Mind Association

"About" MistakenAuthor(s): Nelson GoodmanSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 74, No. 294 (Apr., 1965), p. 248Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252050 .Accessed: 17/09/2011 12:53

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" ABOUT " MISTAKEN

PROFESSOR REScHER contends 1 that my definition 2 of " absolutely about " yields the anomalous result that the sentence " Pa " is absolutely about all individuals. His argument is entirely specious.

He begins by proposing that we adopt the postulate that there are at least two individuals in the world. Then, he says, " Pa " is by my definition absolutely about any other individual in the world, since for any such individual, say b, the statement " (3 x)(x# b . Px) follows logically from " Pa ".

Now the assumption that there are at least two individuals is not very risky or restrictive. But " follows logically from " is so used in my definition of " about " that one sentence follows logically from another only if the inference holds in every non-null universe of discourse. The fact or the assumption that the world contains two or millions of individuals does not affect this usage; and inferences depending on any assumption of more than two individuals cannot be counted as logical in determining what a sentence is absolutely about under my definition.

In the second place, Professor Rescher has concealed a premiss in the words " for any other individual ". Either he must adopt some such general assumption as that no two individuals have the same name-a drastic assumption that is false for English-or he must admit "ajAb" as an explicit premiss. From "Pa . a#b" the statement " (3x)(x # b . Px) " does follow logically; but this, far from showing that " Pa " will be absolutely about every individual, yields only the unobjectionable result that " Pa " is about b relative to the statement " a i b " ,or that " Pa . a = b " is absolutely about b.

University of Pennsylvania NELSON GOODMAN

1 In " A Note on 'About ' ", MIND, vol. 72 (1963) pp. 268-270. 2 In " About ", MND, vol. 70 (1961) pp. 1-24.

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Article Contentsp. 248

Issue Table of ContentsMind, New Series, Vol. 74, No. 294 (Apr., 1965), pp. 155-308Privileged Access [pp. 155 - 173]Practical Reason [pp. 174 - 191]Professor Tillich's Confusions [pp. 192 - 214]Remarks on Logical Necessity and Future Contingencies [pp. 215 - 228]DiscussionsPsychoanalytic Explanation [pp. 229 - 235]On Anything Whatever [pp. 236 - 239]Nidditch's Definition of Verifiability [pp. 240 - 247]"About" Mistaken [p. 248]Wittgenstein's Theory of Universals [pp. 249 - 251]J. L. Austin's Philosophical Writings [p. 252]A Reply to Mr. Ejvegrd [pp. 253 - 254]The Unexpected Examination [p. 255]White at the Shooting Gallery [p. 256]Everything Has Just Doubled in Size [p. 257]Mayo on the Open Future [p. 258]

Critical Noticesuntitled [pp. 259 - 280]untitled [pp. 280 - 298]

New Books [pp. 299 - 308]