigate this risk.

Deliverables: … consider changes to current planning and operating criteria; evaluate and prioritize mitigation and restoration options; improve sector-wide spare equipment sharing programs; develop industry guidance, and provide input into NERC’s reliability Standards process.

Chair and Vice Chair have been appointed:

• Chair: Donald Watkins – Bonneville Power Administration

• Vice Chair: Frank Koza – PJM Interconnection

Task Group Membership spans Electric Industry, US and Canadian Government Agencies, and Transformer and Relay Manufacturers

• Manufacturers: ABB, Siemens, GE Prolec, Efacec, Schweitzer Relays

• Governmental: US (DOE, DHS, State, and NOAA) and Canada (NR Can, DPS)

GMDTF Status GMDTF Status

GMD 10

GMDTF Deliverables GMDTF Deliverables

2011 Deliverables

1st Quarter

Whitepaper outlining the current industry experience and capability and identifies opportunities, options and alternatives to enhanced how the industry manages GMD risks.

2nd QuarterWhitepaper on current warning limitations, the ability of operators to take mitigating action, and areas for improvement.

3rd QuarterWhitepaper on restoration abilities and areas for improvement.

4th Quarter(Dependencies)

1. Whitepaper that reviews industry prevention approaches to GMD events.

2. Complete a final report incorporating the findings of the whitepapers and simulations with suggested recommendations and follow-on actions.

GMD 11

Critical Priorities

Transformer Vulnerability

• ID vulnerability, prioritize, establish characteristics (GIC vs Time)

• This is the primary reason for concern with GMD

• What is your “Live to fight the next day.” plan in an extreme storm?

“Reference Event” – given a locational 1:100y:

How should we establish performance requirements? :

• Each system should be able to withstand the reference storm, or

• Should each do what is prudent in their own estimation

• Should it be a reference worse credible case with each entity deciding how to protect their system? (This is where we are headed)

NERC AdvisoryNERC Advisory

NERC released an advisory to industry that covered immediate operational planning, operating and long-term planning recommendations to address GMD.

The Advisory was developed in partnership with NERC management, NERC’s technical committees (OC/PC/CIPC), North American Transmission Forum, and U.S. government (FERC)

Released to industry on May 10, 2011.GMD 13

SEDTF Members

PC/OC/CIPC March 2011 14

Chair and Vice Chair have been appointed:

• Chair: Dale Burmester – American Transmission Company

• Vice Chair: Mark Westendorf – Midwest ISO

Task Group Membership (43) includes experts from across the North American Electric Industry, US Government Agencies, and Transformer Manufacturers

Content and Function Subgroups initiated to focus on SED efforts and scope milestones/activities.

Question & Answer

Background Slides

Reliability Risk Management ConceptsReliability Risk Management Concepts

Monitoring Progress – The Big PictureMonitoring Progress – The Big Picture

Advisory Actions to ConsiderAdvisory Actions to Consider

Increase attention to Situation Awareness and coordinate all actions with Reliability Coordinator.

Discontinue maintenance work and restore out-of-service transmission lines, wherever possible.

Increase real and reactive reserves to preserve system integrity during a strong GMD event Real-Time Operations

Consider bringing equipment online to provide additional reactive power reserves.

Decrease loading on susceptible transformers through transmission reconfiguration and generation redispatch

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Defined Scope for Each Task ForceDefined Scope for Each Task Force

Inter-Task Force CoordinationInter-Task Force Coordination

1859 Storm 1921 Storm

• Large geomagnetic storms can occur with smaller cycles• The largest geomagnetic storms on record occurred during smaller than average cycles

Sunspot HistorySunspot History

• Solar minimum in December 2008• Solar Cycle 24 now well underway • Cycle 24 maximum forecast - May 2013

Status of Current Solar CycleStatus of Current Solar Cycle

Impacts on Electric Power Grid Impacts on Electric Power Grid

• CME impacts Earth’s magnetic field

• Fluctuations generate electric fields on Earth. These geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) can flow into power lines and transformers

•Leads to transformer saturation and over-heating, voltage drops, harmonic generation, transformer damage, grid collapse

(Credit: K. Turnbull / J. Wild / ESA)

Information Notice No. 90-42: FAILURE OF ELECTRICAL POWER EQUIPMENT

DUE TO SOLAR MAGNETIC DISTURBANCES

Specific events occurred at the Three Mile Island, Unit 1, Hope Creek Unit 1, and Salem Unit 1 nuclear power plants. …inspection of the generator step-up transformer… severe overheating, melted low -voltage service connections in phases A and C, and insulation discoloration in phase B. On September 19, at Salem Unit 2 nuclear power plant, a second solar storm damaged the generator step-up transformer. Sep 1990

Power systems in areas of igneous rock (gray) are the most vulnerable to the effects of intense geomagnetic activity because the high resistance of the igneous rock encourages geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) to flow in the power transmission lines situated above the rock. Shown in cross-hatching are the auroral zone and the extremes that the aurora can reach during severe disturbances such as March 13, 1989. Credit: American Geophysical Union

Areas vulnerable to GMD ImpactsAreas vulnerable to GMD Impacts

Impacts in the SERC RegionImpacts in the SERC RegionStorm Centered 50° Latitude Storm Centered 50° Latitude

GMD 27

From FERC – ORNL Meta-R-319 report – Page 3-26 http://www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Meta-R-319.pdf

Greater than a 10x 1989 Storm (>5000 nT/Minute) will introduce significant GIC into the Southeastern US and may have BPS impacts

Impacts in the SERC RegionImpacts in the SERC RegionStorm Centered 45° Latitude Storm Centered 45° Latitude

GMD 28

From FERC – ORNL Meta-R-319 report – Page 3-26 http://www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Meta-R-319.pdf

NOAA East Coast GIC Measurement Station is located at Fredericksburg, VA

Q4 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

ScopeApproved

Resources In-PlaceWork Underway

Q4

Status – Coordinated Action PlanStatus – Coordinated Action PlanNERC Priority InitiativesNERC Priority Initiatives

Spare EquipmentDatabase

•Define objectives

•Streamlined processes

•Performance requirements

Cyber Attack•Attack tree analysis

•GridEx Summit

•Cyber security monitoring

•Operator cyber certification

GeomagneticDisturbance

• Warning limitations, mitigation

•Restoration abilities

•Prevention approaches•GMD workshop

•DHS bi-directional info sharing

Severe ImpactResilience

•NLE New Madrid •DOD case study

•NERC cyber exercise

• Milestone deliverables

•NERC crisis/communications planOther

Initiatives •Policy-level severeimpact scenario

SEDTF Scope - Deliverables

PC/OC/CIPC March 2011 30

Purpose of SEDTF: …provide recommendations for enhancing resilience to High Impact Low Frequency events through improved access to critical spares, and potentially other long-lead time electric transmission system equipment.

Deliverables: …recommend a uniform approach to collecting, storing, and distributing information on CONFIDENTIAL long-lead time spare equipment.

SEDTF Deliverables

2011 Deliverables

1st Quarter

Whitepaper (draft) defining SED objectives and assessing options/alternatives for a centralized database; including specification of what that database might contain, criteria for participation and identification of communication features that might be incorporated. Complete Whitepaper in Q4.

2nd Quarter

Expand Whitepaper to discuss SED confidentiality, definitions for long-lead time and spare definitions, state/provincial and federal support possibilities, and appropriate ‘streamlined’ processes to access SED equipment information and communication same among entities responding to HILF events.

3rd QuarterExpand Whitepaper to define a process for evaluating the performance and readiness to implement the SED program.

4th Quarter

1. Complete final whitepaper/report incorporating the findings of the whitepapers.

2. SED will provide recommendations, but not build or implement technology solutions. 31